

Toward Holistic Joint Force Structure Decisions

**A Monograph
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Abstract

TOWARD HOLISTIC JOINT FORCE STRUCTURE DECISIONS by Major Joseph Troy Morgan, USAF, 68 pages.

In the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges... We must balance strategic risk across the responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners.” Examination of the propensity of U.S. foreign policy indicates that the Middle East and the radical extremist organizations which draw strength from the region will continue to hold an arguably preeminent position of relevancy. Despite the importance of the enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism, the Department of Defense is still challenged to balance strategic risks across the joint force. Service parochial perspectives continue to drive procurement, and hence strategic, decisions. It is the author’s intent to provide justification for the necessity of a holistic framework from which the U.S. joint force structure can both be shaped and help formulate a grand strategy for the U.S., specifically justified by the context of the Middle East. Arguably this framework for military force structure decisions should be part of a wider whole of government approach to the spectrum of challenges the U.S. faces globally. Further, the framework should reflect a wider whole of government approach to the spectrum of challenges the U.S. faces globally. However, it is the author’s contention that an important, if not first, step towards a broader approach should be taken with respect to military force structure decisions. If a holistic framework is not viable when the focus is limited to the Middle East and the military element of national power over which the U.S. exerts the most direct control, then an even wider holistic approach, encompassing global challenges and a whole of government solution, will likely be met with even greater barriers.

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INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, a new threat has emerged to menace peace-loving people of all nations and all religions. In violent extremism, we face an adversary today that seeks to eject all westerners and western influence from the Middle East and Southwest Asia, to destroy Israel, and overthrow all secular and western-oriented governments in the region. It is an adversary without the resources of a great power, but with unlimited “ideological zeal” and no shortage of fighting power – a challenge that will require what the new national defense strategy, echoing Acheson, calls “the full strength of America and its people.”

– Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, *Dean Acheson Lecture*¹

To describe the prominent adversary facing the U.S., it is striking that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates borrowed the words of Dean Acheson whose book *Present at the Creation* chronicles a formative time of U.S. foreign policy for the Cold War. While it is open to debate, it appears the U.S. is in a similar, formative time for foreign policy formulation. From the bipolar Cold War world, the U.S. has emerged as a single hegemonic power faced with, in addition to conventional challenges, the rise of ideologically driven Islamic violent extremist organizations. Given the propensity of U.S. foreign policy and its interests, the Middle East and Islamic violent extremist organizations which draw strength from the region will continue to command a preeminent position of attention. Unfortunately, the U.S. defense establishment still struggles to effectively translate national security objectives into joint force structure decisions for an enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism. These difficulties are compounded by the lack of a clear U.S. foreign policy and strategy for addressing the challenges of the Middle East. However, it is not the author’s intent to define a new U.S. grand strategy or attempt to replicate George Kennan’s X Article reframed in the context of radical Islamic extremism and then define the military structure necessary to be successful. Much has been written, and continues to be opined, by think tanks, academics, and military professionals concerning recommendations for a

¹ Robert M. Gates, *Dean Acheson Lecture - U.S. Institute of Peace* (DefenseLINK, 15 October 2008, accessed 15 March 2009); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1298>; Internet.

new U.S. grand strategy.² Of specific applicability to the U.S. military, in the words of our National Defense Strategy and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “The United States, our allies, and our partners face a spectrum of challenges... We must balance strategic risk across the responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners.”³

It is the author’s intent to provide justification for the necessity of a holistic framework from which the U.S. military force structure can both be shaped and help formulate a grand strategy for the U.S., specifically justified by the context of the Middle East. Arguably this framework for military force structure decisions should be part of a wider whole of government approach to the spectrum of challenges the U.S. faces globally. However, it is the author’s contention that an important, if not first, step towards a broader approach should be taken with respect to military force structure decisions. If a holistic framework is not viable when the focus is limited to the Middle East and the military element of national power over which the U.S. exerts the most direct control, then extrapolation of the framework may not be a relevant topic.

This work begins by examining the nature of U.S. national security and foreign policy. As a guide to U.S. foreign policy, our national security strategy is built upon the two pillars of “promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity – working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies”

² Barry R. Posen, “The Struggle Against Terrorism,” *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001/2002): 39-55. In fact, within months after 9/11, Barry Posen, Director of the MIT Security Studies Program, compared neo-isolationist, liberal internationalist, primacist/hegemonist, and selective engagement perspectives. Examples submitted from professional U.S. educational and academic institutes can be found by Warren P. Gunderman, “From Containment to Integration: A Grand Strategy for the 21st Century” (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 2006), Robert J. Taylor, “Containment: A Viable Strategy for Success in the GWOT” (Monograph, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007), and Stephen P. Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct* (Hoover Institution, 2005). Examples from more popular circles can be found such as Thomas P.M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: Blueprint for Action* (New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 2005) and Kenneth M. Pollack, *A Path out of the Desert* (New York: Random House, 2008).

³ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 1.

and “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies.” Essentially, the dichotomy which may arise between promoting liberty and confronting challenges suggests that the U.S. remains a nation committed to long-term idealistic goals while also remaining open to short-term realistic approaches to the challenges we face.⁴ In the words of former President George W. Bush, the approach of our national security strategy is “idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.”⁵ Undoubtedly the national security strategy document will be updated under President Obama’s guidance. However, the traditions and schools of American foreign policy as theorized by Walter McDougall and Walter Mead, two prominent U.S. International Relations and foreign policy figures, further define the specific characteristic of American realism and idealism and reflect more continuity of policy themes rather than radical departure. Therefore, it is unlikely that the fundamental idealistic nature of our national security strategy will change dramatically, both for moralistic and realistic reasons. As indicated by President Obama in his inaugural speech, “As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between our safety and our ideals. Our Founding Fathers..., faced with perils that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure

⁴ Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 133-134. The realist-idealist dichotomy is defined in the International Relations Dictionary as “[a]lternative approaches followed by decision makers in the formation of foreign policy. The realist approach to policy-making is fundamentally empirical and pragmatic, whereas the idealist approach is based on abstract traditional foreign policy principles involving international norms, legal codes, and moral-ethical values. The realist school starts with the assumption that the key factor prevalent in all international relationships is that of power. The wise and efficient use of power by a state in pursuit of its national interest is, therefore, the main ingredient of a successful foreign policy. The idealist, on the other hand, believes that foreign policies based on moral principles are more effective because they promote unity and cooperation among states than competition and conflict. Moral power, according to the idealist, is more effective than physical power because it is more durable. It involves not force and coercion but winning over the minds and allegiances of people to accept principles that out to govern state conduct.”

⁵ The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), ii.

the rule of law and the rights of man -- a charter expanded by the blood of generations. Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give them up for expedience sake.”⁶

Importantly, the American foreign policy “schools” identified by Walter McDougall and “traditions” identified by Walter Mead add necessary context and detail to an overarching mix of realism and idealism behind U.S. interests. Taken together, these traditions and schools of thought are useful for analyzing U.S. policy and indicate that the Middle East poses as a long-lasting and critical challenge for U.S. national security. Radical Islamic movements, which seek to submit “all of mankind to one religion – Islam, one God, Allah, and one law – the Islamic law” are in conflict with U.S. realistic and idealistic objectives.⁷ What makes these movements powerful is their combination of nationalistic and religious perspectives, both of which are important determinants of whether individuals will react violently to real or perceived occupation by foreign forces. Continual and expanded integration of the Middle East owing to globalization, largely outside of U.S. control, will not by itself alleviate sources of regional instability. This source of conflict for the U.S. is likely to be a primary driver of national security policy formulation for decades.

However, even with a focus on the Middle East as a primary, overriding concern, the task of translating national security strategy into organization, training, and equipment for armed forces continues to be a difficult task. This challenge is exacerbated by the lack of a clearly articulated grand strategy or holistic foreign policy. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has said, “At the turn of the twenty-first century, the U.S. armed forces were still organized, trained, and equipped to fight large-scale conventional wars, not the long, messy, unconventional operations that proliferated following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The same traditional

⁶ Barack Obama, “President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address,” (The Briefing Room-The Blog: 21 January 2009, accessed 5 February 2009), available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address>; Internet.

⁷ Lambert, Y: *The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*, 134.

orientation was true of our procurement procedures, military health care, and more.”⁸ While Goldwater-Nichols did significantly improve the integration of joint military operations, it did not extensively penetrate into the procurement strategies of the military services nor propagate into the interagency level necessary for a whole of government approach. Further, while regional and country specific focus and policy implementation is provided for the military by regional combatant commanders, an even more holistic perspective coupled with regional and country specific details is required to assess the most effective way to meet national objectives while balancing risks. In this context, holistic relates to joint, rather than individual service, force structure decisions as part of a whole of government approach.⁹ As the current National Defense Strategy indicates, the U.S. military “should act to reduce risks by shaping the development of trends through the decisions we make regarding the equipment and capabilities we develop”¹⁰ and the military “cannot do everything, or function equally well across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately we must make choices.”¹¹

A novel approach is presented here which both offers a holistic perspective of joint force structure decisions and would facilitate interagency level discussions for a whole of government strategy. The approach is holistic in the sense that it seeks to avoid a service-centric perspective that fails to efficiently or effectively balance risks across the joint force. A cursory example of how this approach could be applied is provided by reflecting on U.S. strategy for the Middle East.

⁸ Robert M. Gates, “Reflections on Leadership,” *Parameters*, summer 2008, 9.

⁹ Cambridge Dictionaries Online defines “holistic” as “relating to the whole of something or to the total system instead of just to its parts.” Cambridge Dictionary Online (Cambridge Dictionary of American English, accessed 22 March 2009); available from http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=holistic*1+0&dict=A; Internet.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

UNITED STATES AND NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

– Constitution of the United States, Preamble

A defining characteristic of U.S. foreign and national security policy centers on the seemingly dichotomous perspectives of American realism and idealism as old as the U.S. Constitution's edict to "promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."¹² As former President George W. Bush indicated, "our [national security strategy] is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them," remaining "consistent with the great tradition of American foreign policy."¹³ Generally, American idealism has referred to a Wilsonian perspective of moral and liberal motivations for action. On the other hand, American realism places an emphasis on national power and security in pursuit of U.S. interests. However, beyond these broad definitions of American idealism and realism, it is important to have a clear understanding of their fundamental nature as well as the historical context for their underlying characteristics. With a greater appreciation of American realism and idealism provided by analyzing what arguably are the underlying traditions and schools of thought in American foreign policy, it is not surprising to find that in the contemporary strategic environment the Middle East commands a quintessential position for the focus of our foreign policy.

Historical Context

Before examining whether the Middle East warrants special U.S. foreign policy consideration, it is important to have the specific context in the U.S. behind the broad terms of realism and idealism in order to anticipate how those perspectives will affect U.S. actions. Both

¹² Constitutional Convention, *United States Constitution*, (Philadelphia, 1787), Preamble.

¹³ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, foreword.

Walter McDougall and Walter Mead, two prominent U.S. International Relations figures, set about establishing what exactly that “great tradition of American foreign policy” is and argued that to understand U.S. actions in the international arena, it is necessary to expand the lexicon beyond simply realism and idealism. The combination of these two perspectives, with McDougall’s expertise in history and Mead’s understanding of American foreign policy issues, provides a powerful analytic tool for evaluating and analyzing American foreign policy beyond the comparison of realism and idealism.¹⁴

In *Promised Land, Crusader State*, McDougall suggested that until 1890, the U.S. lived the Old Testament narrative and sought to “deny the outside world the chance to shape America’s future.”¹⁵ The four Old Testament traditions that still appeal to the American public are Liberty, Unilateralism, the American System, and Expansionism.¹⁶ The tradition of Liberty influences foreign and domestic policy to “defend, not define” the uniquely American experience and that “all sorts of tactics might be expedient save only one that defeated its purpose by eroding domestic unity and liberty.”¹⁷ Unilateralism, the avoidance of “permanent, entangling alliances... except when our Liberty – the first hallowed tradition – was at risk” was a natural corollary since allegiances to European powers were viewed as one of the most dangerous threats to our young country.¹⁸ Similarly, the American System built on Liberty and Unilateralism by establishing a buffer to foreign infringements on the unique American experiment, a belief Monroe made “explicit by way of responding to several alarming, interconnected feints toward

¹⁴ Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State* (New York: Mariner Books, 1997), 9. Specifically, McDougall contends, “tension we sense in our past and present politics is not one between idealism and realism at all, but between competing conceptions of what is both moral *and* realistic.” Following a historical path, McDougall identifies eight different “traditions” of American policy. Similarly, Mead points out that “We don’t just draw lucky cards; we also play the game well. Over two hundred years we have developed our own unique style” and identifies four “schools” of American policy thought. Walter R. Mead, *Special Providence* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 28.

¹⁵ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 4.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4-10.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 37.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.

the Americas after 1815.”¹⁹ Expansionism, notwithstanding ideological undertones of America as a “nation of many nations...*destined to manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles,*” naturally flowed from the more realist American System perspective as a way to “preempt European bids for influence over the vast unsettled lands that remained in North America.”²⁰

As the U.S. narrative progressed into what McDougall called the New Testament phase, the four traditions of Progressive Imperialism, Wilsonianism, Containment, and Global Meliorism emerged to expand the internally focused America perspective towards one to also shape the outside world.²¹ The U.S. move into the narrative of the New Testament was in response to European imperialism that “partitioned Africa and much of Asia and Oceania” and largely sought protective tariffs.²² As America had found new material means to enforce the American System, Christian ideals seemed to be under attack by “waves of biblical criticism, geology and Darwinism.”²³ In response to the perceived threat to its interests and ideals, the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine signaled Progressive Imperialism and indicated that the U.S. may intervene in the Western Hemisphere when a country’s “inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.”²⁴ The Progressive Imperialism tradition, coupled with Wilson’s belief that the U.S. could exert the moral authority necessary for lasting peace following WWI, contributed to a perspective that war was fearful “[b]ut the right is more precious than peace...”²⁵ However, while Wilson maintained the ideals of

¹⁹ Ibid., 59.

²⁰ McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 77-78.

²¹ Ibid., 4-5.

²² Ibid., 104-105.

²³ Ibid., 120.

²⁴ Ibid., 115.

