

THE GENERAL BOARD
United States Forces, European Theater

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ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND TACTICAL
EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

MISSION: Prepare Report and Recommendations on Organization, Equipment and Tactical Employment of the Armored Division.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312, dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States Forces in the European Theater.

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REPORT ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

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ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT
OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL

1. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to present:
 - a. A picture of the internal organization of armored divisions as they actually fought in the European Theater, with a discussion of their various tactical grouping.
 - b. A discussion of the various recommendations solicited from the commanders who fought this armor.
 - c. The conclusions and recommendations of The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, for the organization, equipment and tactical employment of the armored division.
2. Scope.
 - a. Chapter 2 is a comparison of missions assigned armor in the European Theater with those prescribed by Field Service Regulations.
 - b. Chapter 3 contains the typical formations utilized in combat, and a discussion thereof. Two armored divisions which operated in the European Theater (the 2d and 3d) were organized according to Table of Organization Number 17, dated 1 March 1942, and are referred to as "heavy divisions". The remaining 13 armored divisions were organized according to Table of Organization Number 17, dated 12 February 1944, and are referred to as "light divisions". Charts showing the typical combat formations of the various armored divisions (except the 20th) are attached as Appendix 1. Appendices 2 and 3 show the typical tactical formations of the two types of divisions.
 - c. Chapter 4 contains historical examples of how the smaller typical formations were employed in combat.
 - d. Chapter 5 contains a synopsis of the opinions of senior commanders of the armored formations which operated in the European Theater. These opinions were obtained through the medium of questionnaires. A chart showing these opinions is attached marked Appendix 4.
 - e. Chapter 6 contains the conclusions of The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, and its recommendations for the organization, equipment and tactical employment of the armored division.

CHAPTER 2

MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO ARMORED

DIVISIONS IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

3. On the fourth day following the initial invasion of NORMANDY, the beachhead was sufficiently large to provide assembly areas for an armored division.

On this day the 2 Armored Division landed on Utah beach. It was followed closely by the 3, 4, 5, and 6 Armored Divisions, and later by ten additional divisions, the last in early 1945. Of these the 2 Armored Division was the only one which had previous combat experience.

On 27 July, 1944 a breakthrough was made by infantry divisions at ST LO, and the armor was ordered through the gap created.

Then followed the dash across FRANCE and BELGIUM in which American armor surpassed the Germans in "blitz" warfare, although the latter had originated the method. Under courageous, farsighted leadership, the armored divisions were properly employed, according to the principles laid down in Field Service Regulations. The overwhelming success proved that the principles were sound.

This excellent leadership and sound employment continued, through the Siegfried Line, during the bitter fighting in the ARDENNES, to the RHINE and on into the very heart of Germany, where the war's end found the armor spearheading all advances.

4. Numerous examples illustrating the assignment of proper missions to armor and their successful accomplishment may be found in the historical records of the European Theater. In the following paragraphs, the missions of armor, as prescribed by Field Service Regulations, are extracted and illustrations are briefly cited. These illustrations were selected as typical. Many more are recorded.

a. The primary role of the Armored Division is "OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN HOSTILE REAR AREAS."

(1) Following the ST LO breakthrough the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 Armored Divisions performed this mission.

(2) Following the crossing of the RHINE RIVER all Armored Divisions were employed offensively behind the German lines.

b. "BREAKTHROUGH AN ENEMY PROTECTIVE SCREEN AND ESTABLISH EARLY CONTACT WITH HOSTILE FORCES."

On 7 March 1945 the 9 Armored Division seized the REMAGEN BRIDGE, broke through the German screen on the east bank of the RHINE RIVER and by 9 March 1945 established contact with the German mobile reserves which had been set up for the defense of the RHINE.

c. "SEIZE GROUND ESSENTIAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHER COMMANDER'S PLAN."

On 1 April 1945 the 3 Armored Division, following a suc-

successful drive from the REMAGEN bridgehead, captured PADERBORN. This was essential for the establishment of contact with the Ninth U.S. Army which had been operating to the North.

d. "REGAIN THE INITIATIVE BY MEANS OF SURPRISE ATTACK."

On 1 January 1945 the 6 Armored Division attacked northeast of BASTOGNE to the vicinity M. OCHT. This was the first action of a general offensive resulting in the reduction of the HERENNES salient.

e. "RESTORE THE IMPETUS OF AN ATTACK THAT HAS LOST MOMENTUM."

- (1) The First Army Offensive which began on 16 November 1944 had come to a standstill northeast of the HURTGEN FOREST in early December. On 10 December one combat command of the 3 Armored Division launched an attack from LANGERWEHE, GERMANY, between the 9 and 104 U.S. Infantry Divisions. This restored impetus to the attack and resulted in the capture of the west bank of the ROER RIVER in the vicinity of DURAN, GERMANY.
- (2) After crossing the WURM RIVER on 3 October 1944 the attack of the 30 Infantry Division was bogged down west of UBACH, GERMANY. A combat command of the 2 Armored Division attacked through the 30 Infantry Division and seized UBACH. This allowed the 30 Infantry Division to reorganize and continue its attack.

f. "SPEARHEAD THE ATTACK AGAINST AN ENEMY INCOMPLETELY PREPARED FOR DEFENSE."

On 16 March 1945 the 4 Armored Division passed through the gap created by the 90 Infantry Division and spearheaded the attack of the Third U.S. Army in the reduction of the PALATINATE. This division traveled 48 miles in 52 hours through scattered resistance.

g. "THROW ON A NARROW FRONT AGAINST A PREPARED POSITION."

On 20 February 1945 the 6 Armored Division attacked on a 4000 yd front, breached the Siegfried Line in the vicinity DASEBURG, GERMANY and by 24 February 1945 had penetrated 20 miles into the German western defenses.

h. "BREAK THROUGH ON A WIDE FRONT AGAINST A DEMORALIZED ENEMY."

On 5 March 1945 the 11 Armored Division, operating to the left rear of the 4 Armored Division, broke through the remnants of the German defenses northeast of LUZEMBOURG on a front of approximately 10 miles and by 9 March had reached the west bank of the RHINE RIVER in the vicinity of ANDERNACH.

i. "EXPLOIT A SUCCESS."

- (1) On 27 July 1944, the German defenses had been breached at ST LO, FRANCE by the Infantry Divisions. The 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Armored Divisions, on purely exploitation missions, rolled through northern FRANCE and BELGIUM until stopped by the German defenses in the Siegfried Line in the middle of September.
- (2) In March and April, 1945, following the crossing of

the RHINE RIVER, all armored divisions were employed to exploit this success.

j. "PURSUE A DEFEATED ENEMY."

In the exploitation following the ST LO breakthrough mentioned above, the German forces were retreating to the Siegfried Line. All armored divisions then on the continent were in pursuit.

k. "PERFORM STRATEGIC ENVELOPMENT."

After breaking out of the REMAGEN bridgehead, which was accomplished by 26 March 1945, the 3, 7, and 9 Armored Divisions spearheaded the advance of the infantry divisions of the First U.S. Army east to the DILL RIVER. On 28 March they turned north and advanced to the vicinity of PALDARBORN. The 2 Armored Division as a part of the Ninth U.S. Army made contact with the First Army at LIIPSTADT. This completed the envelopment of the RUHR pocket and resulted in the capture of 370,000 German troops.

l. "ATTACK TO DESTROY ENEMY ARMORED UNITS WHEN FORCED TO DO SO AS A MATTER OF SELF-PRESERVATION OR WHEN HOSTILE TANKS THREATEN SERIOUSLY TO DISRUPT OPERATIONS OF OTHER TROOPS."

German forces employed in the ARDENNES winter offensive in December 1944 and January 1945 consisted of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies. During this campaign the 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, and 11 Armored Divisions were required to attack German armored units in order to prevent the annihilation of American troops originally in the area and finally to reduce the salient.

m. "OPERATE AGAINST LIGHTLY ARMORED FORMATIONS OR INSTALLATIONS."

On 31 August 1944, the 2 Armored Division, pursuing the German forces through BELGIUM, came upon a lightly armored German column in the vicinity of ORCHIES and completely destroyed it.

n. "COUNTERATTACK IN WITHDRAWAL TO DISRUPT HOSTILE OPERATIONS."

During the period 17 - 20 December, 1944, prior to the stabilizing of the allied lines in the ARDENNES, the 7 Armored Division was forced to execute numerous counterattacks in the vicinity of ST VITH, BELGIUM.

o. "EXECUTE DELAYING ACTION."

In the early stages of the German attack in the ARDENNES during December 1944, the 7 and 9 Armored Divisions were employed to delay the hostile advance.

CHAPTER 3

ACTUAL COMBAT FORMATIONS OF ARMORED DIVISIONS

IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER

(9 June 1944 to 10 May 1945)

5. Source. In order to obtain information concerning the actual tactical formations used by the various armored divisions, after action reports and combat observer interviews were studied. These reports were available on all armored divisions in the European Theater with the exception of the 20 Armored Division, reports on which had not been tabulated and filed.

6. Types. The vast differences in strength and organization of the heavy and light divisions make them incommensurable. Consequently their organizations are presented and discussed separately.

7. Heavy Divisions.

a. Both the 2 and 3 Armored Divisions operated in the European Theater under the control of the First U.S. Army until November 1944, when 2 Armored Division was shifted to the Ninth U.S. Army. Both divisions had an antiaircraft and a tank destroyer battalion attached and these same battalions remained with their respective divisions. One additional armored field artillery battalion (105mmSP) was attached to each division during combat operations. Medium artillery was attached in varying quantities, but normally at least one battalion of either howitzers or guns was attached in combat. Infantry varying in quantity from a battalion to a regiment was attached whenever corps made it available.

b. Both divisions operated with three combat commands, the third one being designated "CCR". In each division the headquarters of the organic infantry regiment functioned as the headquarters of CCR. Although improvised, CCR was a third fighting combat command and was utilized exactly as were CGA and CCB.

c. Combat commands consisted essentially of two tank battalions, one organic armored infantry battalion, one infantry battalion (whenever an infantry regiment was attached to the division) and tank destroyer, engineer and antiaircraft elements. Medical and maintenance elements were attached or in support. Normally two combat commands were committed to action and the third was held in reserve. Each forward combat command was normally directly supported by two armored field artillery battalions and the medium artillery was in general support.

d. Usually each combat command operated with two task forces or columns. A typical task force consisted of a tank battalion, an infantry or armored infantry battalion, tank destroyer and engineer platoons, directly supported by an armored field artillery battalion.

e. Tables of Organization provided for a light tank battalion and two medium tank battalions per armored regiment. Prior to landing on the European Continent both divisions reorganized the armored regiments so that each tank battalion consisted of a headquarters company (containing assault guns and mortars), two medium tank companies, and one light tank company.

f. Attached infantry was transported on tanks and in 2 1/2 ton trucks.

