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READINESS for the LONG WAR

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Some wine, as you know, improves with age. I am here to attest that for some of us, at least, age improves with wine. Since I know surely that each of you will age appreciably during the Sisyphean undertaking launched with this conference, let me start by advising your being generous with your evening libation.

Formidable indeed are the tasks ahead of you. Science-based modeling of exogenous cultures has long been an elusive target for academia and for government analysts. A successful OSD program for maturing, hardening, then validating and verifying human, social, cultural, and behavioral models and simulations will clearly be most advantageous for our military forces in the Long War ahead of them. Let nothing I say tonight lead you to believe that I do not agree with your goals, for my purpose is not to deter your trying to reach them, but rather to offer advice, and to urge you onward to take full advantage of modern gaming engines, geographic information systems, and advanced displays. In my generations, repetition was key to learning; I am convinced that today, experiential learning is both feasible and necessary. *Experientia est mater studiorum*. Would that I had had an opportunity like that lies before you.

In 1963 while serving on the Army General Staff, I was sent into the dungeons of the Pentagon to lead a team preparing a study entitled “World-wide Integrated National Strategy II,” known as WINS Two. There had been a contentious precedent study by Army Engineers. Their study, WINS One, on preparedness for nuclear warfare, had already been presented to Secretary McNamara. WINS One had proposed diverting funds from marginal programs for strategic offense into passive defense of key national infrastructure, recommendations that had, of course, gored the Air Force ox. The blue-suiters, apprehensive over another WINS study, pursued information about WINS Two with a vengeance, and intramural tensions became dysfunctional. Unknown to the Air Staff, the task assigned to the WINS Two study group was to examine Third World cultures afflicted with insurgency, and had little potential impact on the Air Force. However, to divert our flieger confreres, I caused my admin folks to dummy up several books of blank paper, the covers of each marked with every classification for which we could find a rubber stamp, and boldly labeled WINS Three. I then co-opted some trusted agents on the Army Staff who frequented joint meetings to casually place one of the WINS III books on the table, and to refer to it guardedly from time to time in the best “close-hold, burn before reading” style. That tactic succeeded, and enabled my WINS Two officers to walk

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the halls of the Pentagon without being shadowed. When WINS Two emerged from the basement, senior Army leaders averred that they found it useful, and approved most of its recommendations. The latter included a substantially larger establishment of foreign area officers (FAOs) —individuals whose careers centered on understanding an alien culture and language. Four new, separate regimental combat teams were to be added to the Army's force structure, each oriented on a violence-prone region of the Third World, both to provide troop-leading experience for the FAOs, and to supplement Special Forces as a source for linguists and trainers of indigenous military forces. However, those measures were subsumed by Vietnam before they could be enacted. The four separate regiments, if my memory is accurate, all deployed as line combat units, and the FAO program was cut back, and narrowly focused on the Soviet Union and key NATO allies. What survived and grew during Vietnam was the cultural rigor and breadth within the J.F. Kennedy School and Center at Fort Bragg, which underpinned the services' extensive advisory effort in Southeast Asia.

