

Diary #9

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Speech delivered in Japanese and translated to us at Kareuko, 17 Aug. 1942 (date of arrival from Manila, P.S.)

Instructions to the prisoners of war.

I am the head of this prison camp.

Having received you here, I wish to instruct you as follows:

You have shown your great loyalty and patriotism to your fatherland, but your strength was exhausted or you were wounded on the battlefields; and unfortunately, you were captured, for which I express deep sympathy as a soldier of the Nippon Army.

Previous to the present War of Greater East Asia, Nippon ardently desired peace over the Pacific and made her best efforts to settle the problem peacefully. In spite of such diligent effort of Nippon, the United States and Britain had constantly challenged Nippon and drove her to the most difficult position to keep her prestige and to solve the question of

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life and death. Nippon, therefore, has taken up arms with heroic determination for the sake of self-defense and the permanent peace of the world. Nippon, indeed stood up at the rise of her existence, together with her history of the last 3000 years.

One hundred millions of the people have united themselves firmly under the August virtue of

His Majesty the Emperor

and have desperate determination to strike down our enemies, the United States and Britain which have been molesting Great East Asia.

Heaven always sides with justice. Since the outbreak of the war Nippon had (sic) annihilated the Pacific fleets of the United States and Britain and Australia the past six months, and has captured all the Dutch East India, Hong Kong, Malay, Singapore etc.

And now the occupation of

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Australia is imminent.

Such brilliant result of the war has never been recorded in the history of the wars of the world. Now not only on the Pacific but on the Indian Ocean not a single war ship either of the United States or of the Britain is seen. Their aerial forces, too, are almost entirely annihilated and now not an airplane of them is seen flying over our domain.

Vast natural resources of the South Sea Islands, the great treasure houses of the world, are now all in our hands. Consequently, our military power is being strengthened all the more.

On the other hand, such countries as the Republic of China, French Indo-China, Thai and Burma, thoroughly, understand true intentions of Nippon is now cooperate with her to make a rapid progress in the establishment of the New

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Order in the Greater East Asia.

This, of course, owes to the  
August Virtues of  
His Majesty, the Emperor of Greater Nippon who divinely judges everything by humanity and justice. It is entirely the gracious gift of

His Majesty, the Emperor,  
The you who have crossed over the death line, being assured of the safety of your life, can enjoy peaceful living. You must, therefore, be heartily grateful to His Grace.

You are required to pay sincere attention to the significance of the war with your genuine, honest, and sacred heart.

I hope that you will enjoy the peaceful life in this camp and return to your dear families after the restoration of peace which I hope will not be very long.

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The following are general principles that I require you seriously to observe:

1. Anyone who does not observe the Nippon military discipline shall be severely punished, and the life of such prisoner shall not be always assured.
2. To be loath to labor or to express dissatisfaction for food, clothing and habitation is prohibited.

Now Nippon, with the solid unity of the people of 100-millions, is fighting against the United States and the Britain with firm conviction of victory. There is no one person living idle in the country. Everyone of the nation is most patriotic and ready to sacrifice himself for the sake of

His Majesty, The Emperor.

Everyone of the country is willing to endorse all sorts of hardships and fighting for the final victory of the war. You must understand, therefore, that it is nothing but natural that you are not allowed to lead an idle life.

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3. The American and the English are not allowed to had the haughty attitude over the peoples of Asia or to look them down, which have been their common sense for a long time. If there is any of such attitude at all on your part you shall be severely punished.

4. The language spoken daily to you is the Nippon language. English is used only when it is necessary. You must, therefore, make diligent effort to understand Nipponese for your daily use.

5. If you obey the orders, rules and regulations in this camp and put them faithfully into practice, you shall be given just protection and be able to return to your fatherland when peace is restored.

Head of Taiwan Army Prisoners' Camp  
(Capt. Imamura)

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THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT  
(Declaration of War on U.S.A. and Britain)  
December 8, 1941

We, by grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoy upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war, Our public servants of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties; the entire nation with a united will shall mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of Our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy which was formulated by Our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and our Great Imperial Sire succeeding Him, and which we lay constantly to heart.

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To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from our wishes that Our Empire has nor been brought to cross swords with America and Britain.

More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been reestablished the National Government of China with which Japan has effected neighborly intercourse and cooperation, the regime which has survived at Chung-King relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition.

Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient,

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both America and Britain, giving support to the ChungKing regime, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia.

Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire.

Patiently have we waited and long have we endured in the hope that Our Government might relieve the situation in peace, but Our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of reconciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission.

This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of

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Stabilization in East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our Nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defense has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of our Imperial Ancestors guarding us from above, we rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our Forefathers will be carried forward, and that the source of evil will be speedily eradicated and an enduring peace immutably established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire. (Copied from a reprint in the Osaka Mainichi, Thursday, October 8 1942.)

Pages 13, 14,15, and 16 left blank.

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Vowels have a short or a long sound, and some of them may at times be silent.

|                       |   |       |          |
|-----------------------|---|-------|----------|
| <u>Short Vowels</u> - | A | as in | father   |
|                       | E |       | enemy    |
|                       | I |       | ink      |
|                       | O |       | original |
|                       | U |       | pull     |



stressed by holding for a moment the vocal organs in the position required to pronounce them.

Ex: koka – an old song

Kokka – national anthem

Accent (rules governing the accentuation of Japanese words is long and involved) – the stressed vowels in each word of more than one syllable will be marked with an accent.

Ex: Kimono Japanese dress  
Seki Cough  
Seishitsu Character  
Mae before  
Yasui cheap

When a word has no accent, but has one or more long vowels distinguished by a line above them, the accent generally falls on the last long vowel of the word.

Katsudo cinema jiko climate  
Kodo code shogyo commerce

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When the stress in a word with two long vowels falls on the first one, the stressed vowel will be distinguished by an accent above the line indicating the long vowel sound.

Ex: Shoko military officer  
Kokyo Catholicism

The correct stress on Japanese words is very important, as there are many words which, although spelled alike have different meanings according to the stressed syllables.

Ex: ippai – full ippai – one cup  
Kiru – to cut kiru – to wear

Moreover, there are words that change their stressed syllable when preceded or followed by certain words.

Ex: mitsu – honey. Kinu – silk  
Mitsubachi – bee  
ito – thread  
kinu ito – silk thread  
ichiban – first  
ichiban utsukushii – the most beautiful

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Katakana Table

|    |     |     |    |    |
|----|-----|-----|----|----|
| a  | i   | u   | e  | o  |
| ア  | イ   | ウ   | エ  | オ  |
| ka | ki  | ku  | ke | ko |
| カ  | キ   | ク   | ケ  | コ  |
| sa | shi | su  | se | so |
| サ  | シ   | ス   | セ  | ソ  |
| ta | chi | tsu | te | to |
| タ  | チ   | ツ   | テ  | ト  |
| na | ni  | nu  | ne | no |
| ナ  | ニ   | ヌ   | ネ  | ノ  |
| ha | hi  | fu  | he | ho |
| ハ  | ヒ   | フ   | ヘ  | ホ  |
| ma | mi  | mu  | me | mo |
| マ  | ミ   | ム   | メ  | モ  |
| ya |     | yu  |    | yo |
| ヤ  |     | ユ   |    | ヨ  |
| ra | ri  | ru  | re | ro |
| ラ  | リ   | ル   | レ  | ロ  |
| wa |     |     |    | wo |
| ワ  |     |     |    | ヲ  |
|    |     |     |    | n  |
|    |     |     |    | ン  |

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Grammar

Article – there is no definite article or indefinite article in Japanese, and only in a few cases the plural form is used, so that hon (book) may mean the book, a book, books, or the books.

Personal Pronouns –

I        watakushi or watashi

We      watakushitachi or watashitachi

Watakushidomo or watashidomo

You (singular) anata

You (plural) anatagata or anatatachi

Anatagata is more polite than anatatachi.

He ano kata or ano hito

(ano = that; kata or hito= person)

She ano kata or kano-jo

They ano katagata or ano hitotachi

When referring to persons of higher rank ano o-katagata may be used.

Note than in most cases instead of he, she, or they, the use of names of the persons which these three pronouns refer to is generally observed by the Japanese.

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Adjectives [sic]- Most Japanese adjectives of quality end in I, preceded by another vowel. These adjectives are called true adjectives. Ex. Takai – high, dear; utsukushii – beautiful

This class of adjectives may be used predictively without being followed by the verb to be. It is preferable, however, to use to be after such adjectives as it renders the sentence more polite.

Kono hon wa omoshiroi.

Or } This book is interesting.

Kono hon wa omoshiroi desu.

Other adjectives of quality not belonging to this class, are formed by adding na to certain nouns:

Shiawase – fortune

Shiawase na – fortunate

Seiketsu – cleanliness

Seiketsu na – clean

Still others are formed by the particle no placed after certain nouns.

Ex. Oya – a parent, father, mother

Oya no – Parental, paternal, maternal

Gin n. – silver

Gin no adj. – (of ) silver

Gin no tokei – silver watch

Tokyo – (the city of ) Tokyo

Tokyo no hito – Tokyo people, a person from Tokyo

Nippon – Japan

Nippon no sangyo – Japanese industry

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Adverbs – True adjectives which end in i and are preceded by one of the vowels A, I , O, or U become adverbs by dropping their final i and adding ku instead.

| Ex: Adjective | Stem       | Adverb                    |
|---------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Takai         | Taka       | Takaku (highly, dearly)   |
| Utsukushii    | Utsukushii | Utsukushuku (beautifully) |

Many adverbs are formed by adding ni or to to certain words.

Ex:

|                   |                        |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| Makoto – true     | makoto ni - truly      |
| Tashika – certain | tashika ni - certainly |
| Shikkari – firm   | shikkari to – firmly   |

### Comparative Adjectives

When the compared object is not mentioned, the comparison is not expressed in Japanese.

Dochira ga kirei disu ka. Which is prettier? (Lit: which is pretty?)

Kochira ga kirei desu. This is prettier. (Lit: This is pretty?)

When the compared object is mentioned, the word motto is used.

Kono hana wa kirei desu. This flower is pretty

Ano hana wa motto kirei desu. That flower is prettier.

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Instead of motto one may use no ho ga.

Ano hana no ho ga kirei desu.

When the standard of comparison is mentioned, the expression yori or yori mo is used, whether one corresponding to the English more.....than. Yori means from and yori mo, even from.

Nihon-go wa eigo yori no muzukashii desu. The Japanese language is more difficult than the English.

Watashi no uchi wa anata no yori mo chiisai desu. My house is smaller than yours.

Superlative – expressed by the word ichiban, which means number one, first 0 or by mottomo

Ichiban takai yama – the highest number.

Mottomo nagai – the longest.

