

# The U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence

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## FOREWORD

In the summer of 1982, the Director, Combat Studies Institute, assigned me the task of writing a *Leavenworth Paper* on rapid deployment logistics, using the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 as a case study. Lebanon was chosen because there was ample documentation, much of it only recently declassified, and because Dr. Roger Spiller had set the strategic and tactical stage in *Leavenworth Paper No. 3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon*. In the course of my investigation, I decided to contact several military officers who had participated in the operation. Major General (Retired) David W. Gray was one of those contacted.

General Gray said in his initial response that he would reply at a later date, after he had had time to review his papers and comb his memory in order to prepare as thorough and accurate a narrative as possible. When his reply arrived, it totaled over one-hundred handwritten pages.

In addition to providing answers to my specific questions about logistics, General Gray provided his recollections of the Lebanon operation and a critique of *Leavenworth Paper No. 3*. His manuscript not only contained a detailed and candid account of his activities, but amplified, elaborated, and sometimes disputed Dr. Spiller's work. In this sense, it is both an important eyewitness account and a companion piece to *Leavenworth Paper No. 3*. The reader of both publications will benefit from being able to draw upon the scholarly work of a trained historian and the memoir of an actual participant. The historical record could not be better served.

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by

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August 1984

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## SECTION I: CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

### 1. General

I recognize that, years after the fact, it is difficult to synthesize with complete accuracy and largely from official documents the actions relating to a military operation. This is particularly true when references are not available from two principal participants, CINCNELM and the 322d Air Division. Given these gaps in source material it is surprising that Dr. Spiller, the author of Leavenworth Paper #3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, has been able to reconstruct the planning and execution of Operation BLUEBAT as accurately and fully as he has. For my own part, I have prepared these notes, relying on some very meager diary entries, a few letters, and a memory that has not served me particularly well. Some aspects I recall with great clarity, some are quite fuzzy, while concerning still others I draw a complete blank. In this respect, I note that considerable reliance has been placed on a 24th Division Command Report, dated 13 August 1958. My diary indicates that I devoted some time to a command report in early August and that on 13 August I "worked on finalizing command report"; so it would seem reasonable to assume that the report was prepared at least in part by us in Lebanon, yet I have no recollection whatsoever of it.

My first thought was to comment on Dr. Spiller's Leavenworth Paper page by page, but I finally decided that a better contribution would be to set forth chronologically certain aspects of my participation in the operation from inception to final execution. In the course of this narrative I will indicate a few instances in which the Leavenworth Paper on Lebanon appears to differ from my recollections. I will also provide additional information that was not available to Dr. Spiller. In a larger sense, I hope to illustrate that a plan in its development and execution encompasses a multitude of individual thoughts, decisions, and actions performed by mere mortals who at times demonstrate all the strengths and frailties of the human race, even including, at times, a bit of high humor. In undertaking this task I hope I will be forgiven if I use personal experiences, for in the words of my former Commander of 7th Army, Lt. Gen. Francis Farrell, "Frankly those are the only kind I have had."

### 2. SWAGGERSTICK

In 1956 I was Chief of the Operation Division, Department of the Army (DA). On Sunday afternoon, 31 October 1956, I happened

to be in my office when the DA G-2 duty officer called to inform me that the British and French were landing in Egypt. I called the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), Lt. Gen. C. D. Eddleman, at his quarters. He instructed me to direct CONARC to be prepared to brief him the next morning on its contingency plan for intervention in the Middle East. I literally almost fell out of my chair as this was the first that I had heard of such a plan. I can only surmise that as a contingency plan the requirement had been passed through the DA Plans Division and then to CONARC. In any event, as the implementer at DA level, I should have known about it, and I was quite chagrined that I didn't.

A delegation from CONARC, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 82d Airborne Division did arrive bright and early the next morning with Op Plan SWAGGERSTICK in tow. It had obviously been in preparation for some time, but it was my distinct impression that this was the first time it had been aired at DA level. Frankly, I could never understand how it would work, and I jokingly remarked that the only solution was to call a cease fire, air drop on the line of contact between opposing forces, and defend in both directions.

### 3. DA Directive to USAREUR, 1956

At some time in 1956, I'm not sure when, I was directed to draft instructions to USAREUR to develop a plan for limited crisis intervention in the Middle East. The 9th Infantry Division was given this task and developed a plan involving Task Force (TF) 9, which I believe consisted basically of a reinforced regimental combat team. When the 11th Airborne Division replaced the 9th Division in 1956 under the Gyroscope division rotation plan, it inherited responsibility for the plan.

### 4. 11th Airborne Division Revises the Plan, March, 1957

I joined the 11th Airborne Division on 1 March 1957, the same day the division was reorganized under the pentagonal concept (ROTAD). This was a very radical change involving the complete restructuring of the division, a massive shuffling of personnel and equipment, and drastic changes in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. All of this kept everyone scrambling for a while, so it was a few days before I was officially introduced to the 201 Plan by the small group of planners who were responsible for it within the division. The group met on a Sunday morning and spent the entire day familiarizing me with the plan and also restructuring the force to conform to the division's new organization. We also reviewed the individual equipment to be carried by the soldier and that to be forwarded

later ("B" bags), levels of supply, and back-up logistic supplies. I was particularly struck by one item--pith helmets. I had participated in a test of this headgear at Ft. Benning in 1934, a test that rejected the pith helmet as unsuitable for field duty. Remembering this experience, I asked that it be struck from the plan. I was assured that it had been, but in the perverse manner that the system sometimes works, we got the helmets anyway. We made excellent use of about ten of them for the lifeguards on the swimming beach that we established. The rest were returned to USAREUR, where no doubt they still are. At this meeting, I also realized that the pass I had helped to toss to USAREUR the previous year in the Pentagon had now been lateralled to me and that it was my ball to carry from now on.

Each headquarters had a few individuals involved in the planning who, through meetings, phone calls, and correspondence, attended to the many details that go into the development and updating of a contingency plan. We were like moles. Occasionally we popped to the surface for briefings or when some major decision was required, but generally we busied ourselves underground, unmolested and unchallenged in the actions that we took and the decisions that we made.

#### 5. Effort to Obtain Tactical Intelligence, Spring--Summer, 1957

At this point, TF 201's mission was to air drop or air land in Jordan. Lebanon was not in the picture. One factor hindering planning was the lack of hard tactical intelligence on Jordan and the difficulty of obtaining it without disclosing our intentions. Illustrative of this problem were events that occurred in the late spring and summer of 1957.

While attending NATO's course on atomic weapons at Garmisch, I visited the Intelligence School at Oberammergau and questioned the director about any information the school might have on countries in the Middle East--large-scale maps, photos of airfields and environs, city maps, etc. Actually, he had very little, but promised to keep the requirement in mind. It so happened that, shortly thereafter, he encountered a friend, an Air Force major, who was due to visit Amman. He asked him if he would take some pictures of the airport and surrounding terrain. The major was most happy to oblige and then proceeded to tell all and sundry at a cocktail party in Amman that he had taken the pictures for General Gray. Some State Department type overheard him. A hot cable went to Washington and all hell broke loose. Who was this guy Gray and what was he up to? At this time, I had wangled a "space available" trip on an MSTS transport making a periodic swing around the eastern Mediterranean. My intent was to get a little better acquainted with a potential area of operations, and it was only through the intervention of Maj. Gen. Hugh Harris, who then commanded the 11th Airborne Division, that

I was not immediately hauled back from that trip.

When I did return I found myself on the carpet before the 7th Army Commander, Gen. Bruce Clarke. I explained to him our difficulties in obtaining tactical intelligence. I further explained that I had couched my request in very general terms, with no reference to any actual plans, and that I had asked if the school had any information, not for it to go out and actively seek it. Luckily, I had served under General Clarke in Korea, both as a regimental commander and as his G-3 at X Corps. So after a brief silence he said, "Well if you never try anything, you never get into trouble, but what I want to know is that after the ruckus you have raised, did you get the pictures?" We did eventually get the pictures, but by then it didn't matter. The incident must have built a fire under somebody because a few months later we began getting literally footlockers full of maps and large-scale photos of every major city and airfield in the Middle East. Some looked like SAC target folders with air routes, etc. We finally had to construct a specially secured room to hold it all.

#### 6. Meeting in London with CINCNELM, September, 1957

Actually, the London meeting in September, 1957, was sort of a get acquainted session between us, the NELM representatives, USAREUR planners, including COMMZ, and the Air Force representatives, and it did establish a cordial, cooperative relationship that continued henceforth. My first meeting with Adm. James Holloway was some experience. I had asked to brief him on our plan for Jordan and was shown to his office. He was reclining on a sofa and remained that way throughout the session. When I would make a particular point, he would exclaim, "Atta boy," or "That's it. Give'm hell"--a one-man cheering section, so to speak. It was quite the most incredible briefing I ever gave. I learned later that he suffered from some ailment at the time, which required him to take these rest sessions. He impressed me as a 'big picture' type, not too interested in details, but I left his office feeling that here was a man for whom you would make that extra effort and take that extra step.

#### 7. Meeting at CINCNELM, London, November, 1957

The get together in London in November, 1957, was the first meeting of the entire clan: EUCOM, USAREUR, COMMZ, 11th Airborne Division, and the Air Force. I can't recall if the Sixth Fleet was represented or not. It was on the basis of this conference that CINCNELM issued its first Op Plan specifying a joint Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force operation in Lebanon. As the Sixth Fleet ranged all over the Mediterranean, a lot depended on where its

ships were disposed at the time execution was directed. If the fleet was in the western Mediterranean, we would go first: we would either air drop or air land, as the situation dictated, and seize the airfield and the port area for the Marines in Beirut. If the amphibious forces were in the eastern Mediterranean, the Marines would either assault land or administratively land, seize the port area, and then take the airport in preparation for our entry. The British were definitely not involved at this time and had no representation at the conference. In fact, there was some apprehension that they would find out what we were up to. I regretted this because there were some British in London, notably Glubb Pasha, who had organized the Jordanian Desert Legion and to whom I would have loved to talk.

#### 8. War Game at Augsburg, December, 1957

With the advent of the CINCNELM plans, it became obvious that a lot of close coordination was going to be required among several headquarters. There was NELM in London, EUCOM in Paris, USAREUR in Heidelberg, 7th Army in Stuttgart, 11th Airborne Division in Augsburg, VII Corps near Stuttgart, COMMZ at Orléans, France, the U.S. Port at Bremerhaven, 12th Air Force at Ramstein, and the 322d Air Division at Evreux, France. The quickest and simplest way to achieve coordination seemed to be by means of a conference; thus the war game that we hosted at Augsburg in December, 1957.

In the game, we started with a normal situation of no alert and progressed through all phases of the alert and deployment. At each phase, headquarters would state the actions they would take, and all other commands would check to see how these actions would dovetail or conflict with their actions. If possible, conflicts were eliminated on the spot, but if they could not be, they were listed on a chart. When we were finished, more than 100 problems had been identified. Periodic follow-ups were made, so that by the time of deployment, most of the problems had been resolved. I believe this was the single most important action taken in the development of the 201 family of plans. I am certain that it eliminated many phone calls and messages, also much correspondence. Above all, it saved time.

#### 9. Planning and Rehearsal Period: December, 1957, to Initial Alert, 17 May 1958

Following publication of CINCNELM's plan for joint U.S. operations in Lebanon and Jordan, additional directives were issued for us to develop plans for such far away places as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. We dutifully prepared these plans, but without strong conviction. Not only was the airlift inadequate,

but neither the Air Force nor the Navy could have provided adequate air support considering the distances from available air bases and carrier operating areas. Nonetheless, the accumulative effect was to develop a gut feeling that sooner or later TF 201 was going to go somewhere, and I directed our planners to proceed strictly on that assumption.

This was not easy to do. Early in the year the Department of the Army announced a major change in force structure. The 11th Airborne Division was not to be rotated in toto to CONUS, but was to be converted in place to the 24th Infantry Division on 1 July 1958. Two battle groups, the 187th and 503d, would retain their airborne status until late in the year, when they would rotate to Ft. Bragg and be replaced by two infantry battle groups from CONUS. At the same time two airborne battle groups from Bragg, the 504th and 505th, would replace two infantry battle groups in the 8th Division at Mainz. When this rotation occurred, the 8th Division was to assume the TF 201 mission. Since most 11th Airborne Division personnel were eligible for return to CONUS, this meant that throughout the spring and summer of 1958, thousands of individuals went home and were replaced from the United States. These replacements had to be quickly incorporated into units capable of performing their NATO mission.

The division was also charged with training 8th Division paratroopers for the supporting elements of TF 201, the headquarters, artillery battery, engineer company, reconnaissance troop, etc. It also had to help the 8th Division, in light of its partial airborne role, in such matters as establishing an airborne training school at Wiesbaden, drop zones, departure airfields, and parachute maintenance facilities. This task was complicated somewhat by the fact that the 8th Division had a fine reputation as a well-run, disciplined, straight-leg division, one that wasn't too keen on being transformed into a hybrid outfit with a lot of airborne rowdies and their attendant alien requirements gumming up the works. However, there was one redeeming feature. The personnel in the 187th and 503d battle groups who did not have enough overseas time to return to CONUS were replaced by personnel from the other battle groups who were eligible. In consequence, both the TF 201 battle groups were jam packed with officers, NCOs, and other ranks who had all served three years in Germany and who had participated in numerous major field exercises and training tests. They were good.

