- CAC Home
-
About CAC
-
CAC Senior Leaders
Commanding GeneralCombined Arms CenterLTG Milford H. Beagle Jr.Deputy to the
Commanding GeneralCombined Arms CenterMr. Gregg Thompson
Command Sergeant MajorCombined Arms CenterCSM Stephen Helton
Chief of StaffCombined Arms CenterCOL Trent D. UptonCommand Chief Warrant OfficerCombined Arms CenterCW5 Aaron H. Anderson
Deputy
Commanding GeneralCAC ARNGBG Charles MorrisonDeputy
Commanding GeneralCAC USARBG Katherine A. TrombleyDeputy Commanding General - EducationArmy UniversityBG David FoleyDeputy Commanding GeneralCAC - TrainingBG Scott WoodwardDirectorMission Command Center
of ExcellenceCOL Bryan Babich
-
CAC Senior Leaders
-
Organizations
-
CAC HQ
-
CAC Subordinate Organizations
- The Army University (Army U)
- Combined Arms Center - Training (CAC-T)
-
Mission Command Center of Excellence (MCCoE)
- Leadership
- Mission Command Resources
- SharePoint
- Army Joint Support Team (AJST)
- Air Land Sea Space Application Center (ALSSA)
- Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)
- Center for Army Leadership (CAL)
- Directorate of Training (DOT)
-
Force Modernization Proponent Center (FMPC)
- Command and Control Integration (C2I)
- Security Force Assistance Proponent (SFAP)
- Contact Us
- Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
-
Key Partner and Supporting Units
- » Fort Leavenworth Garrison
- » Presidio of Monterey Garrison
- » 902d Military Intelligence Group
- » Munson Army Health Center (MAHC)
- » Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA)
- » U.S. Disciplinary Barracks
- » Community Health Promotion Council (CHPC)
- » Red Team Education
- Contact Us
- Training & Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
- Mission Command Capability Development and Integration Directorate
- 15th MP Brigade
- Centers of Excellence
- Branch Schools
-
Non-Branch Schools
-
Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
- Leaders
- Mission & Vision
- Students
-
Command and General Staff School (CGSS)
- Inbound Class Information
- Department of Distance Education (DDE)
- Department of Command and Leadership (DCL)
- Department of Sustainment and Force Management (DSFM) (Previously DLRO)
- Satellite Campus Program
- Air Force Element (AFELM)
- Navy Element (NAVELM)
- Marine Corps Element (MCELM)
- International Military Student Division (IMSD)
- Contact Us
- School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS)
- School for Command Preparation (SCP)
- Sergeants Major Academy (SGM-A)
- CGSC Degree Programs
- Registrar
- CGSC News Archive
- Contact CGSC
-
Warrant Officer Career College (WOCC)
- About USAWOCC
- Warrant Officer Program
- Warrant Officer Blackboard Enrollment
- Warrant Officer Courses
- Benefits, Pay, and financial Matters
- Fort Rucker Information
- News/Media
- Retirement/Transition Links
- Warrant Officer Career College Contact Information
- Center for the Army Profession and Leadership (CAPL)
- Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC)
- SHARP Academy
- U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA)
- The U.S. Army Inspector General School (TIGS)
-
Command and General Staff College (CGSC)
-
CAC HQ
- References
- Products & Resources
British Forces Lose the Initiative on the Charlestown Peninsula
After the battles of Lexington and Concord, the colonial militia pursued the retreating British back to Boston, occupied the heights and trapped them in the city. Although the British could still sustain and reinforce their position by sea, the Massachusetts militia occupied high ground around the city and were waiting for artillery to arrive to place on these heights.
This key terrain included Breeds and Bunker Hills, located on the Charlestown Peninsula, across the Charles River and north of Boston. The colonials fortified these positions and constructed a redoubt on Breeds Hill. To clear and secure the heights, the British crossed the Charles River and landed on the peninsula on June 17, 1775. William Howe’s force formed ranks and assaulted the colonial stronghold. The Massachusetts militia repelled the first two assaults, inflicting heavy casualties on the British attackers. The third British assault, however, successfully carried the redoubt on Breeds Hill and the militiamen fled the field.
Although the British achieved their objective, they did so at a high cost in human lives. The attacking force suffered over 1,000 casualties, including a score of officers who were killed. The British commander failed to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage.” British commanders knew the colonials were fortifying the position the previous night and Sir Henry Clinton urged an attack at dawn. Moreover, British ships spotted the fortification around 0400 hours and fired on the redoubt with little effect.
Rather than crossing the river immediately, the British commanders took their time. After a long delay, the crossing itself took over six hours. Howe’s force did not finish landing until nearly 1400 hours. The assault did not begin for over an hour. The militia, however, took advantage of the British delay to strengthen their line and reinforced their position. By delaying and refusing to seize the initiative early in the day, the British lost their opportunity to gain a position of relative advantage and easily envelop and overrun a weak, exposed, and lightly defended position.
This key terrain included Breeds and Bunker Hills, located on the Charlestown Peninsula, across the Charles River and north of Boston. The colonials fortified these positions and constructed a redoubt on Breeds Hill. To clear and secure the heights, the British crossed the Charles River and landed on the peninsula on June 17, 1775. William Howe’s force formed ranks and assaulted the colonial stronghold. The Massachusetts militia repelled the first two assaults, inflicting heavy casualties on the British attackers. The third British assault, however, successfully carried the redoubt on Breeds Hill and the militiamen fled the field.
Although the British achieved their objective, they did so at a high cost in human lives. The attacking force suffered over 1,000 casualties, including a score of officers who were killed. The British commander failed to “seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage.” British commanders knew the colonials were fortifying the position the previous night and Sir Henry Clinton urged an attack at dawn. Moreover, British ships spotted the fortification around 0400 hours and fired on the redoubt with little effect.
Rather than crossing the river immediately, the British commanders took their time. After a long delay, the crossing itself took over six hours. Howe’s force did not finish landing until nearly 1400 hours. The assault did not begin for over an hour. The militia, however, took advantage of the British delay to strengthen their line and reinforced their position. By delaying and refusing to seize the initiative early in the day, the British lost their opportunity to gain a position of relative advantage and easily envelop and overrun a weak, exposed, and lightly defended position.
Display Week:
Monday, June 12, 2017 to Sunday, June 18, 2017