In that era, some Army contemporaries considered study of foreign culture a professional diversion, a threat to the warrior ethic, a detour from soldiering. Such attitudes persist; you will no doubt encounter a few bluster and grunt holdouts. But the generation of senior military officers whom I was serving in the 1960's remembered well that the careers of many of the prominent combat commanders of World War II and Korea had been founded on FAO-like assignments. George Marshall mastered enough Mandarin during three years in Tientsin (1924-27) to interrogate a Chinese witness in a U.S. court-martial, and that skill factored in President Truman's decision to send him to China in 1945-1946. Shortly after Marshall took office as Chief of Staff of the Army in 1939, he was directed to counter the growing influence of German and Italian military officers in Latin America. He delegated the mission to two field-grade officers on his planning staff: Matt Ridgway, a Spanish linguist and Latin American specialist, and Max Taylor, who spoke, beside Spanish, French and Japanese. Both were rewarded with command of airborne divisions; Ridgway later pulled MacArthur's chestnuts out of the fire in Korea, and was selected to be Chief of Staff of the Army; Taylor succeeded Ridgway as Chief of Staff, and then became a key adviser to John F. Kennedy. As another example, George Marshall picked Vinegar Joe Stilwell for command of the invasion of North Africa in 1942 because he rated him as the best tactician in the Army. But President Roosevelt overruled Marshall, and sent Stilwell instead to China because of his understanding of its culture and language. Marshall's key war planner in 1941-1943 was Albert Wedemeyer, a field grade officer who had spent two years at the German *Kriegsakademie*, and was deservedly reputed as an authority on German doctrine, equipment, and tactics; Marshall elevated him to serve as Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten in the China, Burma, India theater, and later to succeed Stilwell in China. An army exists to control land and

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people; understanding foreign lands and peoples is central to the professionalism of an Army officer, and cultural expertise should weigh heavily with promotion boards.

In the post-Vietnam era all the services concentrated on readiness for conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But it is important to note that in those years hundreds of thousands of service personnel and their families acquired what can well be termed cultural awareness by living in Europe, confronting daily barriers of language and mores with neighbors and allies. And if military training became focused in those years on kinetic engagement, it was based on models and simulations that portrayed enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures categorically different from our own, that had to be understood to be countered.

That brings up an important point: models and simulations in the 1970's were largely centered on stochastic models, and field exercises based on rules derived from said models. Breaking that paradigm took years of patient research and development, years in which service leadership had to impress upon a community of conservative trainers and a skeptical Congress the importance of embracing training open to engagement simulation, and therefore capable of exploiting live and virtual simulation as well as constructive models. As an example, the Army learned to train its maneuver units to oppose the most highly trained Soviet motorized rifle regiment in the world: the OPFOR at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. I have been part of that transformation, both in uniform, and since.

Our approach of the past two decades continues to serve the Army well, for the Mission Readiness Exercises conducted at Fort Irwin today populate the countryside with Arab and El Quada role actors. But were adaptations of gaming technology — experiential, collaborative learning driven by reliable models of foreign behaviors and using advanced geospatial visualization— to enable (1) effective training at home station while a unit was “resetting” for another deployment, and (2) major economies resulting from simply avoiding the cost of transportation to Fort Irwin and maintaining that “OPFOR” there.

You should find it easier to convince incumbents than did we in my day. Present day leaders of the armed services of the United State have learned what their predecessors once knew well: military success against a determined enemy embedded within a foreign population can be achieved neither by applications of advanced technology, however adroit, nor by indiscriminate coercion, however violent. Rather, that population has to be regarded as an invaluable source of information on adversaries, and treated humanely in a manner that minimally avoids overt hostility, and optimally obtains cooperation. This approach is not

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only humane, but militarily functional, serving the traditional American object beyond the war: to convert our most bitter enemies into friends and allies. Current military doctrine embodies such concepts.

As you proceed to devise models and simulations to support military doctrine, you should understand that “doctrine” is an operative term: referring not only to what is written, but also to what is persistently taught in training, thereby to assure the consensus that, amid violence, facilitates cooperation among components of American forces. All training must convey awareness of what affects indigenous attitudes and behaviors, both pro and con. For example, killing or mistreating detainees is both reprehensible and dysfunctional, inciting an adversary to do likewise, and negating a useful source of intelligence. But altogether too often, Americans have acted ignorant of that reality: battles in World War I were disfigured by ill-trained, murderous doughboys. In World War II, initial contacts by GIs with Arabs in North Africa were soured by thoughtless American brutality. And there were massacres of civilians in Korea and Vietnam.....