All of this turmoil posed a problem for the TF 201 planners. How should we divide our time and efforts between our primary mission of rebuilding our division into a solid NATO force and our secondary mission which, although small in comparison, could have serious consequences if not properly carried out? A desirable goal would have been to have an alert for each TF 201 element each month. We compromised by having an alert for half of TF 201 one month, and for the other half the next. Some of these alerts were held in unit casernes and included a complete

check of alert procedures, showdown inspection of equipment, and movement of needed replacements from other elements of the division. Other alerts included these actions plus movement to an airfield, usually Lechfeld, a NATO forward deployment field that had runways but nothing else. There a Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG) would be established, and the unit would be completely processed for equipment, dog tags, shots, I.D. cards, Geneva Rules of Warfare cards, etc. A rigging line would be established and type aircraft loads rigged. Equipment and personnel would be assigned to aircraft and loaded on simulated aircraft chalked out on the runway. It would have been desirable to have rigged all loads and placed all troops on actual aircraft, but lack of funds limited our expendable supplies for rigging and the Air Force's ability to supply aircraft, although occasionally the Air Force would provide a few such aircraft when our alert coincided with our training jump schedule.

Both Major General Harris and his replacement, Maj. Gen. Ralph Cooper, were very understanding of our problems, but no doubt looked askance at the effort expended on this secondary mission. As for myself, I developed a mild case of schizophrenia and was never really satisfied that I was doing full justice to either mission.

In addition to these alerts, we had units that were scheduled to depart from Bremerhaven, make a practice convoy run with a few vehicles to that port, and there review their embarkation procedures. I visited Bremerhaven and reviewed their preparations, after which I had no doubt that at least that part of our operation would proceed efficiently. The Port CO ran just about the most efficient, disciplined operation I have ever seen. As one of my officers told me, it was the only time in his military career that he had been saluted by a civilian--a woman librarian as I recall. I also visited COMMZ headquarters at Orleans and reviewed planning with Major General O'Neill and Col. A. W. Meetze, who headed the 201 Logistical Command. Colonel Meetze, with several of my officers, visited Adana Air Base in Turkey and coordinated our requirements there. A staging area on the base was arranged, but Colonel Meetze's efforts to establish prepositioned supplies at Adana were not successful because of a lack of protected storage space. I mention these activities as illustrative of the continuous consultation and coordination that must take place after a plan has been put on paper. Equally important is the development of close personal relationships between key participants.

During this period the 322d Air Division was also undergoing considerable change. On 13 March, a Saturday afternoon, with a light snow falling, we made our first jump from a C-130 aircraft, one of those that was then being sent to Europe as replacement for the C-119s. This change was, of course, welcome, but as these new planes were phased in gradually, it was impossible for the Air Force to give us at any one time an accurate forecast of their potential lift.

#### 10. Initial Alert, 17-24 May, and Visit to Cyprus, 22 May

For some reason my notes on this period are practically nonexistent and my memory equally so. There must have been some prior warning because on 15 May, the 187th and 503d battle groups were marshaled at home station, and a conference was held with all COs of TF 201 units in the 11th Airborne Division. We were actually alerted at 0455, Saturday, 17 May. I do not recall when we were authorized to move to Fürstenfeldbruck, but we were completely loaded at 2115, Sunday, 18 May and remained so until Saturday, 24 May, when the alert was terminated with a mass air drop of the TF headquarters and the 503d Battle Group at Warner DZ outside Munich.

One event during this alert period stands out vividly. On Tuesday afternoon, 21 May, I received instructions from CINCNELM to proceed to Cyprus in civilian clothes via an aircraft that would pick me up at Fürstenfeldbruck that evening. I arrived early the next morning at a British airfield where I was met by a British major straight out of central casting. Short and slightly rotund, with reddish cheeks and handlebar mustache, he simply bubbled with energy and good cheer. There followed undoubtedly the wildest ride I have ever had, over forty miles of winding mountain road from the airfield to the British headquarters in what I assume must have been Nicosia. The car was a 1939 Bentley with heavy armor plate and 1-inch glass, but it seemed to me it never went under sixty miles an hour the entire trip. Speed, it seems, was the best defense against guerrilla attack, according to the major. At the headquarters to greet me was a U.S. Army officer from the CINCNELM staff whom I had met in London and who told me that Admiral Holloway had asked that I chair a meeting to develop plans for combined U.S.-British operations in Lebanon and/or Jordan and that the planners were assembled and waiting for me. This shook me up a bit. The plane had been noisy, so I had slept little. Expecting hot weather, I had worn a light suit that rumbled easily. I hadn't had a chance to shave and had only a cup of bad coffee on the plane for breakfast. So with wrinkled suit, whiskers, bleary eyes, et al, I walked into a conference room with at least fifty officers seated in a rectangle--U.S. Navy and Marines (Brig. Gen. Sidney Wade included), British Army, Navy, and Air Force, possibly U.S. Air Force, and CINCNELM representatives all neatly dressed in uniform. A British brigadier introduced me to the assemblage and then handed me an agenda saying, "I thought you might need something to get started." It was the understatement of the day, but I have always been eternally grateful to him for it.

The basic question confronting us was how to use American and British forces in simultaneous operations in Lebanon and Jordan. All depended on the location of the Marines at the time of the crisis. If they were in the eastern Mediterranean, U.S. Army and Marine forces would land in Lebanon, while elements of the

British 5th Infantry Brigade from Cyprus would go to Jordan. If the Marines were in the western Mediterranean, TF 201 and the British would go to Lebanon and the Marines to Jordan. This latter option was the one that required a combined plan. What we did basically was to substitute with some variations the British for the Marines in the already existing CINCNELM Op Plan. The landing scheme was somewhat different. We would either air drop or air land to seize the airfield. The British would then air land and seize the port area. They would then be responsible for operations north of a line extending from the port area through Beirut and out the Damascus road to the Syrian border. We would be responsible south of that line.

Apparently the British had wished to get involved with us in the eastern Mediterranean region for some time. I neither know why we resisted initially nor why we now changed our mind; very possibly the United States had been feeling slightly lonely out on that limb on which it had crawled after President Eisenhower enunciated his Middle East Doctrine. In any event, it was my distinct impression that the decision for a combined operation was made just before the conference, and that the British were clearly very pleased and really gung ho. They simply could not do enough for us. I was invited to the commanding general's home for lunch, where I finally got a chance to shave. At our request there was delivered to our aircraft before departure a large bundle of maps of the Beirut area, scale of about 1:5,000, that were invaluable for our planning and actual operations there. Also at my request, the British mailed to us twenty copies of a manual based on their long experience fighting guerrillas and controlling hostile populations. It was much superior to anything in our manuals at the time. In a lighter vein, the British also volunteered to determine which hotels in Beirut had the best belly dancers.

Shortly after this conference, CINCNELM issued a plan formalizing the arrangements made on Cyprus. To the best of my recollection, this was the first time the code word BLUEBAT was used.

The May alert was important, of course, as a test of alert procedures, but another result was that it let the cat out of the bag about a U.S. NATO force having a secondary mission. As I recall, the main reason for the extreme "Need to Know" imposed upon us was the concern that our Allies, and particularly West Germany, might find out that the U.S. planned to take forces fully committed to NATO and use them on a distant mission. As it turned out, the only concern expressed by anyone was that of German entrepreneurs who stood to lose revenues upon the departure of U.S. forces. In all probability, despite our precautions, NATO knew about it all along, to say nothing of the Russians.

11. Period of 1st Alert to 2nd Alert, 24 May to 15 July 1958

Following the alert of 17-24 May, first priority was given to the correction of deficiencies that developed at Fürstenfeldbruck. Marshaling an airborne unit involves the establishment of a DACG for overall supervision; personnel to erect and seal off, with guards, a tent camp that includes such facilities as messes, latrines, and sleeping, command, and briefing tents; other personnel to lay out and run a marshaling area, where personnel and equipment are processed for loading; and detachments from the AG, Ordnance, auto maintenance and QM to provide last-minute administrative services and repairs to, or replacement of, equipment. When the division had been all airborne, it had not been difficult to detail individuals and units familiar with these tasks. But as the division converted to a straight-leg unit and lost its airborne personnel, particularly senior officers and NCOs, it also lost much of its ability to marshal its units quickly and effectively. To overcome this deficiency, General Cooper tasked Brig. Gen. George Speidel to operate the departure airfield. In addition to Speidel's long experience as a paratrooper, this arrangement had other advantages as well. Fürstenfeldbruck was located near Munich, where General Speidel was stationed. He had supervision of all the division troops located in the Munich area and could draw on them for his task force. Also, as an assistant division commander, he could make decisions and resolve problems more quickly than could an officer of lesser rank.

Another problem arising out of the division's reduced airborne capability was its lessened ability to rig the heavy drop loads quickly. Normally, the Parachute Maintenance Company would reinforce the heavy drop platoon with parachute riggers in order to expedite the heavy rigging. However, this company was being reduced in size to service only TF 201, so it could no longer provide the necessary backup. Accordingly, it was decided that the two battle groups would assist in rigging their own equipment. On 5 June, the 503d did conduct such training, terminating with a heavy drop of part of its equipment. The 187th, at the time of deployment, had not yet conducted such an exercise. As later events were to prove, this was a mistake. I should have insisted that the 187th schedule an exercise as a matter of priority.

One very positive effect of the May alert was a relaxation of the extreme "Need to Know" restrictions under which we moles had been required to operate. We now scurried around much nearer the surface and more frequently popped up to public view. On Memorial Day, 30 May, Admiral Holloway visited the division. He was shown a display of what each individual would take with him, what would follow in his "B" bag, and what would be stored. Then he was shown a complete layout of a rifle company--the personnel and equipment in the air drop, the air land and the seaborne

echelons. (Pictures of this display are in CGSC photo files.) The demonstration terminated with an air drop of a rifle company, including its heavy equipment.

On 7 June, there was a 201 conference at 7th Army, and on 11 June, one at USAREUR. On Saturday 28 June, there was an all-day conference at our headquarters to answer certain questions raised by CINCNELM reference BLUEBAT. On 8 July, there was a CPX held for all units of the Charlie Force, and on 9 July, we went to Ramstein for a conference with 12th Air Force. According to my notes, we agreed, among other things, to establish a joint CP at the departure airfield, to have the Air Force furnish us with a liaison officer, to set up housekeeping for Air Force personnel, and to have the Air Force provide forward air controllers (FACs). What we did not agree on was the lift. The Air Force's chief representative, Brig. Gen. B.O. Davis said, "We gave you what you asked for in May and now you want more. When are you going to stop raising the ante?" I replied in effect that he had been misinformed. TF Alpha's requirement had been met only by taking C-124 augmentation from the States meant for TF Charlie. The simple fact was that there was not enough lift immediately available in the theatre to meet the full lift requirements of TF Alpha. This difference in view was not settled, and in retrospect, this was a mistake. I should have insisted that our full requirement for TF Alpha be met, realizing that on any one day, the available lift might fall a little short because of the operational status of aircraft and other ongoing commitments. If the Air Force could not promise this, I should have asked that the matter be settled at a higher level.

On 1 July, the 11th Airborne's colors were cased for the last time and the 24th Division's colors were unfurled in their stead. For us, this change had one distinct advantage. Unlike ROTAD, the ROCID division organization included a small brigade headquarters, headed by a colonel, designed to conduct planning or to command combat elements of the division as a task force. In effect it was an ideal assignment for our 201 planners; they could work practically full time on 201 rather than doing so in addition to other duties, as had been the case. I promised them nothing but hard work and an out if they wanted it.

Fortunately for us, there were no takers, for suddenly the moles really began to scurry. I found myself supervising the training of two battle groups at Hohenfels and the NATO Le Clerc Matches, which the division was hosting, at Grafenwöhr. We had a new VII Corps CG, Lt. Gen. Gordon Rogers, who had to be familiarized with the plan. There was also a new 7th Army CG, General Eddleman.

The annual Special Forces Exercise, DRAGNET, was scheduled to commence on 14 July. For several months, the Special Forces at Bad Tölz had been training soldiers, I believe from the 8th Division, to act as guerrilla bands. On 16 July, Headquarters,

TF 201, was to air drop in the Bad Tölz area to serve as the Control Headquarters. The 187th Battle Group, plus other divisional elements, would act as the force to rout out the guerrillas. This was an annual affair in which the Bavarian civilian population also got involved, and we were happily anticipating participation in it. On 12 July elements of TF 201 went to Bad Tölz to set up the Control Headquarters. Also on Saturday, 12 July, the 187th Battle Group completed a very successful two-week training period at Hohenfels. On that same day the battle group CO, Col. Tom Sharkey, had somehow wangled the use of Otter Army aircraft to air drop his battle group in four lifts on the Gablingen DZ beside his home caserne. He then issued orders for his company commanders to proceed to the Bad Tölz area to recon the 2000-square miles in which they would be operating in Operation DRAGNET. On Monday, 14 July, the division held a rehearsal for General Eddleman's first visit to Augsburg on Tuesday. His schedule was to include a full briefing on EP 201, followed by an air drop of personnel and heavy drop from the 503d. It was in this atmosphere of heightened activity that the events of the next day began to unfold. General Eddleman got his briefing all right, but not exactly under the circumstances we had anticipated.

## 12. Second Alert, 14-16 July 1958

About 2200 on Monday, 14 July, word was received of the overthrow of the Iraqi government. Shortly thereafter, we received a message indicating that some alert measures might be taken. Upon hearing this news, I went to General Cooper's quarters, which were adjacent to mine. At that time I should have recommended that the air drop for General Eddleman be scrubbed and the heavy drop loads derigged. The critical element in the launching of an airborne operation is the readiness of the unit to move when ordered. That readiness, in turn, depends on the availability of the aircraft, the readiness of the ground force to be loaded, and the efficiency of the air-ground personnel in loading. Key to the ground forces preparation is the expeditious rigging of the heavy drop. Accordingly, the commander should focus his attention on insuring that nothing interferes with that task. The problem facing our heavy drop platoon was this. They would have to first derig the heavy drop loads set up for General Eddleman's visit, check the equipment for serviceability, and return it to stock. They would then have to load all of their equipment on trucks, move to the air base, and set up two rigging lines, one for vehicles and one for A-22 containers. These rigging lines involve the laying down of roller conveyors and the placement of rigging equipment at the successive stations along the line. In view of the arduous and time-consuming nature of this process, the heavy drop for General Eddleman's visit should have been derigged at the first indication of a possible alert. This was a mistake in judgment on my part.

