

Instructions: Comments are welcomed from anyone—civilian or military—who accesses this questionnaire. When complete, please email to: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil or check for updates on FM 3-24 Revision on our website at: <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/FM3-24Revision.asp>.

FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY, REVISION QUESTIONNAIRE

NAME:
ORGANIZATION:
PHONE:

DATE:
GRADE/TITLE:
E-MAIL:

There is no requirement to address all the questions.

1. Please provide you experience/expertise/interest in the field of counterinsurgency.
2. May we use your comments on our Blog, WEBCASTs, or other COIN Center-sponsored forum to help us generate discussion on a specific issue? Do you wish to be identified as the source of the comment?

PART 1: History, Theory, Principles, and Fundamentals

3. Are the current definitions of insurgency and counterinsurgency in FM 3-24, and updated by JP 3-24 (2009) adequate? If not, how would you change them and why?
4. Current US policy and attitudes, along with the contemporary media environment, make difficult the adoption of techniques such as massive resettlement of the population and the application of overwhelming firepower. Considering those limitations, what historical counterinsurgency case studies do you believe have the greatest benefit to determining the most successful counterinsurgent principles?
5. The current FM lists eight “Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency,” five “Contemporary Imperatives of Counterinsurgency,” and nine “Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations.” Table 1-1 lists successful and unsuccessful operational practices. Is this construct a useful means for categorizing the concepts? Are the principles, etc., that are listed applicable globally? What would you add, delete, or modify?
6. How relevant is the Maoist model of protracted war to the insurgencies of the past thirty years and to possible insurgencies of the future? Is there a model more representative of recent and current insurgencies?
7. The ratio of counterinsurgents to the population is one of the more oft-cited portions of the current FM. A study by the Institute for Defense Analysis concludes that twenty counterinsurgents for every 1000 residents in the area of operations leads to a 54% probability of success. If, however, the density increases to 40 for every 1000, the probability increases to 83%. Another study by the Harvard Kennedy School, however, concluded that increases from 5 to 80 troops per 1,000 inhabitants caused the probability of success to increase by less than fifteen percentage points. Most studies caveat

results by stating that no level of force density will guarantee success. Base upon these studies and any others of which you might be aware, how should force ratios in the FM be adjusted? Should force ratios even be addressed in the FM?

8. The current FM quotes Galula who posited “that revolutionary war was 80 percent political action and only 20 percent military.” The sentence that follows caveats that remark. Does the 80/20 ratio have any historical validity, other than being cited as noted? If not, should there be any reference to a political/military percentage in counterinsurgency warfare?
9. Are there any other issues that we have not addressed related to the history, theory, principles, and fundamentals of insurgency/counterinsurgency?

PART II: Understanding the Operational Environment/Threat

10. What are your thoughts on the concept of “center of gravity” when countering an insurgency? What framework do you find most applicable when determining the insurgency’s center of gravity?
11. Does the current FM address adequately how to fight an insurgency based upon an ideological or religious foundation?
12. FM 3-24 and FM 3-24.2 discuss causes of insurgencies. How representative and accurate are the lists in the two manuals? Should there be more analysis of possible causes and how to mitigate those causes? How should the manual address complex causes?
13. Are there any other issues that we have not addressed related to understanding the operational environment/threat?
14. How/Should the revised FM to address armed groups such as criminal gangs, militias, and warlords that may “hitch their wagon” to an insurgency based on grievances against the host nation government?
15. How or should the manual address what the United States government considers to be criminal activity that is ignored, sanctioned, or unable to be countered by the host nation government (eg, growing poppies, pirating CDs)?

PART III: Conducting Counterinsurgency Operations

16. If “legitimacy” is to be deemed a key component of a successful counterinsurgency, how should that term be defined, what are its components, and how should it be measured?
17. Much debate over the focus of FM 3-24 and its application has centered around the terms “population-centric” (focused on securing and controlling a given population or populations), “enemy-centric” (focused on defeating a particular enemy group), and “leader-centric” (the side with certain superior leadership attributes wins). Given that debate, how should (or even should) these “centric” concepts be addressed in the FM? (Population-centric and

enemy-centric are defined by the USG COIN Guide (2009), p. 12, and leader-centric is defined by Mark Moyar, *A Question of Command*, Chapter 1)

18. Should the FM address any term or conditions analogous to “winning” or “victory?” If so, how? What metrics can be used to judge success?
19. Historically, successful counterinsurgencies have required more than just military force. Does Chapter 2 of the current FM address adequately the “whole of government” approach from Phase 0 (Shape) through Phase V (Enable Civil Authority)?
20. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, emphasizes coordination, cooperation, and unity of effort. Should the revised FM tackle the issue of unity of command and propose a structure similar to CORDS in Vietnam? Or is operating under the concept of “Unified Action” sufficient?
21. Does the FM address adequately the interaction of the military with government and non-government agencies?
22. Are the six lines of operation described in the current FM applicable globally, or are there others that would be more relevant?
23. How, or should, the FM account for enablers, such as Female Engagement Teams and Agriculture Teams, in the AO?
24. Should the FM address how to conduct counterinsurgency operations when the national government is itself considered a threat by parts of the population?
25. How, or should, the FM address transition and reintegration? Should there be a section on sanctions and incentives to address former insurgents?
26. Are there any other issues that we have not addressed related to conducting counterinsurgency operations?