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THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater

U.S. Army
G-2
10/12/45

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS
OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

MISSION: To prepare a factual, annotated report on the organization and functions of the Communications Zone in the European Theater, with recommendations for future operations.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States Forces in the European Theater.

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ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

PREFACE

1. Current War Department publications provide the broad outlines for the organization and functions of a communications zone but contain little information on details on the operating relationships between the various echelons of command in a theater of operations. Experience in the European Theater soon revealed the possibility of improving the organizational structure. Later it became apparent that there was need to define more precisely the relationships between the various echelons and to clarify the position of chiefs of technical and administrative services in the theater.

2. A preliminary analysis of the problems and issues involved indicates that experience in the theater could best be evaluated under four headings, and the chapters which follow are so organized:

a. Organization of Headquarters, Communications Zone, including both its internal structure and its relation to higher headquarters.

b. Organization and mission of Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, which was formed to plan the initial phases of operations on the Continent and to supervise activities behind the army boundary until the main headquarters could be transferred from the United Kingdom.

c. Organization and responsibilities of sections and base sections within the Communications Zone, giving special attention to the question of exempting certain activities from section control.

d. Organization and functions of Advance Section, which gave direct support to the Armies under the control of Twelfth Army Group, covering the relationship between Advance Section and the regulating station.

3. Neither the time nor the records available to the officers in charge permitted an exhaustive study of the problems involved. It was recognized, moreover, that the correspondence files would not reveal the considered conclusions of the officers best in a position to pass judgment upon the experience gained during three years of operations in Europe. Therefore the study is based to a considerable extent on the answers to questionnaires submitted to those chiefs of staff sections and services who were still in the European Theater. In addition the responsible officers have used such general orders and circulars as were readily available, amplified by the personal experience of the two senior members of the committee in charge, covering three years active duty with headquarters staff, Services of Supply, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations.

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THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF SERVICES OF SUPPLY

COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

SECTION 1

BOLERO PHASE (JUNE 1942-MAY 1943)

4. Field Service Regulations. The field manuals provide that a theater of operations will be organized with a Theater Headquarters, having the usual general and special staff sections, to handle all theater policies and coordination. Within the theater of operations there is to be a combat zone and a communications zone, the latter having its own general and special staffs and being divided as circumstances dictate into base, intermediate and advance sections in order to decentralize operations.¹ In the European Theater a number of factors led to modifications in this structure and the development of operating arrangements which are not specifically mentioned in field manuals but which suggest the need to revise current publications.

5. Establishment of Services of Supply. Before the European Theater of Operations was established (8 June 1942), steps had already been taken to establish the Services of Supply. Major General James E. Chanoy, head of the Special Observer Group sent to England in 1940 and later Commander of United States Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), had organized a staff to handle the troops arriving in Northern Ireland and to prepare for the receipt of troops in England. Following the reorganization of the War Department (9 March 1942) into three major divisions, Major General Chanoy cabled the War Department (1 May 1942) that he had appointed Brigadier General Donald A. Davison as Commanding General of Services of Supply, USAFBI, and outlining the proposed structure of the organization.² Meanwhile steps had already been taken in Washington to provide the necessary organization in the United Kingdom to establish the necessary bases for U.S. troops. Major General John C. H. Lee had been appointed to command the Services of Supply in the European Theater of Operations. Major General Lee arrived in London on 24 May 1942 and on the same day assumed command of Services of Supply, USAFBI.³ Following the establishment of European Theater of Operations (8 June 1942) and General Eisenhower's assumption of Command (24 June 1942), the organization of SOS, ETOUSA, took the form it was to have, with only minor modifications, for the next year.

6. Mission of SOS, ETOUSA. The mission of General Lee's organization was set forth in a letter from the Chief of Staff (General Marshall) to Commanding General, USAFBI, under date of 14 May 1942 (see Appendix I). In brief it may be summarized as follows: To plan in detail and to operate the supply, transportation and administrative services which serve the Theater as a whole, including procurement,

receipt, storage and issue of supplies and equipment; salvage and maintenance operations; construction; quartering; training of SOS personnel; graves registration service; Army Postal Service; evacuation and hospitalization of sick and wounded; recreational facilities; claims; Army Exchange Service and fiscal operations.

7. Emphasis During First Year. During the period from May, 1942 until May, 1943, the mission of the SOS, ETOUSA, may be further described as that of implementing on the U.S. side the Bolero Plan^{4,5}, as follows:

a. To prepare for the reception, accommodation and maintenance of the U.S. Forces in the United Kingdom.

b. To develop the United Kingdom as a base from which the attack on the enemy (Operation ROUNDUP) could be initiated.

The mounting of troops for the assault on North Africa (Operation TORCH) in the fall of 1942 formed a strenuous interlude in the overall mission of SOS and ruled out the possibility of launching an assault on the Continent in 1943. Pending a decision as to the part the British Isles were to play in the global effort against the enemy, the activities of SOS were concentrated upon the construction of bases and installations to be used by U.S. forces for the air offensive against Germany, together with the provision of supply and administrative services for the U.S. troops in the British Isles.⁶ Essentially the first year in the United Kingdom was a period of orientation and ground work during which valuable operating experience was gained and the foundations were laid for the enormous buildup to come in 1943 and 1944.

8. Organization of SOS, ETOUSA. The headquarters of the new organization conformed to the Chief of Staffs' direction of 14 May 1942. In addition to the chiefs of supply and administrative services, it had the conventional four general staff sections (see Appendix 2). An unusual feature was the fact that the chiefs of the special staff sections of SOS were also members of the special staff of Headquarters, ETOUSA. When SOS Headquarters was established in Cheltenham, each service maintained a representative and a few assistants in London with Headquarters ETOUSA, while most of the chiefs were located in Cheltenham and operated under the direction of the Commanding General, SOS (See Appendix 3), visiting these London officers as required. In effect there was but one special staff to serve both SOS and ETOUSA. This consolidation of staff sections followed the pattern established in the reorganization of the War Department. It was to have a considerable influence upon the whole structure of ETOUSA during the next three years. The decentralization of SOS operations to base sections is set forth in Chapter 3 below.

SECTION 2

OPERATIONAL PLANNING PHASE (MAY-DECEMBER 1943)

9. Change of Emphasis. Although the decision to adopt the OVERLORD Plan was not made until the Quadrant Conference of August 1943, it was known early in 1943, after the Casablanca conference, that an operation would be mounted from the British Isles. The period of relative inactivity and uncertainty following Operation TORCH was therefore not of long duration. SOS began to prepare estimates of troop and supply requirements in February.⁷ In March an "overall planning echelon" of SOS was established in London in order to maintain close contact with the planning of higher headquarters. Thenceforth the chiefs of the principal technical services systematically divided

their time between London and Cheltenham, gradually expanding the personnel of their sections in London as activities increased. With the receipt of a cable in June from the War Department directing the preparation of estimated requirements for Class II and IV supplies above normal maintenance requirements,⁹ definite planning for operations began. The keynote of this period (May-December, 1943) was planning and initial build-up of supplies and troops for a Continental operation, although the detailed preparation for the specific Operation OVERLORD necessarily had to await the appointment of the Supreme Allied Commander. The responsibilities of SOS in connection with the operation were outlined at the end of October as follows.¹¹

- a. Administrative planning and the implementation thereof connected with the mounting of the operation from the United Kingdom for all U.S. forces.
- b. The preparation of "hard" ports and approaches thereto.
- c. Coordination of administrative plans and operations for mounting the Ground Forces, together with SOS responsibilities in the approved plans of Air, Navy and SOS Forces.

10. Changes in SOS Organization. As the SOS girded itself for the big effort two significant changes in its organizational structure took place. The first was the consolidation of ETOUSA G-4 Section and the SCS. A theater directive of 27 May 1943¹⁰ established the Commanding General, SOS, as G-4 ETOUSA. This action carried one step further the consolidation of echelons which had started with the special staff section in the preceding summer. The second change was the grouping of the special staff section within Headquarters SOS (27 May 1943).² In order to insure close coordination and to relieve the Commanding General and Chief of Staff from dealing directly with so many subordinates, the administrative services were grouped under the Chief of Administration (formerly AC of S G-1) and the technical supply services were grouped under the Chief of Services (formerly AC of S G-4). At the same time the duties and functions of the G-2 and G-3 sections (excepting those pertaining to public relations) were consolidated in the newly-formed Training & Security Division (See Appendix 4). For a short period in the fall of 1943 the G-4 section of ETOUSA was reconstituted,¹³ but this was strictly a temporary measure and had no real significance. On 1 December the Commanding General of Services of Supply was again made G-4 of the theater.¹⁴ The internal organization of SOS remained substantially unchanged except that the Chief of Services was redesignated Chief of Operations (See Appendix 5). There was, however, a definite shift in the center of gravity of the headquarters from Cheltenham to London in August with only operating echelons remaining in Cheltenham as the main headquarters was built up.¹⁶

SECTION 3

ASSAULT PREPARATIONS PHASE (JANUARY-JUNE 1944)

11. Consolidation of SOS and ETOUSA. General Eisenhower assumed command of the European Theater for the second time on 16 January 1944. On the following day was announced a reorganization of the theater structure.¹⁷ The staff sections of ETOUSA and SOS were consolidated with the Commanding General of SOS holding the additional position of Deputy Theater Commander and his Chief of Staff holding the additional position of Deputy Chief of Staff for the Theater. (See Appendix 6). These continued to be two headquarters so far as names were concerned, but the same general and special staff sections acted for both. Papers pertaining to Theater matters came out under ETOUSA headings; those

pertaining solely to Services of Supply came out under SOS headings. Since the Theater Commander and his Chief of Staff held similar positions in SHAEF, the effect was to link closely together, at least in appearance, SHAEF, ETOUSA and SOS.

12. Responsibilities of ETOUSA, 1944-1945. It is advisable at this juncture to consider certain points of relationship between the various echelons SHAEF, ETOUSA, SOS, and First US Army Group (FUSAG), later to become Twelfth Army Group. The pattern of relationships was laid down by the Chief of Staff, US Army, in a letter to the Commanding General of ETOUSA in September 1943,¹⁸ extracts of which follows:

"In considering the relationship of ETOUSA Headquarters to the command set-up of SAC the following points appear to be important:

"a. That all US Army forces in the theater should be administered by one supreme US headquarters under one commander.

"b. That Field Force Commanders should be relieved of as many administrative responsibilities as possible. I consider the Army Group Commander (s) Commanders of the Air Forces, and the Supreme Allied Commander as Field Force Commanders.

"I visualize the eventual establishment on the continent of an American Headquarters which will exercise command over all American Army forces in the European Theater (Absorbing the duties and responsibilities of the present ETO Headquarters) and operate under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC).***At that time, the logistical establishments remaining in the UK would become, in effect, a large Base Section organization under the US Commander's SOS.*** It appears sound that we should adopt a similar organizational structure now. My thought is that ETO Headquarters, under a separate commander reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, US Army, or to SAC if the latter is an American, should continue to function in its present capacity under the appointment of SAC. (if American) *** If SAC is not an American, the Commanding General, ETO, would be directed by the War Department to support, with the means available to him, the operations directed by Combined Chiefs of Staff and entrusted to SAC, by furnishing forces, materials, and sources as required by approved plans and the exigencies of the then current situation.

"Under this concept, the initial US Army Group would be organized as a separate headquarters, with separate commander, and subordinate to ETOUSA headquarters. *** Command channels should be separate and distinct.***I desire that the organization of the Army Group Headquarters be initially controlled directly by Bradley under your supervision and that it not be merely an offshoot from, or appurtenance to, ETO headquarters."

Thus FUSAG was to be the US field headquarters under the operational control of SHAEF but in other respects under ETOUSA, which in turn was under General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander. SOS would continue under ETOUSA and relieve FUSAG "of as many administrative details as possible," in addition to commander the base sections. The organization of ETOUSA as established in January conformed to General Marshall's directive. Since SHAEF was to have operational control of US forces it necessarily had to develop strong G-2 and G-3 staffs to supervise US combat operations. In effect ETOUSA was charged with all G-1 and G-4 functions and such G-2 and G-3 operations as did not pertain to field operations.

13. Changes in SOS Organization. Within SOS itself certain changes are to be noted. Since it was actually ETOUSA, it again had the conventional general staff sections in addition to the special staff. However, the administrative services were grouped as before under G-1, while the supply services were grouped under G-4. To provide a staff to work with FUSAG in planning the early phases of Continental operations and to handle communications zone activities on the Continent until such time as the main headquarters could move over, a separate staff was organized in February, known as Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECZ), with general and special staff sections paralleling those of SOS/ETOUSA (for details see Chapter 2 below). At the same time to provide an organization to plan with First Army the assault phase of the invasion and to provide direct administrative support after the invasion was launched, steps were taken to organize Advance Section, Communications Zone (ADSEC). (For details on ADSEC see Chapter 4 below). Action was also taken before D-Day to activate three base section staffs to take charge of Communications Zone operations on the Continent in the rear of ADSEC under FECZ and eventually under SOS/Communications Zone. (For details see Chapter 3 below).

14. Shift in Emphasis in SOS. During the period from January to June 1944 the SOS organization intensified its planning activities, working with FUSAG on administrative plans for the mounting of the operation and its support on the far shore. At the same time SOS was heavily engaged in actual operations -receiving troops and supplies for the assault, processing troops through the marshalling areas and embarkation points, and supporting the vast U S forces accumulating in the United Kingdom.

SECTION 4

COMBAT OPERATIONS PHASE (JUNE, 1944-MAY, 1945)

15. Organization. On 7 June 1944 SOS was redesignated Communications Zone (COM Z),¹⁹ denoting the shift from operating what was essentially an extension of the Zone of Interior in the United Kingdom to providing logistical support for combat operations on the Continent of Europe. Apart from the shift of emphasis, there was no change in the mission of the organization. It continued to serve as ETOUSA as well as Com Z, in accordance with the consolidated staff arrangement adopted in January. Forward Echelon was absorbed on 7 August 1944 and the Southern Line of Communications was taken over in November, while base and other sections were established as required (See Chapter 3 below). With these exceptions there was no significant change within the COM Z structure. There was, however, a slight change in the relation between COM Z and ETOUSA^A on the command side. With the establishment of Headquarters COM Z on the Continent (7 August 1944), the Commanding General of COM Z was relieved of his duties as Deputy Theater Commander.²⁰ At the same time the Chief of Staff COM Z continued to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff, ETOUSA. Actually there was no real change in the situation. In practice the Commanding General SOS/COM Z had been Deputy Theater Commander for supply and administration only, and his position as Commander of COM Z made him that in substance after his formal relief from responsibility as Deputy Theater Commander.²¹ (The organization of ETOUSA, COM Z, and the staff sections is shown in Appendices 7 to 43). On 16 April 1945 Headquarters, COM Z issued a circular showing in great detail the organization and mission of the Communications Zone. This is shown in Appendix 44.

SECTION 5

DISCUSSION

16. Principal Issues. Apart from certain problems connected with Forward Echelon and Advance Section which are discussed separately in chapters below, there are two issues of major significance in the organization of SOS/COM Z: the first is the wisdom of grouping the administrative and supply services under G-1 and G-4 respectively. The second is the integration of the SOS/COM Z staff with the Theater staff.

17. Grouping Service Sections Under G-1 and G-4. In general chiefs of services object to having any staff officer or section between them and the commanding general. However, it is a well-proved rule of administration that one executive cannot deal efficiently with more than eight subordinates. In view of the number of staff sections which must necessarily be created in the Communications Zone, it is clearly necessary to delegate responsibilities. Since the service chiefs are mainly concerned with either G-1 or G-4 it is logical to have these general staff sections do the coordinating. This does not and should not prevent the service chiefs from having direct access to the commanding general on major issues. Obviously it makes no material difference whether the assistant chiefs of staff who do the coordinating are called G-1 and G-4 or chiefs of administration and operations or services. In general the arrangement proved to be an improvement. However it must be recognized that there was a tendency for general staff sections to become unduly involved in operations under this arrangement. In addition, the general staff sections tended to assume that the grouping involved command as well as supervision and coordination.

18. Factors Favoring a Consolidated Staff. The existence of two separate staffs at theater and communications zone levels inevitably involves a certain degree of duplication. The communications zone G-4, for example, is obliged to make a study of any matter which comes to it for decision, and if the matter involves theater policy, it must necessarily be restudied by the theater general staff, thereby entailing a duplication of effort. In most instances there must be a review by the special staff section concerned at both communications zone and theater levels. In addition to the duplication there will be considerable delay in processing papers. Further, border-line cases always arise about which staff jurisdiction is not clear, resulting in confusion and delay. Another inevitable consequence of having two separate staffs is an increase in overhead personnel. Consolidation eliminates duplication and questions of jurisdiction, and it conserves personnel of a type which is always in short supply. Since a large proportion of the business handled by communications zone is of theater scope and vice versa, the consolidation of the two headquarters provides a logical solution of the difficulties.

19. Factors Favoring Separate Staffs for Theater and Communications Zone. The existence of separate staffs is in conformity with established military doctrine. A consolidated staff is bound to be larger because of the volume of work handled by communications zone; therefore it becomes difficult to maintain the consolidated theater headquarters far enough forward to be in proper touch with field headquarters. To divide it into a forward and main echelon cancels much of the advantage of consolidation. Further, field and air force commanders are reluctant to be under the jurisdiction of a headquarters which is at the same time running the communications zone, as

experience in this theater proved. They want to be at least coordinate with communications zone, if not above it, so as to have a higher headquarters to which to refer any major differences of opinion. Also there are many inter-base section matters requiring attention of higher headquarters which are not of theater scope. To have the theater staff handle them in addition to theater matters puts an unnecessary burden upon people who have their abilities already taxed by theater business. Similarly a staff which is handling communications zone business should not be handling theater level matters and is likely to give undue weight to communications zone considerations if it does. Lastly, a separate headquarters should result in a smaller theater staff, facilitating its move forward so as to be at or close to field headquarters, yielding definite advantages in coordination and operation.

20. Ambiguities in Position of Headquarters ETOUSA. The theater organization is discussed in detail in another General Board study and there is no need for extended treatment here. However certain points have a direct bearing upon COM Z and must be considered in the present discussion. Although Headquarters ETOUSA was supposed to be the top US echelon in the theater, its position was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, because the combat operation functions (principally G-2 and G-3) were to be handled at SHAEF and because the Supreme Allied Commander, as US Theater Commander, tended to seek advice on all matters from his immediate staff rather than one which was geographically separate, the US representatives in SHAEF were in many respects actually serving as the senior US staff. On the other hand, the Air Force and Army Group theoretically under the command of ETOUSA, looked to SHAEF as their next higher echelon and tended to consider ETOUSA as a coordinate command. This view was intensified because of the fact that ETOUSA was largely the former SOS headquarters for which combat elements traditionally have little respect. With SHAEF representatives pulling from above and Air Force and Army Group representatives pushing from below, much business was handled at SHAEF level which would normally have been transacted by ETOUSA. One consequence was that the combat elements tended to act independently of each other and of ETOUSA operationally and often administratively. Inevitably there was confusion as a result, and ETOUSA'S authority was impaired. SHAEF had to expand the US representation to handle the increase in activities, using personnel which would otherwise have been unnecessary. In addition the existence of another echelon caused delay in getting decisions through channels. What is worse, decisions were made between SHAEF, Air Forces and Army Groups which involved supply and service matters and yet those who made the decisions were too remote from supply and service operations of the theater as a whole to be properly informed. With logistics playing a major role in modern warfare, there must be a close tie between the logistical element (COM Z/ETOUSA) and the combat elements. Circumstances weakened that tie. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the chiefs of services had been under the Commanding General, SOS/COM Z from the beginning, although they were also nominally the Theater Commander's special staff advisers. Some of them have combat as well as supply functions. Being physically separate from the Theater commander and under the direct command of the Commanding General, COM Z, they were regarded by SHAEF, Air Forces and Army Groups as essentially COM Z representatives. Their authority, like that of ETOUSA, was thereby weakened and the Theater Commander was to a considerable extent deprived of the counsel of his technical advisors.

21. Other Considerations. Conflicts in personalities undoubtedly influenced the evolution of the theater structure. Such conflicts

are inevitable, but the situation itself tended to create the confusion and conflicts which developed. In a correctly organized military structure there are but two basic functions - one of fighting and one of providing administrative support for fighting operations. There can be no competition or rivalry between the two; they are interdependent. Any arrangement which creates a gap between the combat and logistical elements is bound to create difficulty, especially in modern warfare where supply tends to be more important than strategy or tactics. The tendency for the combat elements is to minimize logistics and assume that full support will somehow be forthcoming at all times, even though radical changes develop in the tactical situation. The organization of the theater must therefore link the two elements together, with the logistical element strongly represented at theater headquarters along with the combat elements. In this connection it should be recognized that the theater headquarters will usually operate with a forward echelon in any case, thus weakening location as an argument in favor of a separate COM Z staff. If the entire theater headquarters cannot move well forward, COM Z can readily combine with it.

SECTION 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

22. Conclusions. a. The grouping of the administrative services under G-1 or a chief of administration and the supply services under G-4 or a chief of operations had yielded definite advantages, although these were to some extent offset by disadvantages arising from the fact that the coordinating section tended to go too far in the direction of operations rather than confining themselves to planning, policy making and coordination.

b. The consolidation of ETOUSA and COM Z headquarters proved to reasonably efficient and effected a saving in personnel as well as eliminating delays and confusion. It would have yielded more advantages had SHAEF functioned strictly as an allied headquarters, delegating to ETOUSA all matters relating to US forces alone. The efficiency of ETOUSA was weakened by the fact that armies and air forces tended to look to SHAEF as the next higher echelon and to regard ETOUSA as COM Z and a coordinate command.

c. The emergence of SHAEF as senior US headquarters and the physical separation of ETOUSA from the Theater Commander and his immediate staff created a gap between the combat and logistical elements which aggravated the problems of coordination and support.

d. The placing of the theater service chiefs under the Commanding General of SOS/COM Z and their physical separation from the Theater Commander and his staff was not wise because it prevented the Theater Commander from having immediate access to his technical advisors and deprived the US representation at SHAEF of important technical advice on combat as well as supply matters.

23. Recommendations. a. That the technical administrative and supply services be grouped under G-1 and G-4, or their equivalents, for coordination and supervision but not command.

b. That the organization for a theater of operations as provided in FM 100-10 be revised to consolidate theater and communications zone staffs in order to provide closer contact between logistical and combat elements. Consideration should be given to the possibility of having a deputy or assistant theater commander for operations (with the G-2 and G-3 functions) and a deputy or assistant theater commander for supply and administration (with G-1 and G-4 functions).

(Note: The Review Committee of The General Board does not concur in the recommendation that Theatre and Communications Zone staffs should be consolidated. See Study No 2 "Organization of the European Theater of Operations," for discussion as to why Theatre and COM/Z should be separate headquarters)

c. That chiefs of services be on the theater staff and physically located at the Theater headquarters in order to provide the theater commander with technical advice at all times.

CHAPTER 1

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APPENDIX 1

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1942.

Subject: Organization Services of Supply.

To : Commanding General, American Forces in British Isles.

1. Through my visit and previous communications, you have been furnished with the general plans and intentions covering operations in Bolero.