At this time the 503d was on tap for Task Force Alpha, but I had learned the previous day that the CO of the 503d had injured his leg jumping and was limping quite badly, so much so that I felt it would impair his ability to jump with his unit and command it in active operations. On this basis, and this basis alone, I recommended that the 187th replace the 503d on TF Alpha. If we were to be alerted, Operation DRAGNET would obviously have to be postponed or canceled and the 24th Division relieved of participation. I also knew that before the 187th had departed for two-weeks training at Hohenfels, the battle group had checked out its GRANDIOS plans, had had all personnel pack their "B" bags, and had stored their other personal effects in cardboard containers. Its jump back into Gablingen from Hohenfels meant the men were all current in their jump status. The battle group was definitely ready.

On the basis of a message from General Rogers at VII Corps, we called an AMBER alert at about 0200 and placed the 187th on TF Alpha in lieu of the 503d. I deeply regretted the necessity to do this. Colonel Haynes was an outstanding officer, a proven combat leader, and was rearing to go. Of course, at that time we had no idea that TF Bravo would not be deployed; otherwise he would have undoubtedly protested the switch more than he did.

One glitch in our preparations did develop from this switch. At the time the switch was made, quite a few officers of the 187th were scattered far and wide within a 2000-square mile area of the Bavarian Alps, completely out of communication with their unit. By hook or crook and much luck, Colonel Sharkey was able to gather them all in time to be marshaled at Fürstenfeldbruck. If, when I first considered the switch, I had consulted with the Battle Group CO, I would have learned about the reconnaissance. It would not have altered the decision to lead with the 187th, but it would have given Colonel Sharkey more time to recover his absentees.

Based on another message from USAREUR, we switched to an AZURE alert at 0430 and to a GREEN alert at 0700. Shortly thereafter General Eddleman arrived at division headquarters and was briefed on the situation and our future activities. After the briefing, he indicated that probably a higher ranking officer would be designated to command all ground forces, if and when we got to Lebanon. This surprised me, as in all our prior planning no mention had ever been made of such a possibility.

Following the briefing, I reviewed with my senior 201 staff officers the status of our preparations, using as a guide a Readiness Book that included a check list of actions to be taken by individuals, by the 201 staff, and by the division. It also included reference data, such as load requirements, travel times to Fürstenfeldbruck, airlift requirements, and deployment time to Adana and Lebanon. Following this, I tied up loose ends of division business, reviewed my personal affairs, had lunch at

home, and departed from there by helicopter to Fürstenfeldbruck at 1400.

A part of the air base at Fürstenfeldbruck was occasionally used as a forward deployment base by NATO air units. This part included taxiways, parking aprons, and a large hangar that was central to our operation. We planned to use it for rigging the heavy drop. Around the hangar were clustered our tent camp and other activities. We had been informed that morning that a German Air Force unit was occupying the area that we wished to use, but would be asked to leave. As we approached the field I anxiously scanned the area and was relieved to find no trace of the German unit. I was told later that they got the word at 1100 and that by 1230 they were completely gone, leaving no trace they had ever been there. I also found General Speidel's Task Force hard at work with a part of the tent camp already erected.

Shortly after arriving I and members of my staff met with Brig. Gen. B. O. Davis, 12th Air Force, and Col. C. W. McCafferty, Deputy Commander, 322d Air Division, plus several of his operations staff. At that time we were given an estimate of the airlift that would be available, but according to my notes, the "final airlift not formed up until about 2000." In fairness to the Air Force, the 322d was sort of a vagabond airline that on any one day might have aircraft scattered all the way from India to Africa to the United States. The aircraft simply could not all be whistled in in a matter of a few hours, although one was produced in a matter of minutes. This one happened to be over Fürstenfeldbruck en route to Évreux when the pilot got the word, simply lowered his wheels, and landed.

The Air Force also decided not to collocate their operations with ours, as is normal, but to set up shop in a room inside the hangar. I never learned the reason, but surmise that they felt they did not have sufficient personnel present to handle their strictly Air Force business and to man a joint operations center as well. Accordingly, we set up the tent intended for the joint group as a briefing tent with maps, photos, and charts sufficient to explain our operations at Fürstenfeldbruck, Adana, and Beirut.

Meanwhile, our rigging operation was running into real trouble. To start with, the trucks detailed to load the rigging equipment arrived with no trailers, which completely screwed up the loading plan. Normally the trucks would carry the platforms and large chutes, while the trailers would hold the small equipment and expendable supplies that would be lined up along the assembly line. Now all the equipment was intermingled on the trucks, and as a result the supplies needed at the head of the assembly line were loaded on the last truck. In haste to make up lost time, the trucks were dispatched piecemeal instead of in small serials and were therefore not properly escorted, thus delaying the entire movement. Making matters worse, the detail designated to assist the loading of the trucks arrived late. In

consequence the first load did not roll off the assembly line until 1830. Because of flexibility in our schedule, time lost from the above mistakes was largely recoverable; time lost in the derigging operation was not. Therefore, I have always thought that failure to derig General Eddleman's demonstration drop the previous night was the root cause of all the trouble.

By about 1600 the overall operation was taking definite form. Aircraft were landing, the DACG was established, the tent camp erected, the marshaling area for personnel and equipment set up, and serials of the 187th were arriving. Even the Russians were at the fence taking pictures. In the midst of this we had visitors--fourteen stars in all. In each case I tried to steer them to our briefing tent, where I could give them a full rundown on our plan and on the operation of the marshaling area. With but one exception, they all gravitated toward the hangar area where the major activity was and, in the midst of all the bustle and clamor, began to ask piecemeal questions on various aspects of the plan. At one time there was Gen. Henry Hodes, CG USAREUR, Lieutenant General Eddleman, Lieutenant General Rogers, Major General Cooper, and Brigadier General Davis. They all had a right to be there, but I was afraid they might try to tinker with the plan and that was not the time or the place for it. At one point General Eddleman asked how our army aircraft were being transported. I replied that the light helicopters were going by air, the remainder being flown. He suggested that we ask the Navy to take them on a carrier. I turned to a staff officer and asked him to look into it. I then promptly forgot about it, thinking nothing would come of it. Fortunately for me, the staff officer didn't forget, as much to my surprise the Navy did have a light carrier at Naples and said they would be happy to transport our aircraft. That was the only worthwhile suggestion to emerge from this rather disorganized conclave, and even that was not an unqualified success, as some aircraft were damaged by salt spray en route.

Later in the afternoon I received word that Maj. Gen. Paul Adams, CG of the 7th Army Support Command, was landing. I met his plane and escorted him to our briefing tent, where I gave him a complete rundown on our plan and what was underway at the airfield. He thanked me and departed, but just before boarding his plane, said that it was possible that he might be sent to Lebanon to take command of all land forces. At that point his statement was just one more "if" in a lot of "iffys," but I did take note of the fact that he was the only visitor who allowed me to give him a full-scale briefing, and I considered that a good omen for the future.

After General Adams' departure I visited the marshaling area. Here individuals were being checked out for completeness of shots, dog tags, et cetera, and were also being assigned to aircraft loads. Vehicles were being decanted, prepared for rigging, and then lined up in the order in which they would move

to the assembly line. Unfortunately, I found, according to my notes, "that the 187th had not properly supervised the priority of rigging loads and checked for the uniformity of loads." I suspect this latter fault was due in part to the old supply sergeant syndrome of always trying to take along a little extra, and the former fault due to just plain haste in trying to speed up the rigging process. Whatever the reason these derelictions were inexcusable and certainly not repeated when the unit returned from Lebanon.

The evening was spent in keeping an anxious eye on the progress of the rigging lines and the loading of aircraft. Since rigging of the A-22 containers was a much simpler process, we were able to set up a second line using 187th personnel. The heavy drop was a different problem. It is a process that requires deliberate care and precision performed only by trained personnel. The heavy drop platoon had been hard at it since early morning and, although still plugging along, was obviously tired. Since the 187th had not received heavy drop rigging training, all we could do was give the platoon moral support while it finished the job.

As for the aircraft loading, my notes indicate only that it "proceeded slowly." Although I visited several aircraft where problems developed, I regret that I cannot now recall their exact nature, except that they involved the interrelations between the crew chief, the Air Force loadmaster, and the Army jumpmaster, all of whom had a stake in seeing that the aircraft safely dropped its load, but who didn't always agree on exactly how to do it, especially when they had met for the first time on a dimly lit runway.

At some time late in the evening, I received a call from my West Point classmate, Maj. Gen. Gabe Disosway, CG 12th Air Force. "Dave," he said, "you have the green light to go." I was too embarrassed to tell him that we weren't ready yet, but as it turned out we couldn't have departed anyway. About 2400 I took a snooze and about 0200, 16 July, was awakened by Colonel McCafferty indicating that clearance had not yet been received from Austria to overfly that country. Also the C-119s, which did not have the ability to overfly the Alps and therefore had always been scheduled to fly by way of France, could not take off because of bad weather. He recommended an 0730 takeoff, and I agreed. Actually, the C-119s had wheels up at 0817, and I departed shortly thereafter.

I am sure that General Speidel was largely responsible, but I was surprised that in contrast with previous practice alerts and the actual May alert, I had very little to do other than lend encouragement or occasionally mildly kick a butt or two. No basic changes had to be made in our plan, and such adjustments as were required fell entirely within its framework. On the other hand, we were not loaded and locked within the time we had

projected and therefore did not achieve our objective. In sum, the plan succeeded; we failed in its execution.

### 13. Staging at Adana, 16-19 July 1958

As our plane lifted to the Bavarian Hills, my only thought, mirrored by my staff, I am sure, was one of relief--that finally after all the planning, alerts, and rehearsal, TF 201 was on its way, and we would now have a chance to see how the plan would work. Colonel McCafferty, as the commander of the troop carrier force, accompanied us and, I believe, piloted our aircraft. As I had had little sleep in the past forty-eight hours, I lay down on the floor of the flight deck with my head practically under the pilot's feet and slept for most of the flight. I do recall Austrian fighter aircraft flying close off our wing as we passed high above their country.

We arrived at Adana at about 1500, where we were met by the base commander, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas and Brig. Gen. James Roberts, USAF. Thomas seemed to be in a mild state of shock. His transfer orders had been delayed just as he was about to depart. Instead of contemplating a pleasant change of station leave, he was confronted with the realization that his almost empty base was about to be inundated with one of the largest concentrations of U.S. aircraft since WW II. I don't believe General Roberts was much better off. As I recall he was assigned to HQ, EUCOM, and had just been designated as U.S. Air Force Commander for the operation, but knew little or nothing about BLUEBAT beforehand. At least I had never met him at any of our conferences or heard his name mentioned at any time.

Nonetheless, preparations were in full swing. Tents for the Air Force were going up and grass was being bulldozed off the area that Colonel Meetze had arranged for us on his liaison visit. I stopped that, as I could visualize the dust that would be generated from the strong, steady winds that seemed to blow all the time. Instead, each planeload bivouacked beside the taxiway near its plane. Contrary to Leavenworth Paper #3, page 31, para 4, no equipment was ever unloaded by TF Alpha or TF Charlie at Adana. All the C-130s had landed by 2300, and the last C-124 with Colonel Sharkey aboard at 0600, 17 July. After giving him instructions on establishing his command area, General Miller and I departed for Beirut per instructions from Admiral Holloway.

When we met the admiral aboard the Taconic, he seemed quite preoccupied and not prepared to give us any definite instructions. Much to our surprise, he asked us to plan for a possible airdrop at Tripoli. We adjourned to the Operations Center, where we were briefed by NELM staff members and studied maps and photos of Kleiat airfield and vicinity. We concluded that a drop could be made, but that the aircraft would either

have to approach or climb out dangerously near Syrian territory. Second, the airfield was miles from the city, which could create serious problems if resistance was encountered in the intervening very rough terrain. So with less than full enthusiasm we returned to Admiral Holloway. His mood had changed completely. He was quite relaxed and informed us that TF 201 would proceed to Beirut as originally planned. In retrospect I believe it probable that, when we arrived, a decision as to our employment had not yet been made and planning for Tripoli was simply a ploy to keep us occupied. In the interim, either guidance had been received from some source, or Admiral Holloway had unilaterally made the decision. He indicated that we should establish a base in the large olive grove just east of the airport. I asked, "Isn't that private property? Whom should I see about it?" I shall never forget his answer. Waving his arms in characteristic fashion, he replied, "Matter of military necessity. Send the bills to the Ambassador." Of course, it didn't work out exactly that way, but then I suppose I should never have asked the question in the first place.

Before returning to Adana I made a quick reconnaissance of the olive groves and also arranged for some trucks from the Lebanese Army to assist us in moving our supplies. This was necessary as we wished to keep our TF Alpha vehicles rigged in case an airdrop was later required. On 18 July a recon party was sent to Beirut, and in its absence, I inspected all troops and equipment and talked to all members of TF Alpha. I believed that, although the external threat could not be discounted completely, a more probable threat was an internal one between the different groups inside Lebanon--a threat that might escalate, requiring our involvement. It was my intent that our troops should conduct themselves in such a restrained, alert, highly professional manner that they would not inadvertently involve themselves, and the Lebanese would not want to get involved with them either. So my talk was not only to impart a sense of mission, which is every soldier's due, but just as important to explain to those gathered the reason for the strict discipline and attention to duty I intended to enforce.