²⁵ Ibid., 136. Wilson continued with “and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts – for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by

Roosevelt's Corollary, he had discarded "any intimation that U.S. strategic or economic self-interest was involved."²⁶ Following WWII, the Soviet Union threat gave credence to the seventh tradition, Containment, which McDougall argued was consistent with the previous six traditions.²⁷ While McDougall questioned the way Wilsonianism broke from previous traditions that, however morally grounded, still embraced U.S. strategic interests, he deplored even more the most recent tradition of Global Meliorism. From McDougall's perspective, Global Meliorism carries Wilson's hope "to make the world safe for democracy" further and seeks to "make the world democratic" in an American way.²⁸

McDougall's reference of U.S. foreign policy traditions is powerful because it offers a perspective in which each tradition, to varying degrees, logically follows from the previous tradition given the historical strategic context. Moreover, because of the building block approach, each successive tradition maintains within it an element of each of the previous traditions. Further, McDougall's "traditions approach" suggests that while a new tradition may emerge, the most logical place to look for considering what it may be is to carefully consider the scriptural narrative. These eight traditions also help give context to the American strains of idealism and realism. From an idealistic perspective, U.S. policy is motivated by the Old Testament tradition of Liberty and the New Testament traditions of Wilsonianism and Global Meliorism. While not completely dichotomous to the idealistic viewpoint, since each of the successive traditions are part of an ongoing narrative of U.S. foreign policy, American realism draws mainly from the Old Testament traditions of Unilateralism, the American System, and Expansionism and the New Testament traditions of Progressive Imperialism and Containment.

such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

²⁶ Ibid., 130.

²⁷ Ibid., 167.

²⁸ Ibid., 174.

While McDougall traced U.S. foreign policy history and identified the major traditions which have emerged and built upon each other in a temporal manner, Mead's *Special Providence* took a much different approach by considering four dominate "schools" of American foreign policy and evaluated how they have persisted. Mead associated the schools with four prominent figures in American history: Hamilton, Wilson, Jefferson, and Jackson.²⁹ The Hamiltonian school places emphasis on American economic prosperity first, confounding idealist and realist themes in pursuit of "Freedom of the seas, the open door, and an international legal and financial order [to permit] the broadest possible global trade in capital and goods."³⁰ With a similar global perspective, the Wilsonian school that emerges from American missionary work advances the belief that Americans have an obligation to spread American values, especially democracy, throughout the world...and also expects foreign and domestic policy to reflect this ideal. Conflicted within their own school, Wilsonians seek to avoid war, yet have supported aggression when the ends appeal to the spread of democracy and pragmatically serve to the preservation of our democracy. Mead did not challenge whether Wilsonianism belongs in American foreign policy as much as he simply acknowledged that it continues to play an important role, directly challenging McDougall for "[singling] out the 'global meliorist' Wilsonian tradition as an illegitimate interloper in the otherwise stately procession of American foreign policy."³¹

Often in conflict with the more global focus of the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools, Jeffersonians believe that American civil rights, enshrined by the Constitution and Bill of Rights, are constantly under attack by the government. Because of the danger of foreign influence to the unique American experiment, Jeffersonians support defining interests as narrowly as possible and, if necessary, the use of foreign policy "to manage the unavoidable American involvement in

²⁹ Mead, *Special Providence*. Mead offers a summary of the four schools of American foreign policy on pages xvii and 87-89.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 127.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 138.

the world with the least possible risk and cost.”³² Because of the fear of foreign entanglements, Jeffersonians view the global economic and ideological objectives of Hamiltonians and Wilsonians as, at best, necessary evils. Lastly, if “Jeffersonianism is the book ideology of the United States, Jacksonian populism is its folk ideology,”³³ representing “a deeply embedded, widely spread populist and popular culture of honor, independence, courage, and military pride among the American people.”³⁴ Mead argued that while the Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian schools both contrast and complement each other, tension between these components has actually helped make a successful combination because “it appears that over time the competition of the four schools for influence yields a foreign policy that is better than the product of a single individual mind, however great.”³⁵ A similar analogy of the amalgamation of American foreign policy schools can be even more narrowly categorized as a blend of American realism and idealism. Whereas the Wilsonian school is the greatest benefactor for American idealism, the Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian schools correlate more directly to a realism perspective. Having a more contextual understanding of American idealism and realism should help illuminate whether the Middle East warrants the effort and priority necessary to form a holistic approach to joint force structure decisions.

Long-Term Idealism, Short-Term Realism, and the Middle East

As a guiding foundation for our foreign policy, our national security strategy is built upon two pillars: promotion of freedom, justice, human dignity, effective democracies, and free and fair trade and confronting threats by leading a growing community of democracies.³⁶ These two pillars can be seen as naturally reinforcing rather than mutually exclusive. However, in practice

³² Mead, *Special Providence*, 186.

³³ *Ibid.*, 227.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 88.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 95.

³⁶ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, ii.

the U.S. often struggles with a pragmatic and sometimes short-term realistic perspective and an underlying more long-term idealistic desire to foster and indirectly or directly support the spread of democratic principles. For example, prior to 9/11, U.S. policies in the Middle East largely sought stability and to maintain the status quo rather than allow for the idea that change and reform may actually better serve long-term stability.³⁷ During the Cold War, the “status quo” may have served both U.S. interests and ideals to counter the expansion of communism but it did not serve to promote freedom let alone the growth of democracy. Despite the practical tension that may exist between our pursuit of short and long-term interests, it is unlikely that the fundamental nature of our national security and foreign policy strategy will change dramatically due to their foundation upon the enduring schools and traditions of U.S. foreign policy. More relevantly, whether viewed from a realist or idealist perspective, McDougall’s categories of tradition, or Mead’s policy schools, all point towards a preeminent position of relevancy for the Middle East in U.S. foreign policy and national security focus.

Arguably, one of the important issues facing U.S. foreign policy is how to help shape the future of the Middle East towards a path favorable to U.S. interests, particularly with respect to terrorism and extremism. In the nomenclature of President Obama, the “Global War on Terrorism” terminology is being replaced by an “enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism.”³⁸ Despite the change in lexicon, the focus remains the same. Since 9/11, the U.S.

³⁷ Pollack, *A Path Out of the Desert*, 4. Pollack argues that “many interests in the Middle East are best served by the preservation of stability in the region, but that does *not* mean that stability itself is our interest. Change is often necessary, especially when the status quo becomes untenable, as is the case in the Middle East today. Unfortunately, for much of the last thirty years American administrations have failed to make that distinction and have often favored stability and opposed change at all costs. The result has been a series of American policies designed to preserve the status quo that have ended in disaster, from the Iranian Revolution to 9/11.”

³⁸ Associated Press, “Under Obama, ‘war on terror’ phrase fading,” (MSNBC: 1 February 2009, accessed 3 February 2009); available from <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28959574>; Internet. “The ‘War on Terror’ is losing the war of words. The catchphrase burned into the American lexicon hours after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, is fading away, slowly if not deliberately being replaced by a new administration bent on repairing the U.S. image among Muslim nations. Since taking office less than two weeks ago, President Barack Obama has talked broadly of the ‘enduring struggle against terrorism and extremism.’ Another time it was an ‘ongoing struggle.’ He has pledged to ‘go after’ extremists and ‘win this fight.’”

has placed Islamic violent extremist organizations and their hub of power in the Middle East at the nexus of national security and foreign policy focus. While the traditions identified by McDougall in *Promised Land, Crusader State* were crafted before 9/11, given their sound grounding on the American experience, they should still provide insight into U.S. foreign policy decisions in the Middle East. Specifically, the Old Testament foundation is threatened by the global nature of Islamic terrorism. Not only are attacks on America direct encroachments into the American System but indirectly terrorism threatens Liberty due to domestic counter-terrorism efforts. Further, while McDougall did not seem an advocate of Global Meliorism as a tradition that should be accentuated and found the next most recent tradition of Containment more appealing, both traditions give credence to the perspective of a reversed Cold War containment strategy as the continuation of those traditions, in which Afghanistan and Iraq could be viewed as the first “democracy dominoes.”

Similarly, Mead’s four foreign policy schools facilitate an examination of future policy decisions and also indicate a long-term focus on the Middle East from a U.S. foreign policy perspective. From a Hamiltonian perspective, there is a necessity to maintain U.S. and world access to Middle East markets and vital resources. While open to alternatives, Hamiltonians do not shy away from significant military commitments or infringements on civil liberties if it is necessary to maintain economic growth fueled by globalization and dependent upon resources such as oil from the Middle East. Madisonian propensity is towards the call to liberate oppressed citizens across the Middle East and the alluring appeal for expansion of democracy but will be conflicted due to the prospect of a long-running violent conflict. However, motivated by the threat of terrorism to American democracy and civil liberties, Madisonians will likely continue to give some support to a long-term U.S. commitment in the Middle East, seen both morally and

There even was an oblique reference to a ‘twilight struggle’ as the U.S. relentlessly pursues those who threaten the country.”

pragmatically as a solution to terrorism fueled by ideological hatred. Similarly, Jacksonians, called to a “war on terror,” continue to support proactive engagement in the Middle East but continue to question the “long, slow struggle, with no immediate visible foe.”³⁹ Even Jeffersonians, who appear to be the greatest proponent of isolationism and leveraging the interests of other countries to deal with foreign policy issues, are somewhat compelled to remain actively engaged in the Middle East based upon the civil liberties U.S. citizens seem willing to relinquish in the name of domestic counter-terrorism. For example, in the National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq, President Bush said in June 2003 that “Our mission in Iraq is clear. We’re hunting down the terrorists. We’re helping Iraqis build a free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We’re advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability, and laying the foundation of peace for our children and grandchildren.”⁴⁰ It is clear that while the short-term objective is prevention of immediate threats to the U.S. and international community by “hunting down the terrorists,” this realistic perspective in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” is coupled with a longer idealistic perspective of a Wilsonian school perspective built upon the traditions of Liberty, Wilsonianism, and Global Meliorism.⁴¹ It is not surprising that recently former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described U.S. values and interests are ultimately linked.⁴² In the words of President

³⁹ John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class of the United States Naval Academy” (JFK Link: 7 June 1961, accessed 23 November 2008); available from http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk232_61.html; Internet.

⁴⁰ National Security Council, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 3. Further, “As the central front in the global war on terror, success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against the ideology that breeds international terrorism.”

⁴¹ Thucydides, *The Landmark* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 5.89 page 352. In the famous ‘Melian dialogue’, the Athenian delegation told the Melians that “right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”

⁴² Condoleezza Rice, “Rice Defends Regime Change in Iraq, Stresses Diplomacy Elsewhere” (The Washington Post: 19 December 2008, accessed 15 March 2009); available from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/19/AR2008121901321.html>; Internet. “The promotion of democracy is something that the United States has to stay true to, because ultimately our values and our interests are inextricably linked. We’ve learned that with the collapse of the Soviet Union,

Obama, “Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with missiles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions. They understood that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and restraint.”⁴³

ISLAMISM AND THE THREAT

The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression.

– National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006⁴⁴

In the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy, President Bush began his foreword by pointing out that “America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.”⁴⁵ Not since the Cold War has the United States had a single, overriding focus for national security and foreign policy strategy than engagement in the Middle East to counter the threat of terrorism. As identified by Dr. Hillel Fradkin, Director of the Center for Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World at the Hudson Institute, underlying the focus on

which was good for our values and terrific for our interests. So I'm a firm believer that those are linked. On any given day in policy, one has to balance the fact that, yes, sometimes you have to deal with authoritarian regimes. Sometimes you have to deal with friendly regimes that have not made as much progress as you want them to. But unless the United States keeps the lodestar out there of the end of tyranny and that every man, woman, and child deserves to live in a democratic society, it will fall off the international agenda. And that's what the president's speech did. The conversation in the Middle East is fundamentally different today than it was a few years ago as a result, I believe, of American promotion of democratic values.”

⁴³ Obama, Inaugural Address, Washington D.C. Balancing a call for a prudent use of force, President Obama’s inaugural address ended on an especially idealistic and somewhat liberalistic perspective when he said “Let it be said by our children's children that when we were tested we refused to let this journey end, that we did not turn back nor did we falter; and with eyes fixed on the horizon and God's grace upon us, we carried forth that great gift of freedom and delivered it safely to future generations.”

⁴⁴ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, foreword.

the Middle East and the threat of terrorism is the “Islamic phenomenon and movement variously known as Islamism, Salafism, radical Islam, militant Islam, political Islam and the like.”⁴⁶ More specific to U.S. national security, as articulated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “Today, the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and non-state supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.”⁴⁷ Whether viewed as a mortal, ideological conflict in a zero-sum game perspective, or as a threat that is a uniquely ideologically driven by Islam, it is apparent that the U.S. will need to remain focused on the Middle East. Additionally, while globalization will almost certainly bring reform of one shape or another across the Middle East, U.S. actions will help determine the path that reform takes.

Ideological Conflict or Bad Press Coverage?

Arguably, no greater threat exists today to U.S. idealistic objectives than that posed by the Islamic ideology that supports Islamist terrorism. In conflict with American idealism are Islamic movements that seek to submit “all of mankind to one religion – Islam, one God, Allah, and one law – the Islamic law.”⁴⁸ As indicated by *The 9/11 Commission Report*, the “enemy” is “the threat posed by Islamist terrorism...and its ideology” where Islamism is defined as “an Islamic militant, anti-democratic movement, bearing a holistic vision of Islam whose final aim is

⁴⁶ Hillel Fradkin, “The History and Unwritten Future of Salafism,” *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 6 (2008): 5. Mr Fradkin further points out on page 7 that while the different Islamist movements have some differences, what they have in common are “at least three factors: the desire to purify and thus revive Islamic life; the desire to restore the worldly fortunes of Islam; and the conviction that both can be achieved only by reappropriating the model of Islam’s seventh-century founders, the Salaf or virtuous ancestors, which include Mohammed and his closest companions or followers.”

⁴⁷ The White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 5.

⁴⁸ Lambert, Y: *The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*, 134.

the restoration of the caliphate.”⁴⁹ To counter this enemy means “prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.”⁵⁰ However, it is not really accurate to characterize the Middle East, Muslim and otherwise, as a monolithic threat in the same manner as the U.S. viewed the Soviet Union during the Cold War.⁵¹ John Esposito, who has served as President of the Middle East Studies Association of North America and the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, argued “American policymakers, like the media, have too often proved surprisingly myopic, viewing the Muslim world and Islamic movements as a monolith and seeing them solely in terms of extremism and terrorism.”⁵² Even after the events of 9/11, Esposito indicated that Western support of oppressive regimes in the Middle East and Western incursion on the culture of Muslims provided the underlying genesis of radical Islamic terrorist organizations rather than simply religious fanaticism.⁵³ Even further, some Middle East experts such as Youssef Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur claimed that Islamic extremists distort a truer, more moderate, version of Islam.⁵⁴ From this “softer” perspective of the challenges posed to the

⁴⁹ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 361. The report defines the “enemy” as Islamist terrorism and goes on to further define Islamism on page 562.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 363.

