NATO IN THE DECADE OF THE 80S
as delivered by LTG Gorman 28 Jan 81

- The new administration has pledged renewed commitment to the security of Western Europe and to the alliance which provides for that security. It has recognized—as has every previous administration—that the security of the United States cannot be separated from the defense of Western Europe and that US global interests must be anchored upon a secure and confident North Atlantic community.

- The approaches of the new administration to the tasks of meeting the challenges ahead are still being worked out, but thus far the new administration evidences considerable optimism—an optimism not universally shared if one can believe everything printed in the US press or on US television. In view of these contending judgments, I thought it might be worthwhile to trace through with you this afternoon several of the more important reasons for the administration's optimism.

II. STRATEGY AND LEADERSHIP.

- The administration is beginning to encounter assertions in various forums. That NATO's strategy requires revision; that nothing less will permit NATO to meet future commitments and challenges. Those who so assert have adopted a most gloomy view of the precarious East-West military balance and have succumbed to quiet despair with the alliance's uneven efforts to rectify deficiencies in its defense posture.

- Such arguments have been rejected by the new administration because they portray a serious lack of understanding—or insensitivity to—the fundamental purposes to which our strategy is directed. Moreover, the administration holds the detractors seriously underestimate the resources of the allied nations and...
THE RESILIENCE AND COMMON SENSE OF OUR CITIZENS.

- THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAS REAFFIRMED ITS ADHERENCE TO COALITION STRATEGY AND SO TO ITS COMMITMENT TO FORWARD DEFENSE AND FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. IN FACT, NATO'S STRATEGY IS AS EXACTLY AS WELL SUITED TO TODAY'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES AS TO THOSE URGENCIES WHICH SPAWNED IT ALMOST TWO DECADES AGO. I NEED NOT LECTURE THIS AUDIENCE ON A PROPOSITION SO FUNDAMENTAL AND ONE SO FIRMLY ROOTED IN THE BASIC SECURITY PERSPECTIVES OF THE ALLIANCE. SUFFICE TO SAY THAT THE PROBLEM IS NOT WITH NATO'S STRATEGY, BUT WITH THE COLLECTIVE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT FORCE POSTURE FOR ITS EXECUTION.

- TO ARGUE SO CARRIES EXPLICIT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT COLLECTIVELY WE HAVE ADEQUATE RESOURCE POTENTIAL TO SUPPORT ITS STRATEGY. I AM CERTAIN YOU WILL AGREE THAT BY ANY MEASURE OF POTENTIAL--INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY, TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES, HUMAN RESOURCES, OR MORAL PURPOSE--THE WEST OUTSTRIPS ITS ADVERSARIES BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE NATIONS OF NATO FACE NO ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, OR THAT A DECISION TO INCREASE DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS IS AN EASY TASK FOR ANY NATION. BUT THE PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY IS SELDOM A MATTER OF UNAVAILABLE RESOURCES OR CAPACITY. RATHER IT MORE OFTEN IS INABILITY TO SUMMON THE WILL AND RESOLVE TO IMPLEMENT ALLIANCE STRATEGY AND THUS PROVIDE A REASONABLE MARGIN OF SECURITY.

- AS YOU KNOW THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF PUBLICITY ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC REGARDING THE COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE OF NATIONS IN PROVIDING THE REQUISITE RESOURCES FOR ALLIANCE DEFENSE NEEDS. YOU ALL HAVE HEARD CRITICAL COMMENTS ABOUT SO-CALLED "UNINFORMED CITIZENS", "RECALCITRANT PARLIAMENTS", POOR LEADERSHIP", ETC.

- INDEED, IN THE RECENT PAST A STEADY LITANY OF BURDENSHRARING ARGUMENTS HAS SO CAPTIVATED ALLIANCE DELIBERATIONS THAT ONE MIGHT REASONABLY QUESTION WHETHER
THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTION OF THE ALLIANCE IS TO COOPERATE OR TO RECRIMINATE. MOREOVER, THIS CONTINUING DEBATE HAS ASSUMED THROUGH STRIDENCY AND REPETITION A LIFE OF ITS OWN, FORCING MORE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES INTO THE OUTER RECESES OF NATO'S CONSULTATIONS.

WITH THESE CONCERNS IN MIND, SEVERAL INCOMING US OFFICIALS HAVE QUESTIONED ONE OR ANOTHER OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE APPROACH TO BURDENSHARING WHICH SO PREOCCUPIED THE ALLIANCE FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. SUCH CONCERNS, FOR EXAMPLE, PROVIDE PARTIAL RATIONALE FOR RESERVATIONS EXPRESSED BY SOME REGARDING THE 3 PERCENT COMMITMENT THAT HAS FIGURED PROMINENTLY IN ALLIANCE AFFAIRS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS.