2. The forces under your command will be organized eventually into a Ground Force Command, an Air Force Command and a Services of Supply Command. This letter is to furnish you with instructions regarding the organization of the Services of Supply, which is to be undertaken at once. Your immediate headquarters will be organized along the general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services. All of these services will be grouped under an organization known as the Services of Supply and will be placed under the command of a general officer reporting directly to you. Major General John C. H. Lee and a skeleton staff are being directed to proceed to England. Upon arrival, General Lee will be assigned to command of the Services of Supply and be permitted to appoint the staff officers selected by him before leaving the United States. It is further desired that such administrative and supply officers as are now serving at your headquarters be made available for assignment to your services of Supply in conformity with the organization adopted. Copies of Circular No. 59 (The orders creating the Services of Supply); General Orders No. 8, Services of Supply; Circular No. 11, Services of Supply; and letter, headquarters, Services of Supply, March 9, 1942, are included for you as a guide in the formulation of your orders creating your Services of Supply. Though the organization prescribed for the War Department need not be slavishly followed at your headquarters, it will, in the main, be the pattern for similar organization of the Services of Supply in the British Isles.

3. Under your supervision, General Lee is invested with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission including, but not limited to, authority to approve or delegate authority to:

- a. Approve all plans and contracts of all kinds necessary to carry out the objectives of this directive.
- b. Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to civil service rules.
- c. Purchase any necessary supplies, equipment, and property, including rights in real estate practicable of acquisition.
- d. Adjudicate and settle all claims.
- e. Take all measures regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding, and delivery of personnel, equipment, and supplies for the conduct of military operations.

4. General Lee has been furnished such data as are available in the United States on Plan Bolero and has been directed to communicate this information to you. It is desired that he be acquainted with the plans for these operations in so far as they are matured, and that he forward to the Commanding General, Services of Supply, Washington, D. C., through you the following:

A preliminary supply plan for the operations to include a statement showing information in the following categories:

(1) Operations.

- (a) Requirements and priorities of arrival desired for service units for the Services of Supply (and for combat units if required for service within the Services of Supply).

(2) Training.

- (a) Schools and training centers required for officers and enlisted personnel of Services of Supply troops together with plans for coordination with established training plans.

(3) Personnel (Civilian)

- (a) Requirements and priorities of arrival desired for personnel other than military personnel. (See Inclosure No. 1).

(4) Personnel (Military)

- (a) Requirements and priorities of arrival desired for Military personnel other than combat and services units.

(5) Fiscal.

- (a) Estimates of funds required.

(6) Procurement and Distribution.

- (a) The levels of supply to be maintained for support of the operations according to adopted classifications.
- (b) Port equipment to be requisitioned, on the United States, such as tugs, lighters, unloading equipment, hand trucks, cranes, etc. together with Port personnel.
- (c) Motor transportation, motor repair shops, and motor maintenance supplies to be requisitioned on the United States together with a calendar schedule of priorities of shipment desired.
- (d) Specifications for any special packaging desired.
- (e) Estimates of items to be procured locally together with plans for liaison with the Harrisman Mission.

(7) Requirements and Resources.

- (a) Requirements in railway rolling stock and other railway equipment and accessories to be requisitioned in the United States for use:

(1) In the British Isles.

(2) On the Continent.

(To include recommendations for material required for anti-aircraft or other protection of rolling stock).

- (b) Construction requirements in the British Isles and on the Continent for:

(1) Storage of each principal type of supplies (General, medical, air, ammunition, ordnance, subsistence, chemicals, oils, gasoline, etc.).

(2) Hospitals, motor bases, ordnance, signal, engineer, and motor repair shops.

(3) Refrigeration.

(4) Troop shelter, including schools, replacement depots, staging areas, etc...

(8) Transportation (Shipping)

- (a) Number of ports of entry to be made available to the United States together with their capacities in berths, anchorages, men, and tonnage.

- (b) Arrangements required for explosives, chemicals, and other special cargo and troops.

- (c) Priorities of shipments desired by classifications and items where important, for construction material and all other supplies and equipment. (In this connection, surplus cargo ship tons, over and above requirements for maintenance and transport of troops, will be available for shipments to the British Isles during the following months:

June	200,000 ship tons
July	500,000 ship tons
August	400,000 ship tons

(This shipping should be fully utilized).

- (d) Recommended evacuation policy with number of hospital ships required.

(9) Administrations.

- (a) Plans for printing, binding, and map reproduction.

- (b) Recommendations for enlargement and improvement of the postal service.

(10) Public Relations.

- (a) Recommendations for instructions to American War Correspondents that will minimize friction between British and American rules and practices.

5. Immediate Storage. In order to store supplies contemplated for early shipment, it is necessary that immediate action be taken to provide storage as follows:

June	1,000,000 square feet
July	2,800,000 square feet
August	2,200,000 square feet

6. A study of the estimated battle casualties and sick rates, based upon British and other European experiences, would be helpful in determining hospitalization and medical supplies to be furnished from the United States.

By direction of the Commander-in-Chief:

Chief of Staff

Three Inclosures
Gen. Orders No. 8
Circular No. 11
Initial Directive for the Organization
of the Services of Supply.

APPENDIX 2
HEADQUARTERS
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

CIRCULAR)

19 August 1942

NO.....13

Section

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOS ETOUSA..... I

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE SOS ETOUSA.

1. This circular supersedes "Initial Directive for the organization of the Services of Supply, ETOUSA," 23 June 1942. Paras. V and VI, G.O. No. 10, this Hq., 20 Jul 1942, are also revoked.

2. Mission of CG SOS. To plan in detail and to operate the supply, transportation and administrative services which serve the theater as a whole and which are not a part of other subordinate forces of the theater.

3. Organization of the SOS. See "Organization of the SOS ETOUSA" 19 Aug 1942 (Appendix A).

4. Duties of Staff and Services.

a. The Control Branch.

(1) Compiles the history and maintains a constant record and analysis of SOS operations.

(2) Conducts continuous review of organization, directives, procedures and activities of SOS staff and services to assist them with their problems, effect coordination, and recommend necessary corrective action to higher authority.

(3) Obtains from SOS agencies and other sources the reports and information necessary to carry out its mission.

b. Personnel Division (AC of S G-1).

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 14, FM 101-5.

(2) Establishes priorities for shipments of casual SOS personnel.

c. Intelligence and Public Relations Division (AC of S G-2).

(1) Advises CG on matters of military intelligence.

(2) Recommends policies and instructions for, and supervises counterintelligence and censorship activities in the SOS.

(3) Acts as public and press relations office for the SOS.

d. Training Division (AC of S G-3).

(1) Recommends training policies; plans, supervises and coordinates training of SOS personnel.

(2) Supervises the establishment and operation of training areas, schools and replacement training centers, except for matters pertaining to Air Force combat and ground crew replacement centers.

(3) Makes recommendations concerning tactical disposition and measures for tactical security of SOS units and installations.

e. Supply Division (AG of S G-4)

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 17, FM 101-5.

(2) Plans and supervises activation of SOS units and priorities of movement of SOS units to ETO.

f. The Inspector General. Performs duties prescribed in par. 36, FM 101-5.

g. Air Force Division.

(1) Effects staff coordination of AF matters in Hq SOS.

(2) Represents SOS in coordination of AF and SOS supply plans and policies.

(3) Obtains and consolidates AF requirements of supplies furnished by SOS.

(4) Supervises transmittal of information concerning the points of delivery by the SOS of AF personnel and supplies peculiar to the AF.

(5) Review requisitions for supplies peculiar to the AF to recommend integration of AF and SOS shipping priorities and obtain determination of items which will be procured locally.

(6) Assists SOS agencies in liaison with the Air Ministry, the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Royal Air Force.

h. General Purchasing Agent; General Purchasing Board; Board of Contracts and Adjustments.

The General Purchasing Agent.

(1) Makes surveys to determine which of required items can be procured from local or foreign sources.

(2) Review requisitions on the US for availability of local supply.

(3) Serves as Chairman of the General Purchasing Board and the Board of Contracts and Adjustments, the respective functions of which are;

General Purchasing Board. Supervises all procurement activities in SOS ETO. Formulates policies and established standard procedures for procurement from European governments of all goods, services and labor. Perfect arrangements with the designated representatives of the British and other governments for the procurement of needed supplies to the extent of their availability. Establishes procurement inspection standards.

Board of Contracts and Adjustments. Formulates contractual policies and prepares standard forms of agreements for procurement in the European area. Prepares or approves important contracts and assists contracting officers in their negotiation. Prescribes policies and procedures for adjustments and settlements arising out of contracts of the US in the ETO and assists in effecting such adjustments and settlements.

i. Chemical Warfare Service. Performs duties prescribed in par. 24, FM 100-10.

j. Engineer Service.

(1) Performs the duties prescribed in par. 26, FM 100-10, except operation of military railways.

(2) Provides by construction or other means, accommodations for all forces and activities, including the necessary utilities and maintenance thereof.

(3) Undertakes such duties in relation to small boats and landing craft as may be assigned by the CG.

k. Medical Service. Performs duties prescribed in par. 30, FM 100-10.

l. Ordnance Service.

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 31, FM 100-10.

(2) Effective 1 Sept 1942, procures, stores, distributes, supplies and maintains all general and special purpose motor vehicles, including accessories and equipment pertaining thereto, except special vehicles peculiar to an arm or service having adequate facilities for their maintenance.

m. Quartermaster Service.

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 32, FM 100-10, except for motor transportation, movement of troops and supplies, operation of water transportation, dock operations, provision of accommodations and land, and settlement of claims.

(2) Performs Army Exchange Service duties.

(3) Effective 1 Sep 1942, procures, stores and issues motor and aviation fuel and oil, and associated containers and dispensing equipment, necessary for the operation of the US forces in the ETO.

n. Signal Service. Performs duties prescribed in par. 35, FM 100-10.

o. Transportation Service.

(1) Operates port facilities under control of US forces.

(2) Effects transportation of personnel and supplies from ships to their destinations in ETO, except transportation affected by units.

(3) Operates and maintains all military railroads and inland waterways in ETO under control of US forces.

(4) Operates motor transportation not assigned to other services or commands.

p. Adjutant General's Department.

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 21, FM 100-10, except recreation and welfare.

(2) Maintains a Central Records Office for all army elements of the theater.

(3) Promotes sale of war bonds and stamps.

q. Corps of Chaplains. Performs duties prescribed in par. 23, FM 100-10.

r. Finance Department. Performs duties prescribed in par. 27, FM 100-10.

s. Judge Advocate General's Department.

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 29, FM 100-10.

(2) Administers matters pertaining to adjustment and settlement of claims.

t. Provost Marshal.

(1) Performs duties prescribed in par. 29, FM 101-5.

(2) Establishes and supervises all disciplinary barracks outside other commands.

u. Special Service.

(1) Supervises matters concerning recreation and welfare.

(2) Arranges with supply services for procurement of recreational facilities and equipment.

v. Headquarters Commandant. Performs duties prescribed in par. 27, FM 101-5.

5. The Chiefs of the following services in the SOS are chiefs of their respective services for the ETO (G.O. No. 19, HQ. ETO, 20 July 1942).

Chemical Warfare Service	Ordnance Department
Corps of Engineers	Quartermaster Corps
Finance Department	Signal Corps
Medical Department	Transportation Service

6. Base Sections.

a. See G.O. No. 10, this Hq. 20 Jul 1942, for constitution of Base Sections; see Circular No. 12 Hq. SOS 17 Aug 1942, for duties of Base Section Commanders and for exempted activities.

By command of Major General LEE:

OFFICIAL:

G. R. LINDON,
Colonel, A.G.D.,
Acting Adjutant General.

CHARLES E. SALTZMAN,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incl:
Organization Chart.

Chain of Command

Staff Channels

Prospective Organizations

ORGANIZATION OF THE

Commanding General

SOS EROUSA

Control Branch

Chief of Staff

Secretary of
General Staff

Deputies
Chief of Staff

General Purchasing
Agent
Gen'l Purchasing
Board of Contracts
and Adjustments

Assistant
Chief of
Staff
G-1
(Personnel)

Assistant
Chief of Staff
G-2
(Intelligence
& Public
Relations)

Assistant
Chief of
Staff
G-3
Training

Assistant
Chief of
Staff
G-4
(Supply)

Inspect-
or
General

Air
Force
Division

Transportation Service

Quartermaster Service

Ordnance Service

Medical Service

Signal Service

Engineer Service

Chemical Warfare Serv.

Hq. Commandant

Special Service

Senior Chaplain

Provost Marshal

Staff Judge Advocate

Chief Finance Officer

Adjutant General

North'm Ire-
land Base
Section

Western
Base Section

Eastern
Base Section

Southern
Base Section

Additional Base
Sections as
required

Districts as
Constituted

APPENDIX 3

HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS.

20 July 1942

NUMBER . . . 19

	Section
Organization of Headquarters ETOUSA and SOS,	
ETOUSA - - - - -	I
Assignment of Base Censor Office No. 1 - - - - -	II

I. - ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS ETOUSA AND SOS, ETOUSA.

1. Rescission of previous orders. This order supersedes Circular No. 2, ETOUSA, 13 June 1942, and so much of General Orders No. 2, Headquarters ETOUSA as pertains to the Special Staff.

2. Assignment of Special Staff, Headquarters ETOUSA. The following officers are announced as members of the Special Staff, Headquarters ETOUSA:

Adjutant General	Colonel Thomas J. Davis, AGD
Air Technical Officer	Brigadier General Alfred J. Lyon, USA
Antiaircraft Officer	Colonel Aaron Bradshaw, Jr. CAC
Senior Chaplain	Colonel James L. Blakeney, Corps of Chaplains
Chief Chemical Warfare Officer	Colonel Edward Montgomery, CWS
Chief of Depot Services	Colonel Turner P. Sharp, QMC
Chief Engineer	Brigadier General Thomas B. Larkin, USA vice Brigadier General Donald A. Davison, USA, relieved
Chief Finance Officer	Colonel Leonard M. Sims, FD, vice Colonel Nicholas H. Cobbs, FD, re- lieved
Inspector General	Colonel Frank B. Jordan, IGD
Judge Advocate	Colonel Edward C. Betts, JAGD
Chief Ordnance Officer	Colonel Henry B. Saylor, OD, vice Colonel Everett S. Hughes, OD, re- lieved
Chief Quartermaster	Brigadier General Robert M. Little- john, USA
Chief of Army Exchange Service	Colonel Edmund B. Barnum, Cav
Chief Surgeon	Colonel Paul R. Hawley, MC
Chief Signal Officer	Brigadier General William S. Rum- bough, USA
Special Service Officer	Lieutenant Colonel George E. Ramsey, CE
Chief of Transportation Service	Colonel Frank S. Ross, GSC

3. Chiefs of Services.

a. Location:

(1) The following Chiefs of Services will be located at Theater Headquarters:

Adjutant General
Air Technical Officer
Antiaircraft Officer
Senior Chaplain
Inspector General
Judge Advocate
Provost Marshal
Special Services Officer

(2) The Chiefs of the following Services, for the time being, will operate under the immediate direction of the Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, and will be located as directed by him:

Army Exchange Service
Chemical Warfare Service
Depot Services
Corps of Engineers
Finance Department
Ordnance Department
Quartermaster Corps
Medical Department
Signal Corps
Transportation Service

b. Duties and Responsibilities. Duties and responsibilities of Chiefs of Services are described in paragraph 15 to 19, FM 100-10, and in technical publications of the various services. Insofar as technical instructions, requests for technical reports, and matters of general routine pertaining to his service are concerned, direct correspondence between each Chief of Service and elements of his service in other commands, as prescribed in Army Regulations is authorized. Orders, policies, or other instructions, pertaining to the services for the theater as a whole, prepared by any subordinate of the Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, will, when approved by him, be submitted to the Adjutant General, ETO, for publication in the name of the theater commander.

c. Representatives at Headquarters ETOUSA. Chiefs of supply arms and services, when not located at Theater Headquarters, will be represented at Theater Headquarters by an officer selected by the Theater Commander, with such assistants as may be required. The following are designated for duty as the senior officers of their respective arms or services at Theater Headquarters:

Chemical Warfare Service	Colonel Charles S. Shadle, CWS
Corps of Engineers	Colonel Elmer E. Barnes, CE
Finance Department	Lieutenant Colonel William F. Campbell, FD
Ordnance Department	Colonel John W. Coffey, OD
Quartermaster Corps	Colonel William H. Middleswart, QMC
Medical Department	Colonel Charles B. Spruit, MC
Signal Corps	Colonel Jerry V. Matejka, SC

4. Services of Supply, ETOUSA.

a. Duties and Responsibilities. The Commanding General, SOS, European Theater of Operations, pursuant to directives issued by the Theater Commander, and as his agent, is charged with the operation of all supply and administrative services which serve this theater as a whole and which are not a part of other subordinate forces of the theater, and with the planning incident to such operation. The Commanding General, SOS, is responsible that such planning

is integrated with the broad operational plans of the theater commander. This will include specifically the following:

- (1) Receipt and delivery to depots of all supplies from the zone of the interior or from local or foreign sources.
- (2) Procurement, storage, maintenance, salvage, and basic issue of all equipment and supplies, except certain items peculiar to the Air Forces.
- (3) The establishment of purchasing and contractual policies and procedure.
- (4) Control of all transportation and traffic pertaining to the theater except that under control of other commands.
- (5) Construction.
- (6) Quartersing, to include acquiring, by such means as may be necessary, accommodations and facilities for all forces and activities.
- (7) Operation of all elements of the Army Postal Service except those assigned to other forces.
- (8) The establishment and maintenance of a Central Records Office for all army elements of the theater, including establishment and the operation of a Prisoner of War Information Bureau.
- (9) The acquisition, production, and issue of all publications, training films, film strips, and blank forms.
- (10) Operation of the Graves Registration Service.
- (11) The requisitioning, quartersing, training and distribution, under directives and policies prescribed by this headquarters, of all replacements, except the operation of Air Force combat and ground crew replacement centers.
- (12) The establishment and control of all disciplinary barracks and military police control of members of the theater except in areas under control of other commands.
- (13) The establishment and operation of such training centers and officer candidate schools as may be directed by this headquarters.
- (14) The establishment and operation of centers for reclassification of officers, to include administration of reclassification boards, appointed by the Theater Commander.
- (15) Evacuation from other commands of prisoners of war, and administration and control of all prisoner of war establishments except those pertaining to other commands.
- (16) Evacuation and hospitalization of sick and wounded from other commands.
- (17) Preparation of estimates of funds required for operation of the theater.
- (18) Adjudication and settlement of all claims and administration of the United States Claims Commission for this theater.

(19) Organization and operation of recreational activities.

(20) Promotion and sale of war bonds and stamps.

b. The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, will keep the Theater Commander fully informed concerning his operations insofar as those affect the theater as a whole, particularly with reference to contemplated operations:

c. Authority.

(1) The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is charged with the functions, responsibilities, and authority of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom, for a Corps Area Commander, over all individuals, units, and installations assigned to the SOS as well as over all other U.S. Army personnel in the British Isles except those within the confines of stations occupied by units of other commands or in areas in which other commanders have been or may be given such authority by this headquarters.

(2) He is vested by the Theater Commander with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission, including, but not limited to, authority to, or the delegation of authority to:

(a) Approve plans and contracts of all kinds required to carry out his duties and responsibilities.

(b) Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to Civil Service rules.

(c) Acquire any supplies, equipment, or property including rights in real estate practicable of acquirement, required to carry out his duties and responsibilities.

(d) Take all measures in furtherance of the policies and directives of this headquarters, regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding and delivery of personal equipment and supplies for the conduct of military operations.

(3) The Commanding General, SOS, is authorized to communicate with other appropriate commanders on routine administrative matters arising directly from his duties and responsibilities prescribed in paragraph 4a. above. Such communications will have as their purpose the facilitating of administrative and supply procedure, but they will not impinge upon the inherent command responsibilities of other commanders.

d. Channels of communication between SOS and other commands.

(1) Direct communications between the commanders of other forces in the theater, or subordinate elements thereof, and the CG, SOS, ETOUSA, or subordinate elements thereof, is authorized in all matters pertaining to supply and administration. The following matters will be referred to the Theater Commander:

(a) Cases involving differences of opinion.

(b) Cases involving substantial departure from approved policy.

(c) Cases involving major decisions which should be rendered by the Theater Commander.

(2) Direct communication between the Commanding General, SOS, European Theater of Operations and the Commanding General, SOS, War Department, and subdivisions thereof, is authorized without reference to this headquarters except in matters affecting basic policy, requests for reinforcements and personnel, and other matters in which coordination by this headquarters is obviously desirable.

(3) The Commanding General, SOS, and such subordinates as he may designate are authorized to communicate direct with officers or agencies of both the United States and British Governments on matters pertaining to the duties and responsibilities of the Commanding General, SOS, provided that such matters do not affect other commands of the Theater and are not reserved by the Theater Commander. He will be responsible that this Headquarters is kept fully informed concerning all such contacts that involve planning agreements, joint arrangements, and similar matters, when these affect the theater as a whole or the responsibilities of the theater commander.

II. - ASSIGNMENT OF BASE CENSOR OFFICE NO. 1.

1. Effective this date, Base Censor Office No. 1 is assigned to North Ireland Base Sector, Services of Supply.

2. For purpose of postal censorship, Base Censor Office No. 1 will operate directly under the control of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, this headquarters.

By command of Lieutenant General EISENHOWER:

CHARLES L. BOLTE,
Brigadier General, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.


OFFICIAL:

T. J. DAVIS,
Colonel, A.G.D.
Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:
"B"

Reproduced HQ. SOS.
24 July 1942.
S.O.S. Dist. "B"


ORGANIZATION OF SERVICE ACTIVITIES IN THE EPJ
SHOWING COMMAND & STAFF RELATIONSHIPS




APPENDIX 4
 (Extract from GO 42, SOS, 28 May 1945)

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

ORGANIZATION CHART - SOS, ETCUSA



ORGANIZATION ETO HQ



APPENDIX 6

HQ ETOUSA

GO 5

17 January 1944

ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

1. Headquarters ETO and Headquarters SOS, ETO are herewith consolidated in accordance with organization chart on reverse side.
2. Major General John C. H. Lee, US Army, is appointed Deputy Theater Commander in addition to his duties as Commanding General, SOS.
3. The Deputy Theater Commander's duties and responsibilities include: the command of the Communication Zone; the continued operation of administration and supply for the American forces in the United Kingdom and for continental operations, in accordance with existing procedures; necessary duties in connection with static defense; perform such duties as additionally delegated to him by the Theater Commander. To fulfill his duties and responsibilities, the Deputy Theater Commander will act, in all appropriate cases, for the Theater Commander.
4. Major General W. B. Smith, US Army, is appointed Chief of Staff, ETO, in addition to his duties as Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.
5. Colonel R. B. Lord, GSC, is appointed Deputy Chief of Staff, ETO, in addition to his duties as Chief of Staff, SOS, ETO.

