

CONF ON U.S.
NDU STRATEGIC FAILURES

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MMMS

~~GENERAL GORMAN: Sam Sarkesian asked me this morning whether I learned anything yesterday and I just wanted to report that indeed I did. Justice Goldberg reported that one of the perquisites of the Supreme Court is that each Justice has an individual called a "rover" who sees to it that the judge is properly accoutered when he takes the bench, and to explain it to his military audience the Justice added, "That's like a General's orderly or aide", whence, I suppose, the term familiar to those of us in uniform, "dog-robber star-broken". (LAUGHTER)~~

I am not at all comfortable ^{addressing the subject of past U.S. strategic failures.} ~~with this assignment.~~ You would ~~One might be~~ ^{consult word} ~~have been much~~ better advised to ~~put~~ ^{up} Ed Luttwak, ~~up here~~ because he has at his fingertips all sorts of indices of strategic acuity like the number of Admirals per ship and other sorts of indictments of our approach to matters of the past. ^{Nonetheless,} ~~But~~ I am eminently well qualified, I believe, to address ^{this} ~~my assigned~~ topic, even though ^{Admiral} ~~Bill~~ Crowe might have been expected to talk more about ~~the~~ failures than successes, ~~as did most of the other speakers yesterday.~~

At the present time I live in Nelson County, Virginia, where there is a prominent, if obstreperous, family named Shiplette. [?] ~~(phonetic spelling).~~ ~~And~~ I want to tell ~~you~~ a little parable at the outset of ^{this discussion} ~~my pitch here~~ about the Shiplettes. Three of them were out hunting--Amos, Luke, and their nephew, Harlan--and Amos cut loose at something moving in the bushes and plugged a neighbor. He ^{*kilt} ~~killed~~ ^{'im} ~~him~~ daid." The three Shiplettes went over and looked at the body, and there then ensued an argument over what they were going to do about all of that. So, the two uncles decided that they would assign to the nephew ~~the~~ responsibility for explaining this failure to Bill

Miller's wife. And Harlan said, "Well, I [']am extremely uncomfortable with that assignment, but I'm eminently well-qualified to discharge it. I am a student of psychology at James Madison University. I have studied the human under stress. I have taken courses in feminine psychology. I have had an internship at the local mental hospital. And I think I can probably handle all of this." So, he went over to the Miller farm and knocked on the door. Lettie Miller came to the door, and he said, "Good morning, widow Miller". She said, "Surely, sir, you are mistaken. I am not a widow." And he said, "Bull ^{hockey,} ~~hawky,~~ lady." ~~(LAUGHTER)~~

As I say, I am uncomfortable with my assignment, but probably well-qualified for it, ^{Since} I have been rattling around ^{for many years now} ~~as the Senator~~ ~~indicated earlier,~~ ^{along} in the strategic attic of the United States, ^{with} the cobwebs of neglect.

I brought to my work with the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, ^(the Packard Commission) some distinct prejudices, ^{which} and I might as well reveal ~~them at the outset~~ by way of establishing my qualifications. I rue the fact in the first instance that strategy ^{which is,} in its root origins, a Greek word referring to the affairs of the ~~Generals~~ ^{that strategy} in this country seems to be exclusively the province of civilian underlings. One rarely hears any senior military officer discussing strategy qua strategy, save, I must say, in these hallowed halls. ~~And~~ I think it is proper, ^{therefore,} that the professional military advice ^{provided to} ~~for~~ the President and the National Security Council has been questioned of late both in terms of its quality and its quantity.

I have stated previously, and I still believe, that within the

organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the most prominent strategy^{ists} in recent years seems to have been, admiral, inadvertent^{ce} and general confusion. I believe that the Office of Management and Budget has waged guerrilla warfare against D, Defense^{Department} budgeteers, and that they have induced the latter to resort to classic fiscal counterinsurgency, employing padding, gold watch tactics, and other draconian measures. And, anent the purposes of this gathering, (the bill ~~which has been~~ proposed by Senator Warner), the Congress has clarified all of this by, ~~in the first instance~~^{first}, dictating that our senior military leadership shall be a committee formed in the image and likeness of those on the Hill, with somebody at the head of the establishment called, for Heaven's sake, a chairman.

