

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATION

MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations on Psychological Warfare Operations in the European Theater of Operations.

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APO 408

REPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

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INTRODUCTION

This study represents an agenda for future study with a brief report on Psychological Warfare operations sufficient to explain the agenda. Although appropriate records were not available for certain subjects in the report and it was impossible to interview certain experienced personnel, it is worthy of note that in the opinion of General officers with whom the study was discussed every effort should be made to obtain a thorough documentation and critical evaluation of Psychological Warfare operations in the ETO. Their comment in brief follows:

General George S. Patton: "Such a study must be made. Psychological warfare had an important place in the European Campaign. It can accomplish much good. It can also be extremely harmful."

Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow: "Psychological Warfare operations and methods are not sufficiently well known to officers of the Army generally. I would like to see handbooks and manuals prepared, and a course of study in Psychological Warfare introduced into the Command and General Staff School".

Major General Leven, C. Allen: "Too little is known about psychological Warfare in the Army. A thorough study should be made."

Psychological Warfare in the ETO was a joint Anglo-American operation largely conducted by officers temporarily commissioned in the Army of the United States, civilian specialists of many professional categories and enlisted personnel of many specialized skills. It should be conducted by the most capable personnel obtainable. In its broader aspects propaganda warfare is more properly a State Department than a War Department problem; as such it is a neglected and ineptly used political and diplomatic weapon. The art of propaganda warfare should be developed to the optimum extent before the problem arises as to how it should be employed, by Military Forces.

To recapture many experiences of Psychological Warfare operations that were not made a matter of record, personnel in the U.S. and the United Kingdom must be interviewed, German records must be searched, and German civilians and German army personnel must be interviewed.

DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

ORGANIZATION AT SHAEF

1. Mission of Psychological Warfare. Psychological Warfare has been variously defined, but its primary mission is this: To employ the press, radio and other media to destroy the fighting morale of the enemy, both at home and at the front, and to sustain the morale of friendly populations in enemy territory. Its secondary mission is to provide information in liberated areas to assist the appropriate military authorities in the restoration and maintenance of order. There are other missions which will be defined in their proper place in this report.

2. Psychological Warfare as a weapon of war is not new. It stems from earliest times. In World War II (starting well before the outbreak of hostilities) German psychological warfare was highly successful as part of the overall German offensive against Poland, Norway, France, Belgium and Holland — against all of Germany's eventual adversaries, in fact, except Britain, Russia and the United States.

3. Psychological warfare was not an innovation in the American army in World War II. The effect of propaganda had been well tested in World War I. In the final months of the last war a considerable psychological warfare operation was conducted by the American army, with air dropping of leaflets and other devices in the field as well as a large scale propaganda campaign waged on the level of international information services.

4. Despite this, no substantial body of doctrine or plan of operations for psychological warfare existed before the outbreak of World War II.

5. Even now, no fixed place for psychological warfare in the staff has been determined, but psychological warfare operations in the European campaign could be studied with a view of codifying such phases of the operation as lend themselves to permanent doctrine.

6. Psychological warfare in the European Theater of Operations, — a joint Anglo-American operation in which personnel and facilities of both nations were thoroughly merged, — was virtually created in the European theater. Psychological warfare operations were organized and conducted with no substantial precedent or doctrine or organization. The problems of organizing the psychological warfare campaign, establishing basic doctrine, fixing tables of equipment, and finding a place in the staff were still unsolved at the end of 1943.

7. Experience of psychological warfare teams in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations provided the only battle tested background, and this experience was by no means adequate for the scale on which the campaign in the European Theater was undertaken.

8. Relation of Military to Civilian Agencies. As developed, the psychological warfare operation was not only a joint Anglo-American but a joint military-civilian operation, with civilian personnel of various civilian agencies employed at all echelons. This was true for several reasons: sufficient qualified military personnel were not made available; the nature of psychological warfare is political as well as military, and many decisions and directives could only be obtained through agencies representing the State Department of the United States

or the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom; Psychological warfare required liaison with secret service agencies of a quasi-military nature; with Allied government in exile; and with civilian commercial services.

9. Civilian agencies participating directly in the psychological warfare campaign were:

- a. Office of War Information (United States).
- b. Office of Strategic Services (United States).
- c. Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office (United Kingdom).
- d. Ministry of Information (United Kingdom).
- e. British Broadcasting Corporation (United Kingdom).
- f. Political Warfare executive of the Foreign Office (United Kingdom).

10. Psychological warfare operations embrace policies which can only be fixed at the highest government level. It should be noted that Psychological Warfare Division at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, while not maintaining formal liaison with the State Department of the United States, or the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, did so through the Office of War Information and the Political Intelligence Department, carrying out directives supplied from the highest government levels.

11. It should also be pointed out that psychological warfare, through employment of personnel assigned directly to the military establishment, or to one of the participating civilian agencies, profited by the service of some of the most highly skilled men in the realm of the press, radio, politics and other civilian professions of both the United States and Great Britain. No evaluation of the psychological warfare contribution to the success of the European campaign could be made without evaluating the total contribution of the various Allied civilian agencies.

12. Organization of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF. No critique on this organization will be attempted here, except to outline the organizational structure, and to suggest that no organizational problems appear to have developed. The SHAEF Organization was organized into the following sections:

- Office of Chief of Division
- Executive
- Administration Section
- Supply and Transportation Section
- Communication Section
- Directives (Current Propaganda) Section
- Directives Section
- Leaflets Section
- Radio Section
- Intelligence, Special Operations
- Intelligence Section
- Special Section (Covert Propaganda)
- German Media Control
- Press Control
- Entertainment Control
- Publications Control
- Historian

13. Psychological Warfare Strategic Themes in European Campaign.

No analysis of propaganda themes employed in World War II could hope to be conclusive since these themes were as varied as ingenuity could devise and opportunity afforded. However, the broad propaganda themes of World War II formed a certain pattern, and for the sake of illustration a thumb-nail evaluation of strategic themes is proposed. These are listed in the order of suggested effectiveness:

a. Factual news of the progress of the war, Exploitation of German military disasters.

b. Hopelessness of German cause. Allied superiority in men and material.

c. Good treatment of prisoners captured by Allied Armies. Allied adherence to terms of the Geneva Conventions.

d. Expose of false promises of Nazi leaders. Emphasized with each new development.

e. Guilt of Nazi regime. Identification of ordinary Germans with democratic moral, religious and political standards rather than with Nazi standards.

f. Selfishness and greed of Nazi leaders. Contrast of privileges enjoyed by Nazi party leaders with privileges of ordinary Germans.

14. It will be noted that these basic themes (here only suggested, no proper analysis has been made) did not employ propaganda in the popular sense of distorted truth or downright lies.

15. It should be emphasized also, that at no time in the European campaign did psychological warfare appeals depart from President Roosevelt's policy of demanding unconditional surrender, or make false promises to the German army or the German people.

16. This emphasis is placed to show how policy control in psychological warfare reached to the highest governmental level.

17. It is also worthy of note that Allied propaganda never made prophecies of victories to come, nor directly refuted German propaganda claims, regardless of provocation by German propagandists. Counter propaganda to German claims was by indirect methods.

18. These illustrations indicate a field of analysis which should be undertaken to chart effectiveness of propaganda lines taken.

19. While the above illustrations cover only strategic propaganda directed to the enemy, a similar volume of propaganda output was directed to other targets:

a. Friendly populations in occupied countries.

b. Friendly populations in liberated areas, reached by radio, newspapers, publications, films, photographic displays, etc.

c. Friendly groups within Germany (forced laborers, etc).

d. Populations of neutral countries.

20. Descriptions of the various propaganda media, doctrine of employment of the various media, problems related to the collection of intelligence, planning, relations with other staff sections, etc. are covered in subsequent sections of this report.

DOCTRINE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN FIELD OPERATIONS.

21 Mission of Psychological Warfare Field Operations. Psychological warfare in the field simply localized the broad propaganda mission within the combat zone. It supports the commanding general at each echelon with propaganda focused on enemy elements facing his troops. Combat or field psychological warfare achieves maximum success when built into the operational plan since this enable production of essential leaflets, radio programs etc, and assembly of specialized equipment and personnel for a concentrated effort where necessary.

22. In its large sense it is the mission of destroying the enemy's will to resist; encouragement and facilitation of individual and mass surrenders; communication of orders, directives and appeals to civilian population on both sides of the front lines to create attitudes and prompt courses of action helpful to military operations and to the security of communications.

23. Specifically, combat operations employ media not available to broad strategic propaganda operations - leaflets produced in haste and delivered by aircraft or artillery shell to specific enemy units; direct voice contact with enemy units by loudspeakers mounted on tanks or trucks; radio programs of a tactical nature produced in the field from detailed local intelligence and timed with military operations. It is necessary to study these media to establish success of these operations and in order to systematize those propaganda appeals most successful in various standard situations.

24. While statistical data has little value in determining the success of propaganda operations, it is noted for purpose of illustrating the scope that combat units within the 12th Army Group, within a nine-month period beginning in August, 1944, distributed 520,000,000 leaflets and miniature newspapers to German troops facing the Army Group and to civilians in the immediate path of advancing forces; performed 1,237 loudspeaker missions; and broadcast 975 separate tactical radio programs, not including 825 acceptable recordings produced in forward areas and broadcast over the Army Group programs of Radio Luxembourg, as well as the programs of ABSIE, BBC, etc.

25. Propaganda Themes: Stressed in Combat Psychological Warfare. In addition to all the themes employed in strategic propaganda, the basic theme of combat propaganda leaflets, broadcasts, and loudspeaker appeals was simply that of persuading German soldiers to lay down their arms and become prisoners. This theme runs through all the output of the various media:

- a. Idea of surrender.
- b. Surrender is honorable for the German.
- c. Methods of surrender.
- d. The act of surrender is now the most reasonable act under existing circumstances.

26. It must not be forgotten that the act of surrender is attended by considerable risk, and that detailed instructions in this manner must be constantly given to the enemy soldier to facilitate his surrender. These instructions must also be communicated to friendly

troops and coordinated with any surrender attempt.

27. The secondary theme, constantly impressed through leaflets, broadcasts, etc, were the "six points" of American good treatment of prisoners, constantly repeated with reference to guarantees of the Geneva conventions. These were:

- a. Immediate removal from the danger zone.
- b. Decent treatment "as befits soldiers".
- c. The same food as that given to American soldiers, "the best food Army in the world".
- d. Adequate hospital care.
- e. Postal privileges, to communicate with families at home.
- f. Return home after the war, "as soon as possible".

28. Supporting these basic themes were those of a purely operational nature: Tactical advantages enjoyed by the advancing American troops; superiority of men and material of advancing troops; instructions from field commanders to opposing troops or civilians in the path of advance; accentuated grievances among German soldiers from units ranging from armies down to platoons; weaknesses of German command leadership; food supply shortages; instances of mistreatment, injustice, etc.

29. Safe Conduct Pass. Probably the most effective leaflet of the war was the "Passierschein" or "Safe Conduct Pass". Printed as an official document, it bore the seals of the United States and Great Britain, carried the signature of the Supreme Commander in facsimile; and emphasized adherence to the Geneva conventions.

30. The form and wording of the Passierschein, once established, was never varied. It was strictly adhered to so that no doubt would ever arise in the German soldier's mind as to the authenticity of the document.

31. To provide one safe conduct pass for the entire front, the leaflet was produced only by PWD SHAEF. In December, 1944, directives forbade reproduction of the safe conduct pass on the reverse of any other leaflet. Interrogation reports confirmed that this leaflet accomplished its purpose; that it was regarded by German soldiers as an official document and could be trusted. Objections raised by German soldiers to the more conventional argumentative leaflet, "It may be true", "But it is probably just propaganda", appeared not to apply to this leaflet.

32. Typical of other leaflet doctrine, to implant the surrender idea in the mind of the German soldier and take advantage of the "do-layed action" effect of a leaflet, was that employed in the "Ei Surrender" leaflet, providing a phonetic German spelling of "I Surrender". This theme was further developed with other language lessons, of practical value to the German soldier in case of surrender or desertion, and of indirect propaganda impact. Lessons included phonetic spelling of such terms as "I need another blanket", "I want another cigarette, please", etc.

33. News as a Propaganda Weapon. In combat propaganda, as well as in strategic propaganda, factual news was the chief method of persuading the German soldiers that their cause was hopeless and surrender

inevitable. Augmenting the strategical distribution of "Nachrichten", the London-produced newspaper for German troops, (Distributed by air) was "Frontpost", and "Feldpost", produced by 12th Army Group for tactical distribution by air and artillery shell. News in these two papers ranged from world news to happening on the front at company and platoon level. The basic source of valid items of the latter sort were, of course, obtained directly from intelligence sources.

34. The "Frontpost" was distributed by planes of the tactical air force, while "Feldpost", a tiny but newsy leaflet, was distributed by artillery.

35. These small newspapers contained news pictures, columns of comment, German sport news (obtained by monitoring German broadcasts) plus items culled from intelligence sources. They contained no editorials or covert propaganda preaching. A special feature was "the Yankee Speaks", an appeal of "an ordinary American soldier" speaking directly to "an ordinary German Soldier" across the lines. These newspapers were written with a calculating regard for propaganda effect, but did not violate basic rules of truth. Of proven value was the constant use of good situation maps to explain to the German soldier the true state of affairs on the front.

36. Other leaflets of proven effect were those based on captured enemy documents, particularly secret German documents which exposed (1) inefficiency, inadequacy and general desperation in high Wehrmacht circles, and (2) corruption, ruthlessness and bungling in Nazi leadership.

37. Leaflets, Appeals Addressed to Special Units and Groups. It cannot be overemphasized that appeals to the greatest impact are those addressed to particular groups or specific units. Thus Russians and Poles in the German army received leaflets written in their own languages, appeals to division, regiments, companies, etc. were addressed to them by name and number; appeals to the population of specific cities and towns were made with appropriate denunciations of SS or Nazi Party leaders responsible for hopeless resistance.