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### Cardinal Numbers

There are two sets of numbers from 1 to 109: one of Chinese and one of Japanese derivation –

|   | <u>Chinese</u> | <u>Japanese</u> |
|---|----------------|-----------------|
| 1 | ichi           | hitatsu         |
| 2 | ni             | futatsu         |
| 3 | san            | mittsu          |
| 4 | shi, yo or yon | yottsu          |
| 5 | go             | itsutsu         |

|    |           |  |              |
|----|-----------|--|--------------|
| 6  | roku      |  | muttsu       |
| 7  | shichi    |  | nantsu, nana |
| 8  | hachi     |  | yattsu       |
| 9  | ku or Kyu |  | Kokonotsu    |
| 10 | ju        |  | to           |

Above 10 there is only one set of numbers.

|    |           |    |                     |     |                |
|----|-----------|----|---------------------|-----|----------------|
| 11 | Ju-ichi   | 21 | ni-ju-ichi          | 90  | Ku-ju          |
| 12 | ju-ni     | 24 | ni-ju-shi           | 100 | hyaku          |
| 13 | ju-san    | 30 | san-ju              | 200 | ni-hyaku       |
| 14 | ju-shi    | 31 | san-ju-ichi         | 300 | san-byaku      |
| 15 | ju-go     | 32 | san-ju-ni           | 400 | yon(shi) hyaku |
| 16 | ju-roku   | 40 | yon-ju              | 500 | go-hyaku       |
| 17 | ju-shichi | 50 | go-ju               | 600 | rop-pyaku      |
| 18 | ju-hachi  | 60 | roku-ju             | 900 | Kyu-hyaku      |
| 19 | ju-kyu    | 70 | shich-ju or nana-ju |     |                |
| 20 | ni-ju     | 80 | hachi-ju            |     |                |

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|      |              |         |          |
|------|--------------|---------|----------|
| 1000 | sen or issen | 9000    | kyu-sen  |
| 2000 | ni sen       | 10,000  | ichi man |
| 3000 | san zen      | 20,000  | ni man   |
| 4000 | yon sen      | 30,000  | san man  |
| 5000 | go sen       | 50,000  | go man   |
| 6000 | roku sen     | 100,000 | ju-man   |

7000 shichi sen 200,000 ni-ju man  
or nana

8000 hassen 1,000,000 hyaku man

Numeratives – When counting objects, the Japanese often use a class of words called numeratives, which correspond to the English head in the expression six head of cattle. There are about 30 numeratives, but only the most important will be given here.

Nin (lit. person) used to indicate human beings.

ichi nin = one (person); nin-nin = 2 (persons)

san-nin = 3 (persons) yo-nin = 4 (persons)

Hitori and Futari are more commonly used than ichi-nin and ni-nin.

Between the numerative and the noun following, no is used.

Hitori no kodomo ga imasu. There is one child.

San-nin no kodomo ga imasu. There are three children.

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Hiki (follow) used in counting animals (quadru-peds, fishes, insects).

Note that when a numeral is followed by a noun or numerative, the end sound of the numeral and the first sound of the noun or numerative, may, either or both, suffer modifications, as in the following examples. See phonetic alterations.

Ippiki – one, mi-hiki – two, sambiki – three, shi-hiki – four, go-hiki – five, roku-hiki or roppiki – six, shichi-hiki-seven, hachu-hiki-eight, ku-hiki-nine, jippiki

A noun in the objective case is generally put before the numerative with no although the numerative before the object is grammatically correct.

Watakushi wa inu wo ippiki motto imasu.

Or Watakushi wa ippiki no inu wo mottoe imasu.

I have one dog.

Wa (feather) used in counting birds.

ichi-wa, ni wa 2, sam-ba 3, shi-wa 4, go-wa 5, roku-wa 6, or roppa 6, shichi-wa 7, hachi-wa 8, ku-wa 9, and jippa 10

Watakushi wa hatō wo samba mottoe imasu. I have 3 pigeons.

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Satsu (volumes) used in counting books

Issatsu 1, ni-satsu 2, san-satsu 3, yon-satsu 4, or shi-satsu 4, go-satsu 5, roku-satsu 6, nana-satsu 7 or shichi-satsu 7, hassatsu 8, kyu-satsu 9, and jissatsu 10.

Hassatsu no hon ga arimasu. There are 8 books.

When the meaning is clear, a numeral may be followed by a numerative without the object.

Anata wa hō wo nan satsu motte imasu ka. How many books have you?

Jissatsu motte imasu. I have 10.

Inu ga imasu ka. Are there any dogs?

Shi-hiki imasu. There are 4.

Hon (trunk) is used in counting nouns, long objects as trees, sticks, legs, fingers, needles, cigars, fans, ropes, etc.

Ippon, ni-hon, sambon 3, shi-hon 4, go-hon 5, roppon 6, shi-chi-hon 7 or nana-hon 7, hachi-hon 8, ku-hon 9, jippon 10.

Uchiwa X wo ippon motte kita kudasai.

Bring me one fan.

Hari wo go-ho kudasai. Give me 5 needles.

X no folding. Folding fan = sensu or ogi

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Numeratives (cont'd)

Mai (shrub) used in counting flat things as papers, cloth, blankets, coins, boards, dishes, etc. This numerative does not suffer any alteration, nor does the word that precedes it.

Kami wo yo-mai kudasai. Give me 4 sheets of paper.

Letter paper = reta pepa.

Hai (cup) – used for counting cupfuls or glass-fuls of liquid.

Ippai, Ni-hai, sam-bai, shi-hai or yon-hai, go-hai, roppai or roku-hai, shich-hai or nana-hai, hachi-hai, ku-hai or kyu-hai, and jippai 10. Nam-bai – How many cup fuls?

### Phonetic Alterations

The end sound of a numeral and the first sound of the word following it suffer alteration as show below –

ichi becomes ik

ichi becomes ip

roku “ rok before k

san “ sam before h

haichi “ hak

roku “ rop

ju “ ju

ju “ jup

hyaku “ hyap

hyaku “ hyak

sen “ sem

ichi “ is

hachi “ has before s or sh

ju “ jis

san “ sam

sen “ sem before m or b

ichi “ it before ch, t,

hachi “ hat ts

after san or sen, words beginning with f, h, k, s, sh

generally undergo following changes:

ju “ jit

f or h becomes p, s – z,

k “ g sh – j

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Ordinal numbers – The ordinal numbers are formed by the Chinese cardinal numbers, preceded or not by the word dai and followed by bamme

The word dai means order.

|                  |               |                        |
|------------------|---------------|------------------------|
| 1 <sup>st</sup>  | ichi-bamme    | or dai-ichi-bamme      |
| 2 <sup>nd</sup>  | ni-bamme      |                        |
| 3 <sup>rd</sup>  | sam-bamme     | Day = nichii, hi, hiru |
| 4 <sup>th</sup>  | yo-bamme      | one day – ichi-nichi   |
| 5 <sup>th</sup>  | go-bamme      | 2 days futuska         |
| 6 <sup>th</sup>  | roku-bamme    | 3 “ mikka              |
| 7 <sup>th</sup>  | shichi-bamme  | 4 “ yokka              |
| 8 <sup>th</sup>  | hachi-bamme   | 5 “ ituska             |
| 9 <sup>th</sup>  | ku-bamme      | 6 “ muika              |
| 10 <sup>th</sup> | ju-bamme      | 7 “ nanuka (nanoka)    |
| 11 <sup>th</sup> | ju-ichi-bamme | 8 “ yoka               |
| 12 <sup>th</sup> | ju – ni-bamme | 9 “ kokonoka           |
| 13 <sup>th</sup> | ju-san-bamme  | 10 “ toka              |
| 20 <sup>th</sup> | ni-ju-bamme   | 20 “ hatsuka           |
|                  |               | 21 “ ni-ju-ichi-nichi  |
|                  |               | 24 ni-ju-yokka         |

Between the ordinal number and the following noun, the particle no is used.

Ni-bamme no hako wa oku disu.

Or Dai-ni-bamme “ “ “ “ } The 2<sup>nd</sup> box is large.

When a numerative is used with an ordinal number, bam is omitted.

Ni-hom-mi no empitsu no kudasai.

Or Dai-ni-hom-mi “ “ “ “ } Please give me the 2<sup>nd</sup> pencil.

Fractural numbers

One-half (1/2)      Ni-bun no ichi or hambun.

One-third (1/3)      Sam-bun no ichi.

One-quarter (1/4)      Shi-bun no ichi.

Three-Quarters (3/4)      Shi-bun no san

x/y                  y-bun no x

a quarter of a melon      meron no shi-bun no ichi.

Construction of a Japanese sentence –

In a Japanese sentence or clause, the verb is placed at the end, and its grammatical order is subject + object + verb, so that instead of saying “I bought a new hat,” the Japanese would say “I a new hat bought.”

Nominative and Accusative

In most European languages, no distinction exists between words in the nom. and the acc. In Japanese, the distinction between the two cases exists, and the nom. is indicated by the post-position wa or ga, while the acc. is indicated by the post-position wo. In a very few cases wa or ga may indicate the acc.

Supposing English words were Japanese, let us consider the following sentence in which the Japanese particles indicating the nom. and the acc. are placed

in the position they should have in the Japanese translation.

English construction: Horses eat grass.

Japanese “      “      : Horses wa grass wo eat.

Interrogative – The interrogative form is indicated by ka at end of sentence or clause, which in this case corresponds to our question mark.

Kore wa nan disu ka. What is this?

(This      what      is?)

## Yes and No

Yes is translated into Japanese by the word hai, and no by ie.

Whenever a question is put in the affirmative, the Japanese translation of these two adverbs correspond to the English. However, when the question is put in the negative, hai is used for no, but ie for yes.

Inu wa motte imasen ka. Haven't you a dog?

Hai, motte imasu. No, I have not.

Ie, motte imasu. Yes, I have

The opposite use of yes and no in answer to a negative question may seem strange at first, however, if we consider the use of those adverbs from a Japanese point of view, we shall soon understand.

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To a negative question in English, the positive or negative answer refers to what is said in the answer, that is: if the thought answer is positive, we use the positive adverb yes, while if the thought answer is negative we use the negative adverb no.

In Japanese, however, to the same question "Haven't you a dog?", the positive or negative adverb in the answer refers to the negative idea expressed in the question. Therefore, when the Japanese answer "Hai, matte imasin (Yes, I have not)" the affirmative adverb hai (yes) means "It is true (that I haven't)"; when they answer "Ie, matte imasin (No, I have)" the negative adverb ie (no) means: "It is not true (that I haven't); therefore, I have."

Anata wa ojosan ga arimasin xa.  
Have you not a daughter?

Hai, arimasin no, I have not.

Ie, arimasin Yes, I have.

Kono niwa ni saxura ga arimasin deshita na.  
Wasn't there a cherry tree in this garden?

Hai, arimasin deshita. No, there was not.

Ie, arimashita Yes, there was.

Sono kodomostachi wa haha-oya ga arimarin ka.  
Haven't those children a mother?

Hai, arimason. No, they haven't. Iie, arimasin. Yes they have.

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### Verbs

#### To have

In Japanese, there is one, one expression for all three persons, singular or plura, of each verbs' tense.

#### Indicative

The present ind. Of to have is motte imasin Motte means having holding out \_

Imasin means am, is or are. Therefore the Japanese translation given here for to have may be used only when this verb indicates possession or when used with the meaning of to hold.

I, you, we, you, they have}  
He, she, it has}                      motte imasin

The negative form of to have is motte imasin. Imasin means am, is, or are not.