8. Light Divisions.

a. Light armored divisions operated under the control of all four U. S. Armies in the European Theater, as well as the Second British Army.

b. Attachments to light armored divisions were practically the same as attachments to heavy divisions.

c. These divisions also operated with three combat commands. Most used CCR as a third fighting combat command; others kept it primarily in reserve, rotating troops through it from OCA and CCB. Wherever possible the headquarters of CCR was increased to practically the size of the headquarters of OCA and CCB. Armored group headquarters and headquarters companies when attached, were utilized for this purpose.

d. As in the heavy divisions, combat commands of the light divisions usually operated with two task forces; one consisted of a tank battalion (less one medium tank company), a rifle company of armored infantry, and tank destroyer and engineer platoons; the other task force would usually consist of an armored infantry battalion (less one rifle company), one medium tank company and tank destroyer and engineer platoons. When additional infantry was attached to the division, the proportion of infantry in the task forces was correspondingly increased. Armored artillery was either attached to or in direct support of each combat command.

e. Attention is invited to the differences existing in the composition of these task forces: One is heavy in tanks and light in infantry unless additional infantry is attached; the other is strong in infantry and considerably weaker in tank strength. This obviously required an assignment of missions to task forces which were suitable to their makeup. In fluid situations the assignment of zones or axes of advance of the different task forces may or may not have been suitable to their composition.

9. Preliminary Conclusions. From the above and a study of Appendices 1, 2 and 3 the following preliminary conclusions may be drawn:

a. Antiaircraft and tank destroyer battalions were, to all intents and purposes, organically a part of the armored divisions.

b. Attachment of an additional armored field artillery battalion was so frequent that the number of light battalions was constantly four per division.

c. One or more medium artillery battalions were normally attached to an armored division.

d. The attachment of an infantry regiment to armored divisions brought the ratio of tank battalions to infantry battalions in heavy divisions to 1 to 1 and light divisions to 1 to 2.

e. The task forces of light divisions approximated the strength of a battalion and contained tank companies and infantry companies. The task forces of the heavy divisions approximated the strength of a small regiment and contained a tank battalion and an infantry battalion. Each division normally operated with six task forces.


CHAPTER 4

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF THE EMPLOYMENT

OF ARMORED FORMATIONS

10. Combinations of combat elements. The assignment of missions to the larger armored formations and the typical combat formations adopted by the Armored Divisions have been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. In paragraphs 11 to 16 are presented some typical historical examples illustrating how the various combat elements were grouped in the lower echelons and how the commanders actually employed their available tools to accomplish the missions assigned them.

11. Capture of a City by Armor.



During the drive into Central Germany the 6 Armored Division was directed to seize MULHAUSEN, a city of thirty thousand inhabitants.

On the night of 3 - 4 April 1945 one bridge over the WERRA RIVER was captured intact. The division crossed on this bridge, Combat Command "B" leading, followed without distance by Combat Command "A". Vehicles were crossed without distance as enemy air was not active and speed was necessary. The flow of traffic over the bridge was never halted. When the heads of columns were slowed by narrow streets or by road blocks the elements in rear immediately swung off the roads and coiled, thus never slowing the column in its crossing.

CC"A" was ordered to close in on the city from the north and northwest. CC"B" was ordered to close on the city from the south and southwest. A hasty reconnaissance was made by combat commanders and their task force commanders. Each of the Combat Commands had three task forces. Under CC"A" were Task Forces 15, 68, and 9; under CC"B" were Task forces 50, 69, and 44. The following tables show composition of Task Forces:

CC"A"		
<u>TF #15</u>	<u>TF #68</u>	<u>TF #9</u>
15 Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	68 Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, & 1 Lt Co)	9 Armd Inf Bn (-1Co)
Armd Inf Co	Armd Inf Co	Med Tk Co
TD Plat	TD Plat	TD Plat
Armd Engr Plat	Armd Engr Plat	Armd Engr Plat
212th Armd FA Bn		274th Armd FA Bn

CC"B"TF #50TF #69TF #44


50th Armd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	69th Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	44th Armd Inf Bn(-1 Co)
Med Tk Co	Armd Inf Co	Med Tk Co
TD Plat	TD Plat	TD Plat
Armd Engr Plat	Armd Engr Plat	Armd Engr Plat
231st Armd FA Bn	128th Armd FA Bn	

CC"B" assembled near HEYERODE, CC"A" SW of EIGENRIEDEN. (See sketch). Both Commands started the encirclement of MUHLHAUSEN simultaneously.

Opposition was light. Small forces of enemy infantry were cleared from the small towns adjacent to MUHLHAUSEN. Anti-tank fire was encountered by TF #15 in BICKENRIEDE and in DACHRIEDEN and was quickly overcome. TF #15 and TF #69 both by-passed MUHLHAUSEN as if to continue east, then TF #15 hooked south, then west and blocked all eastern exits of the city. Meanwhile TF #69 drove past the city and blocked from the north and east. By dusk all Task Forces were in position as shown on attached sketch and held MUHLHAUSEN in a vice-like grip. The Division Commander decided that the attack to clear the city would be launched at 0700, 5 April 1945. All artillery was emplaced so as to give support if heavy resistance was encountered. All Task Forces held in place except TF #9 and TF #50, which drove into the city. Sporadic street fighting was encountered. Some three to four hundred prisoners were taken in town, whereas some twelve hundred were gathered in by TF #15 as they tried to flee eastward.

The city was cleared by 0930, 5 April 1945 with a minimum of losses. The enemy troops were well equipped and had excellent morale. It was learned upon questioning the German officers that the rapid encirclement had completely disrupted their plan of defense; thus the quick capitulation of the entire garrison.

12. Attack by One Combat Command (Heavy Armored Division) to Restore Impetus to an Attack which had Lost Momentum.



At dark, 9 December 1944, the American front lines were along a north-south line through the eastern edge of LANGERWEHE, approximately four miles west of DUREN. There had been little advance during the previous 10 days.

During the night 9-10 December 1944, one combat command of the 3 Armored Division, consisting of two tank battalions, one armored infantry battalion, one tank destroyer company, one reconnaissance company and one armored engineer company, moved into LANGERWEHE. Its mission was to attack early 10 December 1944 in its zone (see sketch) from the vicinity of LANGERWEHE and capture ECHTZ, prepared for further action in the direction of HOVEN.

The combat command was organized into two task forces (TF-K and TF-H) and a reserve. TF-K contained a battalion of tanks, less the light tank company, one armored infantry company, one platoon of engineers, and one tank destroyer platoon. TF-H contained a battalion of tanks, a battalion of armored infantry, less one rifle company, one engineer platoon, and one tank destroyer platoon. The reserve consisted of one light tank company, one reconnaissance company and the

remaining platoons of engineers and tank destroyers. The entire division artillery was in direct support of the combat command.

The plan of action was as follows:

TF-K to take positions in support just east of the north-south road east of LANGERWEHE prior to daylight. TF-H to attack east at daylight and capture OBERGEICH and GEICH. Upon the capture of the latter, TF-K to capture the high ground north of GEICH. Subsequently, TF-H, supported by TF-K to capture ECHTZ.

The 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division was to move to the vicinity of GEICH, following its capture and attack east to capture KONZERSDORF. One battalion was to take over occupation of ECHTZ after its capture.

The operation began at 0730, 10 December 1944. TF-K led through the single exit of LANGERWEHE and occupied its support positions. TF-H followed and deployed east of the town and attacked with tanks and infantry together. By noon it was evident that unexpected hostile strength in OBERGEICH would prevent the capture of GEICH that day. Consequently, TF-K was ordered to take the high ground north of GEICH without waiting for GEICH to fall. This attack was made with four platoons of medium tanks deployed in line, followed at approximately 100 yards by the infantry company. The high ground was taken by 1400 against light resistance.

Meanwhile, it was realized that TF-K, originally designed as a secondary attack, was short of infantry. A request was made (and approved) that the 60th Infantry Regiment begin movement into the GEICH and ECHTZ areas.

While the above mission was being accomplished TF-H continued to clear up OBERGEICH. This was accomplished at approximately 1530 and infantry and tanks were in contact with hostile elements on the western edge of GEICH at dark. The position of these elements was so exposed that they were withdrawn to OBERGEICH after dark leaving outposts in contact with GEICH.

At approximately 1430 TF-K was ordered to attack and capture ECHTZ. At 1615 this force was pushing into the town, the tanks having led to this point and the infantry were beginning to work ahead of the tanks down the streets. By 2100 TF-K had complete control of the objective.

At 0945 one light tank platoon, one reconnaissance platoon, and one squad of engineers were dispatched on the mission of establishing a roadblock at ROTHHAUS. This force followed one company of infantry which was part of TF-H and established the block about the middle of the afternoon. They were ordered to hold this at all costs and as a result some 50 German infantrymen were cut off between ROTHHAUS and GEICH.

During the night 10-11 December 1944 orders were issued as follows:

TF-H to attack at 0900, 11 December 1944 from OBERGEICH and capture GEICH in cooperation with the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment. Upon the capture of GEICH, TF-H to push on rapidly to ECHTZ, clearing out hostile resistance northeast of GEICH to be continued throughout the night 10-11 December 1944.

TF-K to initiate reconnaissance in force in the direction of HOVEN beginning not later than 0800, 11 December 1944, and should HOVEN prove to be held lightly by the enemy to take it and establish sufficient forces there to hold it.

Operations began promptly at 0800, 11 December 1944. TF-H and 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, heavily supported by artillery, advanced steadily and secured GEICH by 0845. This task force left one medium tank company in GEICH and began movement to ECHTZ. The armored infantry battalion, less one company, was detached from this task force and assigned to TF-K.


TF-K met strong resistance on the movement of its reconnaissance force towards HOVEN and was unable to make progress. The resistance consisted of heavy small arms and assault gun fire from HOVEN and from a pillbox to the west of the village, and by direct high velocity gun fire from across the ROER RIVER.

It was realized that more than a reconnaissance force would be necessary to occupy HOVEN, so TF-K was withdrawn into ECHTZ and orders were received to launch a coordinated attack the following day and capture HOVEN.

The 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, which had moved into ECHTZ the previous night and had assisted in outposting the town, was attached to the combat command. Orders were issued to the assembled commanders for the attack on 12 December 1944. The plan was to attack with the two infantry battalions abreast, the ECHTZ-HOVEN road being the boundary between battalions inclusive to the north battalion. The tank battalion of TF-K was to support the armored infantry battalion on the north. One medium tank company from TF-H was to support the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry on the south. As the ground was completely open and flat, smoke was to be laid on HOVEN, along the western river bank north of the town, and along the combat command boundary on the north. Two 155mm self-propelled guns were brought to ECHTZ for the purpose of destroying the pillbox mentioned above at H hour. H hour was set at 0745.

Under cover of the smoke the infantry advanced across the open ground between ECHTZ and HOVEN. However, when the smoke on the south was lifted, small arms fire from the village and pillbox, which the 155mm guns had failed to destroy, slowed their advance and they were subjected to heavy time fire from across the river. It was here that the greatest number of casualties of the action were suffered. However, the tanks provided close support and joined the infantry in the advance at the edge of the village, and HOVEN was entered at 1020. There was considerable house to house fighting and the village was completely secured by 1600.

13. Infantry With Tanks.



On the afternoon of April 7, 1945, CC"R", 2 Armored Division completed mopping up the two towns on phase line D (see sketch) and at 1530 was reported ready to jump off to take phase line E, a ridge commanding HILDESHEIM. CC"R's striking force was composed of two task forces, A, and B, each composed of one company of medium tanks and one company of infantry. Boundary between task forces was the main E-W road leading into HILDESHEIM.