38. Strategic and Tactical Propaganda. Experience proved that no clear-cut distinction can be made between combat or tactical propaganda and long-range strategic propaganda. Thus, while output of strategic propaganda was largely delegated to the fixed radio stations and printing facilities of the zone of communications, (with the exception of Radio Luxembourg which served a dual strategic-tactical mission) the responsibility of supplying intelligence for this output plus "targeting" of strategic leaflet bombing on enemy troops formations, etc, was essentially that of the combat teams.

39. Disposition of Psychological Warfare Units and Personnel. It also became clear that for efficient employment of the limited psychological warfare personnel and equipment, advance planning for any given operation was of first importance. More important than building a psychological warfare team for fixed attachment to a unit (Army Group or Army) on a basis of a standardized table of organization and equipment, was that of building teams to accomplish missions as an integral part of special plans for particular operations. Thus advance planning could only be successful if done in relation to other staff plans.

40. Essentials of Field Propaganda Doctrines. In summary, it would appear certain from combat operations in the European Theater, that success depends upon ready access to sufficient resources of intelligence, personnel and equipment to be able to focus propaganda batteries on the enemy in specific situations of weakness. Varying situations

require coordination of many propaganda resources, in addition to proper coordination with the combat units, and should be built into the operational plan to achieve maximum success.

41. Such focal employment was demonstrated in propaganda operations in the entry of Allied forces into Paris; the ultimatum at Aachen, meeting the Ardennes offensive, reduction of the Ruhr pocket, etc. These operations will not be analysed here, nor will operations embracing more limited tactical objectives, but are cited to emphasize necessity for a sufficient field organization, readily assembled, to exploit military developments, large and small, which occur in the course of a campaign.

ORGANIZATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE UNITS AT ARMY GROUPS

AND ARMIES; EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL AT LOWER ECHELONS

AND IN SPECIAL TASK FORCES

42. Psychological Warfare Organization Within Twelfth Army Group. No attempt will be made within this brief report to analyze tables of organization or tables of equipment for psychological warfare units within Twelfth Army Group, or to explore problems which developed during the European campaign.

43. It is clear that a thorough study of this organization must be made and that psychological warfare operations within this army group, employing personnel and equipment on a scale reasonable adequate for the mission, provide sufficient experience on which to base future plans for large scale psychological warfare combat operations.

44. Psychological warfare at Twelfth Army Group was provided through establishment of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, a special staff section with considerable operational responsibilities, which embraced the entire field of public relations, press censorship, and psychological warfare activities.

45. Staff coordination and operational direction were combined in the P & PW Officer, and for psychological warfare was exercised through an assistant for Psychological Warfare.

46. Public relations and press censorship control was exercised through an assistant for Public Relations and an Assistant for Press Censorship.

47. The Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section embraced a headquarters staff section, plus a large P & PW Detachment, in which personnel for the several highly specialized operations were segregated in special branches.

48. Within the P & PW detachment was the Psychological Warfare Branch, to which various propaganda specialists were assigned, including 35 civilian specialists from the Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and participating British agencies.

49. Service elements of the army group publicity and psychological warfare operation were embraced in the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion, which was assigned to Special Troops, Twelfth Army Group.

50. This battalion included a battalion headquarters and headquarters company, plus the 2nd and 3rd Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (propaganda companies) assigned, and later the 5th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company, attached.

51. In planning, the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion was assembled, (following conferences between military and civilian agency planners) on the basis of supplying two armies in the field under the army group.

52. The three subdivisions of publicity and psychological warfare operations, -- public relations, press censorship, and psychological warfare, -- were intended to share communications, administrative and other services facilities in the field. This planning was expressed

as follows: In addition to the two Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies, the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion "will contain a headquarters company with necessary administrative and operational personnel and vehicles to be split into three service groups, each capable of messing, housing, and transporting 50 war correspondents, necessary psychological warfare units and press censors." The headquarters company also provided for "a communications platoon to supply independent signal communications to a maximum of 200,000 words per day westbound for war correspondents' copy and 75,000 words per day eastbound psychological warfare copy for propaganda use and policy directives."

53. In practice, the three subdivisions shared administration and some facilities at army group (through the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion,) but operated independently in the field. The location of press camps, for instance, were frequently some distance from army headquarters, while psychological warfare operations teams remained in close proximity to headquarters.

54. In practice, also service groups within the headquarters company of the 72nd Publicity Service Battalion serviced only the publicity and press censorship operations in the field, while service and administration of psychological warfare field teams at armies were handled from headquarters of the service battalion at army group.

55. To summarize: The joint publicity and psychological warfare plan was not followed at armies. The clearly diverse nature of the two operations early became apparent. Competition between publicity and psychological warfare requirements for communications, transport and other services was intense, for the reason that operations made widely divergent demands upon these facilities. The operations, expanding from two to four armies under army group, overtaxed tables of organization and tables of equipment. Administrative personnel and equipment at armies were diverted from the "joint operation" plan to that of servicing the public relations activities. "Joint Communications" were used almost exclusively for public relations.

56. In consequence, psychological warfare units were generally short of transportation, devoid of adequate communications, and in considerable administrative confusion since administration of field teams was conducted from army group headquarters.

57. This is not to imply that the public relations and press censorship demands were not valid, but only to show that (1) publicity and psychological warfare developed along competitive rather than cooperative lines in the field; (2) psychological warfare was frequently given a second priority on equipment and personnel; (3) a study of the entire organization, embracing all tables of organization and tables of equipment, with a record and study of their field employment of personnel and equipment will be necessary to support basic recommendations for change.

58. It should also be pointed out, in appraising operations of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section of 12th Army group in the European Theater of Operations that (1) public relations and press censorship operations, like those of psychological warfare, were conducted on an unprecedented scale; (2) there was little military doctrine on which to base the operations; (3) publicity and press censorship also involved policies reaching to high governmental levels outside the military organization; and (4) war correspondents, representing the press and public in the United States and the United Kingdom, formed an influential bloc to influence military personnel in the field to obtain satisfaction for their demands; this would not have been the case

had public relations and press censorship operations in the field been separated from psychological warfare operations in planning and organization.

59. Organization of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (propaganda companies) were made up of 20 officers and 145 enlisted men, and designed to serve a single army in the field as a self-contained propaganda unit. A company included intelligence personnel, interrogators and writers, with mobile printing presses and specialist personnel; a communications section equipped with the mobile radio sender and receiver SCR 399; a public address section with mobile loudspeaker equipment for propaganda appeals; a radio section with a one kilovatt mobile radio broadcasting stations, SCR 696 and SCR 698, for tactical propaganda broadcasts; a monitoring unit with mobile monitoring equipment; and an administrative section which permitted operations as a self-contained unit in the field.

60. While designed for use as an integral army team, experience in the field showed the advantage of pooling all equipment and personnel at the level of basic field operations, in this case at army group. In consequence, while the mobile radio broadcasting companies retained their organizational identity at army groups; only certain personnel and equipment were attached to armies, while other personnel were employed (1) to staff the large leaflet and radio sections at Luxembourg, (2) to make up special task forces for special missions, (3) to adjust shortages of specialized personnel requirements for various individual operations.

61. Organization of Combat Teams at Armies. No analysis will be made here, except to explain that army combat teams were built to accomplish the specific army missions, only, while large scale combat propaganda was originated at Army Group.

62. Organization of Special Task Forces. It became clear, shortly after the invasion of Normandy, that Psychological warfare field operations would require frequent dispatch of small independent groups, or task forces, to accomplish specific missions not specifically related to psychological warfare operations at armies. These missions included special forces to seize or operate radio stations; to establish and to maintain newspapers in fixed localities; to conduct prolonged operations against pockets such as port cities under siege; to make political surveys, search for documents, gather specialized intelligence, and so on. Assembly and assignment of these specialized groups for long or short periods was possible through maintenance of the pool of personnel and equipment under operational control of army group.

63. Employment of the 3rd Psychological Warfare Detachment Provisional. No administrative psychological warfare planning contemplated employment of the 3rd Psychological Warfare Detachment Provisional (an Office of Strategic Services field unit engaged in field operations of a covert nature). This unit was attached to the P & FW Detachment, 12th Army Group, and came under operational control of the Psychological Warfare Branch. It was dispatched to 12th Army Group with no equipment or administrative or supply personnel. The parent organization of this unit was eventually located in Paris, and problems of supply and administration were only solved with great difficulty.

64. Employment of Psychological Warfare Personnel at Corps and Division. No psychological warfare personnel were assigned to any headquarters at a level lower than Army. Operations in connection with corps and divisions were managed through liaison officers travelling to lower headquarters from the combat team to army; and through attachment of field teams such as loudspeaker teams to lower headquarters for special missions. The consensus of officers engaged in

psychological warfare, based on field experience, is that army is the lowest level to which any substantial psychological warfare organization should be assigned.

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

PERSONNEL FOR FIELD OPERATIONS

65. Personnel Requirements in Psychological Warfare. In the matter of personnel, the plan of operations of Psychological Warfare in the European campaign was based upon one expressed principle:

"Because of the highly specialized talents required by propaganda work, such as linguistic fluency, editorial judgment and political knowledge, any psychological warfare organization must combine civilian and military personnel; neither the US Army nor the American civilian agencies can provide sufficient men or sufficient ability without pooling their resources. This applies equally to the specialized equipment required."

66. No breakdown will be attempted here of the personnel rosters of various units in psychological warfare. It may be stated that organizations relied largely for specialized abilities upon a group of soldiers and civilians made up of writers, students and instructors in language, history, political science, etc. A high percentage of these were recently naturalized citizens drawn from German and other refugee elements.

67. It should be pointed out that the problems of finding competent men of linguistic ability and political knowledge of Europe, emphasized in the psychological warfare operations, might well concern all agencies of the government who are responsible for United States participation in world affairs.

68. Another problem of first importance was that of finding officers suited for the psychological warfare mission. The bulk of specialized personnel were civilians, junior officers and enlisted men, and no provision had been made for providing sufficient field grade officers for organizations other than that at SHAEF.

69. Unit and Individual Training. The Assistant for Psychological Warfare (in the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, FUSAG), assumed his duties on 22 December 1943, and immediately engaged in establishing a training center for the P & P W units at Clevedon, England.

70. Also established, in cooperation with FWD/SHAEF, OWI, OSS, HOI, and the PWE, were training centers at London, Brondebury, Watford, Caversham and Burton-on-the-Hill.

71. In these centers, particularly for training of individuals, much reliance was placed on the British knowledge of European politics, intelligence operations etc. This knowledge was made freely available to the U.S. personnel.

72. As late as 1 March 1944, no plans, instructions or training directives had been received from higher authority and no psychological warfare personnel was present. Plans had been perfected for individual training and were being implemented, but no tactical or logistical doctrine had been established. The organization was on paper only, with elements assembling in the United States, except that civilians recruited for duty with FUSAG were arriving in England. These civilians were, however, being diverted to other duties by SHAEF, OWI and OSS.

73. No field grade officers had been provided for psychological warfare, other than the Assistant for Psychological Warfare, and no provision had been made for staff or for operational planning and supervision at Army Headquarters.

74. A study of field operations in Africa indicated that field grade officers were needed, and efforts were made to procure and train such personnel. However, there were no table of organization vacancies and it was therefore impossible to train psychological warfare officers for armies.

75. The training program thus created was solved by informal cooperation of army group and armies, and extensive use of the schools and facilities provided by SHAEF and FUSAG.

76. Even by 1 June 1944 no field test of the novel units or any of their elements had been possible. No overall propaganda plan had been furnished by SHAEF and no policy directives or guidance had been received. Virtually no personnel of field experience had been made available. Psychological warfare units became operational in the field with insufficient training because of delay in activating the units, delay in recruiting personnel and non-existence of doctrine and plans for combat propaganda operations.

77. The Psychological Warfare Branch, P & PW Detachment, accomplished two logistical field tests in England. The P & PW Det. accomplished one logistical field test. No operational training of the P & PW teams was ever accomplished; nor were they ever field tested.

78. The P & PW Det., 12th Army Group, left for the Continent with Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 72nd Publicity Service Battalion, on approximately 1 August 1944. Personnel included approximately 50 civilians who had been attached long enough to receive some psychological warfare training and some field training, and approximately 25 other representatives of the civilian agencies attached at the last minute. These were completely untrained for the field, including a complete Morale Operations unit of the Office of Strategic Services.

79. The 2nd MRB Company, which arrived 7 April 1944, received extensive training of personnel, but the psychological warfare elements which accompanied the First US Army on the Invasion of Normandy went without a field test.

80. The 3rd MRB Company, which arrived 23 May 1944, had insufficient time to take full advantage of the training program and facilities. Basic individual propaganda training was effected, but this company also departed for the continent, with the Third US Army, without a field test.

81. Although both companies arrived in England without much of their equipment, splendid improvisation made possible their dispatch to the Continent with all essential items except high powered loud-speakers.

82. Problems Raised by Employment of Civilians. The Tables of Organization and Equipment of the various psychological warfare units did not provide for individual equipment for civilians, and it was never procured on the basis of allowances for military personnel.

83. The exact status of civilians was never determined in many respects. Much confusion, particularly in matters of administration and exercise of authority, continually resulted. Fortunately, most

of these civilians were able and tolerant men, who rendered excellent service and succeeded in their equivocal status.

84. Administration of civilian personnel was supervised by a civilian Administrative Officer, who also served as informal Liaison Officer to the civilian agencies, and as Purchasing and Contracting Officer for those agencies in the field. While this system proved satisfactory to OWI personnel, it was far from satisfactory to personnel of OSS and the British agencies.

85. Problems Raised by Employment of British Personnel. The original plan stated:

"Any psychological warfare organization must combine all the available resources in personnel and equipment of the United States and Great Britain. An important reason for the combined Anglo-American combat and consolidation propaganda units is the necessity of coordinating American and British propaganda so closely that neither the enemy nor Allied sympathizers on the Continent will be able to discern any distinctions. Coordination to such an extent is not simply a matter of policy directives and liaison on high levels; it requires an integration of common purpose and effort, only possible when American and British elements have been so thoroughly merged that they themselves cease to make distinctions."

86. Attachment of British personnel to psychological warfare units presented many problems, particularly in matters of administration and supply.

87. The plan for combined Anglo-American teams proved perfectly sound at PWD/SHAFF, particularly with regard to policy making, etc., but it did not work out well in the field.