Second, the Congress, in dealing with any Administration's defense budget, either addresses it in the aggregate, plus or minus some marginal percentage, or in its minutiae: the thousands of line items which control the amount and the rate of expenditure for goods and services, ^{These detailed goods and services} which are the stuff, I readily admit, of local and regional politics--pork-barreling, or whatever you want to call it.

Third~~ly~~, the Congress, ~~as many of our~~ -----

(NOTE: / Tape expired at this point. / Remarks picked up below as follows:)

~~Warren~~ has largely ignored national objectives ^{and} ~~or~~ grand strategy. ~~And~~ I think Senator ^{Sam} Nunn is entirely correct, as is Senator Warner, in calling upon their colleagues to turn their attention to the latter--grand strategy--as a way of addressing the problems of trying to deal with resource allocation, either in the aggregate or by micro-management.

~~And~~ lastly, the Congress has converted the annual process of

authorizations and appropriations into a ponderous, convoluted, staff-dominated exercise in delay, obfuscation, and uncertainty. The Congressional role seems to be that of assuring that any military strategy ^{indeed,} any grand strategy, however artfully conceived ^{deception} will be a mishmash of fits and starts, fraud and ^{deception} ~~conception~~, and deprived of ~~deception~~ any true vision.

~~Now, I think that~~ the bill that ^{has prompted this convocation} ~~we are asked to address~~ is going to have to go considerably further if we are ~~going~~ to address cogently the very significant failures that have characterized our approach to strategy in recent years.

~~Now, I want to propose to you that~~ those failures ^{are legion} ~~and I could~~ talk about many of them; Professor Rostow ^{no doubt} would have me start with Harry Truman's failure to insist on elections in East ^{ern} Europe. ^{Although} I could take the macro-approach and back up further ^{in history,} ~~as did the chair-~~ ~~man,~~ but I have chosen to confine my remarks largely to the last several decades. ~~And I want to suggest to you~~ that there have been four signal failures ^{during that period, perhaps the most notable of which has been the failure} ~~one of process which has been remarked on by~~ of process, a problem that has received considerable attention in the current defense reform ~~many speakers and which I assume Dave Packard is going to address.~~ atmosphere. ~~this noontime.~~

^{there has been a} Second, ~~the~~ failure of perception.

^{there has been} Third, ~~a~~ failure of persistence.

^{there has been} ~~and~~ fourth, ~~a~~ failure of priorities.

Examples of these failures are sufficiently numerous that I could elaborate at ~~And I am going to give you examples of each; they have been legion~~ great length on any or all of them. However, in the interest of conserving space, ~~in all four categories, but I think time and my inclination to move~~ I shall limit myself to ~~on to the questions forecloses doing much more than touching quickly~~ on the topic, the category, and then ^{an} ~~the~~ example.

~~As~~ a member of ^{the Packard} ~~Dave Packard's~~ commission, ~~the Blue Ribbon~~

~~Commission on Defense Management~~ -- I would have you know that I believe that the single most important recommendation of that commission was our proposal that the Commander-in-Chief himself become involved in the process by which a grand strategy for the nation could be devised and transformed into defense budgets, force structure, and weapon systems. That we, after 200 years of independence ^{as} of a nation, should still be fumbling with strategy is in and of itself an indictment of broad failure. ^{The failure is even attributable,} ~~failure,~~ in part, ~~of,~~ ^{to} this institution--at least the National War College part of it, which was put together, ~~in part,~~ ^{among other things,} to address ^{the} perceived lack of a strategy at the turn of the century.

We of the Packard Commission in recent months came to realize that many more millions of dollars are wasted annually on strategic redundancies and lacunae ~~by far~~ ^{by} than ~~overpriced~~ toilet seats and ashtrays. ~~And we~~ ^{in fact,} became convinced that existing strategic procedures need overhaul.