The task forces attacked at 1540, both using the east edges of the small towns as lines of departure. TF "A" attacked with the tanks about 150 yards ahead of the infantry who were well dispersed. All tanks kept up steady machine gun fire on what appeared to be dug-in infantry. Some 75 and 76 HE and WP was used on the woods near the top of the ridge. Some small arms fire was returned, but the machine gun fire of the moving tanks kept most of it neutralized. As the tanks approached the "Barn", German infantry started moving out of their holes, surrendering. One 88mm AT-AA gun fired 3 or 4 rounds, but Pozit fuse 105mm fire was placed on it by a battery artillery and the crew were either wounded or abandoned their positions. Five well placed HE tank shots in the barn forced 25 Germans from it. The tanks continued on, with one platoon of infantry rounding up prisoners. The ridge was rushed at 1630, a distance of 1 1/4 miles having been covered. Two platoons of infantry came up just short of the ridge and took the lead. The tanks followed to the ridge and took hull down positions, digging in for the night.

TF "B" attacked with the infantry riding on the backs of the tanks, all tank machine guns firing on the slopes of the rolling terrain. No opposition was found to its front and TF "B" assisted

TF "A" by placing fire on the other ridge. It gained its objective at 1615, the infantry having dismounted 200 yards from the top of the ridge. The tanks took hull down positions and TF "B" dug in for the night.


The entire operation netted 4 Germans killed, 14 wounded and 135 PWs. American losses were 1 infantryman wounded. Opposition during the day had been light, with enemy surrendering readily upon being fired on.

The attack brought out two methods of using infantry with tanks:

1. In TF "A", infantry followed tanks at such a distance as would preclude their being hit by artillery fire placed on the tanks. Tanks led as no mines or AT guns had been encountered all day. Infantry did not ride tanks, as dug in enemy could be observed.

2. In TF "B", infantry rode tanks until near the top of the ridge, where they dismounted and led the attack. No positions had been observed in front of TF "B", and by getting the task force northeast of the German positions quickly, it helped make the German position untenable.

14. Attack Against Emplaced Dual Purpose Weapons by Armor with Air Support.



Scale: 1 inch = 500 yds.

A = 33 Dual Purpose Emplaced 88m.

B = Assembly Position TF #15.

C = Position Airground Liaison Obs.

D = Position Supporting Light Arty Bn.

During late afternoon on 14 April 1945 after having cleared a nest of thirty-five dual purposed 88mm guns, the Commanding Officer of Task Force 15, Combat Command "A", 6 Armored Division, was notified by his reconnaissance agents of another enemy position on the axis of his advance.

He quickly summoned his company officers and the supporting artillery commanders and made a reconnaissance. He formulated his plan, made it known to the Combat Command Commander and received approval.

Air support was requested and an early morning mission was obtained.

The task force moved into attack position "B" during hours of darkness.

PLAN OF ATTACK:

One medium tank company with one platoon of infantry mounted on the tanks to envelop the right of enemy position "A". One medium tank company with one platoon of infantry mounted on the tanks to envelop the left of enemy position and to drive on and seize the air field.

The light tank company, reinforced by one platoon of medium tanks and one platoon of infantry to seize the village of NEU.

The light artillery battalion plus one medium artillery battalion to give general support.

Time of attack: 0700, 15 April 1945.

At 0645, 15 April 1945 the air liaison officer reported that one flight of P47 fighters was in the air and available.


A heavy ground haze enveloped the entire area.

At 0715 the haze lifted and both battalions of artillery laid on target with smoke and high explosive.

The flight commander signalled that he was ready for the run over the target. The artillery stopped firing; a blanket of smoke marked the target. The fighters dropped their bombs, the tanks with infantry mounted on them moved out rapidly. The fighters circled, made another run, fired their rockets and strafed. The enemy guns were silent.

Slowly the steel cordon of tanks moved in on the enemy position. The fighters strafed again and then they made two 'dry runs' as the tanks opened up with machine guns and cannons. The tanks closed in, the infantry dismounted while moving and followed. The position was over-run. Thirty-three dual purpose, concrete emplaced 88mm guns and three hundred and fifty prisoners were taken without loss of any equipment and with but two men wounded.

15. Seizure of Remagen Bridge by an Armored Task Force.



Early on the afternoon of 7 March 1945 "Task Force Engeman", consisting of the 14 Tank Battalion (less one medium tank company), 27 Armored Infantry Battalion, one reconnaissance platoon and a detachment of armored engineers, reached the hills (A) overlooking the Rhine River near Remagen. Lt Col Engeman, observing that the Ludendorf Bridge was intact and that fleeing German vehicles were moving across this bridge, sent an armored infantry company and one platoon of medium tanks, with tanks leading, rapidly through Remagen to the bridge. The tanks from positions on the west bank (B) supported the infantry with direct fire. The dismounted armored infantry company ran across the bridge, and the leading platoon climbed the towers (C) on the east bank and destroyed the machine guns which had been firing from them. The next platoon seized the tunnel and occupied positions down stream (E) in order to protect the left flank. The third platoon climbed the bluff and destroyed the snipers and antiaircraft guns (D) which had been firing from there. The engineers then moved onto the bridge and began the removal of demolition charges which had failed to explode. While this was going on the remainder of the 27 Armored Infantry Battalion crossed dismounted and established the initial bridge head.

of WITPERSHEIM, prepared to maneuver to the left or right of the attacking force as the situation would demand.

While the infantry advanced toward A a reinforced light tank platoon advanced north on road D, its mission to protect the flank of the attacking force and to neutralize any threat from the hostile force in the woods at B.

The infantry, working carefully with the tank company, jumped off shortly after noon and by 1600 had reached its objective. The enemy's position was rendered untenable, so that all who were not killed withdrew across the river that night.

The light tank patrol more than proved its worth. It left road D, accompanied by a small force of infantry, entered woods B and engaged the reinforcing enemy infantry, many of whom were not dug in. Nearly 300 bodies were counted in woods B when the action was completed.

CHAPTER 5

OPINIONS OF AVAILABLE COMMANDERS OF ARMOR

17. Analysis of Opinions.

a. Attention is invited to Appendix 4. A number of additional questionnaires were sent to other commanders but answers were received only from those indicated.

b. An analysis of the opinions expressed indicate the following definite trends;

- (1) The missions and methods of employment of armor laid down in Field Service Regulations are sound and correct.
- (2) The Armored Division as distinct from the Infantry Division should be a component of the post-war Army.
- (3) The strength of the armored division should be increased to approximate the size of the "heavy division".
- (4) Regimental organization is favored over separate battalion organization.
- (5) Within the regiment, tanks and infantry should be combined.
- (6) Tanks and infantry should not be combined in battalions.
- (7) Considering the trend to tanks armed with high velocity weapons capable of destroying other tanks, Tank Destroyer Units are not necessary to an armored division.
- (8) The various elements of truck units, artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, normally attached, should be made organic to an armored division.
- (9) A full track personnel carrier should be provided as the basic infantry and engineer squad vehicle. The same vehicle, modified as a command post vehicle, should replace all command half-tracks.
- (10) The armored division should be equipped with two types of tanks - reconnaissance and exploitation. A heavily armored tank which sacrifices some mobility for ~~the~~ heavier armor, should be provided for use of infantry divisions against fortified areas.
- (11) Additional liaison airplanes for liaison and command purposes are necessary.

18. Junior officers who actually commanded battalions, companies and platoons in combat were questioned on the details of the various company organizations. (see Appendix 5). Their opinions are reflected in the organization charts of tank, rifle and battalion headquarters companies and will not be further discussed.

19. Conference on Organization and Equipment of the Armored Division.

a. On 7 November 1945, a conference was held at Bad Nauheim, Germany, at which the preliminary conclusions and recommendations of the Armored Section, General Board, European Theater were presented and discussed. The following officers attended:

Lt Gen Geoffrey Keyes
Maj Gen R. R. Allen
Maj Gen J. M. Devine
Maj Gen R. W. Crow
Brig Gen T. E. Boudinot
Brig Gen J. D. Balmer
Brig Gen J. H. Collier
Col C. V. Bromley, Jr
Col F. J. Brown
Col C. G. Dodge
Col R. J. Handy
Col C. I. Hutton
Col J. L. Inskeep
Col L. R. Dewey
Lt Col J. G. Felber

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Col John A. Smith Jr
Col Walter Burnside
Col K. L. Howze Jr
Col A. E. Harris
Lt Col E. C. Orth

b. An account of the opinions expressed and the conclusions reached in this conference is contained in Appendix 6. With the exception of those pertaining to the Cavalry Squadron and the artillery, the recommendations of this group of officers have been incorporated into the recommendations of The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

20. Conclusions.

a. The employment of armor in the European Theater was based on the methods prescribed by Field Service Regulations. These methods are correct and resulted in success.

b. The use and employment of armor in the European Theater clearly indicated the necessity for Armored Divisions distinct from Infantry Divisions.

c. The "Light Armored Division" is not sufficiently strong.

d. The "Heavy Armored Division" was greatly deficient in infantry.

e. Elements which were found necessary for attachment to armored divisions should be made organic to them.

f. Combat commands were broken down into two or more task forces and were generally employed in accordance with tactical principles prescribed for employment of the armored division.

g. Combat commands were set up as operational headquarters for control of various combinations of units, which were temporarily assigned. This is believed to be a weakness in organization.

h. The organization of the armored division should be such as to facilitate the formation of task forces within the three major striking components. It is believed that a composite tank-infantry regiment will accomplish this and in addition insure that the assault elements of the division normally operate under their own permanently assigned commanders.

21. Recommendations.

a. That the armored division represented by Appendix 7 be adopted, with such minor modifications in personnel as development of improved equipment indicated. Appendix 8 contains the proposed organization of the various companies, troops and batteries. Appendix 9 illustrates a possible tactical break down of the proposed division with task forces.

b. That pertinent doctrines, techniques, T/O's and T/E's be amended by appropriate agencies of the War Department.

APPENDIX 1

Typical Tactical Formation of 2 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 3 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 4 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 5 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 6 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 7 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 8 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 9 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 10 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 11 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 12 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 13 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 14 Armored Division
Typical Tactical Formation of 16 Armored Division

TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
SECOND ARMORED DIVISION
(Heavy Division w/Attachments)

"GRENADE" - COLOGNE PLAIN BREAK-THROUGH - 28 Feb - 4 Mar 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report Second Arm Div March 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CO of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co	HQ  DIV
Arm'd Engr Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
Div Arty (-3 Bns)	 (-)
Arm'd Ren Bn	
TD Bn (-2 Cos) (Atchd)	 (-)
AAA Bn (-1 Btry) (Atchd)	 (-)
CP Sup Bn	 SUP
Arm'd Med Bn (-2 Cos, Det.)	 (-)
FA Gp (Atchd)	
Div Trn Hq & Hq Co	HQ  TRNS
Maint Bn	 MAINT
Signal Co	

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	HQ  CC
Arm'd FA Bn	
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Med Co	
AAA Btry	
Regtl Ren Co	
Regtl Maint Co	 MAINT

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	HQ  CC
Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Regt Ren Co	
Arm'd Med Co	
Inf Regt (-1 Bn) (Atchd)	 (-)

COMBAT COMMAND "C"

CMDR:- Arm'd Inf Regt
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Regt (-3 Bns)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Co	
Med Tk Co	
TD Plat	 TD
Arm'd Engr Plat	
Arm'd Med Det	 DET

