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Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations,(Leavenworth Paper #16). MAJ Paul H. Herbert.
Even though General DePuy and the other authors of FM 100-5 intended to write a manual that would prepare the Army for its next war, not its last, they could not possibly escape the Army's historical experience. General DePuy's most fundamental ideas about tactics, combined arms, combat leadership, the American Soldier, and the U.S. Army came directly from the campaign to liberate Europe from Nazism. He never forgot them and he wrote them into FM 100-5.

Eisenhower, Strategic Operator and Leader. LTC John W. Hall.
Dwight David Eisenhower entered onto the world stage In early 1942 during the very darkest hours of World War II and exited in 1961 after leading the nation as our President for eight peaceful and productive years. The study examines his ability to lead at the highest levels of strategic military and political power. It argues that he is in fact one of our nation's few truly great leaders of vision and moral courage. The paper uses several of Eisenhower's key decisions during important events at critical points of his career to demonstrate his ability to make major visionary decisions while enduring extreme national and international political pressure and personal criticism. Lastly, the end results and implications of his decisions are discussed.

Forging the Instrument: George C. Marshall as a Strategic Leader, 1939- 1941. LTC John T. Nelsen II.
General George C. Marshall assumed the duties of Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, in July 1939. During the subsequent two and a half years, he played a central leadership role in preparing the United States for the possibility of war. In fact, largely through his efforts, America entered the war with a running start. By that time, it had developed a large, well trained Army of over 1.4 million men. This was a far cry from the paltry forces which had existed in 1939. This paper focuses on Marshall's strategic leadership during the relatively unglamorous prewar years. During this period, Marshall went from a generally unknown Washington personage to become one of the more recognized and respected national figures. In the process, he laid the foundation for exercising enormous influence at the highest levels of government throughout the war. Major aspects of his strategic leadership analyzed include the following: his strategic vision, the step-by-step process of implementing that vision, his relations with Congress, his efforts to institutionalize selected values across the Army in consonance with his vision, his success in structuring and restructuring the Army in pursuit of his vision and institutional values, his own interpersonal skills, and his role in strategy formulation.

General George C. Marshall and the Army Staff: A Study in Effective Staff Leadership. LTC Paul G. Munch.
Few dispute George Marshall's role in winning World War II. He is universally recognized as one of its most important leaders. But General Marshall was not a commander in the field. Unlike Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, Bradley, and Patton, Marshall was the Army's Chief of Staff -- a position normally relegated to historical obscurity. In fact, Roosevelt once asked, Who remembers who the Chiefs of Staff were during the Civil War or World War I? Despite his position as a staff officer, Marshall emerged as the war's most respected general. He and his staff directed military operations around the world. In addition, he was Roosevelt's most trusted military advisor, a strategist on global terms, and a champion of alliance warfare. He was one of the war's most effective leaders. As with most talented men, one can learn a great deal from George Marshall. His ability to successfully direct the Army Staff during the crucial 3-month period from December 1941 through March 1942 is particularly instructive. It provides some very good insights on how to lead and direct a large staff faced with multiple problems. During this period, Marshall and his staff successfully tackled a wide range of critical problems that would affect the outcome of the war. This article looks at Marshall's preparation to become Chief of Staff, his ability to build an effective team, the character of the staff, and Marshall's interaction with these very talented men. Following this background information, the author investigates how Marshall handled two critical issues: the support to the beleaguered forces in the Philippines, and the reorganization of the Army Staff. Lastly, he offers some insights into why Marshall was so successful as a staff leader.

George C. Marshall: The Essential Strategic Leader. LTC Jeffrey S. Tipton.
The complexity of the 21st century operational environment, the Global War on Terrorism, and on-going Army transformation require more of Army leaders at all levels. One can apply lessons learned from General George C. Marshall's career when developing today's leadership programs. George Marshall had unique foreign, domestic, and wartime experiences from his commissioning to his final military assignment as Army Chief of Staff. General Marshall displayed certain talents and abilities that allowed him to function with, be accepted by, and finally be chosen by national civilian authority for service as Secretary of State. These attributes, elements of character, and calculated uses of the strategic art enabled the creation or expansion of skills that facilitated strategic leadership at an unprecedented scale. This paper examines Marshall's character, education, experiences, and decisions, and then coordinates these characteristics with selected Pentathlete skills and metacompetencies to form strategic leader essentials. Cultural adjustment, institutional change, professional education, and self-awareness recommendations are suggested to improve leadership development for contemporary officer leaders in the Army.