^{It is} ~~Now, I think it's~~ important to ^{impose upon} those of you who have not read the recommendations of the Packard Commission ~~to impose upon you~~ a summary of what ~~it was that~~ the commission said. The commission recommended to the President that defense planning should start with a comprehensive statement of national security objectives and priorities based on the recommendations of the National Security Council. ^{Of course,} ~~Now,~~ I understand all of the inhibitions against doing that. I certainly understand, in spades, having been a National Intelligence Officer at CIA under Stan ^{sfeld} Turner, that "xeroxoph^obia" is going to lead many policymakers to resist putting down on paper such a comprehensive statement of strategy. But I believe it is true that in recent

years the ~~Proceedings~~ of the National Security Council have, generally speaking, been respectably secure. ~~And~~ in any event, we ~~don't~~^{not} need great, thick documents to implement any of the recommendations of the Packard Commission. What we need, rather, is a discussion at the National Security Council, properly entered into and understood by the participants, which will lead to a consensus of the national leadership on those security objectives and priorities.

To ~~go on~~^{continue} with the recommendations of the commission, the commission said that, based on ~~an~~^{established} objectives, the President would issue at the outset of his administration, and thereafter as required, provisional five-year budget levels to the Department of Defense. Now, that ~~is~~^{is} a novel proposal; to have the Secretary of Defense be given five-year budget levels. ~~Now, they could be, as Bill Crowe was just alluding,~~ ~~significantly lower than what we have been accustomed to seeing here in the recent past.~~ ~~But if they~~^{the budget levels} were consistent, and if we knew we ~~could~~^{actually} count on getting ~~something like that,~~^{what they called for,} I think ~~that,~~^{as Bill does,} we would be better served as a nation than dealing with ~~the~~^{the} peaks and valleys, ~~that now plague us.~~

The commission went on to say that the budget levels, ~~would~~^{would} reflect ~~competing~~^{ing} demands on the federal budget ~~and~~^{as well as} projected gross national product and revenues, ~~and~~ would come from recommendations of the National Security Council and the Office of Management and Budget. That ~~is~~^{is} a crucial ~~sort of~~ observation. The idea ~~here~~ is to get OMB committed to the budget levels before the defense budget and program ~~is~~^{are} put together, so that there is ~~not~~^{not} a last-minute raid on the defense budget ~~ever~~ at the White House--the Christmas knifing ~~that has been~~^{So} familiar to many of us in recent years.

~~the presumption that the requisite guidance and decisions would be forthcoming~~
Based on ~~all of this coming~~ from the White House, the commis-
sion said that the Secretary of Defense should then instruct the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military strategy
for the ^{prescribed} national objectives, ^{develop} and ^{al} options ~~on~~ operational concepts, and
^{identify} key defense issues for the budget levels provided ~~by the President.~~
^{Although not} I ~~do not~~ know whether ~~the~~ ^{Reagan} President and ^{Weinberger} Secretary ~~will~~ implement those
recommendations, ~~but~~ I ^{consider} ~~found~~ it significant, ~~and I think Dave Packard~~
~~did too,~~ that all of the commissioners agree that ~~the~~ ^{responsibility} ~~bee~~ for the
preparation of military strategy should be put squarely on the broad
shoulders of the ^{JCS Chairman.} ~~man who just occupied this podium.~~

The recommendations go on to say that the chairman should pre-
pare broad, military options with advice from the JCS and the Comman-
ders-in-Chief^s of the Unified and Specified Commands--the CINCS^s ~~at~~
^{This would} ~~tempt to~~ bring the people who have the operational forces and ^{the} ~~are~~-
responsibilities therefor, ~~into the strategic process.~~ ~~The recommenda-~~
~~tions go on to say that~~ addressing operational concepts and key de-
fense issues--for example, modernization, ^{ca} ~~for~~ structure, readiness,
sustainability, and strategic versus general purpose forces--~~the~~ chair-
man would frame explicit tradeoffs among the armed forces and submit
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. ~~We didn't use the word~~
~~"priority", but we did use the word "tradeoff" and explicit trade-~~
~~offs at that.~~