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Regt
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Regt (-2 Bns, Ren Co, Maint Co)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
TD Plat	 TD
Arm'd Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn	
Arm'd Inf Co	
TD Plat	 TD
Arm'd Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Regt
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Regt (-1 Bn, Med Co, Ren Co, Med Plat)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Co	
TD Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Plat	
Arm'd FA Bn	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Inf Bn	
Med Tk Co	
Med Tk Plat	
Arm'd Engr Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
TD Plat	 TD
Arm'd FA Bn	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn	
Arm'd Inf Co	
TD Plat	 TD
Arm'd Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
THIRD ARMORED DIVISION
(Heavy Division w/Attachments)**

EXPLOITATION - REMAGFN TO THE ELBE - 25 Mar - 25 Apr 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 3rd Arm Div March - April 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CG of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co	 DIV
Arm'd Engr Bn (-3 Cos)	 (-)
Arm'd Maint Bn (-2 Cos, 1 Sec)	 (-)
QM Sup Bn (-3 Trk Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Med Bn (-3 Cos)	 (-)
AAA Bn (-4 Btrys) (Atchd)	 (-)
Inf Regt (-3 Bns) (Atchd)	 (-)
Div Tns Hq & Hq Co	 TNS
Arm'd Rcn Bn	 (-)
TD Bn (-3 Cos) (Atchd)	 (-)
Div Arty (-3 Bns)	 (-)
Signal Co	

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	 CC
Arm'd Rcn Co (Regtl)	
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Med Co	
155mm FA Bn (How) (Atchd)	 155
Arm'd Maint Co	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	 CC
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Med Co	
Arm'd Maint Co	
155mm FA Bn (How) (Atchd)	 155

COMBAT COMMAND RESERVE

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Inf Regt
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Regt (-3 Bns)	 (-)
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Med Co	
Arm'd Maint Sec	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Regt
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Regt (-2 Bns, Rcn Co)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Bn	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
Arm'd FA Bn	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn	
Inf Bn	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
Arm'd FA Bn	
QM Trk Plat	 TRK

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Regt
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Regt (-2 Bns)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Bn	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
Arm'd FA Bn	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn	
Inf Bn	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
Arm'd FA Bn (Atchd)	
QM Trk Plat	 TRK

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn	
Arm'd Inf Bn	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn	
Inf Bn	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
QM Trk Plat	 TRK


NOTE: During this period only two combat commands were committed at a time. Artillery was shifted accordingly to support those commands committed.

TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
FOURTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Armored Division w/attachments)

RELIEF OF BASTOGNE, BELGIUM - 19th - 31st DEC 1944
(Reference: After/After Action Report 4th Arm Div December 1944)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CO of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co	
Cav Recon Sq (-1 Trp)	 (-)
Armored Engr Bn (-3 Cos)	 (-)
AAA Bn (Atchd)	
Armored Med Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
Ord Maint Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Div Arty (- 3 Bns)	 (-)
Sig Co	
Hq & Hq Co Div Tns	
LM Truck Co (Atchd)	
QM Truck Co (Atchd)	

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	
Armored Med Co	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	
Armored Med Co	
Ord Co	
Cav Recon Trp	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq Div Res Det	
Armored Engr Co	
TD Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
Armored FA Bn	
Tk En	
Armored Inf Bn	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Armored Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armored Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
Armored Engr Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
TD Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
Armored FA Bn	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk En (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Armored Inf Co	
Armored Engr Plat	
TD Plat	
Armored FA Bn (Atchd)	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk En
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Armored Inf Co	
Armored Engr Plat	
TD Plat	
Armored FA Bn	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armored Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armored Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
Armored Engr Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
TD Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
1st How En (Atchd)	

NOTE: The Reserve Command normally controlled units of the Division relieved from the combat commands. It however, was sometimes used as a fighting force i.e. as a combat command.

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
FIFTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

ROER TO THE RHINE - 25 Feb - 5 Mar 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 5th Arm Div March 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR: - CG of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co		DIV
TD Bn (-3 Cos) (Atchd)		(-)
AAA Bn (-2 Btrys) (Atchd to FA)		(-)
Ord Maint Bn (-3 Cos)		(-)
Armd Med Bn (-3 Cos)		(-)
Cav Ren Sq (-3 Trn)		(-)
Sig Co		
Armd Engr Bn (-3 Cos)		(-)
Div Arty (-3 Bns)		DIV (-)
Hq & Hq Co Div Tns		DIV TNS
155 How FA Bn (Atchd)		155 How
QM Trk Co (Atchd)		TRK
QM Trk Co (Atchd)		TRK

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR: - CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"		CC
Armd Engr Co (-1 Plat)		(-)
Armd Med Co		
Ord Maint Co		
Armd FA Bn		
TD Co (-1 Plat)		(-)
Engr Towy Br Sect		TRDWT
Lt Tk Co		
AAA Btry		

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR: - CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"		CC
Armd Engr Co (-2 Squads)		(-)
TD Co		
Armd Med Co		
Ord Maint Co		
Armd FA Bn		
Cav Ren Trp (-1 Plat)		(-)
Lt Tk Co		
Engr Towy Br Sect		TRDWT
AAA Btry		

COMBAT COMMAND "R"

CMDR: - CO of CC "R"
COMPOSITION:

Bq Div Res Det		DET
Armd Med Co		
Ord Maint Co		
Cav Ren Trp		
Armd FA Bn		
AAA Btry		
Engr Towy Br Sect		TRDWT

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR: - CO Armd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	
Med Tk Co	
Med Tk Co	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR: - CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-2 Med Co, 1 Lt Co)		(-)
Armd Inf Co		
Cav Ren Trp		
TD Plat		
Armd Engr Plat		

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR: - CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, 1 Lt Co)		(-)
Armd Inf Co		
Armd Inf Co		
Armd Engr Squad		

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR: - CO Armd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn (-2 Cos)		(-)
Med Tk Co		
Cav Ren Plat		
Armd Engr Squad		

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR: - CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)		(-)
Armd Inf Co		
Armd Inf Co		
TD Plat		

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR: - CO Armd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn (-2 Cos)		(-)
Med Tk Co		
TD Co (-1 Plat)		
Armd Engr Co		


NOTE: Throughout the entire operation of the 5th Armored Div, the units assigned to the three Combat Commands were fixed. Within the Combat Command, medium tank companies were married to the rifle companies i.e. lived, slept and fought together. ✓

TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
 OF
SIXTH ARMOR DIVISION
 (Light Division w/Attachments)

EXPLOITATION - CENTRAL GERMANY - 1st-15th APRIL 45
 (References:- After/After Action Report 6th Arm Div April)


DIVISION

CMDR:- CO of Div
 COMPOSITION:




COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
 COMPOSITION:




COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
 COMPOSITION:




DIVISION RESERVE COMMAND

CMDR:- CO of Div Res Cmd
 COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO of Tank Bn
 COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Inf Bn
 COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Inf Bn
 COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO of Tank Bn
 COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO of Tank Bn
 COMPOSITION:



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO of Arm'd Inf Bn
 COMPOSITION:



**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
SEVENTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

SEIZURE OF TERRAIN - PEEL SWAMP HOLLAND - 30 Sept - 31 Oct '44
(Reference: After/After Action 7th Arm Div October 1944)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CO of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co

Arm'd Engr Bn (-3 Cos)

Cav Recn Sq (-1 Tp, 1 Plat)

Arm'd Med Bn

Ord Maint Bn

TD Bn (-2 Cos) (Atch'd)

Div Tn Hq & Hq Co


AAA Bn

QM Trk Co (Atch'd)

QM Trk Co (Atch'd)

Div Arty (-3Bns)

Signal Co



COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"




COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"

Cav Recn Tp

Arm'd Engr Co (-3 Plats)



COMBAT COMMAND "R"

CMDR:- CO of CC "R"
COMPOSITION:

Div Res Det



TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:


Tk Bn (-2 Med Cos)

Arm'd Inf Co

TD Plat

Arm'd Engr Co

Arm'd FA Bn



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)


Med Tk Co

Med Tk Co

Arm'd Engr Co

TD Co (-1 Plat)

Arm'd FA Bn



TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)

Med Tk Co

Arm'd Engr Plat

Arm'd Engr Plat

TD Plat

Arm'd FA Bn (-1 Btry)



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:


Tk Bn (-1 Ved Co)

Arm'd Inf Co

Arm'd Engr Plat

TD Co (-1 Plat)

Arm'd FA Btry




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Ved Co)

Arm'd Inf Co

Cav Recn Plat



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)

Med Tk Co




NOTE: The Div normally worked in three combat commands, each command having one tank battalion, one arm'd infantry battalion, one arm'd field artillery battalion supplemented by engineers, tank destroyers, anti-aircraft, medical detachments and sometimes with additional reconnaissance troops. Combat commands generally worked with two task forces, each task force commanded by a battalion commander.

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
EIGHTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Armored Division w/attachments)**

ROPER RIVER - February 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 8th Arm'd Div February 1945)


DIVISION

CMDR:- CG of Div
COMPOSITION:




COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:




COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:




COMBAT COMMAND "H"

CMDR:- CO of CC "H"
COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armed Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armed Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:




TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armed Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:



**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
NINTH AVIATION DIVISION
(Light Division w/ Attachments)**

DURING THE JULIA RIVER - 1964 - 20th April 1965
(Reference: After/After Action Report 9th and 10th April 1965)

LISTED

COMBAT COMMAND "A"	
CMDR:- CO of Div	HO  DIV
COMPOSITION:	
Liv Hq & Hq Co	 Hq Co
Liv Co	 Liv Co
Armed Engr Bn (-3 Cos)	 (-)
Cav Recon Sq (-3 Trops)	 (-)
AAA Bn (-3 Btry)	 (-)
TU Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
FA Group (Atchd)	
Chem Mortar Plt (Atchd)	
Liv Tns Hq 2 (Hq Co)	HO  DIV TNS
Armed Med En (-2 Cos)	
Enl Maint Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
4 th Truck Co (Atchd)	 TRK
4 th Truck Co (Atchd)	 TRK


COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	HO  CC
Armed Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Armed Med Co	
Cav Recon Trp	
Armed FA Bn	
Enl Maint Co	
TD Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
155 How SP FA Bn	 155 SP

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	HO  CC
Armed Med Co	
Ord Supt Co	
TD Co (-3 Plats)	 (-)
Cav Recon Trp	
Armed Engr Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
155 SP How FA Bn (-1 Btry)	 155 SP (-)
Div Arty (-2 Bns)	HO  DIV (-)
Combat Engr Co	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO Liv Res
COMPOSITION:

Hq Div Res Det	HO  DET
Armed Med Co	
Armed Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Ord Maint Co	
Combat Engr Co	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, 1 Med Plat)	 (-)
Armed Inf Co	
Armed Engr Plat	
TD Plat	
105 FA Bn	 105

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armed Inf En
COMPOSITION:

Armed Inf En (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
Armed Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #3

CMDR:- Co Inf En
COMPOSITION:

Inf En	
Med Tk Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Armed Inf En
COMPOSITION:

Armed Inf En	
Med Tk Co	
TD Plat	
AAA Sect	
Armed Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, 1 Med Plat)	
Inf Co	
TD Plat	

TASK FORCE #3

CMDR:- CO Inf Regt
COMPOSITION:

Inf Regt (-2 Bns, 1 Plat)	 (-)
Med Tk Plat	
TD Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Armed Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armed Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Inf Co	
Armed FA Btry	
155 SP How FA Btry	 155 SP
Cav Recon Plat	
Cav Recon Plat	
Armed Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, 1 Med Plat)	 (-)
Armed Inf Co	
Armed FA Bn (-1 Btry)	 (-)
Cav Recon Trp (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Armed Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #3

CMDR:- CO Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Inf Bn	
TD Co	
Med Tk Plat	


NOTE: It is assumed the AAA Bn was broken down and assigned to units of the Division although records did not disclose such breakdown.