By command of General Eisenhower:

David G. Barr,
Brigadier General, GSC, Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

RALPH PULSIFER,
Brigadier General, USA, Adjutant General


DISTRIBUTION "B"

COMMAND & LIAISON CHANNELS

ETOUSA

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C.O.F.S. G-3
ETOUSA

12 FEBRUARY 1945



APPENDIX 7

HQ ETOUSA


12 FEBRUARY 1945

COMMAND FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY ONLY.
OPERATIONAL COMMAND FROM SHAEF TO MAJOR
SUBORDINATE COMMANDS DIRECT

NOTE: THE GENERAL STAFF FUNCTIONS OF THEATER ARE PERFORMED JOINTLY
BY THE US ELEMENT OF SHAEF AND THE GENERAL STAFF OF COM Z

NUMBERS APPEARING IN UPPER RIGHTHAND CORNER OF BLOCKS
REFER TO INDIVIDUAL NUMBERED CHARTS


— COMMAND — STAFF




PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF AC OF S, G-3

HEADQUARTERS COM ZONE ETOUSA

28 FEBRUARY 1945




ORGANIZATION of CONTROL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATIONS ZONE EUROPEAN THEATER of OPERATIONS



APPROVED BROSHOUS

OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-1 COM ZONE

12 FEBRUARY 1945.



PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-3


ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	39
WARRANT OFF	2
ENLISTED	52

OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-2 COM ZONE

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 12

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	39
WARRANT OFFICERS	5
ENLISTED	92

OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-3 COM ZONE

12 FEBRUARY 1948




RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	65
WARRANT OFFICERS	6
ENLISTED	97

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF S G-3
ETOUSA

OFFICE OF AC OF S, G-4 COM ZONE


12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 14

OFFICE A.C. OF S, G-5 COM ZONE

12 FEBRUARY 1945



NOTE CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICERS ARE ATTACHED TO THE FOLLOWING
GENERAL & SPECIAL STAFF SECTIONS


G-4
QUARTERMASTER
SURGEON

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	43
WARRANT OFFICERS	0
ENLISTED	63

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-5

JUDGE ADVOCATE SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 16


PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ET OUSA

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	26
WARRANT OFFICERS	5
ENLISTED	42

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 17

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3


ETOUS&

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	102
WARRANT OFFICERS	34
ENLISTED	44

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CHEMICAL WARFARE OFFICER

12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 18


PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	33
WARRANT OFFICERS	3
ENLISTED	62

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF QUARTERMASTER

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 19

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	107
WARRANT OFFICERS	15
ENLISTED	590

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 20

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION
 OFFICERS 328
 WARRANT OFFICERS 14
 ENLISTED 1,324


OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SURGEON

12 FEBRUARY 1945

CHIEF SURGEON
GENERAL OFFICER
 MAJ. GEN. P. R. HAWLEY

DEPUTY CHIEF SURGEON
 COL. D. E. LISTON

EXECUTIVE OFFICER
 COL. H. W. DOAN




RECAPITULATION	100
OFFICERS	3
WARRANT OFFICERS	269
ENLISTED	269

Appendix 21

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF TRANSPORTATION


12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 22

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 25

PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUSA

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE

12 FEBRUARY 1945




PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	263
WARRANT OFFICERS	7
ENLISTED	649

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL


12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 25

OFFICE OF THE THEATER INSPECTOR GENERAL

12 FEBRUARY 1945




PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AG OF S G-3
E T O U S A

RECAPITULATION
OFFICERS 12
WARRANT OFFICERS 4
ENLISTED 16

OFFICE OF THE THEATER ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY OFFICER

12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 27


PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF A C OF G-3
ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	7
WARRANT O	1
ENLISTED	7

FIELD ARTILLERY SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	5
WARRANT OFFICERS	0
ENLISTED	6

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF G-3
K23488A

ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLE & WEAPONS SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF S G-3
ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	5
WARRANT OFFICERS	1
ENLISTED	4

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 30

RECAPITULATION
 OFFICERS 59
 WARRANT OFFICERS 7
 ENLISTED 53

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 31

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUS A

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	18
WARRANT OFFICERS	2
ENLISTED	26

OFFICE CHIEF OF CLAIMS

12 FEBRUARY 1945




RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	21
WARRANT OFFICERS	1
ENLISTED	28

ARMY EXCHANGE SERVICE

12 FEBRUARY 1945




PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ET OUSA

RECAPITULATION
OFFICERS 25
WARRANT OFFICERS 1
ENLISTED 72

MILITARY LABOR SERVICE

12 FEBRUARY 1945



RECAPITULATION


OFFICERS	3
ENLISTED	8

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3

BTORBA

OFFICE OF THE REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING GROUP

12 FEBRUARY 1945



4 OFFICERS ATTACHED FROM GENERAL STAFF SECTION

REGAPITULATION


OFFICERS 6

ENLISTED 4

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE AG OF G-3
ETOUSA

HISTORICAL SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUSA

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	13
WARRANT OFFICERS	3
ENLISTED	27

OFFICE OF THE FISCAL DIRECTOR

12 FEBRUARY 1945



UNDER THE DIRECT SUPERVISION
BUT NOT A PART OF THE
OFFICE OF THE FISCAL DIRECTOR

NOTE: The above personnel is comprised of NON-T/O personnel of the Fiscal Director plus the personnel of thirteen Finance Disbursing Units organized under T/O & E 14-300 which were requisitioned especially for manning the RD & A Division of this office


PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUS A

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	48
WARRANT OFFICERS	17
ENLISTED	357

Appendix 37

HEADQUARTERS COMMAND

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 3B

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	128
WARRANT OFFICERS	2
ENLISTED	2040

OFFICE OF SPECIAL & INFORMATION SERVICES

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 39

PREPARED BY THE OFFICE OF THE AC OF S G-3
E TO U S A

RECAPITULATION
 OFFICERS 187
 WARRANT OFFICERS 5
 ENLISTED 578

OFFICE OF THE THEATER CHAPLAIN

12 FEBRUARY 1945




RECAPITULATION
 OFFICERS 6
 WARRANT OFFICERS 7
 ENLISTED 8

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-3

ETOUSA

HQ GROUND FORCE REINFORCEMENT COMMAND

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 41

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A.C. OF S, G-3
 15300000

COMMUNICATION ZONE AIR SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOLUSA

RECAPITULATION
OFFICERS 6
WARRANT OFFICERS 0
ENLISTED 0

LIAISON SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945



PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AC OF S G-3
ETOUSA

R E S T R I C T E D

APPENDIX 44

HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Cir 36

16 Apr 1945

ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

1. The organization charts and statement of functions inclosed as Annex "A", are published for the information, guidance, and compliance of all concerned.

2. Proposed changes, amondments or deletions will be submitted to the Office of the Commanding General, this headquarters, for consideration and publication as an amendment to this circular. (AG 322 OpDCG) (Annex "A").

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

T. B. LARKIN,

OFFICIAL:

Major General, USA, Chief of Staff.

R. B. LOVETT,
Brigadier General, USA, Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION: D (less non-Com Z)

1 Incl:

Annex "A" - Organization of Communications
Zone, w/3 Incls.

APPENDIX 44, CHAP 1

R E S T R I C T E D

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

1. General. a. The purpose of this order is to specify the functions of each element of Communications Zone Headquarters and each section command and to indicate the relationship between the major components of the organization.

b. In describing the functions of components of the organization in this directive these definitions are applied to certain terms frequently used herein:

(1) Those involving direct command authority. The terms "command" and "operates" indicate this authority.

(2) Those involving staff authority. The term "supervise" is used to indicate this type of authority. "Supervision" does not include authority to order, except through normal command channels and only by virtue of the authority of the appropriate higher commander. Staff authority consists of these activities:

(a) Advising the Commanding General in respect to suggested policies and plans and in respect to current performance.

(b) Formulating plans, policies and procedures.

(c) Coordinating plans, policies and procedures of subordinate units in respect to their relationship to each other and their conformance with approved plans, policies and procedures.

(d) Advising and providing service to subordinate operating units.

(e) Follow-up on performance through reports and inspections.

(f) Scheduling of activities, from the standpoint of control of movements.

(g) In the case of special staff sections, this headquarters, making recommendations as to the allocation, assignment and transfer of units of all respective branch of service.

2. Mission and functions of Communications Zone. a. The mission of the Communications Zone is to provide the necessary supply, transportation and administrative facilities required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces in the theater and to the extent directed, of the air, naval and Allied forces. In accomplishment of this mission, the Communications Zone performs these principal functions in the area of the Communications Zone: (Certain functions listed below may be performed outside the area of the Communications Zone as directed by the theater commander).

(1) Procurement (from US and local sources), storage and issue of supplies and equipment needed by the theater (except items which are a supply responsibility of the air forces).

(2) Operation of Communications Zone supply installations.

(3) Operation and maintenance of facilities for the transportation of material and personnel.

(4) Procurement of real estate.

(5) Operation of repair, salvage and reclamation facilities.

(6) Construction, repair and maintenance of roads, railroads, bridges, military buildings and other facilities required for military use.

(7) Establishment, maintenance and operation of Communications Zone Signal communications system and of theater long-lines Signal communications system.

(8) Training of Communications Zone troops and personnel.

(9) Evacuation and hospitalization of sick and wounded; provision for medical service.

(10) Policing and control of traffic.

(11) Custody and utilization of prisoners of war turned over to the Communications Zone by the armies.

R E S T R I C T E D

- (12) Providing Chaplain services.
- (13) Providing leave and rest camps and welfare and recreational programs and facilities for theater personnel.
- (14) Operation of Army Exchange service.
- (15) Delivery and transmission of mail.
- (16) Providing legal and judicial services.
- (17) Providing financial services.
- (18) Investigation and settlement of claims.
- (19) Administration of Civil Affairs matters.
- (20) Security and defense of the Communications Zone.
- (21) Providing administration and supply services for designated elements of air forces, field forces, Navy, Allied military and civilian agencies.

b. In enemy territory, Communications Zone responsibilities are limited to certain functions involved in the direct supply and administrative support of the US forces and designated Allied forces. No area responsibility is assigned under these circumstances (see paragraph 21e, below).

3. Components of Communications Zone organization. The organization of the Communications Zone is presented in the inclosed chart. The Communications Zone is organized into section commands. The Headquarters, Communications Zone, is composed of the Office of the Commanding General, the general staff, and the special staff. The general staff sections comprise the functional staff agencies of the Commanding General. The special staff sections comprise the staff agencies in technical, commodity or specialized fields. The section commands are the operating agencies for the performance of the Communications Zone mission and, as such, exercise command jurisdiction over all field activities, units and personnel of the Communications Zone, except in respect to the operation of military railways, construction, maintenance and operation of petrol and oil pipelines, and such other activities exempted from section command jurisdiction by authority of the Commanding General, Communications Zone. In enemy territory commands perform administrative and supply support for US and designated Allied forces, but have no area responsibility (see paragraph 19e, below).

4. Relationships between elements of the organization. Relationships between the general staff, special staff and the section commands will be in accordance with these principles:

a. The general staff sections will issue orders, within the scope of their functional staff responsibilities, in accordance with approved policies, in the name of the Commanding General, to special staff sections and section commands.

b. Special staff sections will issue orders within the scope of their technical, commodity or specialized fields, in accordance with approved policies, in the name of the Commanding General, to section commands. (Chiefs of Services will issue shipping instructions in accordance with ETO-SOP No 7, dated 19 March 1945).

c. In respect to activities and installations under the jurisdiction of section commands, general staff sections and special staff sections will issue instructions only to section commanders, and then only in the name of the Commanding General, Communications Zone. Except for those activities and installations directly under their jurisdiction, as specified herein, chiefs of general or special staff sections will not issue instructions by virtue of their own authority. When instructions are issued on technical matters familiar to certain subordinates of section commanders, they will be addressed to the section commander for the attention of the subordinate.

d. Informal direct personal or written contact for the purposes of the interchange of technical advice and information is not precluded by the procedure outlined above, but formal agreements, de-

R E S T R I C T E D

isions or instructions will be issued or confirmed only through the prescribed command channels.

e. Orders issued in accordance with the procedure prescribed above will be processed through the Adjutant General for authentication and publication, in accordance with the provisions of Staff Memorandum No 1, dated 13 March 1945.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

5. The Office of the Commanding General consists of those elements of the Communications Zone which are intimately related to the immediate supervisory responsibilities of the Commanding General, Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff. The functions of each section of the Office of the Commanding General include:

- a. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, is responsible for the mission assigned to the Communications Zone.
- b. The Deputy Commanding General assists the Commanding General in accomplishing the mission of the Communications Zone; acts for the Commanding General during his temporary absence, or when otherwise authorized to do so.
- c. The Chief of Staff directs and coordinates the work of the staff divisions and services; acts directly on matters which, in his judgment, do not require personal reference to the Commanding General, or Deputy Commanding General; and transmits decisions of the Commanding General and Deputy Commanding General to appropriate staff officers.
- d. The Deputy Chief of Staff assists the Chief of Staff and acts for him in his absence.
- e. The Secretary of the General Staff acts as executive officer for the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, including the maintenance of an office of temporary record, the routing of correspondence and reception of visitors in the Office of the Commanding General.
- f. Liaison Section provides administration for liaison officers to and from this headquarters.
- g. Control Division (1) Gathers, analyzes and evaluates data regarding the efficiency of the operations of all elements of the Communications Zone.
(2) Recommends changes of existing policies, organization, procedures, and methods in situations requiring corrective action.
(3) Supervises statistical and reporting procedures within the Communications Zone and prepares or supervises the preparation of statistical reports on the operations of the Communications Zone.
(4) Reviews proposed standing operating procedures developed by general staff sections and special staff sections.
(5) Supervises the execution of control functions throughout the Communications Zone.
- h. The Inspector General (1) Conducts investigations, surveys and special inspections as directed by proper authority.
(2) Causes all money accounts of appropriated funds to be inspected at prescribed periods.
(3) Reviews investigations made at the direction of this headquarters, by subordinate command Inspectors General.
(4) Formulates administrative determinations relating to questions of conduct of personnel of the Army and all manner of subjects pertaining thereto, wherein the recommendation of the Inspector General is required.
(5) Makes recommendations as to procurement and allotment of personnel of the Inspector General's Department in the Theater.
(6) Conducts indoctrination schools, trains officers for Inspector General's Department duty as fillers in the field forces and Communications Zone.

R E S T R I C T E D

- (7) Prepares special guides and particular information as required for Inspector's General in the theater.
- (8) Conducts the inspection of all units being redeployed.
- i. The Public Relations Officer (1) Advises the Commanding General on all public relations matters and recommends to him public relations policies.
- (2) Clears and releases all press material from Communications Zone sources.
- (3) Arranges for official press, radio and pictorial coverage of all military activities not otherwise covered by accredited war correspondents.
- (4) Assists war correspondents in covering various activities of the Communications Zone, and in interviewing personnel.
- (5) Maintains liaison with the various services and staff sections to assure that activities of these agencies are given appropriate public relations treatment.
- (6) Furnishes technical information for the guidance of field public relations officers.
- (7) Coordinates public relations policies and procedures in the Communications Zone with equivalent or complementary policies of the War Department Bureau of Public Relations.
- (8) Supervises presentation of policies of the Communications Zone to Allied information agencies operating in Communications Zone territory (Office of War Information and Ministry of Information).
- (9) Supervises presentation of information to local agencies of the activities of the Allied military forces to secure the cooperation of civilian populations toward projects undertaken by the Communications Zone.

GENERAL STAFF

6. The general staff consists of the five Assistant Chiefs of Staff (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4 and G-5) and the General Purchasing Agent. In general, their responsibilities are of a purely staff character (see par 1b, above), involving the supervision of activities performed throughout the Communications Zone which are related to the functions assigned to them. The specific responsibilities of each section of the general staff are:

- a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
 - (1) Exercises staff supervision over:
 - (a) Execution of administrative arrangements pertaining to personnel as individuals, civilian employees of the Communications Zone and prisoners of war.
 - (b) The Womens Army Corps.
 - (c) The procurement, classification, reclassification, assignment, pay, promotion, transfer, retirement and separation of all personnel.
 - (d) Decorations, citations, honors and awards.
 - (e) Leaves, furloughs and passes.
 - (f) Religious, informational, recreational and welfare activities, including the American Red Cross.
 - (g) Employment of civilians.
 - (h) Billeting, rest areas, recreational facilities.
 - (2) Performs these activities:
 - (a) Prepares, evaluates and disseminates personnel statistics.
 - (b) Determines and processes requirements for non-T/O grades.
 - (c) Screens requests for air priorities for personnel.
- b. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
 - (1) Exercises staff supervision over:
 - (a) Collection, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information concerning activities and capabilities of the enemy as they affect the Communications Zone.
 - (b) Measures taken to detect and destroy the effectiveness of enemy espionage, sabotage, counter-espionage, or subversive systems.

R E S T R I C T E D

- (c) Security of information contained in personal communications of military personnel and prisoners of war.
- (d) Intelligence activities of the supply services (except air forces).
- (e) Allocation, assignment and transfer of personnel engaged in intelligence and counterintelligence activities in the Communications Zone.

(2) Performs these activities:

- (a) Determines and designates, in conjunction with the War Department and the Supreme Command, Allied Expeditionary Force, the essential elements of information of the Communications Zone.
- (b) Prepares and directs the implementation of intelligence plans.

c. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

(1) Exercises staff supervision over:

- (a) Activation, organization and reorganization of all tables of organization, special, and provisional units.
- (b) Selection and allocation of training areas and the development of requirements for and allocation of training aids.
- (c) Policies and training procedures for post hostilities education, athletic and vocational training programs.
- (d) Training of units and individuals.
- (e) Troop requirements, allocation of troop units (service troops, including Military Labor units, administrative troops, security troops).

(f) Movement and assignment of units, including priorities and movement planning.

(2) Performs these activities:

- (a) Assures the dissemination of current and forecasted strength data in respect to US military personnel and all other classes of personnel for which the US Army has a supply responsibility.
- (b) Recommends operational requirements for ammunition, security, anti-aircraft artillery defense and passive air defense.
- (c) Establishes priorities for initial and replacement equipment of units and/or issues of critical material.
- (d) Prepares troop bases and troop basis studies pertaining to redeployment.

(c) Redeployment planning and staff coordination therefor.

d. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4.

(1) Exercises staff supervision over:

- (a) Maintenance of theater stock levels.
- (b) Priorities and other measures necessary to effect delivery of all items of supply.
- (c) Reception, distribution and issue of all items of supply.
- (d) Storage and stock control activities.
- (e) Movement of all supplies, troops, mail and evacuation, including the efficient utilization of all facilities pertinent thereto.
- (f) Activities concerning acquisition of real estate, utilities, facilities, property, and maintenance and/or disposition thereof, to include location, type, capacity, priority and phasing of all types of construction.
- (g) Location of depot sites.
- (h) Evacuation of personnel, material and animals, including hospitalization of personnel and animals.
- (i) Maintenance, reclamation and salvage of materiel, including supervision and coordination of facilities and methods of operation.
- (j) Supply, maintenance and equipment of non-US forces including co-belligerent rearmament units, liberated manpower, para-military forces, prisoners of war, repatriated prisoners of war, civilian labor and Italian Service Units.
- (k) Requisitioning, reception, distribution, and issuance of all Civil Affairs supplies.
- (l) Collection and disposition of salvaged, captured, surrendered, excess, or surplus material.

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(2) Performs these activities;

(a) Establishes priorities of allocation and issue (in coordination with G-3), priorities of procurement and movement for all items of supply.

(b) Formulates the supply and evacuation portions of operational plans and procedures.

(c) Logistical operational planning and staff coordination therefor.

e. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5

(1) Exercises staff supervision over:

(a) Civil Affairs activities throughout the Communications Zone and staff direction of Civil Affairs administration in subordinate commands.

(b) Importation and distribution of relief supplies for the civilian population.

(c) Disposition of captured enemy supplies to civilian agencies when declared available for Civil Affairs use.

(d) Reception, maintenance and repatriation of displaced persons and refugees.

(e) Civil Affairs fiscal activities.

(f) Enforcement of established policy to avoid damage by military personnel to structures and objects of cultural, artistic, archeological or historical value.

(g) Allocation, assignment and transfer of personnel engaged in Civil Affairs administration in the Communications Zone.

(2) Performs these activities:

(a) Assists civilian authorities and population to make the maximum use of indigenous supplies and resources.

(b) Assists in obtaining facilities necessary for civilian air defense, police and fire department organizations.

(c) Takes necessary measures with civilian health authorities to prevent public health and welfare from interfering with military operations.

f. The General Purchasing Agent

(1) Exercises staff supervision over:

(a) Local procurement of supplies and equipment, facilities and services.

(b) Arranges with governments concerned the necessary agreements affecting the employment of civilian labor, and settlement of labor disputes.

(c) Local procurement of supplies for governmental agencies which have no procurement organization of their own, such as Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, War Shipping Administration, American Red Cross, etc.

(d) Determination of requirements for mining supplies and equipment for British/US forces in Northwest Europe.

(e) Procurement of special commodities for export to the US.

(f) Disposal of surplus property of US forces for which the War Department is responsible.

(g) Development of local production facilities.

(2) Performs these activities:

(a) Implements reciprocal aid agreements and negotiates procurement agreements on behalf of US forces in countries where there is no reciprocal aid agreement.

(b) Establishes reciprocal aid and direct procurement procedures with European governments for the procurement of supplies, facilities and services.

(c) Negotiates agreements and establishes procedures with European governments for the procurement of alien civilian labor for US forces.

(d) Adjusts and settles claims arising out of procurement.

(e) Presents long-term programmed requirements of the US forces to governments in the European area and coordinates and processes specific requirements on behalf of US forces.

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(f) Regulates the imports of raw materials for industrial production for US forces in Northwest Europe.

SPECIAL STAFF

7. The special staff includes the seven technical services (Office of the Chief Ordnance Office, Office of the Chief Quartermaster, Office of the Chief Engineer, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Office of the Chief Surgeon, Office of the Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, Office of the Chief of Transportation) and the Adjutant General, Judge Advocate, Provost Marshal, Fiscal Director, Special Services, Information and Education Division, Chief of Army Exchange Service, Chaplain, Chief of Claims, Historian, Anti-Aircraft Artillery Officer and Headquarters Commandant.

8. The activities of the technical services consist of two types: those which are common to all technical services and those which are of a specialized character performed only by individual services.

a. The common activities of technical services are:

(1) Providing technical advice to the Commanding General, Communications Zone and to the staff.

(2) Exercising staff supervision over:

(a) Determination of quantities of items to be stocked at each depot to maintain the prescribed depot stock level.

(b) Stock control and record keeping systems at depots and maintenance of central stock records.

(c) Distribution of supplies to maintain stock levels at base, filler and key depots.

(d) Storage space requirements.

(e) Classification and disposition of salvage.

(f) Repair and maintenance of supplies and equipment.

(g) Requirements in terms of units and personnel for Communications Zone service troops.

(h) Allocation, assignment and transfer of Communications Zone units and personnel.

(i) Training of personnel of the respective branches of service.

(3) Performing these activities:

(a) Preparing plans to meet requirements of strategic and tactical projected operations; implementing approved supply plans.

(b) Determining requirements for supplies and equipment, and preparing requisitions on US for needed quantities.

(c) Under supervision of General Purchasing Agent, local procurement of items available or able to be manufactured locally.

(d) Recommending the function of each depot of the service.

(e) Disseminating information regarding the operation and care of items of supply and equipment.

(f) Gathering and disseminating technical intelligence and data on enemy material.

(g) Conducting field research as to the performance of current items of supply and equipment.

(h) Performing development work in respect to improvement in items of equipment and supplies.

(i) Procures and transfers Civil Affairs supplies, as directed.

(j) Procures supplies and equipment for agencies other than the US Army, as directed by higher authority.

b. Specialized activities performed by each of the technical services are:

(1) Office of the Chief of Ordnance. Supervising overall bomb disposal activities within the theater.