~~It says, further, and here Ray Klein, I think, deserves a tip of~~
~~the hat from the commission, that~~ ^{it} the chairman ^{also,} with the assistance
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence,
would prepare a net assessment of the effectiveness of ^{U.S.} ~~the United~~
~~States~~ and allied forces as compared with those of possible

adversaries. This assessment would be used to evaluate the risks of the options and would accompany the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense to the President. The President would then ~~go on to~~ select a particular military program and associated budget level, and submit to the Congress a two-year budget within a five-year plan. The Congress would be asked to approve the two-year budget based on this plan. ^{Now,} if we could make that much progress--and I believe ~~that~~ this is crucially a matter for the Congress to address in its further work on defense management--the two-year budget would do much to smooth out the whole disorderly process of allocating resources and make it possible for the military--the armed services--to restore a degree of ^{calm} ~~order~~ in their house that they have not had for the past two decades.

^{Furthermore,} ~~A Congress, according to the commission, sh~~ould authorize and appropriate funding for major weapon systems at the two key milestones of full-scale engineering development and high-rate production. ~~I won't develop that much further. Again, I assume Dave Packard will pick up and go with this.~~

What we are talking about ~~here~~ is a process. ^{And} many of you ~~may be struck with~~ ^{by} the fact that this ~~seems rational~~ ^{may consider it} and strange that such ^{a rational} process has not, or was not, part and parcel of our national proceedings; it is a failure that it has not been. Again, I ^{am} ~~not~~ calling ~~here~~ for the return of the days of the basic National Security Panel policy, the ponderous NSC ~~Staff~~ ^{Proceedings} of the Eisenhower era. ^{we} ~~are~~ talking about bringing ^{the views of} the Commander-in-Chief and his principal advisers--civilian and military, ^{throughout} ~~and within~~ the Cabinet--to bear on grand strategy, ^{which is linked so inextricably to} ~~for the nation which, as we were reminded~~

~~frequently yesterday, involves crucially~~ the ^{proper and effective} allocation of ^{the nation's} resources.

~~But~~ neither I, ^{nor}, as far as I know, any other member of the Blue Ribbon Commission, entertain any illusion that ~~a process~~ a better process for devising grand strategy will lead inevitably to a failure-free future. ~~I understand all the skepticism of the chairman on these matters.~~ For the trouble is, after all, that reasonable men sitting ⁱⁿ the National Security Council or in the halls of Congress can, and often do, disagree ^{precisely} on what our national interests may be, ~~and~~ how to evaluate threats thereto, or how to assign national priorities. ^{No less difficult is it for such presumably reasonable men to differentiate} ~~or how to discriminate~~ between ^{those} situations in which they are leading the nation into a new realization of its mission and its potential ^{and those in which they are} ~~or~~ disregarding vox populi to the hazard of us all.

The resulting frictions may lead many to ^{propound} ~~essay~~ formulae for resolving such uncertainties ^{or} strategic touchstones, if you will, such as predefining the necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of military force. I think the ^{current} Secretary of Defense is categorically wrong in ^{offering} ~~essaying~~ such a definition. I really believe that the stuff of deterrence, as General ^{Bernard} Rogers is fond of reminding us, is in calculability. ~~And that~~ ^{is} to the degree that the United States is able to preserve uncertainty in its adversaries, ^{deterrence is enhanced and} ~~to that degree, deterrence,~~ the necessity to use military force becomes ~~the~~ more remote.

Others offering up touchstones would have us reach for some kind of réalpolitik ^{manipulating} Marxists, some of them, ^{at least}, in order to control others. ^{This is} ~~It is~~ a hell of a lot easier to be said, by far, than to be done.

Others would force the world into one or another ~~of~~ strategic