George Washington, America's First Strategic Leader. LTC Sheila C. Toner.
American military officers are educated via a formal professional military development program, for more than twenty years in pursuit of mastery of the strategic art. Much of that developmental program emphasizes the concepts of war and military genius advocated by Carl Von Clausewitz in his nineteenth century classic, On War. This study examines the strategic thought and actions of General George Washington in the American Revolution, which preceded Clausewitz's work by more than thirty years. It shows that, despite the lack of any formal military professional education, Washington made skillful use of the ways and means available to him to construct a strategy capable of achieving the desired ends. The author concludes that, whether judged against Clausewitz's concepts or modern definitions of the strategic art, Washington deserves to be recognized as a master of the strategic art and America's first strategic leader.

Great Service Secretaries - Lessons Learned. Van B. Cunningham.
This paper is designed to help a new Service Secretary during the difficult transition period. It is based on the lives of two great men, Secretary of War Elihu Root and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., who made extraordinary contributions to the Army. Twelve lessons learned are drawn from each man's experience. Because of the similarity of issues surrounding the role of the Service Secretary and the role of the corporate director, twelve lessons are drawn from business corporate governance. Three guiding principles for governance of the military are offered. Several contemporary issues: civilian control of the military, evolution of the Secretary's role, and several detractors are discussed. Exclusion of the Service Secretary from operational matters is challenged. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's amazing fast start is explained.

Major General Leonard Wood: A Study of Leadership in an Army in Transition. LTC Robert J. Sperberg.
Leonard Wood rose from obscure civilian contract doctor in the American southwest of 1885 to Chief of Staff of the United States Army as the Army itself changed from frontier constabulary to global fighting force. Besides his service as Chief of Staff, Wood was a Medal of Honor winner in the campaign to capture Geronimo; commander of the Rough Riders in Spanish American War; Governor of Cuba and later the Philippines; a prolific writer; and candidate for President of the United States. He was the Prophet of Preparedness and dedicated his career to initiating training and readiness improvements in the Army in the years of transition before World War I. But Leonard Wood was foremost a political general, shrewd, ruthless, and often insubordinate. Capable and ambitious, he used friends and position to further his power, prestige, and his singular vision of America. Eventually his conflict with influential political leaders, fellow generals, and presidents led to his banishment to Kansas while the Army he had spent years in promoting marched to World War I without him. Even now, he remains an enigma to the Army's officer corps. This study reviews Leonard Wood's service as the Army's foremost strategic leader in a period of unprecedented transition to examine his leader competencies and the political military relationship lessons learned that may be apropos to today's Army leaders.

Prepare the Army for War. A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973 - 1993. John L. Romjue, Susan Canedy, and Anne W. Chapman.
This is an excellent short history of TRADOC written by the TRADOC Historians.

Selected Papers of General William E. Depuy. Compiled by COL Richard M. Swain.

Soldier, Statesman, Scholar: A Study of Strategic Generalship. MAJ Maurice L. Todd.
Contrary to Army promotion policies and practices today, all types of generalship are not the same. Instead there are different types of generalship required for different levels of command and specialized function Unfortunately, the Army's focus on promoting officers to general rank based almost exclusively on tactical unit assignments does not address the differences in the requirements for the different types of generalship, particularly at the strategic level. The key characteristics of the strategic level that make it different from lower levels are the importance of joint, combined, and unified command? the constant international scope; and the interaction in the national political system. Examining the lives and careers of three American general who performed unquestionably well at the strategic level, Douglas MacArthur, George C. Marshall, and Dwight D. Eisenhower, reveal indicators of their success in terms of organizational characteristics, education experience, and selection. The organizational characteristics of the US Army were similar for MacArthur, Marshall, and Eisenhower.

Something Old, Something New: Army Leader Development in a Dynamic Environment. RAND Arroyo Center.
Over the past two decades many aspects of military operations have changed profoundly, with the potential for equally profound effects on the things that Army leaders must know and do. The tangible threat of the Soviet Union has been replaced by amorphous, changing, and ill-defined threats and challenges. Simultaneously, the focus has shifted toward stability operations, support operations, and military operations other than war. As a result, considerations that once were peripheral now often take center stage. These changes have created a dynamic situation-volatile, unpredictable, and novel in many respects-making the conduct of military operations more complex and varied than in the past.