88. Necessity for Military Training of All Psychological Warfare Personnel. It should be noted that the bulk of the personnel of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies (Propaganda companies) arrived in Europe after considerable training at the Military Intelligence Training Center at Camp Ritchie. Operations in the European campaign confirmed the value of the training received there, by comparison with the performance of these men with that of military personnel and civilians who had not had the Camp Ritchie training. Some substitute for this training, along the lines of individual training only, was provided by short-time attendance at psychological warfare training centers improvised in England, but this training was insufficient. A thorough grounding in such military intelligence as organization of the German Army, organization of the American Army; living and working under field conditions, etc., were found to be absolutely necessary. A thorough basic military and thorough basic military intelligence training of all psychological warfare personnel is essential to combat propaganda units. If sufficient military personnel skilled in psychological warfare can be provided it will be unnecessary to employ civilian personnel in combat propaganda operations.

89. Indoctrination of Officers of All Arms and Services. It cannot be overemphasized that one great difficulty facing psychological warfare personnel at all times was the lack of understanding of their mission on the part of other officers. Psychological warfare personnel were continually put in the position of having to "sell" their mission at all echelons to officers having either command or staff planning responsibility.

90. This was due to the fact that no basic doctrine existed for psychological warfare operations. It is suggested that due to the

gravity of the psychological warfare mission, and its proven effects in the European campaign, that all officers be given some basic psychological warfare indoctrination.

CHAPTER 5

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE STAFF COORDINATION

AT ALL ECHELONS

91. Establishment of the Psychological Warfare Division as a Special Staff Section at SHAEF. A brief history of the creation of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, as a special staff section, indicated the condition of unpreparedness which existed for the waging of psychological warfare on a large scale. Psychological warfare in the European Campaign suffered, because no fixed doctrine existed for staff coordination at all echelons, no fixed doctrine existed for psychological warfare in relation to other staff sections, as well trained field grade officers were not available for psychological warfare at Army Group and Army levels.

a. In the United States Army, prior to America's entry into World War II, the psychological warfare section consisted of a small section in MIS, G-2, War Department.

b. From September 1939, the British Army had been conducting psychological warfare through the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, Ministry of Information, and British Broadcasting Corporation, employing both radio and leaflets.

c. In the late summer of 1941, the United States established the Office of Coordinator of Information, in Washington, D.C.

d. In 1942, the Office of Coordinator of Information was split into two organizations, the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information.

e. In London, late in 1942, the London Liaison Section of the Office of War Information and Political Intelligence Department agreed to issue each week a Joint Psychological Warfare Directive to which the various psychological warfare agencies of the two countries would be subject.

f. In November, 1942, by orders of General Eisenhower, a joint Anglo-American-military-civilian unit was attached to Allied Force Headquarters after allied landings in French North Africa. This agency was known as Psychological Warfare Branch, AFHQ, and laid many of the foundations for the more elaborate structure of Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF.

g. In April, 1943, Anglo-American discussions were held in London to divorce Publicity and Propaganda Warfare activities from other intelligence activities.

h. In June, 1943, a plan for creation of a Directorate of Press and Propaganda (DPP) was approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee of the War Cabinet. In October, 1943, the name Press and Propaganda was changed to Publicity and Psychological Warfare.

i. Between July, 1943, and November, 1943, British and American committees failed to agree as to whether Publicity and Psychological Warfare should be held together or separated. The decision was left to the Supreme Commander when he should be named.

j. In November, 1943, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure arrived in London from AFHQ to assume duties as chief of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEP.

k. In February, 1944, General McClure was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6, new designation of the P & PW Division as a general staff division.

l. And In April 1944, the G-6 general Staff division was abolished, and two special staff divisions were set up: Public Relations Division under Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis and Psychological Warfare Division under Brigadier General McClure. (The order stated that the two divisions, when necessary, should share communications and censorship facilities).

m. From April, 1944, until dissolution of SHAEP, the PWD division became Information Control Division, United States Forces, European Theater. (Cessation of hostilities brought no diminution of responsibilities to the division, now concerned with a large program of information control in occupied Germany).

92. Psychological Warfare in the Staff of Other Echelons. A brief summary follows of the place, Psychological Warfare eventually found in the staff sections of other echelons:

a. 12th Army Group - Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, a special staff section under a P & PW Officer, with an Assistant for Psychological Warfare directing psychological warfare activities.

b. 21st Army Group - Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, a special staff section under a P & PW Officer, with a Psychological Warfare Officer heading a separate branch within the staff section.

c. 6th Army Group - Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, a special staff section of extremely limited personnel.

d. First U.S. Army - Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, a special staff section embracing a Psychological Warfare Combat Team (headed by an operations Officer and an Intelligence Officer).

e. Third US Army - Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2 Section, with a Psychological Warfare Officer heading the branch.

f. Ninth US Army - Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, a special staff section with a Psychological Warfare Officer in charge of operations under the P & PW Officer.

g. Seventh US Army - Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2 Section.

93. In summary, it will be seen that psychological warfare had no fixed place in the staff, falling into one of three categories: A special staff section, a branch of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare special staff section, and a branch of the G-2 Section. For maximum success it is necessary that (1) the place of psychological warfare in the staff be coordinated at all echelons and that (2) psychological warfare doctrine be firmly established in relation to all other staff sections.

94. Relation of Psychological Warfare mission and operations with G-2 Section. Coordination of psychological warfare with G-2 activities

proved absolutely necessary, and in general was accomplished satisfactorily whether or not psychological warfare was incorporated in the G-2 section. The general flow of G-2 intelligence was of course essential for both psychological warfare appreciation and propaganda output, as well as intelligence from the sub-sections such as Counter Intelligence Corps, G-2 Documents Section, etc.

95. The G-2 Officer was frequently called upon to release information for propaganda output which was banned by routine censorship directives, — which case G-2 evaluation of the request was of paramount importance.

96. Serious question arose during the campaign whether psychological warfare properly belongs to the G-2 section. It was shown that psychological warfare activities imposed a vast catalogue of responsibilities upon the G-2 officer with which he was not otherwise concerned such as the collection of intelligence for propaganda output; collection of documents for propaganda output; collection of political and morale intelligence generally unrelated to the combat intelligence mission of the G-2 section; plus operational control of the Psychological Warfare Units.

97. Relation of Psychological Warfare mission and operations with G-3 section. In relating the psychological Warfare mission to military operations (whether in loudspeaker mission in direct contact with the enemy or in radio and leaflet campaigns coordinated with large scale tactical or strategic operations) it was proven that closest liaison with the G-3 section was necessary. Access to G-3 facilities, such as the situation maps and tactical information services (particularly the PHANTOM) radio net, were of paramount importance. Knowledge of future plans was required to anticipate psychological warfare output requirements. Cooperation with G-3 specialists engaging in deceptive operations was necessary, and joint planning sometimes proved necessary.

98. The proposition will not be explored here, but there is foundation for one contention that of general staff section the G-3 section has the primary interest in the psychological warfare mission.

99. Relation of Psychological Warfare Mission and Operations with G-5 Section. Relations with the G-5 section throughout the European campaign revealed a considerable area of overlapping interests. No analysis of the problems will be undertaken here, but in indication of the sphere of such an inquiry is given in the following comment from Brigadier General C. E. Ryan, chief of the G-5 section on the General Board:

"During operations in France and other liberated countries, Psychological Warfare was responsible for propagandizing civilians behind enemy lines, and on occasions also assisted through its loudspeaker trucks in effecting the local control of civilians in forward areas. Later, entering Germany, it published German-language newspapers for distribution through Military Government Detachments, and through its radio stations broadcast Military Government news and announcements. Its planes dropped informational material for displaced persons and refugees, responsibility for the control of which persons was that of Military Government.

"In Germany, complete responsibility for control of all German informational services was placed with Information Control Units of Psychological Warfare, but the police enforcement of these control measures was left almost entirely with Military Government Detachments. At the same time, responsibility for German educational and religious

affairs was exclusively that of Military Government units, but Psychological Warfare uncontrolled all church publications.

"The frequent overlapping of G-5 and P & PW interests resulted in activities that were not always coordinated, at times with adverse effects on one or the other, and resulted in a strong feeling during the operation that the interests should be consolidated under a single direction.

"A study of inter-related activities of G-5, G-2 and Publicity and Psychological Warfare Sections and their operating units in propaganda and control of civilian information services, including the press, radio, theaters, publishing, schools and churches should be undertaken, to determine the extent of overlapping and conflicting interests, if any, and means of eliminating them."

100. Psychological Warfare as a Branch of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Special Staff Section. Psychological Warfare was first planned as a joint operation with public relations (or press and publicity) in the P & PW special staff section at SHAEF, to share communications, transport, administration and service facilities, etc. This plan, dropped at SHAEF before it was activated, was nevertheless carried out at 12th Army Group and in the First and Ninth US Armies, with P & PW special staff section.

101. It became clear in the campaign that this concept, for practical purposes, had many drawbacks. The two branches were in constant competition for transport, communications, service facilities, etc. The missions, i. e. making psychological warfare against the enemy, on the one hand, and supplying demands of the American and British press and public on the other, -- were found to follow divergent rather than parallel lines.

102. Further, the staff officer charged with responsibility of both operations found himself (in the matter of allocating equipment as well as that of assigning personnel), confronted with the demands of a vociferous corps of war correspondents and the necessities of psychological warfare.

103. Experience throughout the campaign showed that demands of the press were frequently satisfied at the expense of psychological warfare.

104. This experience was partially due to one serious weakness in the planning, recruitment and training of psychological warfare personnel, namely, the failure to provide sufficient field grade officers trained in psychological warfare. In consequence, field grade officers for the P & PW operations were largely drawn from among those with public relations training, or those with no substantial training in either press or psychological warfare operations.

105. Since few trained persons of field grade were available psychological warfare operational personnel gravitated toward G-2 Section for planning and support, and in frequent instances for all practical purposes were under operational control of the G-2 Section. Had sufficient field grade officers been trained in psychological warfare it would have provided for informed psychological warfare representation at all echelons, including division.

At the highest echelons publicity and psychological warfare have much in common, particularly in the sphere of political intelligence and policy control. However, at lower echelons, under field conditions, operations of the two sections proved to have nothing in common.

COLLECTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE INTELLIGENCE

107. Mission of Psychological Warfare Intelligence. Psychological Warfare Intelligence requirements differ materially from other military intelligence requirements in two particulars: emphasis is on political and morale conditions rather than upon the military situation *per se*, and Intelligence material must be obtained not only for appreciation of the situation, but also in great volume for propaganda output. The success of psychological warfare operations is dependent upon a constant flow of highly specialized intelligence. Primary sources of intelligence were:

- a. G-2 reports on the enemy's order of battle strength, capabilities, intentions, etc.
- b. G-3 situation reports and future plans.
- c. Interrogation of prisoners of war with special emphasis on psychological warfare requirements.
- d. Interrogation of civilians in liberated and occupied enemy areas.
- e. Captured enemy documents.
- f. Monitoring of enemy and friendly broadcasts.
- g. Reports obtained from other intelligence agencies, air liaison etc.
- h. Libraries of guide books, maps of enemy territories, and other reference documents.

108. The varied intelligence requirements of psychological warfare may be illustrated by requirements for only four broadcasts of a tactical nature from Radio Luxembourg, repeated daily and each requiring sufficient material for 15 minutes broadcasting. They were: "Letters that were never received", a program based solely on excerpts from captured soldiers' mail; "Story of the Day", based on front line intelligence, exposing weaknesses in units of the German army facing Twelfth Army Group; a "Leaflet Show", based on appeals to specific units to encourage surrender; and "Frontpost", based on the small newspaper of that name, distributed by air to the German troops. Other intelligence requirements for this station alone included material for broadcast in various languages to foreign workers within Germany; broadcasts to special audiences such as young people in Germany, railroad workers in Germany, women in Germany, etc. Any list of propaganda productions, newspapers, leaflets and radio programs will indicate the volume of Intelligence of specialized nature required to maintain the propaganda output.

109. Exchange of Intelligence with Civilian Agencies. A constant flow of intelligence between psychological warfare and various civilian agencies (Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and the various British agencies) as well as a flow of information to psychological warfare from civilian news agencies was maintained. It is essential to relate psychological warfare activities more closely to that of other staff sections and specialized intelligence agencies.

110. Exchange of Intelligence with G-2 Section. Basic to successful psychological warfare operations is collection of intelligence from G-2, and that collection presupposes that G-2 of every echelon is familiar with psychological warfare operations and is not only willing to assist in providing intelligence, but is willing to release essential items for propaganda output.

111. Psychological warfare requires a huge volume of details about each enemy division, enemy personalities, conditions in enemy territory, etc.

112. One problem which was only resolved in later stages of the European campaign was proper liaison with G-2 at all echelons. At 12th Army Group satisfactory liaison was only achieved after some six months had elapsed. Similar problems presented themselves at armies during early stages and the problem reoccurred at corps and divisions. It may be stated that successful liaison with G-2 was finally based on sympathetic understanding on the part of individual G-2 officers, rather than any basic military procedure or doctrine covering the relationship.

113. Another problem which beset psychological warfare, was that of obtaining clearance of material for propaganda output; the responsibility of releasing classified intelligence items was never satisfactorily determined in the European campaign. Access to classified documents which passed through the hands of G-2 and G-5 sections was readily obtained, and a great deal of this material was of first-rate value for propaganda output. It was often difficult to find an officer in the G-2 section willing to assume responsibility for releasing classified material for this purpose. This was true at all levels. At SHAEF the problem was solved in the following manner; the psychological warfare intelligence liaison officer made relevant extracts from G-2 material and submitted this report in written form to the responsible G-2 officer. This officer marked passages as cleared for propaganda output, and those which were to be circulated for information only. At lower echelons where tactical propaganda campaigns were paced more rapidly, the problem was more often solved by personal conference.

114. Exchange of Intelligence with G-3 section. While G-3 sections were generally cordial to psychological warfare personnel, and provided essential information when requested, psychological warfare was not always considered in planning future operations. Tactical situations developed which could have been foreseen by the G-3 section in its planning, with subsequent increase in efficiency on the part of psychological warfare teams, had they been properly briefed.