I, you, we etc – have not – motte imasin. The ind. Past is motte imashita (lit. having was or were) and its negative form is motte imasin deshita (lit. having was not or were not)

I, you, we, etc had motte imashita  
I, you, we, etc had not- motte imasin deshita

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To have is also translated by aru as shown below. When using aru, the object takes ga instead of wo which is required after the object of motte imasin

...ga arimasin                      I, you, they have, he, she has  
...ga arimasin                      I, you etc have not  
...ga arimashita                    I, you etc not  
...ga arimasin deshita I you etc have not

#### Future

Future of to have is rather irregular and different expressions are used according to the persons it refers to.

When the future of to have is used with the meaning of to hold or to carry out refers to the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> person with sing. Or plural, it is translated by motsu desho.

Jochu ga motsu desho. The servant will (have, hold) carry it.  
Note that in this example, will is used more in the sense of shall.

When to have means to receive or to be given, it is translated in the future, by morau desho.  
Ano hitotachi wa morau desho. They will probably? have (receive, be given) it.

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When used for the 1<sup>st</sup> person sing. Or plural., the future of to have is translated by mochimasho.  
When this English verb is used in the sense of to hold or carry aut. By moraimashito when used in the sense of to accept, receive or be given. These two Japanese words, however, correspond to to have preceded by one of the expressions I or we will, am I to?, are we to? Shall I?, shall we? Or let us.

Mochimasho            I or we will have, hold, carry it. Let us have, hold, carry it (a parcel for instance)

Mochimasho Ka        Shall I, we have, hold, carry it? Am I, are we to have hold it?

Moraimasho            I we well or shall have, accept it. Let us have, accept it.

Moraimasho Ka        Shall I, we have, accept it?

Note that the English to have may be used in a great many cases, and may mean to hold, carry, keep, retain, eat, receive, accept, cherish in estimation, perform, experience, etc, while in Japanese a different word is used for each meaning that the verb to have may indicate. Therefore in translating to have, one must be sure of its real meaning if one is to translate in correctly.

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Subjunctive. Various are the forms used in Japanese, but the easiest one for beginners is obtained by adding the expression nara or naraba, corresponding to if, to the forms of the indicative as shown below –

If I have                            motte imasin naraba.  
Or.....ga arimasin naraba.

If I have not                        motte imasin naraba.  
Or.....ga arimasin naraba.

If I have                            motte imashita naraba.  
Or.....ga arimashita naraba.



following examples, or an adjective of quality that does not belong to the group of words classified as true adjectives. See p 23

Anata wa Yamada San de irasshaimasu ka

Are you Mr. Yamada? (de irasshaimasu is used in polite speech instead of desu).

Iie watashi wa Yamada de wa arimasin. Tanaka desu. No, I am not Mr. Yamada, I am Mr. Tanaka.

#### Future

The positive form of to be is translated by ni naru desho, and it's negative form by ni naranai desho. This translation is used when to be has the idea of to become, and is used for all persons. Kanemochi ni naru desho. I we shall (probably) be rich; she, he, you, they will (prob.) be rich. Kanemochi ni naranai desho.-----not be rich.

Desho alone means think or thinks he, you etc. is or are or it may be that.- perhaps it is so. Ano hito wa kanemochi desho. I think he is rich. The negative of desho is de wa nai desho. Ano hito wa kanemochi de wa nai desho. I don't think he is rich.

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To omoimasu (so I think) may follow desho when the future has the idea expressed by I, you, etc think, believe, suppose.

Anata wa kanemochi ni naru desho to omoimasu. I think you will be rich.

When to be indicates the existence of something or somebody in a place, it is translated by orimasu, orimasin, arimasu. [When referring to animals to be is translated by imasu – neg. imasin- for the present, and by imashita – neg. imasin deseita – for the past. Imasu and its negative and past forms may be used also when referring to people, but is less polite than arimasin. When referring to inanimate objects, to be is translated by arimasu – neg. arimasin – for the present, and by arimashita – neg. arimasin deshita – for the past.)

#### Subjunctive

If I am or if I were, if you were, etc dearimasu naraba.

If I am not, if I were not, etc. dearimasan naraba

#### Conditional

I, we should be; he etc would be = naru desho ni

I, we should not be, he etc would be = naranai desho ni.

Ni after desho may be omitted.

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little [aract] = mátsũ

Sũkõshi mátte kudasai

Please wait a moment (little)

## Weights and Measures

### Linear Measures

| <u>Japanese</u>  | <u>Metric</u> | <u>English</u> |
|--|---------------|----------------|
| 1 bu (ichi bu)   | .003 meter    | 1/9 inch       |
| 1 Sun (issún)  | .03 meter     | 1.2 in         |
| 1 Shaku (isshakú)  | .303 meter    | 11.93 in       |
| 1 Ken (ikken)  | 1.818 meter   | 5.97 ft        |
| 1 Cho (itcho)  | 109 meter     | 119 yd         |
| 1 ri (ichi ri)   | 3927 meter    | 2.44 mi        |
| 10 bu (jú bu) = 1 sun  |               |                |
| 10 sun (jissun) = 1 shaku                                      |               |                |
| 6 shaku (roku shaku) = 1 ken                                   |               |                |
| 60 ken (roku jikken) = 1 cho                                   |               |                |
| 36 cho (san-ju-roku cho) = 1 ri                                |               |                |
| 1 meter = 3 shaku, 3 sun, 3 bu<br>(san-shaku, san-zun, san bu) |               |                |
| 1 Km = 9 cho + 10 ken  |               |                |
| 1 in = 84 sun  |               |                |
| 1 ft = 1.006 shaku   |               |                |
| 1 mi = 14.8 cho  |               |                |

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### Cloth Measures

|                            |
|----------------------------|
| 1 Sun = .038 m = 1.5 in    |
| 1 shaku = .397 m = 14.9 in |
| 1 jo = 3.79 m = 12.4 ft    |
| 1 m = 2.64 shaku           |
| 1 ft = .8 shaku            |
| 1 yd = 2.4 shaku           |

The shaku of ordinary linear measure is called kane-jaku, [our] that of cloth measure kujira-jaku. The latter is ¼ longer than the former.

### Square measure

|                                     |
|-------------------------------------|
| 1 tsubó = 6 <u>kane-jaku</u> square |
| = 36 sq kane-jaku                   |
| = 3.30 sq m = 3.95 sq yd            |
| 300 tsubo = 1 tan                   |
| 10 tan = 1 cho                      |
| 1 sq m = 303 tsubó                  |
| 1 sq yd = .253 tsubó                |
| 1 acre = 1224 tsubó                 |

### Capacity

|   |
|---|
| 10 shaku = 1 go (ichi go) = .18 litre = .318 pt |
| 10 go = 1 sho (isscho) = 1.8 litre = 3.18 pt    |

10 sho = 1 to (itto) = 18 litres = 3.97 gal  
 10 to = 1 koku (ikkoku) = 180 litres = 39.7 gal = 4.96 bu  
 1 litre = 5.54 go                      1 pt = 3.15 go

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Weight

10 fun = 1 mommé (ichi mommé)  
           = 3.75 gm = 2.12 drams  
 100 mommé = 1 kin (ikkin) = 600 gm  
               = 1.32 lbs  
 1000 mommé = 1 kan (ikkan) = 3.75 kilo  
                = 8.27 lbs  
 1 kilo = 267 mommé  
 1 lb = 121 mommé  
 1 ton = 271 kan

[Itekoshi rotsuwa]    strawberry  
 [unknown katakana/kanji writing beneath words]    s

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|                           |                     |             |
|---------------------------|---------------------|-------------|
| Illness, disease          | Byoki, yamai        |             |
| Indisposition             | [Fukai]             |             |
| Pain, ache                | Kutsú, ítamí        |             |
| Headache                  | Zutsú               |             |
| Tooth ache                | Ha – itami          | Ha = tooth  |
| Stomach – ache            | I no itami          |             |
| Cough                     | Seki                |             |
| Cold in the head          | Hana kaze, bikataru | Hana = nose |
| Cold, chill               | Kaze, fúja          |             |
| Fever                     | Netsu               |             |
| I have pains in my [head] | Atama ga itami masu |             |
| I've got a cold           | Kaze wo hikimashita |             |
| Snail                     | Katatumuri          |             |
| Cow                       | Meusi               | } Dairy     |
| Pen                       | Shakóya             | }           |
| Dairy                     | Meusi shakoya       |             |

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When the Prisoner of War Camps Commandant of Taiwan was here on May 2 '44, he made a speech (incidentally, the [first] conciliatory in tone we've heard yet) [about], among other things, stated that he would remain at Camp [huadynarkus] for a short while to receive any complaints that the prisoners cared to make. Generals Ilgen (Dutch), Parker (American) and air vice

Marshall Maltby, went up and were told the Camps Commandant could not see them, and were asked the nature of their complaint. They replied that it had to do with the failure of the Nipponese to live up to the Geneva Treaty regarding the treatment of Prisoners of War. Sometime later they were told by Lt. Hioki (Camp Commandant) to put their complaints in the form of a letter to the Camps Commandant. The following letter is the result of their combined efforts.

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To The Camp Commandant,  
Through the Nippon Duty  
Officer

No 4 Prisoner of War  
Camp, Taiwan  
May 18, 1944

Sir,

We understood the Main Camp Commandant to say in his recent speech that prisoners of war would be treated according to the International custom supported by the Code of Bushido: International custom for the treatment of P.O.W. is codified in various Hague and Geneva Conventions, which we assumed was to be observed in our treatment.

Under your instructions, we now submit our views in writing to you:

Treatment under international custom

Treatment Hitherto

1. Status of Officers

1. Status of Officers

(a) No P.O.W may be deprived of his rank. All are entitled to respect for their persons and honour.

Rank is not recognized for P.O.W. It is not normally used in addressing P.O.W who have been informed that they are all of one rank with enlisted men. Senior Dutch, British, and American officers are not recognized as such.

(b) Officer P.O.W salute only captor officers of equal or higher rank.

(b) All P.O.W, including those of the highest rank, have to salute all Nippon Army personnel, including the most junior privates.

(c) P.O.W are entitled to respect for Their persons and honour. Officer P.O.W are to be treated with due regard for their rank and age. They are not to be compelled to work; but if they ask for it, suitable work should be found as far as possible, and in accordance with their rank and abilities. No P.O.W. should be employed on work for which he is physically unsuited.

(c) Officers are compelled under threat, to undertake unaccustomed manual labour, in labour gangs in a tropical climate and frequently in the strong tropical sun, although most of them are of advanced age. Much of their work, they are told, is essential, in order to produce necessary extra food.

(d) Soldier P.O.W. should be employed at officers' camps in sufficient numbers for the personal service of officers according to the numbers and rank of the officers in the camp.

(e) N.C.O.'s may be employed on supervisory work only, and in accordance with their rank.

## 2. Humane Treatment

(a) P.O.W. should at all times be treated with Humanity, protected against acts of violence, insults and public curiosity. They are entitled to respect for their persons and honour.

(b) All forms of corporal punish are prohibited.

(c) Collective penalties for individual acts are prohibited.