The articulation of U.S. Army doctrine in June 2001 —written in an era of preoccupation with “overwhelming force” and “shock and awe”—emphasized domination. It characterized land combat as **“contact with the enemy throughout the depth of an operational area...maneuver, fires, and other elements of combat power to defeat or destroy enemy forces.”** It did note, however, **“land combat normally entails close and continuous contact with noncombatants. Rules of engagement reflect this.”** Coupling the word “contact” on the one hand to “defeat or destroy,” and on the other hand to treatment of noncombatants, failed to address the usual circumstance in contemporary, asymmetric conflict: to defeat or to destroy an adversary he must first be found, and rules for engagement once we find him (or he finds us) can not address the importance of the role the populace can and should play in the “finding.” And to destroy the enemy is less desirable than to promote collaboration by indigents in putting an end to violence. In 2008, forty years after My Lai, Secretary Gates commented ruefully on deplorable behavior by some American troops: “In Iraq and Afghanistan, the heroic efforts and best intentions of our men and women in uniform have at times been undercut by a lack of knowledge of the culture and people they are dealing with everyday -- societies organized by networks of kin and tribe, where ancient codes of shame and honor often mean a good deal more than ‘hearts and minds...’ “

In contrast to that doctrine operative at the outset of the war in Iraq, the current expression of Army doctrine, Field Manual 3-0, published one year ago this month, enjoins commanders to go beyond defining “rules of engagement” to integrating their objectives for the populace into their plans and operations for achieving and sustaining stability:

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1-12. The operational environment will be extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and actors. Interagency and joint operations will be required to deal with this wide and intricate range of players occupying the environment.complex cultural, demographic, and physical environmental factors will be present, adding to the fog of war. Such factors include humanitarian crises, ethnic and religious differences, and complex and urban terrain, which often become major centers of gravity and a haven for potential threats. The operational environment will be interconnected, dynamic, and extremely volatile.

Hence, your task, as I understand it, is to provide models and simulations that capture this fluidity, this dynamism, and thereby to provide the armed services tools for conducting training, and preparing leaders for sound decisions in combat.

Despite blots on the American escutcheon, however, our forces have shown that, properly led, acting in concert with other agencies of the U.S., and amply resourced, they can successfully conduct operations predicated on respect for indigenous populations. Secretary Gates himself, in a previous office, participated in one historical success, cited approvingly in 1988 by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy:

In many situations, the United States will need not just DoD personnel and material, but diplomats and information specialists, agricultural chemists, bankers and economists, hydrologists, criminologists, meteorologists, and scores of other professionals. Because so many Americans are predisposed to pessimism about our role in the Third World, it is worth pointing to one recent example of a U.S. intervention that, against high odds, did very well: the saving of democracy in El Salvador. In 1980 it seemed quite possible that the country would fall to guerillas supported from Nicaragua by the Sandinistas and Cubans. Many Americans assumed that the [Salvadoran] government would soon be toppled by the Communist insurgents. Congress severely limited the security assistance our government could make available to it. And yet by 1985 there was a democratic government in place in El Salvador, and Congress became committed to supporting it.

By agreement with the Congress, American military on the ground in El Salvador 1983-1985, other than individuals assigned to the Embassy, were limited to 55. These were foreclosed from direct participation in combat, and confined to training the Salvadoran armed forces both to limit the ability of the guerillas to move freely through the countryside in their depredations, and —more importantly— to observe in relations with the populace strict rules for respect of human rights. Those Americans so assigned by USCINCSO — your speaker-- were largely drawn from units of the Army's Special Forces that were linguistically and culturally prepared to instruct and to motivate Salvadorans, supplemented by Spanish-speaking technicians, such as communicators, medics, and one US Southern Command civilian sociologist. In one helpful project, the corps of cadets of the Salvadoran military academy were transported to Fort Benning, Georgia, there to

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undergo a version of the U.S. Army's Officer Candidate School (OCS) conducted entirely in Spanish that emphasized the essential utility of observing human rights, of avoiding casualties among non-combatants, and thereby, of wresting popular support away from the guerrillas.