115. Supply of Political Intelligence to G-5 Section. The mission of supplying political intelligence to the G-5 section was never clearly defined, and led in some instances to misunderstandings. Political intelligence of value to G-5 was a normal by-product of psychological warfare interrogations and surveys. This was particularly true after occupation of areas in Germany, when it became necessary to learn the "Political Climate" in Germany, and intelligence became increasingly a job of political reporting.

116. Collection of intelligence in France, Belgium and Holland during early stages of combat, was also of closest interest to the G-5 section. This responsibility will be discussed further in the section on consolidation activities.

117. Documents were freely exchanged between psychological warfare intelligence personnel and G-5, and it was constantly impressed upon interrogators in the field that when reporting on conditions affecting G-5 administration or policy, clearance should be obtained in the field

with the responsible officers. In reporting on the attitudes of civilians, it was inevitable that there should be criticism of military government appointees or even of military government personnel. The closest liaison at all echelons was sought to avoid misunderstandings.

118. Relations in the field between intelligence teams and military government detachments were almost without exception cordial. Military government detachments began to seek eagerly for the service of psychological warfare intelligence officers who aided them in political screening of candidates for local offices, etc.

119. However, in some higher echelons, - due to the lack of definition of the psychological warfare-military government relationships, liaison between the sections was not always satisfactory.

120. It may be said that in this relationship reliance was placed more on individual tact and judgment rather than upon any fixed military doctrine, since no such doctrine existed.

121. Techniques of Interrogation and Collection of Other Intelligence. When the psychological warfare intelligence teams entered upon the European campaign (the first began on D-Day plus 3) they possessed very little knowledge of methods of gathering intelligence for combat psychological warfare operations. There had been a record of experience in the North African and Italian campaigns, but little information about these operations had reached those setting out for the campaign in Europe. However, it is believed that the intelligence section developed methods of the highest order, during the campaign.

122. Processing and Distribution of Intelligence. The collection and distribution of psychological warfare intelligence in the European campaign achieved a high degree of proficiency. Processing and distribution was accomplished within the section at every echelon with reports going both to lower and higher echelons as needed. Reports were generally with a view to output requirements, but as the campaign developed, other staff sections showed an increasing interest in "pure intelligence", and the types of reports tended to specialize. At all levels summaries of intelligence, analyzing morale conditions in the German army and on the German home front, plus items suitable for propaganda output were produced. At SHAEF intelligence publications found a large audience among both military divisions and various civilian agencies. At Twelfth Army Group the daily summary of intelligence was requested for G-2 at all levels, plus requests from higher headquarters for distribution to the civilian propaganda agencies.

123. Use of Prisoners of War in Propaganda Appeals. Prisoners of War were used effectively in direct radio appeals, but no satisfactory procedure for obtaining suitable prisoners was ever worked out. It was the recommendation of the chief of the intelligence section that an adequate liaison be set up with prison camp authorities to give them an integral part in the selection procedure, and that a special section should have been created (preferably in the radio Section) to deal with the problem as its exclusive province.

124. Public Opinion Technique as Applied to Prisoners. The underlying morale of the Wehrmacht as evidenced by its behavior in battle appeared to be a subject not susceptible of measurement by the questionnaire method. Nevertheless, the survey services were useful with respect to determining attitudes of allegiance to Nazi leaders and symbols, fears with respect to Anglo-American intentions, and similar matters. It was found that the survey technique required careful appraisal in the light of other media available before conclusions could be drawn.

125. Seizure and Scrutiny of Documents. Documents for psychological warfare purposes were obtained in two ways, by collection in the field by psychological warfare personnel, and by obtaining them directly from the G-2 Section documents. The normal flow of enemy documents was from regiment or division to G-2 at Army, and from army to the G-2 documents section at SHAFF. However, in this sphere, much depended on opportunity. It was observed that no very firm doctrine existed in any section for the collection and preservation of documents, and that much remains to be developed in this sphere.

126. Use of Monitoring Reports of Enemy and Friendly Broadcasts. Monitored reports of enemy and friendly propaganda broadcasts, plus monitored reports of straight news were in increasing demand at all echelons. Psychological warfare monitors, in fact, provided field newspapers as well as formal intelligence summaries of enemy propaganda trends, etc. This function, of keeping the armies informed of news developments, became a highly valued psychological warfare service although it was not initially contemplated in the mission. In the later stage of the campaign monitoring units were able to furnish many pieces of valuable, specialized intelligence to G-2. For instance, the Germans regularly broadcast the Rhine River readings, which were of interest to G-2. The monitoring group also supplied 12th Army Group headquarters daily with the German, Russian and other communiques.

127. Use of Reference Works. It should also be noted that a complete library of reference works on enemy areas was essential for propaganda output, since constant research was necessary to give color and background to propaganda messages. This type of material was of special importance in writing material for black or covert propaganda.

128. Evaluation of Intelligence Operations. Psychological Warfare intelligence personnel, in staff groups at various echelons and in individual field teams working at prisoner of war cages, in liberated and occupied towns and cities, or was task forces in the most forward areas, achieved a high degree of efficiency. Techniques were developed which resulted in a constant flow of intelligence of the highest order. Psychological warfare intelligence operations and experience would provide a profitable field of study for any military or civilian intelligence agency.

MONITORING OF FRIENDLY AND ENEMY BROADCASTS

129. Radio Monitoring in Psychological Warfare Field Operations. The necessity for prompt and accurate field monitoring of friendly and enemy broadcasts, to sustain psychological warfare operations with armies in the field, was demonstrated in the European campaign by the Psychological Warfare Branch, Publicity and Psychological Warfare Section, 12th Army Group. Provisions are needed for field monitoring at every echelon where psychological warfare intelligence and operations personnel are engaged in propaganda output.

130. The basic monitoring of broadcasts in the European theater, to meet requirements of both military and civilian agencies, was done by the British Broadcasting Corporation, employing in the United Kingdom approximately 1,000 people and elaborate technical equipment. Radio stations broadcasting in all wave lengths from every European country, as well as from America, Africa and other places, were monitored by these people. This monitoring supplied spot news reports and propaganda analyses of the highest order.

131. While summaries of these reports were of value to psychological warfare teams in the field, difficulties in communications prevented rapid delivery of these reports to field teams, and proved of little immediate value in the daily propaganda analysis and propaganda output from the field.

132. Reliance was necessarily placed on monitoring by field teams at 12th Army Group and at armies.

133. The field monitors reached England before the Normandy campaign with no training in monitoring. Little equipment was available for training at the psychological warfare training center improvised at Clevedon, England. Training was commenced there, however, and the monitors began by recording straight news broadcasts in English and German, including the daily German communique broadcast over various German stations. Later, for a period of two weeks, the monitors received training at the British Broadcasting Corporation monitoring station, familiarizing themselves with various receivers, recording devices, etc.

134. The monitoring teams actually developed skill under field conditions. The basic installations was maintained at 12th Army Group Headquarters, augmented by teams with mobile vans at Third Army Headquarters, and small teams at 1st and 9th Army headquarters.

135. Monitoring Reports for Propaganda Analysis and Output. Output requirements for various leaflets and newspapers (Frontpost, Feldpost, Die Mitteilungen, etc) and for the variety of tactical and strategic radio programs originating at Radio Luxembourg demanded regular reporting of Allied and German broadcasts. The propaganda analyses were also vital to psychological warfare planning.

136. The monitors listened to voice broadcasts, taking notes by hand or on the typewriter; employed recording machines and reproduction devices; recorded messages sent in Morse code; and operated Hellschreiber equipment. (The Hellschreiber is a German device which receives signals by radio and prints on a tape).

137. The monitors reported broadcasts in German, French, Czech, Swedish, Russian and English, and kept the psychological warfare intelli-

gence and operations personnel informed of every news and propaganda development.

138. These reports also were circulated to various Staff section at Army Groups and armies, as well as to the production sections engaged in psychological warfare output.

139. The necessity for maintaining monitoring teams and operations in closest proximity to the intelligence and operations sections of psychological warfare units engaged in output became apparent following the liberation of Radio Luxembourg. The monitoring teams remained at main headquarters of 12th Army Group, at Verdun, and their finished reports were delivered to Luxembourg by courier. This delay proved a considerable handicap to the sections engaged in output, particularly during periods of rapidly changing military and political developments.

RADIO BROADCASTING IN PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

140. Doctrine of Radio Broadcasting in Psychological Warfare. No attempt will be made in this short report to cover the doctrine of radio broadcasting in psychological warfare, but only to outline the scope of these operations. To determine effects of Allied radio propaganda, both strategic and tactical, during the European campaign, inquiries must be made into German records and German military and civilian personnel must be interrogated.

141. It need not be emphasized that the peacetime networks of the radio industry form a vast reservoir of equipment and personnel suited to wartime operation. The mission of psychological warfare was this:

a. Servicing the high power fixed transmitters with specialized personnel, directives and policy guidance, and intelligence.

b. Servicing high power fixed transmitter with voice relays and recordings from the field.

c. Reestablishment of liberated stations in friendly areas, and operation of captured enemy radio stations.

d. Operation of mobile transmitters.

142. Employment of High Power Fixed Transmitters. Most important of the psychological warfare radio operations were conducted over the following fixed transmitters:

a. British Broadcasting Corporation.

b. ABSIE (American Broadcasting Station in Europe, employing transmitting facilities of BBC).

c. Voice of America (short wave transmitters in the United States.) (

d. Radio Luxembourg (following its liberation, employed by SHAEF and 12th Army Group in both strategic and tactical radio programs)

143. Programming for High Power Fixed Transmitters. Allied high powered fixed transmitters maintained an audience embracing a large percentage of the German military and civilian population, particularly during news broadcasts. No analysis of this vast sphere of propaganda operations will be undertaken, except to sketch operations of ABSIE and Radio Luxembourg to suggest requirements of specialized intelligence, personnel, etc., for their successful operation.

a. ABSIE: Prior to 30 April 1944, the Radio Division of the OPI had the primary task of feeding BBC with "American Calling Europe" programs which originated in New York. From 30 April 1944, the American Broadcasting Station in Europe went on the air, and broadcast eight hours each day, without interruption, in German, French, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, Flemish and English. The broadcast material of three kinds: (1) Orders to people of occupied countries and warnings to the enemy from General Eisenhower's Headquarters; (2) straight news of events on the fighting fronts presented to make the enemy understand the inevitability of his defeat and to help America's Allies appreciate America's part in the war; (3) feature material reinforcing

straight news and projecting the part played by American soldiers.

B. Radio Luxembourg: From the time it went on the air in 23 September 1944, (with relays from London and New York) this station virtually operated around the clock, with programs ranging from news and comment directed to German soldiers and all classes of the German population, programs directed to Allied Peoples, programs in eight languages directed to foreign workers and other foreign groups within Germany, tactical programs based on intimate enemy intelligence, etc.

144. It will be noted that whereas only Radio Luxembourg, or all the major radio stations, was operated as a strictly military enterprise under psychological warfare personnel, program requirements of the stations operated by civilian agencies (BBC, ABSIE, Voice of America) relied on military sources for intelligence on which to base their propaganda programs directed to various audiences in enemy territory. The role of psychological warfare intelligence operations cannot be overemphasized. When internal communications were uncertain, and when troops sensed that their command was uncertain, German troops turned in desperation to Allied sources for information. It should also be emphasized that recordings from the field, made in forward areas by small recording teams, played an increasing role in these programs.

145. Low Power Mobile Transmitters in Psychological Warfare. Liberation of Radio Luxembourg in workable condition in September, 1944, made unnecessary employment of mobile radio transmitters as the primary weapon of tactical or combat radio propaganda in the European Theater of Operations.

146. Basic equipment for the four mobile Broadcasting Companies intended for this combat propaganda mission, were one kilowatt transmitters SCR 693, housed in large vans, which had been developed by the Signal Corps and the G-2 Section of the War Department. The concept of the one kilowatt radio transmitter as a basic equipment of the Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies might be studied with a view of development of transmitters of greater power which would not necessarily be mobile, but would be capable of dis-assembly for shipment, and re-assembly in the field at permanent or semi-permanent locations. The one kilowatt transmitter together with the studio SCR 696 was found too bulky and ponderous for successful field operation as planned. The same equipment, with some modifications, was removed from the vans and installed in two and a half ton trucks, with a resulting improvement in mobility.

147. No substantial test of this instrument was made in combat, although the SCR 698 was employed at Remues for a short period as a consolidation station with fair success.

148. The basic instrument actually employed in field broadcasting was the SCR 299, later known as SCR 399, a standard Signal Corps communications instrument modified to work in the broadcast band. It provided an instrument not perfect for the purpose, but valuable because of its availability, efficiency and mobility.

149. On the broadcast band, output of the SCR 399 was limited to 400/500 watt with an effective radius of 10 to 25 miles, depending on the antennas efficiency. Tests often revealed greater breadth of coverage, but uncertain conditions in the field enforces a conservative estimate of its effective range.

150. Most useful service performed by this instrument lay in the

field of voice communication for rebroadcast, but one experiment, with a tactical team attached to the containing force at Lorient, is worthy of special study. It provided the sole example of a small transmitter in tactical radio propaganda.

151. This program, beamed to the German Forces being contained at Lorient was an intimate program based on intelligence reports (obtained by interrogation of prisoners) and featuring such items as "Overheard in Lorient", talks and discussions about personalities in the German garrison at Lorient, surrender appeals and promises of good treatment, and appeals such as "If you don't like your Prisoner of War cage you can go on back", etc., tied in with the actual return of prisoners to the besieged garrison, laden with candy and cigarettes and prepared to give first-hand reports of American good treatment. A large audience was built among the German garrison, and a certain comedy spirit was injected into the programs, with satire, jokes, limericks, etc. An average of 20 German soldiers each day deserted to the Americans during the period of this program, and after discontinuance of the program - when the radio team was called for another mission - almost no prisoners were taken.

152. One experiment with the SCR 399 had been attempted on the Cotentin peninsula, but was not successfully put on the air because of difficulties in clearing a radio band for the broadcast.

