




NEWSLETTER



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Complex Operations II



Observations, Insights, and Lessons

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Foreword

This newsletter focuses on a comprehensive approach to integrated civilian-military command and control (C2) and staff integration in complex operations. Interagency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and several other locations have revealed the requirement to address complex conflicts requiring a high level of civilian-military integrated coordination. Civilian-military integrated staffs and C2 architectures provide the frameworks to design, develop, and build C2 systems capable of greatly increasing the effectiveness of complex operations.

The articles included in this newsletter illustrate a number of important initiatives designed to build the capacities to respond to complex operations. The integrated approach seeks to make order out of the diverse inter-institutional relationships that develop and also seeks to capitalize on the clear opportunities provided by collaboration. The need to develop a comprehensive approach by working together with other agencies will be fundamental in promoting unity of effort.

New initiatives such as the “special skills initiative” and a management tool such as the “tactical conflict assessment planning framework” are a few of the concepts and programs that have been identified. Continuous development and implementation of initiatives such as these will contribute to a coherent response to complex conflicts.

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Introduction

Command and control (C2) is not just confined to the military organization. The interaction of the interagency functions and military operations may be seen as a complex C2 process. This newsletter introduces the concept that the issue of C2 and civilian-military integration is of vital importance and not about purely military processes and structures. Stabilization and reconstruction operations campaigns have proven immensely complex and complicated.

Several positive steps have been taken to improve the U.S. government's ability to conduct complex operations, but there are many challenges in developing capabilities and measures of effectiveness, integrating the contributions of civilian into military contingency plans, and incorporating lessons learned from past operations into future plans. These challenges, if not addressed, may hinder the U.S. government's ability to fully coordinate and integrate stabilization and reconstruction activities with all agencies or to develop the full range of capabilities those operations may require.

The implementation of whole-of-government policies and procedures with the planning construct and the joint operating concept will contribute to a greater focus on stability operations in developing plans to improve capabilities. Inadequate guidance and practices that inhibit sharing of planning information will reduce the effectiveness of the mission.

Approach to “Whole of Government” Continuity, Civilian-Military Staff Integration for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, and Specialty Skills Initiative

Robert McDonald, CALL Liaison Officer to the Center for Complex Operations

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“One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win; economic development, institution building and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.”

—Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates

Efforts to achieve an effective integration of interagency capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction missions have been limited at best. There is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Civilian and military cooperation and collaboration are not sufficient in today’s complex environment. The change in paradigm is to focus on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when required to engage in stability operations. While the military may have led the initial phases, all stakeholders involved now realize that civilians must take a leading role in these missions.

Strategic Context

The leaders of our government have set the strategic context for the whole-of-government approach to future conflict that fully integrates civilian and military operations. The quotes below give some important thoughts that emphasize this requirement.

“The Army must create horizontal ‘grassroots’ links that can build habitual links and foster relationships between civilian and Army SSTR [stability, security, transition, and reconstruction]-related planners and organizations.” Source: RAND Corporation study, *Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations*, 2009

“We must significantly modify organizational structures to achieve better unity of effort. ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] cannot succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts... ISAF will welcome the integration of new civilian funding streams, but must be willing to make up the difference using military funding as necessary.” Source: GEN McChrystal’s Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009

“[Sec. Clinton] was enormously proud of this integrated civilian-military process. We all talk about civ–mil integration, and the bottom line on it is the closer you get to the battlefield, the closer the integration. And at the province level and

the district level, it is really remarkable...” Source: U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, *Special Report on Secretary of State Clinton’s Recent Visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan*, 23 November 2009

To effectively strengthen our interagency skills, the Army requires an initiative that maximizes training, cooperation, integration, and relationships between military and civilian counterparts.

Specialty Skills Initiative

The specialty skills initiative (SSI) is a “grassroots” initiative under the Department of Defense’s Campaign Continuity to create an interagency pilot program within an Army division headquarters at home station to better prepare units to perform stability operations in theater. Recognizing the need to improve the execution of stability operations in Afghanistan through an interagency structure, “civilian platforms” have been established in Regional Command (RC)–East and RC–South to improve critical components of stability operations, such as democracy/governance, agriculture, economic development, rule of law, and other development sectors.