(d) Imprisonment is the most severe disciplinary punishment that may be inflicted, and this may not exceed thirty (30) days.

(e) A parole not to attempt to escape may be given voluntarily by a P.O.W. It is forbidden to force it upon them.

## 3. Submission of Petitions

(a). P.O.W. should appoint their own representatives to represent their joint needs to the captor military authorities and their protective powers. At officers' camps, the senior officer P.O.W. should be recognized as this intermediary.

(d) Soldier P.O.W. are almost entirely employed as labourers, and officers have to do nearly all their orderly work themselves.

No distinction whatever is made between N.C.O.'s and privates. All are employed as manual labourers.

## 2. Humane Treatment

P.O.W. including officers of the highest rank, have been repeatedly struck with the fist, boot, and rifle butt for offenses often most trivial: in many cases they have not understood for what offense. They have been forced to perform menial tasks, at times in the public highway and in view of the public. They have been informed that the penalty for attempting to escape is death. They have been forced to sign, under threat, an [undertaxing] on their honour as officer not to escape. They have recently been formed into groups and have been told that if one of their numbers escapes, the remainder of the group will be punished.

## 3. Submission of Petitions

(a) Senior officer P.O.W. are not allowed to act as such, and administrative appointments are made by the Nippon authorities without reference to P.O.W. The submission of petitions through an O.D. who changes daily makes it impracticable

for P.O.W. as a whole to represent satisfactorily their requirements and grievances, many of which remain unventilated.

(b) P.O.W. have the right to communicate with Protective Powers about any unsatisfactory conditions of their captivity. Such petitions are to be transmitted immediately, and if the complaint is found to be groundless, no punishment is to ensue.

#### 4. Treatment of Non-Combatants

(a) Medical personnel and Chaplains are not to be treated as P.O.W. They should be returned to their won nationals.

(b) Clergy should be allowed freely to minister to P.O.W.

#### 5. Hygiene

(a) Belligerents are to take all necessary hygiene measures to ensure cleanliness of camps; P.O.W. are to have for their use, lavatories maintained in a constant state of cleanliness.

(b) P.O.W. should be provided with sufficient water for bodily cleanliness.

#### 6. Infirmary

(a) Each camp shall possess an infirmary where P.O.W. shall receive attention of any kind they may be in need of.

(b) An appeal to the Protective Power has been refused, and we are given to understand that such appeals could not be considered.

#### 4. Treatment of Non-Combatants

(a) All medical personnel and Chaplains have been retained and are treated as Prisoners of War.

(b) Clergy may not visit other camps where are no clergy of their denominations; they may not hold religious meetings other than Church Services; communion bread and wine have been refused.

#### 5. Hygiene

(a) The kitchen and its facilities are such as to make hygienic preparation of food nearly impossible. Latrines frequently overflow for considerable periods. Several barracks are badly illuminated and overcrowded.

(b) The water supply, except in the rainy season, is frequently insufficient.

#### 6. Infirmary

(a) The camp infirmary cannot provide medical attention at the standards of international custom, owing to absence of

Some necessary drugs and shortages of others; insufficient dressings and absence of surgical apparatus for specific cases, shortage of essential dental equipment and supplies, of desirable nursing and laboratory equipment, inadequate supplies of invalid diet and poor facilities for preparing it. P.O.W. medical officers are not allowed, in our opinion, sufficient voice in deciding the fitness or otherwise

of patients for return to duty or manual work.

(b) P.O.W. who are seriously ill, or in need of important surgical treatment, shall be admitted to a military or civil hospital qualified to treat them.

(b) Opportunities for investigating and treating serious cases by [accessing] methods and surgical operation in an outside general hospital are not adequate by the standards of International Custom.

(c) Sick and wounded unlikely to recover within one year should be repatriated.

(c) Not done though several exchange ships have offered opportunities.

#### 7. Food

(a) Rations of P.O.W. are to be equivalent in quality and quantity to that of captors depot troops.

#### 7. Food

(a) P.O.W. have to work on the farm to get necessary extra food over and above what is allowed by regulation. The authorized ration scale must therefore be less than that allowed for depot troops of the Nippon Army, since otherwise, it would not be necessary for P.O.W. to produce extra food for themselves. In spite of repeated assurances that the food produced from the farm is solely for P.O.W.'s own benefit, so far only a small proportion has been received by P.O.W. Much has been diverted to other uses. P.O.W. particularly lack proteins and fats.

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(b) All collective disciplinary action regarding food is prohibited.

(b) Collective disciplinary action to reduce food drastically has been threatened if P.O.W. do no work on the farm and at manual labour.

#### 8. Clothing

(a) Clothing is to be supplied by the captor power, and regular replacement and repair is to be assured.

#### 8. Clothing

(a) Many are badly in need of clothing. Articles are normally replaced only if P.O.W. can certify that they have none at all of the article concerned. Repair facilities are still quite inadequate; much clothing is falling to pieces for want of repair, and old age.

9. Mails

(a) If P.O.W. are transferred from one place to another, all necessary arrangements are to be made for correspondence. [former] camps to be re-addressed without delay.

(b) In cases of emergency, P.O.W. may send telegrams on payment of the usual charges.

10. Transfer of Money

Transfer of money to relative and other individuals in P.O.W.'s home countries should be arranged.

9. Mails

(a) Prisoners from Java and Hong Kong have, for the most part, received no letters since their arrival in Taiwan, 16, 7, and 9 months ago, respectively.

(b) This has rarely been sanctioned.

10. Transfer of Money

Facilities for transferring money under this arrangement are inadequate. A number of officer P.O.W. have been allowed, only once to remit a limited sum, but to close relations only and then only to those who were financially dependant upon them before the war.

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The above are the chief ways in which we feel that the present treatments falls short of International Custom. Many less important items are not mentioned. In order that a comparison may be drawn we attach a report of the treatment of Italian prisoners of war in India in British hands, which treatment is in accordance with International Custom.

I.A. ILGEN  
Major General  
Senior Dutch Officer

P.C. MALTBY  
Air Vice Marshall  
Senior British Officer

GEO M. PARKER, JR.  
Major General  
Senior American Officer

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Initial organization of PA

10 divisions – 7 on Luzon + 3 in Visayas

WLF

SLF

VTM

|   |                             |                                 |
|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 11 <sup>th</sup> Broujhe (RA)                               | 51 <sup>st</sup> Jones (RA) | 61 <sup>st</sup> Chywoweth (RA) |
| 21 <sup>st</sup> Capronipon Mateo (PS)                      | 41 <sup>st</sup> Lison (PS) | 81 <sup>st</sup> Fort (PC)      |
| 31 <sup>st</sup> Bluemel (RA)                               |                             | 101 <sup>st</sup> Vachon (RA)   |
| 71 <sup>st</sup> Selleck (RA)- Initially in USAFFE Reserve! |                             |                                 |
| 91 <sup>st</sup> Stevens (PC)- Initially in USAFFE Reserve! |                             |                                 |

WLF- 11<sup>th</sup> + 21<sup>st</sup> Divisions about in Lingayan Gulf area  
 91<sup>st</sup> covering Balete Pass + approach from Oparri from vicinity of Cobanatuan  
 71<sup>st</sup> in Reserve at O'Donnell  
 31<sup>st</sup> – Covering area west of the Zaubrales + ~~O'Donnell~~ + Subic Bay from San Marcelino.

SLF- 41<sup>st</sup> + 51<sup>st</sup> Cover Batangos + Tayobas, Sr FA Instr at Camp Del Pinar was LtCol Ralph Hirsch FA (executed, so the rumor goes for possessing Nipponese Money, at O'Donnell) His asst arty Major Joe Tacey as Dr. of Instruction (P.S. material + equipment used concurrently with Stotsenberg FA)- no serv. Ammo. or sub caliber tng. ammo available.

---

|   |                      |                        |
|---|----------------------|------------------------|
| Assignments of FA officers                    | 91 <sup>st</sup> FA  | Lt Col Jim Hoskins     |
| 11 <sup>th</sup> FA Lt Col James Hughes       | 21 <sup>st</sup> FA  | “ RC Mallonee Sr Instr |
| 31 <sup>st</sup> FA Major Eugene C(?) Harper  | 41 <sup>st</sup> FA  | “ AP Moore             |
| 51 <sup>st</sup> FA Lt Col Hamilton Seabright | 61 <sup>st</sup> FA  | “ Hiram Tarrington     |
| 71 <sup>st</sup> FA Major Chas. Fowler        | 81 <sup>st</sup> FA  | Maj James Woodbridge   |
|   | 101 <sup>st</sup> FA | Lt Col Alex Quantant   |

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CO 21<sup>st</sup> FA Lt Col Nemis is Catalan  
 Mallonee's reason that he and Moore are "Instructors" while the others Command-  
 "The 21<sup>st</sup> and 41<sup>st</sup> Divs will be Commanded by Filipino Generals + arty Filipino officers throughout. It is not desired that there be any American officers in these divisions, which will be the forerunners of the same status in all Divs. as capable native commanders are developed, certifying before independence year in 1946. But at this time the need for Amer. guidance is evident – hence the Instructors".

Status of PA at outbreak of war

On Nov 20 '41, no div. was completely organized – generally, 1 inf regt was in existence, 1 in process of mobilization + 1 to be called early in Dec, "In 21<sup>st</sup> Div, the 22<sup>nd</sup> Inf came in during Sept, the 21<sup>st</sup> Inf early in Nov; the 21<sup>st</sup> FA was in-ducted Nov 24 + the 23<sup>rd</sup> Inf was scheduled for early Dec – it was actually about 2/3 mobilized when the war started.

"Of the 10 Artillery regts, 4 were inducted on Nov 24 (the 21<sup>st</sup>, 41<sup>st</sup>, 71<sup>st</sup> + I believe, the 91<sup>st</sup>). The others were scheduled for later dates, none earlier than Dec 10."

"Col Hughes of the 11<sup>th</sup> FA tells me that on the date he was to go to the induction centre for his men, the Nip. Army was occupying the town. Major Harper + about 60 of the cadre of the 31<sup>st</sup> FA reported to Gen Bluemel at [San Ana Caliva} on Dec 12 to find that 8 guns had arrived and were being secured by infantry units.