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
TENTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

ENCINEMENT OF METZ - 16th - 27th NOV 1944
(Reference: - After/After Action Report 10th Arm Div November 1944)


DIVISION

CMDR: - CG of Div
COMPOSITION:




COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR: - CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:



COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR: - CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:



COMBAT COMMAND "R"

CMDR: - CO Div Res
COMPOSITION:



TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2

TASK FORCE #3

TASK FORCE #1


TASK FORCE #2

TASK FORCE #3

TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2

TASK FORCE #3



* NOTE: The break-down to units of the AAA Bn was not shown in any report. But it is assumed that the Arty, Division Trains, and other headquarters had their tactical allocation.

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
ELEVENTH ARMORED DIVIS. -
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

SEIZE TERRAIN - CHEROEGNE - RECHRIVAL VALLEY - 29 Dec 44 - 3 Jan 45
(Reference: After/After Action Report 11th Arm'd Div - January 45)

DIVISION

**CMDR:- CG of Div
COMPOSITION:**

Div Hq & Hq Co	Hq  E.N
Cav Recon Sq (+2 Trn)	 (-)
FA Gp (Atchd)	
AAA Bn (Atchd) (-2 Btry)	 (-)
Ord Maint Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Armed Med Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Div Tns Hq & Hq Co	Hq  TNG
Div Arty (-2 Bns)	Hq  DIV (-)
TD Bn (Atchd) (-2 Cos)	 (-)
QM Trk Co (Atchd)	 T.M
QM Trk Co (Atchd)	 T.M
Signal Co	

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

**CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:**

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	Hq  CC
Armed FA Bn	
Cav Recon Tr	
Armed Med Co	
Ord Maint Co	
AAA Btry (-1 Plat)	 (-)

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

**CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:**

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	Hq  CC
Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Cav Recon Tr (-2 Plats)	 (-)
AAA Btry (-2 Plats)	 (-)
TD Co	
Armed FA Bn	

DIVISION RESERVE COMMAND

**CMDR:- CO of Div Res Cmd
COMPOSITION:**

Div Res Hq	Hq  DET
Armed Inf Bn	
Med Tk Co	
Armed Engr Bn (-1 Co - 2 Plats)	 (-)

TASK FORCE #1

**CMDR:- CO of Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:**

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Rifle Co	
TD Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
Armed Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

**CMDR:- CO of Armed Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:**

Armed Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
TD Plat	
Armed Engr Plat	
AAA Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

**CMDR:- CO of Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:**

Tk Bn (-1 L Plat, 1 Med Co)	 (-)
Rifle Co	
Cav Recon Plat	
Armed Engr Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
AAA Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

**CMDR:- CO of Armed Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:**

Armed Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
Light Tk Plat	
Cav Recon Plat	
Armed Engr Plat	
AAA Plat	


**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
TWELFTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

TRUCK TO THE RHINE RIVER - 10th - 20th April 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 12th Arm Div April, 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CG of Div
COMPOSITION:


Div Hq & Hq Co
Sig Co
Div Arty (-3 Bns)
FA Cp (-3 Bns)
Arm Med Bn (-3 Cos)
Ord Maint Bn
Tns Hq & Hq Co
QM Trk Co (Atchd)
QM Trk Co (Atchd)
Cav Ren Sq
AAA Bn (-3 Btrys) (Atchd)
Arm Engr Bn (-3 Cos)



COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:


Hq & Hq Co CC "A"
Arm Engr Co (-2 Plato)
AAA Btry (-2 Plato)
Arm FA Bn (Atchd)
Engr Towy Br Sect
Arm Med Co



COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:


Hq & Hq Co CC "B"
Arm Engr Co (-2 Plato)
AAA Btry (-2 Plato)
Arm FA Bn (Atchd)
Engr Towy Br Sect
Arm Med Co



COMBAT COMMAND "R"

CMDR:- CO Div Res
COMPOSITION:


Hq Div Res Det
Arm Engr Co (-2 Plato)
AAA Btry (-2 Plato)
Arm FA Bn (Atchd)
Engr Towy Br Sect
Arm Med Co



TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:


Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, 1 Lt Flat, AG Flat)
Arm Inf Co
Arm Engr Plat
AAA Plat
Arm FA Btry
AG Plat (6 guns)
Prov Inf Co (Atchd)



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Arm Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:


Arm Inf Bn (-1 Co)
Med Tk Co
Lt Tk Plat
Arm Engr Plat
Arm FA Bn (-1 Btry)
AAA Plat



TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:


Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, AG Plat)
Arm Inf Co
Arm Engr Plat
AAA Plat
Arm FA Btry
AG Plat (6 guns)
Prov Inf Co (Atchd)



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Arm Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:


Arm Inf Bn (-1 Co)
Med Tk Co
Arm Engr Plat
Arm FA Bn (-1 Btry)
AAA Plat



TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:


Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, AG Plat)
Arm Inf Co
Arm Engr Plat
AAA Plat
Arm FA Btry
AG Plat (6 guns)
Prov Inf Co (Atchd)



TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Arm Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm Inf Bn (-1 Co)
Med Tk Co
Arm Engr Plat
Arm FA Bn (-1 Btry)
AAA Plat



**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
THIRTYFIVE ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

ROSE POCKET - 10th - 18th April 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 13th Arm Div April 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CO of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co	 DIV
Sig Co	
Arm'd Med Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
AAA Bn (-3 Btrys) (Atchd)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Bn (-2 Cos)	 (-)
Cav Ren Sq	
Ord Maint Bn	
Tns Hq & Hq Co	HQ  TNS
Div Arty (-3 Bns)	HQ  DIV (-)
CM Trk Co (Atchd)	 TRK
CM Trk Co (Atchd)	 TRK
TB Bn (-3 Cos) (Atchd)	 (-)

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
AAA Btry (-1 Plat)	 (-)
Lt Tk Co	
Arm'd FA Bn	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	HQ 
TD Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm'd Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
AAA Btry	
Arm'd FA Bn	

COMBAT COMMAND "R"

CMDR:- CO Div Reserve
COMPOSITION:

Hq Div Res Det	HQ 
Arm'd FA Bn	
Arm'd Med Co	
TD Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
AAA Btry	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
Med Tk Co	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
AAA Plat	
TD Plat	
Engr Tody Br Sect	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-2 Med Co, 1 Lt Co)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Co	
Arm'd Engr Plat	
TD Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Co	
TD Plat	
Arm'd Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm'd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm'd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
TD Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	 (-)
Arm'd Inf Co	

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
FOURTEENTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

RHINE RIVER TO ALSTRAUM BRIDGE - 1 April - 10 May 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 14th Arm Div April and May 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CO of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co		DIV
Sig Co		
Div Arty (-3 Bns)		DIV (-)
Armd Engr Bn (-2 Cos)		(-)
Cav Rec Sq (-2 Trps)		(-)
TD Bn (-3 Cos) (Atchd)		(-)
AAA Bn (-3 Btrys) (Atchd)		(-)
Div Ins Hq & Hq Co		DIV TNG
Armd Med Bn		
Ord Maint Bn		
QM Truck Co (Atchd)		TRK
QM Truck Co (Atchd)		TRK

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	
Cav Rec Trp (-2 Plato)	
TD Co	
Armd FA Bn (-2 Btrys)	
Armd Engr Co (-2 Plato)	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	
Cav Rec Trp (-2 Plato)	
Armd Engr Co (-2 Plato)	
TD Co	
Armd FA Bn (-2 Btrys)	

COMBAT COMMAND "C"

CMDR:- CO Div Res
COMPOSITION:

Div Res Hq Det	
Cav Rec Trp (-2 Plato)	
Armd Engr Co (-2 Plato)	
TD Co	
Armd FA Bn (-2 Btrys)	
Provisional Co	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	
Armd Inf Co	
Cav Rec Plat	
Armd Engr Plat	
Armd FA Btry	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	
Med Tk Co	
Cav Rec Plat	
Armd Engr Plat	
Armd FA Btry	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	
Armd Inf Co	
Cav Rec Plat	
Armd Engr Plat	
Armd FA Btry	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	
Med Tk Co	
Cav Rec Plat	
Armd Engr Plat	
Armd FA Btry	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co)	
Armd Inf Co	
Cav Rec Plat	
Armd Engr Plat	
Armd FA Btry	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Armd Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn (-1 Co)	
Med Tk Co	
Cav Rec Plat	
Armd Engr Plat	
Armd FA Btry	

NOTE: It is assumed that the TD Companies were broken down and assigned to the Task Forces. Since the entire Division was in three balanced commands, it is believed, although not shown in the records, that the proportionate shares of AAA and the Medical Battalion were assigned to each of the Combat Commands.

**TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION
OF THE
SIXTEENTH ARMORED DIVISION
(Light Division w/Attachments)**

CAPTURE OF PILSEN - 6th - 9th May 1945
(Reference: After/After Action Report 16th Arm Div May 1945)

DIVISION

CMDR:- CG of Div
COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co	Hq  DIV
Div Arty (-2 Bns)	 (-)
Ord Maint Bn (-) Co	 (-)
Arm Med Bn (-1 Co, 2 Plats)	 (-)
Sig Co	
Cav Recon Sq (-2 Trs)	 (-)
Arm Engr Bn (-3 Cos)	 (-)
AAA Bn (-3 Btrys) (Atchd)	 (-)
TD Bn (Atchd)	
Hq & Hq Co Div Tns	Hq  DIV TNS
QM Trk Co (Atchd)	 T.S.
QM Trk Co (Atchd)	 T.R.

COMBAT COMMAND "A"

CMDR:- CO of CC "A"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "A"	Hq 
Tk Bn	
Arm Inf Bn	
Cav Recon Trp	
Arm Engr Co	
Arm Med Co	
AAA Btry	

COMBAT COMMAND "B"

CMDR:- CO of CC "B"
COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co CC "B"	Hq 
Arm PA Bn	
Arm Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
Arm Med Co (-1 Plat)	 (-)
Ord Maint Co	
AAA Btry	

COMBAT COMMAND "C"

CMDR:- CO Div Res
COMPOSITION:

Hq Det Div Res	Hq 
Arm PA Bn	
Med Tk Co	
Arm Engr Co (-2 Plats)	 (-)
AAA Btry (-2 Plats)	 (-)

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm Inf Bn (-1 Co)	 (-)
Med Tk Co	
Cav Recon Trp	
Lt Tk Plat	
Arm Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-1 Med Co, 1 Lt Plat)	 (-)
Arm Inf Co	
Arm Engr Plat	

TASK FORCE #1

CMDR:- CO Arm Inf Bn
COMPOSITION:

Arm Inf Bn (-1 Co)	
Med Tk Co	
Arm Engr Plat	
AAA Plat	

TASK FORCE #2

CMDR:- CO Tk Bn
COMPOSITION:

Tk Bn (-2 Med Cos)	 (-)
Arm Inf Co	
Arm Engr Plat	
AAA Plat	

TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION OF LIGHT ARMORED DIVISION


(From study of After/After Action Reports and other reports of 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 16th Arm Divs)

DIVISION CONTROL




COMBAT COMMAND "A"

COMBAT COMMAND CONTROL




COMBAT COMMAND "B"

COMBAT COMMAND CONTROL





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COMBAT COMMAND CONTROL





TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2





TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2



TASK FORCE #1


TASK FORCE #2



TYPICAL TACTICAL FORMATION OF HEAVY ARMORED DIVISION


(From study of After/After Action Reports and other reports of 2d and 3d Armored Divisions)

DIVISION CONTROL




COMBAT COMMAND "A"

COMBAT COMMAND CONTROL




COMBAT COMMAND "B"

COMBAT COMMAND CONTROL




COMBAT COMMAND "P"

COMBAT COMMAND CONTROL




TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2




TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2



TASK FORCE #1

TASK FORCE #2



NOTE: T/O of 1 Light Bn and 2 Medium Bns in the Arm'd Regt, was changed by both 2d and 3d Arm'd Divs to a 3 Bn Organisation with each Bn composed of 1 Light and 2 Medium Cos.