When the advance party returned, they presented a plan that looked as if it had been lifted from the diagram in the field manual for defense of an airhead. It would have disposed our troops in company-size strong points on the semicircular ridge of hills that rose to the south and east of the airport and the open sand dunes to the north, with the ocean to the west. I believed that if we had trouble, it would come from small forays or acts of individuals such as snipers, fanatics, or thieves, and it would be better to initially, at least, deploy ourselves in a tight perimeter, largely in the olive grove east of the airport, where we could protect ourselves by mutual support as well as provide a secure area for the support units that were to follow. In view of these changes, I decided to send the advance party back to Lebanon that night, but unfortunately a clearance for the flight could not be obtained from the Beirut Airport.

Colonel Meetze, with some members of his 201st Logistical Command Staff, joined us at Adana and was able to arrange for B rations, drawn from Air Force supplies stockpiled at Adana, which thankfully enabled us to go off C rations almost immediately. Also, since our equipment was to remain rigged, we were short on amenities of any kind and arranged to draw from the Air Force fly away kit (Seaweed stocks), stored at Adana, such items as tents, folding tables and chairs, typewriters, and office supplies. In the evening a meeting was held with the Air Force, and all details for the air movement the next morning were finalized. I also reviewed the TF troop list to see if any changes should be made in view of the situation we now expected. I cannot now recall if I requested any deletions to the troop list, but I do recall two changes--that a truck platoon be placed as top priority on TF Charlie and that TF Alpha's "B" bags be sent by air rather than by sea. Unfortunately, this last request was garbled in transmission and was interpreted by the 24th Division to mean Bravo advance. So a few days later, into Beirut came the advance party of the 503d, happy as could be. This mistake was unfortunate in two respects. It unnecessarily raised the hopes of the 503d that they were to be deployed, and it caused an unnecessary delay in the receipt of "B" bags by TF Alpha. To add insult to injury, there was extensive pilferage of the bags by the crew of the ship that transported them. The error could have been avoided in two ways. I should have asked that the key words in the message be transmitted twice. During WWII in the Southwest Pacific Theatre, where messages over long distances were often garbled in transmission, we routinely repeated the essential elements of a message, so I knew better. On the other hand the 24th Division should have requested a service on the garble instead of guessing at the meaning.

#### 14. Movement to Beirut, 19 July

At about 0500 on 19 July I was informed by our G-4, Col. Lynn Smith, that his efforts during the night to obtain a clearance for our advance party plane to return to Lebanon had been unsuccessful. This meant trouble. Our entry into Beirut at best was not going to be your basic textbook type of air-landed operation. Although pleasant and accommodating, the airport officials insisted that our flights would have to be integrated with their normal civilian traffic, which was by no means light. Compounding the problem was the size of the airport, which was not large by current standards. There were two main runways, one of which was closed for landings because of an extension that was under construction. There were two taxiways leading to an apron that extended across the front of the terminal where civilian planes were ordinarily parked. On the previous day the advance party had asked that space be provided to park our heavy drop loads and a taxiway be reserved for our use in unloading aircraft. It was to finalize these details as well as to recon

the new unit locations I had prescribed that we had wanted to send our advance party back to Beirut the previous evening. As it turned out, we took off with the advance party plane piggybacking on our clearance, bringing up the rear.

When we arrived the press and photographers who were there to meet us gathered for some reason around the advance party plane, allowing me with some of my staff to escape unobserved and to check on the situation. To our dismay we found that the Lebanese Army trucks promised us had not arrived, the taxiway had not been reserved, and no space had been allocated for our heavy drop. There followed a fine example of accelerated, high pressure staff activity. A taxiway was designated for our use. We were told to park the heavy drop on the runway that was being extended. The Lebanese Army trucks were located just as the first group of C-119s appeared in the distance.

I proceeded to the taxiway reserved for us, and what I saw there so astonished me that I quickly drove back to the advance party plane where the press was still gathered and, pointing toward the C-119s, called to them, "You're wasting your time here. There's your story." As each aircraft turned into the taxiway still rolling at a considerable speed, a soldier jumped off and sprinted forward to establish an assembly point for his planeload. The other soldiers came tumbling out behind him while the plane was still rolling, neatly stacked their weapons and equipment in a line designated by the guide, then raced back to the plane to unload the A-7 containers and weapons bags. In a matter of several minutes the plane was proceeding to the runway for takeoff. The troopers had formed up with their equipment and were moving toward the olive groves. As later related to me by a Pan Am representative who observed the operation from an upper story of the terminal, "It was amazing. One moment the place was full of soldiers, and the next moment they had just disappeared." I was so proud of them I conveniently overlooked the fact that they had exited their aircraft in a manner certainly not taught to them at jump school or permitted by AF regulations, but it did portend their conduct throughout the operation.

The remainder of the day was spent in a variety of activities normal to entry into a new operational area. I contacted the Marine battalion commander located near the airport and made a reconnaissance accompanied by him. I then flew to the Taconic by helicopter to report to Admiral Holloway, but he was involved with the U.S. Ambassador, so I did not see him. Returning to the airport I observed the unloading of the C-130s, which were coming in at irregular intervals as they could be fitted into traffic. The scheme for unloading the heavy drop I thought was quite ingenious. The first plane in brought an extra load of roller conveyors, which were laid out on the edge of the runway. The heavy drop loads were rolled out of the plane onto these conveyors. The roller conveyors under the loads on the first plane were then removed and laid on the runway for the next

plane, so that we ended up with all the heavy drop loads in a single line on conveyors in proper sequence to be rolled back onto the aircraft if needed. I then made a check by helicopter of the activity in the olive grove. The check indicated that the Headquarters tent camp was being erected on the edge of a large clearing in the center of the grove, the CP of the 201st Logistical Command was going up nearby, and the 187th was settling in very smoothly. Returning to the airfield I conferred with Colonel McCafferty, who had established his Combat Airlift Support Unit (CALSU) in several GP tents beside the taxiway. Our first briefing at our CP was held at 1900, and at 2130 we reported to CINCSPECOMME that TF Alpha had closed.

#### 15. Consolidation Phase, 20-26 July

Naturally our first consideration was to be able to respond to any operational requirement that might arise. For quick response, one company of the 187th was maintained on thirty-minute alert and one platoon on ten-minute alert. A grid of the Beirut area was established and heliopads designated in each grid, together with the shortest vehicle route thereto. A large-scale photo mosaic of the Basta area was prepared by the Air Force and studied by us in the event trouble erupted there. Liaison was established with Marine units and visits made to their positions. General Wade and I arranged coordination of Marine artillery with ours, and a TOC established at our artillery battery was able to control the fires of all artillery, our 4.2s, naval gunfire from destroyers offshore, and aircraft strikes. Simulated missions were run each day for these capabilities, with fighter aircraft coming down from Adana to participate. I made an aerial reconnaissance of all Lebanon, courtesy of the Navy, and made daily flights over Beirut in an Army L-5, until I became thoroughly familiar with the area.

Our second consideration was the security and well-being of our troops. A Letter of Instruction was given to each unit commander as he arrived, and it was reviewed with him in detail. It contained guidelines for the establishment of his company area, security, uniform regulations, sanitation, etc. A follow-up check was made of the unit, and I spoke to it, all within the first twenty-four hours of arrival. Colonel Meetze adopted the same procedure for his units, which ensured that everyone stepped off on the same foot.

At this time of year our area was a real hotbox with noonday temperatures from 90-degrees to 100-degrees Farenheit as normal. Accordingly, I prescribed reveille at 0430, followed by running and PT for everyone, myself included. The work day extended from 0600 to 1100 and from 1400 to 1700. All individual and unit training was conducted in the morning hours. The afternoon periods were reserved for less physically demanding subjects,

troop information, care and cleaning of equipment, and athletics. Saturday mornings were reserved for a complete inspection of all personnel, equipment, and camp areas, followed by a talk by the unit commander, during which he read my weekly letter reviewing past performance and setting goals for the future.

Our third consideration was the movement to Lebanon of TF Charlie. I met the first unit at 0700, Sunday, 20 July and the last unit, the 58th Evac Hospital, at about 2000 on 1 August. It was a very noisy twelve days. The C-130 engines ran at a constant speed, emitting an ear-splitting roar, and never shut down while unloading. The C-124s undoubtedly made more noise on takeoff than any aircraft ever built. As the operation was an airstream type that ran at irregular intervals, the sound of the engines reverberated night and day through the olive grove and was a considerable impediment to sleep. Instead of counting sheep, I counted airplanes and, on one sleepless night, according to my diary, recorded 26 of them. The Air Force CALSU and a detail from the 187th headed by Capt. Gerald Carlson worked around the clock, performing in an outstanding manner. Toward the end, Captain Carlson's voice in competition with the engine noise was reduced to a bare whisper, and it was a wonder that the whole gang did not end up totally deaf.

Our fourth consideration was the establishment of good working relationships. Knowing Admiral Holloway was a very busy man, I did not contact him unless necessary, but worked closely with Adm. Howard Yeager and General Wade. He and I visited Gen. Fu'ād Shehāb, and I established cordial relations with the two Lebanese Army units located near me. I worked closely with Mayor Saab of Chouiefalt, a large Druze settlement adjacent to the olive grove. Close liaison was established with the U.S. Embassy, the CIA, USIA, and other U.S. agencies operating in the area. I also initiated frequent correspondence with Generals Hodes, Eddleman, and Cooper to keep them fully informed of what was happening to their troops.

I have included the above not to impress anyone as to what a busy boy I was, but to establish the framework for the following account of incidents more directly related to the EP 201 planning process and also to illustrate that its execution was not entirely all peaches and cream.

a. The Honest John

USAREUR added an Honest John unit to the Troop List, and although I was never told directly, I assumed that it was at DA direction in order to demonstrate that the U.S. Army had the ability to deploy a tactical nuclear capability quickly in any and all situations. Although no formal protest was made, I did

not favor the idea of being saddled with a weapon I could not visualize needing. I was also concerned about the highly restrictive and extensive regulations governing the security of the launcher and missiles. At that time there were only two air transportable launchers in Europe, both with the U.S. Task Force stationed in Italy. One of these was transferred to us in Germany and was scheduled to be deployed by C-124 as a part of TF Charlie. However, soon after the Marines came ashore, some enterprising reporter asked a Marine officer if their 8-inch guns could fire nuclear weapons. He tried to hedge his answer, but did admit that nuclear weapons did exist for 8-inch artillery. The inference was made that the Marines did in fact have a nuclear capability, and the fat was in the fire. The ensuing hubbub apparently caused DA to have second thoughts and to issue an order canceling the deployment. When this order was received, the Honest John detachment was already en route to Beirut via C-124. It was landed after dark, was immediately parked in a remote part of the airport, and took off the next morning without unloading. The retraction order went through AF channels, so I was not informed of it until the following morning. For reasons I cannot now recall the Honest John personnel were not returned with the launcher. Since they all were high-quality people, we decided to keep them, at least until we got a squawk from the 24th Division, but as was characteristic of the division in all its dealings with us, they suffered our transgressions with forbearance. Note: I realize the above account differs from that in Leavenworth Paper #3, page 37. I don't recall it, but apparently there was a sea tail consisting of the Btrg (-).

#### b. Command Relationships

When the Marines landed, General Wade quite properly was designated as CG AMLANFOR as prescribed in the BLUEBAT plan. This raised a question as to what my designation should be. I found out when I paid my first call on Admiral Holloway on 19 July. I was piped aboard and announced over the ship's loud speaker system as "CG, US Army Troops Assigned," which rather surprised me as I had never heard that term used before, but I thought little more about it. This was not true of some of the Army officers who were assigned to CINCNELM and were now on CINCSECOMME's staff. They believed that General Wade and I should have had the same designation or that I should have had the title of CG, AMLANFOR. They suggested that I make an issue of it.

This I did not do. Whatever our respective titles, I was getting my instructions directly from Admiral Holloway. General Wade and I were coordinating our activities effectively, and he at no time made any effort to assert authority over me. I was well aware and could understand the Navy's desire that a high ranking Marine Corps general get the job as AMLANFOR and assumed

that was why the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, was rushed from Camp Lejeune without heavy weapons, vehicles, radios, and other means required for sustained combat. I was also aware that General Adams had been given some strong assurance that he was the heir apparent, otherwise he would not have taken the trouble to visit me at Fürstenfeldbruck. I assumed that if Admiral Holloway had thought it necessary to discuss the matter with me, he would have done so. Besides, throughout my service I have consistently tried to do my job with as little reference to or interference from my superiors.

Admiral Holloway undoubtedly appreciated this, as one day he said, "You're my strong right arm. You are the only guy who comes to see me without asking for something." I believe he was sincere in saying this. After his visit to us on 30 May at Augsburg, one of his Army staff officers, Lt. Col. Ben Capshaw, wrote, "As a matter of interest to you, General, Admiral Holloway told the senior members of his staff that his visit with you was one of the most wonderful and educational experiences he has had in a long time, and he only wished he could have spent longer with you. After the meeting he called me in individually to expand on the subject in more detail. I am sure that he was sincerely impressed." During that visit we gave him an airborne swaggerstick that, according to his aide, he carried with him when he first went ashore in Lebanon, and I do know that he always carried it when he visited our troops on their positions, something he loved to do.