Strategic Leadership Competency Development: A Comparison of Generals Zinni and Powell. COL Peter M. Warker.
The intent of this paper is to compare and contrast the developmental experiences of two military leaders who have successfully performed at the strategic level in the United States military and government. I will subjectively compare their careers to assess experience similarities that could suggest assignment paths that contribute to successful strategic leadership competency development. For the purpose of this assessment I will compare and contrast the careers of General Anthony Zinni, United States Marine Corps, and General Colin Powell of the United States Army. I believe that the assessment will demonstrate that exposure to combat, or challenging decision-making in a VUCA environment, opportunities to command increasingly complex organizations, assignments within the Joint and Interagency environment, and opportunities to personally grow through civilian and military education are critical to the competency development for future strategic leaders of the military. The Army War College classifies the strategic leadership competencies as conceptual, technical, or interpersonal. I will utilize a specific competency within each of the three competency classifications to assess Generals Zinni s and Powell s careers for common developmental experiences. The experiences of each General in combat, adult education, leadership and command positions, joint assignments, and multinational or interagency environments will be compared to assess developmental experiences that contributed to gaining competency in frame of reference development, Joint, Interagency, Multinational, and Intra-agency relationships, and consensus building skills.

The Strategic Vision of Admiral Arleigh Burke. CDR Craig D. Lesher.
The transition from tactical expert to senior leader involves widening one's scope and becoming comfortable at the strategic level. Strategic vision is one of the competencies required of the leader functioning at that level. This report develops a list of questions by which one can evaluate the senior leader's strategic vision and then applies the list to a study of the strategic vision of Admiral Arleigh Burke, United States Navy. The final determination of the evaluation of Burke's actions as Chief of Naval Operations revealed that he possessed strategic vision.

Transformational Leadership in the Era of Change. MAJ Thomas D. Huse.
The U.S. Army is currently in the midst of unprecedented transformation. Weapons, vehicles, technology, and most important, people, are the focus of the Army's future change. Understanding the relationship between people (Soldiers) and change is a definite leadership challenge. By combining emerging technologies with people and change, future leadership challenges increase immeasurably. Transformational leadership is about leading an organization through change. In its purest form, it is the ability to guide and direct those within a given organization, focusing on one clear, directed vision through the application of the components of transformational leadership. As the U. S. Army continues to change and progress through the twenty-first century, we will without doubt need transformational leaders to spearhead this change, leaders that can effectively guide and direct their subordinates through this transformation, and to serve as agents of change. The purpose of this monograph is to determine the applicability of transformational leadership within the U. S. Army through an analysis and comparison of transformational leadership styles and techniques based upon selected evaluation criteria. Moreover, the base question to be answered is should transformational leadership be adopted at all leadership levels within the Army, or at specific levels only? The case studies are an analysis and historic significance of transformational leadership, centering on two renowned transformational leaders of our Army, General George C. Marshall, and General William E. DePuy. Both of these leaders possessed exceptional transformational leadership ability through periods of true change and transformation within the U. S. Army. Furthermore, the case studies apply the principles of transformational leadership to these leaders abilities, decision-making, and overall.

The Ulysses S. Grant: A Strategic Leader. LTC Henry W. Suchting III.
With the increased emphasis that is currently being placed upon strategic thinking, it is appropriate to reexamine past U.S. leaders to determine their proficiency in this skill. This study focuses on the strategic thinking of General Ulysses S. Grant as a military leader. Specifically addressed are his national strategic vision, his operational (battlefield) vision, and his personal leadership style. This study argues that Grant was 'state of the art' in each of these arenas. Diverse sources provide a view of his possession and mastery of the several layers of what we would dub strategy. The section on national strategic thinking furnishes a glimpse of his ability to see, well beyond most of his contemporaries, the connectivity between battlefield results and national destiny. The segment covering operational vision demonstrates Grant's key role in the advancement of operational art. The final portion, concentrating on his leadership style, displays a more personal view of Grant.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1982: A Case Study in Successful Peacetime Military Reform. MAJ Suzanne C. Nielsen.
In the 1970s, the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) played a key role in instituting and integrating peacetime military reforms. TRADOC updated doctrine, revised training practices, and ensured that these and other aspects of the combat developments process were mutually supportive. TRADOC changed the manner in which the U.S. Army prepared for war. That TRADOC played such a central role is important because a common expectation is that military organizations will be unable to reform themselves. This perspective is deficient in that it fails to predict the changes that Generals William DePuy, Donn Starry, and Paul Gorman spearheaded in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Army faced external pressures--changing national security policy, budget stringency, and the political decision to move to an all-volunteer force--but these challenges and constraints did not provide Army leaders with a detailed plan of action. The shape and extent of reforms within the U.S. Army in the 1970s were primarily determined by leaders from within the organization. This thesis explains the role of TRADOC in the Army's reforms in the 1970s and draws implications relevant to today's Army Transformation.