NOTE: Normally only 2 Combat Commands were committed at a time. Arty was shifted accordingly to support the Combat Commands committed.

THE GENERAL BOARD
 UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
 Armored Section
 APO 408

OPINIONS OF JUNIOR COMBAT OFFICERS

The following questionnaire was submitted to 88 officers, between the grades of 2d Lieutenant and Lt Colonel, who had served an average of eight and one half (8½) months with various armored units (12 Armored Divisions and 3 Separate Tank Battalions) during combat on the continent of Europe. The results are tabulated below. Tank officers answered questions pertinent to tanks, likewise infantry officers to infantry. (List of officers is appended hereto.)

QUESTIONNAIRE	RESULTS	
	<u>No</u>	<u>Answer</u>
1. How many tanks should there be in a tank platoon?	43	- 5 Tks
	2	- 6 Tks
	9	- 4 Tks
	6	- 3 Tks
2. How many platoons should there be in each infantry or tank company?	34	- 3 Tk Plat
	14	- 4 Tk Plat
	13	- 3 Inf Plat
	15	- 4 Inf Plat
3. How many officers should there be in:		
a. Tank Company?		Average 6
b. Armored Infantry Company?		Average 7
4. a. Should we have light tanks?	68	- Yes
	8	- No
b. If yes, where should they be and how many?	34	- 1 Co/Bn
	19	- w/Rcn
5. What weapons platoons should there be in:		
a. The Tank Battalion Hq Co?	49	- AG Plat
	43	- Mort Plat

	<u>No</u>	<u>Answer</u>
b. The Armored Infantry Battalion Hq Co?	48 50 28	- AG Plat - Mort Plat - HMG Plat
6. What reconnaissance unit should there be in:		
a. The Tank Bn: (Give size, and component elements)?	12 21	- A/C & $\frac{1}{4}$ Ts - Lt Tks & $\frac{1}{4}$ Ts
b. The Armored Infantry Bn: (Give size, and component elements)?	14 12 13	- A/C & $\frac{1}{4}$ Ts - Lt Tks & $\frac{1}{4}$ Ts - HT & $\frac{1}{4}$ Ts
7. Should the Hq Companies of the Tank Bn and the Armored Infantry Bn be identical?	10 53	- Yes - No
8. Should the Service Co of the Tank Bn and the Armored Infantry Bn be identical?	2 68	- Yes - No
9. a. Should there be a combined Hq and Service Co in the Tank Bn?	46 2	- No - Yes
b. The Armored Infantry Battalion?	4 34	- Yes - No
10. What is your opinion of the proposed Armd Inf Co?		Satisfactory
11. a. Do you like the 105mm Assault Gun?	79 3	- Yes - No
b. How were they used?		Btry - Indirect Fire
12. Should the 60mm mortar be retained? (Qualify your answer.)	25 33	- Yes - No

THE GENERAL BOARD
 UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
 Armored Section
 APO 408

LIST OF JUNIOR COMBAT OFFICERS QUESTIONED

Name	Rank	ASN	T/O Position	Unit	Length in Combat
Richard T. Johnson	1st Lt	0513533	Inf Plat & Co Cmdr	7 AD	7 mos
Samuel L. Irwin	Lt Co	0508520	Inf Bn Cmdr	7 & 2 AD	9 mos
William S. Parkias	Capt	01293099	Plat & Co Cmdr Inf	2 AD	10 mos
Robert F. Brockmann	1st Lt	0486933	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	8 mos
Wm. H. Greer	Maj	03233944	Sv Co Cmdr & Tns CO CC	2 AD	11 mos
Fred J. Ezelle	1st Lt	0131499	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	1½ mos
James H. Strack	1st Lt	0328306	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	5 mos
Robert C. Wells	1st Lt	0548201	Plat Ldr & Co Cmdr, Inf	7 AD	8 mos
Edw. C. Drews	2d Lt	02017674	1st Sgt & Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	9 mos
Allen Nelson	1st Lt	0539844	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	10 mos
John P. Huntington	1st Lt	01325009	Plat Ldr, Inf	5 AD	6 mos
Paul Murray, Jr.	Capt	01304934	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	6 mos
Donald W. Dunn	1st Lt	01321895	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	15 mos
Geo. H. Culwell	1st Lt	0532754	AG Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	6 mos
Terrell D. Huddleston	1st Lt	01018753	Mort Plat & Rcn Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	6 mos
Richard W. Sidenberg	Capt	01166607	AG Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	8 mos

Name	Rank	ASN	T/O Position	Unit	Length in Combat
Anthony Sokovich	2d Lt	02018062	Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	5 AD	6 mos
Edward F. Lunsford	1st Lt	01018533	Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	8 mos
Wilson M. Hawkins	Lt Col	022737	Bn Ex, S-3 Regt	2 AD CC Ex & CO Tk Bn	36 mos
Wm. C. Buck	1st Lt	0526679	Bn Motor Off,	2 AD Tk Bn	9 mos
C. M. Jones	Capt	025890	Plat Ldr & Maint Off,	2 AD Tk Bn	2 mos
Louis F. Bresna	1st Lt	01012626	Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	8 mos
W. E. LaRock	1st Lt	01017133	Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	9 mos
Wm. H. Cox	1st Lt	01014781	Ren & Med Tk Plat Ldr	2 AD	6½ mos
Michael A. Semancik	1st Lt	01016989	Plat Ldr, Tk Bn	2 AD	10 mos
Harold A. Shields	1st Lt	01822065	Plat Ldr & Co Cmdr,	2 AD Tk Bn	10 mos
Wm. S. Belcher	1st Lt	01060354	Plat Ldr, Inf	2 AD	6 mos
Henry Z. Elen	Lt Col	0321828	Bn S-2-3, CO Tk Bn	2 AD	11 mos
L. C. Harkness	Lt Col	022181	CC Ex, Tk Bn Cmdr	2 AD	18 mos
John L. Ryan	Col	016451	CO CCR, C of S	7 AD	9 mos
J. S. Simmeran	Lt Col	0365990	CO Tk Bn	1 AD	15 mos
H. S. Streeter	Lt Col	020300	CO Tk Bn	707 Tk Bn	9 mos
Henry Johnson	1st Lt	01014346	AG Plat Ldr		7 mos
Harry Basse	1st Lt	01015542	Plat Ldr Tk		6 mos
Richard A. Hardin	Capt	01016417	Plat Ldr & Co	CO	9 mos
D. W. McBride	1st Lt	0547635	Plat Ldr Tk	12 AD	5 mos
H. G. Leach	1st Lt	01062227	Plat Ldr Tk		8 mos

Name	Rank	ASN	T/O Position	Unit	Length in Combat
E. J. Boch	1st Lt	01015095	Tk Plat Ldr	1 AD	14 mos
W. L. Sanders	1st Lt	01015727	Plat Ldr	745 Tk Bn	8 mos
W. R. Hoft	1st Lt	01015708	Tk Plat Ldr	7 AD	7 mos
W. F. Heavener	Capt	01012279	En Motor Off		5 mos
J. E. Carey	Capt	01012485	Plat Ldr & Co Cmdr	707 Tk Bn	8 mos
R. L. Miller	1st Lt	01017265	Med Tk Plat Ldr	3 AD	3 mos
R. L. Sweeney	Maj	024494	Tk Bn Exec Off	1 AD	24 mos
C. J. McLaughlin	Capt	01013371	Tk Co Cmdr		3 mos
F. B. Zinh	1st Lt	0436268	Tk Co Pl Ldr	7 AD	3 mos
L. A. Hitchcock	2d Lt	02010803	Arm'd Inf Plat Ldr		6 mos
W. J. Jones	1st Lt	01999088	Inf MG Plat Ldr		16 mos
B. S. Banaker	1st Lt	01540753	Plat Sgt & Plat Ldr		9 mos
K. R. Heintz	2d Lt	01332494	Rifle Plat Ldr		3 mos
Allan Fox	1st Lt	01540728	Rifle Co Plat Ldr		14 mos
G. G. Vess	2d Lt	02008546	MG Plat Sgt & Ldr	7 AD	9 mos
G. C. Sola	2d Lt	02001800	Sq & Plat Ldr		10 mos
M. N. Hinds	2d Lt	01326706	Inf Plat Ldr	6 AD	2 mos
E. C. Martin	1st Lt	0533464	Plat Ldr & Rifle Co Cmdr	6 AD	10 mos
M. S. Griffin	Lt Col	019954	Inf Bn Cmdr	7 AD	6 mos
E. C. Wood	Maj	0387302	Co Cmdr, Inf Bn Exec	1 AD	30 mos
G. D. Covey	1st Lt	0447211	AT Plat Ldr, Inf	1 AD	16 mos

Name	Rank	ASN	T/O Position	Unit	Length in Combat
J. A. Costello	1st Lt	01057391	Plat Ldr Rifle Co		2 mos
T. E. Peterson	Capt	0428448	Asst S-3 AIB	7 AD	11 mos
Wallace H. Barnes	Col	016426	C of S	12 AD	
Wendell Blanchard	Col	015528	CC"R" Cmdr	4 AD	11 mos
Albin F. Irzyk	Lt Col	024158	S-3, ex O & CO Tk Bn	4 AD	10 mos
Robert B. Crayton	Capt	0409499	Tk Co Cmdr	9 AD	7½ mos
Ralph C. Pierson	1st Lt	01017818	Tk Plat Ldr	9 AD	4 mos
John S. Ridley	Maj	01012297	Tk Co Cmdr	4 AD	10 mos
Walter G. Stockdale	1st Lt	01016200	Tk Plat Ldr	9 AD	5 mos
John G. Kingsley	Capt	01013199	Tk Plat & Co Cmdr	4 AD	10 mos
E. R. Berky	Capt	01016987	Tk Plat & Co Cmdr	4 AD	10 mos
Thornton B. McGlamery	Capt	01010497	Tk Co Cmdr	4 AD	8 mos
Herman Reich	1st Lt	01018681	Tk Plat Ldr	14 AD	8 mos
R. A. Warner	1st Lt	0526677	Tk Plat Ldr	4 AD	6 mos
R. B. Edmundson	1st Lt	01018320	Sv Co Cmdr	16 AD	22 days
W. R. Prince	Lt Col	020219	CO AIB	9 AD	3 mos
Walter Wagner	2d Lt	0208585	Rifle Plat Ldr	9 AD	7 mos
H. H. Holder	1st Lt	0437964	Inf Plat Ldr	4 AD	9 mos
B. M. Cooperman	1st Lt	0538395	Rifle Plat Ldr	4 AD	7 mos
Lee Ross	1st Lt	02000666	Plat Ldr, Inf	14 AD	7 mos
K. W. Collins	Lt Col	022169	AIB Comdr	9 AD	8 mos
F. X. Bingham	1st Lt	01014136	Rifle Plat Ldr	14 AD	6 mos
G. T. Semmes	1st Lt	0557741	Rifle Plat Ldr	9 AD	1 mo