At the time when we relieved the Marine unit stationed at the ambassador's residence, Admiral Holloway was spending the night there. As he told me later, "I awoke this morning and heard orders being barked and rifle slings slapped and said to myself that the paratroopers must have relieved the Marines." I recount all this by way of explaining why, under the circumstances that existed during this consolidation period, who had what title was not important, and why I was confident that whatever happened we would always get a fair shake from Admiral Holloway. It may also explain why he did not opt to turn us back at Adana. He had real affection for us and simply did not want to. Of course, no doubt lurking somewhere in the background was the realization that we carried with us the supporting wherewithal to make Lebanon a first-class show and not just a skin-of-the-teeth affair.

#### c. More Ammunition

On another occasion I was not as fortunate in resisting a suggestion from the Army members of CINCSPECOMME's staff. The Army's senior member, a Colonel Ward, was concerned that we did not have enough ammunition on the ground and wanted me to request more while the Charlie airlift was still in operation. Knowing what was on the way by sea and given the existing noncombat

situation, I resisted at first, but the suggestion was made again while I was hurrying from the Taconic to another appointment, and in a moment of weakness I agreed. As General Cooper told me later, the message was received just as a unit was about to take off. Neither he nor General Speidel could fathom why this urgent request for Class V, but they decided that if "Dave wants it, send it." So the unit was unloaded and ammo was loaded on all available aircraft until the amount we requested had been dispatched. As a result, the airlift of TF Charlie was needlessly prolonged, and we had stocks we didn't need. During our long period of preplanning, I had established a close relationship with CINCNELM's Army members, and they were therefore not reluctant to keep me informed of activity within that staff and to offer suggestions. I appreciated this, but in this instance I made a mistake in accepting their advice.

d. Our PIO Snafu

The PIO Section of Headquarters, TF 201, consisting of a Major Bretz and five enlisted members, was furnished by USAREUR. As they were not jumpers, they were not a part of TF Alpha, but were assigned to the nonjumping element of the headquarters in TF Charlie. Consequently, for the first few days in Lebanon, we were without a PIO section.

When the Marines landed the news media descended on Beirut in droves, taking pictures of the Marines wading ashore, manning positions, etc. When we arrived we generated no photo happenings, so some enterprising reporter got one of our soldiers to pose in his company area, sitting backward on a donkey, drinking a bottle of soda. The picture by itself was bad enough, but the Washington Post printed it alongside a grim-faced Marine in full battle regalia, with bayonet fixed, charging across the beach. The Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, must have hit the roof when he saw it, as I received a message from him direct asking me very pointedly whether our soldiers weren't doing something more worthwhile than that. Knowing how our men were actually performing, I was equally exasperated about the picture and replied with a message that even now I wonder how I had the nerve to send. I said that our soldiers certainly were doing something worthwhile, but that I lacked an adequate PIO capability. I enumerated what I needed and added that if the Army would supply it, I would guarantee good PI coverage. Almost before I had time to finish regretting I had ever sent the message, a plane arrived direct from Washington carrying a real PI hot shot, a Lieutenant Colonel Steward, complete with a team of officers and enlisted specialists who had their own cameras, jeeps, and mobile photo lab. Both Generals Hodes and Eddleman also chided me, but much less severely, as they were more aware of the true situation.

My basic mistake was to fail to insist that our PI section be jump qualified, and failing that, I should have taken them to Adana anyway. Under the circumstances then existing, the section could have proceeded to Beirut with us. Publishing of the donkey picture was regrettable, but not of lasting importance. More important is that a commander understand the awesome power of the press. His only defense is to insure that he has a good PIO, keep him fully informed and insure that he is capable of establishing good working relationships with all the media, press, TV, and radio. This is particularly important in the initial phase of an operation when the military and the press meet for the first time. I failed to do this and therefore did not provide TF 201 and the Army the initial press coverage it should have had.

#### 16. Creation of AMLANFOR

During a meeting with Admiral Holloway on 24 July, he informed me that a decision had been made to establish a Land Force HQ, and that General Adams would be arriving that evening at 1900 to organize and command the headquarters. He then asked me where, if I were General Adams, I would prefer my headquarters to be. I replied in Beirut, because most of the agencies and the activities with which AMLANFOR would be concerned were located there.

When I returned to our CP, in that remarkable way that bad news travels fast, I found that the staff already had the word and were in an absolute blue funk. They all had either served under General Adams in the XVIII Airborne Corps or knew him by reputation as a tough, very tough, and demanding boss. Also, I am sure that quite naturally after all their work, they didn't like the idea of someone moving in on top of them. At our 1800 briefing I told them that I could understand their disappointment, but it had been decided that a joint land force headquarters was necessary, and that being so, General Adams was the best qualified officer in the Army for the job. He had extensive experience as a leader in combat, as an administrator, and as a planner; equally important, he understood airborne troops, being one of them. Personally I had no illusions. I had served under him in Korea and the Pentagon and knew that he walked right down the middle of the road and that everyone under him better walk there, too.

That evening we got off to an inauspicious start. CINCSPECOMME's Chief of Staff (an Admiral) and I were to meet General Adams' plane at what I had been informed was 1900 local time, but instead was ZULU time, an hour earlier. I got the word while the plane was on final and rushed to the airport to find General Adams' plane sitting on the tarmac, but no Admiral. General Adams, realizing something was amiss, tactfully remained

aboard until I arrived, but said nothing about the screw-up when I greeted him. I took him to our CP for a briefing. He visited with me in my tent for a few minutes, and before we left to drive into town he said, "You know there is an awful lot of heartbreak in this business." I replied, "Yes, sir. There is." I knew what he meant. No one likes to be superseded, but looking back I believe I was more relieved than sorry. More and more of my time was being spent coordinating with CINCSPECOMME, General Wade, Admiral Yeager, Amb. Robert McClintock, and the Lebanese. It was becoming apparent to me that most of that coordination could better be done at a higher level than my own.

Two days later, on 26 July, General Adams asked me to have lunch with him. During the meal he told me that he simply would not be able to wait for personnel from USAREUR, that he had to be operational by 1900 that evening, and that the only way he could do that was to utilize my staff, less thirty-six officers and enlisted men, who would remain in the field as a brigade headquarters to command the army combat units. Since the brigade would exercise purely operational responsibilities, the 201st Logistical Command would operate under his control. He then said that I could either be his deputy at his headquarters or command the brigade. I told him that I thought I could be of more service to him and to the troops in the field by commanding the brigade, and he accepted my preference. I also mentioned that, in anticipation of some decision concerning the command structure, I had brought my four Gs with me, and if I could be excused for a minute I would like to send them back to camp to start planning for the move. Upon my return I told him that I thought I could function with the allotment given me, but if I could not, I would utilize personnel from units under my command. However, if the situation heated up, I would need more people and would like to prepare a standby augmentation list to be submitted through him to USAREUR. He agreed.

I then returned to my CP to find the place in an uproar. One of the officers I had sent back early had made an offhand remark that was interpreted to mean that the whole headquarters was going to Beirut. This impression was corrected in a hurry and thereafter the exodus proceeded in an orderly manner. AMLANFOR was operational at 1900 and became an effective headquarters in a remarkably short period of time. There were certainly other, less gentle ways in which this operation could have been performed, but General Adams did it as delicately and with as much compassion for the patient as anyone could expect. As for us, we survived the major surgery in good shape and quickly adjusted to our new situation.

The activation of AMLANFOR in effect terminated the execution of EP 201 and ushered in a new phase in U.S. operations in Lebanon. We probably would have muddled through without the new command structure, but we might well have made some mistakes that need not have been made. General Adams gave firm direction to

the entire operation and played a pivotal part in the many actions that were never publicized, but which eventually nudged the Lebanese into burying their firearms for a while and allowing the U.S. to retract its forces.

#### 17. Postscript

I departed from Beirut on Sunday, October 15, with a warm sun shining down from a clear blue Mediterranean sky. I landed a few hours later in a typically chilly German fog, so thick that our wheels almost took the horns from a Bavarian cow as we crossed the edge of the airfield. Soon, I thought, I will be reassigned and that will end my association with a contingency plan that started for me back in the Pentagon in 1956. Well, not quite. As Brig. Gen. Harold Johnson, the assistant C/S, 7th Army, and I were traveling to the Infantry Conference at Ft. Benning later that fall, I remarked that I pitied the brigadier general who would have to assume the 201 contingency mission in the 8th Division. He replied, "What makes you think it won't be you?" And so in January, 1959, much like a missionary, I went to Bad Krasnauch, the land of the Golden Arrow, to convince the disbelievers that having an airborne element was not the worst of all worlds. Besides, 201 was now their baby, and they had better learn to get on with it. Both the 504th and 505th battle groups that came from Ft. Bragg had been superbly trained by Maj. Gen. Ham Howze, which made my job a lot easier.

Learning from the Lebanon experience we kept one rifle company on two-hour alert with its heavy drop loads rigged and on a roller conveyor at truck-bed height, so it could be rolled directly onto trucks. The heavy drop platoon was located in the same caserne with the two battle groups, so instruction on heavy drop rigging could be facilitated. A complete scale model mock up of a departure airfield was constructed in sections so that it could be transported around the division to train all those who would be involved in DACG operations. Each month alternately at Evreux and Bad Krasnauch a conference was held with the 322d Air Division. In the spring an exercise was held that included the air drop of a battle group, seizure of an airfield, airlanding of the battle group's equipment at the airfield, and subsequent antiguerrilla operation, all within fifty miles of our home base and without expenditure of any other than normal training funds. At the end of that exercise, the 8th Division was better prepared to execute 201 than we had been in 1958.

In June I went to work for General Adams, for the fourth time, as his Chief of Staff at V Corps, and so finally left TF 201 behind me.

SECTION II: COMMENTS ON LEAVENWORTH PAPER #3

This section contains my comments with respect to the relatively few instances wherein either my records or my recollections differ substantially with specific statements in Leavenworth Paper #3, "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, by Dr. Roger Spiller.

1. Page 11, Para 2, Line 3. Statement: "In the light of subsequent events, however, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Air Force planners assumed that general arrangements made earlier would suffice in this situation also."

Comment: At no time during the planning process did we ever have any direct contact with any Air Force unit or personnel on the specific matter of tactical air support. Similarly, there was no direct liaison between us and CASF Bravo while we were at Adana or after we arrived in Lebanon. Practice air strikes in Lebanon were arranged directly between CASF Bravo and our forward air controllers. Although Maj. Gen. Henry Viccellio visited Beirut on several occasions that I was aware of, I do not know what coordination may have been effected between him and General Adams. If there was any, we were not involved in it in any way.

At the November meeting in London in 1957 a general officer from the 3d Air Force located in England remarked to Admiral Holloway in my presence that there was no need for all the planning; if there was any trouble in the Middle East, just give them [the Air Force] the mission and they would settle it with just one bomb. Admiral Holloway never batted an eye, but I certainly did. I had encountered this officer in the Pentagon and knew him to be a dyed-in-the-wool SAC type and a devoted disciple of General Curtis LeMay, down to the ever present big brown cigar. Nevertheless, I was startled, as I couldn't imagine any situation that our small force might encounter that would warrant the use of nuclear weapons. This remark might explain the less than avid interest the Air Force seemed to take in the entire operation but it does not explain my own actions or lack thereof. During World War II as a student at the Army-Navy War College, I attended the Air Corps School of Applied Tactics at Orlando, Florida, and during the Korean War, an Air Force school in Japan for commanders at the regimental/wing level. I knew that when an Air Force unit was placed in direct support of an Army unit, an Air Force detachment should be collocated with the Army unit in order to coordinate their joint operations. Even though I understood that our tactical air support, if needed, would come from units already based in Turkey rather than units in Western Europe, I should have insisted that we be given some point of contact for the purpose of coordinating tactical air support. At Adana, when much to our surprise CASF Bravo came

zooming out of the sky, I should have initiated coordination then and requested that an operational element with appropriate communications accompany us to Beirut. These were major derelictions on my part, for which I have no explanation and can offer no excuse.

One lesson to learn is that a plan is not really complete unless every single element of it is complete, but more important, an Army planner should not hesitate to insist that other services fully engage in the planning process and deliver the means to execute the missions for which they are tasked.

Note: At Adana, General Viccellio and I were assigned the only BOQ room on the base. We both slept little, but it seemed he would be asleep when I came in and leave before I woke up, or vice versa. In deference to each other we never turned on the lights, so we never saw each other or spoke until we met in Beirut. Years later, when he was Deputy CG at Strike Command, we met often, and he always referred to me as someone with whom he had roomed for two days and still didn't know what he looked like.

2. Page 22, Para 2, Line 19. Statement: "McClintock later scored the marines for their 'extremely inflexible orders,' . . ."

Comment: Lt. Col. Harry Hadd was executing the Op Plan as written, so I can understand his reluctance to send a force to the Presidential Palace. I can also understand the ambassador's impatience in view of the fact that he traveled freely in the western part of the city and his own residence was only a few blocks from the palace. He therefore felt the force could move to the palace without difficulty.

As chief of the International Branch of the Plans Division on the DA Staff in 1954-55, I developed a good understanding of the Country Team concept and was fully aware that unless otherwise specified as with Eisenhower in Europe in WWII, the ambassador is responsible for execution of U.S. policy in a foreign country. I don't recall what was stated in the BLUEBAT plan or any discussions with CINCLANT on the matter during the planning stage, but it was my distinct understanding at the time that if we had gone in first, I was supposed to secure the airport and the post area and then contact the ambassador for further instructions pending the arrival of CINCSPECOMME and his assumption of control. After he arrived I would naturally take my orders from him.