⁵¹ John Cornwell, “Are Muslim enclaves no-go areas, forcing other people out” (Times Online: 16 March 2008, accessed 15 March 2009), available from <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/faith/article3537594.ece>; Internet. British historian John Cornwell points out that “Wherever I went, from Oldham in the North to Finsbury Park in the South, I found fragmented Muslim affiliations, rivalries and loyalties, comparable to traditional British socioeconomic and class divides. Many I spoke to thought the term ‘Muslim community’ absurd since their relations are defined by a diversity of clanship, families, villages and class divisions ‘back home’. Every Muslim nation of origin – from Morocco to the Bay of Bengal – contains a huge array of social divisions as well as different complexions of Muslim practice.”

⁵² John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3.

⁵³ John Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27.

⁵⁴ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein and Sherifa Zuhur, “Islamic Rulings on Warfare” (Report, Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 30. “Al-Qaeda and like-minded groups seek to employ Islam and secure Islamic conquest for their own purposes and ignore the emphases that the sacred texts place on restraint and justice. Osama Bin Laden and other extremists want Muslims to believe that Muhammad took up the sword to kill disbelievers, while Islamic texts show that Muhammad resorted to fighting only in defense of his new society in Median. Religious scholars must work more assiduously to discredit this version of Islamic

U.S. in the Middle East, U.S. national security and foreign policy would be better served by developing a greater understanding of Islam and by addressing underlying economic and political sources of resentment rather than viewing the problems through the overly general and arguably misnamed lens of “global war on terrorism.”

Conversely, others have argued that the preservation of the Western way of life and individual liberties is in a mortal struggle against Islam and the Middle East and failure to recognize the nature of the conflict places the West at a disadvantage. As argued by prominent Israeli foreign policy expert and author Ambassador Dore Gold, failure to recognize the primacy of ideology in the current struggle against terrorism and extremism obviously could lead to tactical or operational “successes” yet strategic failure.⁵⁵ For example, Stephen Coughlin, a former military intelligence officer and attorney specializing on Islamic law and ideology, indicated that Islamic law not only condones the use of terrorism but is a driving factor.⁵⁶ In addition to violent means, Islam also seeks expansion by entering the political debate.⁵⁷ The fact

history. We are not proclaiming or inventing an Islamic ‘reformation,’ a theme that has been appearing in the media. An Islamic reform movement began in the 19th century, and there is a well-established tradition of liberal ‘readings’ of the texts. Unfortunately, the extremists and other trends in Muslim thinkers have countered many of these arguments, seeing them as instruments for Westernization. The emphasis on justice, moderation, and restraint long predates our era. Hopefully, it will bring Muslims closer to other faiths and heal the fissures created by the extremists’ brand of Islamic warfare.”

⁵⁵ Dore Gold, *Hatred's Kingdom* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2003), 5-6. Gold further argued that the U.S. continues to mistake military victories as a success in a “war” that is ideological. “The United States and its allies can win the most spectacular military victories in Afghanistan; they can freeze terrorists’ bank accounts and cut off their supplies of weaponry; they can eliminate terrorist masterminds. But even taken together, such triumphs are not enough to remove the terrorist threat, for they do not get at the source of the problem. Terrorism, on the scale of the September 11 attacks, does not occur in a vacuum. . . No, there is another critical component of terrorism that has generally been overlooked in the West: the ideological motivation to slaughter thousands of innocent people. . . In short, unless the ideological roots of the hatred that led to September 11 are addressed, the war on terrorism will not be won.”

⁵⁶ Stephen C. Coughlin, “‘To Our Great Detriment’: Ignoring What Extremists Say About Jihad” (master’s thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), 228.

⁵⁷ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 102. Esposito used the example of the Islamic Salvation Front finding success as an Islamic party in Algeria. “While for many in the West the 1980s were dominated by fears that ‘Islam’ would come to power through revolutions or the violent overthrow of governments by clandestine groups, Algeria saw their Islamists succeed through the ballot box. But this initial Islamist political success gave birth to a spiral of violence and counterviolence that has threatened the very fabric of Algerian

that Islamic law is constitutionally established, though to varying degrees, in most Middle Eastern Muslim countries means that it is a part of those countries' underlying foreign policy. As pointed out by Sayyid Qutb, renowned Egyptian revolutionary who broke with the Muslim Brotherhood over failure to establish an Islamic state governed exclusively through *sharia*, the first step towards achieving individual dignity and freedom under God is by reviving Islamic rule in Muslim countries.⁵⁸ Moreover, encroachment of existing law by Islamic ideals is already finding success in Europe where nationals have begun to feel that they are losing their own identity owing to immigrants who do not want to integrate and that "the majority of Muslims follow the ideology of conquest; it is in the Koran and the Hadith!"⁵⁹ Political scientist Samuel Huntington argued:

As the world moves out of its Western phase, the ideologies which typified late Western civilization decline, and their place is taken by religions and other culturally based forms of identity and commitment. The Westphalian separation of religion and international politics, an idiosyncratic product of Western civilization, is coming to an end...intracivilizational clash of political ideas spawned by the West is being supplanted by an intercivilizational clash of culture and religion.⁶⁰

society. Following bloody antigovernment riots in October 1988, the Algerian government, long regarded as the most monolithic, single-party political system in the Arab world, felt constrained to hold multiparty elections that included the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), North Africa's first legal Islamic political party. Islamic opposition parties had flourished when Algerian state-socialism failed to resolve its social and economic problems."

⁵⁸ Qutb argues that "the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems and the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against God's authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by God. In this respect, Islam's way of life is unique, for in systems other than Islam, some people worship others in some form or another. Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of God alone deriving guidance from Him alone, and bowing before Him alone." Qutb further argues that to bring about the desired Islamic way of life, "we need to initiate the movement of Islamic revival in some Muslim country. Only such a revivalist movement will eventually attain to the status of world leadership, whether the distance is near or far." Syed Qutb, "Milestone" (Studies in Islam and the Middle East Electronic Books: 2005, accessed 10 February 2009), 5-6; available from <http://www.majalla.org>; Internet. The title of his book comes from wanting to establishing guidelines for the "vanguard" that will lead the revivalist movement.

⁵⁹ Ruthie Blum, "A 'dhimmi' view of Europe" (Jerusalem Post - Online Edition: 10 July 2008, accessed 12 August 2008), 2-3; available from <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/offers.html?FMT=FT&pf=1>; Internet.

⁶⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York City: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 54. Interestingly, possibly because of a lack of perceived militancy currently within the ideology, Christian voices which question the secular nature of the U.S. governance are

There is at least some indication that U.S. strategic leadership view the challenges in the Middle East as part of a much larger ideological conflict. As President Bush said during a speech at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2005, “They know that as freedom takes root in Iraq, it will inspire millions across the Middle East to claim their liberty, as well” and that “America’s mission in Iraq is to defeat an enemy and give strength to a friend – a free, representative government that is an ally in the war on terror, and a beacon of hope in a part of the world that is desperate for reform.”⁶¹ President-elect Barack Obama reaffirmed this U.S. priority after recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai, saying that the U.S. “must stand with India and all nations and people who are committed to destroying terrorist networks, and defeating their hate-filled ideology.”⁶² While President Obama has not gone as far as former President Bush to indicate that the “genius of democracy” is that it provides answers to the factors that need to be addressed to defeat “terrorism in the long run,”⁶³ Obama reiterated U.S. support to India “whose democracy will

not viewed as a similar threat. Carl A. Anderson, Supreme Knight of the Knights of Columbus which is a Catholic fraternal benefits organization, states that “In the public life of society, secularism goes even further: It is not content simply to regard religion with indifference, but it increasingly regards religious faith as an obstacle to ‘emancipation’ and ‘liberation’.” Carl A. Anderson, “A Catholic Difference,” *Columbia* (January 2009): 3. Further, as pointed out by Esposito, “As we move forward in the twenty-first century, a key reality to keep in mind is the Islam is the second largest and fastest growing religion not only out there, but also in Europe and America. Improving our understanding of the faith of our fellow citizens and neighbors will require that we look at Muslims with new eyes and judge Islam by the totality and teachings of the faith, not just the beliefs and actions of a radical few. An important first step is to guard against judging Islam by a double standard. When we approach Judaism or Christianity or understand our own faith, we operate differently. We interpret the violent, bloody texts in the Bible in their historical contexts. We explain the history of violence, slaughter, and imperialism in the name of Judaism or Christianity in terms of the times and context, or we condemn such acts as aberrations or extremist.” Esposito, *Unholy War*, 120.

⁶¹ George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror” (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: Office of the Press Secretary, 2005).

⁶² John Cochran, “Mumbai: Obama's First Foreign Policy Test” (ABC News: 28 November 2008, accessed 2 December 2008); available from <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=6355849&page=1>; Internet. This quote was also broadcast on national news stations and viewed by the author.

⁶³ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, 10.

prove far more resilient than the hateful ideology that led to these attacks.”⁶⁴ Besides the fact that geographically, historically, and theologically the Middle East is the origin of the radical Islamic ideology that is currently fueling global terrorist organizations, the Middle East contains vast amounts of natural resources upon which the U.S. and global economic prosperity currently depends.⁶⁵ Further, the Middle East remains a comparatively fairly unstable region, threatening the flow of natural resources and creating uncertainty in terms of how U.S. interests may benefit or be threatened as the regional inevitably becomes more modernized.⁶⁶

In any case, whether we are in an era of ideological conflict between civilizations that will span generations or if the actions of a few “bad actors” are accentuating the perceived threat of radical Islamic movements, the propensity of U.S. foreign policy and the strategic location and resources of the Middle East indicates the region will continue to hold a preeminent position of relevancy for U.S. national security and foreign policy. A holistic perspective encompassing all the elements of national power is required. As indicated by the National Intelligence Council’s

⁶⁴Obama spokesman Brooke Anderson said. “These coordinated attacks on innocent civilians demonstrate the grave and urgent threat of terrorism. The United States must continue to strengthen our partnerships with India and nations around the world to root out and destroy terrorist networks” and continued “We stand with the people of India, whose democracy will prove far more resilient than the hateful ideology that led to these attacks.” Andy Barr, “Bush on Mumbai: ‘Nothing but violence and hopelessness’” (POLITICO: 28 November 2008, accessed 2 December 2008); available from <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1108/16020.html>; Internet.

⁶⁵ Pillar, a veteran of the CIA and former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, points out, from a general perspective, that “terrorism is a method – a particularly heinous and damaging one – rather than a set of adversaries or the causes they pursue. Terrorism is a problem of what people (or groups, or states) do, rather than who they are or what they are trying to achieve. (If Usama bin Ladin, for example, did not use or support terrorist methods, he would be of little concern to the United States – probably receiving only minor notice for his criticism of the Saudi government and his role in the Afghan wars.) Terrorism and our attention to it do not depend on the particular political or social values that terrorists promote or attack. And counterterrorism is not a war against some particular foe; it is an effort to civilize the manner in which any political contest is waged.” Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 18. However, it would be shortsighted not to recognize the influence of Islam and primacy of the Middle East in context of the threat of terrorism dominating current U.S. foreign policy discussions.

⁶⁶ “The same emotions that are driving so many people across the Arab world into the arms of various Islamist opposition groups are also creating a more pervasive set of forces that feed a fundamental instability throughout the region. It is this instability that creates the greatest threats to American interests over the long term.” Pollack, *A Path out of the Desert*, 133. Pollack also argues on page 5 that “Let’s not kid ourselves: America’s first and most important interest in the Middle East is the region’s oil exports.”

2020 Project, “The collective feelings of alienation and estrangement which radical Islam draws upon are unlikely to dissipate until the Muslim world again appears to be more fully integrated into the world economy.”⁶⁷ However, because of the primacy of the Islamic faith in the predominantly non-secular Middle East, globalization’s path to integration will not be without difficulties and conflict.⁶⁸

Globalization and Modernization in the Middle East

Despite the enduring tension that exists in the American perspective of idealism and realism, given that the Middle East will be a central focus of national security and foreign policy it is applicable to consider whether other forces, namely the impact of globalization, will help the “problem fix itself” or, at the other extreme, further complicate and possibly dictate our action. As Thomas Barnett wrote in *The Pentagon’s New Map: Blueprint for Action* which was widely circulated in DOD circles, while the U.S. may have to take action to protect its interests and security, its long-term security rests with integrating isolated regions and nations with the rest of

⁶⁷ National Intelligence Council, *Mapping the Global Future* (Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, 2004), 15. The National Intelligence Council further indicates on page 81 that “The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating over the next 15 years. Facilitated by global communications, the revival of Muslim identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology inside and outside the Middle East, including Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Western Europe, where religious identity has traditionally not been as strong. This revival has been accompanied by a deepening solidarity among Muslims caught up in national or regional separatist struggles, such as Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, Kashmir, Mindanao, and southern Thailand, and has emerged in response to government repression, corruption, and ineffectiveness. Informal networks of charitable foundations, madrassas, hawalas, and other mechanisms will continue to proliferate and be exploited by radical elements; alienation among unemployed youths will swell the ranks of those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.”