(2) The Office of the Chief Quartermaster

(a) Exercises staff supervision over:

1. Theater food program.

2. Mess operations.

3. Baking, coffee-roasting and refrigeration facilities.

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4. Quartermaster laundry, dry cleaning, sterilization, fumigation and bath and decontamination facilities.
5. Remount activities and the acquisition and training of dogs for military purposes.
6. Burial, disinterment and reinterment of United States personnel.
7. Disposal of effects of deceased personnel.
 - (b) Performs these activities:
 1. Prepares menus and conducts subsistence research.
 2. Maintains US cemeteries of World War II.
 - (3) The Office of the Chief Engineer
 - (a) Exercises staff supervision over:
 1. Design, construction, maintenance and repair of Army facilities.
 2. Acquisition and disposal of real estate.
 3. Construction, operation and maintenance of utilities used by the Army.
 4. Procurement of alien civilian labor employed on the continent by US forces.
 - (b) Operates the Military Pipeline Service, including the construction, maintenance and operation of facilities for bulk handling and storage of liquid fuels by pipeline.
 - (c) Performs these activities:
 1. Prepares military maps and map substitutes.
 2. Prepares construction plans for standard facilities.
 - (4) The Office of the Chief Signal Officer
 - (a) Exercises staff supervision over:
 1. Installation, construction, operation and maintenance of Communications Zone fixed communications plants.
 2. Signal operating procedures.
 - (b) Operates:
 1. Long lines theater Signal communications system.
 2. Communications system and messenger service for this headquarters.
 3. Photographic service for Communications Zone agencies through Signal photographic teams.
 4. Central film and equipment exchanges.
 - (c) Performs these activities:
 1. Develops plans for theater communications networks.
 2. Prepares and distributes codes and ciphers.
 3. Monitors radio traffic for maintenance of signal security.
 4. Installs, repairs and maintains theater cryptographic equipment.
 - (5) Office of the Chief Surgeon
 - (a) Exercises staff supervision over:
 1. Medical service within the theater.
 2. Location of hospital sites and technical suitability of construction for hospitalization.
 3. Contents of the soldiers' ration from the standpoint of health.
 4. Vaccination, inoculation and other protective measures required by military personnel.
 5. Sanitary measures to be enforced in all localities where troops are located.
 6. Health inspection of meat, meat food, and dairy products to be consumed by troops.
 7. Professional treatment methods (medical, surgical, dental, nursing and veterinary) throughout the theater.
 8. Distribution of patients in Army hospitals; the movement of patients between fixed installations, and the movement of patients to ports in transit to the Zone of Interior.
 9. Conducts a program of venereal disease control in troop areas.
 - (b) Performs these activities:
 1. Determines the physical standards for retention in the theater of officer and enlisted personnel in all branches of the military service.
 2. Compiles records of vital statistics for the theater.

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- (6) Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service exercises staff supervision over:
- (a) Impregnation and re-impregnation of clothing, as required.
 - (b) Filling of munitions with chemicals, as required.
- (7) Chief of Transportation
- (a) Exercises staff supervision over:
 1. Packing and marking of export shipments upon cessation of hostilities.
 2. Port operations.
 3. War Department water transportation in the theater.
 4. Supply and personnel movements into, within and out of the theater, except air transport, movements under control of armies and movements performed by organic motor transport.
 5. Motor transport units assigned to section commands.
 6. Transportation of personal baggage of military personnel.
 - (b) Operates:
 1. All motor transport units assigned to this headquarters for inter-section movement of materiel and personnel.
 2. Military Railway Service, under the Director General, Military Railway Service, which performs these activities:
 - (a) Supervises the repair, and maintenance of railroad bridges, track and buildings.
 - (b) Supervises the repair and maintenance of locomotives and rolling stock.
 - (c) Supervises the distribution of supplies necessary for the operation of railways.
 - (d) Schedules and operates passenger, freight and express trains.
 - (e) Distributes cars and locomotives.
 - (f) Guards trains to prevent pilferage.
 - (c) Performs these activities:
 1. Prepares movements program.
 2. Develops plans for port utilization and materiel and personnel movement.
 3. Maintains intelligence on roads, rail and inland waterways in territories of possible interest.
 4. Controls the movement of theater-operated vessels.
 5. Assigns incoming ships to ports.
 6. Represents Army in conferences with Navy, War Shipping Administration and Ministry of War Transport in respect to allocation and utilization of shipping.
9. The Adjutant General
- a. Exercises staff supervision over:
 - (1) Distribution of blank forms and publications.
 - (2) Machine records personnel accounting.
 - (3) Maintenance of individual personnel records.
 - (4) Postal service.
 - (5) Allocation, assignment and transfer of AG units and personnel.
 - b. Operates a lithographic plant and arranges for printing through commercial firms.
 - c. Performs these activities:
 - (1) Processes all official correspondence except that pertaining to combat orders and instructions, and that routed directly to recipients from general and special staff sections (See paragraph 4a, above).
 - (2) Publishes official orders and instructions initiated by the Office of the Commanding General or general or special staff sections.
 - (3) Determines the form and method of promulgation of all orders issued in connection with (1) and (2) above.
 - (4) Maintains the office of record for Headquarters, Communications Zone.
 - (5) Prepares and distributes troop and station lists.
 - (6) Prepares and submits to the War Department reports of strength, captured materiel, prisoners of war, and incidental returns.
 - (7) Processes and forwards to the War Department all reports of casualties in the European Theater of Operations, US Army.
- Determines status of casualties on request; acts as clearing house

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for collection and dissemination of supplemental information regarding casualties.

(8) Processes approved requests for US Army printing, except maps.

(9) Receives, maintains custody of all non-current records of organizations.

(10) Procures, stores and distributes War Department publications and blank forms.

10. The Judge Advocate

a. Acts as advisor to Commanding General and staff on matters involving military law.

b. Exercises staff supervision over:

(1) Administration of military justice.

(2) Allocation, assignment and transfer of Judge Advocate personnel.

c. Performs these activities:

(1) Examines general court-martial records and prepares recommendations thereon.

(2) Furnishes opinions on the application and interpretation of US laws and regulations affecting Army administration or personnel.

(3) Furnishes opinions on the application and interpretation of treaties and foreign laws affecting military administration and operations.

11. The Provost Marshal

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

(1) Military police activities, both static and tactical.

(2) Training, equipment and distribution of criminal investigation detachment personnel, as well as their operations in the field.

(3) Disciplinary training centers.

(4) Rehabilitation or disposal of general and garrison prisoners.

(5) Collection, custody, processing, transportation, care and distribution of prisoners of war and their evacuation to the US.

(6) Collection, care, and evacuation of US and Allied repatriated military personnel from their point of entry into the Communications Zone.

(7) Enforcement of traffic control regulations.

(8) Disposition of stragglers, deserters and AWOL's.

(9) Military police arrangements with civil police.

(10) Allocation, assignment and transfer of military police units and personnel.

b. Maintains a Prisoner of War Information Bureau, responsible for the collection of information concerning US personnel reported as missing or as prisoners of war, enemy prisoners of war and enemy prisoner of war casualties.

12. The Fiscal Director

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

(1) Finance services, including arrangements for foreign exchange, banking and currency.

(2) Receipt of funds due the War Department and its agencies, and accounting therefor.

(3) Disbursement of all appropriated funds, and the accounting therefor.

(4) Accounting procedure of the American Red Cross.

(5) Allocation, assignment and transfer of Finance Department units and personnel.

b. Performs these activities:

(1) Operates a central agency for the establishment of bank credits for all disbursing officers in the theater.

(2) Prepares fiscal plans for new military operations.

(3) Prepares studies and recommendations in connection with the personal expenditures of military personnel and their relation to local financial structures and economy.

(4) Prepares reports of all transactions under Reciprocal Aid.

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- (5) Develops audit procedures for the Army Exchange Service and other quasi-military agencies; audits Quartermaster sales accounts.
- (6) Audits disbursements to assure accuracy, sufficiency of supporting documents, and legality and propriety of payment.
- (7) Administers allotments for war bonds, Government Life Insurance premiums, and allotments of military personnel for family dependency.

13. The Chief Information and Education Division

a. Exercises staff supervision over information, orientation and education programs.

b. Operates:

(1) ETO Branch of US Armed Forces Institute.

(2) American Forces Network.

c. Performs these activities:

(1) Conducts and disseminates studies on troop attitudes and other conditions affecting morale of troops.

(2) Disseminates information and orientation ideas to military personnel through the medium of radio, pamphlets and servicemen's publications.

(3) Publishes "Stars and Stripes" and the European edition of "Yank".

(4) Procures, stores and distributes information, education and orientation supplies and equipment.

(5) Makes recommendations concerning the allotment and employment of FDGA funds, lend-lease, reciprocal and mutual aid for information and education activities.

14. The Chief, Special Services

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

(1) Recreational, entertainment and athletic programs.

(2) Motion picture entertainment service.

(3) Music programs, soldier and civilian talent shows, USO camp shows.

(4) Vocational arts and crafts programs.

(5) Home and community hospitality programs for officers and enlisted personnel.

(6) Proper accommodation of officer personnel on leave, furlough and pass; supervised tours and other means of adding to the recreational activities available to troops on leave and furlough.

(7) Allocation, assignment and transfer of special service units and personnel.

(8) Training of personnel assigned to supervision of athletic programs.

(9) Procurement, storage and distribution of athletic and recreation supplies and equipment.

b. Operates a library service for recreational reading.

c. Makes recommendations concerning the allotment and employment of FDGA funds, lend-lease, reciprocal and mutual aid for athletic and recreation activities.

15. The Chief, Army Exchange Service

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

(1) Establishment, operation and activities of Army exchanges.

(2) Operation of soft drink bottling facilities and breweries.

b. Performs these activities:

(1) Provides the necessary capital for establishment of exchanges.

(2) Provides the necessary insurance protection for exchanges.

(3) Requisitions, through Chief Quartermaster, or directly on New York Port of Embarkation for exchange resale items.

(4) Procures items of furniture, fixtures and equipment required by Army Exchange Service.

(5) Establishes maximum quantities of goods for resale which may be drawn from distribution points and sold to authorized customers; establishes a uniform resale ration program, publishing maximum ration lists and providing standard ration cards.

(6) Maintains a central accounting system and maintains individual exchange records.

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16. The Chaplain

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

- (1) Religious activities of the Army, including the guidance of Commanding Officers and Chaplains on matters of religion and morals.
- (2) Supply of items peculiar to the needs of chaplains.
- (3) Allocation, assignment and transfer of Chaplain personnel.

b. Coordinates the religious work of various welfare societies.

17. The Chief of Claims

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

- (1) Foreign Claims Commissions, Contract Claims Commissions, and Maritime Claims Commissions, Personnel and Workmens Commission.
- (2) Selection and training of personnel for assignment to Section Command Claims Commissions or as section command investigative agencies.
- (3) Claims investigation and settlement activities by section commands.

b. Performs these activities:

- (1) Investigates, processes and disposes of claims arising out of service-connected accidents or incidents over \$2500 but under \$5000.
- (2) Recommends settlements of claims of \$5000 or over to The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
- (3) Negotiates Reciprocal Aid agreements in respect to settlement of claims with the authorized representatives of the countries in which US Army personnel operate.

18. The Historian

a. Exercises staff supervision over historical activities of subordinate commands.

b. Develops the overall history of the Communications Zone.

19. The Anti-Aircraft Officer

a. Exercises staff supervision over:

- (1) Allocation and reallocation of available anti-aircraft and sea-coast artillery to the principal subordinate commands.
- (2) Coordination of all means of active defense against air operations
- (3) Allocation of anti-aircraft artillery ammunition.
- (4) Allocation, assignment and transfer of anti-aircraft units and personnel.

20. The Headquarters Commandant

a. Exercises staff supervision over the security, internal administration, layout and space allocation, and moving of the headquarters.

b. Performs these activities:

- (1) Commands all enlisted personnel assigned to Headquarters, Communications Zone.
- (2) Establishes and operates all messing facilities within Headquarters, Communications Zone.
- (3) Operates Post Exchanges for officer, enlisted and certain categories of civilian personnel within Headquarters, Communications Zone.
- (4) Provides special service activities within Headquarters, Communications Zone.
- (5) Provides for the interior guard and security of Headquarters, Communications Zone buildings and installations.
- (6) Operates patrols to preserve discipline and order, and aids in investigation of civilian cases which involve Communications Zone personnel.
- (7) Appoints and administers a special court for the administration of military law.
- (8) Procures real estate from the appropriate section commander; maintains real estate required for the personnel of Headquarters, Communications Zone.
- (9) Procures, surveys, classifies and distributes billets for officer, enlisted and certain classes of civilian personnel serving with Headquarters, Communications Zone.

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- (10) Provides motor transportation for Headquarters, Communications Zone, including the operation of passenger vehicle pools, truck pools and garages for transient vehicles.
- (11) Procures, transports, stores and issues all classes of supplies including solid and liquid fuels for Headquarters, Communications Zone.
- (12) Moves the headquarters and installs its offices in accordance with approved space allocations.

SECTION COMMANDS

31. The section commands are the operating agencies of the Communications Zone. All functions of the Communications Zone, outside of this headquarters, are the direct responsibilities of section commanders unless specifically provided otherwise herein.

a. The mission of the section command is to unload cargo and to clear assigned ports of incoming and outgoing material; to receive, store and move forward material as required; to maintain, repair and salvage army property; to receive and evacuate personnel through assigned ports, staging areas and other facilities and installations; to maintain the security of the section and installations located therein; to provide supplies and services for all Army units and personnel located in the section; to construct and maintain Army facilities located within the section; to provide hospitalization service; to provide welfare activities; to transfer approved material to allied governments; and to return to allied governments and people all facilities no longer needed by the army.

b. There are three types of section commands: base sections, intermediate sections and advance sections. Each type of section command participates in the movement of supplies to the armies in a different manner:

(1) Base sections are the most distant from the combat zone and are responsible for the receipt, unloading and usually for the initial storage of material from the Zone of Interior.

(2) Intermediate sections are located between base and advance sections and are responsible for the storage of the major portion of theater stocks.

(3) Advance sections are in direct support of the armies, located immediately behind the combat zone, and store and issue immediate requirements of the armies.

c. The typical organization of a section command is shown on Inclosure 2.

d. The major specific functions of section commanders in liberated territory and United Kingdom are:

(1) Allocation, assignment, transfer and command of all Communications Zone personnel and units assigned to the section.

(2) Location and establishment of all approved field installations and agencies of the Communications Zone.

(3) Operation of ports.

(4) Responsibility for all supply activities within the section, including operation of depots and regulating stations.

(5) Supply of all personnel and organizations within the section, or for the supply of which the section has been made responsible.

(6) Procurement of supplies and services from local sources.

(7) Operations of salvage, maintenance, repair and reclamation installations and collection of all salvage within the section.

(8) Procurement of real estate for Communications Zone activities.

(9) Construction and maintenance of facilities, roads, railroads and communications systems.

(10) Operation of section command signal communications system.

(11) Control of motor traffic and convoy movements, policing of highways.

(12) Operation of motor transport system service within the section (except motor transport units assigned to this headquarters, i.e., "through hauls").


R E S T R I C T E D

- (13) Supervision of civilian agencies in operations of the inland waterways.
 - (14) Operation of staging and evacuation areas.
 - (15) Hospitalization and evacuation of sick and wounded.
 - (16) Providing welfare, recreational and exchange services to personnel located in the section.
 - (17) Operation of rest and leave centers.
 - (18) Operation of quarters and quartering for all personnel in the section.
 - (19) Training of section command personnel.
 - (20) Defense and security of the section.
 - (21) Intelligence, counter-intelligence and unit censorship activities within the section.
 - (22) Investigation of all claims.
 - (23) Administration of military justice and disciplines, including operation of disciplinary facilities and installations.
 - (24) Custody and utilization of prisoners of war.
 - (25) Execution of military responsibility for Civil Affairs.
 - (26) Operation of film and photographic equipment exchanges.
 - (27) Performance of necessary administrative and supply functions for the field forces, air forces, Ground Force Reinforcement Command, Navy, Allied military and civilian agencies.
 - (28) Operation of all facilities and installations within the section which are not assigned elsewhere.
- e. The functions of section commands in enemy territory include only the rehabilitation and operation of ports, railways, inland water transportation, through LOC transportation, and such depots, shops and other installations in the conquered territory as are required to accomplish Communications Zone responsibility for administrative and supply support of US forces. Section commands in conquered territories are charged with no area responsibility, and except for personnel and units assigned to the section command, have no responsibility for service, welfare and discipline.


2 Incls:

- Incl 1 - Organization Chart, Com Z, 1 April 45.
- Incl 2 - Organization Chart, Section Section Command, Com z, 1 April 45.

ORGANIZATION CHART
 COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
 ETOUSA
 1 April 1945



ORGANIZATION CHART
 TYPICAL SECTION COMMAND
 COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
 EPOUSA
 1 April 1945



* May be under G-3

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

CHAPTER 2

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION OF FORWARD ECHELON

SECTION 7

EVENTS PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF FORWARD ECHELON

24. Introduction. The period prior to the establishment of the Forward Echelon of ETOUSA/SOS was marked by the assumption of command of ETOUSA by General Eisenhower on his return to England to become Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.¹ At the same time there were shifts within the Headquarters itself and in the relationships existing between it and other commands. The shifting was designed to better its position in the fulfillment of its mission. The situation was complicated by the appearance of new and important organizations such as First US Army Group (FUSAG) and First US Army (FUSA) and US strategic Air Forces (USSTAF).

25. Assignment of Overlord Missions. FUSAG was activated on 19 October 1943 and assigned an initial mission of responsibility only for operational planning as directed by Headquarters ETOUSA.² Its responsibilities and duties were restated in detail in a letter of 3 November 1943 from ETOUSA,³ and included responsibilities for all plans, operations and administration involving operations on the Continent of Europe by US forces other than air. The plans were based on directives issued by COSSAC or ETOUSA and were subject to approval by ETOUSA. At the same time the Commanding General, SOS, was required to initiate such planning as might be required by the Commanding General, FUSAG, Commanding General, USSTAF, and the Commanding General, FUSA, who were directed to effect necessary coordination of their plans.

26. Delineation of Responsibilities. The first letter was followed closely by a communication which summarized responsibilities of the Commanding General, FUSAG,⁴ as follows:

- a. Planning for crossing of the field forces including assault build-up.
- b. Execution of such planning.
- c. Development of administrative plans for mounting the operation.
- d. Coordination of field force administrative plans with operational plans of Navy, Air, and the SOS.

On 29 November 1943, COSSAC sent a directive to FUSAG and 21 Army Group in which the responsibilities of each were made specific and definite and the accountability of each for their respective missions clearly stated.⁵ Under this directive 21 Army Group was made jointly responsible with the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, and the Air Commander-in-Chief, AFAF, for planning the operation and for its execution, until an area of responsibility was allotted to FUSAG by the Supreme Commander. FUSA became functional in the United Kingdom on 20 October 1943. Its initial mission⁶ was almost identical with

the mission assigned to the mission assigned to the V Corps by GO 16, ETOUSA, 21 March 1943. In addition FUSA. was to undertake such planning as might be required of it by the Commanding General, FUSAG, The task proved to be detailed planning for the assault phase of Operations OVERLORD. In an ETOUSA letter of 29 October 1943⁴ the responsibilities of SOS with respect to the coming invasion were stated as follows:

- a. Administrative planning and implementation thereof connected with the mounting of the operation from the UK by all US forces.
- b. The preparation of harbors, ports and approaches thereto.
- c. The coordination of administrative plans and operations for mounting the army field forces with requirements included in approved plans of Air, Navy or SOS forces.

27. Reorganization of ETOUSA. On 16 January 1944 General Eisenhower assumed command of ETOUSA for the second time.⁷ On 17 January a re-organization was announced whereby Headquarters SOS and Headquarters, ETOUSA, were combined.⁸ The same order appointed the Commanding General, SOS, as Deputy Theater Commander in addition to his other duties, and assigned him a mission which included the performance of such other duties as were delegated by the Theater Commander, and the authority to act for the Theater Commander in appropriate cases. Since the Theater Commander was also Supreme Allied Commander, the new setup was intended to provide a compact arrangement whereby the SAC could keep the US forces under his immediate control and at the same time conserve manpower.

SECTION 8

NECESSITY FOR ESTABLISHING FORWARD ECHELON

28. General. As events stood on 7 January 1944, SHAEF had made General Montgomery commander of 21 Army Group which was given the responsibility for the preparation of plans and for general supervision of the development and operation of the lines of communication on the Continent, for determination of equipment and for supervision of movement overseas. To this end the Commander of 21 Army Group had been directed to coordinate with Headquarters, ETOUSA, in the formulation of logistical plans for the support of initial operations on the Continent. (See Appendix 1).

29. Need for ETOUSA Planning and Coordinating Section. Headquarters, ETOUSA/SOS was faced with great problems in connection with mounting the cross-channel operation. The Headquarters had been delegated the responsibility of providing support from the United Kingdom for US forces on the Continent, and arranging for continued support from the United States, the United Kingdom and other sources.⁹ At the same time it was necessary to plan and make preparations to move the Headquarters and supply establishment from the United Kingdom to the Continent and transfer the administrative and supply functions without interruption. Since the ETOUSA/SOS staff was deeply engaged with logistical build up and mounting preparations, it was advisable to set up a special section to work on planning COM Z operations on the Continent.

30. Need for U.S. Administrative Staff with 21 Army Group. With such a mission ETOUSA/SOS had to plan, coordinate and supervise not only with 21 Army Group but with the FUSAG, FUSA, and later with the Advance Section (SOS) attached to FUSA.¹⁰ It was evident that some US administrative body had to be established in the highest headquarters, 21 Army Group, to coordinate all planning and that such an organization would have to work with the ETOUSA/SOS planning section. On 18 January 1944 21 Army Group sent COSSAC a proposal

for an Administrative Staff, composed of US and British personnel,¹¹ which was concurred in by a letter of 2 February 1944 from the Commanding General, SOS, to FUSAG.¹² This called for the formation of a US Section in the Administrative Staff of 21 Army Group to operate under G-4 of FUSAG, with SOS to be represented.

31. Establishment of Forward Echelon. It immediately became apparent that, in order for 21 Army Group to carry out its mission, more than mere SOS representation and liaison would be necessary. 21 Army Group was responsible for the overall planning and had placed FUSAG in charge of US planning. At the same time ETOUSA/SOS was concerned with not only the planning and buildup in the United Kingdom, but also for planning on the Continent and subsequent operations there. Some special planning section was needed to take care of US Continental administrative planning which could be attached to 21 Army Group and move to the Continent at the start of operations with authority to act for and as Headquarters, SOS, until such time as it could assume direct responsibility. Steps were therefore taken via informal memos and discussions, to set up an SOS section with adequate authority to act, finally culminating in a SHAEF memorandum on 9 February 1944 (see Appendix 1) directing the Deputy Theater Commander, as Commanding General Communications Zone, to appoint a Deputy Commander with appropriate staff to "Be responsible for the initial planning, development and operation of the US Communications Zone on the Continent," and further directing such Deputy Commanding General of Communications Zone and his staff "to be attached to 21 Army Group until such time as relieved by the Supreme Commander and be attached to a US Army Group." This action gave ETOUSA/SOS its special planning and coordination section and provided it with an organization which could move to the Continent and command the Communications Zone until the main headquarters could be transferred. At the same time it gave FUSAG and 21 Army Group a section which could be attached to 21 Army Group under FUSAG G-4 control to work on logistical plans for the initial phases of the invasion.