While I was in Washington, Mr. McClintock was stationed in Hanoi, and I regularly read his cables to the State Department. They made much more sense than most of the cable traffic to which I was exposed. In view of this respect of his ability, I believe I would have been inclined to accept his assurance that we could reach the palace without undue difficulty. I would have asked

the ambassador to accompany me in his official car with flags flying on both fenders on a PR of the palace area. Based on the results of this PR and in the absence of any definite instructions from CINSPECOMME, I would have then made a decision as to whether to commit a force. If I had decided to go, I would have sent a rifle company, which under ROCID was quite an effective force, with four rifle platoons and a weapons platoon, including 81-mm mortars, machine guns, and recoilless rifles. If the decision had been negative, I hope it would have satisfied McClintock and avoided the dispatch of Mr. Robert Murphy from Washington to adjudicate between the military and the State Department. My basic inclination to go to the palace was largely influenced by the fact that one of the reasons we went to Lebanon--as questionable as that reason may have been--was to preserve the government until this internal squabble could be resolved. I don't believe I would have been very happy if a coup had occurred while I was sitting on my fanny at the airport.

If I am not mistaken, difficulties also arose between the military and State when we went into the Dominican Republic. This relationship, especially in the initial stages of execution of a contingency plan, can get very sticky. It is a matter for study that should be included in the curriculum of all our higher military educational institutions.

3. Page 25, Para 3, Line 8. Statement: ". . . bring one battle group and airlift therefor [sic] to a state of readiness to enable their arrival within 24 hours of execution order on Beirut airfield assuming it is safely held, or within 36 hours if airdrop is required and to be prepared to follow with second battle group."

Comment: I note this communication mentions only the battle groups. There may have been later clarification, but if there was not, we deployed a much larger force than the JCS intended. I can understand why Adm. Arleigh Burke might think in terms of a battle group only, as the Marine force with the Sixth Fleet had no support of any kind. But if the message was staffed, the Army should have detected the oversight. This tends to confirm my feeling that very few people were familiar with our plan. As for us, we always assumed that commitment of one or both battle groups into a potential combat situation would automatically trigger the commitment of TF Charlie. Actually, I don't recall that we ever did receive a written message to execute BLUEBAT.

The execution times in the message were feasible only if the order to execute had come after we were fully loaded and ready at Fursty. We calculated it would take ten hours after first alert to completely close TF Alpha at the airfield and twelve hours to rig and load 126 heavy drop loads. Assuming these two activities would overlap to some extent and also assuming no hitches, we figured we could be ready to go in eighteen hours.

4. Page 26, Para 4, Line 5. Statement: ". . . procedures for marshalling and deploying the task force which looked sufficient on paper were beginning to seem superficial."

Comment: I must say this statement was a considerable shock to my ego. If in fact our marshaling procedures were superficial, then I would hope that some better examples than those given could be found. They were not simply paper procedures as Leavenworth Paper #3 implies, but had been practiced and tested previously to the extent we were able to do so. Unquestionably the transfer of personnel under the pressure of time was a difficult operation and never performed in practice to our complete satisfaction, so no doubt some difficulties did occur, but these were not unanticipated and did not delay the departure of the 187th from Gablingen caserne. The disruption to the division was certainly anticipated by us and was simply a fact of life, not a weakness in our plans. Actually, the effect on USAREUR's troop basis was even more severe than on the 24th Division. Already stretched thin, it could hardly afford the loss of the combat support and service units we took from it. That is why in Section I, I referred to us as "moles" who, largely unnoticed, busied ourselves making plans, but I often had the uneasy feeling that those above us never took us very seriously and didn't fully realize what we were doing to their force structure.

As for the account of me personally selecting officers by laboriously scrutinizing the division officers' 201 files, the incident simply never happened. The roster of division personnel assigned to HQ TF 201 had been set for a long, long time. There might have been a few last minute changes, but those would have been handled by our G-1 Section, and I would not have been involved unless a key individual was involved; luckily there were none of these. Besides, the division personnel assigned to the HQ had been fully marshaled in the May alert, and on 16 July the same group was preparing to jump into the Bad Tölz area. We tried to spare the division as much as we could. For instance, our four Gs came from VII Corps or 7th Army, and many of our nonjumping people, special staff, PIO, Civil Affairs, etc. were provided by USAREUR. One G-2 specialist was an Arabic linguist who had been a spook in Berlin for years, didn't even have a uniform, hadn't touched a rifle since WWII, and certainly looked it when he arrived for duty. No doubt the division was crippled, yet none of my correspondence with General Cooper indicated that it was about to fall apart.

5. Page 26, Para 4, Line 7. Statement: "The battle group for Force Alpha was to be augmented to 110 percent of its full strength."

Comment: I hesitate to comment on this question of augmentation as my memory draws a complete blank on the subject, and a

diligent search of my files has failed to diminish that blank. If we did augment TF Alpha to 110 percent of strength, it was a mistake. During the Korean War, my regiment as well as the other two in the 25th Division became overstrength to the extent that our infantry squads numbered fourteen to sixteen men. Because such a squad was patently unmanageable, the division decreed that an additional platoon be formed in each company, although I personally favored forming an additional squad in each platoon. Whatever the solution, the experience left me strongly opposed to any unit being overstrength, so much so that I can't understand why I would not have vehemently opposed it. If I didn't, I should have.

Equally important is the question of retainability. I cannot recall what our criteria were for Lebanon. It is not an easy question to answer. In theory it would be desirable to purge a unit of all personnel without at least six-months retainability in order to maximize stability in the early stages of an operation. Generally, however, this would cause such disruption in unit integrity prior to deployment that it would be more of a hindrance than a help. At the other extreme, one month is not enough, as personal turbulence within the unit commences too early after deployment. During the Vietnam buildup, I believe we used three months, but as a general rule I prefer two months. This strikes a balance between the sudden disruption of the unit prior to deployment, and the degree of stability achieved in the first critical days following deployment. It must be remembered that a unit in the field operates twenty-four hours a day, and on that basis an individual can contribute a lot in sixty days.

6. Page 27, Para 1, Line 4. Statement: "Still, the haste to deploy was such that some officers and men actually went to Lebanon without orders."

Comment: What happened was this. By G.O. 194, dated 15 July, USAREUR activated HQ, TF 201, and HQ, 201st Logistical Command. Pending receipt of this order, the 24th Division issued S.O. 13 on 15 July assigning all officers and enlisted men of the division who were a part of the Task Force HQ to Advanced Detachment, HQ 24th Division. S.O. 19 on 23 July transferred the same personnel to HQ, TF 201, where they remained assigned--even when some of them became part of HQ, AMLANFOR--until their return to Germany. This type of individual assignment order is a G-1/AG responsibility. When issued, a copy is placed in the individual's 201 file, and two copies are given the individual.

The movements of units is a different story. These orders are a G-3 responsibility and are only issued to units, not individuals. Thus, the majority of our personnel were properly in Lebanon without individual assignment orders of any kind. Nonetheless, HQ AMLANFOR directed that each individual be given a copy of the order that returned his unit to Germany. I did not

question this, even though my past experience both as a G-1 and a G-3 indicated that, although not improper, it was, on the other hand, not necessary except for people carried as a part of HQ, TF 201, who were reassigned to their parent unit in USAREUR by Special Orders issued on 15 October by AMLANFOR. Of course, it is possible that considering the diverse sources from which HQ TF 201 was assembled, a few individuals did either reach Lebanon without orders or never received their personal copies. I simply don't know, but if so this would be despite our marshaling procedures, not for lack of them.

As for considering our move to Lebanon as "a permanent change of station," technically this is correct, but I doubt if many of our force thought that they would not return to Germany. We had operated on the thesis that we were deployed simply because of close proximity, and if the mission were prolonged, we would be replaced from CONUS. A DA visiting team in August even told me what U.S.-based units would replace us.

I don't recall how our unit assignment orders read, but it must have been in a way so that the umbilical cord between us and our parent unit was never completely severed. I recall that the C/S of the division, a Colonel Smith, told me that their administrative statistics had been considerably improved by the fact that our units in Lebanon had few if any DRs, AWOLs, accidents, courts-martial, etc. This could not have happened if USAREUR did not still consider our units an integral part of the 24th Division.

7. Page 27, Para 2, Line 7. Statement: ". . . the 187th principally drew upon the 1st Battle Group, 21st Airborne Infantry, for any extra men or equipment."

Comment: I believe the 187th drew from the 19th Infantry Battle Group, formerly the 504th Airborne Battle Group, which was located in Augsburg, perhaps a thirty-minute drive from Gablingen. As replacements went to the receiving unit at its home station, were checked out there and integrated into their new unit, it would have been impractical for the 21st to have furnished replacements because it was located in Munich, sixty kilometers from Gablingen. However, the 21st was designated to provide replacements for the 503d, as both occupied the same caserne in Munich.

8. Page 29, Para 1, Line 4. Statement: ". . . the dimensions and number of loads to be carried by the Air Force--had not been determined; . . ."

Comment: I believe this statement is only partially true. The configuration of each plane load and the total number of loads for Task Force Alpha had been determined, approved by me, and

given to the Air Force long before 15 July. As related by me in Section I, this requirement is what I discussed with General Davis at Ramstein AFB on 9 July.

Task Force Charlie is something else. For security reasons, we were not allowed any contact with the TF Charlie units prior to the May alert. After that alert we started working to get the airlift data from these units and to prepare loading plans. This was no easy task, as these units had no experience in preparing such data and had to be educated. The 8 July CPX was designed to accelerate this process, and another conference was planned to finalize the loading data. Nonetheless, it is true that these loading plans were not complete on 15 July. Since most of TF Charlie had to wait for turnaround planes, this was not a serious deficiency as time was available to finalize plans while waiting for inbound planes. Still, if we had gone all out on this, we could have had the Charlie loading data by 15 July. That we didn't was my responsibility.

9. Page 29, Para 1, Line 10. Statement: "It was at Fürstenfeldbruck airfield that the configurations for loading the task force were first calculated, . . ."

Comment: I believe it is incorrect to say "first calculated." They had to be recalculated and adjusted to fit the aircraft that were available on that particular day. This is a standard procedure in mounting all airborne operations except those where it is known beforehand that the airlift in proper types required will be well in excess of the lift requirement. This is why regulations prescribe the establishment of an Army-Air Force coordinating group at the departure airfield. It is interesting to note that on 16 July the airlift available for TF Alpha fell short by one rifle company. Echo company arrived at Adana a day late on, I believe, C-124's scheduled for TF Charlie.

10. Page 29, Para 1, Line 18. Statement: "Finally, there does not seem to have been any thought given to how the dimensions of the airlift might affect aircraft availability."

Comment: My comment is more a question than anything else. If Dr. Spiller is referring to how the size of the Alpha lift would affect availability of aircraft for Charlie, I'm not sure this is relevant. It was understood from the beginning that once TF Alpha was delivered, TF Charlie would be an airstream operation carried on to completion, regardless of time required.

11. Page 29, Para 1, Line 20. Statement: "At the time, just how long it would take aircraft to get to Turkey, unload, and return to Germany for subsequent loads had not been estimated."

Comment: I believe this is a mistake. No aircraft were ever unloaded in Turkey. TF Alpha certainly didn't and after that, to the best of my recollection, TF Charlie lift flew direct to Beirut. We definitely did have airtimes for all type aircraft from Germany to Adana and then to Beirut for air drop and return to Germany. I believe it is correct to say that we did not have a turnaround estimate for an airlanded operation, as there were too many imponderables. At what intervals could we land aircraft at Beirut? What would be the unloading space available? How would we fit into civil air traffic? And so on. It would have been a guess of little or no practical value.

12. Page 31, Para 2, Line 6. Statement: ". . . and, strangely, Colonel McCafferty of the air liaison staff."

Comment: There seems to be some misunderstanding concerning Colonel McCafferty's role. As Deputy Commander of the 322d Air Division, he was the Commander of the Air Force element of TF Alpha, not a liaison officer. Had we had to jump he would have been in command of TF Alpha en route to the target. It was his duty to fly with us to Adana and on to Beirut. I believe it is a misnomer to refer to the Air Force officers at Fursty as liaison officers. They were an operations element of the 322d.

13. Page 31, Para 4, Line 3. Statement: ". . . continued to unload tons of equipment and thousands of men . . ."

Comment: I confess I am mystified why the 24th Division Report should make such a statement. As I have previously indicated, no equipment was ever unloaded by us at any time at Adana. Our aircraft were parked off on one side of the field on a secondary taxiway. Our personnel bivouacked just off the taxiway beside their aircraft and, as they were not allowed to leave that immediate area, caused no congestion on the base. I cannot comment on what problems the Air Force may have had, but I thought all things considered they handled the situation very well. The Air Force isn't exactly noted for first class living under field conditions. Come to think of it, the most congestion I recall was in the evening when two large, disparate, and slightly antagonistic groups--the fighter pilots and the transport pilots--all tried to squeeze into the very small Officers' Club designed to hold at most two dozen people.

14. Page 31, Para 4, Line 11. Statement: ". . . nor had any stockpiling of supplies been attempted."

Comment: Colonel Meetze and several of my planners did visit Adana and did attempt to stockpile supplies. No storage space was available for us, but the Air Force did have considerable supplies on hand. As I stated in Section I, we did draw

approximately 20,000 B rations and a considerable amount of housekeeping equipment from these stocks.

15. Page 33, Para 1, Line 9. Statement: ". . . Adana Air Base would have made a wonderful target for anyone who wished to take advantage of it."

Comment: I had always understood that our air support would come from Air Force bases in Turkey other than Adana. I was surprised when CASF Bravo blew into town and used Adana as its base.

16. Page 33, Para 2, Line 24. Statement: "No photographs of the drop zone existed, and none were possible because the reconnaissance aircraft at Adana did not have the proper equipment to take any."

Comment: We did see pictures of the airfield that someone, perhaps the Navy, took. CASF Bravo did have an excellent photo capability and took many pictures for us, including the fine mosaic of the Basta. It is probable that on 17 July, when we went to Beirut, its photo capability was not yet operational, as CASF Bravo was still arriving at Adana from the United States.