SOME EXPLANATION OF THOSE RESERVATIONS MIGHT PROVE USEFUL IN ANTICIPATION OF THE AGENDA THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION WILL WANT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU IN THE DAYS AHEAD. FIRST, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN CLEAR ON WHAT THOSE RESERVATIONS DO NOT PRESAGE:

-- THEY DO NOT REPRESENT SATISFACTION WITH OR ENDORSEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE, OR FOR THAT MATTER THE DEFENSE POSTURE OF ANY OF OUR NATIONS. THEY CANNOT IGNORE THE VERY REAL EROSION IN THE EAST-WEST MILITARY BALANCE THAT HAS RESULTED FROM THE RELENTLESS GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER DURING THE PAST TWO DECADES; IN SHORT THE STATUS QUO IS AN UNTENABLE STRATEGIC POSTURE, AND STRATEGICALLY ADVERSE TRENDS MUST BE REVERSED.

-- THESE RESERVATIONS, DO NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM A BELIEF THAT ALL ALLIANCE NATIONS MUST DO MORE TO ASSURE OUR FUTURE SECURITY OR THAT SOME ALLIANCE NATIONS MUST DO SIGNIFICANTLY MORE THAN OTHERS. INDEED, PART OF THE PROBLEM WITH A 3 PERCENT FISCAL GOAL IS THAT IT MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO THE CRITICAL TASKS AHEAD; AND

-- THESE RESERVATIONS DO NOT REPRESENT A RETREAT FROM A BELIEF THAT THE
BURDENS OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP MUST BE DISTRIBUTED AS WIDELY AND AS EQUITABLY AS THE BENEFITS.

- INSTEAD, THESE RESERVATIONS REFLECT A GROWING CONCERN THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN ITS EYES OFF THE OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING FOR A STEADY, SUSTAINED GROWTH OF NATO’S DEFENSES, WHILE FOCUSING TOO OFTEN ON AN EXAMINATION OF EACH MEMBER’S RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTION.

- THE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS PROBABLY ALSO REFLECT DOUBTS ABOUT SOME OTHER APPROACHES TO WHICH ALLIANCE CHALLENGES, HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETELY PRODUCTIVE EITHER.

-- THUS, THE ADMINISTRATION APPRECIATES THAT AD HOC PROGRAMMING, WITHOUT THE ALLOCATION OF NECESSARY RESOURCES, CAN DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE BASIC PROCESS BY WHICH THE ALLIANCE ARRIVES AT ITS FORCE COMMITMENTS. IT IS POSSIBLE EVEN WHILE APPLAUDING THE BASIC THRUST OF SUCH PROPOSALS TO WONDER WHETHER THE ALLIANCE HASN'T SOMETIMES PURCHASED INCREASED SHORT-TERM EFFECTIVENESS AT TOO GREAT A PRICE.

-- THE ADMINISTRATION HAS ACCEPTED THAT ONLY THOSE ENTERPRISES DERIVED THROUGH FULL COMMITMENT OF PARTICIPATING ALLIANCE MEMBERS PROVIDE THE MOST ASSURED CAPACITY TO ENSURE ADHERENCE BY THE MEMBER NATIONS TO OUR COLLECTIVE DECISIONS.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, THERE WAS VERY GOOD REASON INDEED FOR INTRODUCING SOME AD HOC MEASURES. THERE WAS A NEED TO DEMONSTRATE OUR RESOLVE TO MOSCOW. AND THERE WAS A NEED TO STIMULATE MORE FORCE EFFECTIVENESS, TAKING SHORT TERM STEPS TO IMPROVE FORCE CAPABILITIES IN SPECIFIC AREAS, OR FOR SPECIFIC TASKS.

- IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATION ACCEPTS THAT THE PRIMARY GOAL MUST BE AN ALLIANCE PROVIDING FOR A STEADY, COHERENT AND SUSTAINED GROWTH OF ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES.
- TO THAT END, THERE ARE SEVERAL OPPORTUNITIES OPEN AND ONE OF THESE MIGHT BE TO RETURN TO A CLOSER AND MORE SUSTAINED ACCEPTANCE OF NATO'S FORCE GOALS AS THE PRINCIPAL AND PROPER FOCUS OF DEFENSE PLANNING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

- IN THAT REGARD, HERE ARE FOUR PROPOSITIONS WHICH MIGHT FORM A TENTATIVE BASIS FOR CONSENSUS:

1. NATO'S FORCE GOALS, TOGETHER WITH THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, REPRESENT A REASONABLE CHALLENGE TO WHICH OUR NATIONS DEDICATE THEMSELVES;

2. NATO'S FORCE GOALS REPRESENT A REALISTIC, EFFECTIVE FORCE PLANNING STATEMENT WHICH, IF ATTAINED, WOULD CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A MILITARY POSTURE EQUAL TO THE THREAT;

3. THE LTDP PUTS THE SPOTLIGHT ON KEY FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND PROVIDES ACTION PROPOSALS TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES OVER THE LONG TERM; AND

4. NATO'S FORCE GOALS REPRESENT IN THEIR FULFILLMENT THE CLEAREST DEMONSTRATION TO OUR ADVERSARIES OF NATO'S RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION TO PROTECT ITS VITAL INTERESTS.

- THESE ARE NOT GROUNDBREAKING PROPOSITIONS. FORCE GOALS ARE NOT THE ONLY AREA REQUIRING CONSENSUS. YET THEY REPRESENT THE ONE FAMILIAR APPROACH THE ALLIANCE MIGHT PROFITABLY PURSUE IN ATTEMPTING TO FIND A REALISTIC AND ACHIEVABLE MEANS OF ORDERING THE ALLIANCE'S TASK OF STRENGTHENING ITS DEFENSES. AS IMPLIED EARLIER, IT MAY SOMETIMES BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER SHORT-TERM MEASURES OR ACCELERATION OF ON-GOING MEASURES TO PROVIDE FOR SPECIAL NEEDS OR PARTICULAR SITUATIONS. BUT THESE SHOULD BE THE EXCEPTIONS TO A RATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS.

- THE VIEW IN WASHINGTON IS THAT A 3 PERCENT REAL GROWTH IN DEFENSE SPENDING REPRESENTS A GENERAL STARTING POSITION FOR FUNDING REQUIRED DEFENSE EFFORTS. ONLY OUTLAYS OF THAT MAGNITUDE WILL PROVIDE FOR OUR COMMON DEFENSE, AND CREATE A DEFENSE POSTURE THAT WILL RESTRAIN OR DETER POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES.
In sum, what is suggested here is that the advocates of change based on gloom want strategic departures that are just not warranted. American optimism reflects a belief NATO can overcome current difficulties using its familiar and tried planning mechanisms, to pursue its chosen strategy.

III. NATO AND THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT BEYOND WESTERN EUROPE.

Unfortunately, the chorus of the gloomy is not confined to proposals to alter NATO's strategy for the common defense of Europe and the North Atlantic. Doubts are also expressed regarding the ability of NATO's limited geopolitical span to provide a realistic security framework for protecting Western interests in the 1980s.

Such questions raise two fundamental issues:

-- First, whether NATO's traditional strategic focus is sufficient to cope with threats to the alliance which might originate on the periphery of NATO or beyond, but which nevertheless threaten the alliance's vital interests.

-- Second, whether NATO oftentimes pursues the normalization of East-West relations in Europe while ignoring Soviet or Soviet surrogate activities elsewhere.

Here too, the new administration regards future prospects on both issues with some degree of optimism. It does so precisely because it believes the issues have been incorrectly articulated.

The Atlantic Alliance was created with definite purposes in mind in response to a regionally focused threat--a Soviet Union whose power was arrayed principally, but not exclusively, against Western Europe. The purposes to which we set our collective endeavors have been successful to date, perhaps more successful than many of the alliance's detractors recognize.

To suggest that NATO does not completely provide for the global security needs
OF THE WEST IGNORES THE CONTINUED—IN FACT, THE HEIGHTENED—SOVIET THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE AND THE VERY REAL CONTRIBUTION THE ALLIANCE CONTINUES TO PROVIDE FOR GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH DETERRENCE IN EUROPE. OR TO SUGGEST THAT NATO SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY RESPOND TO SOVIET THREATS BEYOND THE CONFINES OF THE ALLIANCE IGNORES THE DETERRENT VALUE OF DECISIONS DERIVED IN CONCERT AND IMPLEMENTED IN UNITY.