⁶⁸ Robert D. Lee, *Overcoming Tradition and Modernity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 50. According to Dr. Lee, a professor at Colorado College who specializes in religion and politics, with emphasis on the Middle East, “The thrust of all authentic thought is toward the particular and away from the universal. By seeking the true self, it divides rather than unites, distinguishes rather than encompasses....The more intensely religious versions seem antithetical to the notion of equal sovereignty for weak and strong, yet that idea appears vital to the practical survival of a self-consciously authentic regime, unwilling to depend on a great power for defense. For this reason, the practical problem of maintaining peace at home and normal relations with neighbors dictates compromise, but compromise begins to separate theory from practice and to invite charges of hypocrisy similar to those leveled at an ancient regime. The more a regime seeks legitimacy in piety, the more it is sensitive to such criticism, and the greater the tension it feels with the equalizing, universalizing forces operant internally and externally.”

the world and the Middle East is a logical place to start.⁶⁹ However, Huntington suggested that an era in which the West sustained an overpowering, unidirectional influence over other civilizations, owing not to superiority of ideas or ideals but by superiority in military might, has given way to a greater dispersion of power with multidirectional and intense interactions among all civilizations.⁷⁰ Huntington further argued that it is unlikely that economic modernization will lead to political integration, since acceptance of certain aspects of “pop culture and consumer goods” has not signaled acceptance of Western civilization.⁷¹ Even John Esposito, a critic of Huntington, pointed out that the enhanced ability of terrorist groups to leverage modern technology and religious fervor owing to globalization increases the threat of Islamic radicalism.⁷² In fact, aspects of globalization can contribute to the challenges posed by the Middle East, such as growth of Islamist extremist networks through exploitation of the Internet.⁷³

⁶⁹ “The global war on terrorism marks the ruthless realism by which we’ll deal with our enemies – day in and day out – over the coming years. But the goal of making globalization truly global by shrinking the Gap speaks to something larger and far more long-term: not individual scenarios to be prevented but a global future to be created. Winning the war will be zero-sum: *some* must die so *others* can remain safe. But securing the peace will be far more inclusive: *they* must be connected so *all* can participate. There is no logical choice between these two pathways, just a balance to be maintained.” Barnett, *Pentagon’s New Map*, 73. Barnett goes on to point out that the Middle East is the logical place to start since it represents a nexus of organizations which present short-term threats to the U.S. yet countries which offer great opportunity to reap the benefits of increased connectivity to the outside world.

⁷⁰ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 50-51.

⁷¹ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 58. Huntington points out that “[s]omewhere in the Middle East a half-dozen young men could well be dressed in jeans, drinking Coke, listening to rap, and, between their bows to Mecca, putting together a bomb to blow up an American airliner.” This is somewhat prophetic of 9/11 and the individuals who appeared to be directly integrated into United States society.

⁷² Esposito, *Unholy War*, 73. Esposito highlights the dangers at the cross-roads of globalization and terrorism by pointing out that “Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s declaration of war against America would bring together many elements from Muslim history (militant jihad, eighteenth-century revivalists, Wahhabi Islam, and condemnation of Western alliances with autocratic Muslim leaders) and add another dimension, the greatly enhanced power that globalization affords to terrorist groups – the ability to harness religion and modern technology to strike anywhere, anytime, and anyplace. This dark side of globalization now strengthens the threat of Islamic radicalism to our stability and security and forces us to recognize that the growing threat of terrorism in the name of Islam is part of a much bigger picture.”

⁷³ House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 5. The report indicates that one of the points that America’s intelligence agencies agree on is that the “Islamist extremist threat will continue to grow though the exploitation and use of the Internet.”

Importantly, religion fills a human requirement and “[n]either Adam Smith nor Thomas Jefferson will meet the psychological, emotional, moral, and social needs of urban migrants and first-generation secondary school graduates” and, while both Christianity and Islam both spread by conversion, Islam has a comparative advantage based upon reproduction rates.⁷⁴ While the U.S. may look at globalization as a movement towards a universal civilization, Huntington points out that “non-Westerns see as Western what the West sees as universal. What Westerners herald as benign global integration, such as the proliferation of worldwide media, non-Westerners denounce as nefarious Western imperialism. To the extent that non-Westerners see the world as one, they see it as a threat.”⁷⁵ In a sense, given the self-perceived solidarity within U.S. society, despite a “patchwork heritage,” it is difficult for many in the U.S. to perceive severe rifts in cultural identities.⁷⁶ Furthermore, the strong influence of the Enlightenment on the American intellectual pedigree further weakens the ability of the U.S. to perceive religious elements as major friction points in international affairs.⁷⁷ Complicating the issue further is that, even if U.S. presence were to decline in the Middle East, governments seen as supportive of Western governments would become a bigger target for attack by radical Islamic elements within their societies. As the writings of Muhammad abd al-Salam Faraj, a follower of Sayyid Qutb, indicate,

⁷⁴ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 65-66. Huntington points out that the “percentage of Christians in the world peaked at about 30 percent in the 1980s” and will probably be surpassed by Muslims by 2025.

⁷⁵ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 66.

⁷⁶ As President Obama said in his inaugural speech in Washington D.C. on 20 January 2009, “For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness. We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus, and non-believers. We are shaped by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth; and because we have tasted the bitter swill of civil war and segregation, and emerged from that dark chapter stronger and more united, we cannot help but believe that the old hatreds shall someday pass; that the lines of tribe shall soon dissolve; that as the world grows smaller, our common humanity shall reveal itself; and that America must play its role in ushering in a new era of peace.”

⁷⁷ Lambert, *Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct*, 28. “First, because of our Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment philosophy, we are snared by rationalism and secularism. This is significant...it represents a critical rejection of an understanding and appreciation of ‘the religious’ altogether – especially in the academic and analytical communities. Theology is often discarded out-of-hand as a variable or a tool of understanding. To the Western mind, the concept of religious passion seems incomprehensible.”

there are strong ideological motives behind the establishment of a “pure” Islamic state across the globe with a return to a strict interpretation of the *Qur’an* and the example set forth by Mohammed.⁷⁸ It is this perspective of Islam that has motivated individuals with liberal political philosophies to also support a larger global conflict with Islamism, dating back to Operation Desert Storm.⁷⁹

Concerning whether the purely economic impact of globalization will alleviate the problems in the Middle East, Huntington argued that the “liberal, internationalist assumption that commerce promotes peace” is “at a minimum, not proven, and much evidence exists to the contrary.”⁸⁰ “At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people of that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer.”⁸¹ Further, even if globalization never

⁷⁸ Muhammad 'Abdus Salam Faraj, *Jihad: The Absent Obligation* (Birmingham: Al Ansaar, Maktabah, 2000), 16. In his section concerning the “Absent Obligation” of a “Return to Islaam” that must accompany jihad, Faraj writes “Indeed the glad tidings regarding the establishment of the Islamic State and the return of the *Khilaafah* (Islamic State) were given by the Messenger of Allaah, not to mention that they are part of the Commandments of Allaah. Further, it is obligatory upon every Muslim to do his utmost to implement them. The Prophet said: ‘Allaah drew the ends of the world near one another for my sake. And I have seen its eastern and western ends. And the dominion of my Ummah would reach those ends which have been drawn near me.’ This is still occurring, because there are countries, which have not been conquered by Muslims until now, and this will happen Insha-Allaah.”

⁷⁹ Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2003), 76. Berman used a liberal rationale for supporting Operation Desert Storm and has categorized Islamism in the same category as Nazism and communism and argues that “Qutb had described a universal experience. But he described it in a specifically Muslim version, with an explanation that put the blame not on anything vague such as modernity or human nature but on something specific and identifiable – namely, on Christianity, and its doleful influence on modern culture, as exported by the power of the Western countries. Qutb trembled in fear at the hideous schizophrenia. He thought the crisis was enormous and incomparably profound. Deep currents of theological and ecclesiastical deviation, two thousand years of Christian error, were bearing that crisis atop the roiling waves. And the tide was rushing forward, across the Muslim world.”

⁸⁰ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 67. Huntington categorizes “increased interaction among peoples” as “trade, investment, tourism, media, electronic communication” and points to studies which show higher levels of trade can be a show of increasing international conflict, especially if there is not an expectation of continued economic interdependence.

⁸¹ Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 76.

eliminates borders which physically and cognitively remain important determinants of human interaction, the transition spaces between borders present the greatest challenges and opportunities for integration.⁸² Even as projects such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative continue to bring many Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries together with the G8 and non-governmental organizations to focus on economic and political liberalization, the chief criticism is that the concentration is really limited to economic issues since genuine political reform would ultimately remove those national leaders sitting at the table from power.⁸³ What has heightened the tension and friction in the Middle East, and helped propagate Islamic movements, is that globalization has not resulted in anticipated individual liberties, national equality in the international system, or reciprocal exchange of ideas with the West.⁸⁴

⁸² Professor David Newman, a British-Israeli scholar and editor for Geopolitics, states that “It is passé to continue to spend our time discussing whether the world is becoming borderless or not. Globalization has had its impacts on some cross-border flows, such as cyberspace and the flow of capital, but it is clear to all scholars of borders that we live in a hierarchical world of rigid orderings and that borders – be they territorial or aspatial – are very much part of our daily lives.” He further points out that “the mechanics through which difference is created, exists and is perpetuated, sometimes through the sealing and the closing of the lines, sometimes (paradoxically) through their opening and the creation of the frontier zones of interaction and transboundary contact and cooperation. The latter is always preferable to the former but it is the latter which really challenges us, since it is easy to understand why difference and animosity exist across the contemporary Israel-Palestine divide, much less so across the peaceful Anglo-Welsh divide.”...”The transition spaces which are created may indeed result in hybridity and mixing; equally the meeting of the other may serve to strengthen notions of difference and animosity. As the lines of separation become more fluid and flexible, so too will the challenge become more difficult, but equally more intriguing.” David Newman, “The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our ‘borderless’ world,” *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no. 2 (2006): 156.

⁸³ Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An Overview,” (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service - The Library of Congress, 2005), 4-5. The BMENA (Broader Middle East and North Africa) “Forum for the Future” initiative most recently met in June 2008. However, as pointed out shortly after the initial Forum in 2004, besides criticism of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as impeding reform, “Other critics charged that the conference was too focused on economic liberalization and modernization rather than on genuine political change. According to Leslie Campbell, director of the Middle East Program at the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, ‘the unspoken fact behind all of the discussions is that we are trying to work with a bunch of people who are going to be kicked out of office if democratic change moves forward... for now, it’s easier to support free-trade agreements than political change.’”

⁸⁴ Lisa Anderson, “Fulfilling Prophecies: State Policy and Islamist Radicalism,” in *Political Islam: Revolution, Redicalism, or Reform?*, ed. John L. Esposito (Boulder, CO: Rienner, 1997), 25-26. “Islamist movements were natural continuations of independence movements that stalled before attaining their final goal. Apparent political independence did not produce freedom, either for the country in the international system or for the individual at home, nor did it lead to economic prosperity or cultural renewal. Indeed, Western languages, political institutions, economic structures, and cultural influences continued to be

Confounding Effect of U.S. Actions

What makes the challenges posed by the Middle East so problematic for the U.S. is that the problems reflect pursuit of short-term “realist” objectives at the expense of supporting the growth of democracy.⁸⁵ Following the end of the Cold War, the United States has refocused on more idealistic values concerning the nature of states rather than a realist view of primacy to our national goals concerning the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the U.S. is suffering the long-term negative consequences of actions taken for shorter-term objectives. In fact, the failure of economic and political reform coupled with deep rooted perceptions that the failures are owing to the West, specifically the U.S., has been cited as a main condition that fuels Islamic radicalism.⁸⁶

strong. Moreover, to add insult to injury, dependence on and fascination with things Western in the Islamic world was almost completely unrequited. As the behavior of the Western tourists, the structure of the Western oil markets, the policies of Western strategic planners all testified, Western interest in the Middle East and North Africa was more a function of its physical than its human or cultural resources. While the governments did not – indeed, could not – acknowledge the psychological dilemma created by the disparity because they could not bite the hands that fed their countries, the Islamists openly expressed the widespread popular resentment of the lack of interest, not to say respect, shown by Westerners for the peoples and cultures of the Islamic world. For a significant number of Islamist leaders, the reciprocal rejection of Western influence was absolute, and notions of popular sovereignty, majority rule, and pluralist democracy were equated with exploitation and lack of authenticity.”

⁸⁵ George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London,” (Iraq - U.S. Policy Documents: 19 November 2003, accessed 29 January 2009); available from <http://merln.ndu.edu/MERLN/PFIraq/policyFileIraq.html>; Internet. In an indictment of previous US and British foreign policies in the Middle East, President Bush gave a speech at the Whitehall Palace in London, support a new focus towards democratization of the Middle East as part of a ‘forward strategy of freedom.’ “We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. Your nation and mine, in the past, have been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold.”

⁸⁶ Angel M. Rabasa and others, *The Muslim World After 9/11* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), xix. The RAND Corporation report, “The Muslim World After 9/11,” indicates that there are three main sources of Islamic radicalism (failed political and economic models; structural anti-Westernism; decentralization of religious authority in Sunni Islam) and two of them deal directly with the U.S. “Arguably, many of the ills and pathologies that afflict many countries in this part of the world and that generate much of the extremism we are concerned about derive from—and contribute to—economic and political failure. This situation leads to the concept of structural anti-Westernism (or anti-Americanism). This concept holds that that Muslim anger has deep roots in the political and social structures of some Muslim countries and that opposition to certain U.S. policies merely provides the content and opportunity for the expression of this anger. It differs fundamentally from the type of anti-Americanism that may result from objections to specific U.S. policies in that it is not amenable to amelioration through policy or public diplomacy means.”

For example, following the cessation of the Afghan-Soviet war in 1989, the Islamic extremism network of support for the mujahedeen did not evaporate unlike the U.S. support which had spanned much of the 1980s. In essence, U.S. support for Islamic extremist efforts against the Soviet Union, confounded with globalization and modernization, has helped create a struggle in the Middle East between traditional and conservative elements within the Muslim community as a “struggle of ideas within the Muslim world between moderates, who saw the need for modernization, tolerance, and cooperation with the West, and extremists who asserted that violence was necessary to defend Islam from aggression and subjugation including against Islamic moderates.”⁸⁷ While other regions and nations have also been, and continue to be, shaped by other powers, the Middle East’s geographic location and energy resources have exacerbated the intrusion of outside super powers on its progression through history.⁸⁸ The total victory of Israel over combined Arab forces in the 1967 Six-Day Arab-Israeli war followed centuries of perceived denigration under European imperialism and marked a turning point where jihad against Israel and use of economic power, exemplified by the Arab oil embargo, became sources

⁸⁷ Daniel S. Roper, “Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War,” *Parameters* (autumn 2008): 99.