32. Use of Name Communications Zone. It is necessary to note at this time that the name Communications Zone started to be used in reference to the SOS although SOS was not officially redesignated as such until 7 June 1944.¹³ It was the intention to maintain the ETOUSA/SOS set-up as long as it remained in the United Kingdom prior to the invasion, but to have the Communications Zone come into being after the invasion started. However the name "Communications Zone ETOUSA" was employed without benefit of official orders and appeared on a letterhead date 21 February 1944 covering "Organization of US Forces (Administration)" and ETOUSA/SOS was frequently referred to as "CCM Z" thereafter. Consequently until June the same staff was known under three different names - ETOUSA, SOS, and CCM Z.

SECTION 9

ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF FORWARD ECHELON

33. Forward Echelon Organized. No time was lost in organizing the new Forward Echelon. On 11 February 1944, the Commanding General, SOS, verbally appointed a Chief of Staff for the Forward Echelon. On 17 February 1944, the headquarters opened in the John Lewis Building, London. When the staff outgrew its quarters, new offices were established in the Selfridge Building, London, on 2 May 1944, where it remained until moving to the Continent on 8 July 1944. Forward Echelon was organized in the conventional pattern with general and special staff sections. At first the G-2 and G-3 were combined but subsequently they were restored their individual identity

(17 May 1944). The organization structure never changed materially.

34. Conception as Separate Command. The basic SHAEF memorandum directed the Commanding General, SOS, to appoint a "Deputy Commanding General" for COM Z and a "suitable staff" and attach them to 21 Army Group for overall logistical planning, coordination and technical supervision of mounting operation OVERLORD. The commanding General, SOS, however, appointed 14 March 1944 (see Appendix 4) a Commanding General of the Forward Echelon instead of a Deputy Commander, COM Z.

35. Modifications in Command. On 27 May 1944, through a letter issued by General Eisenhower as Theater Commander, the command organization was modified to restore Forward Echelon to the original conception (see Appendix 5). This letter called for a "Deputy Forward Commander" for Forward Echelon and clearly stated that "it is not a separate command headquarters." This letter was intended to correct a common attitude of mind which had developed on the part of not only the Forward Echelon staff, but ETOUSA/SOS, and other major command headquarters, that Forward Echelon was a separate command headquarters. However, further corrective action was required, and on 3 June 1944 the Chief of Staff of the Forward Echelon issued a memorandum directing his staff to "discontinue the use of the word 'Headquarters' with the connotation that this is a separate headquarters." 14 He also restated the fact that the Forward Echelon was purely and simply what its name implied.

36. Forward Echelon Absorbed. The final major modification in command of the Forward Echelon took place on 26 June 1944, when the Commanding General, Communications Zone (SOS having been redesignated 7 June 1944) personally assumed command of the Forward Echelon, relieving the Deputy Forward Commander and eliminating that position.¹⁵ The Chief of Staff, Forward Echelon was also absorbed and redesignated Deputy Chief of Staff of Communications Zone; he was then placed in charge of the Forward Echelon. The only mission prescribed in the order was that Forward Echelon would make the "necessary arrangements.... for the establishment of headquarters Communications Zone on the Continent." This set-up remained in force until headquarters, Communications Zone moved to the Continent 7 August 1944 and became operational. It then completely absorbed the Forward Echelon, its duties, responsibilities and personnel.

37. Summary. To summarize, the three outstanding points in the organization of the Forward Echelon were:

- a. The establishment of a complete and separate staff with physically separate offices in London at the outset.
- b. The appointment of a "Commanding General" for Forward Echelon.
- c. The assignment of an operating (later modified to staff supervision) mission on the Continent as well as a planning mission. These three factors played a decisive part in creating the impression that the Forward Echelon was a separate command and tended to confuse the duties and responsibilities of the Forward Echelon as well as the administrative channels. Absorption of Forward Echelon by COM Z proved to be the only solution of the problem.

SECTION 10

MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

38. Original Directive. The Forward Echelon was the vehicle to accomplish the SOS planning and technical supervision under FUSAG. The SHAEP memorandum of 9 February 1944 (see Appendix 1), directing the establishment of the Forward Echelon, outlined its responsibilities, as follows:

"3. The Deputy Theater Commander is the Commander of the Communications Zone (US). He will designate a Deputy Commander, Communications Zone (US), with adequate staff, who will be responsible for initial planning, development and operation of the US Communications Zone on the Continent. The D/CG, CZ and staff will be attached to the 21 Army Group. He and his staff will remain so attached until an area of responsibility on the Continent has been assigned to US Army Group by the Supreme Commander.

"4. The US Army Group, (FUSAG) will be assigned an appropriate tactical command under the Supreme Commander when he determines that the number of US troops on the Continent warrants. At that time the Communications Zone will be attached to FUSAG Headquarters.

"5. When the Supreme Commander establishes on the Continent or by advance echelon of ETO, the Deputy Commander, Communications Zone (US), and staff will come under the command of Headquarters ETO (US)."

39. New Directive Covering Mission. On 21 February 1944, Headquarters, CCM Z issued a directive (see Appendix 2) based upon the earlier SHAEP memorandum. It detailed at some length the Forward Echelon mission and responsibilities and was addressed to the Deputy Commander, Communications Zone. The two most significant paragraphs follow:

"1. You are responsible to the Commander of the Communications Zone for initial planning, development and operation of the US Communications Zone on the Continent. In carrying out this responsibility, you are attached initially to 21 Army Group and will operate as a Forward echelon of the US Communications Zone."

"2. a- You will perform and supervise planning and operations in connection with communications zone activities in close cooperation with the staff section attached by FUSAG, working in consultation with the proper elements of both the FUSAG staff section and the 21 Army Group Administrative Staff in accordance with technical agreements and policy of this headquarters."

40. Summary of Responsibilities. The responsibilities of Forward Echelon at this time may be summarized as follows: It was responsible for assisting the 21 Army Group Staff "in supervising the communications Zone operation conducted by the First US Army during the time that the Advance Section" was attached to FUSA, for the period approximately D to D plus 20 (later changed to D plus 44). When an army rear boundary was formed it was "to supervise detailed planning and operations conducted by the Advance Section" for the contemplated period of D plus 20 (later D plus 44) to D plus 44. After that time, for the period from D plus 42 to D plus 90, Forward Echelon was "to conduct and direct the detailed planning of subsequent Communications Zone activities" in the original lodgment area. It was contemplated that the staff section of FUSAG in 21 Army Group would "exercise the required overall general staff coordination between activities in the army areas and activities in the Communications Zone." When Advance Section was detached from FUSA it would revert to command of Forward Echelon.

41. Mission and Responsibilities Modified. The letter of 21 February became the basic directive governing the Forward Echelon.

However, it was superceded three weeks later, on 14 March 1944 (see Appendix 4), by another letter covering the same subject which referred to a SHAEF directive of 10 March 1944 (see Appendix 3) regarding organization of US Forces (Administrative). This brought about the first major change in responsibilities of the Forward Echelon Commander. It stated Forward Echelon "will be attached to 21 Army Group until an area of responsibility on the Continent has been assigned to US Army Group by the Supreme Commander." Two significant paragraphs are quoted:

"4. You will be responsible, under direction of the C-in-C, 21 Army Group, for initial planning, development, operation and security of the US Communications Zone on the Continent. The C-in-C 21 Army Group will give you such instructions as he may consider to be within his province as commander of all ground forces and which he considers necessary for coordination of the communications Zone on the Continent with the other commands under him....

"5. c- Assist the staff of the C-in-C, 21 Army Group in supervising the detailed planning for, and operation, of the organizations attached to the First US Army which are intended for eventual use in the Advance Section Communications Zone."

Also previous instructions requiring the Forward Echelon to conduct and direct detailed planning of subsequent Communications Zone activities for the period of D plus 41 to D plus 90 was modified as follows: "Conduct planning for subsequent Communications Zone activities." Command responsibility was indicated as follows: "When an army rear boundary is designated you will command the Communications Zone on the Continent while attached to 21 Army Group."

42. Final Modifications. An ETOUSA letter published on 27 May 1944, gave the last major modified mission and responsibilities of the Forward Echelon (see Appendix 5). The principal paragraphs follow:

"1. Forward Echelon Communications Zone will exercise staff supervision over Continental Base Sections in the UK and on the Continent. It is not a separate command Headquarters. When Headquarters, Communications Zone, is established on the Continent, the Forward Echelon staff will be absorbed."

"5. All administrative planning for the period subsequent to D plus 90 will be performed by Headquarters, COM Z, (Hqs ETOUSA). The Forward Echelon will complete all COM Z planning for the period to D plus 90 in accordance with previous instructions.

This directive also redesignated the Commanding General of the Forward Echelon as "Deputy Forward Commander, COM Z" Nothing was said about operating on the Continent, but the letter stated that "Staff duties and responsibilities of Forward Echelon, COM Z, while attached to the 21 Army Group remain unchanged" and therefore were as outlined in the COM Z, ETOUSA letter of 14 March 1944. This could be interpreted as continuing Forward Echelon's responsibility for supervising Advance Section operations during the initial phase and of commanding the Communications Zone from the declaration of the army rear boundary until Headquarters, COM Z arrived. Subsequent events proved, however, that the intention was to eliminate Forward Echelon from operational supervision and command.

SECTION 11

RELATIONS WITH OTHER HEADQUARTERS

43. General. The position of Forward Echelon was complicated by the existence of a large number headquarters all working toward the same objective. It was inevitable that there should be opportunities for conflicts, delays and confusion which necessarily resulted in difficulties of coordination.

44. Overlapping Relationships. Stated simply, relationships were woven together as follows: FUSA was under FUSAG which in turn was under 21 Army Group. The Advance Section of the Communications Zone was attached temporarily to FUSA. The Forward Echelon, also a part of Headquarters, Communications Zone, was attached to Headquarters, 21 Army Group, under the G-4 of FUSAG for planning and subsequent supervision of Communications Zone operations. Therefore, the Forward Echelon would be supervising the Advance Section. Both the Advance Section and the Forward Echelon necessarily had to maintain close contact with SOS/ETOUSA while attached to (and therefore subject to direct command of) the combat echelons. The fact that Headquarters COM Z was also Headquarters ETOUSA confused many people. Further complications resulted from the fact that 21 Army Group had a main and a rear headquarters. This was also true of FUSA and the Advance Section. The difficulty of keeping all staffs properly informed, to say nothing of the problem of routing administrative papers, is obvious. Apart from SHAEF and 21 Army Group it was difficult for any staff to know which echelon was in authority over it.

45. Attempts at Clarification. That the relationships were not entirely clear even to those who established them is evident in a personal letter from the Deputy Chief of Staff, Headquarters, ETOUSA, to the Commanding General, Forward Echelon, dated 26 April 1944.¹⁶ It was written because the Commanding General, Advance Section had expressed concern about the relationship of the Advance Section with the Forward Echelon. The Deputy Chief of Staff made the following statements:

"1. ... we definitely agreed with the First Army, General Bradley and General Keane, that the Headquarters with which they would deal during the early stages would be AdSec and that we would not establish other Headquarters between First Army and AdSec for supply and transportation and other Communications Zone matters.

" It is the desire of the Commanding General to base a Communications Zone Headquarters on the Continent as early as possible. No one disputes this necessity. I do not feel however, that this Headquarters should engage in detailed operations but rather that the work of operations be left to the Advance and Base Section

" Your responsibility in the Forward Echelon will be discharged in these matters by supervision and coordination in the earlier stages with the operations vested in the Advanced Section."

This same communication also informed the Commanding General, Forward Echelon:

"You will complete all Communications Zone planning for the period to D plus 90 in accordance with previous directives. Upon completion of the planning you will arrange for the return of the General Staff Section and Service personnel required to assist on the planning for the period subsequent to D plus 90."

46. Attempts at Clarification Failed. That the correspondence failed to clarify matters is evident from the reply (30 April 1944) made by the Commanding General, Forward Echelon, in which he pointed

out the fact that he was receiving directives from both 21 Army Group and Headquarters SOS/ETOUSA.¹⁷ He was unable to see how, unless Advance Section was officially under Forward Echelon, Forward Echelon could supervise and coordinate activities of the Advance Section while the Advance Section itself was responsible for the operation of the Communications Zone on the Continent until Headquarters Communications Zone arrived there. He also asked for clarification of the instructions to return his planning staff to Headquarters, Communications Zone, on completion of planning through D plus 90. The Forward Echelon's commander stated that he was supposed to operate on the Continent and that returning of General Staff and Service personnel would leave him with no staff to carry out his ultimate mission. In general these issues were never really settled until Forward Echelon was absorbed by Headquarters, Communications Zone.

SECTION 12

ACHIEVEMENTS

17. General. Contributions made by the Forward Echelon toward the success of initial operations on the Continent are:

- a. Assisted in the preparation of Standard Operating Procedures and Administrative Instructions for Communications Zone Activities on the Continent.
- b. Planned and phased in all Communications Zone troops for the period of D plus 41 to D plus 90.
- c. Participated in the phasing in of supplies for the period of D plus 41 to D plus 90.
- d. Supervised the planning of Advance Section and Continental Base Section No. 1.
- e. Planned and prepared for the physical establishment of Headquarters, Communications Zone, on the Continent.

SECTION 13

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

18. General. That there was a need for a staff section of ETOUSA to work on logistical plans for the assault was evident. Headquarters, ETOUSA/SOS needed a special staff to handle the overall planning and supervision of Communications Zone activities on the Continent. Likewise 21 Army Group charged with the overall responsibility of planning and operations on the Continent, needed some special agency to handle US logistical planning. FUSAG in turn which was delegated by 21 Army Group to see that the US side of the planning was carried out required SOS representation to work on supply and service plans. The need of these commands resulted in the establishment of the Forward Echelon. ETOUSA/SOS contemplated that this special group would eventually move to the Continent as a body and supervise Communications Zone activities there. Therefore, it established the group in physically separate Headquarters, placed a general officer in charge, and attached it to Headquarters, 21 Army Group. In this way, Headquarters, ETOUSA/SOS, felt that it would be assured the formulation of sound plans which would be integrated and coordinated with policies and plans of ETOUSA as a whole, with adequate SOS representation. In addition, it would give Headquarters, ETOUSA/SOS, a strong agency on 21 Army Group staff while on the Continent, assuring adequate supervision of Communications Zone activities.

49. Difficulties Encountered. As events proved, the Forward Echelon was given a greater degree of authority and independence than was contemplated, and, with the lack of clear-cut responsibilities in relation to the other commands, this situation soon grew confused, 21 Army Group, FUSAG and Headquarters, ETOUSA/SOS all issued instructions to the Forward Echelon. Although a part of ETOUSA/SOS, it was attached to 21 Army Group and, therefore, logically it should have received instructions from that one source. Yet, initially, the SOS Commander had held the Forward Echelon commander responsible to him. This was later corrected to a certain extent, but never completely clarified. Originally the Forward Echelon was contemplated to become operational on the Continent. It was also to conduct planning from D plus 41 to D plus 90. Later a directive stated it would be responsible for planning Communications Zone operations subsequent to D plus 41 and supervise its operations. Still later, the Forward Echelon was informed that after D plus 90, all planning would be done by Headquarters, Communications Zone, and it would return necessary staff personnel to assist with this work. But no decision was ever made of its supervision responsibilities. This was incongruous because it could not operate if personnel were withdrawn. Likewise, the Advance Section, under FUSA, was to command the Communications Zone initially, yet it was responsible only to FUSA and not to Forward Echelon which was supposed to exercise staff supervision for Headquarters SOS, under 21 Army Group. Further ETOUSA had agreed not to place any other Communications Zone headquarters between FUSA and Advance Section. At the same time ETOUSA required the Forward Echelon to supervise Communications Zone activities on the Continent. This was incompatible and confusing. Forward Echelon was finally relegated to impotence in favor of Advance Section and ended its life on the Continent concerned mainly with planning and preparing for the physical establishment of the main headquarters on the Continent. Forward Echelon did not fulfill its mission as originally contemplated.

50. Conclusions.

a. Forward Echelon performed its planning mission satisfactorily. However, it was never in a position to operate as Headquarters, Communications Zone on the Continent.

b. The establishment of Forward Echelon with a complete general and special staff, a commanding general, and in a separate location, created the belief that it was a separate command.

c. The manner in which Forward Echelon was established created confusion and misunderstanding at all levels and interfered with logistical planning for Continental operations.

d. Written directives and personal conferences alike failed to clarify the situation and eliminate misunderstandings.

e. The absorption of Forward Echelon by Headquarters, Communications Zone was the only solution to the problem which had been created.

51. Recommendations. It is recommended that, in a similar situation, the formation of a Forward Echelon be avoided. Instead, a special planning staff should be organized under a deputy chief of staff, charged with supervising and coordinating detailed planning by general and special staff sections and responsible for conducting necessary negotiations with the combat command staffs. Further, when operations actually begin, a somewhat similar staff must be attached to the forward general or field headquarters to implement

the plans and to make the necessary modifications required by operating conditions. That staff, however, must be more than a planning staff. It must be strengthened by men with operating experience and in a position to act authoritatively in supervising logistical operations. It is at this stage, therefore, that a Forward Echelon of the theater Headquarters must be established, with deputy chiefs of service present to take the necessary action to see that supplies and services are furnished promptly efficiently and in accordance with overall policies and capabilities.

CHAPTER 2

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15. GO No. 28, Hq. COM Z/ETOUSA, 26 June 1944.
16. Letter, DC/S, Hq., ETOUSA, to CG FECZ, 28 April 1944.
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APPENDIX 1

Letter, SHAEF (AG 322.), subject;
Organization of US Forces (Administrative),
Operation OVERLORD, 9 February 1944.

"1. Major General John C. F. LEE, as Deputy Theater Commander (US) is, ex officio, Chief Administrative Officer (US), and as such is available to SHAEF, on administrative matters.

"FUSAG will attach to the 21 Army Group an adequate Staff Section for administration of U.S. Ground Forces which are now under or may come under command of 21 Army Group.

"3. The Deputy Theater Commander is the Commander of the Communications Zone (US). He will designate a Deputy Commander, Communications Zone, (US) with adequate staff, who will be responsible for initial planning, development and operation of the US Communications Zone on the Continent. The D/CG, CZ and staff will be attached until an area of responsibility on the Continent has been assigned to the US Army Group by the Supreme Commander.

"4. The US Army Group, (FUSAG) will be assigned an appropriate tactical command under the Supreme Commander when he determines that the number of US troops on the Continent warrants. At that time the Communications Zone will be attached to FUSAG Headquarters.

"5. When the Supreme Commander establishes on the Continent an advance echelon of ETO, the Deputy Commander, Communications Zone (US), and staff will come under the command of Headquarters ETO (US)."

APPENDIX 2

S-E-C-R-E-T

HEADQUARTERS
Com Z ETOUSA
APO 887

AG 322 x 381 OpCG

21 Feb 1944

SUBJECT: Organization of US Forces (Administrative), Operation OVERLORD.

TO : Deputy Commanding General, Communications Zone.

1. Reference is made to Staff Memo, subject as above, SHAEF, dated 9 Feb 1944 which outline certain responsibilities and directed FUSAG and the Deputy Theater Commander (Commander of the Communications Zone) to attach staffs to 21 Army Group. You are responsible to the Commander of the Communications Zone on the Continent for initial planning, development and operation of the US Communications Zone on the continent. In carrying out this responsibility, you are attached initially to 21 Army Group and will operate as a forward echelon of the US Communications Zone.

2. The following will govern your activities while attached to 21 Army Group:

a. You will perform and supervise planning and operations in connection with communication zone activities in close cooperation with the staff section attached by FUSAG, working in consultation with the proper elements of both the FUSAG Staff Section and the 21 Army Group Administrative Staff in accordance with technical agreements and policy of this headquarters:

(1) To check the suitability of existing administrative arrangements and instructions pertaining to the Communication Zone.

(2) To assist the combined staff of 21 Army Group in supervising communication zone detailed planning and communication zone operations conducted by the First US Army during the time that the Advance Section Communications Zone is attached to that Army (until a rear boundary of the army is established for planning purposes, approximately D + 41).

(3) To supervise detailed planning and operations conducted by Advance Section Communication Zone after the establishment of an army rear boundary (for planning purposes, approximately D + 20 to D + 41).

(4) To conduct and direct detailed planning of subsequent Communications Zone activities in the original OVERLORD lodgment area (for planning purposes approximately D + 41 to D + 90).

(5) To coordinate requirements of troops and other resources for Communication Zone activities charged to you and to arrange for implementation by the proper agencies.

(6) To submit administrative and technical reports as directed by this headquarters.

b. It is contemplated that the staff section of FUSAG in 21 Army Group will exercise the required overall general staff coordination between activities in the Army areas and activities in the Communication Zone. However, as a whole, to provide for suitable channels of technical supervision in the theater, the special staff officers of FUSAG staff section and Hq Forward Echelon Communication Zone should carry out normal special staff functions for operations in army areas and the Communication Zone respectively. The respective special staff officers concerned must work closely together. In the case of work with the British, each must act within his own field.

c. You will be provided with the necessary staff and will utilize existing Hq ETOUSA agencies wherever possible. Close consultation will be effected between the respective general and special staff sections of Hq ETOUSA, FUSAG, and your headquarters. Policies, procedure, and command matters will be reduced to writing.

3. Initially you will exercise technical supervision over the Advance Section, Communication Zone. When this Section is detached from command of First US Army, it will revert to your command.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL LEE:

R. B. LOVETT
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Addressee	(2)
CAO, SHAEF	(1)
Civ Affairs Div, SHAEF	(1)
FUSAG	(1)
MGA, 21 Army Group	(1)
FUSA	(1)
Each Base Section, SOS, ETOUSA	(1)
Advance Section, Com Z	(1)
AG, FE Com Z	(1)
General & Special Staff Sections ETOUSA	(1)
AG Records	(1)

APPENDIX 3

EXTRACTS FROM SHAEF DIRECTIVE (44) 22, SUBJECT: OPERATION, OVERLORD, 10 MARCH 1944.

OBJECT

2. The object of Operation 'OVERLORD' is to secure a lodgement area on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions, and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the UNITED STATES and elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month.

3. The operation will be carried out in two phases:

Phase I - The effecting of an assault landing on the NORMANDY beaches between the limits of Quineville in the WEST and CAENBOURG-LES-BAINS in the EAST, to be followed by the early capture and development of airfield sites and the capture of the port of CHERBOURG.

Phase II - The enlargement of the area captured in Phase I so as to secure the whole of the CHERBOURG, LOIRE AND BRITANNY group of ports.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

5. The Supreme Commander controls and co-ordinates the planning and execution of the operation as a whole.

6. You will be responsible to him for the planning of the operation and for its execution, when so ordered.

7. You will work in close consultation with the Service Ministries (through the Executive Planning Section) and with Headquarters, STOUA, in connection with the mounting of the operation.

8. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, will be responsible for the command of all ground forces engaged in the operation until such time as the Supreme Commander allocates an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First (US) Army Group.