17. Page 36, Para 1, Line 9. Statement: ". . . no provisions had been made in the contingency plans for such a command [CAMLANFOR]."

Comment: This is a valid criticism. As I recall in CINCNELM's original plan, I was ARMSPECOMME and the Marine Commander was MARSPECOMME. Instead there should have been a LANSPECOMME with us and the Marines subordinate to it. Of course, if this had been written into NELM's plan it would have been necessary to predesignate either a Marine or Army Commander, and I doubt if the JCS were ready to do that, especially when it was not clear that both Army and Marines would actually become involved. Perhaps what actually transpired was the best solution obtainable under the circumstances. Although not intended by us, HQ, TF 201, luckily exhibited sufficient amoebic tendencies to undergo fission and provide the nucleus for two viable, operating headquarters. I might add that the procedure was not entirely new to General Adams. At Ft. Bragg, the XVIII Airborne Corps was both a tactical command and a post command. When General Adams assumed command, he divided responsibilities so that if the Corps was deployed, a working nucleus would remain behind to run the post. It is not surprising either that when General Adams organized the Strike Command, he divided the HQ into two similar elements, either of which could have been deployed while the other element continued to function at McDill AFB.

18. Page 36, Para 1, Line 18. Statement: "In effect, this meant that those staff officers were serving two masters, . . ."

Comment: This is not correct. The AMLANFOR staff served only General Adams and no one else. My HQ and my staff were completely subordinate to AMLANFOR. There remained a personal linkage between me and some of the officers who went to AMLANFOR that was useful to me at times, but there was no question as for whom they worked. Misunderstanding here may have arisen from the fact that although there were two separate operating HQs, AMLANFOR and mine, all of us were officially assigned to HQ, TF 201, throughout our stay. I either never knew this or had forgotten it until I checked my 201 file while preparing these comments.

19. Page 38, Para 1, Line 7. Statement: "All these matters were finally taken up at a joint conference held in Beirut--on 4 August, . . ."

Comment: One of our first actions was to coordinate our artillery and 4.2-inch mortars with the Marines' artillery and with the gunfire of Navy destroyers. We relied on our FACs to coordinate ground panels, smoke, etc., with the Air Force. These FACs were the same ones we had worked with in Germany, so they were familiar with our standard procedures.

20. Page 38, Para 2, Line 1. Statement: "Shortly after Force Alpha reached Beirut, General Gray called the men of the 187th together for a talk."

Comment: A nit pic, but I talked to Alpha at Adana and to all other units within twenty-four hours of their arrival in Lebanon. General Adams also often spent Saturday and Sunday afternoons visiting units and giving them a talk.

21. Page 38, Para 4, Line 11. Statement: ". . . but USAREUR and USAFE got theirs [new maps] after deployment."

Comment: As I stated in Section I, we received a large bundle of the British maps on Cyprus in May, and I brought them back to Germany with me.

22. Page 39, Para 2, Line 6. Statement: ". . . the American commanders were forced to assess the situation on the spot and quickly."

Comment: True. On the first day I talked to the CIA, the State Department, and the Army Attache, all of whom had differing views, but the best information I received on the situation in

Lebanon and the various personalities involved was from the wife of an American official of Top Line Oil Co. She had more and better information than all the others put together.

23. Page 43, Para 1, Line 17. Statement: "Still, there was no overt American reaction to these incidents [sporadic outbreaks of harassing fire]."

Comment: True, no overt action, but when the trooper was wounded near the Basta, that same evening General Adams called and directed that we have a demonstration ready the next day on the reduction of a roadblock. The next afternoon we gave the demonstration to a select group from the Lebanese Army, using tanks, bulldozers, APCs, and helicopters and considerable firepower. Luckily a half-finished seaside resort was ready-made for the demonstration. Because the Lebanese Army and the rebels had many close connections, we knew the rebels would soon get the word. General Adams then informed the Lebanese privately that if the rebel who shot the soldier was not arrested and prosecuted, the roadblock would be destroyed. We had no further incidents of that nature. This was typical of how General Adams operated, quietly, behind the scenes, but still forcefully.

24. Page 43, Para 2, Line 26. Statement: General Adams "sent armored vehicles to the very edge of the Basta."

Comment: These tanks followed a patrol route through the city all night long. When they reached a certain high point on their route overlooking the city, they turned their guns toward the Mediterranean and fired one round. It did have a sobering effect on the hotheads.

25. Page 44, Para 3, Line 7. Statement: "... one is impressed by the wave of 'provisionalism' which dominated military planning as well as by a certain parochialism in the services."

Comment: In our case there were two other alternatives. One would have been to task XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft. Bragg with the mission. If as was actually assumed, time was a critical element, then this was not an acceptable solution. The other alternative would have actually been to activate HQ, TF 201, in Europe and have it constantly available. Beside the political nuances of this solution with respect to NATO, it would have meant committing personnel, housing, equipment, etc, to the mission. No one would prefer a provisional headquarters over an established one, but if personnel are well trained and qualified for the specific positions they occupy, it is amazing how quickly they coalesce.

The above comments are not intended to be contentious. Leavenworth Paper #3 has certainly raised some very fundamental questions that need to be considered. If, as the foreword to Leavenworth Paper #3 states, "The Lebanese contingency operation represents a gauge to measure the effectiveness of our planning for the 1980s," then that gauge should be stated as accurately as it is possible to do so and should highlight what was right and what was wrong with the planning and execution. Accordingly, I feel an obligation to clarify aspects of the operation which could not be fully reconstructed from the study of the reference data available to the author.

## SECTION III: RANDOM AFTERTHOUGHTS AND VARIOUS TRIVIA

### 1. Preposed CPX at Rota, Spain.

In the spring of 1958 someone, I believe EUCOM, proposed a CPX to be held at Rota, Spain, in which HQ, TF 201, would parachute into the area. Spanish officers had jumped with us in Germany and, we noted, wore specially constructed shoes because of the hard, rocky soil and frequent high winds encountered in Spain. Although our division boasted that it had never jumped on a plowed DZ, still we were not too keen on the Rota deal, as neither was Admiral Holloway. A CPX was certainly needed, but should have been set up on a less grandios scale. As it was, the idea got overtaken by events.

### 2. C-130 Aircraft

For us it was love at first sight. After listening to the coughing, popping, and sputtering of the durable, but aging C-119s as they lumbered slowly down the runway, it was, on our first C-130 jump, a thrill to hear the roar of the plane's four engines as it surged forward, rose quickly, and, it seemed, reached jump altitude before it was clear of the runway. As we prepared to jump and I looked down the stick, I could see the elation on the faces of the 201 staff. If we had to go, we would at least go first class.

### 3. Colonel Carlson's Account

As Col. Gerald Carlson was then a captain in HQ Company of the 187th, he must have gotten the story about me searching the files secondhand and a pretty unreliable secondhand at that. If I had waited until after the alert to form my headquarters and robbed the 24th Division of its best personnel in the process, I should have been relieved on the spot and reduced at least one grade.

### 4. President Chamoun's Palace Guard

Chamoun did not fear an external as much as he did an internal attempt on his life by members of the Palace Guard, which was part Arab and part Christian. First the Marines, and then we, maintained a platoon at the U.S. Ambassador's compound to rush to the palace in event the Guard started something. It

was always questionable in my mind if we could have gotten there in time.

#### 5. Marine Modus Operandi

I have abiding respect for the fighting verve of Marines, but based on association with them in WWII, Korea, and Lebanon, they seem to believe that there is some merit in making life less comfortable than it needs to be. When I sought out the CP of the Marine battalion near the airport on the first day, I found it consisted of a radio, a map tacked to a piece of cardboard leaning against a tree, and indications of C rations having been cooked over an open fire.

One of their companies was disposed tactically on a completely barren hill exposed all day to a searing sun and 100-degree heat. Another company was spread out in the sand dunes north of the airport. In the port area, the Marines seemed to be living amidst the dirt and debris. When we relieved them on the hilltop, we withdrew the company to a nearby shaded area, constructed a few covered bunkers on the hill for daytime observation, and reinforced the hill only at night. In the sand dune area we built two observation towers that covered the entire area completely and again only reinforced the position at night. At the port we set up GP tents on wooden frames and enforced the same strict rules of cleanliness and sanitation that we did throughout the command. In the current embroglio [the Marine peacekeeping force in Lebanon] I was disappointed to read in the Miami Herald that after one month the Marines were still on C rations, but I was not surprised. I certainly don't believe in coddling the troops, but their energy should be conserved for the time when they will really need it.

#### 6. To Bake or Not to Bake

I was criticized for including a bakery platoon on the troop list. In Sixth Army in the Southwest Pacific during World War II the troops didn't have much, but General Walter Krueger insisted that they have fresh bread whenever possible, even dropping it by light aircraft on occasion. The policy was popular then and it was also in Lebanon. The only drawback was that the platoon was located close to our CP and late at night the aroma of freshly baked bread would come wafting through the camp and make us all very hungry.

#### 7. Admiral Holloway and the JCS

One day I walked in on Admiral Holloway to find him sputtering. He said, "Do you know what I just told the JCS? I

am sixty-years old, I have thirty-five years of service, I have a physical infirmity that will allow me to retire tomorrow, and I will do it if you don't leave me alone and let me do my job."

This is a chronic failing of high command, I am afraid. At the time of the Dominican Republic action, the alert procedure was from the JCS to Strike Command to XVIII Airborne Corps to 82d Airborne Division with a parallel alert channel from DA to CONARC to HQ, Ft. Bragg. This alert process was quite detailed and called for specific actions at each level. So what happened? Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, called Maj. Gen. Robert York, CG of the 82d Airborne Division, direct. He may have saved five minutes, but he caused so much conflict in instructions that it took hours to straighten out. Unfortunately, I was in Puerto Rico at the time on leave. I had served under General Wheeler in a rifle company, in the Plans Division of the DA, and in the JCS. If I had been in my office at CONARC, I hope I would have called General Wheeler and said, "For God's sake, Buzz, get back in channels." At least I would have called him.

#### 8. Power of the Press

When the Press is divided on an issue, their influence is diffused, but when they are united, their power is overwhelming. I learned this in Korea. Just before Gen. James A. Van Fleet was to return to the U.S., a lot of bad publicity developed over an unfortunate action called "Operation SMACK." General Van Fleet was very popular with the reporters and realizing that the bad publicity could hurt him, they joined together not only to erase completely the bad publicity, but to cast the operation in a favorable light. They accomplished this in a matter of days. I might add that General Van Fleet had nothing to do with this action by the press.

#### 9. You Can't Win Them All

I thought that our troops on their PT runs through the villages and towns in our vicinity would impress the populace with energy, discipline, and physical condition. It may have done that, but the word soon got back to me that the local inhabitants didn't particularly appreciate being awakened at 0500 every morning to the sound of pounding feet and the airborne chant. We kept running, but we did eliminate the chant.

#### 10. Initiative

Early in the operation I made a casual remark that if the situation remained stable we might want to establish a small

Officers' Club. My assistant S-1, a Captain Holmes, and my assistant S-4 overheard and immediately arranged to have a very large supply of liquor sent down from the 24th Division Officers' Club in Augsburg, mixed in with the Charlie lift. With more serious consideration I vetoed the idea, and Captain Holmes was stuck with a tent full of very pilferable whiskey and gentle nudges from the 24th Division to pay for it. At this point Holmes and the S-4 decided that they had better tell me what they had done. Fortunately, Captain Holmes learned that the embassy's liquor store was running short due to the port being closed, and the whiskey was sold to the store at a considerable profit which enabled the 24th Division to bring their club out of the red just in time to avoid a 7th Army audit.

Lesson: Beware of casual remarks before staff officers, especially airborne staff officers. They'll take the ball and run with it.

#### 11. Discipline

When we returned to Germany, General Cooper and General Speidel remarked that what they noticed most was that the men not only looked sharp, but when a leader gave an order the troops jumped. General Watlington, who visited us from EUCOM, wrote, "It was certainly a pleasure to see what you've done with your command. I'm glad you weren't turned loose in Germany while I was there." When he commanded the 8th Division, it had the best overall record in Germany, so from him this was high praise, indeed. I attribute what was accomplished in large part to the continuous close contact between leaders and the led. In our headquarters, my staff lived in tents next to mine. Throughout the command, the platoon leader's pup tent was at one end of the line, the platoon sergeant's at the other. Whatever the reasons for doing it, modern barracks with small rooms have lost to the Army this very valuable disciplinary tool available when troops live together as a tactical unit. For this reason commanders should periodically conduct individual and unit training from tent camps pitched in the field. This one action alone would do more for cohesion than the fancy theories now being advanced on this important subject.

#### 12. Khaki Clothing

For reasons of simplicity, clothing items in the "B" bag were all combat type with no dress uniforms. General Adams coaxed General Hodes, at considerable expense to USAREUR, into sending two sets of the tropical khaki uniform for each soldier for wear on pass in Beirut. This apparently stuck in General Hodes' craw, because when he attended a TF 201 parade at Augsburg he spent

more time on the reviewing stand scolding me about the khaki uniforms than he did reviewing the troops. Perhaps we were wrong, but then if we had stayed through the winter, we should have brought winter gear, too. My view is that the "B" bag should be kept light and additional items furnished through supply channels as the situation dictates.