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Status of Artillery, Luzon Force, at outbreak of war Dec 8 '41

| Unit                           | Modernized<br>75's | Old<br>75's | SPM<br>75's | 2.95<br>Pack How | 155 mm<br>how | 155 mm<br>rifles |     |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------|---------------|------------------|-----|
| NLF                            |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| H(?) FA Col Hughes             | 3                  | 7           |             |                  |               |                  | 10  |
| 21 FA Col Mallonee             | 16                 | 8           |             |                  |               |                  | 24  |
| 31 FA Lt Col Harper            |                    | 8           |             |                  |               |                  | 8   |
| 71 FA Lt Col Fowler            | 16                 |             |             | 8                |               |                  | 24  |
| 91 FA Col Hoskins              | 16                 |             |             | 8                |               |                  | 24  |
| SLF                            |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| 41 FA Col Moore                |                    | 16          |             | 8                |               |                  | 24  |
| 51 FA Col Seanight             |                    | 8           |             | 4                |               |                  | 12  |
| Army Artillery                 |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| 3DI FA Col Quinton             |                    |             |             |                  | 2             | 16               | 18  |
| II Region                      |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| 2 FA Col Alba                  |                    |             |             | 4                |               |                  | 4   |
| Philip Scout Art -             |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| 23 FA BN Lt Col Lockwood       | 8                  |             |             | 4                |               |                  | 12  |
| 24 FA BN                       |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Lt Col Willson | 8                  |             |             | 4                |               |                  | 12  |
| 2 <sup>d</sup> Lt Col Lembach  | 8                  |             |             | 4                |               |                  | 12  |
| 88 FA BN                       |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| 1 <sup>st</sup> Lt Col Ray     | 8                  |             |             |                  |               |                  | 8   |
| 2 <sup>d</sup> Maj Howard      | 8                  |             |             |                  |               |                  | 8   |
| 86 FA BN Lt Col Scott          |                    |             |             |                  |               | 12               | 12  |
| SPM Arty                       |                    |             |             |                  |               |                  |     |
| Separate Batteries             |                    |             | 50          |                  |               |                  | 50  |
| Total Artillery in Luzon       | 91                 | 47          | 50          | 44               | 2             | 28               | 262 |

In Visayas the artillery regts were employed as inf there being only 3 - 2.95 Hy in entire Force + no sights.

Strength of Luzon Force –

As the strength of PA Div was about 8000 men the entire 7 divs in Luzon force had no more than 56000 men. Actually all units were continuously below strength and this figure was never approached. There were some additional numbers in Service units (Qm, Med etc)

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as well as 2 Reg Divs of PA.

In addition to PA there were available in Luzon the P Scouts (PA native troops) + American units. The PD (31<sup>st</sup> Inf (Amer), 45<sup>th</sup> + 57<sup>th</sup> Scouts) + scout artillery – a total of about 9000 men (+ CAC + Service units on Corregidor about 12000 total)

Also some Amer units had arrived –

|                                       |               |
|---------------------------------------|---------------|
| 200 <sup>th</sup> CAC (AA) Newthex US | 1600 (approx) |
| Taux group (not guard various shots)  | 1040          |
| Air Corps Ground Troops               | 5000          |

Col Bregina told Mallonee he was facing 14000 Americans, 75000 Filipinos + 13000 civilians at Bataan.

Mengie has copy of radio sent to WD as of Feb 28 '42 showing 2460 Amer. + Scout officers, 40 warrant officers + 14,000 Amer e.m. (including the harbor defences). Therefore the table below showing about 14000 Amer on Bataan, of whom only about 4500 were first line combat troops (31<sup>st</sup> Inf, Taux Group, SPM Artillery, officers with Scout units + instructors with PA units), 1600 were AA + the remainder were ground troops of the AC Service elements.

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Mobile Forces on Luzon at Peak Strength –

| Unit                  | Amer Off Instr | Amer NCO Instr | Amer Combat units | Amer Serv. units | Total Amer | Phil Comb. Units | Phil Serv Units                   | Total Phil Troops | Max Total     |
|-----------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------|------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|
| PD                    |                |                | 2100              |                  | 2100       | 6200             | 700                               | 6900              | 9000          |
| 26 Cav                |                |                | 50                |                  | 50         | 500              |                                   | 500               | 550           |
| 200 CAC               |                |                | 1600              |                  | 1600       |                  |                                   |                   | 1600          |
| Taux Gp               |                |                | 1050              |                  | 1050       |                  |                                   |                   | 1050          |
| SPM Art               |                | 100            |                   |                  | 100        |                  |                                   |                   | 100           |
| A.C. Ground           |                |                |                   | 5000             | 5000       |                  |                                   |                   | 5000          |
| PA 7 Div<br>2 Reg Inf | 1000           | 200            |                   |                  | 1200       | 56000<br>7000    | <del>700</del><br><del>7000</del> | 56000<br>7000     | 57200<br>7000 |
|                       |                |                |                   |                  |            |                  |                                   |                   |               |
| Total Combat          | 1000           | 300            | 4800              | 5000             | 11,100     | 69700            | 700                               | 70400             | 81500         |
|                       |                |                |                   |                  |            |                  |                                   |                   |               |
| Service               |                |                |                   | 3000             | 3,000      |                  | 2000                              | 2000              | 5000          |
| Grand Total           | 1000           | 300            | 4800              | 8000             | 14100      | 69700            | 2700                              | 72400             | 86500         |

The 31<sup>st</sup> Inf (US) had a paper strength of 2100 but 300 were enroute to US + 200 were on D.S. with PA as instructors and are so shown. The officers with Scout units numbered 500 bringing the Amer strength back to 200 for the PD. The 26 Cav strength was 789 on paper with only 550 present, the others being either with other units (PA) as instructors or other DS. The SPM Artillery received its men from Scout units, PA units, and officers from Scout artillery, all of whom except NCOs as noted are listed with parent organizations. The 5000 AC ground troops included many flying officers grounded by the destruction of

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planes. Many of these 5000 were used as infantry on Bataan.

The main item of importance is that we had at the maximum 14000 Americans + 72000 Filipino troops, of whom about 4800 Americans + 70000 PA + Scout can be classed as combat troops – a high percentage compared to the service element requirements of modern warfare. These troops opposed trained seasoned troops estimated at from 100,000 to 140000 for 4 mos and 1 day.

The 11<sup>th</sup> (CP at Mananos) + 21<sup>st</sup> Divs, with a combined total of less than 16000 poorly trained + poorly equipped troops were at Lunpayan(?) Gulf, the logical point for the Upporise(?) beachhead with the mission of defending the beaches against a hostile attack.

(Col Townsend, who commanded the 11<sup>th</sup> Inf 11<sup>th</sup> Div – PA – say that about Nov 25 '41 Gen MacArthur expressed to him the view that there would be no war until June at the earliest.)

Baguio was bombed at 8am and Clark Field (Stotsenberg) was destroyed at 12:30pm Dec 8 '41 Right of 21<sup>st</sup> Div – Dagupan (excl) 11<sup>th</sup> on its right. 21<sup>st</sup> Div frontage “almost 30 mi.”)

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No airplane photo mosaics—not even one aerial photo. 1 map per bn—2 per regt.—with many inaccuracies. 15 yrs ago the defense plan provided for peacetime construction of a buried multiple cable from Manila to each potential defense area. No evidence of any such cable at Linjayan at war's outbreak. 21<sup>st</sup> FA unable to locate 11<sup>th</sup> FA (on its right). On the 10<sup>th</sup> or 11<sup>th</sup> when Gen King (accompanied by Ed Cordell) visited Linjayan he was displeased at first with Mallonee's selection of gun positions (too far forward—too vulnerable) but withdrew his disapproval as he left. The reason Mallonee couldn't contact the 11<sup>th</sup> FA—it had not been unreadable! Gen King confirmed report of Baguio's destruction—“the entire plane compliment of the field had been caught on the ground & completely destroyed. The planes had taken the air when word of the Baguio bombing was received, but came down, leaving the planes on the apron while the pilots went to lunch” Gen King also said “that despite heavy losses, we still had bombardment aviation.”

MacArthur's plan 15 yrs before this war started, according to Mellonee who says he helped write & effect it in 1928-29 was based on all out defense of the beaches—catch enemy at period of greatest helplessness—transports close in, air dropping troops in small boats. This divided the responsibility into 3 main groups—after unreadable expedition at sea & determining the landing

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back to which he was beached: Navy, thru service craft & submarines would engage the convoy and do as much damage as possible while off shore, the bombardment aviation protected by fighters would work on the hostile transports; the shore forces, with the main reliance on artillery would resist the small boats & the infantry mop up any troops which reached shore.” Subsequent to MacA's retirement from active duty this plan was unreadable to a defense of exactly the same sort at the beach, but in the vent of a hostile landing being effected in force, delaying actions were to be fought while the unreadable forces dropped back into Bataan, where a last-ditch defense would be made to carry out the mission assigned to the defense force—and the mission is unchanged from that given us in 1928-9—to hold Corregidor and American sovereignty in the P.I. for 6 mos. MacA's original plan has been named WPO#1--& the current plan as WPO#3. While I was at Stabenlup(?) during Nov. we were told that when MacA became CinC last summer he reverted to the basic plan of WPO#1. The principle pre-campaign differences of courses(?) is in the stocking of Bataan with supplies and spare equipment etc using that as a base instead of Manila.”

However when USAFFE G-3, Col Irwin visited Linjayan he was not interested in tactical dispositions. “Ammunition was his sole concern. He took a look at our ammunition disposition and the dangerous supply routes & very violently announced that it would be impossible to

withdraw the amm. in time to save it, and By God he would crucify anyone who lost as much as one round. This was the first time we

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have thought or heard of the word withdraw. I attempted to explain to him that our orders were to hold at all costs, that we had but 200 rounds per gun at the positions & this was less than one full day of fire. I emphasized the orders for the last-ditch defense, repeating one grandiloquent expressions of the NLF order that 'we must die in our tracks falling, not backward but forward toward the enemy! Col. Irwin's answer was 'Don't believe everything you hear. As God is my judge if you leave one round of amm. Behind for the enemy I'll have your head' This was in the presence of the Sr. Instr. Of the Div., the CofS of the Div, the regimental commander the Bn commander & 2 Amer. Bn Instructors"

It was impossible to withdraw from the beaches during action. Now, by implication from Irwin, there was an entirely different—or an *unreadable* mission. Inquiry at NLF elicited only a reiteration of the "hold-at-all-costs" mission,—“but by the manner in which it was issued it was evident that there was considerable doubt in the minds of the NLF command as to whether their mission is actually as given.”

A plan of removing one battery at a time (after Irwin disclosed an empty bag) to rearward positions was tried out but so much chaos resulted that the idea was abandoned.

(“Note. Toward the eve of the Bataan Campaign I learned that telegrams were sent from the Linguyan Bureau of Ports to USAFFE Hq bearing my name and Col Catalan's stxxx? that the 21<sup>st</sup> FA was disorganized, demoralized and would not

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stand to the guns in *unreadable*, therefore recommending that the regiment be disbanded & the men returned to their homes; that resistance was futile and should not be attempted. No notice was taken of this unless Col Irwin's visit was one of investigation which determined the falseness of the telegrams.” Mallonee could not understand how such messages could have been filed with the telegraph office w/o the connivance of the officials there unless—in view of later events—they were delivered by an officer of the regt. in uniform.

The 21<sup>st</sup> FA with CP in Bugallon received orders to withdraw on morning of Dec 24 '41. Late on 20<sup>th</sup>-21<sup>st</sup> info from USGFFE thru Div. was received to the effect that a Nip expedition of from 100 to 120 vessels, escorted by Navy warships was moving south toward Lingayan Gulf and could be expected off the mouth of the Gulf by dark 21<sup>st</sup>. In late afternoon of 21<sup>st</sup> info. was rec'd that “a few vessels had been maneuvering actively near Vigan(?) during the day but that the main expedition was turning in from sea toward the Gulf & that landing operations could be expected at dawn.”