9. The Supreme Commander will effect the allocation of an area of responsibility to the First (US) Army Group by the designation of an appropriate boundary line, the general principle being adopted that UNITED STATES forces will be on the right and BRITISH/CANADIAN forces on the left of the line throughout the operation. The effective date for the allocation of an area of responsibility to First (US) Army Group will be when, in the opinion of the Supreme Commander, the number of UNITED STATES troops landed on the Continent warrants their control being exercised by the First (US) Army Group Commander.

ALLOTMENT AND CONSTITUTION OF FORCES

Ground Forces

13. A suitable staff and signals increment from First (US) Army Group will be attached to Headquarters, 21 Army Group, at a time to be mutually arranged. This increment less such staff as may be

necessary for liaison or administration of any US force remaining under command of Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, will rejoin Headquarters, First (US) Army Group, when the latter is set up on the Continent.

14. An estimate of the UNITED STATES and BRITISH/CANADIAN ground forces which will be available in the UNITED KINGDOM for the operation on 31st May 1944, is attached as Appendix "C".

15. In addition to the forces forming 21 Army group and such commandos as are required the following UNITED STATES troops will be under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, for the operation, until such time as the Supreme Commander allocates an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First (US) Army Group.

a. First (US) Army reinforced by: -

- (1) Such UNITED STATES airborne troops as are required for the operation consistent with the air lift available.
- (2) Such ranger battalions as are required for the operation.
- (3) Such additional US Army Group troops as are required for the support and maintenance of UNITED STATES forces.
- (4) A supply and maintenance organization to consist of a Base Section Headquarters and such SOS troops and personnel as are necessary. These troops will pass to the control of First (US) Army Group in the Communications Zone when Headquarters, First (US) Army Group, is set up on the Continent.

b. Such additional UNITED STATES troops including those required for logistical support as are placed under command of Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, in the execution of plans prepared for the seizure of the lodgement area and for initiating operations subsequent to the seizure of the lodgement area.

16. All allied contingents now under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, may be employed in conformity with the existing directive issued to each of them.

EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION

21. You will adhere to the broad design of the operation as given in the Outline Plan which has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A copy of this plan (COSSAC (43) 28; COS (43) 416 (0)) has already been issued to you.

22. You will plan on the basis of a simultaneous lift of eight assault brigades being available.

23. You will ensure the earliest establishment of 'MULBERRIES' at ARROMANCHES and ST LAURENT, the exact positions of which have already been notified to you.

24. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, will direct and co-ordinate the planning, by First (US) Army Group, for the employment of UNITED STATES troops, in addition to those troops referred to in paragraph 15a which will be required for the seizure of the lodgement area and for initiating operations subsequent to the seizure of the lodgement area.

ADMINISTRATION

Maintenance

28. You are responsible for determining the requirements in material and personnel for the maintenance of all forces under your commands, and for making the necessary arrangements for obtaining the required resources and for distributing resources which are obtained.

29. For this purpose you will deal direct with Headquarters, ETOUSA, COMNAVEU, and the Service Ministries on related matters which are within the announced policies of this headquarters or which are not of common concern to BRITISH AND UNITED STATES forces. Recommendations on matters of common concern not already covered by announced policies will be submitted to this headquarters.

30. You will be responsible for ensuring sound maintenance and for directing administrative development within the zone of operations in accordance with directives from this headquarters. Administrative procedures of UNITED STATES forces will function as far as practicable through normal UNITED STATES channels.

Ground Forces

31. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, will be responsible for the administration of all ground forces engaged in the operation until such time the Supreme Commander allocates an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First (US) Army Group. Pending such time, the First (US) Army Group will attach to the 21 Army Group an adequate Staff Section for administration of UNITED STATES ground forces which are now under, or may come under, command of 21 Army Group.

Base and lines of communications

32. Initially the main base will be in the UNITED KINGDOM.

33. Subject to such general direction as may be exercised by the Supreme Commander, the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, in collaboration with Air Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force is responsible for the preparation of plans for, and the general supervision of, the development and operation of the lines of communication on the Continent; for determination of requirements for movement to the Continent; and for the supervision of movement on the Continent. The Deputy Theater Commander (US) is the Commander of the Communications Zone (US). He will designate a Deputy Commander, Communications Zone (US), with adequate staff, who will be responsible under the general direction of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, for initial planning, development and operation of the UNITED STATES Communications Zone on the Continent. The Communications Zone will be attached to 21 Army Group and will remain so attached until an area of responsibility on the Continent has been assigned to First (US) Army Group by the Supreme Commander at which time the attachment will pass to First Army Group.

ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

First Phase - Command of ground forces vested in 21 Army Group

STAFF will:-

1. Prepare outline administrative plans for future allied operations.

2. Co-ordinate as necessary both inter-service and inter-called administrative policy.

3. Allocate material resources in short supply until shipped overseas.

4. Make representation to UNITED STATES Departments or BRITISH Ministries concerning policy and material requirements whenever these influence the theater as a whole.

5. Deal on policy as to requisitioning and purchasing in the theater of operations, including policy as to hiring of labour and policy as to allocation of local resources.

7. Determine policy in POL matters; approve POL plans from the long-term viewpoint; and allocate as necessary POL products.

8. Co-ordinate as may be necessary plans and construction of airfields.

9. Co-ordinate policy on discipline, honours and awards, welfare and health.

10. Co-ordinate policy concerning prisoners of war.

11. Co-ordinate movement policy as a whole so as to ensure optimum use of available facilities including:-

a. Shipping routes and requirements.

b. Combined movement policy in the overseas theater as a whole.

c. Policy as to port and rail development into the overseas theater as a whole.

d. Movement policy for Civil Affairs.

APPENDIX 4

S E C R E T

HEADQUARTERS
COM Z ETOUSA
APO 887

AG 322 x 381 OpCG

14 Mar 1944

SUBJECT: Organization of US Forces (administration), Operation
OVERLORD

TO : Deputy Commanding General, Communications Zone

1. Reference is made to SHAEF Directive SHAEF (44) 22, dated 10 March 1944.

2. Directive this headquarters subject as above AG 322x381 OpCG dated 21 February 1944 is rescinded.

3. You will initially command the Communications Zone on the Continent when established and for this purpose your headquarters will be known as the Forward Echelon Communications Zone and will be organized provisionally as such. It will be attached to 21 Army Group until an area of responsibility on the Continent has been assigned to US Army Group by the Supreme Commander.

4. You will be responsible, under the direction of the G-in-C, 21 Army Group, for initial planning, development, operation, and security of the US Communications Zone on the Continent. The G-in-C, 21 Army Group will give you such instructions as he may consider to be within his province as commander of all ground forces and which he considers necessary for coordination of the Communications Zone on the Continent with the other commands under him.

5. While attached to 21 Army Group, it is desired that you undertake the following insofar as they do not conflict with the directions of the G-in-C 21 Army Group:

a. Conduct your activities in accordance with technical agreements and administrative policies of this headquarters.

b. Check the suitability of existing administrative arrangements and instructions pertaining to the Communications Zone.

c. Assist the staff of the G-in-C, 21 Army Group in supervising detailed planning for, and operation of the organizations attached to the First US Army which are intended for eventual use in the Advance Section Communications Zone (until an army rear boundary is established, estimated for planning purposes to be about D + 20).

d. Supervise detailed planning for operations of the initial Advance Section Communications Zone (for planning purposes from about D + 20 to D + 41).

e. Conduct planning for subsequent Communications Zone activities.

f. Coordinate requirements of troops and other resources for the Communications Zone activities charged to you and to arrange for implementation by the proper agencies.

g. Submit the administrative and technical reports directed by proper authority.

6. You will be provided with the necessary staff and will utilize existing Hq. ETOUSA agencies wherever possible. Close consultations will be effected between the respective general and special staff sections of Hq. ETOUSA, FUSAG, and your headquarters. Policies, procedure, and command matters will be reduced to writing.

7. You will exercise technical supervision over the operations of the units from the Services of Supply attached to the First US Army but intended for eventual use in the Communications Zone. When an army rear boundary is designated you will command the Communications Zone on the Continent while attached to 21 Army Group.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE;

R. B. LORD,
Brigadier General, G.S.C.
Chief of Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: A, plus:

Addressee	(30)
CAO, SHAEF	(2)
Civ Affairs Div SHAEF	(2)
FUSAG	(20)
HQ, 21 Army Group	(5)
FUSA	(20)
Fifth Air Force	(5)
Task Force 122	(5)
Each Base Section, SOS, ETCUSA	(1)
Advance Section, Com Z	(20)
AG, FE Com Z	(1)

APPENDIX 5

Letter, Hq., ETOUSA, (AG 32,6610 PGa)

Subject: FECZ, 27 May 1944.

- "1. Forward Echelon Communications Zone will exercise staff supervision over Continental Base Section in the UK and on the Continent. It is not a separate Command Headquarters. When Headquarters, Communications Zone is established on the Continent, the Forward Echelon Staff will be absorbed.
- "2. Brig. Gen. Harry B. Vaughan is designated as the Forward Deputy Commander, Com Z, and will be in charge of the Forward Echelon Staff.
- "3. The personnel requirements for the Forward Echelon Staff sections and services will be as determined by the respective Chiefs of the Staff Sections and Services, ETOUSA, after consultation with the Forward Deputy Commander, COM Z. Personnel to be placed on detached service with Forward Echelon will be recommended by Chiefs of Staff Sections and Services, ETO, and approved by the Deputy Theater Commander.
- "4. Reference is made to SHAEF Directive 4433, dated 10 Mar 44, and to Directive this Hqs, subject as above, AG 322/381, OPGG, dated 14 Mar 44. The Staff duties and responsibilities of Forward Echelon, Com Z, while attached to the 21 Army Gp remain unchanged.
- "5. All administrative planning for the period subsequent to D plus 90 will be performed by Headquarters Com Z (Hqs ETOUSA). The Forward Echelon will complete all Com Z planning for the period to D plus 90 in accordance with previous directives."

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO LOS

THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

CHAPTER 3

ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BASE SECTIONS

SECTION 14

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASE SECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOMS

52. Situation Before Establishment of Services of Supply. Until the activation of the European Theater of Operations (8 June 1942) the problem of creating administrative subdivisions in the British Isles had not arisen. Troops in Iceland were under the Iceland Base Command; those in the United Kingdom were concentrated in Ireland under the Northern Ireland Base Command. With the rapid development of plans in May and June 1942, it became essential to consider the administrative framework for the supply and maintenance of a substantial force of American troops.

53. Necessity For Establishment of Base Sections. In addition to the increasing force in Ireland, action was being taken to establish a large number of United States troops in England, Wales and Scotland. Quarters and maintenance installations for those had to be taken over or constructed along with air fields and other installations for American Air Force operations. In addition to supplies for current maintenance it was essential to make arrangements to receive and store supplies and equipment for continental operations. The British railways and communications systems were already heavily loaded by British civil and military requirements, and it was immediately apparent that the task of maintaining American troops and preparing for the invasion would require close coordination of activities over a wide spread area, with transportation and communication more difficult by far than in the Zone of Interior. The situation might become aggravated at any time by enemy action. Further the magnitude of the task would soon be too great for effective control by a single headquarters. The creation of base sections to permit decentralization of administration and supervision of operations afforded the only answer to the problem.

54. Creation of Base Sections in the United Kingdom. Following rapidly upon the formal organization of the Services of Supply in England orders were issued dividing the territory concerned into four base sections as follows: 1,2

- a. Northern Ireland Base Section
- b. Western Base Section
- c. Southern Base Section
- d. Eastern Base Section

These base sections did not include the Bristol Port Area which was established as a separate command.² Following the embarkation of troops from Ireland during Operation Torch, Northern Ireland Base Section was merged with Western Base Section (15 December 1942).³ It was re-established in November, 1943, when troop strength in

Northern Ireland again began to reach significant proportions.⁴ Meanwhile the London area had been set up as Central Base Section in April, 1943.⁵ During 1944 as troops moved from the United Kingdom to the Continent, Western Base Section absorbed Northern Ireland Base Section and Eastern Base Section.^{6, 16} In September, 1944, the United Kingdom base was established to administer to all United States troops in the British Isles, with districts where there had formerly been base sections,^{17, 18}

55. Period of Exempted Activities. As originally established, the base sections in the United Kingdom were charged with "administration, sanitation and necessary arrangements for supply, and with other operation of the SOS as the CG may direct." (See Appendix 1). Certain important operations were exempted from control of the base section commander, viz: 2

- a. Transportation Service, including port operations.
- b. General supply and repair depots.
- c. New construction.
- d. General Hospitals.

The exempted activities were controlled directly from Headquarters, Services of Supply, although the base section commander was to be kept "continually informed of progress and status of operations." (See Appendices 1 & 2). Essentially the base section commander was responsible for the supervision, inspection, and coordination of operations and activities within his base section.² During the course of the first ten months, the number of exempt activities increased, the exemptions including the American School Center,⁸ convalescent hospitals,⁹ general laboratories,⁹ and certain specific technical installations like the 36th Station Hospital,¹⁰ a Chemical Warfare Service impregnating plant¹¹ and X-Ray Service Depot No. 400.¹²

56. Abolition of Exempted Activities. In the spring of 1943 there was a fundamental change in policy concerning exempted activities. The feeling among base section commanders and the general staff sections of Headquarters, Services of Supply was that a more complete decentralization of activities was essential to efficient operations. In May 1943, base section commanders were made responsible for the "internal management" of the exempted activities, leaving technical operations still under the direct control of the respective chiefs of service concerned.¹³ In August, 1943, the policy of complete decentralization was inaugurated by making base section commanders responsible for all activities within their respective areas.¹⁴ (See Appendix 3) This policy was subsequently applied to continental base sections when they were established.

57. Organization of Base Section Staffs. In general the base sections were set up with general and special staff sections along conventional lines so far as structure was concerned. However, owing to the existence of exempted activities, the special staff sections were not completely responsible to the base section commander during the first year. Provision was made that each officer who was "charged by the Chief of Service concerned with supervision of an exempted activity throughout a Base Section will be on the staff of the Base Section Commander."¹⁷ Thus the base section commander's service representatives were directly responsible to the chiefs of their respective services at Headquarters, Services of Supply and at the same time under the direct control of the base section commander. As soon as exempted activities were abolished, this anomalous situation was eliminated.¹⁴ In order to obtain complete uniformity of organization and to eliminate uncertainties as to proper routing of communications a directive was issued requiring base section staffs

to be organized so as to parallel the staff of the Commanding General, Headquarters, Services of Supply. ¹⁵ Base section commanders were authorized to subdivide their areas into districts where necessary in order to bring about more effective and direct supervision of activities. The resulting district headquarters were not to be offices of record, nor were they intended to be another command echelon. ¹⁴ Their purpose was primarily that of providing further decentralization, especially for inspection and supervision.

SECTION 15

ESTABLISHMENT OF SECTIONS BASE SECTIONS ON THE CONTINENT

58. Organization in Advance of Landing. Well before D-Day, preparations were made in the United Kingdom for the establishment of subdivisions of the Communications Zone on the Continent. The organization of the headquarters staff of Advance Section was officially directed in early February, 1944. ¹⁹ Before that date the nucleus of the staff had already been formed. Its mission was to provide immediate support for Armies, assuming responsibility as soon as a rear boundary was declared and moving forward as that boundary was advanced. ²⁰ The organization of Continental Base Section No. 1 was provided in April, 1944, ²¹ and that of Continental Base Section No. 2 was set up late in May. ²² Thus before the actual start of operations in France steps had been taken to have three headquarters staffs organized and functioning (by working on plans) in preparation for subdivision of the Communications Zone on the Continent as soon as the area involved should warrant such decentralization.

59. Establishment of Section/Base Sections on the Continent. Advance Section staff began to take over operating responsibilities gradually from First Army after the arrival of the initial increment on D 3, although not as rapidly as original plans provided. ²³ (For further discussion of Advance Section see Chapter 4 below.) The radical change in tactical plans, including the abandonment of the project to develop the Quiberon Bay area as a supply base, resulted in a revision of arrangements for base sections on the Continent. Advance Section's mission continued to be "to provide direct administrative support to the armies." Base Section No. 1 was assigned to the Brittany area. Base Section No. 2 was temporarily held in reserve. Base Section no. 3 relieved Advance Section by taking over Cherbourg and the vicinity. ²⁴ Base Section No. 3 was the first of the base sections to operate, starting on 7 August. ²⁵ It was initially known as Cherbourg Base Section but within a few days was redesignated Normandy Base Section. ²⁶ Brittany Base Section (Base Section No. 1) officially began operations on 16 August. ²⁶ The creation of Base Sections Nos. 4 and 5 was announced on 22 August. ²⁷ No. 5 became Seine Section; ²⁸ No. 4, after being redesignated Intermediate Section, took over the territory and name of Channel Base. ^{29, 31} Oise Base Section, later known as Oise Intermediate Section, was established on 15 September, ^{30, 40} while Base Section No. 2 became Loire Section. ²⁹ Because of the rapid advance of the U.S. Forces to the east and a decision not to develop the Brittany ports, Loire Section was absorbed by Brittany Base at the end of November. ³² It should be noted that the section headquarters staffs were not entirely new organizations or new to their operation. They were to a large extent, the result of the transfer of working staffs which had been operating in the United Kingdom. Thus Base Section No. 1 (Brittany) was formed out of Eastern Base Section. Normandy Base Section was started by a detachment from the XVIII district of Southern Base. ³⁹ Base Section No. 2 was almost wholly the old Northern Ireland headquarters staff. Channel Base was headed by personnel from Western Base, Seine Section from Central Base and Oise from Southern Base.

Meanwhile the operations in Southern France had resulted in the creation of a second communications zone which was shortly to become part of ETOUSA. Coastal Base Section was established on July 7, 1944, 33 and then renamed Continental Advance Section when the base area was turned over to the newly-created Delta Base Section (October 1, 1944). 35 Both organizations were placed under Headquarters, Southern Line of Communications, as a part of Communications Zone ETOUSA, effective 20 November 1944, 36 and directly under Headquarters, Communications Zone, ETOUSA in February 1945. 37 Apart from Changes in territorial boundaries the only other change in Sections/ Base Sections on the continent before the cessation of hostilities was the absorption of Brittany Base Section into Normandy Base Section, 38, 39 The organization charts of the sections as they existed in February 1945 are shown in Appendices 5 to 12 inclusive.

60. Exempted Activities on the Continent. As already indicated, base section commanders on the Continent, were charged with full responsibility for all Communications Zone activities and operations within their respective areas (See Appendix 4). Certain military activities, however, extended continuously through several sections and into the Combat Zone, and these were exempted from section control. They included the operation of military railways (Military Railway Service), the construction, maintenance and operation of petrol and oil pipelines (Military Pipeline Service), certain communications facilities (Theater Signal Communication Service), and inter-section motor transport (Motor Transport Service). Such exempted activities had not existed in the United Kingdom owing to the fact that railways, wire communications, and petroleum movements had been handled by the British government and commercial facilities as required upon request of United States authorities. To a considerable extent such exemptions were not formalized in written directives to the base sections until the spring of 1945 (See Appendices 13, 14 and 15 of this chapter and Appendix 14, Chapter 1). In addition, as in the United Kingdom, certain overall Communications Zone and Theater functions were necessarily handled by the headquarters staff of Communications Zone:

- a. Requisitions on the Zone of Interior and local procurement of supplies for Theater stocks.
- b. Distribution of supplies among depots.
- c. Inter-depot transfers of supplies.
- d. Issue of controlled and critical items.
- e. Assignment of troops units to Sections/Base Sections.

SECTION 16

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

61. Basic Issues: Apart from certain questions concerning the functions of Advance Section (treated separately in Chapter 3 below) there are only two basic issues raised in the organization of subdivisions within the Communications Zone.

- a. The desirability of establishing sections and base sections within the Communications Zone, together with the desirability of establishing further subdivisions within such sections.
- b. The extent to which activities should be controlled directly from headquarters and exempted from base section command.

62. Desirability of Creation of Subdivisions within the Communications Zone. The necessity of establishing sections and base sections within the Communications Zone is scarcely debatable. In a fast changing situation, with operations scattered over a large geographical area and particularly when communications are difficult, the decentralization of operations offers the only possible means of obtaining prompt, effective and properly coordinated results. This is provided in the current edition (15 November 1943) of War Department Field Manual FM 100-10, Section V, paragraph 55, and experience in this theater has confirmed the necessity of such subdivisions. The advisability of further subdivision into districts is not so clear except for the execution of certain specified functions. There is frequently need to have a representation of the base section commander assigned to a limited area for the purpose of carrying out frequent and executing specific directions of the section commander. This was particularly true on the Continent, where a single base section sometime extended several hundred miles in length and breadth and personal visits to installations involved too much travel in time and distance from section headquarters. In some instances, however, both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent, the section commander delegated complete command and operating responsibility to the district commander. As a result, another staff echelon was created, thereby complicating the situation, absorbing more overhead personnel and slowing down responsiveness to directives or requests for assistance. Thus, when a service chief desired to move a unit from a base section, the matter had to be cleared not only with the general staff and the base section commander but also with the district commander. Certain matters arising at the level of troop units or installations had to channel up through district commander as well as a section headquarters and then back down again, thereby entailing serious delays.

63. Factors Favoring the Exemption of Activities. The factors favoring the exemption of activities from base section control may be summarized as follows:

a. There is definitely a need to have uniform operating policies and procedures throughout the Communications Zone. Many of these matters are governed by Army Regulations and are so well established that they may be safely left to the section commander for execution. Such matters include administration, quartering, discipline, of personnel, routine supply, sanitation, and basic training. On the other hand activities of a more technical nature, such as the operation of supply depots, maintenance shops, signal installations and hospital facilities, may require considerable supervision from Communications Zone Headquarters. In a static situation such matters can be handled through the issuance of detailed directives and standard operating procedures, but in a new situation, such as was encountered in the United Kingdom, it takes time to develop the necessary policies and instruction. This situation is aggravated when there is a general shortage of trained and experienced personnel. Meanwhile service chiefs can handle problems quickly as they arise by personal direction or direct communication, concentrating the best available personnel on central control.

b. Because service chiefs are held responsible for the efficient operations of their respective activities, they feel the need for direct control, including the command of installations and personnel. Such control enables them to take prompt corrective action, to apply policies and procedure as they think best and to obtain results by inspection and on-the-spot decisions. By directing the assignment of troop units and personnel, plus control over promotions, they can assure the most effective use of available

resources throughout all sections and keep operating efficiency at a high level. Without such control, the chief of service feels that his hands are more or less tied. Adjustments in units and individual personnel become slow and difficult to accomplish through command channels. Further, after he has supplied what he considers the necessary personnel to perform the mission, he may find that it has been diverted to activities other than those for which it was intended.

c. The section commander necessarily looks at the situation from his own point of view, yet the Communications Zone must be operated as a well coordinated, balanced entity. By having each service direct operations from the Communications Zone headquarters, problems are approached from an overall point of view, and good balance located in individual sections are of concern to more than that section, sometimes being of theater scope. It is difficult for the base section commander to visualize the effect upon activities outside his area of decisions made for operations within it. Communications Zone headquarters sees the picture as a whole.

d. Certain activities, notably intersection motor transport, long-lines communications, pipeline service and railway operations, must be operated for the theater as an integral unit. Conflicts and confusion are bound to arise if responsibility for them is divided among base sections.

e. Service depots are operated as exempted stations in the Zone of Interior and there is naturally a feeling that such arrangements should be maintained on a similar basis in a theater of operations.

f. If base section commanders are made responsible for all activities, including the internal operation of service depots, operations are subject to a multiplicity of inspections. Thus in addition to the chief of service or his staff representative they will be inspected by the commanding general of the Communications Zone, the base section commander, the service representative in the base section staff, and the district commander, to say nothing of visits by general staff representatives. This results in conflicting directions, confusion and interruption of daily operation.