William J. Donovan: Visionary, Strategic Leader, an Historical Perspective. COL Anthony F. Caruana.
This paper presents the concepts of vision and strategic leadership at senior levels as enumerated by several respected civilian and military leaders. The major focus of the paper, from a historical perspective, will be an analysis of the life experiences which included family background, education, character and personality, career path, accumulative knowledge, and the network of contacts that lead William J. 'Wild Bill' Donovan to become a visionary and strategic leader. It chronicles his life in four stages demonstrating his efforts towards realizing his visions, especially the development of a central intelligence agency for the United States. It attempts to prove that Major General William J. Donovan was a citizen soldier worthy of study by U.S. Army War College students and other senior leaders.

Government Reports / After Actions

Eisenhower Report on Torch. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower.
A narrative report produced by General Dwight Eisenhower on the invasion of North Africa by the Allied Forces in 1942. Areas covered in the report are the creation of the Allied Force; the planning considerations; the invasion; the race for Tunisia; and operations against Field Marshal Rommel and Africa Korps.

Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. Office of the Inspector General, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience appears virtually upon the five-year anniversary of my appointment as Inspector General in Iraq. Shortly after that appointment, I met with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to whom I reported, to discuss the mission. His first words were: Why did you take this job? It is an impossible task. I began to understand why he offered so startling a welcome during the following week, when I made my first trip to Iraq to begin setting up oversight of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), then in charge of Iraq's reconstruction. My office in the Republican Palace, which housed the CPA and would later house the U.S. Embassy was adjacent to the CPA Comptroller's. What I saw was troubling: large amounts of cash moving quickly out the door. Later that same day, walking the halls of the palace, I overheard someone say: We can't do that anymore. There is a new inspector general here. These red flags were the first signs of how challenging executing oversight in Iraq would be. But it has not been impossible, chiefly because of the professional, productive, and courageous conduct of the many auditors, inspectors, and investigators who have worked diligently to fulfill the mission of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). SIGIR's oversight jurisdiction covers about $50 billion in U.S. funds appropriated by the Congress for Iraq the largest relief and reconstruction effort for one country in U.S. history. This sea of taxpayer dollars flowed to a wide spectrum of initiatives, ranging from training Iraq's army and police to building large electrical, oil, and water projects; from supporting democracy-building efforts to strengthening budget execution by provincial councils; and from funding rule-of-law reforms to ensuring that the Iraqi government sustains what the U.S. program provided.


Articles with an Asterisk (*) are only available to Fort Leavenworth Users through our proxy server / ip recognition.

* Bennis, Warren G. "The Seven Ages of the Leader." Harvard Business Review 82, no. 1 (January 2004): 46-53. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed June 5, 2009).

Caldwell IV, William B. "Leadership in a Time of Crisis." Lincoln Lecture Series at the University of Saint Mary, 12 February 2009.

* Fryer, Bronwyn. "Timeless Leadership." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 3 (March 2008): 45-49. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed June 5, 2009).

* Ibarra, Herminia, and Mark Hunter. "How Leaders Create and Use Networks." Harvard Business Review 85, no. 1 (January 2007): 40-47. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed June 5, 2009).

* Kotter, John P., and Leonard A. Schlesinger. "Choosing Strategies for Change." Harvard Business Review 86, no. 7/8 (July 2008): 130-139. Business Source Complete, EBSCO host (accessed June 5, 2009).


Officer Education History (Army)

Patton on the Next War


Last Reviewed: May 28, 2015

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