“Came the dawn & the enemy vessels—but not a shot, not a bomb, not a torpedo. From the 2 PM OP on top of the Capital bldg at Linjayan could be seen the huge fleet of hostile vessels far to the North and near the eastern shore—the vicinity of San Fernando. But neither at dawn nor during the morning did we see an American bomber nor observe any action among the hostile fleet that would indicate the presence of submarines. If there was any defense

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against the landing it was purely local & so far away that you could not hear it. During the day we received the news that the enemy main force landed unopposed from Vigan to San Fernando.”

Stragglers soon began drifting through the 21 FA area & fragments of info were rec'd from them. Some info was gained from the 11<sup>th</sup> Div CP. Liaison between 21<sup>st</sup> Div & 11<sup>th</sup> Div CPs alarmingly poor. MANAUOG

NLF had patrols only in Vigan area “from a Bn of Inf stationed near San Fernando (La Union)-- & commanded by Major Noble. Landings from 10<sup>th</sup> to 14<sup>th</sup> were unopposed except by local constabulary & home guard detachments. About the 16<sup>th</sup> the enemy began pushing southwards”—“The Nipponese must also have pushed up the TAGUIDIN trail toward Cervantes and Baguio as stragglers tell us of action there as the main force landed and developed(?) rapidly to the south an embussed(?) combat team was sent to help Noble. This was a Bn as near as I can gather with some SP artillery support.” \*\* “There were no reconnaissance jeeps, command or patrol cars or radio cars.” Principles of security were violated flagrantly. The enemy got in behind them from a road which parallels the main highway & cut them off. Another force was sent up—this time a regt or a regt less 1 Bn. The were more cautious & “apparently met with some initial success until Nippon naval vessels *unreadable*, shelling the hell out of them while additional forces were landed from transports while farther south, working a 4 layer, 3 decker sandwich out of our troops. The appearance

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Of tanks completed the picture. Some undurdias ?

escaped to the mountains & then back to the main body in “the plains.” The SPMs were probed ? of a cliff on the Nagilian Trail, according to one of the Del Pilar officers who told the story with tears in his eyes. Stragglers & riderless horses from the 26<sup>th</sup> Cav. since the morning of Dec 23d (this item is from Col Wallonei's ? diary entry of Dec 24<sup>th</sup>). No word of commitment of 11<sup>th</sup>, 71<sup>st</sup> or 91<sup>st</sup> Divisions as divisions or as part of larger force, “ But if this is correct & the main force of our troops is still unengaged I cannot account for the withdrawal order. To the contrary, an American Inf. Officer just told me that the enemy has debonched?into the Pargasman? Plains & the right flank of the Army is imperiled. If this is so the enemy has moved with incredible speed in the last 48 hrs., landing troops, actually, tanks, transport & supplies, driven off landing opposition?, faced a difficult defile and debouched ? into the open. This is military efficiency of top grade.” [sic]

Stragglers tell the same story – are gathered up and started in the direction of [sic] division. “Always they were subjected to terrible, horrible mortar fire. Always the story teller continued to bravely fire his rifle, M.g., or 75 as the case might be; always their officers ran away – or if the teller is an officer, then his superior officers ran first; always the enemy planes dropped many bombs & fired many m.g.s; always there suddenly appeared many hostile tanks headed straight for him; always he was suddenly surprised & astonished to realize that he was absolutely alone, all the others having been killed or – despicable

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cowards – run away. Then & only then, with the tanks a few feet away hol? he [sic] flung himself to one side where - & there the story has two variations, first he is captured but escapes that night; 2d, he hides until night when he returns to our lines – but doesn't stop there. But from

there on the threads of the story reunite; they are very tired, they seek their companions, they are very hungry, & Sir Could they be transported to the Water Transport Corps & drive a truck”.[sic] No official information has been procurable. No staff officers have been since Cap? Irwin’s? visit. “I never have seen a NLF Staff officer.” Since becoming a P.W., Waallione? Has talked to Col W F Maher? C of S NLF, Gen Brorgher(effo Dio) ? Col Fraux Nelson NLF G 3 – and believes the following “is a reasonably accurate summary of the events as they took place. I am indebted to COL Arahes? for the use of his work sheets of the NLF report over? of the info.”

“By Dec 13 the NLF has the 1<sup>st</sup> Bn 13 Inf (Noble) at San Fernando, La lumen?, with patrols to the North. The 12<sup>th</sup> Inf (moses) (less 1 bn & 1 Co) at BAUNG with 2 batteries of SPM artillery (Ganahl) attached, & 1 Co 12<sup>th</sup> Inf at Damortis.[sic]

“On Dec 13<sup>th</sup> patrols reported the landing of about 3000 Jap troops at Vigan (This landing actually took place a.m. of 12<sup>th</sup>) Nipponese papers 12-8-42 report small parties ashore on 10<sup>th</sup>. At this time the mission of the NLF was to prevent an enemy landing in its assigned area, or in the event of such a landing to attack and destroy the landing forces.

“The first land combat action was on Dec 16<sup>th</sup> when 2 bus loads of enemy from Vigan were ambushed at Tagudin

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by a platoon of the 13<sup>th</sup> Inf (Lt Williams). The NLF mission was changed to require the enemy to be held North of the E –W line thru San Fernando La lemain. The main Jap force at Vigan (3000) advanced south & on Dec 21 encountered the battalion of the 13<sup>th</sup> Inf (Noble) & one bn. 12<sup>th</sup> Inf (Moses) on the Borara River (San Juan). A night attack outflanked and dispersed this force of ours which was cut off from the main body, took to the hills & rejoined with a portion of the force about 2 wks later. USAFE having authorized the use of the 71<sup>st</sup> Div, the 71<sup>st</sup> Inf was attached to the 11<sup>th</sup> Div, & on Dec 21 its C.O., Col.Bonnett was ordered to position at Naguilian & Bauong. One Bn with one Battery SPM’s attached was about to move up the coast road & attack the enemy moving south from the east flank. During the night of Dec 21-22 info was rec’d of a major landing in the vicinity of & South of Bauong. On the morning of the 22d the units at Buaong & Naguiban were attacked. The 1<sup>st</sup> Bn 71<sup>st</sup> Inf (Hicker) was ordered to withdraw via the coast road to Mabila –[author’s ?] leaving 1 Co to reinforce the Co of the 12<sup>th</sup> Inf of Demortis. Bonnett was ordered to withdraw the bn at Naguilian, with remnants of the 12<sup>th</sup> & 13<sup>th</sup> Inf of the Borara River fight to Manaoag via Baquio, clearing Camp One on the Kenyon Rd before dark Dec 22. This force stopped at Baguis during the night Dec 22 -23 – were cut off from the main body, never rejoined as a complete unit. Troops at Baguis were similarly cut off. 26<sup>th</sup> Cav. Was moved to NLF reserve at Rosales & one Bn 21<sup>st</sup> Inf to NLF reserve at San Quentin. Ten batteries of SPM were attached to NLF

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+ the 192<sup>nd</sup> Tank Bn was ordered to support NLF, but remained under USAFFE throughout the campaign. On Dec 22, 26<sup>th</sup> Cav (less detachments) was ordered to conceal bivouacs at Rosario from Pozarubio, arriving at 10AM + was immediately ordered to Damortis to hold that town until forced to withdraw, then move via Rosario + prevent the enemy from advancing south of the Damortis-Rosario Rd. Enroute to Damortes the 26<sup>th</sup> Cav was attacked by bombers + suffered a few casualties. It arrived at Damortes at 1 PM + was attacked by infantry, tanks + bombers, with drawing at 4 PM to its 1<sup>st</sup> delaying position east of Damortes – the infantry Cos of the 12<sup>th</sup>

and 71<sup>st</sup> Inf at Damortis suffered heavy casualties, only a few stragglers from these units ever rejoining. On Dec 22, at 230 P, 71<sup>st</sup> Div (Gen Selleck) was ordered to the Urdanetta area to move via Rosario on Damortis + prevent hostile movement to the south. The 71<sup>st</sup> Div + the 26<sup>th</sup> Cav were relieved from attachment to 11<sup>th</sup> Div., which was ordered to take up a line south of the Bued River, the 26<sup>th</sup> Cav to conform. The 26<sup>th</sup> Cav was to cover the right flanks of the 71<sup>st</sup> Div., holding the junction of Hy 3 + the old Manila Rd to permit the forces near Baguio to rejoin. In the meantime hostile troops landed unopposed at AGOO + ARINGAY + advanced south on Damortis, sending a flank detachment by way of PUGO toward Rosario + Camp One. On Dec 23, the 71<sup>st</sup> Div (less 71<sup>st</sup> Inf which had been cut off) took up a position north of SISON, astride Hy 3, with the 72<sup>nd</sup> Inf + 71<sup>st</sup> Engrs in front line. The 26<sup>th</sup> Cav which suffered severely on Dec 22nd was ordered to BINALONAN to reorganize. The 91<sup>st</sup> Div at Cabanatuan

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Was released to NLF + the 91<sup>st</sup> Combat Team (Carter) was ordered north to support 71<sup>st</sup> Div. Enroute, this unit was delayed by the bombing of the bridge over the AGNO at VILLASIS + forced to detour via TAYUG. (x) (x) Col. Moher tells me that Carters 1<sup>st</sup> – or leading Bn – got across before the bridge was bombed, + that the remainder of the 91<sup>st</sup> made the detour. At 4:30 PM COL Carter with his advance echelon arrived + was ordered by Gen Selleck to occupy a position north of Pozarubio astride Hy 3. Before the 91<sup>st</sup> CT arrived, the 72<sup>nd</sup> Inf was attacked + routed. The 91<sup>st</sup> CT was attacked at night at Pozarubio + routed. On the morning of Dec 24, the 26<sup>th</sup> Cav was attacked at Binalonan, checked the hostile advance until late in the afternoon + then withdrew to Tayug. Gen Wainwright was present during the Binalonan fight. During the evening of Dec 23, the further defense of LINGAYEN GULF being impracticable, permission was obtained to withdraw, USAFFE directing that WPO3 be effected. Accordingly the withdrawal, in 5 phases, to Bamban – Arayat line was ordered. 26<sup>th</sup> Cav was ordered to assemble the scattered elements of the Div. + reorganize at San Fernando, Pampanga. The 91<sup>st</sup> Div. with only one regt. remaining (92<sup>nd</sup> Inf. Rodman) was assigned the zone of withdrawal east of the Pampanga River. The 11<sup>th</sup> Div. with one complete infantry regt + parts of 2 others withdrew in the center from Pampanga River to Hy , excl. The 21<sup>st</sup> Div via 13 + 3. Actions were fought during the withdrawal at Undanetta, Santa Barbara, Tayug, Rosales + Carmen, before D4 was reached. At Carmen + Villasias one Bn 21<sup>st</sup> Inf, Corps Reserve, counterattacked + restored the line but was so badly shot up at to completely lose its identity. (In this fight – so Col Moher tells me – Bob Besson was captured End)

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Dec 24 '41 Cont'g Several times, this date, enemy vessels move in toward + Binmaley. They remained out about 3000 yds beyond 75mm gun range – and Mallone's did not think they'd move in before dusk. The NLF plan for the withdrawal was "to withdraw, starting at 7 PM tonight (24<sup>th</sup>) occupying a delaying position before dawn, holding it during daylight tomorrow (25<sup>th</sup>), withdrawing again tomorrow night, continuing that procedure until the final defensive line D5 is reached. The 21<sup>st</sup> Div is to withdraw on two roads, one east of the AGNO until the big bend in the river is reached near CAMILING, thereafter in one column. This gives me some concern, as the lack of bridges + communications across the Agno makes it impossible for those two columns to be mutually supporting. The Force orders require the rear of each column to be

covered by a shell, which is to remain in position each night until just before dawn, then to withdraw rapidly to rejoin the division. The order requires one battery of FA to remain with the covering shell of each column. This means that 1/3 of the artillery strength will be left with the covering shells. This is all out of proportion to the strength of the infantry in the shells, about the equivalent of one Co. in each.”