153. German 20 Kilowatt Mobile Broadcast Transmitter. Possibilities in mobile transmitter equipment are indicated in the German 20 KW mobile transmitter captured in the last days of the war. The entire outfit was mounted in ten large vans. Although obviously an adaptation rather than a planned job of engineering, it had been used effectively both as a broadcasting instrument and a jamming station used against 12th Army Group's covert radio operation, (Operation Annie, see Section 15) and other allied programs. This transmitter is installed in a specially designed railroad train.

154. Mobile Recording Equipment for Field Recordings. It is a basic to radio propaganda programs as to civilian programs that color and interest must be introduced into the programs. Most important in combat propaganda is that programs emanate from the forward areas as often as possible. While combat conditions usually prevent "Live Broadcasts" mobile recording devices do make it possible to reproduce such programs from the front.

155. Wire recorders, tape recorders and other novel devices were not employed to any considerable extent in psychological warfare operations, (although considerable experimentation was done in the field by press sections) but considerable "on the spot" recordings were made by four recording teams with mobile equipment.

156. Closed ambulance bodies proved to be the most useful vehicles for mounting this equipment. They offered protection from dust, which ruins the equipment, and made it possible to heat the interior in winter to warm the glass base disks so that the cutting needle could perform. Manned by a technician-driver and an interrogator-announcer, these recorders were all operated up and down the front, with marked success. They were also employed widely in the consolidation phase, in recording interviews with civilians behind the lines, prisoners of war at cages, displaced persons, etc.

157. Reconnaissance and Capture of Radio Stations. The Radio Section of 12th Army Group realized a broad experience in reconnaissance and capture of radio stations, both in the seizure of Radio

Luxembourg in September, 1944, and seizure of German stations during the months February, March, April and early in May, 1945. Their efforts were directed to attempts to seize vital German radio equipment before demolition could be completed and before the stations and equipment could be damaged by our own troops, through failure to recognize the value of the equipment.

158. Experience with Radio Luxembourg has set the pattern for this operation, when a "task force" of armor and engineer personnel had been improvised to seize the transmitter.

159. Uncovering of radio stations at Trier, Saarbrücken, Coblenz, Stuttgart, Cologne, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Leipzig and Munich each posed special problems.

160. The problems at Saarbrücken, for instance, consisted merely of examining an installation only slightly damaged. At Coblenz the station had to be taken and held under artillery fire which lasted more than a week. Cologne and Frankfurt stations were not reached until after heavy demolition had been accomplished. At Leipzig, psychological warfare personnel occupied the radio station while infantry combat was waged on both sides. The Munich station was captured by Seventh Army with an organized task force of high fire power.

PRODUCTION OF LEAFLETS AND DISTRIBUTION BY AIRCRAFT

161. Doctrine of Leaflet Distribution by Aircraft. No method for mass distribution of leaflets in enemy and enemy-occupied territory has been devised except dissemination by aircraft. In the European Campaign leafleting by aircraft achieved a high degree of technical perfection, through experimentation with various types of leaflet bombs and improvements in targeting.

162. Through continued experimentation employment of airborne leaflets as a propaganda weapon in military operations may be further perfected on the basis of experience gained in the European Theater. It seems fairly certain that chief improvements yet to be made in the employment of leaflets disseminated by aircraft will be in improving basic doctrine of psychological warfare leaflet operations coordinated with military operations, and in improving communication of target data and leaflet requirements from the field.

163. In general, dissemination of leaflets by aircraft depends for effect upon mass distribution, or saturation of large target areas. For this reason, heavy medium bombers, and fighter bombers carried leaflets in World War II, rather than light observation-type aircraft. The job which might have been done by light aircraft was delegated to artillery, capable to pin point targeting. A total of more than 3,000,000, 000 leaflets were dropped in enemy or enemy occupied territory during the European campaign.

164. Development of Leafleting by Aircraft. Leafleting by aircraft was no novelty in World War II. During World War I Allied pilots and bombardiers had thrown leaflets out of the open cockpits of fighter and bomber planes.

165. Despite this precedent, no doctrine for aircraft leafleting was developed between wars, and at the outbreak of World War II, when fliers of the Royal Air Force began leafleting, leaflets were again thrown by hand out of bombers. Later leaflets were dumped in large quantities from the bomb bays into the slip stream. Still later, leaflets were dropped in bundles secured by a mechanical device designed to break the bundles in the fall. These methods were all wasteful, and accurate targeting was almost hopeless even over large areas. For instance, a bomber flying at 30,000 feet with a 60 mile wind had to drop leaflets somewhere near Brussels if targeting on Paris.

166. Development of the Leaflet Bomb. Development of the T-1, or Monroe Bomb, (named after the inventor, Major James Monroe, an air force liaison officer assigned to PWD/SHAEP,) first brought leaflet dissemination to a fair state of perfection for strategic bombing, and thereafter assured a reasonable degree of accuracy in saturation targeting. The bomb was first used in leaflet dropping on a mission over Norway on 19 April 1944.

167. This bomb carried 80,000 leaflets (size 5 1/2" by 9 1/2") and since a heavy bomber (Fortress of Liberator) can carry 10 such bombs, a single plane could deliver 800,000 leaflets over a given target.

168. The Monroe bomb was improvised from light weight case containers for M17 amiable cluster chemical bombs. It consisted of a laminated paper cylinder of great strength. This cylinder, sealed with wood on each end, was laced with double strands of primer cord, affixed

to a barometric fuse. Explosion of this fuse (T-30) detonated the primer cord, which bisected the paper container, allowing the leaflets to disperse in the air. Set to explode at 1,500 to 2,600 feet, tests showed a pattern of dispersal covering roughly an area of one square mile on the ground. Given calculations for wind drift, this leaflet bombing achieved a fair degree of concentration on targets.

169. One American heavy bombardment squadron of the Eighth Air Force was assigned to the mission of leaflet bombing.

170. While this squadron, together with planes of the Royal Air Force, was assigned to various targets for all three army groups, plus strategic bombing in the interior of Germany, Denmark, Norway, etc., it provided a considerable volume of leaflet bombing for each group. For example, from D Day (6 June 1944) to V Day (8 May 1945) this squadron disseminated approximately 480,000 leaflets on targets set by Twelfth Army Group and its armies alone.

171. Targetting for Strategic Leaflet Bombing. Strategic leaflet bombing depends upon mass distribution, or saturation of large targets to achieve its effect. This targetting requires careful planning, however, and if this is done a reasonable assumption can be made that leaflets are being fairly well concentrated on specific targets. Such targets may be as follows:

a. All populated areas of a country or region to which leaflets and other publications are addressed. (For example, the Eisenhower statement proclaiming military government destined for all Germans; the publication "L'Amérique en Guerre" for all French; special messages for all Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, etc.)

b. Cities, towns or other localities of concentration, to which special leaflets are addressed. (For example, leaflets addressed "To the People of Cologne", "Warning to Frankfurt-Mannheim Area", "Warning to Citizens of the Ruhr area", etc.)

c. A pattern of special small targets, such as railroad yards, industrial plants, etc., where people of special groups are assembled and to whom special leaflets are addressed; (For example, "Message to Railway Workers", "To Foreign Slave Laborers", etc.)

d. A pattern of enemy military targets, such as communications centers, assembly areas, or approximate divisional areas of enemy troops in the line with targetting on cross roads, ration dumps, etc. For the example, the newspaper "Nachrichten", dropped on a rough pattern following the front line three to ten miles to the rear of the line was shown to have reached a large percentage of enemy troops there.

e. Cities and islands under siege, large pockets of encirclement, etc.

172. Employment of Medium Bombers for Tactical Leafletting. Medium bombers based on the European continent were effectively employed through February, March and April of 1945, with Marauders carrying the Monroe T-1 bomb for tactical targetting of frontpost and leaflets produced in Brussels. Approximately 20,220,000 copies of these leaflets were dropped during this period.

173. Employment of Fighter Bombers for Tactical Leafletting. Employment of fighter bombers for dissemination of frontpost and leaflets of a strictly tactical nature bridged the gap between artillery leafletting and strategic saturation bombing by British based heavy bombers. This employment provided two advantages over heavy bombers for tactical

leafleting. (1) Through field channels of communications made possible accurate targetting even in a fairly fluid situation; (2) distribution of leaflets produced from intelligence forwarded directly from the field and intended for specific units in special tactical situations are made possible.

174. Fighter bombers carried a new leaflet bomb--parachute flare bombs (M-26 or T-3) converted for leafleting. Each bomb carried approximately 12,000 leaflets of 5 1/2" by 8 1/2" in size, or 2,000 copies of the Frontpost. Each fighter bomber carried a cluster of three bombs under each wing, and one bomb under its belly.

175. A separate bomb loading depot was set up at each tactical airforce headquarters, and fighter bombers proved to be effective in tactical leafleting.

176. On the Twelfth Army Group front, fighter bombers disseminated approximately 31,000,000 leaflets.

177. Problems of Targetting in Aircraft Leaflet Bombing. Chief problem in fixing targets for leafleting by aircraft was that of communications. It was found that about 48 hours notice was required at FWD/SHAEF (with its leaflet production and air base in England) to produce leaflets and deliver them over the target. This made targetting for heavy bombers difficult in fluid situations. Bad weather also caused cancellation of leaflet missions. The experience proved the insufficiency of heavy bomber distribution alone, unsupported by tactical fighter bombers and artillery distribution.

PRODUCTION OF LEAFLETS AND DISTRIBUTION BY

ARTILLERY SHELL

178. Doctrine of Tactical Leaflet Distribution by Artillery Shell.
Artillery shells are employed for distribution of leaflets, because:

a. Artillery provides the only sure means of delivery leaflets at the right time to specified enemy units.

b. Artillery provides the means of rapidly distributing leaflets written on the spot from local intelligence to fit the tactical situation.

179. Artillery leaflets may be of two kinds: Standard battle leaflets such as the "Safe Conduct" leaflet, "One Minute Which May Save Your Life", etc., which have a special propaganda impact in specific situations; and leaflets prepared on the spot to fit a local situation such as ultimata leaflets; leaflets outlining the tactical situation of particular units; local "Hoe to surrender" leaflets, etc.

180. It is clear that prior to landing on the Normandy coast for the European campaign, insufficient attention was paid to the technical aspects of artillery leafleting.

181. During World War I, the French had successfully employed 75mm field pieces for shooting tactical leaflets. The US Army had employed the Stokes Mortar for the same purpose. In World War II the British had employed the 25 pounder during the Tunisian campaign with good effect. Trials in North Africa prior to the Fifth US Army landing in Italy had established the 105 mm smoke shell as the best shell for carrying leaflets. However, the Fifth Army report on artillery leafleting in the Italian campaign stated that use of artillery for dissemination of leaflets was "only in the experimental stage."

182. When American forces landed in Normandy, artillery leafleting from the standpoint of the artillery, was still in the experimental stage. Although distribution of leaflets by artillery shell was the most efficient means of bringing propaganda to bear on enemy troops in tactical situations, such operations were handicapped during the early stages of the European Campaign by insufficient technical information and lack of understanding of the psychological warfare mission on the part of G-2, G-3, artillery and ordnance officers. Varied experiments had been made by psychological warfare personnel, by G-2 officers of various units, and by certain artillery officers, but neither at SHLEF nor at Army group was there any one section or any one man exclusively interested in this problem, nor was there proper coordination of the various experimental efforts.

183. A range table for propaganda shells prepared by the MATOUA ordnance officer was available and had been distributed through artillery channels to some artillery units concerned.

184. This range table, prepared on 1 February 1944, proved of limited value since the predominant factor governing accurate dissemination of leaflets requires not only an accurate range setting, but consideration of existing wind velocity and direction. Ballistic changes between standard smoke shells with canisters and the smoke shell with leaflet loads causes a maximum variation in range of some

200 yards, while a wind velocity of 10 to 15 miles per hour may cause leaflets to drift as much as 500 to 800 yards if ejected at a point between 100 and 200 yards in the air.

185. Improvements on this range table were made during the course of the campaign, but a really satisfactory firing table was never developed. Proper firing range tables should be computed for various ammunition, to improve unobserved fire which at present is not accurate for lack of technical data.

186. From interrogation of prisoners and observation it was found that not sufficient area saturation was being obtained, resulting in preparation of a chart which indicated that a maximum of 25 rounds should be fired into an area 500 yards wide and 500 yards deep.

187. In general, it may be stated that prior to actual employment in the European campaign field problems of coordinating various steps in artillery leafletting operations had not been solved. The Mobile Radio Broadcasting Companies, activated in the US were intended to be supplied with experienced field personnel from other theaters. Artillery liaison officers appeared on the tables of organization, but experienced personnel were not made available, nor were officers available to instruct inexperienced personnel in this phase of operations.

188. While psychological warfare detachments at Armies were prepared to do a complete intelligence and production job, liaison with corps and divisions was developed only from experience obtained in the campaign.

189. Experience proved the necessity for two officers assigned to the corps mission. They were a corps liaison officer for operations and intelligence, and a liaison officer for artillery at all echelons from Army down to the artillery battalion or battery. It should be noted that these officers, while assigned to the corps mission, were never actually attached to the corps, but were employed as part of the army teams.

190. Corps Operations and Intelligence Liaison Officer. The duties of this officer were as follows:

- a. Liaison with corps and lower echelon G-2 and G-3 Sections to advise these sections on psychological warfare matters.
- b. Liaison with intelligence sections to collect items of intelligence value and interest to psychological warfare.
- c. Planning and supervision of psychological warfare operations within the corps; coordination of operations with the psychological warfare artillery liaison officer and the combat loudspeaker officer.

191. For purpose of illustration, a typical tactical leaflet operation is outlined:

- a. The corps liaison officer calls on the divisions within his corps each day and is informed by the division G-2 section of the tactical situation in the sector.
- b. Future plans are discussed, with reference to possible employment of psychological warfare.
- c. A tactical psychological warfare plan is outlined, special intelligence pertaining to the target enemy units is collected

d. The corps liaison officer returns to Army headquarters and works out details with the intelligence and operations section of the psychological warfare detachment there.

e. A team conference is held; essential intelligence data is assembled, writers are informed of text and policy requirements. The leaflet is written, and delivered to the printing section with the mobile printing press.

f. The printing section produces the leaflet, (requiring 12 to 14 hours from the time the writing is begun, plus typesetting, layout, photography and plate making for the offset press and the actual printing) while the artillery liaison officer supervises loading, plans for delivery and firing.