In the words of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy such measures worked a transformation in relations between Americans and the peoples of Central America:

The transformation in large measure reflects ideas that are applicable elsewhere. American technology gave the Salvadoran government a new tactical intelligence capability, which became a prod to action for the [Salvadoran] military (while also giving it constant feedback on the effectiveness of its operations). The war also became a model of sorts for cooperative efforts: under American leadership, other Latin American countries proved willing to offer military training and some economic aid of their own to El Salvador. Our security assistance program helped the Salvadoran military to acquire weapons systems that made possible more discriminate attacks on enemy troops and reduced civilian casualties. We also did a lot for the morale of our allies by introducing medical programs that drastically reduced death rate among wounded Salvadoran troops (from around 45% to around 5%). ...

The Commission set forth these concepts:

- **Conflicts in the Third World were less threatening than any Soviet-American war would be, yet they can undermine our ability to defend our most vital interests.**
- **Low intensity conflict is not a problem just for the Department of Defense**
- **U.S. forces will not in general be combatants.**
- **Security assistance requires new legislation and more resources**

I served with that Commission, and must report that the demise of the Soviet Union subsumed actions per the Commission's findings and recommendations, even as the American involvement in Vietnam subsumed those of WINS II. But I truly believe that you have a much better chance of succeeding, given that Secretary Gates will remain in office, and given the present acceptance among the armed services of necessity to posture for a long war similar to the one they are now fighting. Moreover, each of the military departments has already undertaken measures that invite the application of human, social, cultural, and behavioral models and simulation. Let me mention a few of these:

- Programs have been established to build cultural awareness for stability operations, to acquire germane data, and to use communication for collaboration, distributed training and consultation. These programs are disparate, yet to be well coordinated among the services or COCOMs. You can be a unifying factor for OSD.

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- USMC programs, such as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) and the related Career Marine Regional Studies Program (CMRS), require all officers and NCOs to demonstrate learning about the culture(s) of one of 17 regions worldwide. These programs can use your help.
- The USAF has activated at the Air University a set of “centers” intent upon developing insights into foreign cultures for stability operations, and building a culturally aware Air Force. You can improve the content and efficiency of these centers.
- U.S. Army programs are not yet closely coupled, but TRADOC is developing a holistic strategy embracing cultural awareness and linguistic skills for operational readiness:
 - Mission Readiness Exercises at Combat Training Centers now emphasize cultural awareness.
 - Professional Military Education is being modified to the same end.
 - Use of a combat force structure unit such as 1st BCT, 1st ID, to prepare Provincial reconstruction teams is an undoubtedly painful expedient for the Army, one it wants to replace as soon as possible.
 - The Human Terrain System seems likely to provide useful support to BCTs engaged in stability operations, but it too has been an uncomfortable recourse for the Army
- Both Air Force and Army maintain reportedly extensive networks of consultants among social scientists.
- Efforts are underway to create DoD-wide, network accessible, repositories of culturally specific data, upon which you can draw, and to which you can contribute.
- And because of my work with the George C. Marshall Foundation, let me suggest an early application for behavioral models: Army and the Air Force Junior ROTC programs. These influence about a half million high school students, mostly in inner city schools. They eschew teaching military doctrine and tactics, and focus instead on citizenship and character to portray role models that teach sound personal values using machinima or propaedeutic vignettes that capture situations in which moral choices must be made, You won’t need DCGS-A; you can model the culture from the pages of the Boston Globe or the Washington Post.

Allow me to offer two concluding observations:

First: the climate within the Department of Defense is propitious. What you seek to build is urgently needed not only for operational efficiency, but also for cost avoidance within the military departments.

Second: you would be foolish not to study military doctrine and training closely, seeking to understand how your products can meet service needs, and making a partner of service end-users early in your development cycle.

I wish you success. May you early and often be able to improve military readiness for the Long War.