54. Factors Against Exemption of Activities. The factors against exempting activities from base section control may be summarized as follows:

a. The staff of headquarters, Communications Zone is too far removed from actual operations in the basic sections to control them effectively. Distance and normal difficulties of communications make it essential that authority be delegated to an echelon which is in close and constant touch with activities in the field.

b. The base section commander has the primary responsibility for operations in his area. He must be given authority commensurate with that responsibility. The division of the authority and responsibility which existed in Services of Supply during the first year of operations in the United Kingdom could only be justified as a temporary expedient until well defined policies, procedures, and instructions could be developed and back up by the acquisition of more adequate staff in the field.

c. The establishment of uniform policies and operating procedures can be achieved by centralizing their formulation (as must be done in any case) in the Communications Zone and holding base

section commanders strictly responsible for putting them into practice. The section commander is in a position to provide close and constant supervision backed up by full knowledge of the local situation. The service chief cannot possibly provide comparable supervision without greatly expanding his staff on the operating side. This usually results in violating the well-tested principle of not having too many persons and activities reporting to one administrator. The choice then is between extravagant administration at Communications Zone headquarters or neglect of field operations. Since competent personnel is always scarce in war, the latter alternative is most likely to result. Headquarters should confine its operating activities primarily on follow-up to see that policies and procedure are strictly observed. The service chief can be given sufficient control over service representatives in sections by requiring his concurrence on transfer and promotion of key officers.

d. A headquarters staff should concern itself principally with planning, policy formulation and coordination. If it is made responsible for the direct supervision of exempted activities, the inevitable tendency is for the staff to become immersed in operating details. Staff functions are bound to suffer as a consequence. A strict division between staff work and operations is neither possible nor desirable, but the emphasis of a headquarters should clearly be on staff function, with operating activities held to a minimum. Even with operating responsibility completely decentralized to the base sections, the tendency remains strong for the staff to concern itself too much with operating details. This tendency was manifest in the European Theater. It must be curbed or planning and coordination will be materially impaired.

e. The section commander, possessing full control over labor, utilities, and other resources, is able to give all installations the facilities they require on a prompt and efficient basis. With exempted activities the responsibility for providing utilities, labor, and other services falls on the chief of service, who is in a poor position to obtain them except in so far as they relate directly to his own service. Thus the Communications Zone quartermaster cannot supply ordnance, signal, constructions or transport facilities to his depots so readily as the base section commander who has such operations directly under his own control. When an installation is an exempted station, the base section commander naturally will not give its requirements the same consideration he devotes to activities for which he is directly responsible. Further, if the chief of service does eventually succeed in providing for the full requirements of an exempted installation, there is bound to be a waste of facilities and personnel because not all activities work at a peak at the same time. The conservation of resources, as is always imperative, demands that they be pooled to the maximum extent. With exempted stations there will be waste, or neglect, or both.

f. Contrary to general opinion, the exemption of activity does not materially reduce the number of inspections. So long as the base section commander is responsible for the administration and housekeeping of troops in his area, he must perform a certain amount of inspection even in exempted stations, and any reduction in the extent of inspections is offset by the more efficient results which are likely to flow from the base section commander having full authority to supervise closely and take prompt corrective action.

65. Other Considerations: Service chiefs almost universally desire operational control of the activities for which they are responsible, leaving administrative control to base sections. The difference between the two terms is exceedingly difficult to define, with the result that service chiefs and base section commanders inevitably and necessarily make their own interpretations. Confusion

and friction are bound to follow. The elimination of exempted activities helps considerably to remove this difficulty. Service chiefs still have the necessary degree of operating control through the proper use of command channels. Decentralization of course, does not mean complete abdication of responsibility by the service chiefs, but there is no need for caution on that score; their tendency is to go too far in the other direction. On the other hand, base section commanders, must be made to understand the function of service chiefs, and they must not be allowed to block staff coordination or to depart from established policies and procedure without full justification or without consulting the chief of service concerned. When a base section commander, as was sometimes done, attempts to arrogate to himself the functions of a chief of service, operation for the Communications Zone as a whole immediately suffers and eventually those within the base section will also be impaired. Direct informal or technical communication between the service chief and his representative in the base section must be maintained, and the base section commander must understand that the service chief speaks for the Commanding General on matters pertaining exclusively to his own service. Lastly, a large part of the problem eventually boils down to a question of personnel. With an adequate supply of competent personnel for all echelons, operations usually can be conducted without serious difficulty or friction. But in time of war, there is never enough trained and experienced personnel to meet requirements. The tendency of service chiefs generally is to concentrate the best personnel in their own staff and to release the weaker men to the base sections. This is natural; there must be good men in the headquarters staff, and men who distinguish themselves in the field are entitled to recognition by advancement, which frequently means moving them to headquarters. At the same time, there is need for judicious balance. Base sections must be given their share of competent personnel if operations are to be effective. In this connection, the fact is often overlooked that good operators are often poor staff men and vice versa, so that care must be exercised in taking men from the field to perform duties with the headquarters staff. With this qualification in mind, there should be a limited but systematic exchange of personnel between headquarters and base sections so that there is a proper understanding at both ends of the line. Without such exchange, each element becomes too much engrossed with its own problems and point of view to the detriment of operations as a whole.

66. Conclusions: a. The subdivision of the Communications Zone into sections and base sections was necessary and justifiable, both in the United Kingdom and on the Continent.

b. The subdivision of section/base sections into districts was justified, because of the large territory involved, but decentralization of operation and district staff should have been limited to inspection, sanitation and strictly routine matters not involving higher headquarters, together with specific missions delegated by the section commander. The district should not be a command echelon. Base sections should function as an integrated command and should not be so large that all troops and installations cannot be commanded by a single headquarters.

c. The degree to which activities should be exempted from base section control is a matter of evolution in a specific situation but in general there should be complete decentralization of operating responsibilities to the base section commanders, with the Communications Zone staff concentrating on plans, policies and coordination.

d. When activities cannot be decentralized because of their inter-sectional nature (such as railway and pipeline operation) the base section commander still has the responsibility for assisting

such activities in accordance with established policies and procedure. Further, in the interest of uniformity and efficiency on routine matters, the exemption of such activities should not be complete. The section commander in all cases should be charged with:

- (1) General court-martial jurisdiction.
- (2) Personnel accounting (including Machine Records Servicing).
- (3) Hospitalization and evacuation.
- (4) All fiscal transactions.
- (5) Supply of common items.
- (6) Assisting the commander to which assigned in the administrative and disciplinary inspection of units.

3. Base Section Commanders, in order to permit the effective decentralization of operation, must be given their due proportion of the competent personnel available to the theater, rather than concentrating the best personnel at Communications Zone headquarters.

CHAPTER 3

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36. GO No 61 HQ COM Z ETOUSA 8 November 1944
37. GO No 10 HQ COM Z ETOUSA 29 January 1945.
38. History of Normandy Base Section.
39. GO No 44 HQ COM Z ETOUSA 2 April 1945

APPENDIX 1

HEADQUARTERS
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

CIRCULAR)
No 3)

20 July 1942

INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING BASE SECTIONS

1. Description of Base Sections.

The SOS is divided into the following Base Sections (G.O. No. 10, Hq, SOS, 20 Jul 1942) for the purpose of achieving decentralization in administration and the supervision of operations:

Northern Ireland Base Section.	Northern Ireland
Western Base Section.	Scottish Command, Western Command, excluding ports in the Bristol Port Command, U.S. Army.
Southern Base Section.	Southern Command, South Eastern Command, and all ports in the Bristol Ports Command, U.S. Army.
Eastern Base Section	Northern Command, Eastern Command, and the London area, (for matters pertaining to the SOS).

2. a. The Base Section Commander is charged with administration, discipline, sanitation and necessary arrangements for supply, and with such other operations of the SOS as the CG may direct.

b. There are exempted from control of the Base Section Commander the internal management and technical operations of:

- (1) The Transportation Service, including Port operations.
- (2) General Supply and Repair Depots.
- (3) New construction.
- (4) General Hospitals.

c. Base Section headquarters and subordinate personnel will be assigned by the CG, SOS.

3. The duties, functions and responsibilities of the Base Section Commander include:

a. Administrative control of all SOS organizations and individuals in his Base Section except Hq. SOS.

b. Continual inspection of all SOS organizations and operations with appropriate action to promote overall efficiency, including recommendations to proper authorities in cases of exempted activities

(see 2 b. supra), and informing the CG, SOS, on all matters requiring his attention.

c. Co-ordination covering preparation of plans for all SOS organizations and individuals in all emergencies, including fire fighting, anti-sabotage activities and defence against ground or air attack.

d. Co-ordination of SOS organizations in the use of transportation and labor assigned to his Base Section Command.

e. Co-ordination of SOS relations with the British pertaining to his base section.

f. Counter-intelligence, censorship, and local press relations pertaining to the SOS.

g. Supervising the training of SOS units.

h. Co-ordination and supervision of hospital facilities assigned to his command and the sanitation of all areas under SOS control; notification to each unit in his Base Section of medical and evacuation facilities furnished by CG, SOS.

i. Necessary detailed arrangements for troop movements between points within his Base Section after advice from chiefs of Services concerned.

j. Co-ordination of traffic control and police regulations with other commands.

k. Administration of all quarters and quartering with which the CG, SOS, is charged.

l. Effecting arrangements for maintenance and repairs, with establishment of priorities therefor.

m. Supervision of arrangements in connection with deceased personnel of all U.S. forces.

n. Co-ordination of salvage and all facilities and services such as electricity, laundry and shoe repair required by U.S. forces, including necessary co-ordination with the British.

o. U.S. Army signal communications in his Base Section.

p. Supervision over payment of SOS units and such other disbursements of U.S. Government funds as the CG, SOS may direct.

q. Supervision of all Army Exchanges serving SOS troops.

r. Promotion and co-ordination of athletic and recreation programs for SOS troops and of recreational areas assigned to his command.

s. Recommendations covering matters of policy and major importance. (See para. 3 f.)

4. Sub-division of Base Sections.

a. Upon approval of the CG, SOS, the Base Section Commander will divide his Base Section successively into such geographical

Districts and areas as may be necessary and will define the missions of the district and area commanders.

b. The Base Section Commander will decentralize to district commanders the details of administration and operations with which he is charged. District Commanders' offices will be offices of record.

5. Engineer Service

The Engineer officer in charge of construction in a Base Section Commander. He will receive technical instructions and policies concerning repair, maintenance and engineer supply, and all instructions concerning new construction directly from the Chief, Engineer Service, SOS. The Base Section Engineer, in accordance with the priorities and administrative arrangements established through his District Engineers, of all repair and maintenance, the supply of tools and construction materials to U.S. troops and installations for this work, and all pertinent arrangements with the British.

6. Relationship with British Authorities

In general, Base Section Commanders will co-ordinate necessary administrative arrangements with the British through the appropriate British military or civil administrative agencies in the locality concerned.

7. Relationship with Tactical Commands

The relationship between the Base Section Commander and the tactical commanders in his Base Section will, within the limits of special conditions existent in this theater, be similar to the relationship in the within the Corps Area.

8. Reports and Communications

a. The office of the Base Section Commander will not be an office of record.

b. The channel for routine communications between Hq. SOS and SOS organizations will be to the district commander concerned, or direct in the case of an organization not located in a constituted district. Such routine communications will not be forwarded through the Base Section Commander unless they require his action.

c. Chiefs of services and their subordinates will communicate directly concerning exempted activities (see 2d. supra), but will keep the Base Section Commander continually informed of progress and status of operations by furnishing him copies of all policies, instructions, status and progress reports, plans and major modifications thereof, pertaining to his Base Section.

d. Communication between district commanders within a Base Section and between Base Section Commanders will be direct on all routine matters.

e. The number and length of reports and communications will be held to a minimum.

f. Base Commanders recommendations are desired by the CG,

SOS, on all questions of policy, all new projects and matters of policy, and matters of major importance.

By command of Major General LEE:

EWART G. PLANK,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

/s/t/ C. R. LONDON,
 Lt. Col., A.G.D.,
 Acting Adjutant General

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APPENDIX 2

HEADQUARTERS
SERVICES OF SUPPLY
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY

17 Aug 1942.

CIRCULAR)
No....12)

INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING BASE SECTIONS

1. Circular No. 3, this Hq., 20 Jul 1942, subject as above, is rescinded

2. The SOS is divided into four Base Sections to achieve decentralization in administrative and in the supervision of operations:

<u>U. S. DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CORRESPONDING BRITISH AREA</u>
Northern Ireland Base Section	Northern Ireland
Western Base Section	Scottish Command Western Command
Southern Base Section	Southern Command Southeastern Command
Eastern Base Section	Northern Command Eastern Command London District (for matters pertaining to the SOS).

3. a. The Base Section Commander commands all SOS individuals, units and installations located in his Base Section except those of Hq. SOS. He is charged with their training, administration, discipline, sanitation and necessary arrangements for supply, and with all operations of the SOS in his Base Section which are not specifically excepted by the CG. He has, within the limits of special conditions existing in this theater, the authority of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom for a Corps Area Commander over all individuals, units and installations assigned to his command, as well as over all other U.S. Army personnel in his Base Section except those within the confines of stations occupied by units or other commands, or in areas in which other commanders have been or may be given such authority by this Hq. or by Hq. ETO.

b. The internal management and technical operations of the following are exempted from command of the Base Section Commander, except as may be directed otherwise by the CG.

- (1) The Transportation Service.
- (2) General Depots, and Branch Depots, except those facilities whose sole mission is distribution to units within the Base Section, the particular facilities falling in the latter category to be designated by the CG.
- (3) Base Repair Shops.

- (4) New construction, including construction of wire and cable lines.
- (5) General Hospitals and General Laboratories.

c. Each officer who is charged by the Chief of Service concerned with supervision of an exempted activity throughout a Base Section will be on the staff of the Base Section Commander. The Base Section Engineer will command all Engineer troops assigned to the Base Section except those assigned to subdivisions thereof.

4. The functions and responsibilities of the Base Section Commander include, but are not limited to:

a. Continual inspection of all SOS organizations and operations, with appropriate action to promote overall efficiency, including recommendations to proper authorities in cases of exempted activities (3b. supra), and information and recommendations to the CG on all matters requiring his attention.

b. Co-ordination of plans of all SOS organizations and individuals for all emergencies, including fire fighting, anti-sabotage activities and defence against ground or air attack.

c. Counter-intelligence, censorship and local press relations pertaining to the SOS.

d. Arrangements for reception and orientation of US Forces in his Base Section.

e. Administration of all quarters and quartering in the Base Section with which the CG is charged.

f. Issuance of orders and detailed arrangements for movement of troops under his command between points within his Base Section (on advice of, or on concurrence of chief of service concerned in case of exempted activities (3b. supra)).

5. Sub-Division of Base Sections:

Upon approval of the CG, the Base Section commander may divide his Base Section successively into such geographical districts and areas as may be necessary and will define the missions of the District and Area Commanders. In the formation of such sub-divisions he may decentralize separate functions successively, as warranted by his operations.

6. Relationship with British authorities:

Base Section Commanders will co-ordinate necessary administrative arrangements with appropriate British military or civil administrative agencies in the locality concerned.

7. Relationship with Tactical Commanders

The relationship between the Base Section Commander and the tactical commanders in his Base Section will, within the limits of special conditions existing in this theater, be similar to the relationship in the United States of a Corps Area Commander to commanders of tactical units within the Corps Area.

8. Reports and Communications:

a. Chiefs of Services and their subordinates may communicate directly concerning exempted activities (3b., supra) Chiefs of Services will keep the Base Section Commander continually informed of progress and status of operations.

b. Communications between district commanders within a Base Section and between Base Section Commanders may be direct on all routine matters.

By command of Major General LEE:

CHARLES E. SALTZMAN
Colonel, G.S.C.
acting Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/s/t/ C. R. LONDON
Colonel, A.G.D.
Acting Adj. Gen.

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APPENDIX 3

R E S T R I C T E D
HQ SOS ETOUSA

Dir No 49

24 August 1943

Directive on Base Sections.....I
Operation of General and Branch Depots.....II

I DIRECTIVE ON BASE SECTIONS: 1. The SOS is divided into five Base Sections, to achieve decentralization in administration and in the supervision of operations.

<u>U. S. DESIGNATION</u>	<u>CORRESPONDING BRITISH AREA</u>
Northern Ireland Base Section (when activated)	Northern Ireland
Western Base Section	Scottish Command Western Command Northern Ireland (until N.I.B.S. is activated)
Southern Base Section	Southern Command South Eastern Command
Eastern Base Section	Northern Command Eastern Command
Central Base Section	London District

2. The Base Section Commander is charged with the responsibility for all SOS operations in his Base Section. He has, within the limits of special conditions existing in this theater, the authority of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom, for the Commanding General of a Service Command, over all SOS individuals, units and installations (except those of Headquarters, SOS) in his Base Section. The limitations placed upon the authority of a Commanding General of a Service Command over certain agencies of the Army Service Forces by AR 170-10 is not applicable to Section Commanders in this theater.

3. The responsibilities of the Base Section Commander within his Base Section include, but are not limited to:

- a. The control of an co-ordination of all SOS activities and operations, including the assignment of personnel and units.
- b. Locating and activating all approved field installations and agencies of the SOS.
- c. Construction.
- d. Administration of depots, including allocation and assignment of space therein, subject to overall allotments made by the CG, SOS.
- e. Receipt, storage, maintenance, salvage and issue, as directed, of supplies and equipment (except Air Corps technical supplies.)
- f. Administration of all quarters and quartering with which the SOS is charged.

g. Assignment of all SOS personnel, after consultation with Chief of Administration as to commanders and principal staff officers of units and installations.

h. Hospitalization and evacuation in accordance with policies of this headquarters.

i. Counterintelligence and censorship pertaining to the SOS.

j. The preparation of plans for SOS organizations and installations to meet all emergencies, such as fire, sabotage, and ground, airborne or air attacks.

k. Organization and operations of recreational activities and the Army Exchange Service.

l. Promotion and sale of War Bonds and National Service Life Insurance.

m. Arrangements for the reception and orientation of US Forces arriving in his Base Section.

n. In the case of the Commanding General, Central Base Section, continue to exercise the functions and administrative control heretofore charged to the Commanding Officer, London Base Command, by GO No. 50, ETOUSA, 16 Oct 1942, as amended by GO 7, Hq, ETOUSA, 2 Feb 1943. In the administration and enforcement of Military Justice within his Base Section in accordance with the commanding officers of individuals concerned is authorized.

o. In the case of the Commanding General, Central Base Section, the filling of requisitions for supplies and equipment submitted directly to him by the Headquarters Commanders, Headquarters, ETOUSA and Headquarters, SOS, ETOUSA.

4. Staffs of Base Section Commanders will be organized in general, so as to parallel the staff of the CG, SOS, with the activities of the Special Staff coordinated by a Chief of Administration and a Chief of Operations.

5. Base Section Commanders may subdivide their Base Sections into districts and areas as may be necessary for the purpose of achieving decentralization of operating control. Commanders of such subordinate agencies will have such responsibilities as are directed by the Base Section Commander, and will be given sufficient authority to enable them to carry out their assigned missions. Districts and areas will not be offices of record, and the staffs of their commanders will be held to the absolute minimum.

6. Relationship with Air Force, Field Forces and Naval Force Commanders:

The relationship between the Base Section Commander and any Tactical Commander in his Base Section is similar to the relationship in the United States between the Commanding General of a Service Command and the Commanders of Tactical units within the Service Command.

7. Relationship with British Authorities: Base Section Commanders will co-ordinate necessary administrative arrangements with appropriate British Military or Civilian administrative agencies in the locality concerned.

8. Channels for Communications: Communications from and to higher headquarters will be routed through normal military channels of command. Efficiency Reports and Recommendations for Promotions of Officers on reaching this headquarters will be referred to in appropriate cases to the Chief of the Service concerned.

9. All SCS personnel within the limits of a Base Section, except those assigned to units, depots, or other activated installations, will be assigned by administrative purposes to the Headquarters and Headquarters company of the Base Section concerned.

10. Circular 41, this headquarters, 31 October 1942, as amended is rescinded.

II OPERATION OF GENERAL AND BRANCH DEPOTS: 1. Base Section Commander is responsible for the operation of all General and Branch Depots in his Base Section.

2. The functions and duties of each Chief of a Supply Service in the operation of Branch Depots and Service Supply Sections of a General depot are:

a. Maintaining approved overall stock levels in the Theater.

b. Requisitioning or procuring the supplies required for (a.) above.

c. Prescribing stock levels for his Service, to be maintained in individual depots and other installations.

d. Allotting incoming supplies to Depots in accordance with stock levels prescribed therefore.

e. Recommending minimum requirements of military personnel for Branch Depots and Service Supply Sections of general depots to the Chief of Operations.

f. Requisitioning of authorized military personnel including troop units, except that the QI Service will requisition for all Service Bns.

g. Recommending to Base Section Commanders initial assignments and transfers of all military personnel of his Service, and to the Chief of Operations thru the Base Section Commanders concerned, transfers between Base Sections.

h. Recommending minimum requirements of motor, warehousing and materials handling equipment for Branch Depots to Chief of Operations.

i. Technical Inspections of Branch Depots and Sections of General Depots, to insure that proper and adequate storage is provided, that issues are in accordance with proper procedure, that losses are reduced to the minimum, and that the policies of the Commanding General, SOS, are properly executed.

j. Preparing technical instructions and other publications covering the receipt, storage, and issue of supplies pertaining to his Service, for distribution through command channels.

3. The Chief Quartermaster is charged with staff supervision under the direction of the Chief of Operations of all General Depots including:

a. Recommending to the Base Section Commanders, the assignment of Commanding Officers of General Depots.

b. Recommending to the Chief of Operations and, when approved, providing authorized requirements of military personnel for the operation of General Depots.

c. Recommending to the Chief of Operations, and providing authorized requirements of motor, warehousing and materials handling equipment.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL LEE:

R. W. CRAWFORD,
Major General US Army
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

/t/a/

C. R. LONDON
COLONEL, AGD,
Adjutant General

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APPENDIX 4

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Cir 23

17 Oct 1944

COMMUNICATIONS ZONE ORGANIZATION

1. Sec II, Cir I, Hq, Services of Supply, 8 Jan 1944, and Cir 11, Hq, Services of Supply, 15 May 1944, are rescinded.

2. To achieve decentralization in administration and in the supervision of operations, the Communications Zone is divided into several sections and the United Kingdom Base. The provisions hereof are applicable to all such Sections, whether now or hereafter established and to the United Kingdom Base. As used herein, the term "Section Commander" includes the Commanding General, United Kingdom Base.

3. The Section Commander is charged with the responsibility for all Communications Zone activities and operations in his Section except those retained under the control of this headquarters. He has, within the limits of the special conditions existing in the theater, the authority of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom for the commanding general of a Service Command, over all Communications Zone individually, units, and installations (except those of this headquarters) in his section.