192. It will be noted in the above outline of typical leaflet operations in the field, that the G-5 section did not figure largely. It is certain that the psychological warfare liaison officers did not fully develop relationships with G-3 sections. This was due to the equivocal status of most psychological warfare detachments, who were forced continually to "sell" psychological warfare at all levels; such selling would have been unnecessary had all staff officers concerned at all echelons been indoctrinated with the methods and mission of psychological warfare. There was a tendency to lean upon G-2 staff officers who generally were the most sympathetic to the psychological warfare mission.

193. The Artillery Liaison Officer. As stated before, the problems of coordinating necessary steps in actual leafleting procurement of ammunition, loading of shells, delivery to the firing units and supervision of the shooting operation, were solved by assignment of the artillery liaison officer within the psychological warfare detachment. This officer headed the artillery liaison teams at army level, maintaining liaison with army, corps and divisions and usually transporting loaded propaganda shells directly to the batteries for the shoot. His duties, as developed, were as follows:

a. Liaison with army ordnance and ammunition officer to insure a continuous supply of ammunition for propaganda purposes.

b. Liaison with artillery sections at all levels to insure timely shooting of leaflets and exchange of technical information.

c. Collection of required smoke shells from Army ammunition depots and/or corps ASPs.

d. Modification and loading of ammunition with leaflets for firing.

e. Delivery of loaded ammunitions back to depots, supply points, etc., or to artillery batteries as required.

f. Assistance of artillery units in the firing of propaganda ammunition.

g. These duties were accomplished with a small crew of enlisted men attached to the artillery liaison section, and usually a small crew of civilians employed for preparation of leaflet rolls at the printing place.

194. In the First US Army an artillery operational memorandum worked out in coordination with psychological warfare personnel, stated that loading of shells at ASPs should be performed by ordnance person-

nel. This plan was never actually enforced, except in one or two isolated instances, due to the fact that loading of shells, simple as it may be, requires a great deal of care and attention and it was felt that ammunition personnel were not properly equipped to perform this task in addition to their other duties. Other disadvantages were the fact that inclement weather made loading in the open air an impossibility, etc. However, because of this memorandum the section was able to obtain the assistance of ammunition personnel of various ASPs in the carting of ammunition, opening of cases and other time-wasting chores.

195. Certain other facts of importance with relation to artillery dissemination of leaflets were learned during the campaign; early hours of morning or just before dusk are the best hours for firing leaflets without being discovered by officers or NCOs; leaflets fired in open fields of extreme front lines are seldom picked up due to the obvious danger of being observed; in dense woods best distribution is obtained by firing all rounds on impact, thus avoiding high loss of leaflets clinging to foliage of trees.

196. Basic Weapons and Ammunition for Artillery Leafletting. A thorough report on the technical aspects of artillery leafletting has been made in the "History of Psychological Warfare" published by the P & PW Section, Twelfth Army Group. In brief, problems of rolling leaflets, modifying the shells, etc., were satisfactorily solved and explained there, and will not be explored here.

197. Experience in the European campaign confirmed that the best weapon for firing leaflets was the 105 mm Howitzer M2 or M2A1 and that the best shell for the purpose was the 105 mm shell, Smoke shell M64, Ho B4, 2 w/PDF M54. This shell carried approximately 500 leaflets sized $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches by 8 inches.

198. This shell, equipped with the M54 fuse, was capable of an accurate time of flight of about 20 seconds. Because of the many variations from the standard of the modified shell, observed fire was desirable but was not always practical. Observed fire was sometimes possible at ranges up to 6,000 yards, but the general practice among artillery units was to make a registration and then fire the propaganda shell by means of a K transfer with corrections for the smoke shell applied. It seems that the Posit fuse would be ideal for propaganda leafletting, since it would provide for unobserved fire with certain explosion above ground to scatter the leaflets; for this reason continued experimentation with the Posit fuse has been suggested.

199. A limited use of the 155 mm Howitzer smoke shell was made in the theater, but despite the fact that three times as many leaflets may be placed in the 155 mm shell than in the 105 mm shell (approximately 1,500 leaflets as compared with 500 leaflets) it was the consensus of ordnance officers concerned with the supply of ammunition that unless a tactical advantage could be shown, it was cheaper and more efficient to employ 105 mm shells.

200. Procurement of Ammunition for Artillery Leafletting. It may be noted that Twelfth Army Group expenditures of propaganda ammunition were approximately 10,000 to 15,000 rounds per month.

201. Ammunition for propaganda purposes was not always available. Forward transportation of HE ammunition during periods of speedy forward movement was the ammunition officer's primary concern, and army psychological warfare detachments were frequently rationed to 100 rounds per day (for an army front) when the average weekly expenditures were seldom less than 1,500 rounds. Solution of this problem of ammunition

shortage was frequently achieved by the artillery liaison officer of the psychological warfare detachment by inducting the divisional staff concerned to request the required number of rounds through channels to army. Such requests from a lower unit in the line were always met. In other instances, temporary shortage difficulties were overcome by taking the rolled leaflets down to the artillery battery positions and loading them in ammunition from the artillery basic load. In other cases "loans" were arranged with neighboring armies.

202. It is suggested that because of the considerable expenditures of ammunition for propaganda purposes, more attention be paid to this item by ordnance officers. A great deal of lost time occurs when the artillery liaison section must remove smoke canisters and make necessary modifications of shells under field conditions. Such slight modifications could easily be made at the place of origin, with resulting increase in efficiency of the ammunition. Experimentation in the employment of the mortar shell could be made to determine whether some modified or specifically made mortar shell, loaded with standard surrender or safe conduct leaflets should be incorporated into the basic infantry ammunition load, to be available in cases of encirclement when artillery distribution is not practical.

203. It was found practical for field artillery battalions to carry a limited number of Safe Conduct leaflet shells as part of their basic loads. This practice was accepted by some units, and eliminated many rush trips with these standard leaflets. However, in general, few artillery battalions willingly carried propaganda shells as part of their basic load.

204. Another practice, that of stock piling standard battle leaflet shells at the ASP's proved disadvantageous due to the fact that ASP ammunition personnel had difficulty in retaining control over this type of ammunition, causing confusion by issuance of certain leaflets to the wrong units etc. Whenever a stockpile of leaflet ammunition was accumulated at any one ASP it was found necessary to station a member of the psychological warfare artillery liaison section at the spot to insure proper issuance.

205. Mobile Printing Presses. Psychological Warfare combat teams, stationed at armies, were equipped with mobile printing presses mounted on 2½ ton trucks. These Webberforfer and Davidson presses produced all tactical leaflets required by armies in the field. No discussion of this equipment will be made here, except to assert that the equipment proved satisfactory.

206. Production of standard battle leaflets (Safe Conduct, etc.) used repeatedly in great quantities, was not attempted in the field. Printing was done by PWD/SHAEP with the elaborate printing facilities at London, Paris, and Brussels, or at the Twelfth Army Group plant at Luxembourg.

EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT LOUDSPEAKER UNITS

WITH THE INFANTRY DIVISION

207. Doctrine of appeals to the enemy by portable loudspeakers. The combat loudspeaker provides a projection of the voice in tactical situations where a surrender appeal may induce individual surrenders, or facilitate group surrender when the enemy's position has become untenable.

208. Requirements are portable loudspeaker equipment which can be moved readily into position; a skilled announcer-linguist; a technician for maintenance and servicing of the equipment during broadcasts; and proper liaison with friendly elements to insure proper control of fire to facilitate surrender.

209. Varied success, ranging from outright failure to obtain prisoners to successful surrender of individuals and large groups was obtained during the European campaign in situations such as the following:

a. Surrender appeals directed to isolated pockets of resistance, such as pillboxes, houses and cellars, and woods where enemy troops were hiding.

b. Ultimate delivered to isolated pockets and towns.

c. Facilitation of white flag missions.

d. In static situations where intelligence indicated poor enemy morale, to further lower morale and encourage desertions by supplying simple instructions on how to surrender, and controlling friendly fire so that surrenders could be safely made.

e. To obtain prisoners for interrogation without the employment of patrols.

f. To control civilians, displaced persons and prisoners of war in the wake of the advance.

g. To consolidate by-passed towns, to clear roads for our traffic, to obtain reports of booby traps and mines, to facilitate mop up surrender of enemy soldiers in civilian uniforms, or hiding themselves in cellars, etc. and to obtain surrender of weapons, etc.

210. Particular success was had with loudspeakers mounted on tanks, which are discussed separately in Section 12.

211. Tactical employment of loudspeakers with the Infantry Division. Tactical employment of combat loudspeakers, except in static situations where employment is deliberately staged, is often one of exploiting targets of opportunity provided by disintegration of the enemy will to resist during attacks or envelopments.

212. Sufficient combat loudspeakers were not included in T/E of any psychological warfare unit committed to an army to provide six teams for each division in the line. A recurring problem in psychological warfare operations was that often loudspeaker requirements were not anticipated in advance by the field commanders concerned. Loudspeaker

teams were frequently summoned too late for maximum success in exploiting situations of entrapment or encirclement. Such incidents suggest that indoctrination of ground force commands in the use of combat loudspeakers would assure pre-planning for their use with maximum hope of success.

213. Evaluation of combat loudspeaker equipment employed. Equipment available in the early stages of the European campaign, (Battle of Normandy, Battle of Northern France) was not suitable for the mission. The 30-watt Sogen amplifier, which was substituted for T/E equipment of the mobile radio broadcasting companies when that equipment failed to be delivered, was capable of throwing the voice only about 200 yards, just about far enough to span the distance between two hedgerows. The percentage of successful combat missions with this equipment was not high, with subsequent lowering of enthusiasm for loudspeakers among field commanders.

214. During the Brittany peninsula campaign, 100-watt RCA amplifiers had been obtained, and were employed with increasing success. However, speakers could not be dismounted and used at a distance from the sound truck, and the sound throw was too short to permit fullest exploitation of the tactical situation.

215. Public Address System PA AN/UIQ-1 was obtained late in August 1944, and thereafter the employment of loudspeakers met with increasing success. These 2000-watt amplifiers were the first satisfactory loudspeakers used in the European theater. Under favorable conditions this combat loudspeaker could be heard clearly at a distance of two miles, with a wide angle of dispersion. A lip microphone excluded battle noises and eliminated feedback from the loudspeaker. Frequency response in the upper register provided good intelligibility above battle noises. However, crosswinds carry the sound sideways and away from the target troops, and rising air currents carry it upward. In summary, the AN/UIQ-1 was the only equipment provided capable of carrying out its military mission, but experience showed that the combat loudspeaker would have been more serviceable had the following properties been available:

a. Improved speakers with at least 500 yards of cable, to make possible setups in advantageous position away from troops and a suitable reel device for the cable.

b. Microphone cable of at least 100 feet to enable announcer to secure adequate cover away from the vehicle.

c. A turn-table for broadcast or recording.

216. Evaluation of Vehicles Mounting Loudspeaker Equipment. Most effective mounting for loudspeaker systems in the European campaign was the tank, which is discussed separately in Section 12.

217. First vehicles used were the $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton personnel carriers. Their pickup was slow and they were too large and awkward to maneuver, especially in the Normandy terrain. The $\frac{3}{4}$ ton ambulance type was convenient, offered protection against rain, but was available because the other transportation was lacking. The $\frac{1}{2}$ ton jeep and trailer was fast and convenient, had a low silhouette, and was easily camouflaged. However, traction in mud was poor and maneuvering on narrow roads and in cops was difficult. The $\frac{3}{4}$ ton weapons carrier offered better protection against the weather than the jeep, and was more maneuverable since no trailer was necessary. One armored car was used, and offered protection against snipers because of its fire power, but had poor

traction off the road. The half-track proved a good mounting for the loudspeaker. It mounted a machine gun, had good traction, offered protection against small arms fire and rain. However, it attracted more fire than the less conspicuous vehicles and needed more maintenance.

218. Of all vehicles used, the half-track was considered the most suitable vehicle available for loudspeaker mounting.

219. Generator Operation of Combat Loudspeaker. The generator employed for power in operating combat loudspeakers was the PG-75 gasoline driven generator which requires a warm-up period of fifteen minutes, thus attracting dangerous premature attention. It was suggested that a battery operated generator would eliminate this danger.

220. Personnel Requirements for Combat Loudspeakers. Original loudspeaker teams consisted of a driver, a technician, a linguist writer and announcer, and an officer for liaison with the friendly combat units. Shortage of personnel and the need for a minimum crew at the front caused reduction of the team to two men, a driver-technician and a language man.

221. The driver was required to be an experienced radio technician with a knowledge of generator maintenance.

222. The linguist-announcer was required to have knowledge of the language of the enemy troops, a background in preparation of his announcements, and a knowledge of basic arrangements with the friendly ground forces to facilitate the surrenders.

223. Both were required to be good leaders able to stand the pressure of battlefield conditions.

224. In short, the team was required to exercise great care in preparation; to have essential intelligence of the enemy, a good short script for the appeal; proper liaison with the ground units concerned and prepared announcements for the friendly troops to control fire and facilitate the successful surrender of the enemy; and to replace the equipment properly to safeguard friendly troops with the loudspeakers drew enemy fire.

225. In some instances, substitution of one announcer for another was necessary to provide for addresses in languages other than German, addressed to Russians, Poles, Yugoslavs, etc. among the enemy troops.

226. Report of War Department Observers Board. An excerpt from a report by Colonel Gilbert E. Parker, infantry observer, with the War Department Observers Board, Hq. European Theater of Operations, of 28 June 1945, subject: AGF Report No. 1021-Psychological Warfare, Loud Speaker, follows:

"1. Source: Material in this report is based on conferences held in G-2 Sections of six divisions (30, 69, 76, 87, 102) during the period 5-15 June 1945. All six of these divisions had intermittent service from a two-man broadcasting team furnished by higher headquarters.