WHAT THEN IS THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN POLICY FOR THE GROWING THREAT TO AREAS ON NATO'S PERIPHERY? HERE ARE THREE FUNDAMENTAL US PERCEPTIONS:

FIRST, SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN SOUTHWEST ASIA DO SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE MUTUAL VITAL INTERESTS OF THE NATIONS OF NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, AND NORTHEAST ASIA. WHATEVER ONE ASSUMES ABOUT THE SOVIET RATIONALE FOR INVADING THE PERSIAN GULF AND UNDERMINING REGIMES IN THE REGION. MOVEOVER, AT LEAST AS IMPORTANT AS THE SOVIET FORCES PROJECTED INTO AFGHANISTAN OR THE THREATENING MODERNIZATION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE TRANSCAUCASUS AND TURKESTAN OR EVEN THEIR PROVEN ABILITY TO PROJECT FORCES OVER GREAT DISTANCES BY AIR OR SEA ARE THE UNSTABLE POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN IRAN, THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ AND OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF ENDOMIC INSTABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALL THESE FACTORS HEIGHTEN THE PROSPECTS FOR NEW SOVIET INTRUSIONS IN THE AREA, AND OTHERWISE IMPERIL THOSE VITAL INTERESTS.

SECOND, THE FUTURE COURSE OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR WILL DEPEND LARGELY ON HOW THE WEST, AND PARTICULARLY THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, RESPONDS TO DETER THIS NEW CHALLENGE TO ITS VITAL INTERESTS.

THIRD, THE ADMINISTRATION RECOGNIZES THAT THE US MUST LEAD IN MEETING SOVIET CHALLENGES TO WESTERN INTERESTS BEYOND NATO. IT ALSO BELIEVES THAT PRUDENT ACTION IS URGENTLY REQUIRED NOW.

THE POINT HERE IS THAT THE ALLIANCE MUST NOT—INDEED CANNOT—FORFEIT WHATEVER DEGREE OF CONSENSUS DELIBERATIONS ON THESE ISSUES MAY YIELD IN ATTEMPTS TO
ACHIEVE FURTHER REACHING AGREEMENTS TOO AMBITIOUS AND TOO ABRASIVE, HENCE ABORTIVE. US LEADERS ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO REACH ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS AS TO COLLECTIVE RESPONSES. REST ASSURED, THEY ARE NOT PROCEEDING WITH SOME RIGID, OR FORMALISTIC FORMULA OR WITH FIXED NUMBERS IN MIND.

NOW SOME OF YOU HERE MAY HAVE OBSERVED RESENTFULLY THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SOMETIMES ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE THE PACE AND SCOPE OF ALLIANCE DELIBERATIONS—AT LEAST MORE OFTEN THAN YOU WOULD HAVE LIKED. NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD ALL AGREE, PROBABLY THAT THE ALLIANCE CANNOT AFFORD TO DEFER DECISIONS ON VITAL ISSUES. TO A GREAT EXTENT THE CURRENT STRATEGIC DILEMMA HAS BEEN CREATED BY COLLECTIVE UNWILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THESE VITAL ISSUES. DEFERRAL IN THE PAST HAS BOTH CREATED DOUBTS AS TO ALLIANCE RESOLVE AND PROVIDED FERTILE GROUND FOR DISAGREEMENT IN THE FACE OF REAL TESTS THEREOF.

AS THE ALLIANCE COLLECTIVELY CONSIDERS THE FUTURE, IT MUST CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING QUESTION:

-- WILL THE ALLIANCE AND WORLD PEACE BEST BE SERVED BY A STRATEGY THAT EXTENDS DETERRENCE TO THE PERSIAN GULF AREA SOLELY BY THREATENING DIRECT US-USSR MILITARY CONFRONTATION? DISTANCE ALONE WOULD TEND TO DETRACT FROM THE CREDIBILITY OF SUCH A STRATEGY. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THOUGH SUCH A STRATEGY COULD FURNISH A STRONG DETERRENT, IT PROVIDES POORLY FOR INTERVENING LEVELS OF ESCALATION CONTROL. AND IT DOES LITTLE TO ADDRESS THE THREATS MORE LIKELY TO ARISE TO NATO'S INTERESTS DUE TO THE CHRONIC INSTABILITY OF THE REGION.

TOGETHER THE ALLIANCE NATIONS MUST SEEK ANSWERS. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY MUST SEEK ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVES SHOULD DELIBERATIONS DIVERGE—ALTERNATIVES WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF WHAT WE KNOW IS THEIR AGREED PRIMARY INTEREST—COLLECTIVE DEFENSE.