“The delaying positions are: (for the 21<sup>st</sup> Div):

D-1: From the Zambalas range down a spur to the vicinity of Agualr, then across the Agno.

D-2: From the Zambalas down another spur near Mangaterem + across the Agno.

D-3: The flat open ridgeline near our old camp at Sta. Ignacia + across the Agno.

D-4: South of the Tartac River, south of the Tarlac, along the south bank of a small stream extending eastward along the TARLAC-LE PAZ Road.

D-5: Final defensive line to be held at all costs: From the Zambalas north of Statsenberg along the high ground, north of the Bamban River, then across the river at a point near the highway, then south of the Bamban, + finally refusing the right flank back toward Mt Arayat and the Candaba Swamp.

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Referring to this last line, Mallonée says: “It is a fine strong line in most respects, but like any defensive line it has disadvantages. It has a good field of fire, excellent artillery observation, is well anchored to mountains on both of the Force flanks, + has a large portion of the center covered by an impenetrable swamp which, however is not deep enough to be a barrier to our own lateral, interior line of communication. It has the disadvantage of being a long line, requiring a very large number of troops to defend it – although it is the shortest line between Luigayen \_ Manila. It is very open terrain + will leave us very much exposed to hostile air attack, which in view of our dearth of an air corps is a serious matter. But its principal weakness is that the rear of the line toward Manila must also be defended against hostile attacks, originating on the South Luzon beaches, or in certain circumstances from Manila Bay” Manila is still the key point. “We are to defend to the end on D-5 + presumably the SLF has a similar line south of Manila.” At 3:30 PM Dec 24 info. From the OP at Luigayen was rec’d to the effect that the hostile vessels had massed over near Damortes. Mallonée decides to break communication and get out whatever he can. The Regt’l C.O. agreed. Col Mallonée is given command of the Artillery Groupment, 21<sup>st</sup> Div, consisting of 2 SPM batteries (Lt Fisher and Lt Suadbodny) and the 21<sup>st</sup> FA – On Dec 25 ’41 by CO 21<sup>st</sup> Div. Major Stanley B. Bonner FA, one of Mallonées instructors for the 21<sup>st</sup> FA went back to NLF HQ + was told by some USAFFE staff officer he met there (a captain whose name he did not know) that “decision had been reached by USAFFE not to attempt the last ditch defense on D-5 but to refuse into Bataan. Delaying actions will be fought until near Bataan at which time the Filipinos, except Scouts, would be demobilized, declared civilians, + returned to their homes. The American + the Philippine Div. would defend Bataan as long as possible, then retire to Corregidor, go into a state

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of siege + await the arrival of the U.S. Navy and the relief expedition.”

Sometime after morning of 26-27 Tarlac was bombed-most of the bombs being concentrated on the railroad yards. Much looting followed-the shop owners showing their places open to the soldier's settling now have their stocks loan by the enemy.

On Dec 28, Major Bonner came back from NLF CP with following order:  
"Commanding General, all Decisions-D5 is abandoned as a final Defensive Line. D4 will be held at all costs until order withdraw. Maximum delay will be effected on each position. Withdrawal plan later.

Wainwright"

About mid afternoon 28<sup>th</sup> inf recd from Savoie that Jap bicyclists had been seen in Tarlac & patrols near rte #13 south of Tarlac River bridge were reported by civilians-as well as many Japanese working southwest along Zamboles foothills north of Tarlac River. Woppen-Stein (21<sup>st</sup> inf) extended line toward the mountain.

Dec 29<sup>th</sup> Div bombers began working over the line. Enemy began to feel out left flank of 21 Div. (Woppen-stein's 21<sup>st</sup> had but 2 Bns-one having been so roughing harder at Villasis (Fno Reserves) as to be unable to function as a unit. 21<sup>st</sup> Div was on left of NLF the enemy was in contact along the entire line from Tarlac to Cabanatuan.

The 71<sup>st</sup> Div was badly disorganized, had been pulled off the line & was organizing in rear (this cont info re contact & the 71<sup>st</sup> Div from Montgomery Asst G3 NLF also the following). The 91<sup>st</sup> Div had been roughly handled, one regt. Having completely disintegrated & others having but one or two effective Bns., all disorganized & at reduced strength. The 11<sup>th</sup> Div had lost one regt. & part of another in the fighting around & north of Damantes-the 11<sup>th</sup> Div had no organic artillery & the artillery of the other two (91<sup>st</sup> & 71<sup>st</sup>) had lost a good many guns as had the SPM's. The NLF must keep the Manila-San Fernando

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guagua fighting until the SLF cover withdraw. This was estimated to be midnight Jan 1-2 at earliest-3 ½ days (this was Dec 29<sup>th</sup>).

Nate-I have asked Col WF Maher NLF cys about the USAFFE staff contact from whom Maj Bonner is supposed to have got the orders on disbanding the PA plan to withdraw unto Bataan. He knows nothing about it & believes Bonner's stay is in correct. Col Harry Skerry NLF Eng HQ agrees with Col. Maher.

Amplifying the NLF orders greater on proceeding page-orders were received that when withdrawal was ordered (from D4) "the utmost delay must be accomplished between D4 & D5, over the D5 line must be held until orders withdrawn." Plan of withdrawal thru D4 to D5 & hence to Bataan-11<sup>th</sup> & 21<sup>st</sup> Divs would extend to the right, refusing the flank to the south & SE, forming a covering force near the CAUMPIT-APALOT bridge until the completion of the withdrawal of the SLF from Manila via Calumpit-Guagua. The 11<sup>th</sup> & 21<sup>st</sup> Divs would then withdraw via Guagua & porac resp., the 11<sup>th</sup> Div uncovering & falling in behind the 21<sup>st</sup> Div which would extend its line to the right & would be the last division to withdraw into the pearly

gates of Bataan-if we had not already passed through another set of pearly gates. The 57<sup>th</sup> Div (PS) is now digging in a defensive line from near Angetes to the Zambales. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Regular def of the PA is similarly digging in an entrenched line from near Ageles to Mexico. The 88<sup>th</sup> FA (DS) is supporting that line, 3 batteries 57<sup>th</sup> & 2 batteries behind the 2<sup>nd</sup> Reg inf. (PA). Montgomery told us that the 21<sup>st</sup> Reg inf. Was a new unit which had been constabular from permanent camp personnel & others three days before” (Note: I was informed at 2<sup>nd</sup> Reg Inf HQ that they had been attacked on Dec 17<sup>th</sup>) “he also was rather vague as to whether the line was being dug for our occupation, the scouts returning, or whether we would pass through & have the scouts covering our withdrawal.”

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Info. rec'd. from Asst G3 N,LF (Montgomery) re dispositions of the other troops – 31<sup>st</sup> Inf (US) entrenched between Dinalupijan + Layac Jef. 45<sup>th</sup> Inf (PS) divided between vicinity of Dinalupijan + the SW coast of Bataan. 31<sup>st</sup> Div (PA) near Bagac on west coast of Bataan. 41<sup>st</sup> Div (PA) , SLF, had not been engaged, was already in Bataan and was digging in to the main battle position from Mt. Natib to Abucay. The 51<sup>st</sup> Div PA + a new unit, the 1<sup>st</sup> Reg Div (PA), both of the SLF, were fighting the withdrawal action in the south. The 51<sup>st</sup> Div would retreat to near Lamao on the east coast of Bataan. Not much done about 1<sup>st</sup> Reg Div – but it was probably slated for the west coast of Bataan. The 2d Red Div (PA) newly constituted, was in Bataan with mission of defending the SE coast. Only artillery info. – all scout artillery (except 88<sup>th</sup> which was near Angelos) was in Bataan supporting Dinalupijan – Lagac Jct line + the main battle position.

26<sup>th</sup> Cav (or what was left of it) was only NLF reserve + could not be moved to left to take care of a Nip. Breakthrough between Woppenstenis' 21<sup>st</sup> Inf + Zambales hits(?) – because the situation on NLF right was so precarious. (Dec 29) Hostile tanks reported massing north of Tarlac + LePag. Quite a gap existed between rt. Of 21<sup>st</sup> Div + left of 11<sup>th</sup> Div – the 11<sup>th</sup> Div being a mile or so north of Tarlac + the 21<sup>st</sup> South of Tarlac.

Jan 1'42 “The following is from Col. Urabus' worksheet; Col Nelson's recollection + statements of Col. Carter:

“Contact was established along the line from Tarlac to Cobanatuan on Dec 29<sup>th</sup>. On Dec 30, the 91<sup>st</sup> Div was hit by tanks, infantry + cavalry + faces back to GAPAN, + later in the afternoon and evening was hit again

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and routed. One Bn. was able to withdraw by bus to BALIVAG, reform along the river north there of about 11 pm. The 92<sup>st</sup> Inf had about 250 men, the 92<sup>nd</sup> Inf about 200. A bn. of the 12<sup>th</sup> Inf which had been operating in the Cagayan Valley joined on the D5 line, with some personnel of the 12<sup>th</sup> + 13<sup>th</sup> Inf together totaling about 1000 men. It is of interest to note the operations of this separate force from the outbreak of war to the date they rejoined (Dec 30) The following facts were given to me in Tarlac prison camp by Col Townsend, the C.O. at the outbreak of hostilities one bn 13<sup>th</sup> Inf was stationed in the Cagayan valley from Aparri to Balet Pass. The enemy landed at Aparri and pushed south to TUGUEGARAO + was seemingly content to stop there in control of the landing fields near Taguegaras \_ Iligan, from which they operated about 60 dive bombers. x x Townsend was sent to take command and operate against the enemy in this

corridor. He collected the bn. + by recruitment from constabulary + PA cadres + others increased his force to about 2000 men. The natives in the Cagayan Valley had destroyed the bridges south of Iligan + Townsend's advance was very slow, repairing bridges as he went. Except for two sharp patrol skirmishes near Iligan there was no contact. He was ordered back by radio from NLF to prevent his being cut off when the exit through Balete Pass was closed. His main body had not reached Iligan when the withdrawal order was received." Night of Dec 30-31 the 71<sup>st</sup> Div reorganizing at San Fernando, Pampauga, was ordered to relieve the 91<sup>st</sup> Division north of Baliwag, the latter to go into reserve south of Baliwag. About noon 31<sup>st</sup> the badly disorganized elements of the 91<sup>st</sup> Div were ordered to Guagua. The busses to be used in this movement were to be returned promptly to pick up the remaining elements of the 71<sup>st</sup> Div (71<sup>st</sup> + 72<sup>nd</sup> Inf); these elements to clear Calumpit bridge at 4:00 am Jan 1<sup>st</sup> '42. This order was not