Name	Rank	ASN	T/O Position	Unit	Length in Combat
V. O. Conway	2d Lt	02011714	Rifle Plat Ldr	14 AD	7 mos
J. J. Flanagan	2d Lt	02011610	Rifle Plat Ldr	14 AD	7 mos
J. J. Keeline	2d Lt	0557676	Rifle Plat Ldr	4 AD	7 mos
A. J. Reetz	1st Lt	01016344	Mort Plat Ldr	9 AD	6 mos
C. Brooks	Maj	0370297	AIB Cmdr	20 AD	4 mos
J. C. Donohy	Maj	0351335	S-2, Ex AIB	14 AD	7 mos
John T. Cole	Col	05256	CC Cmdr	5 AD	9½ mos
Glenn F. Rogers	Lt Col	018366	Tk Bn & Gp CO		
Delk M. Oden	Lt Col	020805	Tk Bn Co	4 AD	10 mos

APPENDIX 6

CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

OF THE ARMORED DIVISION

1. The following is a resume of the comments and recommendations of the group which attended the conference with the Armored Division Committee on 7 November 1945. Those who were invited will be referred to as the Group.
2. The Group unanimously approved the regimental organization. They also approved organization within the regiment of one tank battalion and two infantry battalions with two dissenting votes. Considerable discussion was had on the proportion of infantry companies to tank companies. Finally the proportion of three infantry companies to two tank companies was accepted. Opinions were expressed on the proportions of three infantry companies to two tank companies, two infantry companies to one tank company, and one infantry company to one tank company. The following were those who favored the ratio of three to two: General Collier, Colonels Inskip, Hutter, Dodge, Dewey, Brown and Handy. The following desired a proportion of two infantry to one tank companies: Generals Keyes, Allen, Boudinot and Grow, and Colonel Bromley. General Devine was the only one desiring equal proportion of one infantry company to one tank company.
3. The Group recommended the adoption of a Cavalry Squadron consisting of a headquarters, headquarters and service troop, four cavalry troops equipped with light tanks instead of armored cars, and an assault gun troop. The head of the Cavalry Committee (Colonel Biddle) recommended the substitution of an improved armored car for the light tank and the addition of rifle squads within the platoons for the reconnaissance troops, but these recommendations were not accepted by the Group. It was the consensus of the Group that a suitable light tank should be produced for use as a primary combat vehicle for the Cavalry Squadron.
4. After hearing a discussion by Colonel Morris of the Engineer Section of the Board on the reasons for their recommendations for the Engineer Regiment as shown on the chart, the consensus of the Group was that the Engineer component of the proposed division should consist of an Engineer Battalion of four line companies and one Bridge Company with Headquarters and Service Company.
5. After discussion by the head of the Artillery Section of the Board for the artillery component of the proposed division and after listening to his recommendations, the Group voted 7 to 6 to adopt an organic artillery component consisting of four light battalions and two medium battalions.
6. After a discussion by General Armstrong, Head of the Anti-aircraft Section of the Board, the Group accepted by vote of 11 to 1 the proposed antiaircraft regiment as shown in Appendix 7.
7. The Quartermaster Battalion recommended was accepted by the Group with the provision that the number of truck companies in the battalion should depend upon the organic load of ammunition that has to be hauled in a division.
8. The maintenance Battalion as recommended was accepted unanimously by the Group.

9. The Medical Battalion as recommended was accepted after a discussion of the advisability of changing the battalion organization to separate collecting and clearing companies.

10. The Special Troops of the division were accepted as recommended.


11. It was recommended that the artillery commander and that the commander of each armored regiment be a brigadier general and that the assistant division commander be eliminated. Also that a G-5 section, the composition of which will be determined later, be added to the General Staff of Division Headquarters.

12. General Grow expressed the opinion that the term "infantry" should be eliminated with reference to any elements of the armored division. It was suggested that all elements now referred to as "armored infantry" be referred to as "armored rifle battalions", "armored rifle companies", etc.

13. It was agreed by the Group that a tank replacement section should be included in the maintenance companies of each armored regiment.

MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

FULL TRACK CARRIERS	844
PERSONNEL CARRIERS	77
ARMORED CARS	79
LIGHT TANKS	279
MEDIUM TANKS	62
ASSAULT GUNS	61
TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES	54
105 MM HOW SP	36
155 MM HOW SP	27
MORTAR CARRIERS	32
75 MM GUN AUTOMATIC AA	32
QUADRUPLE 20 MM GUN AA	32



APPENDIX 8

CHARTS OF PROPOSED COMPANY, TROOP

AND BATTERY ORGANIZATIONS

- (a) Headquarters Armored Division.
- (b) Headquarters Company, Armored Division.
- (c) Armored Signal Company.
- (d) Military Police Company.
- (e) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Armored Regiment.
- (f) Maintenance Company, Armored Regiment.
- (g) Light Tank Company, Armored Regiment and Cavalry Squadron.
- (h) Service Company, Armored Regiment.
- (i) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Tank Battalion.
- (j) Medium Tank Company, Armored Regiment.
- (k) Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Armored Rifle Battalion.
- (l) Armored Rifle Company.
- (m) Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Troops, Cavalry Squadron.
- (n) Cavalry Troop.
- (o) Dragoon Troop.
- (p) Cavalry Assault Gun Troop.
- (q) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Armored Division Artillery.
- (r) Light Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
- (s) Service Battery, Armored Field Artillery Battalion (105 and 155).
- (t) 105mm Armored Field Artillery Battery.
- (u) Medium Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
- (v) 155 Howitzer (SP) Armored Field Artillery Battery.
- (w) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.
- (x) Service Battery, Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.
- (y) Antiaircraft Artillery Battery.
- (z) Headquarters and Headquarters Company Armored Engineer Regiment.
- (aa) Headquarters Detachment Armored Engineer Battalion.
- (bb) Armored Engineer Company.
- (cc) Headquarters and Headquarters Company Armored Division Trains.
- (dd) Supply Battalion.
- (ee) Headquarters and Headquarters Company Ordnance Maintenance Battalion.
- (ff) Service Company, Ordnance Maintenance Battalion.
- (gg) Maintenance Company, Ordnance Maintenance Battalion.
- (hh) Headquarters and Headquarters Company Armored Medical Battalion.
- (ii) Medical Company.

HEADQUARTERS
ARMORED DIVISION

53 - 9W | 120

32 - 2W | 45

FORWARD
ECHELON

21 - 7W | 75

REAR
ECHELON

COMMAND
AND
GENERAL STAFF

2 | 4
PROV
MARSHAL SEC

1 Lt Col
1 Maj 4 EM

ENGINEER
SECTION

1 Lt Col, Personnel
From Engr Bn

2 | 4
CHEMICAL
SECTION

1 Lt Col
1 Capt 4 EM

3 | 3
DIV COMDR
AND AIDES

1 Maj Gen
1 Maj (ADC to
Maj Gen)
1 Capt (ADC to
Maj Gen)
3 EM

2 - 1W | 2
CHIEF
OF
STAFF

1 Col
1 Maj (Hq Comdt)
1 WO
2 EM

2 | 3
G-1

1 Lt Col
1 Major
3 EM

3 | 7
G-2

1 Lt Col
1 Major
1 Capt
7 EM

10 | 14
G-3

1 Lt Col
3 Major
6 Capt
14 EM

3 - 1W | 6
G-4

1 Lt Col
1 Major
1 Capt
1 WO
6 EM

5 | 2
G-5

1 Lt Col
1 Major
3 Capt
2 EM

5-4W | 39
ADJ
GEN

5 | 3
DIV
SURG

1 Lt Col
3 Maj
1 Capt MAC
3 EM

ORD

1 Lt Col
Personnel as required
to be drawn from re-
spective services for
Ord, QM Sections

QM

2-1W | 3
JAG

1 Lt Col
1 Capt
1 WO
3 EM

IG

2-1W | 3
IG

1 Lt Col
1 Capt
1 WO
3 EM

FIN

2-1W | 17
FIN

1 Lt Col
1 Capt
1 WO
17 EM

SP
SLRV

3 | 7
SP
SLRV

1 Maj
1 Capt
1 Lt
7 EM

CHAP

2 | 3
CHAP

1 Lt Col
1 Maj
3 EM

4-2W | 26
DIV
SEC

1 Lt Col, 1 Maj
1 Capt, 2 Maj
1 Lt Lt, 26 EM

1-1W | 11
POST
SEC

1 Capt
1 WO
1 EM

1W | 2
HQ
UNITS
PERS


1 WO
2 EM

Transportation for Fwd Ech in Div Hq Co,
for Rear Ech in Tn Hq Co.

14 - 152

HQ CO
ARMORED DIVISION


Personnel Carriers - 12
Light Tanks - 5
Liaison Aircraft:
L-4 - 4
L-5 - 4




9 - 4W - 362

ARMORED
SIGNAL COMPANY

Personnel Carriers - 22






NOTE:

1. All platoons should be trained in traffic, police and security duties.
2. The Division Provost Marchal is not included in this table.

HQ & HQ CO
ARMED REGT

NOTE: EM total 141 w/o Bank.


20 - 2W | 169



6 - 4W - 165


MAINT CO
ARMORED REGIMENT

Personnel Carriers - 2
Tank Recovery Vehicles - 8
Light Tanks - 2
Medium Tanks - 8




LIGHT TANK
COMPANY

6 | 109



TRANSPORTATION	
Personnel Carrier	2
Tank Recovery Veh.	1
Tank, Lt (M-24 type)	17
Trailer, 1 Ton	1
Truck, 1/4 Ton	3
Truck, 2 1/2 T, Cargo	2



NOTE: Same strength and organization as proposed Medium Tank Company.



15 177

HQ & HQ CO
TANK BN

- Personnel Carriers - 8
- Armored Cars - 3
- Medium Tanks - 3
- Assault Guns - 6
- Tank Recovery Vehicle - 1
- Mortor Carrier - 3




2-Pers Carriers
4-1/4 T

3-Med Tks (1 provided for air-ground liaison sec)


1-Pers Carrier
5-1/4T
3-Armd C

3-Mortar Carriers
3-81mm Mortars
1-1/4T


6-AG's
1-1/4T
3-Pers Carriers



1-Pers Carrier
1-1/4T



1-Pers Carrier
1-1/4T





2-21/2T Trks
1-3/4T Trk


* Identical with platoons of Cavalry Troops.

6 109

MEDIUM TANK COMPANY.



TRANSPORTATION	
Personnel Carriers	2
Tank Recovery Veh	1
Medium Tanks	17
Trailer, 1 Ton	1
Truck, 1/4 Ton	3
Truck, 2 1/2T, Cargo	2




NOTE: This organization is identical with the Hq & Hq Co of the Tank Battalion.