⁸⁸ Avi Shlaim, “The Middle East: The Origins of Arab-Israeli Wars,” in *Explaining International Relations Since 1945*, ed. Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 222-223. Avi Shlaim, a noted source concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict and professor of International relations at Oxford, claims that in addition to conflicting territorial claims between Palestinian Arabs and Israel and the ebb and flow of Arab unity in relation to the state of Israel, the history of involvement of great powers in the region is a third major source of tension and instability in the Middle East. “Two features of the Middle East help to account for the interest and rivalry it has evoked among the great powers in the twentieth century: its geostrategic importance and its oil reserves. Great power involvement is not, of course, a feature unique to the Middle East but one that affects, in varying degrees, all regions of the world; what distinguishes the Middle East is the intensity, pervasiveness, and profound impact of this involvement. No other part of the Third World has been so thoroughly and ceaselessly caught up in great power rivalries. No other subsystem of the international political system has been as deeply penetrated as the Middle East. The dominant great powers in the Middle East have been the Ottoman Empire until its dissolution in 1918, Britain and France until, roughly, the Suez War of 1956, the United States and the Soviet Union from Suez until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the United States on its own since 1991. So much stress has been laid on the role of these external powers that the history of the modern Middle East, in the words of Malcolm Yapp, has often been written as though the local states were ‘driftwood in the sea of international affairs, their destinies shaped by the decisions of others’. Yet this is a false picture, popular as it is with Middle Easterners and outsiders alike. From Yapp’s detailed historical survey it emerges quite clearly that the dominant feature in the relations between international and regional powers is the manipulation of the former by the latter.”

of power for Arab nations.⁸⁹ Given the Cold War legacy of the U.S. in the Middle East, coupled with perceived ambivalence of the U.S. unless Israel or oil are at risk, any direct or indirect involvement the U.S. has in the region will be viewed with skepticism.⁹⁰ Additionally, efforts to promote democracy may exacerbate the threat of terrorists attacks on the U.S.⁹¹ More challenging to U.S. efforts to shape the Middle East is that the leadership of Muslim countries may be deemed illegitimate based upon perceived collusion with outside, non-Islamic forces. This precedent goes back to the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya during Mongol dominance of the region and, more contemporarily, the teaching of former Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb.⁹² Beyond indigenous populations, Arabic nations are also under pressure from regional

⁸⁹ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 8. The jihad against Israel was declared by Anwar Sadat in 1973.

⁹⁰ Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, "Getting to the Core," in *Uncharted Journey - Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, eds. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 251-252. "When the United States talks of promoting democracy, many Arabs have concluded, it is really talking about forcefully removing regimes it does not like and replacing them with ones willing to safeguard U.S. interests. Democracy promotion is perceived as a dark, self-interested conspiracy rather than a generous attempt to improve the lives of Arabs and make the region a better, less dangerous place. Some Arabs do not even believe that the United States is interested in reform, except in the case of anti-American regimes, where it wants their elimination. Despite the new rhetoric, they are convinced, the United States remains quite willing to accept autocratic regimes when it suits its interests. Democracy promotion, in other words, is for many in the region either a dark conspiracy or meaningless rhetoric. It is nearly impossible for the United States to overcome this distrust in the short run. After all, it is a fact that the United States became concerned about democracy in the Middle East after September 11, at the same time as it started planning war in Afghanistan and Iraq."

⁹¹ William E. Stebbins, "Fighting Islamic Terrorists with Democracy: A Critique" (Monograph, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007). In a U.S. Army School of Advance Military Studies monograph, Major Stebbins argument is that by focusing on the political and economic issues usually associated with promoting democracy, the U.S. drains resources from defeating the radical Islamic non-state actors which pose the most immediate threat to the U.S. and, by easily being cast as imperialists/Crusaders, actually legitimizes the terrorist acts and spurs recruitment.

⁹² Esposito, *Unholy War*, 46. "Ibn Taymiyya's ire was especially directed at the Mongols. Despite their conversion to Islam, the Mongols had been locked in a jihad with the Muslim Mamluk rulers of Egypt. Because the Mongols continued to follow the Yasa code of laws of Genghis Khan instead of the Islamic law, Shariah, for Ibn Taymiyya they were no better than the polytheists of the pre-Islamic jahiliyyah. He issued a fatwa that labeled them as unbelievers (kafirs) who were thus excommunicated (takfir). His fatwa regarding the Mongols established a precedent: despite their claim to be Muslims, their failure to implement Shariah rendered the Mongols apostates and hence the lawful object of jihad. Muslim citizens thus had the right, indeed duty, to revolt against them, to wage jihad. Later generations, from the Wahhabi movement to modern Egypt's Sayyid Qutb, Islamic Jihad, the assassins of Anwar Sadat, and Osama bin Laden, would use the logic in Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa on the Mongols to call for a jihad against "un-Islamic" Muslim rulers and elites and against the West."

countries, such as Iran, to maintain deference to Islamic law and to be wary of alignment with the West.⁹³

The central tension in the Middle East for the U.S. is how to prevent short-term attacks while obtaining long-term security and whether what is needed is a “transformation of Muslim societies” or not.⁹⁴ Religious difference, while not the main cause, “hardens the boundaries between national communities and so makes it easier for terrorist leaders to portray the conflict in zero-sum terms, demonize the opponent, and gain legitimacy for martyrdom from the local community.”⁹⁵ Besides a religious perspective, one study of a particular facet of terrorism, suicide terrorism, indicated that “data show that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism” but that nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have a “specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces” from their land.⁹⁶

That is not to say that fundamental American idealism, with an underlying ambitious liberal goal of spreading democracy to end world conflict, is a failed objective in the Middle East, though at least as long ago as Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* it has been argued that Islam is not compatible with democracy.⁹⁷ As pointed out by former Iranian president

⁹³ Middle East Media Research Institute, “A World Without Zionism or America,” (e-Zion Israel News: 27 October 2005, accessed 9 February 2009); available from http://www.zionism-israel.com/news/world_without_zionism.htm; Internet. “I warn all the leaders of the Islamic world to be wary of Fitna: If someone is under the pressure of hegemonic power [i.e. the West] and understands that something is wrong, or he is naïve, or he is an egotist and his hedonism leads him to recognize the Zionist regime - he should know that he will burn in the fire of the Islamic Ummah [nation].”

⁹⁴ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York City: Random House, 2005), 7. As pointed out by Pape “The key to lasting security lies not only in rooting out today’s generation of terrorists who are actively planning to kill Americans, but also in preventing the next, potentially larger generation from rising up. America’s overarching purpose must be to achieve the first goal without failing at the second.”

⁹⁵ Pape, *Dying to Win*, 80.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Cambridge: Sever and Francis, 1863), 26. “Mohammed professed to derive from Heaven, and has inserted in the Koran, not only religious doctrines, but political maxims, civil and criminal laws, and theories of science. The Gospel, on the contrary, speaks only of the general relations of men to God and to each other, beyond which it inculcates and imposes no

Mohammad Khatami in 1991 during a television interview, “existing democracies do not necessarily follow one formula or aspect. It is possible that a democracy may lead to a liberal system. It is possible that democracy may lead to a socialist system. Or it may be a democracy with the inclusion of religious norms in the government. We have accepted the third option.”⁹⁸ In particular, John Esposito argued that current Islamic concepts already offer a basis for the development of democracy in the Muslim world, mainly through the *shura* tradition of consultation.⁹⁹ Further, there is more historical precedent of Muslims living within democratic societies than living under mullah led governance.¹⁰⁰

However, even if the Middle East is suitable for expanded democratization, it is likely that it will take a long time for significant changes to take hold.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the U.S. must carefully evaluate the path modernization, and potentially democratization, across the Middle East will take, help shape its development in a positive direction in lines with our short and long-

point of faith. This alone, besides a thousand other reasons, would suffice to prove that the former of these religions will never long predominate in a cultivated and democratic age, while the latter is destined to retain its sway at these as at all other periods.”

⁹⁸ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 146.

⁹⁹ John Esposito, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and Southwest Asia* (Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2001), 28. “With regard to the compatibility of Islamic belief and values with democracy, many in the worldwide Muslim community believe that Islam is capable of reinterpretation (*ijtihad*) and that traditional concepts of consultation (*shura*), consensus (*ijma*), and legal principles such as the general welfare (*maslaha*) provide the bases for the development of modern Muslim notions or authentic versions of democracy. While some would reinterpret traditional beliefs to essentially legitimate western generated forms of democracy, others wish to develop their own forms of political participation and democracy appropriate to Islamic values and realities.”

¹⁰⁰ United States Institute of Peace, *Islam and Democracy* (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2002), 3. “In considering the compatibility of Islam and democracy, Muqtedar Khan noted, one must recognize that it is false to claim that there is no democracy in the Muslim world. At least 750 million Muslims live in democratic societies of one kind or another, including Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Europe, North America, Israel, and even Iran. Moreover, there is little historical precedent for mullahs controlling political power. One exception is Iran since the revolution in 1979 and the other is the Taliban in Afghanistan. For the preceding 1500 years since the advent of Islam, secular political elites have controlled political power.”

¹⁰¹ Jennie Carignan, “Democracy in the Middle East: a Goal or an Impossibility” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007). LtCol Jennie Carignan analyzed the suitability of the Middle East for democracy and, while not finding any significant factors which would indicate the Middle East is ready for a semblance of Western liberal democracy, also did not find any evidence to support claims that the Middle East was not compatible with democracy.

term interests, be cognizant of the possible dangers along that path, and develop a modern military to reflect the most likely outcomes and mirrored requirements.¹⁰² Even more specific to the U.S. military, the National Defense Strategy introduction indicates that a “core responsibility of the U.S. Government is to protect the American people....For our friends and allies, as well as for our enemies and potential adversaries, our commitment to democratic values must be matched by our deeds. The spread of liberty both manifests our ideals and protects our interests.”¹⁰³ Whether globalization and economic integration of the Middle East result in a “clash of civilization” or “more connectedness,” modernization and potentially a condition of “modernity” is somewhat inevitable.¹⁰⁴ How that transition progresses will have a large impact on how the U.S. policy shapes, and is shaped, by that path. The U.S. is likely to continue to be one of the primary entities against which the Middle East defines itself and, irrespective of our intent, our

¹⁰² The perspective that reform is somewhat inevitable and preferable over stability in dangerous regimes in the Middle East also reflects the opinion of several officials from OSD-Policy. Reform is now part of the lexicon in the Middle East in ways that few could imagine just a few years ago. Moving forward, political and economic reform efforts will no doubt be uneven and turbulent at times, but it remains in U.S. interests to promote and to help channel such efforts. While the path to greater reform may appear dangerous, it is preferred over stability in regimes that foster, support, or fail to confront extremism and terrorism. Further, the evolution of current regimes in a more republic fashion, with greater economic, political, and cultural opportunities for citizens, is not only viable but is probably the only long-term strategy for progress against the threat of extremism and terrorism. While the lead for promoting reform is the Department of State, DOD helps in many ways such as extensive mil-to-mil contacts, educational efforts, and focused foreign military sales.

¹⁰³ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 1.

¹⁰⁴ Barnett, *Pentagon's New Map*, 92. Barnett argues that “The Islamist conservatives in countries such as Saudi Arabia can seek to deny the youth such connectivity through censorship and interdiction, but by and large, it’s going to be a losing battle as time wears on. Regimes in the region have a difficult choice: either open up economically to provide the jobs necessary to process the youth bulge or try to contain all that ambition through political repression. If they choose the former, the resulting connectivity will render their attempts at social conservatism all the more difficult, but if they choose repression, they run the risk of social implosion.” Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations*, 73. Huntington viewpoint doesn’t conflict with Barnett’s perspective that modernization is inevitable, pointing out that “Except for small, isolated, rural communities willing to exist at a subsistence level, the total rejection of modernization as well as Westernization is hardly possible in a world becoming overwhelmingly modern and highly interconnected.”

actions will shape the context on how we are perceived by individual citizens and national leadership in the region.¹⁰⁵

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE MILITARY

We should act to reduce risks by shaping the development of trends through the decisions we make regarding the equipment and capabilities we develop and the security cooperation, reassurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and operational activities we pursue. Implementation of any strategy is predicated on developing, maintaining and, where possible, expanding the means required to execute its objectives within budget constraints. Without the tools, we cannot do the job. The Department of Defense is well equipped for its primary missions, but it always seeks to improve and refine capabilities and effectiveness. The challenges before us will require resourcefulness and an integrated approach that wisely balances risks and assets, and that recognizes where we must improve.

– Secretary of Defense Gates, 2008, *National Defense Strategy*

Given the complex and intertwined nature of U.S. idealism and realism, while there is no clear indicator of what specific U.S. grand strategy for the Middle East may develop, if at all, there is ample evidence to indicate the region will maintain a preeminent position in our foreign policy focus. However, given the same complex nature of the guiding principles of U.S. national security policy, it is not surprising that it is difficult to translate those principles into a coherent and readily consistent strategy for the use of the military instrument of national power to support that policy. Furthermore, because the U.S. policy for the Middle East is so complex and no clear and definitive precedent is established for the entire region, it is further complicated due to reliance on a more personal perspective of U.S. presidents which changes with each presidential election.¹⁰⁶ Despite the difficulties, given the obvious relevancy and primacy of the Middle East

¹⁰⁵ Esposito, *Unholy War*, 27. “Western governments are perceived as propping up oppressive regimes and exploiting the region’s human and natural resources, robbing Muslims of their culture and their options to be governed according to their own choice and to live in a more just society. Many believe that the restoration of Muslim power and prosperity requires a return to Islam, the creation of more Islamically oriented states and societies. Some Muslims, a radicalized minority, combine militancy with messianic visions to inspire and mobilize an army of God whose jihad they believe will liberate Muslims at home and abroad.”

¹⁰⁶ Steven L Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 14-15. “Whenever a new president arrives in the Oval Office, the system changes because he brings with him a new set of advisers and associates, a new background, different knowledge and predispositions, a new philosophy, a conception of his own interest, and a new attitude toward the proper policy roles of the

in U.S. foreign policy focus, it is surprising that a more robust and holistic synchronization of a whole of government ends, ways, and means has not matured to deal with the primacy of radical Islamic terrorism and its center of gravity in the Middle East. In words as indicative of their time as well as the present, President Kennedy said “When there is a visible enemy to fight, the tide of patriotism in this country runs strong. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediate visible foe...your choice will seem hard.”¹⁰⁷ Given the complexity of the challenges the U.S. faces in the Middle East, it is necessary to have a holistic approach to the region concerning both long-term and short-term interests as well as all elements of national power. Is the military prepared to help shape and inform the formation of that approach?

The choices do seem hard indeed for determining a balanced joint force structure to meet current and future challenges. One of the objectives of the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to ensure strategic needs versus service interests were the primary factor for department of defense resource allocation. While improvements have been made in terms of joint requirements driving service procurements, service-centric perspectives still dominate long-term resource allocation and acquisition strategies. The risk is a parochial view of how the services want to fight versus the joint warfighting combatant commander perspective of the capabilities required to actually conduct operations.¹⁰⁸

bureaucracy, Congress, and interest groups. Each president sets the rules and helps determine the victors in the war for Washington that is waged between the Arabs, the Israelis, and their respective American supporters.”

¹⁰⁷ Kennedy, “Remarks at Annapolis to the Graduating Class.”