MORE FUNDAMENTAL YET IS THE ISSUE OF HOW NATO SHOULD PROCEED WITHIN EUROPE
TOWARD THE UNDERSTANDABLE LONG-TERM GOAL OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHILE RESTRAINING SOVIET AGGRESSIVENESS.

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST AND CONCERN, EVEN AS WE HERE PONDER THE ALLIANCE'S FUTURE, THAT THE POLISH CRISIS CONTINUES TO SIMMER, AND SOVIET INTIMIDATION OF POLAND PROCEEDS APACE. IF THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION SEEMS TO SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF ALLIANCE CONTRADICTIONS, PERHAPS POLAND MIGHT SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE OF OUR EFFORTS TO CONCERT POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE.

YOU RECALL HOW NATO MINISTERS SENT A SOMBER WARNING TO MOSCOW LAST DECEMBER—THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD "FUNDAMENTALLY ALTER THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION" AND THAT "DETENTE COULD NOT SURVIVE IF THE SOVIET UNION WERE AGAIN TO VIOLATE THE BASIC RIGHTS OF ANY STATE TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE."

HOW MUCH OF AN IMPACT THAT COLLECTIVE WESTERN WARNING HAS HAD ON THE SOVIET DECISIONMAKING PROCESS IS, OF COURSE, AS YET UNCLEAR. THERE ARE THOSE WHO SEE THE SOVIETS INEVITABLY RESORTING TO FORCE TO RESTORE THE UNCONTESTED PRIMACY OF THE PARTY STRUCTURE. OTHERS HOPE THAT SOMEHOW THE POLES WILL MANAGE AN ACCOMMODATION AMONG THEMSELVES AND BETWEEN WARSAW AND MOSCOW THAT WILL PERMIT AN EVOLUTION TOWARD GREATER HUMAN FREEDOM.

NONETHELESS, IF INTERVENTION OCCURS IN SPITE OF THE INCALCULABLE COSTS, THE SOVIETS MAY GAMBLE, AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST, THAT WHEN THE STORM OF INITIAL WESTERN PROTEST SUBSIDES, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY UPON DIFFERING INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS, TO RESUME PROFITABLE RELATIONS WITH SOME WESTERN NATIONS, POSSIBLY EVEN TO FOSTER FRAGMENTATION OF THE ALLIANCE. IF INTERVENTION DOES OCCUR—AND AS TRAGIC AS THE BRUTAL SUBJUGATION OF POLAND WOULD BE—THE MOST IMPORTANT CONCERN AMONG THE ALLIES MUST BE TO AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE WEST ACTS IN DISARRAY. MORE THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE ALLIANCE'S HISTORY, IT IS IMPERATIVE FOR
THE ALLIES TO DEMONSTRATE A CONCERTED DIPLOMATIC POSTURE THAT WOULD HOLD THE SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS. IF A LUKEWARM AND TEMPORARY WESTERN RESPONSE FOLLOWS UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET ACTIVITIES, ONE CANNOT EXPECT A MODIFICATION OF THEIR BEHAVIOR. FORTUNATELY, A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR CONCERTED ACTION EXISTS IN ALLIED MINISTER'S DECISIONS OF DECEMBER 11-12, AND SUBSEQUENT WORK BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL.


IV. NATO'S ACCOMPLISHMENTS--THE FORGOTTEN DIMENSION.

- FINALLY, AMERICAN LEADERS FIND ROOM FOR OPTIMISM THROUGH RECOGNITION OF THE RECENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE--ACCOMPLISHMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED THROUGH CONCERTED EFFORTS OF THE WESTERN NATIONS. NATO CAN POINT, WITH JUSTIFIED PRIDE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ITS COLLECTIVE DECISION AT THE DECEMBER 1979 MINISTERIALS TO DEPLOY NEW LONG RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPON SYSTEMS AND TO SEEK ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON LRTRAN. THIS DECISION PROVIDES IN A MOST UNAMBIGUOUS WAY, MANIFESTATION OF OUR INTENT TO RECTIFY A LONG-TERM AND PARTICULARLY GRAVE IMBALANCE IN THE EAST-WEST BALANCE, AND TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS OF MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL. THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT OF THE DIFFICULTY
THESE DECISIONS HAVE IMPOSED ON MANY MEMBER NATIONS. INDEED, JUST ARRIVING AT IT WAS A MAJOR REAFFIRMATION OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY. AND IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT IT WAS THE ALLIANCE'S DETERMINATION TO CORRECT THIS IMBALANCE, THUS EVIDENT, WHICH SUCCEEDED IN IMPELLING THE SOVIETS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

- AMERICAN LEADERS FIND ROOM FOR CONFIDENCE, TOO, IN THE INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS THAT MANY MEMBER NATIONS HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ASSIST IN THE REFURBISHMENT OF SOUTHERN FLANK DEFENSES. REINTEGRATION OF GREECE INTO THE ALLIANCE'S MILITARY STRUCTURE SIGNALS RENEWED COMMITMENT TO IMPROVE OUR POSTURE IN THAT CRITICAL REGION.