"2. Loud Speakers: All divisions reported that the loudspeakers were excellent for controlling civilian populations and for obtaining surrenders, particularly in pockets and in towns. All G-3's indicated their use for training but had no use for them for battlefield communication, radio being considered better for the latter use. Divisional comment follows:

"30th Division: We mounted a captured German loud speaker on the general's M-20 after crossing the Rhine and the VII team ran it for us. We were going so fast we didn't have much use for the MIIT in its normal role.

"69th Division: The loud speaker always draws fire.

"76th Division: In one case, a civilian who heard our broadcasts persuaded enemy soldiers to leave his premises. Others followed suit.. Battlefield coordination by means of loud speakers is not practicable for the division but it should be experimented with by lower units with a view to developing its possibilities.

"78th Division: We couldn't always get the 'hog-caller' from Corps when we wanted it, but we did manage one surrender of over 300 Krauts that could have caused us a lot of trouble.

"87th Division: In some cases, civilians in towns turned on the SS men and helped drive them out when they heard our loud speaker... There were a good many small towns in our area and we estimate that the loud speaker saved us 50% of our fighting in these towns.

"VIII Corps referred to the effective use of loud speakers for sonic effects in the Luxembourg Division.

"Recommendations: VII and VIII Corps Headquarters and all Divisions recommended that the loud speaker be made organic in the Infantry Division. Four of the eight headquarters recommended four per division (one for division headquarters and one for each regiment or GP) and the other four recommended one per division. Five of the eight specified that it be suitable for mounting on a tank or armored car. None wanted the broadcasting teams organic in divisions." S/t Gilbert E. Parker, Colonel, Infantry, WD Observers Board.

227. From experience in the theater it is observed that (1) combat loud speakers in certain situations hasten the enemy's decision to surrender, facilitate his surrender, and reduce casualties which would occur if the enemy fought to the bitter end, (2) the combat loud speaker is capable of inducing individual surrenders in static situations from among dissident enemy elements, and reducing the necessity for patrols to capture enemy personnel for intelligence purposes, (3) combat loud speakers are valuable for establishing local communications with enemy military and civilian personnel in conditions where his own organization is in chaos, (4) combat loud speakers are valuable in the wake of our advance in facilitating the reorganization of enemy elements for surrender, and civilian elements for obedience to our authority.

EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT LOUD SPEAKERS ON TANKS

228. Doctrine of employment of loud speakers on tanks. High powered loud speakers mounted on tanks added an important dimension to the capabilities of loud-speaker units, previously mounted only on jeeps or trucks. This was the ability to keep up with armored spearheads on the breakthrough and exploit situations as rapidly as they developed.

229. There is no doubt that the tank-mounted loud speaker manned by experienced psychological warfare personnel with carefully rehearsed script and announcer technique achieved success. There is repeated evidence in reports from field commanders to sustain the enthusiasm of Psychological Warfare personnel for this equipment. Operations in the BT proved conclusively that the high powered loud speaker mounted on a tank has an essential place in the armored column.

230. At the time of the St. Lo breakthrough, loud speakers mounted on other vehicles could not keep up with the armored spearheads and many opportunities for employment were lost; close coordination with combat elements was shown to be an absolute necessity by planning well in advance of such operations.

231. This condition was later remedied, and the success of the loud speaker technique with the armored column is illustrated by this excerpt from the Periodic Report, 9 April 1945, G-2, XIX Corps:

"During the advance of the 2d Armored Division that commenced 30 March, the combat loud speaker mounted on an M1 tank, made an average of 20 broadcasts a day. The tank came to be considered not just an oddity to be used on special occasions; but as an integral part of every attack. After the tanks were deployed, the infantry held their fire while the personnel in the tank gave a talk to the enemy troops. If this talk was unsuccessful the attack was started, but was halted before the mopping up phase to make the final broadcasts. Leaflet shells were also fired from the assault guns in order to lessen the time between the arrival at a town and the presence of the leaflet. The tank was used most successfully against large towns. The commanders of the large towns of Bad Pyrmont and Blankburg surrendered their swords personally to the tank, and guaranteed that the soldiers in the town would not fire a shot. Counting the garrisons and hospitals of the towns over five thousand PW's were taken. However, though the successes were more spectacular in the large towns, the place where the tank really proved his worth, was in the fighting at the road blocks, and the cleaning up of stubborn pockets. The fact that from 10 to 30 bazooka firing Jeeps surrendered at road block after road block, assisted in making the advance rapid and less costly. These missions could not have been accomplished with a soft vehicle, as the tank was under fire during the broadcast, and speed was essential. On one occasion during the breaking out of the Teutoburger Wald, an infantry platoon was pinned down by enemy automatic fire. The tank, having swung around the flank with the other lights, made a broadcast, the enemy ceased fire, and the platoon, hastily arising from the ground, accepted their surrender. At the town of Kildesheim, the tank, after clearing approximately 200 PW's from the outskirts, made a broadcast to the foreign workers to remove the explosive charges from under the bridge. On being told that this was done, the tank proceeded into the town proper, where by itself it induced 50 more PW's to surrender. However, the lack of support, and the presence of heavy machine gun fire caused the tank to withdraw. The next day the tank returned with a company of

infantry and a company of lights and assisted in clearing the town without a shot being fired. The great success of these operations is to be laid to the excellent cooperation of all arms -- infantry, tanks, assault guns, and the PA light tank."

232. The success of these tank loud speaker operations was also recognized by the enemy. A DNB Berlin report of 1300 12 April 1945, quoted a Decree of Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler as follows:

"Through tricks the enemy tries to make German localities hand themselves over to the enemy. His advanced armored recon cars have the job of intimidating the population by saying that if the locality were not handed over it would be destroyed by tanks or artillery that are supposed to be present. Also this trick of the enemy does not fulfill its purpose. No German town will be declared an open town. Every village and every town will be defended and hold with every means."

233. The advisability for at least one loud speaker tank with each tank battalion was expressed. A letter of 26 March 1945, from Headquarters 11th Armored Division, for the Commanding General of the Division to the Commanding General, Third US Army, states:

"Experience in recent rapid advances by this Division shows a definite requirement for a tank-mounted public address system in the tank battalion. This system must be capable of operations from within the tank under fire and will be used to warn occupants and enemy personnel against sniping, the terms and directions for surrender, and other similar uses. Normal truck-mounted psychological warfare equipment has been found unsuitable for this purpose...It is requested that three (3) each Public Address Systems be furnished this Division as soon as possible."

234. A letter of 12 March 1945, signed by Major General Hugh J. Gaffoy, Commanding Fourth Armored Division, to Commanding General, Third US Army, says:

"Attached is an extract of an annex from the AC of S, G-2, Periodic Report No. 151, dated 12 March 45, Headquarters Fourth Armored Division, covering the experimental use of a combat loud speaker unit which was installed in a light tank and used with the leading tank and infantry battalions in the Fourth Armored Division's recent breakthrough from the Kyll River to the Rhine River. It is recommended that the loud speaker equipment, which is now with this division on a temporary loan basis from the Headquarters Third US Army, AC of S, G-2, Psychological Warfare Section, be assigned permanently to this division. It is recommended that Mr. Alexis Somaripa, civilian, OSS, 9-0451-9, Psychological Warfare specialist, Headquarters Third US Army, who is now on temporary duty with this Division, continue his work until such time as suitable divisional personnel can be trained to handle the broadcasting."

235. The extract from the annex referred to above, which appeared 15 March 1945 in the G-2 Information Bulletin No. 18, Hq Third US Army, is quoted in part:

"A combat loudspeaker unit was used effectively in overcoming hostile resistance and in controlling the civilian population. The combat loud speaker unit was installed in one of the light tanks of the 37 Tk Bn and was operated by a specialist from the Psychological Warfare Branch.... It was used alternately with the fire and shock power of the tk, Armcd Inf, Arty team (37th, 10th and 68th Bns, respectively) in attacking towns, woods and strong points occupied by the enemy.... It is estimated that the broadcasts helped to capture at least 500 PW and, in many cases, resulted in keeping the Germans from firing on our

troops thereby minimizing our casualties, saving time, and ammunition...
CONCLUSION: (1) Combat loud speakers can be used effectively during moving situations to save time, ammunition and casualties without interfering with operations. (2) It is essential that there be closest cooperation between the Tk-Inf staffs and the Psychological Warfare specialist. The latter must have a full understanding of the tactical requirements of each situation and he must be of such a caliber and experience as to have the confidence of the tactical commanders. (3) The loud speaker units must be installed in a light tank to keep up with the Tanks in a moving situation."

236. A report of the War Department Observers Board of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, of 28 April 1945, Subject: AGF Report No. 836, Loud Speaker in a Medium Tank, submitted by: Col James D. O'Brien, Infantry Observer, is quoted in part:

"The following information was obtained from G-2, 7th Armored Division, operating near Balva, Germany on 14 April 1945: The First Army had furnished one medium tank, equipped with a loud speaker, to the 7th Armored Division.... This tank had been used in various ways. When near the tail of a column it often drew in prisoners who heard propaganda released by it in passing. In the operation against the Ruhr Pocket it had been run in the rear of enemy positions and put to work. In one instance over three hundred (300) prisoners were taken as a result. It was the opinion of several officers that (it) was a valuable means of forcing the surrender of units. In going through towns, necessary orders could be quickly given to the inhabitants. The question was asked whether or not they could use more or all tanks so equipped. The answer was, since the installation of loud speakers in no way impaired the fighting ability of the tank and since its use was so wide and varied, that such would be a decided advantage. They could be of tremendous value in controlling PW's in the areas and on roads to the rear."

237. Evaluation of Loud speaker equipment employed. High powered combat loud speaker equipment was mounted on both light and medium tanks. In the medium tank the speaker was welded to the front of the turret and the PE-75 generator to its rear. Both were protected by armor plate. The two amplifier cases were mounted inside in place of ammunition under the floor plate. Fire power was not impaired. The announcer sat in the position of the assistant driver while the technician operated the tank radio and the loud speaker system.

238. In the light tank the loud speaker was mounted on the gun rack outside the tank and the PE-75 generator was mounted behind the turret. Both were protected by armor plate welded to the tank. The amplifiers were mounted on both sides to the gun outside the tank. The announcer replaced either the tank commander or machine runner.

239. While the loud speaker was technically adequate, had a 120 volt DC operated from batteries with a 200 watt output been used, the mounting would not have provided these two disadvantages: the horns and generator provided a conspicuous silhouette which attracted the attention to the tank; and mounting of the generator outside the tank required the technician to dismount and start the generator before using. Improvisation of extra gasoline tanks for the generator in some instances enabled the generator to be started before an advance and ran constantly for a long period without the necessity of being cared for by the technician.

CONSOLIDATION IN FRIENDLY AREAS AND CONTROL PRO-

PAGANDA IN OCCUPIED ENEMY AREAS

240. Doctrine of Consolidation and Control Propaganda. While the mission of consolidation and control propaganda plainly differs from that of combat psychological warfare, experience in the European campaign clearly demonstrated that no clear-cut distinction exists in the employment of field personnel and equipment during hostilities. The same media are largely employed for both missions; intelligence requirements overlap, and personnel and equipment are necessarily committed to both missions.

241. For definition, the term "Consolidation" refers to information services for friendly populations in liberated areas, while "control" defines propaganda activities among conquered peoples in occupied enemy areas.

242. Basically, during combat, consolidation requirements are for wall sheets, newspapers, radio, books and magazines, picture displays, motion picture exhibitions, etc. to inform and instruct friendly liberated peoples. The purpose is to assist civil affairs administrators in establishing and maintaining good order and discipline; to obtain necessary active cooperation; and to effect security of lines of communication.

243. Likewise, control activity employs the psychological warfare media to assist military government administrators in informing and instructing enemy populations for the same military purpose.

244. It was determined that there is little difference between intelligence requirements for consolidation and control, and requirements for appreciation and output of propaganda directed across the enemy lines.

245. Further, propaganda addressed to populations in occupied areas, especially by radio, reached audiences in unconquered enemy territory. It therefore served an important secondary combat propaganda mission.

246. Efficiency in employing psychological warfare personnel required frequent assignment of intelligence and loudspeaker teams to consolidation and control missions; employment of monitors to provide files of news and information for control publications while servicing combat propaganda media, employment of writers and translators engaged in combat radio, leaflet and newspaper writing to do double duty in writing radio programs and publishing newspapers for distribution in the occupied areas. For example the editorial staff producing combat leaflets and the airborne newspaper "Frontpost" for German troops also produced "Die Mitteilungen," a weekly newspaper for people in occupied areas for Germany.

247. Finally, while psychological warfare was related to immediate military developments, consolidation and control propaganda had a long range purpose unrelated to the battle of action. Cessation of hostilities caused no interruption in activities of psychological warfare personnel. It required, rather, a reassembling of personnel from combat teams to continue the long range program of controlling information in Germany. This operation continues under the newly

248. Relations with Civil Affairs/Military Government. The mission of psychological warfare in consolidation and control propaganda was intimately related with that of Civil Affairs and Military Government. In general, psychological warfare media provided these services:

a. Dissemination of Military Government laws, proclamations and essential instructions.

b. Dissemination of news of military government operations and news of successes of civilian populations in helping themselves back to normalcy, through local reports supplied largely by military government detachments.

c. Counteraction of panics and rumors, and stabilization of public opinion through accurate service of local and world news.

d. Collection of intelligence as to the state of morale, political attitudes and conditions of life among the civilian people, evaluation of civilian reaction to measures taken by Civil Affairs Military Government.

249. It is clear that prior to the actual invasion of Normandy, problems jointly related to G-5 and psychological warfare were anticipated in joint planning. Neither G-5 nor psychological warfare units had provided in tables of organization for liaison with the other.

250. However, cordial liaison was established in the field, and problems solved largely by improvisation. It is necessary to study joint G-5 psychological warfare problems arising out of consolidation activities in friendly areas and control propaganda activities in occupied enemy areas in order to solve such problems of overlapping interest.

251. Record of Consolidation in Friendly Areas. Close relations between psychological warfare and civil affairs was first experienced in the Normandy campaign, with establishment of newspapers at Issigny and Cherbourg; establishment of Radio Cherbourg, and employment of loudspeaker units to disseminate news and instructions in the French villages and towns. Wall sheets and "handout" papers were also distributed.