7 1 253

ARMORED
RIFLE CO

Personnel Carriers - 20
Truck, 1/4 Ton - 3
Truck, 2 1/2 Ton, Cargo - 2
Trailers - 3



14-3W - 157

HQ, HQ & SV
TROOP
CAVALRY SQUADRON

Armored Cars - 4
2 1/2 T Trucks - 15
Personnel Carriers - 3
1 1/2 T Truck - 1
Recovery Vehicle - 1

10-2W 73
SQUADRON
HQ

2 16
ATCHD
MED
5 1/4T

4-1W 84
HQ & SV
TROOP

2 7
CMD
SEC

1 Armd C
2 1/4T

2-1W 14
S-1
SEC

1 2 1/2T
2 3/4T
2 1/4T

1 5
S-2
SEC

1 Pers C

3 8
S-3
SEC

1 Pers C
2 1/4T

1-1W 8
S-4
SEC

2 2 1/2T
1 3/4T
1 1/4T

1 31
COMM
PLAT

2 Armd C
1 Pers C
1 3/4T
5 1/4T

2 25
TR
HQ

2 2 1/2T
1 1 1/2T
3 1/4T

0 20
SECY
SEC

1 2 1/2T
1 1/2T

1 10
TRANS
PLAT

6 2 1/2T
1 1/4T



1-1W 29
MAINT
PLAT

1 Armd C
1 Recov Veh
1 10T Wrecker
3 2 1/2T
1 1/4T

5 - 155

CAVALRY
TROOP

Armored Cars - 10
Personnel Carriers - 4




1 Armd Car
1 Pers C
3 1/4 T
1 3/4 T w/wire reel

1 2 1/2 T
1 3/4 T
1 1/4 T

1 2 1/2 T
1 1/4 T



1 Armd Car
1 1/4 T
1 Pers C
1 81mm Mortar

1 Armd Car
2 1/4 T



Personnel Carriers - 9
 Assault Guns - 8
 Tank Recovery Vehicle - 1

6 - 110
 CAVALRY
 ASSAULT GUN
 TROOP



1 Pers C
 3 1/4 T

1 Trk 2 1/2 T
 1 1/4 T
 1 Tk Rec Veh

1 Trk 2 1/2 T
 1 1/4 T
 1 Trl, 1 T




1 Pers C
 1 1/4 T

1 AG


1 AG

1 Pers C

Personnel Carriers - 4
 2½ Ton Trucks - 5



- Brig Gen - CG
- Col - Exec
- Lt Col - S-3
- Maj - S-3 Air
- Maj - S-2
- Maj - Asst S-3
- Maj - S-1, S-4
- Capt - Comm C
- Capt - Asst S-2
- Capt - Asst S-2 (Counter Mortar)
- Capt - Liaison Pilot
- Capt - Asst S-3 (I & E)
- Capt - Liaison Ground
- 1st Lt - Asst S-1 (A & R)
- 1st Lt - Liaison Pilot
- 1st Lt - Air Obs
- 1st Lt - Air Obs
- 1st Lt - ADC
- 2nd Lt - ADC



LIGHT
ARMORED FA
BN

Med Tanks - 3
Pers Carriers - 31
105mm SP Hows - 18
2 1/2 Ton Trucks - 25
Recov Veh - 2
10 Ton Wrecker - 1

42 518

19 114
HQ & HQ
BTRY

6 105
FIRING
BTRY

6 105
FIRING
BTRY

6 105
FIRING
BTRY

5 -2W 89
SV
BTRY

9 15
BN
HQ

10 99
HQ
BTRY

1-1 MAG-10
ATCHD
MED

1 2
BTRY
HQ

5 38
OPNS
PLAT

0 15
ADM MESS
SUP SEC

0 7
MAINT
SEC


4 37
OBS RCN
& LIAISON
SEC

4 10 0 17 1 1
EXEC OPNS & COMM
SEC FDC SEC

4 16 0 9 0 12
FO RCN & LIAISON
SEC SURVEY SEC

5 - 2W - 89
 SV BTRY
 ARMORED FA
 BN (105 & 155)

Trucks, 2 1/2 T - 21
 Recovery vehicles - 2
 Wrecker, 10 T - 1



6 - 105

105mm
ARMD FA
BTRY

Personnel Carriers - 7
105mm How (SP) - 6

3 | 35
BTRY
HQ

1 | 62
FIRING
BTRY

2 | 8
RCN
SEC

2 | 9
HQ
SEC


1 | 6
MAINT
SEC

0 | 20
ADM, MESS
& SUP SEC





1 | 10
FIRE
CONTROL
SEC

0 | 10
AMMO
SEC

0 | 7
HOW
SEC



- Med Tanks - 3
- Pers Carriers - 31
- 155mm SP Hows - 18
- 2 1/2 Ton Trks - 25
- Recov Veh - 2
- 10 Ton Wrecker - 1



6 120
 155 HOW (SP)
 ARMD FA BTRY

Personnel Carriers - 10
 155 How SP - 6
 2 1/2 Ton Trucks - 5

3 35
 BTRY HQ

1 77
 FIRING
 BTRY

2 8
 RCN
 SEC

2 9
 HQ
 SEC

1 6
 MAINT
 SEC

0 20
 ADM, MESS
 & SUP SEC

1 10
 FIRE
 CONTROL
 SEC

0 1
 ARMD
 SEC

0 11
 HOW
 SEC

1-155 How
 1-Pers C

1-155 How
 1-2 1/2 T


1-155 How
 1-Pers C

1-155 How
 1-2 1/2 T


1-155 How
 1-Pers C

1-155 How
 1-2 1/2 T

2 1/2 T Trucks - 2
C & R Cars - 10



2 - 2W - 80




2 1/2 T Trucks - 13
Personnel Carriers - 3


2 30



0 - 1W 25



0 - 1W 25



10 - 2 1/2 T
1 - 1/4 T
1 - Pers C


1 - Recov Veh
1 - Pers C
1 - 2 1/2 T
1 - 1/4 T

2 5




2 - 2 1/2 T

0 18



1 - 2 1/2 T
1 - Pers C
1 - 1/4 T

0 7







2 - 2 1/2 T
1 - 1/4 T

6 - 139




75mm AA SP Guns - 8
 20mm Quad Guns - 8
 Pers Carriers - 4
 2 1/2 T Trucks - 1



2-1/4 Ton

1-Pers C
2-1/4 Ton

1 - Pers C
1 - 2 1/2 Ton
2 - 1/4 Ton




1 - Pers C
1 - 1/4 Ton

1 - 75mm
1 - 20mm


18- 3W -212

HQ & HQ CO
ARMORED
ENGR REGT

Personnel Carriers - 8
Armored Cars - 4
Trucks, Bridge, Treadway - 9





Personnel Carriers - 2



5 197

ARMORED
ENGINEER
COMPANY

Personnel Carriers - 11



1-Pers Car
3- $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton


1-Air Comp
1-Bulldzer
1-6 Ton
1-20 T Tlr
1-2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton
1-1 T Tlr
1- $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton

1-Per Car
1- $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton

3-1 T Trlr
3-2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton

1-2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton
1-1 T Tlr
2- $\frac{1}{4}$ Ton

1-Pers Car




* Identical with platoons of Cavalry Troops

25 - 2W - 550

SUPPLY
BATTALION

Trucks, 2 1/2 T - 112
Trucks, 4-5 T, Tractor - 3
Semi-Trailers - 10



18 - 1W - 158

HQ & HQ CO
ORD MAINT BN

Personnel Carriers - 1
Trucks, 1 1/2 T Cargo - 4
Trucks, 2 1/2 T Cargo - 23
Trailers, Animal Cargo - 6
Trailers, 2 1/2 Ton - 15
Trucks, Wrecker, 10 Ton - 2
Trucks, 4-5 Ton, Tractor - 6

15 43
BN HQ

1-1MAC 10
ATCHD
MED

3-1W 115
HQ CO

5 13
DIV ORD
OFFICER SEC

10 30
HQ SEC

1 49
CO HQ

2-1W 66
SUPPLY
PLAT

4-1/2 T Trks
1-1 1/2 T Trk
2-2 1/2 T Trk

1-Pers C
10-1/2 T Trk
1-3/4 T Trk
6-2 1/2 T Trk

1 3
HQ SEC

1-1/4 T Trk
1-3/4 T Trk

0 40
ADM, MESS
SUP SEC

1-1 1/2 Ton
3-2 1/2 Ton

0 6
MAINT
SEC

1-1/4 Ton
1-2 1/2 Ton

1 48
SPARE
PARTS
SEC


6-Trlr, Animal Cargo
15-Trlrs, 2 1/2 T, 4 whl
1-1/4 Ton Trk
1-1 1/2 Ton Trk
20-2 1/2 Ton Trk
6-Trk, Tractor, 4-5 T
2-Trk, Wrkr, 10 Ton

1-1W 18
ORGANIZATIONAL
EQUIPMENT
SEC


1-1/4 Ton Trk
1-1 1/2 T Trk
1-2 1/2 T Trk

(ee)

SERVICE COMPANY
ORD MAINT BN




MAINT CO
ORD MAINT BN




23 - 2W - 109

HQ & HQ CO
ARMORED MEDICAL BN

Trucks, 2 1/2 T, Cargo - 11



Ambulances - 12
 Trucks, 2½ T Cargo - 7
 Trucks, Surgical - 2



POSSIBLE TACTICAL FORMATION OF PROPOSED ARMORED DIVISION

DIVISION CONTROL

CMDR: CG of Div

COMPOSITION:

Div Hq & Hq Co
Armd Sig Co
MP Co (-1 Plat)
Cavalry Squadron
Div Arty (-3 Lt Bns, 1 AAA Bn)
Armd Engr Regt (-2 Bn Hq Dets, 3 Co's)

DIV TRAINS:

Hq & Hq Co
Armd Med Co
Maint Bn (-Dets)
Supply Bn

1ST ARMORED REGIMENT

CMDR: CG of Armd Regt

COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co
Maint Co (-2 Bn Secs)
Service Co
Lt Tank Co
Armd Engr Bn Hq Det
Armd Engr Co (-2 Plats)
Armd Med Co (Support)
Maint Det (Maint Bn)
MP Det

3D ARMORED REGIMENT

(In Division Reserve)

CMDR: CG of Armd Regt

COMPOSITION:

Armd Regt
Armd Engr Co
Armd Med Co (Support)
Maint Det (Maint Bn)
MP Det

2D ARMORED REGIMENT

CMDR: CG of Armd Regt

COMPOSITION:

Hq & Hq Co
Maint Co (-2 Bn Secs)
Service Co
Lt Tank Co
Armd Engr Bn Hq Det
Armd Engr Co (-2 Plats)
Armd Med Co (Support)
Maint Det (Maint Bn)
MP Det

TASK FORCE 1

CMDR: CO of Armd Inf Bn

COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn
Tk Br (-2 Med Co's)
Armd Engr Plat
105 Armd FA Bn (Atchd
fr Corps Arty)
(Direct Support)

TASK FORCE 2

CMDR: CO of Armd Inf Bn

COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn
Med Tk Co
Med Tk Co
Armd Engr Plat
105 Armd FA Bn (Direct
Support)

TASK FORCE 1

CMDR: CO of Armd Inf Bn

COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn
Tk Bn (-2 Med Co's)
Armd Engr Plat
105 Armd FA Bn (Direct
Support)

TASK FORCE 2

CMDR: CO of Armd Inf Bn

COMPOSITION:

Armd Inf Bn
Med Tk Co
Med Tk Co
Armd Engr Plat
105 Armd FA Bn (Direct
Support)