4. The responsibility of the Section Commander within his Section include, but are not limited to:

a. The control and coordination of all Communications Zone activities and operations, including the assignment of personnel and units.

b. The location and activation, or establishment, of all approved field installations and agencies of the Communications Zone.

c. The administration of depots, including the allocation and assignment of space therein, subject to the overall allotments made by this headquarters.

d. The receipt, storage, maintenance, salvage and issue, as directed of supplies and equipment, except:

(1) Air Force technical supplies, which are to be received, stored maintained, salvaged and issued by the Air Force.

(2) Ordnance supplies and equipment which will be issued to the Air Force in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Air Force in accordance with procedures agreed upon by the Air Force and the Ordnance Service, Communications Zone.

e. The administration of all quarters and quarters with which the Communications Zone is charged.

f. The administration of training areas and ranges, including:

(1) Assistance in the reconnaissance and selection of training areas and ranges.

(2) Procurement of areas required, and the construction, operation and maintenance of ranges to be established.

(3) Liaison with major field forces with reference to training areas and range requirements.

(4) Maintenance of complete records and maps relating to training areas and ranges within the boundaries of the Section.

g. The hospitalization and evacuation of personnel in accordance with the policies of this headquarters.

h. Counter-intelligence and censorship pertaining to the Communications Zone.

- i. The assignment of Communications Zone personnel in accordance with existing instructions. Key personnel will not be assigned or transferred without the concurrence of the concerned Chief of Service, this headquarters.
 - j. The preparation of plans for Communications Zone organizations to meet all emergencies, such as fire, sabotage, and ground, airborne and air attack.
 - k. The organization and operation of recreational activities and of the Army Exchange service.
 - l. The promotion and sale of War Bonds and National Service Life Insurance.
 - m. Arrangements for the reception and orientation of newly arrived US Forces.
 - n. In the case of the Commander of a Section within the confines of which this headquarters, or a higher headquarters, is located, the exercise of such functions and administrative control as may, from time to time, be charged to him by such headquarters.
5. The staffs of the Section Commanders will be organized, in general, so as to parallel the staff of the Commanding General, Communications Zone.
 6. With the prior approval of this headquarters in each case, Section Commanders may subdivide their sections into such districts and areas as may be necessary to achieve decentralization of operating control. The commanders of such subordinate districts and areas will have such responsibilities as are directed by the Section Commander. Such districts and areas will not be offices of record, and the staffs of their commanders will be held to the absolute minimum. The establishment of a district will not be the basis for a request to this headquarters for the further allotment of grades.
 7. All Communications Zone units and detachments, and field and air force units and detachments attached to the Communications Zone, except those for duty with this headquarters, will be assigned or attached by order of Theater Headquarters.
 8. All Communications Zone personnel within the limits of a Section, except those assigned to units, depots or other activated installations, will be assigned, for administrative purposes, to the Section headquarters and headquarters company.
 9. Relationship with Air Force, Field Force and Naval Commander: The relationship between the Section Commander and any tactical commander in his Section is similar to the relationship in the US between the commanding general of a Service Command and the commanders of tactical units within the Service Command.
 10. Relationship with Allied Authorities: The Section Commanders will be responsible for the necessary coordination of administrative arrangements with the Allied military and civilian administrative agencies in their respective Sections.
 11. Channels of Communications: Communications from and to higher headquarters will be routed through normal military channels of command. (AG 322 PubGG)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LES:

OFFICIAL:


/s/t/ R. B. LOVETT
Brigadier General, USA,
Adjutant General

R. B. LORD,
Brigadier General, GSC.
Chief of Staff

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HEADQUARTERS ADVANCE SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945



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
Appendix 5

RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	450
WARRANT OFFICERS	18
ENLISTED	1,107

CONTINENTAL ADVANCE SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




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ETO USA

RECAPITULATION	
OFFICERS	207
WARRANT OFF	4
ENLISTED	413

Appendix 6

CHANNEL BASE SECTION


12 FEBRUARY 1945



Appendix 7

HEADQUARTERS OISE SECTION

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


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STOUSA

NORMANDY BASE SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




RECAPITULATION

OFFICERS	202
WARRANT OFF	8
ENLISTED	650

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SEINE SECTION

12 FEBRUARY 1945




Appendix 11

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RECAPITULATION
 OFFICERS 375
 WARRANT OFFICERS 9
 ENLISTED 891

UNITED KINGDOM BASE

12 FEBRUARY 1945



RECAPITULATION
 OFFICERS 715
 WARRENOFFICERS 51
 ENLISTED 3,546

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF A C OF S G-3

ETOUSA

APPENDIX 13

HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

GO 16

6 Feb 45

DIRECTOR GENERAL, MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE, US

1. Effective 12 February 1945, Brigadier General Carl R. Gray, JR, United States Army is designated Director General, Military Railway Service, US and will report to the Chief of Transportation, this headquarters, for duty.

2. The duties and responsibilities assigned to the Director General, Military Railway Service, US, will include the command of all military Railway Service units; advance planning, development and operation of all railroads required for US military operation; stocking and issue of all railway stock material for ordinary maintenance; distribution, for operational use, of all US railroad rolling stock and all other railroad property that may come under the control of the US Army; and authority to order and execute the move of Military Railway Service units, together with personnel and units attached thereto, within the theater.

By command of Lieutenant General LEE:

R. B. LORD,
Major General, G. S. C.
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

R. B. LOVETT,
Brigadier General, USA, Adjutant General.

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APPENDIX 14

HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

GO 82

19 May 1945

Military Railway Service.....I
Motor Transport Service.....II
Military Pipeline Service.....III
Signal Communications Service.....IV

I -- MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE. 1. The Military Railway Service, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, is established as a service command under the Commanding General, Communications Zone; technical control will remain with the Chief of Transportation, Communications Zone. 2. The Military Railway Service will be operated and administered by General Headquarters, Military Railway Service, Communications Zone (Provisional), organized by Organization Order No 110, this headquarters, 16 February 1945, file AG 322 OpGG, with the exceptions outlined in paragraph 2, Section IV, circular No 70, this headquarters, 19 May 1945. (AG 322 OpGG)

II -- MOTOR TRANSPORT SERVICE. 1. The Motor Transport Service, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, is established as a service command under the Commanding General, Communications Zone; technical control will remain with the Chief of Transportation, with the Communications Zone. 2. The Motor Transport Service will be operated and administered by an organization designated by the Chief of Transportation, with the exceptions outlined in paragraph 2, Section IV, Circular No 70, this headquarters, 19 May 1945. (AG 322 OpGG)

III -- MILITARY PIPELINE SERVICE. 1. The Military Pipeline Service, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, United Commanding General, Communications Zone; technical control will remain with the Engineer, Communications Zone. 2. The Military Pipeline Service will be operated and administered by an organization designated by the Engineer, Communications Zone, with the exceptions outlined in paragraph 2, Section IV, Circular No 70, this headquarters, 10 May 1945. (AG 322 OpGG)

IV -- SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE. 1. The Signal Communications Service, Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, United States Army, is established as a service command under the Commanding General, Communications Zone; technical control will remain with the Signal Officer, Communications Zone. 2. The Signal Communications Service will be operated and administered by an organization designated by the Signal Officer, Communications Zone, with the exceptions outlined in paragraph 2, Section IV, Circular No 70, this headquarters 19 May 1945. (AG 322 OpGG)

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL LEE:

T. B. LARKIN
Major General, USA, Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

VERNON H. RICE
Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General

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APPENDIX 15
HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATIONS ZONE
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Cir 70

19 May 1945

EXTRACT

ANNEX "B"

IV — Service Command Control

1. In compliance with Section I, Cir 64, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, 19 May 1945, certain Communications Zone units are being assigned to the service commands outlined below which are responsible for technical control to the technical service chief, this headquarters, as indicated:

<u>COMMAND</u>	<u>ESTABLISHED BY</u>	<u>RESPONSIBLE TO</u>
Military Railway Service	Sec I, GO 82, Com Z 19 May 1945	COT
Motor Transport Service	Sec II, GO 82, Com Z 19 May 1945	COT
Military Pipeline Service	Sec III, GO 82, Com Z 19 May 1945	C/Engineer
Signal Communication Service	Sec IV, GO 82, Com Z 19 May 1945	C/Signal C.

2. The commander of the Communications Zone section in which a unit assigned to one of the above commands is located will be responsible for:

- a. General court-martial jurisdiction.
- b. Personnel accounting (including Machine Records Servicing)
- c. Hospitalization and evacuation.
- d. All Fiscal transactions.
- e. Supply of common items.
- f. Assisting the commander to which assigned in the administrative and disciplinary inspection of units.

3. All other command and administrative functions will be handled within the respective service command without reference to the Communications Zone section commander.

4. Communications Zone section responsibility for an individual unit under the provisions of paragraph 2, above, will be indicated or confirmed in Troop Assignment orders issued by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

5. Unit Commanders will, in cases of inter section movements of units, notify headquarters of departure and headquarters of destination of estimated times of arrival and departure.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

THE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMUNICATION ZONE

CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF ADVANCE SECTION

SECTION 17

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

67. Reasons for Establishment. Experience in North Africa indicated that base sections can support armies only when the supply lines are not too long. Plan OVERLORD, if successful would result in extended lines of communications. Therefore it would be necessary at an early stage to create another section between army and base section to provide close support. North African experience also indicated the need to have the section giving support to an army take part in the planning so as to assure well-coordinated and adequate logistical support, with command channels directly to the headquarters responsible for supply (SOS/COM Z). The allied staff headquarters known as GOSMAC (Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command) decided, therefore, to have an advance section to support the First US Army, being attached to the army during the planning and assault phases of the operation and then reverting to COM Z when the latter headquarters was established on the Continent.¹

68. Establishment. Decision to create Advance Section was reached late in December, 1943, and the headquarters was officially set up in February 1944. Between the two dates a party of officers designated for the new staff visited Italy and North Africa to observe operations and gain as such knowledge as they could from the base sections operating in the Mediterranean area. Shortly after its formal organization the staff was moved from London to Bristol to facilitate close coordination with First Army. It had the conventional general and special staff sections, and its table of organization, as approved in May, 1944, provided 458 officers and 1077 enlisted men.¹

69. Relation to other Headquarters. As indicated in Chapter 2 above, the position of ADSEC, like that of Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECZ) was ambiguous, and its relations with other headquarters were complicated until the army rear boundary was declared. It was attached to First Army which in turn was under First US Army Group (FUSAG). For the initial phase of operations FUSAG was under the British 21 Army Group. At the same time ADSEC was subject to supervision by FUSAG as well as FEUSA. The difficulties of proper coordination are apparent, and the situation was further aggravated by the changes and ambiguities in the position of FECZ.

70. Mission of Advance Section. The General Order establishing Advance Section did not prescribe its mission. In general its mission was to prepare logistical plans for the support of First Army, to execute Communications Zone functions on the Continent from the time the rear boundary was declared until FECZ (later changed to Headquarters COM Z) should take command of Communications Zone operations, and subsequently under COM Z to give direct support to the First Army.

in accordance with the NEPTUNE and OVERLORD plans. As FUSAG plans developed the specific mission of ADSEC may be summarized as follows:

- a. To prepare detailed plans for logistical support in the Continent for the period D plus 15 to D plus 41.
- b. To schedule the movement, location and mission of each ADSEC unit and detachment.
- c. To schedule movement and receive store and issue supplies for all US troops ashore during D plus 15 to D plus 42, including necessary build-up of levels of supply.
- d. Location and construction of ADSEC installations and transportation facilities on the Continent.
- e. Preparation of standard operating procedures and other directives to cover continental supply and administrative operations in the area of ADSEC responsibility.
- f. Rehabilitation, construction, and operation of:
 - (1) Ports, both major and minor, except that the minor ports of Grandcamp, Isigny, and St. Vaast were to be operated by the Engineer Special Brigade initially.
 - (2) Roads.
 - (3) Railroads.
 - (4) Fixed signal communications.
 - (5) Bulk petroleum installations.
- g. Performance of Communications Zone functions in support of field forces and air forces in coordination with Anti-Aircraft Defense Command, US Navy and British Army.

SECTION 18

SUMMARY OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE

71. Extent of Operations. Advance Section staff began to arrive on the Continent on D plus 8 and worked closely with First Army representatives, gradually taking over limited responsibility for supplies and installations even before the army rear boundary was declared. Owing to the change in Forward Echelon's mission, Advance Section was in charge of the COM Z area until Headquarters COM Z took command on the Continent (7 August 1944). Thereafter Advance Section moved forward as First Army advanced. When Third Army became operational Advance Section gave direct support to it in the same manner, and eventually added the Ninth and Fifteenth Armies to its responsibilities. Thus Advance Section finished the campaign at the German border with area responsibility immediately in the rear of all four armies assigned to Twelfth Army Group. Throughout the period it not only operated the installations in its own area but also was active in the army service area, assisting in construction, expediting movements, and preparing to take over installations when the armies advanced. The extent of its operation may be judged from the fact that troops under Advance Section control numbered over 216,000 at the time COM Z assumed command and ranged from 64,500 to 95,000 thereafter until 15 May 45.²

72. Use of Regulating Stations. FM 100-10 provides that the regulating station will be a theater agency, the regulating officer being "the direct representative of the theater commander".³ In the European Theater, however, the regulating stations were assigned to Advance Section, one being used to support each army. They controlled road as well as rail transportation between army and Communications Zone under the direction of the Advance Section Staff, each with a representative at the office of G-4 in the army being supported. No facilities were available during the campaign for the establishment of marshalling yards, so that the function of the regulating station was largely that of controlling and expediting rail and motor shipments. However, the "Regulating Officer" assigned to each army G-4 was concerned also with maintaining liaison on construction of rail, signal, pipeline and other installations as well as maintaining general information on movements, rail facilities and other matters. In effect Advance Section was a large regulating station with four subdivisions.⁴

73. Principal Operating Problems. Apart from the many difficulties created by large-scale operations behind fast-moving armies, Advance Section encountered basic problems which may be attributed to its mission and the organizational structure of the theater. Advance Section was given a general mission of providing direct support to the armies. Detailed definition of this mission was left to Advance Section itself. It naturally conceived its function to be that of a supply agency, and the Theater Standard Operating Procedure No. 7 gave support to that view. It is clear, however, that the term "supply agency" needs clear definition in view of the fact that COM Z itself is the supply agency of the Theater and there must be a clear line of demarcation between its responsibilities and those of Advance Section. Service chiefs felt that Advance Section was trying to go too far (on one occasion Advance Section asked the office of Chief Quartermaster for reports not only on supplies awaiting discharge in the port but also those on route from the US). Further, Advance Section lacked the authority commensurate with its conception of its job. As a subdivision of the Communications Zone, Advance Section was under the direct command of Headquarters COM Z, although it operated at a distance of 400 miles or more from that headquarters. Its geographical location, plus difficulties of communications, forced it at times to act for COM Z although its authority to do so was not clearly defined. It had to deal directly with armies and Twelfth Army Group, all of which regarded SHAEF as their next higher echelon, ETOUSA as a coordinate and less important command and COM Z and Advance Section as lower echelons. First Army, for example, refused to turn over the operation of supply dumps and installations until long after D plus 14, releasing them partially, on 10 July, when an Advance Section "forward boundary" was declared and finally on 19 July (D plus 43) when the army rear boundary was declared. By that time such large stocks had accumulated under army control without proper inventory or systematic handling that it took months for the succeeding base section to restore order. The situation was further complicated later in the campaign by the fact that Military Railway Service operated as an exempted activity and felt little obligation to conform to the wishes of the regulating stations or Advance Section itself. On the whole, Advance Section in fact lacked an authoritative voice with armies and Army Group on the one hand and Headquarters, COM Z on the other. It was therefore handicapped in discharging its extensive and loosely defined responsibilities.

SECTION 19

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

74. Principal Issues. Experience with Advance Section gives rise to a number of basic questions:

a. Should Advance Section be given responsibility for preparing detailed logistical plans for the period of its control of the Communications Zone or should that responsibility be retained by Headquarters SOS?

b. Should Advance Section act as a supply agency for the armies or should it be restricted to responsibility for the installations and facilities in a given area like any other section or base section?

c. What should be the relation between Advance Section and the regulating stations?

d. Should Advance Section move forward with army or remain to operate the area it develops?

75. Planning Responsibilities. Advance Section was given complete responsibility for planning the logistical support for all troops ashore for the period D plus 13 to D plus 15, including determination of supply requirements and phasing in of supplies and COM Z troops. Since Advance Section had to establish supply facilities and construct installations on the Continent, it necessarily had to prepare plans for them. It also had to determine its troops requirements and phase its troop movement. On the other hand, the chiefs of services had previously worked out detailed supply requirements and coordinated plans for the operation and were the only agency possessing the necessary overall knowledge essential for working out plans with the combat echelons. In practice both Advance Section and Forward Echelon had to rely heavily on service chiefs in the preparation of supply requirements and plans, and it would have been better to have given the COM Z staff responsibility and authority for making them in the first place. This would have kept the responsibility for supply plans continuously in one headquarters instead of passing it successively from First Army to Advance Section to Forward Echelon to COM Z. In addition to providing continuity and eliminating an echelon of coordination, it would have placed negotiations directly in the hands of a strong, well-informed staff capable of dealing with armies and Army Group on an equal plane. It goes without saying that Advance Section would have to be kept fully informed of all plans as a basis for operating and that it would have to make such modifications on the spot as operating conditions subsequently made necessary. Service chiefs and G-4 representations are in general agreement on the view that responsibility for the preparation of detailed logistical plans must be centered in Headquarters, Communications Zone.

76. Advance Section as a Supply Agency. As the forerunner of COM Z on the Continent, Advance Section had to serve as the supply agency for First Army until Headquarters COM Z arrived on the Continent. Subsequently Advance Section, as the echelon responsible for direct support of armies, took action which at times, infringed upon the responsibilities of the staff at Headquarters, COM Z. It is clear that COM Z as a whole has as its principal mission the support of the armies and that only one headquarters can have the complete facts and central authority necessary to direct supply operations. The section which supports armies has a huge task in handling the necessary construction and operating the various installations in its area in an efficient manner. To give it supply responsibilities beyond those of any other section not only overloads it but also raises the question of its authority in relation to COM Z service chiefs and the combat commands. In practice Advance Section lacked the necessary authority as has been pointed out. It did not possess complete information and the administrative weight necessary for dealing effectively with armies and Army Group. The combat elements

must be served fully and promptly, but they must be held in line with logistical policies and capabilities of the Theater as a whole. Further, Advance Section was not in a position to deal authoritatively with COM Z service chiefs in expediting supply.

77. Position of the Regulating Station. It is clear that regulating stations in the European Theater were not used as laid down in FM 100-10, and in retrospect it seems generally agreed that the substitute arrangement was not satisfactory. The regulating organizations had to concern themselves with many matters not related to movements, and in the handling of movements they were in such a subordinate position that they lacked the authority essential for dealing effectively with armies on the one hand and COM Z staff (particularly Military Railway Service) on the other. In effect Advance Section absorbed the regulating stations and became a large regulating station itself. Yet this amalgamation prevented the regulating stations from concentrating upon their missions and at the same time increased and complicated the work of the heavily-burdened Advance Section staff, thereby tending to impair its effectiveness in other activities.

78. Other Considerations. The desirability of charging any organization with the responsibilities which Advance Section assumed in the European Theater is open to question. Advance Section had too many responsibilities and had to operate over too large an area. Consequently neither the armies nor the chiefs of services were satisfied with its performance. To strengthen Advance Section with sufficient authority to cope with all its responsibilities would create difficulties because it would make Advance Section a rival of Headquarters, COM Z. It is highly impracticable to give both Advance Section and the Chief of Transportation direct authority over Military Railway Service, and yet without that authority Advance Section was handicapped in handling movements between combat and communications zones. To take away from Advance Section the responsibility for handling movements necessitates charging another agency with that responsibility. The obvious answer is to make the regulating station responsible and give it full authority to expedite movements by having it the representative of the Theater commander as provided in FM 100-10. This would provide a strong agency far enough forward to have the necessary understanding of Army requirements and armed with sufficient authority to deal with all elements concerned.

79. Proposed Solution. A possible solution of the problem is to eliminate Advance Section in the form used. Establish in advance the necessary base sections with appropriate staffs and troop units and give them specific areas and missions. The first base section should land with the army and immediately take over operation of the beaches and installations under the army commander. (The use of engineer shore brigades created another echelon, confused the issue and created operating difficulties). The army should not become involved in establishing large dumps as was done in Normandy, but rather should confine itself to small dumps well forward. It is imperative to start immediately on the orderly receipt, classification and tabulation of supplies so that they can be made readily available on a selective basis for shipment forward. This point cannot be too strongly emphasized. Army is not in a position to perform the necessary work, being absorbed in the immediate problem of supply. The first base section should establish itself on a permanent basis to avoid changes in command, lack of continuity in operations and general inefficiency. The second base section would move in and be commanded by the first temporarily until it was familiar with the job. As soon as the army has pushed forward sufficiently to warrant establishing another section, the second base section would pass from

the control of the first and move forward to take over a specific area and mission in support of the army. In Normandy the First Army and Advance Section, knowing that their tenure was temporary, took care of immediate problems with little thought for the permanent arrangements which were necessary. They left a mess which required months to clean up, and the situation was aggravated by the fact the personnel familiar with the situation had moved forward. This lack of responsibility and continuity must be remedied. Using a second base section, trained on the spot, to move forward provides the army with proper immediate support and yet leaves the original base section in charge of the area it developed. Meanwhile, a regulating station representing the Theater Commander would provide the connecting link between army or army group and the communications zone. It would have full information on transport facilities, movements, depot locations and capabilities, and the status of requisitions placed by the army. Its technical information would come directly from service chiefs or their deputies at headquarters. Being specialized, fully informed and backed by Theater authority, the regulating station would be effective in expediting all movements in accordance with the current situation. This proposal must be considered in conjunction with the proposal for creation of a logistical corps or division now under consideration by the War Department.

80. Conclusions.

a. Advance Section was successful in the performance of its mission but a different arrangement would have produced better results.

b. Advance and other sections should be held responsible only for planning the construction and installations for which they are responsible, as provided in Theater plans, plus responsibility for administration and operations in the areas to which they are assigned.

c. Detailed planning for an operation should be the responsibility of the theater headquarters, with sections and base sections participating only to the extent necessary to keep properly informed for the performance of their mission.

d. The regulating station, rather than Advance Section, should be the agency responsible for controlling movements between army and communications zones and expediting delivery of supplies. It should be directly under the theater commander and not assigned to a subordinate command.

e. The practice of having an advance section develop an area and then move forward with the army, leaving another organization to take over, interrupts continuity of operations, creates confusion and leads to neglect of long-run considerations in the development of the area. Hence it is desirable to have advance section or any similar organization assigned permanently to the area of its responsibility.

81. Recommendations.

a. That detailed plans for logistical support of an operation be the responsibility of the theater headquarters rather than of the advance or other section charged with providing initial support.

b. That the regulating station be used as provided in FM 100-10, to control movements between combat and communications zones, that it be directly under the theater commander and that its respon-

sibilities be expended to include information on status of requisitions and of shipments made.

c. That the handling of base or advance section developing a lodgment area be as outlined in paragraph 13 above, so as to assure continuity and complete responsibility for the area concerned.

CHAPTER 4

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