¹⁰⁸ Two good sources for this discussion are James R. Locher III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 14 and Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era - Phase 2,” (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 77-79.

Translating National Security Policy into Joint Force Structure Decisions

To help translate national security policy into action, the President of the United States is responsible for producing a “congressionally mandated National Security Strategy (NSS) document” that, as an interagency product, “serves to discipline the interagency system to understand the president’s agenda and priorities and develops a common language that gives coherence to policy.”¹⁰⁹ In addition to National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy documents, the Department of Defense also regularly performs a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to “help shape the process of change to provide the United States with strong, sound and effective warfighting capabilities in the decades ahead.”¹¹⁰ Unfortunately, from the “top down,” the United States has challenges to implementing a holistic national security strategy to balance the development of elements of national power with the resources available to meet the span of challenges it faces.¹¹¹

While an instructional document from the Defense Acquisition University suggests that the defense resource allocation process is designed to efficiently and effectively allocate resources towards the generation of military capabilities while answering what the U.S. needs, how the capabilities should be developed, and how much should be spent, much criticism points

¹⁰⁹ Gabriel Marcella, “National Security and the Interagency Process,” in *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J. Boone Jr. (US Army War College, 2004), 247.

¹¹⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), *QDR* (accessed 19 December 2008); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/>; Internet.

¹¹¹ Rice, “Rice Defends Regime Change in Iraq.” Even former Secretary of State Rice, who has been supportive of interactions between the State Department and Department of Defense, has admitted that, even with the efforts to date with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan, further refinement is required. “And so while I understand the desire to make all of this work better, I think that we have a lot of innovations now that need to be worked on and need to be furthered. We’re learning. We’ve learned the hard way that counterinsurgency, which is mostly what we’re doing around the world, is not war and then peace; it’s a continuum. And yes, civilians and military have to cooperate better together. But you do have two very distinct departments with two very distinct missions and two very distinct sets of authorities. And what we’ve been able to do is to blend those through various mechanisms without really eroding the State Department’s capabilities and the State Department’s mission, or eroding the mission of our military. I prefer the blended strategy that we have.”

towards a bleaker reality.¹¹² For example, a criticism of the QDR process is that it becomes a service-centric process in which the status quo of budgetary positions is maintained rather than an honest assessment of the most desirably joint force structure.¹¹³ Additionally, Secretary of Defense Gates has been very outspoken that a myriad of influences on Department of Defense have hindered his ability to shape the military force structure for a “balanced” strategy for national defense to be prepared for threats from the conventional rival nation level to the “prolonged, world-wide irregular campaign” the U.S. finds itself involved in today:

When referring to “Next-War-it is,” I was not expressing opposition to thinking about and preparing for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so – and the overwhelming majority of the people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry to just that. My point was simply that we must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that we neglect to provide, both short-term and long-term, all the capabilities necessary to fight and win conflicts such as we are in today.

Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support – including in the Pentagon – for the

¹¹² Sean C. Sullivan, *Defense Resource Allocation: The Formal Processes in U.S. Defense Planning* (Newport: Naval War College, 2007). Professor Sullivan, from the United States Naval War College National Security Decision Making Department, outlines the formal processes used in defense resource allocation. Included are a description of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to “assess the national security environment to evaluate current strategy, develop national military strategy, and analyze existing or proposed defense programs and budgets,” the SECDEF’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process for defense strategy, programming priorities, and budget control, and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) for iterative and adaptive plan development.

¹¹³ “The QDR is really a pitched battle scenario,” says Kathleen Hicks, formerly director of policy planning in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who participated in the last QDR and now is a fellow at CSIS directing a study on how to improve Defense governance. The services always are better prepared than the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the review, she says. They’re better funded, have more personnel dedicated to the QDR and “the services run QDR shops in the off years,” she adds. By contrast, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is highly reliant on outside expertise for its QDR work, and its analytic staff essentially stands down in off years. Hicks says that when the military services see something they don’t like emerging during the QDR process, they go to members of Congress and begin building political support to stop it.” Greg Grant, “Girding For Battle,” (Government Executive.com: 1 January 2008, accessed 19 December 2008); available from <http://governmentexecutive.com/features/0108-01/0108-01s3.htm>; Internet. Further, an Air University report indicates that “Traditionally, the Services present a strategy with accompanying budget requirements and typically do not deviate from this position as the QDR progresses. The QDR should not be a pitched battle over programs and budget, or a zero-sum game. Instead, the Services should contribute their individual strengths symbiotically to our overall national defense.” P. Dean Patterson and Lenny J. Richoux, *Rethinking the QDR: The Case for a Persistent Defense Review* (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 2008), 4.

capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of missions we are most likely to undertake in the future.¹¹⁴

Gates' perspective is shared by a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which indicated that "the gap between setting policy priorities and effectively executing them is one of the hardest and most frustrating perennials in our system of government."¹¹⁵ To strengthen the link between policy, resource allocation, and execution, the three main challenges are to establish an agreed interagency approach, especially for high priority mission areas, to establish a process to "ensure that agency budgets reflect the President's highest national security priorities," and to create "adequate mechanisms to coordinate the policy implementation of diverse U.S. actors within various regions of the world."¹¹⁶ Similarly, as indicated in the National Defense Strategy, the Department of Defense needs to more proactively shape the decisions of the service components in their long-term "equipment and capabilities" procurement strategies to balance "future challenges risks" across the joint force.¹¹⁷ Further, what is necessary is to balance the risks across the joint force without losing perspective of what makes each of the services indispensable and maintaining the ability to conduct joint operations across the spectrum of conflict.

To facilitate interagency and defense level decisions, a holistic perspective of how the military element of national power can be applied is necessary, in particular to facilitate a "mechanism for integrating the activities of all U.S. government players in a given region."¹¹⁸

However, while it is a whole of government challenge to balance national level ends, ways, and

¹¹⁴ Robert M. Gates, "Speech: National Defense University" (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), 29 September 2008). Secretary of Defense Gates elaborated on the context for the National Defense Strategy. "The defining principle driving our strategy is balance. I note at the outset that balance is not the same as treating all challenges as having equal priority. We cannot expect to eliminate risk through higher defense budgets, to, in effect 'do everything, buy everything.'"

¹¹⁵ Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Phase 2*, 30-31.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹¹⁷ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 20-22.

¹¹⁸ Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Phase 2*, 37.

means, the military is currently ill-equipped by itself to help inform, let alone shape, that strategic discussion. As indicated by former Chief of Staff of the Air Force General T. Michael Moseley while he was still in office, “we owe the Nation a holistic approach that balances today’s exigencies with the far-reaching, long-term implications of looming threats.”¹¹⁹ While regional and country specific focus is provided for the military by regional combatant commanders in a holistic manner, even attempting to go beyond a joint perspective and bring in interagency and international partners, a national level holistic perspective of a strategic concepts coupled with regional and country specific details is required to assess the most effective way to meet national objectives while balancing risks. As the current National Defense Strategy indicates, the U.S. military “should act to reduce risks by shaping the development of trends through the decisions we make regarding the equipment and capabilities we develop;”¹²⁰ we “cannot do everything, or function equally well across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately we must make choices.”¹²¹ In the post Cold War “9/11” era more, not fewer, tasks are being levied on our military forces. As an example, the U.S. Army has included “stability and civil support” operations in addition to “offensive” and “defensive” in Field Manual 3-0 *Operations* based upon a future in which “our Nation will continue to be engaged in an era of ‘persistent conflict’.”¹²²

Newly elected President Obama’s defense agenda indicates the U.S. “will invest in a 21st century military to maintain our conventional advantage while increasing our capacity to defeat

¹¹⁹ T. Michael Moseley, “The Nation’s Guardians - America’s 21st Century Air Force” (CSAF White Paper, 29 December 2007), 5. Former CSAF General Moseley’s White Paper was required reading for all Air Force Professional Military Education students. “The Global War on Terrorism is a generational struggle we must win. The Air Force will continue to fly and fight in the various theaters of this war. At the same time, we owe the Nation a holistic approach that balances today’s exigencies with the far-reaching, long-term implications of looming threats. America’s Air Force will succeed in the 21st Century only by developing and resourcing a strategy that closes the gap between ends and means.”

¹²⁰ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 5.

¹²¹ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 20.

¹²² Headquarters Department of the Army, “Operations,” *Field Manual 3-0* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2008), foreword.

the threats of tomorrow.”¹²³ However, efforts to balance current and future military requirements tied to strategic end states against the necessary ways to achieve those ends is being confounded by a period in which the military budget will probably see stagnant growth or even a reduction. Furthermore, significant cost increases have resulted in tremendous changes to modernization and recapitalization programs. For example, there has been continual erosion in the development of future Air Force aircraft weapon systems since World War II, with almost as many initial aircraft starts occurring for fighter and bomber aircraft in the 1960s as the four decades since then.¹²⁴ The Air Force has attempted to reverse a gradual increase in their average aircraft age, exacerbated by a “procurement holiday” in the 1990s, by reducing the number of personnel.¹²⁵ Clearly, making sweeping tradeoffs between personnel end strength numbers and modernization programs poses strategic effects on our nation’s ability, and flexibility, to wage war. The Army and Navy face similar modernization challenges concerning the tradeoffs that will need to be made given economic realities, with the Army’s Command and General Staff College’s Deputy Commander asking students and faculty, in an effort to stimulate thought and discussion, “How should the Army approach this problem? How do [we] capture risk? Should we decrement everyone or cut

¹²³ The White House, *The Agenda – Defense* (Washington, D.C., 26 January 2009, accessed 26 January 2009); available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/defense/>; Internet.

¹²⁴ Bruce Carlson and Stephen Chambal, “Developmental Planning,” *Air & Space Power Journal* (Spring 2008): 6. “In the past, rapid advances in aviation benefited greatly from a high number of new-program starts. As the same time, many industrial partners built their own aircraft to sell to the Department of Defense or to use in ‘fly-off’ competitions. We gained an incredible amount of knowledge, experience, and technological maturity even when the programs were cancelled and not taken into full production. Soon after the end of World War II, new starts declined dramatically and have continued this downward trend, significantly affection aviation dedicated to America’s defense. Today, the rarity of new starts places tremendous pressure on early [developmental planning] activities to support successful program execution.”

¹²⁵ Michael W. Wynne and T. Michael Moseley, “Presentation to the Armed Services Committee,” 24 October 2007. “With the funds we have available, have programmed, and have tried to free up with personnel endstrength cuts, we are attempting to halt, then reverse the steadily aging trend. In the 1990s, the Air Force deliberately chose to assume risk in modernization and, instead, sustained aging weapon systems throughout continual combat operations. The tragedies on 9/11 and resulting War on Terror regrettably coincided with the period when the Air Force expected to recover and begin a true force-wide re-capitalization. While victory in the war on terror is our number one priority, the nation cannot afford to take another procurement holiday that places our future at grave risk. We will not win tomorrow’s fight without re-capitalization, and we cannot sacrifice victory in today’s fight to prepare for tomorrow.”

major programs?”¹²⁶ There is a need to make joint force structure decisions to more proactively balance capabilities with risks, synchronizing national security and foreign policy strategy with services’ organize, train, and equip responsibilities, and regional combatant commanders’ efforts... a holistic approach.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report indicates for the 21st century the “Total Force must continue to adapt to different operating environments, develop new skills and rebalance its capabilities and people if it is to remain prepared for the new challenges of an uncertain future.”¹²⁷ However, the same report indicates that the “rebalance” is really going to reflect service-level decisions rather than across the Department of Defense.¹²⁸ For example, the QDR is supposed to be “strategy driven” rather than “budget driven” under the guise of allowing risk determination.¹²⁹ However, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that

¹²⁶ In an e-mail circulated to the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College U.S. Army Combined Arms Center intended to stimulate thought and discussion amongst students and faculty, BG Cardon wrote: “DoD budget cuts will occur. DoD has gone from a budget of \$293 billion in 2001 to \$647 billion this year, we should expect some reduction in the overall DoD budget. Our Army has a choice -- to sit on the sideline or shape the discussion. How should the Army approach this problem? How do capture risk? Should we decrement everyone or cut major programs? Clearly FCS is an issue -- program has grown to \$300 billion from its original \$175 billion which make it a prime candidate for cuts, especially from the outside, if we cannot describe both the effectiveness and efficiency of the program. We could speak about the 70-odd FCS items under testing that will probably be available in one way or another to Soldiers starting in 2011, therefore bringing it back to the Soldier.” Edward C. Cardon, “A Few Big Ideas,” *New York Times*, 6 January 2009.

¹²⁷ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), 75-76.

¹²⁸ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, 76. “The Department plans to introduce a new methodology and review process to establish a baseline for personnel policy, including the development of joint metrics and a common lexicon to link the Defense Strategy to Service-level rebalancing decisions. This process will help synchronize rebalancing efforts across the Department.”

¹²⁹ Department of Defense, “Quadrennial Defense Review” (DefenseLink: 3 February 2009, accessed 3 February 2009); available from http://www.defenselink.mil/dbt/products/Sept-06-BEA_ETP/bea/iwp/definitions1_icomarrow_175980.htm; Internet. “This is a review of the nation's defense strategic objectives that are needed to support the National Military Strategy. This review enables the Department of Defense to develop strategic goals and plans to meet the current requirements and make future investment decisions to transform equipment requirements, organizational structures, and operational concepts into more efficient military forces. The Quadrennial Defense Review is strategy-driven, not budget-driven, so that the decision makers can assess the risk of not having the desired amount of resources to meet the requirements.”

the 2006 QDR failed to even provide a sound analytic approach for risk assessment.¹³⁰ More importantly, the GAO's first two critiques of the 2006 QDR focused on the lack of analysis to support force structure and personnel requirement decisions, something the GAO has found to be an enduring QDR weakness, with force structure decisions "not clearly supported by analysis and linked to strategic plans."¹³¹ In fact, the GAO's first recommendation was that the Secretary of Defense should develop "appropriate methods" to assess alternate force structure and personnel requirements.¹³² In essence, the QDR fundamentally fails to provide a construct for joint force structure and end strength decisions that inherently have to balance risk simultaneously between desired ends, the ways our instruments can and could be applied, and the means available. Instead, the QDR process has relied on service-centric perspectives to drive DOD-level or above decisions.