- ON THE NORTHERN FLANK, THE NEW AGREEMENT ON PREPOSITIONING US EQUIPMENT IN NORWAY SHOULD STRENGTHEN THAT REGION.

- THE LEADERS IN WASHINGTON FIND ROOM FOR OPTIMISM AS WELL IN THAT AMERICA HAS FASHIONED A BROAD, POPULAR CONSENSUS IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY WHICH HAS BEEN ANIMATED BY CONCERN WITH THE CHANGES IN THE MILITARY BALANCE AND BY SOVIET INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT, AND DEDICATED TO GREATER VIGILANCE IN OUR PURSUIT OF LIBERTY, PEACE, AND SECURITY.

- INDEED, AMERICAN LEADERS ARE OPTIMISTIC FOR AN EVEN MORE FUNDAMENTAL REASON. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT, DESPITE THEIR POWER, THE SOVIET LEADERS ARE FRUSTRATED CUSTODIANS OF A FAILED IDEOLOGY AND AN ECONOMY FACING SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. AS THEIR OWN INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS BECOME MORE VISIBLE, THEY HAVE LESS AND LESS TO OFFER OTHER THAN MILITARY POWER. THIS DOES NOT ELIMINATE THE PRESENT DANGER; INDEED, THE NEAR-TERM DANGERS ARE EVEN GREATER BECAUSE THERE IS LITTLE REASON TO DOUBT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE TO SUSTAIN SIGNIFICANT ANNUAL GROWTH IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES. BUT THIS DOES GIVE HOPE FOR THE LONG-TERM, THAT ULTIMATELY THE MOSCOW LEADERSHIP WILL PURSUE A MORE RATIONAL ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.
THUS FOR THESE REASONS AND MANY OTHERS, THERE IS ROOM FOR CONFIDENCE IN WASHINGTON THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO PROTECT THE COMMON INTERESTS OF ITS MEMBER NATIONS IN THE FUTURE.

V. CONCLUSIONS.

- THE NEW ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO SET ITS DIRECTION COHERENTLY AND TO PURSUE IT CONSISTENTLY. IT SEEKS CONCERTED ALLIANCE POLICIES THROUGH PROPER AND FULL EXERCISE OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES. IT IS DETERMINED TO EARN INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN AMERICA'S KEY ROLE WITHIN THE FREE WORLD.

- THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY HAS STOOD TESTS IN THE PAST, ESTABLISHING A FIRM BASIS FOR FAITH THAT IT WILL DO SO IN THE FUTURE. BUT CHALLENGES CAN EMERGE FROM WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS WELL AS FROM WITHOUT, AND, THAT UNLESS EACH NATION REMAINS ATTENTIVE TO COLLECTIVE UNITY, THE ALLIANCE WILL NOT BE CAPABLE OF CONFRONTING THE SIZEABLE AND GROWING EXTERNAL THREATS TO SECURITY.

- NATO POSSESSES AN ABUNDANCE OF HUMAN, MORAL, AND MATERIAL RESOURCES THAT GREATLY EXCEED THE POTENTIAL OF THE EAST. THE TASK AHEAD IS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO MARSHALL THOSE RESOURCES, DEALING AS IT DOES SO FORTHRIGHTLY WITH THE LEGITIMATE AND UNDERSTANABLE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE ALLIES.

- TO SUMMARIZE, THE NEW ADMINISTRATION REAFFIRMS THE PRIMACY GIVEN BY THE US GOVERNMENT FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS TO ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRESENTATION HAS BEEN TO SET FORTH SOME CURRENT IDEAS ON THE ALLIANCE, AND TO ASSURE THAT THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WILL PROCEED TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH ITS ALLIES. HENCE, THESE REMARKS PRESAGE NO SHARP BREAK WITH THE PAST. RATHER, THEY FOreshadow A SEEKING TO MOVE AHEAD TOWARD A STRONG ALLIANCE CONSENSUS FOR MEETING THE COMPLEX WORLD PROBLEMS WHICH WILL EMERGE IN THE DECADE AHEAD.