### 13. Mountain Training

As one phase of our training program I asked that a course in mountain training be set up. What I had in mind was training for mountain fighting of the kind experienced in Italy and Korea, where a regiment sometimes advanced on a one-squad front. What I got was plain old Ranger training with a dash of Recondo thrown in. There was rappelling, hand-to-hand combat, the death slide, the works. The training was set up among some palisades that rose from the beach along the ocean road into Beirut. The soldiers liked it. It was very well conducted and the general populace who could watch it from the road above seemed to enjoy it most of all, so I didn't interfere. I erred in assuming that the term "mountain training" was generally understood, but I have always been disturbed by the tendency to substitute training in ancillary, more exotic skills that have only occasional application in large-scale intense combat for the much more basic and tougher everyday skills of the combat soldier.

### 14. Squad Tactics

The first time we tried to practice squad tactics, the soldiers, to our surprise, ended up with torn shirts and trousers and blood all over the place. Upon investigating we found that the terrain was covered with a small thorny bush that punished anyone who fell upon it. Consequently, we instructed the soldiers to not flop down as they would normally when they rushed, but to crouch down behind the outcroppings of rock, which were just as numerous as the thorn bushes.

I believe more emphasis should be placed on studying tactical techniques that may be required under varying circumstances. In Lebanon we had flat terrain with high straw grass, rocky, hilly terrain with the thorns, high mountains and desert, yet in our planning we gave no consideration to the effect these conditions might have on the tactics employed.

Our airborne training in Lebanon is a case in point. When we initiated jump training we did so in the large sand dune area that extended from the airfield north toward Beirut. From the air and from casual observation from the ground, the area appeared to be quite flat. Much to our surprise upon landing, we

found that it was not flat at all, but a series of undulations that formed a pattern of fairly small swales and depressions often twenty to thirty feet deep. I had issued a reminder for everyone to follow standard procedure and run from the drop zone, an order I was soon to regret. The sand was extremely loose, providing little traction, the temperature was in the nineties, and by the time I floundered from one depression to another to reach the assembly area, I was as close as I ever want to be to complete exhaustion, even though I had thought I was in fairly good physical condition. Stretched out on the ground gasping for breath and with my blood pounding, I jokingly told my aide that if I didn't make it, he was to tell my executive officer, a Lieutenant Colonel Knox, that my dying wish was for him to rescind that stupid order. What we actually did was to modify the instructions to run only when skylined on a crest, when in the depressions, one was in complete defilade from all directions. We also learned that had we actually jumped tactically into that same area according to our plan, we would have had one devil of a time getting our vehicles and supplies off the drop zone, as only tracked vehicles would have been able to negotiate that sand. Had we known this we could have included in TF Alpha several of our light air-droppable bulldozers from our engineer company.

In World War II, the 7th Division was completely unprepared for the tundra it encountered on Attica, and the Alaskan troops had to bail them out. Also, our troops sat on their rear ends for months in England, and no one thought beforehand to devise special tactics for the boage country in France.

I have never understood why at Army HQ level there should be a Tank Section, an Artillery Section, and Engineer Section, but no Infantry Section. When I was the Operations Officer of the G-3 Section, Eighth Army, during the Korean War, I created an Infantry Branch within my Operations Section, and it proved extremely useful.

#### 15. The Red Cross

Some enterprising staff officer had the foresight to include in TF Charlie a Red Cross Detachment complete with a large amount of expendable supplies. This was a godsend. Until we could get a PX supply line set up, this was our only source for convenience items, toilet articles, stationery, etc. The Red Cross representative was literally a one-man gang and worked his tail off. No self-respecting contingency operation should be without one early on.

## 16. Local Enterprise

In a matter of days, almost spontaneously it seemed, a small group of tradesmen set up shop on the fringe of each unit area. Usually there would be a barber, a shoe shine boy, a family collecting laundry and repairing clothing, and someone collecting films to be processed, selling stationery, etc. These people were polite, friendly, and scrupulously honest. Outside our CP area, the service included a booth where orders for merchandise from a Beirut department store could be ordered using catalogues. As a matter of control, we decided to issue permits to all these entrepreneurs, as we did with all the local people we hired. To discourage proliferation, we decided to charge a fee for these permits, but we could only do this if we had a properly established unit fund, and all unit funds were supposed to have been turned in before we left Germany. As luck would have it, one unit, Troop C, 17th Cavalry, had failed to do so. After we started issuing permits, these tradespeople showed me noticeably more deference. They figured I was now getting my cut, which is an ancient and honorable custom in the Middle East. The money was used to buy various items for the soldiers not available through Army supply channels. Specifically, I recall books on the history of Lebanon for I & E classes, horseshoes for a competition, and a bass fiddle for our hillbilly band.

## 17. Special Services

After the dust settled a little, one of our main concerns was to maintain high morale and prevent the soldiers from getting bored, because that is when they start looking for some kind of trouble to get into. To prevent this we organized an extensive extracurricular program. Classes were given in the history and culture of Lebanon. A group of Christian monks volunteered to assist in the program, and they turned out to be quite popular with the troops. Athletics, geared to our dispersed situation, were set up--mainly horseshoes and volley ball. A swimming beach was established on the ocean, and arrangements made for use of a privately run beach as well. A softball diamond was set up near our CP and games scheduled between our units and the crews of Navy ships. After the game the sailors ate with our troops and later our men visited the Navy ships.

I mentioned at a Commanders' meeting that I would like to organize a country music band and a barber shop quartet. An hour or so later, the Tank Battalion Commander told me there was no need to organize a band, as he had one, and rather sheepishly admitted that its members had smuggled aboard ship all the instruments except a bass fiddle. These two groups visited units each evening for impromptu concerts and sing alongs.

In addition General Adams set up an afternoon pass program and also a two-day stay at a hotel free of charge. He also arranged a joint Army-Marine exercise near Byblos, after which the troops were given a guided tour through this ancient city. In September a Soldier Skills Competition, involving both soldiers and Marines, was held in the sports stadium. This generated intense competition, not only in the finals but in the preliminary eliminations as well.

#### 18. The American Colony

Of extensive assistance to us in the program just described were Americans residing in Lebanon. How this all got started I'm not entirely sure. From the beginning they seemed to take an interest in our activities and began inviting us to meetings and gatherings of various kinds. Although time consuming, I attended these and took every opportunity to explain our mission and how we were carrying it out. We invited them to visit our camps and to attend some of our activities, such as a nighttime fire power demonstration given for the Lebanese Army and a rifle company parachute jump. In turn, the resident Americans reciprocated in every way they could.

An official of the Top Line Oil Company established a Service Club in Top Line's own Community Center in Beirut. It was staffed by women volunteers, mainly wives, embassy secretaries and high school students; it offered snacks, music, entertainment of some kind, and a place to just relax, talk, write letters, play cards, etc. The club succeeded beyond highest expectations.

Some of the women also asked if they could bake cakes and cookies and distribute them to the soldiers in their bivouacs and on position. I called them our "cooky pushers" and often lifted them by chopper to the less accessible positions.

On one occasion I mentioned to an oil company executive that my biggest logistic problem at the moment was getting horseshoes for our competition. He offered to have them bought in New York and flown out to us on a company plane due back in a few days. We got the shoes in due course, but the story doesn't end there. Several days later on a visit to the Service Club, a young lady confronted me with the startling statement, "I've got a bone to pick with you." As a secretary at the Top Line Oil Company, she was one of two who were authorized to decode confidential messages. One night she was called at 0200 and told to come to the office to decode a message. Not too happy about that, she was less happy when she read the message: "General Gray's horseshoes arriving Beirut on Flight 416." Her first thought was to call me and get me up, too, but after cooling down a bit she decided to ask me in person, "What in heaven's name do you want with horseshoes?" As I was explaining it to her, the recreation

director for the oil company overheard me and said, "I wish I had known you wanted them. I have a warehouse full of horseshoe pitching kits." It seems someone got the bright idea of distributing these kits at pipeline stations in the desert. It was a complete bust. The only horseshoes the Arabs were interested in were those on a horse.

At another time I mentioned our need for a bass fiddle. The news traveled fast. The next morning I got a call from a lady who said, "I understand you need a cello. I'll ask around in musical circles and get back to you." A few hours later she had not only located a cello but had persuaded the owner to open his store, which he had closed when the trouble started. To be sure, it was rather old and with the hard usage it got, kept falling apart and had to be glued back together. But it served its purpose very well.

To show appreciation before our departure, General Adams had a reception for the members of the American community who had helped us and awarded each a Certificate of Appreciation. We also presented 24th Airborne Brigade certificates to those who had been of particular assistance to us.

#### 19. The 201st Logistical Command

A pleasant surprise was the functioning of the 201st Logistical Command. It was, like our headquarters, an ad hoc organization, yet, despite a tragic bus accident in France, it joined us in part at Adana, landed with us in Lebanon at a dead run, and never stopped running thereafter. As is true in every organization, the speed with which it settled into its job was due in large part to its commander, Col. Adam Meetze, who performed every aspect of his job in an absolutely outstanding manner.

Some critics, including Hansen Baldwin of the New York Times, believed that our logistical tail was too large. Overlooked was the fact that it takes an irreducible number of units by type to provide all the logistics functions for even a minimum combat force. Also overlooked was the very substantial support the Army provided the Marines and to some extent the Navy. I believe we did err in one respect. Instead of a construction battalion we should have had a provisional company specially tailored to meet our specific needs. Truthfully, I was flabbergasted as I watched the parade of heavy equipment, rock crushers, steamrollers, asphalt dispensers, cranes, you name it, that rolled off ship in a seemingly endless stream. Under the circumstances we didn't need it and had difficulty finding a place to park it. Of course, if we had stayed through the rainy season, more permanent installations would have been necessary and the construction battalion would have gotten a workout, but even so I believe our

engineer combat battalion plus a provisional construction company and our airborne engineer company augmented by local labor would have been adequate. As an amphibious planner in WW II, I knew that a construction battalion was one big outfit, that it took sixteen LST's to move it, and I should have put this knowledge to use. That I didn't was my mistake.

I must say that I am surprised that USAREUR did not question the deployment as there were only a few of these battalions in Europe and an overabundance of projects assigned to them.

## GLOSSARY

AF:	Air Force
AG:	Adjutant General
AMLANFOR:	American Land Forces
APC:	Armored Personnel Carrier
AWOL:	Absent Without Leave
BOQ:	Bachelor Officers' Quarters
CALSU:	Combat Airlift Support Unit
CASF:	Composite Air Strike Force
CINCLANT:	Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic
CINCNELM:	Commander-in-Chief, Naval Element, Mediterranean
CINCSPECOMME:	Commander-in-Chief, Specified Command, Middle East
CINCUSAFE:	Commander-in-Chief, United States Air Force Europe
COMAIRSPECOMME:	Commander, U.S. Air Forces, Specified Command, Middle East
COMAMLANFOR:	Commander, American Land Forces
COMNAVSPECOMME:	Commander, Naval Forces, Specified Command, Middle East
CONUS:	Continental United States
CONARC:	Continental Army Command
C/S:	Chief of Staff
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CG:	Commanding General
COMMZ:	Communications Zone
CP:	Command Post
CPX:	Command Post Exercise
DA:	Department of the Army
DACG:	Departure Airfield Control Group
DCSOPS:	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
DR:	Delinquent Report
DZ:	Drop Zone
E-DAY:	The day on which plans become orders
EUCOM:	European Command
G.O.:	General Order
HQ:	Headquarters
JCS:	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MATS:	Military Air Transportation Service
MSTS:	Military Sea Transportation Service
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO:	Noncommissioned Officer
NELM:	Naval Element Mediterranean
PIO:	Public Information Officer
PR:	Personal Reconnaissance
PT:	Physical Training
QM:	Quartermaster
ROCID	Reorganization of Current Infantry Divisions
ROTAD:	Reorganization of the Airborne Division
SETAF:	Southern European Task Force

SPECOMME: Specified Command, Middle East  
S.O.: Special Order  
STRAC: Strategic Army Corps  
SAC: Strategic Air Command  
TF: Task Force  
TOC: Tactical Operations Center  
USAREUR: United States Army Europe  
USIA: United States Information Agency

## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David Warren Gray was born in Evansville, Indiana, on 1 March 1911. After serving in the CMTC, the National Guard, and the ROTC at Purdue University he received an appointment from Indiana to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1933. His early Army service included attending the Regular Course of the Infantry School in 1937 and the Regular Course of the Tank School in 1938. From 1938 to 1942 he was an instructor in the Department of Drawing at West Point. From 1942 to January, 1944, he served in the Officers' Assignments Branch, G-1 Section of the Army Ground Forces Headquarters in Washington, D.C. He attended the abbreviated General Staff Course at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth from January through May, 1944, and the Army and Navy Staff College in Washington from May through September, 1944.

Gray's next posting was to the Southwest Pacific as Executive Officer of the G-3 Section of 6th Army Headquarters from 1944 to 1946. He served in New Guinea, the Philippines, and Japan and received the Bronze Star for that service. He continued his tour in Japan through early May of 1947 with the 24th Infantry Division and 8th Army Headquarters. From 1947 to 1951 he was Associate Professor in the Department of Military Topography and Graphics at West Point; he attended the Army War College in 1951-52.

Gray served as Operations Officer, Headquarters 8th Army; Commanding Officer, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Division; and then as G-3, Headquarters, X Corps, during and after the Korean War and received the Silver Star and two Legion of Merit awards. During the latter half of the 1950s he was Chief of Operations, Department of the Army, Assistant Division Commander, 11th Airborne Division, and Commanding General of the 24th Airborne Brigade during the 1958 intervention in Lebanon. For his service in Lebanon, he received his third Legion of Merit. From 1960 to 1963 General Gray served with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He returned to Korea in 1963 for a two-year tour as Commanding General of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1964 he was assigned to Headquarters, Continental Army Command, eventually serving as Chief of Staff and Deputy Commanding General and earning the Distinguished Service Medal. Major General Gray retired in 1968 and now resides in Golden Beach, Florida.