¹³⁰ United States Government Accountability Office, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, 2007), 6. As a third critique of the 2006 QDR, the GAO reports that "the risk assessments conducted by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which are required by the QDR legislation, did not fully apply DOD's risk management framework to demonstrate how risks associated with the proposed force structure were evaluated. Although tasked to use the risk management framework to demonstrate how risks were evaluated, several of the QDR study teams relied primarily on professional judgment to assess risks and examine the consequences of not investing in various capabilities. The Chairman was not tasked to use the risk management framework in assessing risks and did not choose to use it in his assessment. Our prior work has shown that performing a data-driven risk assessment can provide a guide to help organizations shape, focus, and prioritize investment decisions to develop capabilities. DOD did not conduct a comprehensive data-driven risk assessment because, according to DOD officials, it had difficulties in developing the department-level measures that would be necessary to assess risk and, as a result, the assessment tools were not available for use during the QDR."

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹³² United States Government Accountability Office, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 34. In response to the GAO's recommendation, the DOD's response was basically that it was too complex and there was not enough time during the QDR process. The GAO report went on to report on pages 45-46 that "[t]o produce an alternate force structure, analysts would need to produce different concepts of operation for each vignette. While such analysis was not undertaken comprehensively during the QDR, the methodology exists for assessing alternate force structures.... The QDR is designed to evaluate the defense strategy and produce a defense program aligned to that strategy. It is not feasible to complete both of these tasks during the QDR process. The detail and complexity of the analysis required to align the entire defense program with a revised strategy extends well beyond the QDR, especially because a significant portion of the review process is spent revising the strategy."

Goldwater-Nichols and Defense Reform

Previous efforts have helped improve “jointness” of the U.S. military. In particular, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 help institutionalize significant improvements towards integrating service capabilities for employment as a joint force. The Act had such a significant impact that it is commonly recognized simply by “Goldwater-Nichols.” Broadly, the eight objectives of Goldwater-Nichols were: strengthen civilian leadership, improve military advice, ensure that the combatant commanders had authorities commensurate with their responsibilities, increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning, achieve a more efficient use of defense resources, improve the management of joint officers, enhance the effectiveness of military operations, and improve the management and administration of the Department of Defense.¹³³ Indicative of the defense bureaucracy’s resistance to changes which might threaten services’ power, the changes imposed by Goldwater-Nichols were resisted by Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the service leaders.¹³⁴ Despite institutional resistance within the DOD, much progress has been made towards these objectives, particularly an increased effectiveness of military operations. However, two of the most prominent current critiques of defense reform are that whole of government rather than just DOD-centric unity of effort is required and, more central to the DOD itself, Goldwater-Nichols did not extrapolate a joint perspective into service procurement strategies.¹³⁵

The 2006 QDR, intended to provide an assessment of force structure requirements to execute the defense strategy, reflects this service-centric perspective. As the GAO found,

¹³³ Clark A. Murdock, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era - Phase I* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 15-17.

¹³⁴ Locher, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols,” 10. “The Pentagon, which did not favor the legislation, not only dismissed Aspin’s characterizations [that Goldwater-Nichols was the greatest sea change of the American military since the Continental Congress created the Continental Army in 1775] but held an opposite view. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and service leaders had resisted reorganization legislation throughout a bitter, five-year battle with Congress.”

¹³⁵ Murdock, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Phase I*, 15-17.

although the 2001 and 2006 QDR guidance emphasized the use of capabilities-based planning, “DOD did not conduct a comprehensive, integrated assessment of alternative force structures. . . . For example, while DOD conducted separate studies about tactical aircraft and ground forces, these were not integrated into an overall assessment of the numbers and size of units needed.”¹³⁶ As evidence that QDR criticism reflects a larger issue in the military, an independent assessment in 2004 on defense reform found that narrow service parochial perspectives, reinforced by inefficient resource allocation of defense related funds, frequently prevail over joint perspectives and solutions.¹³⁷ While DOD press releases indicate that the next QDR will help create a construct to help make tradeoffs across service parochial perspectives, historical precedent indicates it will not.¹³⁸ As a specific example, a twenty-five year Army

¹³⁶ United States Government Accountability Office, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, 5.

¹³⁷ In the first of two reports on defense reform beyond Goldwater-Nichols, the Center for Strategic and International studies reported that “Even while the defense budget has grown considerably in recent years, there is a growing awareness of the need to rationalize resources because fiscal realities will arguably limit future defense allocations. The Pentagon’s inefficient resource allocation process has reinforced inertia, incrementalism and parochialism in the distribution of defense related funds. These inefficiencies are extraordinarily wasteful. They stifle innovation in the deployment of resources for both legacy and transformational systems crucial for the nation’s national security. Compounding the problems of inefficiency and waste in the resource allocation process is the continuing dominance of the Services in the procurement process. Under the current system, narrow Service interests frequently prevail over joint perspectives and solutions. The fact of too little jointness in the acquisition determinations ultimately is a liability in terms of providing the Combatant Commanders with the necessary capabilities to prosecute modern warfare. While the passage of Goldwater-Nichols has significantly advanced joint perspectives in the policy arena, jointness in the procurement and defense allocation process has lagged substantially and is one of the few unrecognized dimensions of the 1986 legislation. A new round of reforms must aim to close the jointness gap between the policy and operational realms and the overall procurement world.” Murdock, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Phase 1*, 19-20. This “Phase 1” report was so popular, the “Phase 2” report was funded by Congress and oversight was provided by OSD/PA&E.

¹³⁸ As a senior Defense official indicated in response to a question concerning the allocation of resources across the departments, “I mean, resources are derivative at some point in time of this, but the thing is – to get right is how do you deliver military capability to the warfighter, and how can we best do that. So we’ve taken some steps already in that it’s not just about what services get, but we have these horizontal portfolio managers, nine of them, to look at how do we harmonize across portfolios that are working in separate mission spaces.” Further, the official indicated, “We tried to look at it from a warfighter’s perspective. And you know, I think that’s one of the things that we’re going to get out of this whole effort, is to be more definitive as to what becomes unnecessary, what becomes redundant, versus what you do need to have in order to be able to have flexibility to be able to accomplish the mission across all the services.” Department of Defense, “Defense Department Background Briefing on Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review” (DefenseLink: 8 May 2008, accessed 6 February 2009); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4226>; Internet.

veteran voiced concern about joint integration after observing the “work-arounds” required for Operation Iraqi Freedom command and control systems:

Specifically, the [Goldwater-Nichols Act] legislation focuses on improving the joint requirements or capabilities side of the department but does nothing to the business side of the department. While the Goldwater-Nichols Act realigns organizationally, the funding resource prioritization remains with the already funding constrained services. The CJCS and the combatant commanders receive no funding resources for development or integration of joint C4I [command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence] systems. That responsibility remains with the services. Under U.S. Title 10, services organize, supply, equip, train and mobilize forces for the operational requirements of the unified combatant commands. Today, the service departments remain centralized, hierarchical and highly autonomous, and none view the primacy of joint C4I interoperability as the principal mandate.¹³⁹

The fact that service parochial perspectives negatively impacted operational joint command and control capabilities arguably indicates larger, long-term systemic problems.

The perspective that DOD reform is needed beyond Goldwater-Nichols helped stimulate a CSIS follow-on to their initial independent report. The “Phase 2” report was funded by Congress and the DOD’s “watchdog,” the Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation, provided oversight. While much of the report articulated that the type of reform that Goldwater-Nichols helped mandate for the military is needed to be extrapolated to the interagency level, there were areas for the DOD to improve to give it the ability to properly inform, shape, and translate national level discussions on structuring interagency capabilities from a military perspective. Specifically, the report indicated that while the services’ processes for acquisition should remain in place due to their proven history, the acquisition process needed to be placed under greater combatant commander direction to ensure the proper joint capabilities were provided for the warfighter rather than the result of service parochial desires.¹⁴⁰ Indicative that this perspective

¹³⁹ John Saputo, “Joint Force C4I integration - significant challenges ahead,” *Army Communicator* (summer 2003), 27.

¹⁴⁰ Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols – Phase 2*, 77. “The risk of relying upon Service-centric resource allocation and acquisition processes is the possibility – some would say likelihood – that the Services will acquire weapons systems and provide capabilities that meet their own parochial visions for how they want to operate, rather than meet the joint capability requirements of the Combatant Commanders. This concern is not new.”

will have impact on DOD restructuring, one of the two lead investigators on the CSIS report, Michèle Flournoy, is serving as the newly appointed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, whose organizational mission is to “consistently provide responsive, forward-thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense, in alignment with national security objectives.”¹⁴¹

HOLISTIC APPROACH FOR JOINT FORCE DECISIONS

...I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

– Plato, *Republic*¹⁴²

At the national level, as articulated by President Obama, the U.S. needs to take a holistic approach to the Middle East.¹⁴³ This perspective has been echoed within the Department of Defense. Secretary of Defense Gates has said, “Just as one can expect a blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so, too, should the United States seek a better balance in the portfolio of capabilities it has...”¹⁴⁴ However, in an era of accelerating weapons system and personnel costs, it is not practical, or even most effective, to balance service capabilities in parochial stovepipes rather than across the joint force. Further, if the Department of Defense is to be accurately and effectively represented in a “holistic approach to the Middle East” that President Obama expects, then a framework for making tradeoffs within the Department of

¹⁴¹ Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Mission Statement (17 March 2009, accessed 17 March 2009); available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy>; Internet.

¹⁴² Plato, *Republic*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York City: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2005), 370a.

¹⁴³ Barack H. Obama, interview by Hisham Melhem, 26 January 2009, transcript, Al Arabiya. In President Obama’s first television interview, responded to Al Arabiya’s question concerning whether there is a paradigm shift in the U.S. towards a “holistic approach to the region” by answering “I do think that it is impossible for us to think only in terms of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and not think in terms of what’s happening with Syria or Iran or Lebanon or Afghanistan and Pakistan. These things are interrelated.” While this may not indicate a long-term and focused approach to the region, it does indicate an appreciation of the interconnectedness of the region.

¹⁴⁴ Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy” (Foreign Affairs: January/February 2009, accessed 12 December 2008); available from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88103-p0/robert-m-gates/a-balanced-strategy.html>; Internet.

Defense needs to be available and as easily as possible translatable into interagency level discussions. As pointed out in a recent Department of Defense Public Affairs briefing concerning the upcoming QDR, an area that needs improvement over past QDRs is balancing the means available against the force structure needed to execute a strategy.¹⁴⁵

Strategic Concepts: Brute Force, Compellence, Deterrence

Using the Cold War as an example of a singular defining context which dominated U.S. national security and foreign policy strategy similar to the current primacy of the Middle East, Game Theory constructs and concepts were developed to help define and inform U.S. strategy. While other constructs could be used, such as the categories for military use outlined in the National Defense Strategy,¹⁴⁶ they may not resonate across the interagency nomenclature in which the military instrument of national power must be integrated. Game Theory, conversely, was especially popular among academics, politicians, and the military during the Cold War. Informed by the context of the Cold War and the Vietnam War, in *Arms and Influence* Thomas Schelling outlined the concepts of brute force, compellence, and deterrence as the range of strategies which could be pursued. At one extreme on the spectrum of conflict is ‘brute force’, in which what is wanted is simply taken and only accomplishes “what requires no collaboration.”¹⁴⁷ Conversely, coercion “requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want – worse off not doing what we want – when he takes the threatened penalty into

¹⁴⁵ Department of Defense, *Background Briefing on Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review*. “If something isn’t broken, then we’re not interested in looking to try to fix it. We’re just trying to look at areas where we think -- where we feel still need work. The roles, missions functions and how one thinks through that and how one aligns the supply side and the demand side of the activities the department does -- we thought would be good to put some effort into that, have a special team look at that, address these somewhat theoretical issues and develop a construct to leave for future administrations to use. And so we will have a specific framework team that is looking at those issues. And then this is supposed to be something that is supposed to be cost neutral.”

¹⁴⁶ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 6. The five categories, or objectives, specified in the National Defense Strategy are “Defend the Homeland,” “Win the Long War,” “Promote Security,” “Deter Conflict,” and “Win our Nation’s Wars.”

¹⁴⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 8.

account.”¹⁴⁸ Therefore, from the perspective of a target state, “the key question is whether the value of the concession being demanded is greater than the cost imposed by the coercive pressure.”¹⁴⁹ One form of coercion, compellence, involves “a threat intended to make an adversary do something” and the other, deterrence, involves a “threat intended to keep him from starting something” and is at the opposite end of the conflict spectrum of brute force.¹⁵⁰ To apply these strategic concepts to joint force structure decisions requires balancing anticipated requirements and mechanisms against resources and capabilities.

Strategic Concepts: Application to Weapons System Decisions

LtCol Beene built upon Schelling’s framework and developed a “Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy of Decision Analysis” to assess the utility of weapon systems for compellence and deterrence. Beene was motivated by the observation that the military had not developed any consistency to the method by which it justifies its force structure or defense strategy.¹⁵¹ Beene’s approach was to build a hybrid decision analysis framework using the categories of capability, credibility, and communication which Schelling identified as necessary for an effective coercive strategy (**Figure 1**). By further stratifying capability, credibility, and communication into distinct means available to the military, he used the construct to evaluate the coercive value of specific weapons systems. In essence, he attempted to “create a framework for assessing the contribution of force structure toward achieving national strategic goals and the contribution of strategy toward achieving national policy goals.”¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 4.

¹⁴⁹ Pape, *Dying to Win*, 62.

¹⁵⁰ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 69.

¹⁵¹ Eric A. Beene, “An Enduring Framework for Assessing the Contributions of Force Structure to a Coercive Strategy” (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 2002), v. “With a strategy and force structure review occurring on average every two years, the military has still not been able to generate a consistent basis on which to justify its force structure or its strategy.”

¹⁵² Beene, “An Enduring Framework for Assessing the Contributions of Force Structure,” 4.




Figure 1: Completed Hybrid Hierarchy

While Beene’s framework helps inform force structure decisions in a more enduring construct than the myriad of top-down Department of Defense strategic documents that are under continual revision, it fails to adequately provide the necessary strategic framework for a holistic perspective of those decisions. By focusing specifically on coercion and deterrence, he fails to address the central task of the military to win, not just threaten to win, our nation’s conflicts. Further, using the categories of capability, credibility, and communication in an attempt to provide a set of “bins” which are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, his framework obscures the underlying strategy and is in fact just as interdependent as the more lucid categories of brute force, compellence, and deterrence. For example, the credibility of a specific weapon system to deter an adversary is inherently related to the weapon system’s capabilities and has no tangible meaning outside of the specific strategy that the weapon system must support, whether for brute force, compellence, or deterrence. Additionally, the weapon system specific nature of Beene’s framework fails to provide a normalization of the weapon system’s value without the context of a holistic construct of comparison of choices in the resource constrained environment of reality. While the categories of brute force, compellence, and deterrence are not mutually

exclusive, neither are capability, credibility, and communication, and Schelling's overarching construct is more relevant to the decisions necessary when making the hard choices for major weapon system procurements in the context of an overarching strategy. Most importantly, while the framework offered by Beene does help provide a more consistent framework for evaluating specific weapons systems, it does so independent of making tradeoffs against competing ways within the means available.