252. Following entry into Paris, psychological warfare personnel assisted civil affair officers in obtaining publication in French press and radio media of required news and information, assisted in liaison with the French government in campaigns against the black market, problems of allocating transport, precautionary instructions to the French public on the reestablishment of bus service, investigations for public reactions to "invasion money", public confidence in "Victory money", black market in dollars, status of food supply, etc.

253. As rapidly as the military situation permitted the mission of psychological warfare in France was turned over to the Allied Information Service. This service was a subsection of the Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and under command of the chief of the division, but it was largely staffed by civilian agencies (Office of War Information, Ministry of Information) and emphasized its non-military character. The Allied Information Service continued working in the field of public information and maintained liaison with French information officials, serving also

as political intelligence and public relations advisor to civil affairs officers.

254. In the autumn of 1944, through agreement with the French and Allied military authorities, this trend away from psychological warfare and toward pure information service was further accentuated with establishment of the United States Information Service (USIS) with headquarters in Paris, still under operational control of the Chief of Psychological Warfare Division but in fact operated by the Office of War Information except in matters requiring military decision.

255. This organization continued the mission of rendering aid to the liberated governments in reconstructing public information media, such aid including supply of news services, personnel and equipment as well as policy guidance. A greatly expanded distribution of films, books and magazines, etc. was carried out.

256. Similar services were rendered in Belgium, Holland and Denmark with psychological warfare and/or USIS personnel attached to the SHAEF missions to those governments.

257. Record of Information Control in Germany. Psychological warfare operations with and for military government were expanded as Allied armies broke into Germany, and as the liaison activities of civil affairs gave way to the occupational responsibilities of military government. Services similar to those rendered in France and Belgium were continued in the occupied enemy areas, with the added responsibilities of suspending German press, radio and publishing activities, as well as public entertainment activities and the ultimate responsibility of reviving those activities under proper control.

258. First dissemination of printed news for German civilians was on 3 November 1944, when 10,000 copies of "Frontpost" were distributed through military government channels. On 27 November 1944 "Die Neue Zeitung" appeared, a full sized weekly newspaper for German civilians, produced by psychological warfare personnel of Twelfth Army Group. The second issue of the paper carried the new name, "Die Mitteilungen", which publication continued without interruption each week for 22 weeks.

259. The last issue of the weekly "Die Mitteilungen" appeared on 21 April 1945, having been gradually reduced in circulation area as new publications appeared under the U.S. Army imprint the "Kolnischer Kurier", at Cologne, the "Frankfurter Presse" at Frankfurt, the "Hessische Post" at Kassel, the "Braunschweiger Bote" at Braunschweig, the "Ruhr Zeitung" at Mulheim, etc.

260. Total circulation of papers printed for Germans in territory occupied by American forces exceeded 3,000,000 copies on 12 May 1945.

261. This figure did not include circulation of the "Aachener Nachrichten", a newspaper published in Aachen by a German publisher, under control of a detachment from Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. This was the first of the "licensee" papers established, in Germany, i.e. papers published by licensed German publishers.

262. Distribution of papers to the German population in occupied areas during the period of hostilities was never easy. No transport was allocated for this purpose, nor had liaison with military government officials been established. Vigorous field improvisation accomplished this operation however, with G-5 officers and military government officers in the field cooperating on a cordial basis. Distribution

was finally accomplished in this way: Papers were delivered to G-5 stations at armies and were forwarded to military government establishments in various communities. German burgomasters were held responsible for setting up distribution, which was done through employment of news boys, policemen, postmen, shopkeepers, etc. requisitioned civilian vehicles of all types were used.

263. The problem of maintaining channels of distribution in the face of a fluid military situation, with shifting army, corps and divisional boundaries was a constant problem, only solved by repeated excursions and negotiations in the field.

264. Radio Broadcasting in Civilian Control. Radio broadcasts for civilian control followed parallel lines with publication and distribution of newspapers. Programs embracing military government experiences and intentions were broadcast in great volume.

265. Particularly effective for propaganda purposes were field recordings of military government activities, (reopening of churches, military government trials of civilian offenders, speeches and appeals by civilian authorities, etc.)

266. Military Government and Information Control Relationships After Cessation of Hostilities. It may be stated in summary that the greatest overlapping of interests between military government and psychological warfare developed after the cessation of hostilities, rather than during the period of combat operations, when relationships were never clearly defined but were developed in the field.

267. Psychological warfare operations, now redesignated as informational control operations under Information Control Division, United States Forces, European Theater, are continuing and embrace a large sphere of responsibilities not covered in this report. They may be summarized briefly as the licensing, reestablishment and control of German newspaper, magazine and book publishing industries, the control of German radio, reestablishment and control of the German film, theater and music industries, etc.

268. Many of these operations were only in the planning phase during the period of the European campaign, and no analysis will be undertaken in this report.

PUBLICATIONS AND RADIO PROGRAMS FOR DISPLACED

PERSONS AND ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR

269. Mission of Psychological Warfare in Supplying Information to Displaced Persons and Allied Prisoners of War. The mission of supplying publications and radio programs for displaced persons and allied prisoners of war was not anticipated in psychological warfare planning and no basic doctrine or standard procedure for such operations was set up. Not until April, 1945, was this mission delegated to the Psychological Warfare Division, United States Forces, European Theater of Operations. Operations thereafter were largely conducted on a basis of expediency, but the mission was accomplished with fair success by employment of personnel and facilities readily available in the various psychological warfare organizations.

270. This phase of psychological warfare activities did not reach its peak until after the cessation of hostilities on 8 May 1945, but because of its nature a summary belongs properly in this report. It is, however, a continuing mission of the Information Control Division, United States Forces, European Theater.

271. The mission of psychological warfare with regard to displaced persons was two-fold: (1) Production of publications and radio programs to give news and instructions to displaced persons; and (2) collection of intelligence to assist planning agencies in solution of problems affecting displaced persons and allied prisoners of war.

272. Program for Displaced Persons. A brief summary of the publications and radio programs actually produced for displaced persons and allied prisoners of war follows:

a. Publication in England of a four-language newspaper "SHAEP", (first published in English, German, French and Polish, later in French, Polish, Russian and Italian.)

b. Production and distribution of a French weekly newspaper, "Retour", edited by a group of French officers from the French Ministry of Information, attached to Twelfth Army Group.

c. Production and distribution of a Polish weekly newspaper by an editorial staff of Polish officers attached to the Twelfth Army Group.

d. Distribution of a Yugoslav weekly newspaper produced by Yugoslav officials in Paris.

e. Distribution of two Czech weekly newspapers, published in London under control of the Political Intelligence Division of the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom.

f. Production and broadcast of radio programs from Radio Luxembourg for displaced persons and allied prisoners of war (in Russian, Polish, French, German, Dutch, Flemish, Italian and Czech languages.) These programs included many recordings made at displaced persons camps by recording units from the psychological warfare radio sections.

g. Distribution of "Since 1939", an objective illustrated history of World War II, produced in several languages; weekly editions of "Communique Graphique", a newspicture poster for bulletin boards, issued in several languages; and large quantities of booklets and brochures produced by the Office of War Information and Ministry of Information for other "consolidation" purposes but suitable for displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war.

h. Motion picture exhibitions by a mobile projection unit touring displaced persons camps.

i. Broadcasts of news and instructions from loudspeaker trucks.

273. Problems of Distribution. In no phase of psychological warfare operations were difficulties of distribution more aggravated than for distribution of publications to displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war.

274. The period of greatest necessity was that from mid-April 1945 through July, 1945, during which period the occupation armies were in a constant state of flux. Army, Corps and divisional boundaries were constantly changing, and poor communications existed between various echelons. Further, while the problem of distributing publications to displaced persons was a "geographical" problem, -- that is, displaced persons camps were in a fixed location, -- the command channels for administration of these camps were constantly changing as army boundaries shifted.

275. The problem was solved by establishing psychological warfare teams in central localities throughout the American zone of occupation. Newspapers and other publications were delivered from England by Lancer, -- the packages being parachuted to the ground, -- and delivery routes were established throughout the region with the employment of several trucks from the psychological warfare pool. Teams manning these delivery trucks obtained on-the-spot clearance for their activities from the unit commanders concerned, and developed distribution channels largely by improvisation.

276. Problems of a Political Nature. Problems of a delicate political nature presented themselves in the publication and distribution of papers and booklets for displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war. Some of these problems required solution at the highest governmental levels, particularly problems affecting rights and privileges of displaced persons in the matter of repatriation to their homelands, etc. In general, the policy adopted was that of treating these subjects with the greatest caution in all publications, or simply making no reference to these problems when they could not be clarified.

277. Relations with G-1, and G-5. In general, problems affecting G-1, (charged with responsibilities for Allied prisoners of war) and G-5, (charged with responsibilities for displaced persons) were settled in informal liaison. It cannot be overemphasized that the program for displaced persons and Allied prisoners of war was conducted, initially, on an emergency basis, with facilities of all interested sections overtaxed during an extremely fluid period of military operations. This emergency planning resulted in a fairly efficient program but long range planning, on the part of all interested sections, including British and American civilian agencies concerned, would have resulted in a more effective program.

BLACK OR COVERT RADIO PROPAGANDA AND OTHER

BLACK PROPAGANDA

278. Doctrine of black radio propaganda. Black or covert propaganda is that propaganda which conceals its source, i.e., which pretends to emanate from within the territory of the enemy and either takes the form of official enemy pronouncements to cause dismay or confusion, or pretends to be the expression of subversive enemy elements. As a weapon in psychological warfare it requires a great degree of skill in its production and employment.

279. Black propaganda need not always be completely successful from the standpoint of deception to achieve a worthwhile purpose. For instance, an alert listener may well understand that a black radio program is not what it purports to be, and may still be influenced by its context.

280. Media for black or covert propaganda are radio, leaflets, "clandestine newspapers", rumours started by agents infiltrated into enemy territory. Other media are forgeries and distortions of official enemy documents, etc.

281. Black propaganda requires sources of intelligence of the most detailed sort, writers thoroughly familiar with the subject matter and great skill in composition and reproduction. American propaganda personnel were initially unfamiliar with this type of propaganda, but adapted themselves to this medium with vigor and imagination.

282. There seems little doubt that the most effective of black propaganda in the European campaign was that disseminated by radio. Employment of black radio propaganda for the aid and encouragement of subversive elements within areas controlled by the enemy affords opportunities for substantial benefits. Most noteworthy of these operations were the two British operations, "Soldatensender Calais" and "Kurzwellensender Atlantic", (programs of news and music for the German armed forces,) and the American operation "Annie", which employed radio Luxembourg during night and early-morning hours and presented a "clandestine" program ostensibly from an underground group in the Rhineland. These were dangerous operations from the standpoint of security and required handling with great skill.

283. Operation "Annie". This program known to its listeners as "1220 Sender", raised the most controversy among Anglo-American psychological warfare personnel, and among certain staff officers outside the propaganda circles. It was an audacious undertaking which introduced a new element into black radio operation -- the employment of detailed news of the battle fronts, and detailed intelligence on the German order of battle, to build and hold an audience among enemy military formations. It employed highly classified information in considerable volume for tactical deception, and ultimately faked news to create fear and disorder in target localities, until afforded opportunities for spectacular military benefits. It further developed a strong "underground" political line.

284. Operation "Soldatensender West". This British-conducted program operated over a long period to distribute news and music to

the German Army. It capitalized on intelligence reports, distributed news designed to shatter German morale, but did not attempt tactical military deception.

265. Operation "Kurzwellensender Atlantic". This British-conducted program operated on lines similar to "Soldatensender West". These programs were conducted with great skill and enjoyed a huge following of German listeners, regardless of whether the German listeners knew that the programs were produced by the Allies.

266. Black Leaflets. Black leaflets may be distributed either by air or by agents, and presume to be produced by subversive enemy elements. Frequent use of this device was made during the European campaign, but one difficulty presented itself, that of infiltrating agents through the lines. One particularly successful leaflet operation was that of duplicating German "Skorpion" output. "Skorpion" leaflets were published by German propagandists for distribution by air to their own troops, as a medium of refuting Allied propaganda. Copies of these leaflets, with subversive texts, were duplicated and distributed to the enemy forces. This caused abandonment of the "Skorpion" leaflets.

267. Office of Strategic Services Field Operations. Sufficient data is not available to include a summary of these activities in this report.

FINANCING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS:

MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS

288. Employment of funds of Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and other funds. It will not be attempted here to analyze fiscal problems incident to the psychological warfare operation in the European Theater. Initially, Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, had no independent funds for operation, depending upon requisitioned supplies and material contributed by the civilian participating agencies. On 15 May 1944 a fiscal section was set up in PWD, SHAEF, and henceforth PWD met certain obligations from a basic fund, contributed on a 50-50 basis by the British and American governments. The American contribution was split between the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services; the British contribution came through the Ministry of Information, the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office, and the British Broadcasting Corporation.

289. Not all contributions are in cash supplied to the fund, some contributions, (such as from the Ministry of Information,) being in the form of psychological warfare bills paid directly by the participating agency. The amount of material obtained from the various agencies was of considerable consequence, in view of the fact that equipment provided in the tables of equipment had to be augmented by large quantities of specialized equipment from sources outside the army.

290. Supply and Transport. The problems of supply and transport have not been investigated in this report. Many millions of dollars worth of equipment of a highly specialized nature, was employed in psychological warfare operations. This equipment included radio receivers; public address systems; press monitoring equipment; motion picture films and projectors; immense stocks of paper; radio broadcast transmitters, etc.

291. Problems of Newsprint. The problem of obtaining newsprint and other paper was basic to the psychological warfare operation in the European Theater, both in the United Kingdom and on the European continent. These problems of supply were solved with establishment of a newsprint board to allocate available stocks to prime users. Newspapers and other publications published by liberated governments or individuals in liberated areas, The Stars and Stripes and other American and British troop newspapers and publications, and Psychological warfare newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, etc.

292. Psychological Warfare Communications. The whole problem of signal communications, embracing a large operation for psychological warfare, has not been covered in this report.