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understood + an immediate withdrawal of all units started about 1 pm Dec 31. This movement was not halted until 4 pm + an outpost line established north of Plaridel, astride highway no. 5, supported by the 53<sup>rd</sup> Infantry of the SLF, which reached Plaridel the morning of Dec 30 {Note: Col SCMacDonald CofS SLF says this should be Dec 31 EJJ also that this was 51<sup>st</sup> Inf – not 53<sup>rd</sup>.}

The NLF mission was to halt the enemy off Manila – Columpit-Guagua road during the night of Dec. 31-Jan 1. "The CG 91<sup>st</sup> Div (Stevens) + his staff were ordered to proceed to Calumpit, assemble all available troops + cover the river at that point, which had become the focal point of the hostile effort to drive a wedge between NLF + SLF. Gen Stevens collected about 300 riflemen of all units, principally 71<sup>st</sup> + 72 Inf, 1 mg, posting them on the north side of the river at Calumpit. The bn. of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Inf + Batt. E 21<sup>st</sup> FA (all 21<sup>st</sup> Div) under command of Major MacLaughlin took position at Apalito, supporting Gen Stevens. This critical position was held during the night 31<sup>st</sup>-1<sup>st</sup> until 6.15 am Jan 1<sup>st</sup>, when it was blown by NLF Eugio(?) (note – I assume Uraclonce means the bridge was blown ELJ), Gen Wainwright personally giving the order, all SLF troops having cleared. The troops north of the river + highway held positions to fulfill the mission of keeping the SanFernando-Guagua road open until midnight Jan 1-2. During the morning of Jan. 1 all troops in this vicinity received a severe strafing + bombing from the air. At 1:30 pm the enemy forced a crossing of the river near Calumpit Orders were issued for the withdrawal of the NLF from D5 to the Guagua – Porac line commencing at 7 pm Jan 1<sup>st</sup>, the 11<sup>th</sup> + 21<sup>st</sup> Divs. To occupy that line, the shattered elements of the 71<sup>st</sup> + 91<sup>st</sup> Divs to follow the SLF into Bataan. The mission of holding the bottleneck – for the withdrawal of the SLF was successful. Now time must be secured to enable that force to get into Bataan, move supplies at Guagua, + get the NLF safely

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back behind the Bataan line.

(I learn that Warren – probably Miller P. former Capt. 57<sup>th</sup> Inf was Woppenstein's Rifle Exec (21<sup>st</sup> Inf). He was a fine youngster when I knew him + I know he did good work in his new job. EJJ) Alex Karlan Caplan – was the – Cafferty's exec (22<sup>nd</sup> Inf) – Alex was killed later at Abucay when he stepped on a land mine EJJ).

On Jan 4 the situation was critical for the 11<sup>th</sup> Div throughout for the 21<sup>st</sup>. According to radio reports from a tank platoon, Mallonei Bainez that – the 11<sup>th</sup> division line had “evaporated” x x A large infantry force had been cut off from the 11<sup>th</sup> Div route of withdrawal and was marching into the 21<sup>st</sup> Div area in an attempt to get around the enemy + reestablish themselves between the hostile force + Dinalupijan.” x x “This withdrawal of the units of the 11<sup>th</sup> Div threw McCaferty’s right completely in the air, and cluttered up the already insignificant route of withdrawal available to him.” Orders for withdrawal at 7:00 pm was rec’d (afternoon of Jan 4) from this position just south of Porac. [In PW camp later Mallones got from Col. Glen R Townsend C.O. 11<sup>th</sup> Inf the following account of the action on the front of the 11<sup>th</sup> Div, in position in Guega – Dinalupijan Rd. “The 11<sup>th</sup> Div was in line from Guagua toward Porac. The 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Inf had been severely used in the fighting in the north + during the withdrawal. A heavy, powerful attack on the 3<sup>rd</sup> + lasting until the 4<sup>th</sup> disintegrated these 2 regts. + allowed the enemy to drive down the Guagua – Dinalupijan Rd, cutting off the 11<sup>th</sup> Inf which was in the open country west of the road. Remnants of the 12<sup>th</sup> + 13<sup>th</sup> Inf joined the 11<sup>th</sup> Reconnaissance was made for routes to the rear close in to the highway, but there were no trails, much less route in that area. Cross country was impossible as it was evident such a movement would quickly result in every man for himself + degeneration into a rout. The troops were moved via Floridablanca, thence to the Porac-Pabanlag Rd, to Dinalupijan, thence on the highway north to KP95 where the troops occupied positions again facing the enemy. The troops were out

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of position 14 hrs, from 4 pm on the 4<sup>th</sup> to 6 pm on 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. During this period, the only troops of the NLF between the enemy + the critical bottleneck into Bataan at Lagac Jet were about 200 stragglers rounded up + placed under command of Capt. Primrose, a reserve officer, + put in position near KP90 – plus the 10 guns of the 11<sup>th</sup> FA + some SPM artillery.”

Withdrawal gets underway Jan 4 – 7 pm – bridge at Pabanlag interdicted by artillery – no casualties. On Jan 5<sup>th</sup> 11<sup>th</sup> Div retire(?) from KP90 to 95 + were “in a state which is generally expressed by the word ‘fluid’. We were completely out of contact with them on our right flank” – leaving no pressure on from t of 21<sup>st</sup> Div. “The enemy had not come forward once the last attack out of PIO” x x “the infantry, as far as I could see, + certainly the artillery were incapable of offering the most feeble resistance.” Jan 5 – “Scout cars of the tanks report that on 21<sup>st</sup> Div front the enemy had not advanced south of PIO. Mallones leaves from Woppenstein (21<sup>st</sup> Div) who had received orders from division hq. that the infantry would withdraw to conform to the line they held by the 11<sup>th</sup> Div (KP95) – the artillery to do likewise. Failing that there was something in the order that needed further clarification Mallores goes to Div Hq where General Copinparin(?) greeted him with an excited “Get out, get out, get the guns out” Mallonce replied “Very well sir, where shall we go?” “Anywhere into Bataan” Came the reply “Get across the bridge. Get south of Hermosa, find a place + bivouac. I will find you tomorrow! Mallonce “Do you mean we are through here sir; that you do not want any further support of the div?” Coperipian(?) – “Are you firing? Are we in contact?” – Mallonce “No sir, very little prospect today.” C\_ “Then get across the river. Things are bad on our right. The 11<sup>th</sup> Div has fallen to pieces. We will probably all be cut off. The infantry can get out by swimming the river but the

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guns will be lost. Get out. Hurry.” M\_ ”Shouldn’t I go into position just south of the river so as to fire in front of the bridge + keep it open?” C\_ “No, get south of Hermosa”.

The 12<sup>th</sup> FA + rest of Col. Mallonee’s command (if any) started back to carry out this order.— Which incidentally was given in the presence of C of S, G-3, Col Cotalan(?). Mallonee sent Maj Bonsier(?) to NLF(?) to tell them of his instructions + ask for assignment of a bivouac area. He (Mallonee) is told that the 31<sup>st</sup> Inf (?) + scout artillery were in position south of the river to cover the bridge + river. (Note- the 2<sup>nd</sup>(?)Bn 57<sup>th</sup> Inf under LtCol Frank E. Brokow(?) was there too, under command of CO 31<sup>st</sup> Inf (Col Steel, I think) (?)). Bonner(?) returns to Mallonee at Divalupijan with info that Gen. Wainwright strongly disapproved of Coperipian’s(?) withdrawal order. “He directed the right to continue its support of the division. He also used Bonner to deliver(?) a written to Coperipian(?) directing that the div. hold the line of the \_\_\_\_\_ river which was south of Pabanlag as per prior orders.” The div. had already withdrawn from that line to conform to 11”Div” (at KP95) Div. staff informs Mallonee that “representation would be made to Gen W. that the div. could not be returned to the line of the river before dark, the effective time of the NLF withdrawal order + would take position across the Guagua(?)-Dinalupijan + Pabanlag-Dinalupijan road covering Layac(?) Jct. + the bridge. On passing into Bataan Col Mallonee turned over his SPMS to Ganabil(?) + reverted to the status of Sr. Instr. 21<sup>st</sup> FA.

On passing into Bataan the NLF+SLF ceased to exist as such—the I Corps was formed under the command of Major Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, with his old NLF Staff. The II Corps was under the command of Major Gen George Parker Jr, who

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Commanded the SLF from war’s outbreak to about Dec 23 ‘41, at which time he was sent to command the Bataan Defense Force—charged with the defense of the Peninsula until after the withdrawal (NLF + SLF) was completed. The Bataan Defense Force was also charged with the preparation of Bataan for defense by the army. He retained the Bataan Force Staff when he became II Corps Commander. A Service Command was now constituted under the command of Brig Gen. Allan C. MacBride who had been C of S. Philippines Department under Major General George Grunert prior to the war. (Note: General MacBride came from Charleston, SC. To San Francisco on the USAT LEONARD WOOD with my family + me—and thence to Manila with us on the USAT GENERAL GRANT, arriving Feb 21 ‘41(?)). General MacBride had as his staff the old officers of the Philippine Dept. Hq.

The II Corps(Right(?)) had 11<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, 41<sup>st</sup>, 51<sup>st</sup> Div’s + part of the Phil. Div (LOUGH(?)). In addition the (?) Reg Div which was on beach defense of Manila Bay, overlapped sectors of the II Corps + the Service Command. During the early days the 31<sup>st</sup> Div was transferred from the I Corps to the Corps to the II Corps—and upon withdrawal from the Abucay(?) line (?) the 11<sup>th</sup> Division was transferred from the II Corps to the I st.

The I Corps had the 1<sup>st</sup> Reg. Div, the remnants of the 71<sup>st</sup> & 91<sup>st</sup> Div. a part of the Philippine Div., some Constabulary Regiments & subsequently, the 11<sup>th</sup> Div. The 26<sup>th</sup> Cav. was in USAFFE reserve. Later the rest of the Phil. Div. was in USAFFE reserve.

In Bataan, Division organization was not strictly adhered to, being replaced by sector organization manned by “combat teams” with divisional units split between various sectors. \*\* Also the A.C. ground troops—no longer need[ed] for their normal function—were formed into an infantry combat unit & performed front line service.

USAFFE under General MacArthur, commanded the whole from CORREGIDOR, with an advance echelon of the General Staff on Bataan. After General MacArthur left Corregidor (March 11 '42) for Australia, USAFFE became USFIP (U.S. Forces in the Phils.) commanded by Maj General Wainwright who was soon promoted. HQ USFIP was on Corregidor. At this time all the forces in Bataan were constituted into the LUZON FORCE under Major General Edward P. King Jr.—up to that time the artillery advisor on General MacArthur's Staff.

Initial CP 21<sup>st</sup> Div—at Guitol near Balanga.

\* Night of Jan 23-24 -42      See p 51 Note Book \* No \_\_\_\_  
(With Columbus Notes)

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End of notebook