In summary, the concept of using the strategic concepts of brute force, compellence, and deterrence as benchmarks for evaluating joint force structure decisions is not novel but currently there is not an application of those concepts as a holistic framework to inform joint force structure decisions. Clear, unambiguous guidance to the services in terms of where their specific priority and weight of effort should be, rather than service specific strategic frameworks for determining the 'right' force structure mix, is necessary in an era in which additional requirements are being levied on the military despite no significant increase in resources available to accomplish those tasks. Therefore, a holistic perspective is necessary - not only to balance limited resources across the joint force to minimize future challenges risks,¹⁵³ but to also provide a framework for discussions of how the military instrument of national power is balanced at the interagency level whole of government approach to the challenges being faced in the Middle East. With the means available, how do we structure the military to enable the way it will be used?

Holistic Joint Force Structure Decisions Using Strategic Concepts

Deciding on a joint force structure is a wicked problem. There are multiple objectives, different temporal domains, confounding and interdependent ends and ways, risks associated with tradeoffs that have to be made because of constrained resources, and the enemy will cast his vote after possibly taking into account U.S. decisions. In an era of persistent conflict, what is the

¹⁵³ Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 21. "Future challenges risks are associated with the Department's capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective challengers."

“right” force structure mix? It is the author’s hypothesis that as part of a long-term, whole of government approach, joint force structure decisions should be made to balance capabilities across the joint force versus within service-centric parochial perspectives. However, a long-term, whole of government approach does not obviate the tension created by the realist-idealist dichotomy. It would be naïve to expect that pursuit of national interests today would be entirely subject to their relationship to idealist objectives of an undetermined horizon. As much as the cause-effect linkage of U.S. actions in pursuit of short-term objectives is suspect, the linkage to long-term conditions is even more tenuous. For example, while there has not been a major terrorist attack within the U.S. since 9/11, it is not provable that even the main determinant is Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). How OEF and OIF shape the international landscape decades from now, including the existence of ideologically driven Islamic violent extremist organizations, is even more art than science. However, with a holistic approach, synchronized globally if not at least regionally, contradictions which exist within our actions today and when put in the context of long-term and broader objectives should be limited to those which are deemed necessary to U.S. vital interests. Not only does this new approach help illuminate the capabilities the military brings to bear in a context that is more aligned with interagency vernacular, but it provides a framework for regional military commands to articulate “longer-term joint capability needs,” a shortfall identified by a CSIS report which focused on necessary defense reform beyond Goldwater-Nichols.¹⁵⁴

Subordinate regional objectives could be fleshed out subject to the overarching pillars of promoting freedom and confronting challenges. For example, based upon the 2006 National Security Strategy, subordinate to the overarching pillars of promoting freedom and confronting

¹⁵⁴ Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols - Phase 2*, 84. Earlier, on page 10, the Congressional sponsored report, conducted under OSD/PA&E oversight, specifically recommended that “the process for identifying and advocating joint capability requirements be restructured around the COCOMs, with Services competing to supply the capabilities that the COCOMs determine are necessary. This would entail a more “joint” JROC, on which Service Vices are replaced by COCOM Deputies, and adding civilians responsible for requirements policy.”

challenges the main national security and foreign policy objectives for the Middle East are to deny terrorists sanctuary and freedom of action, prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and increase free trade with countries in the region, all under the umbrella of supporting reform and freedom.¹⁵⁵ Similarly, country-specific objectives for the region could be delineated that help achieve regional or global objectives. For example, considering U.S. national security objectives specific to Iran, the 2006 National Security Strategy indicates that the three primary objectives are to ensure that Iran does not possess a nuclear weapons program, ceases support of terrorist organizations, and open integration into the global society.¹⁵⁶ While further subordinate categories could be identified, this example will focus at the sovereign government level which may help facilitate discussions with other agencies such as Department of State or U.S. AID. For illustrative purposes only, the author focused singularly on the objective of keeping Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Based upon the strategic construct offered by Schelling, one possible U.S. approach would be to systematically, and possibly periodically, impose its will on Iran and physically force a halt to the Iranian nuclear weapons program to obtain the objective via brute force or compellence. Additionally, a primary U.S. effort could be to deter further Iranian development of their nuclear weapons program. Lastly, it is possible that the U.S. could fail to

¹⁵⁵ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Various sections of the 2006 NSS contain guidance relevant to the Middle East, especially “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends,” “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” and “Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power.”

¹⁵⁶ According to the 2006 NSS, Iran has violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and continues to sponsor terrorist activity abroad. “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons....As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has broader concerns regarding Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct.” The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 20.

prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The nesting of these objectives and options is illustrated in **Figure 2**.




Figure 2: Notional Framework from U.S. to Target Nation Level

Stratification beyond the level of brute force, compellence, and deterrence could also be adjusted as dictated by the level of discussion. For instance, simply leaving compellence as an objective may be too general and additional detail may be desired. If so, compellence could be further stratified to account for the mechanism by which the use of force or threatened use of force are most likely to be required or utilized. A construct for compellence mechanisms has previously been identified by Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, two foreign policy experts who have been involved in foreign policy think tanks, DOD, and DOS.¹⁵⁷ In their construct, there are five mechanisms: ‘power base erosion’ is threatening a regime’s relationship with key

¹⁵⁷ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 48. “Effective coercive strategy making requires an understanding of coercive mechanisms – the processes by which the threat or infliction of costs generates adversary concessions. Mechanisms are the crucial middle link of the means-end chain of a coercive strategy.” Byman and Waxman go on in Chapter 3 to define the five coercive (in Schelling’s terminology, compellence) mechanisms of power base erosion, unrest, decapitation, weakening, and denial.

supporters, ‘unrest’ is to create popular disaffection, ‘decapitation’ is to threaten leadership’s personal security, ‘weakening’ is to debilitate the country as a whole, and ‘denial’ is to prevent military and political victory (**Figure 3**). Coupled with a construct for evaluating different joint force structure mixes, this type of construct could be used to evaluate the relative importance and priority of certain mixes. For illustrative purposes, consider if the guidance was that the U.S. military should be equally prepared for failure, deterrence, and compellence in consideration of preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons program and that the use of brute force to achieve the objective is a lesser consideration. Merely to demonstrate the concept, a small study was conducted by the author with the help of two classmates to determine the relative weights to assign the categories as well as the effectiveness of different joint force structure mixes; the example construct is depicted in **Figure 3**. Based upon this notional construct and values, force structure categories “B” [$.1*3 + .3*(.2*3+.2*3+.1*3+.1*4+.4*3) +.3*4 + .3*4 = 3.63$] and “D” [3.01] are preferable over “C” [1.97] and “A” [1.26], indicating that an “Offense/Defense” Air Force and a mix between “Offense/Defense” and “Stability / Civil Support” for the Army would be most effective towards achieving the objective of preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Obviously, when taken into context with the other objectives with respect to Iran, this mix would almost certainly change, let alone when combined with the greater Middle East or global requirements.




Figure 3: Notional Framework for Joint Force Structure Decisions

Efficacy of Holistic Framework

The author does not disagree with likely criticism that the future is so uncertain and complex we cannot possibly foresee what is going to happen, let alone develop weights and values for a holistic framework to scientifically come up with the “optimal” solution for joint force structure decisions. Further, the author is not offering this framework as even a possible solution. As a starting point, it does not address: 1 - temporal domain issues, 2- interdependencies between force levels, 3-interdependencies between different countries, 4-circular logic between weight associated with the categories chosen and the likelihood they will be required, and 5-the fact that the categories and weight are more accurately pictured as distributions rather than deterministic values. If anything, however, the benefit of developing a holistic framework is the conversation that accompanies it - the necessity to analyze realistic and necessary tradeoffs between competing requirements both within the DOD and with respect to other elements of national power, and what primacy each service and requirement warrant in our national perspective. These actions are already being taken without the conscious, articulated,

and fully debated discussion that should accompany decisions of this magnitude. For example, the Army and Marine Corps are getting additional end strength authorizations, planned Air Force personnel cuts to help create funding for modernization programs have been halted, and a generation of soldiers is coming up through the force that have never been to a major conventional operations training scenario at the National Training Center. That is not to say that conscious decisions may not still point towards how the U.S. is already structuring the military somewhat unconsciously. However, it may highlight risk mitigation measures that today's force does not reflect. An example from the scenario given may be that while the U.S. Army is focused primarily on winning the wars we are in today, they need to "fence off" capability that is ready to prosecute major conventional operations and their training at the National Training Center needs to reflect that requirement. Conversely, we may find that a larger counterinsurgency focus of our Air Force is not only justifiable but desirable to achieve our national objectives.

This approach does not negate competing or complementary national security objectives or differing regional perspectives. Rather, it offers a framework into which competing priorities for limited resources can be identified and, as clearly as possible, articulated for the harsh and realistic decisions which need to be made to most effectively create a pragmatic strategy. Perhaps more importantly, this construct would help create dialogue between departments in terms of the limits of military force and integration of other elements of national power. Inherently, it ties more directly to a combatant commander and regional DOS political affairs strategic focus. However, if this approach is not plausible or acceptable when limited to the construct of national security objectives which focus primarily on the Middle East, which arguably hold a position of primacy and more easily demonstrates the efficacy of such an approach, then it probably does not warrant consideration for a global perspective which the author contends is necessary.

Unfortunately the Department of Defense does not have a useful framework for engaging national leadership concerning the role of the military element of national power within a whole of government approach towards the many relevant questions central to U.S. national security. What is the impact of U.S.-led brute force regime change in Iraq? Will Iraq deteriorate into

further internal strife, involving conflict along Shia and Sunni lines and Arab and Persian divides and is the U.S. at least prepared for the impact on Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran that may have? Or will Iraq emerge as a Western-leading Islamic republic, possibly giving an example of reform to other countries in the area? If Iraq emerges as a successful and progressive Western-leading Islamic republic, will internal instability in Saudi Arabia and Iran transition into wider reform in the region or further repression and likely conflict? What are the implications of an Iranian nuclear weapons program and what measures will the U.S. take to stop that program? Given specific country and wider regional focus, what military capabilities are most likely to be needed to shape outcomes and protect against risks? Given the resources available and the possibility of different outcomes, what joint capabilities are best suited for credible brute force, compellence, and deterrent requirements? These are all obvious questions that are easy to ask; none of them have easy answers. Failure to decide on a course of action based upon an open and earnest discussion at the national military or civilian leadership level of governance does not obviate the fact that our actions reflect an unconscious course of action. Given the importance of the Middle East and the inability of each service to simply do everything, the time has come for the Department of Defense to present a construct in which the difficult joint force structure decisions that are being made are accomplished in full recognition of the tradeoffs and risks. Broad concepts may brief well, but what is missing is a national-level decision that reflects U.S. interests and clearly articulates the priorities and how to get there.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, "America's Self-Destroying Airpower," *Working Draft* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 15 December 2008), 3. "Secretary Gates has issued a new "strategy" that emphasizes irregular warfare, and has given the improvement of IS&R capabilities high priority to meet current warfighting needs and serve immediate mission requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, like his predecessor's QDRs, and the strategy of each of the military services, his "strategy" is not yet a strategy at all. It is still a mix of concepts and doctrines which is not defined in a clearly delineated force plan, in a modernization and procurement plan, in any form of program budget and cost analysis, or in any measures of time and effectiveness."

CONCLUSION

“Hey Yogi, I think we’re lost.” “Yeah, but we’re making great time!”
– Yogi Berra scenario concerning thrust versus vector

If the U.S. military, over which the U.S. Government has the most direct control, cannot provide a framework to help articulate the short-term and long-term tradeoffs of joint force structure decisions in the narrowed, but arguably most important, regional context of the Middle East, what hopes are there for us to “balance strategic risks across our responses, making the best use of the tools at hand within the U.S. Government and among our international partners,” as indicated in the 2008 National Defense Strategy? As current Secretary of Defense Gates has said:

Implementing the National Defense Strategy and its objectives requires balancing risks, and understanding the choices those risks imply. We cannot do everything, or function equally well across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately we must make choices. With limited resources, our strategy must address how we assess, mitigate, and respond to risk.

It is time the U.S. military stops talking broadly about the tradeoffs that need to be made to our joint force structure and the relevant risks due to those choices. Rather than allowing those choices, and balancing of risk, to be made on a service by service basis, national defense leadership needs to be able to engage civilian leadership to ensure conscious decisions reflect our national will rather than limited Congressional or service parochial perspectives.

When the author first described the topic of this monograph to a fellow Air Force officer, the other officer commented “What’s the title? It should be *Why Moseley Got Fired.*” The ouster of the top civilian and military leaders of the Air Force reflects a larger issue that will not simply solve itself.¹⁵⁹ Despite the fact that Secretary Gates recently identified the need for a holistic

¹⁵⁹ Cordesman, “America’s Self-Destroying Airpower,” 11. “Secretary Gates’ focus on fighting today’s wars and his vision of predominantly counterinsurgency-type wars in the future have started to shift the budgetary focus away from air-dominance jet fighters and other tactical combat systems to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other network, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Resistance from the Air Force has not fallen silent, even after the ouster of the Air Force’s civilian and military top leadership.”

approach to the defense budget, the real problem goes beyond acquisition processes.¹⁶⁰ Our nation deserves a holistic approach toward the challenges of our time. If the Department of Defense cannot provide a holistic framework for joint force structure decisions to help inform that national level process, the U.S. may just be concerned about how fast it is going rather than considering how to be most effective at getting to the different places it needs to go.

¹⁶⁰ Robert Gates, “Gates Says No Decisions Yet On F-22, Other Weapons” (Early Bird: 10 February 2009, accessed 11 February 2009); available from <http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20090211656344.html>; Internet. Gates identified the need for a holistic approach to the defense budget but did not articulate that necessity for a whole of government approach or even a holistic military strategy that the budget should reflect. “My hope is that if we present a coherent whole, a holistic approach to the budget that demonstrates seriousness of purpose, that people will see the logic in what we've put together and conclude that it's in the best interests of the country as a whole.”

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