Civilian platforms in RC–West and RC–North are also currently being staffed. These platforms strengthen civilian–military relations by improving communication and coordination, thereby promoting unity of effort. A corresponding interagency stability operations structure (i.e., SSI at home stations during dwell time [time between deployments]), will facilitate improvement of collective, interagency effectiveness. In doing so, units will be better prepared to deploy to Afghanistan, fortifying the U.S. government’s continuity of effort. The following desired effect and benefits are consistent with the SSI concept:

- Desired effect: Interagency specialty skills personnel are embedded into division headquarters while at home station, during training, and through deployment (quantity and specialty).
- Benefits:
 - Improves interagency approach to stability operations prior to deployment.
 - Builds interagency relationships and understanding during train-up.
 - Improves interagency planning process and synchronizations.
 - Builds division staff and teamwork early.
 - Integrates all interagency approach of stability operations into training, command post exercises, and mission rehearsal exercises.
 - Furthers the concept of “continuity” by rotating interagency expertise through Campaign Continuity divisions.

In December 2009, an SSI conceptual framing session was conducted with the other agencies that have a vested interest in and knowledge of SSI to brainstorm how SSI could be structured and implemented. Specifically, the purpose of the framing session was to develop specific aspects of the initiative such as the composition of the SSI team and pilot structure, command and

control (coordination and collaboration), and training requirements. This initial framing session did not cover detailed aspects of funding or manning these requirements, as those topics will be addressed as the pilot develops.

The SSI attempts to address complex, wide-ranging, and long-standing issues. The SSI is building on progress being made in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to better integrate interagency efforts to improve effectiveness in stability operations. The SSI does this by creating a pilot program to assess the training and organizational changes that should take place in the United States to support, facilitate, and improve interagency progress in theater. The SSI is not a militarization of development but rather an opportunity to improve our nation's partnership in stability operations.

As a result, 10th Mountain Division's upcoming deployment was chosen as a vehicle to further this partnership. Ultimately, this type of partnership should become "a way of doing business" for military and governmental (and nongovernmental) organizations in the future.

The 10th Mountain Division has conducted an assessment of stability operations training, structure, and processes to determine what needs to be improved under the umbrella of the SSI. The division established an SSI working group with periodic back briefs to organizational leadership and steering committees. At the publishing of this article, the division is developing plans to conduct the training, integration, structure, processes, and relationship-building of interagency personnel who will train and deploy with the division. This phase runs the length of the deployment. Periodic assessments will be conducted to refine and improve follow-on iterations of the SSI with other deployments.


(Note: This article was compiled from notes and discussions with COL John D. Sims, Fire Support Coordination Officer, 10th Mountain Division.)

Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework

U.S. Agency for International Development

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To increase the effectiveness of stability operations, the Office of Military Affairs–U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) created the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF). The TCAPF was designed to assist civilian and military personnel in identifying the root causes of instability, developing activities to mitigate the causes, and evaluating the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability at the tactical level (provincial or local). The TCAPF should be used to create local stabilization plans and provide data for the international conflict assessment framework, which has a strategic and operational-level (country or regional) focus.



Legend:

ANSF: Afghanistan National Security Forces
 ASF: Army Special Forces
 DOD: Department of Defense
 GIRoA: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

IED: Improvised explosive device
 ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
 NGO: Nongovernmental organization

Figure 2-1

Conceptual Framework

Various U.S. government entities involved in stability operations have different perspectives on fostering stability. For example, in Afghanistan, USAID focuses primarily on long-term development. Typical metrics include number of children attending school, amount of roads built, percentage of the population with access to health care, and so on. The Department of Defense (DOD) is primarily focused on combat operations. The DOD's typical metrics include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), troops in contact, number of security forces, and number of insurgents killed. However, none of these metrics tell us whether an area is more or less stable. Since the population is the center of gravity in stability operations, planning and metrics must be focused on the population's view of the situation. The TCAPF helps provide a common understanding of the causes of instability in an area and our effectiveness in mitigating them.

The TCAPF is based on the following four premises:

- Instability results when factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the society or government to mitigate them.
- Assessment of the local environment is necessary for effective targeting and strategic planning.
- The population's perceptions must be included when identifying causes of instability.
- Measures of effectiveness are the only true measures of success.

Instability

Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the host nation to mitigate them (see Figure 2-2). To understand if there is instability or determine the risk of instability, the following factors must be identified:

- Grievances.
- Key actors.
- Events — windows of vulnerability.

Grievances are factors that can foster instability. They are the result of unmet expectations or the perception that individual or group interests are being threatened. Examples include ethnic or religious tensions, political repression, population pressures, or competition over natural resources. Grievances by themselves do not lead to instability. One billion people earn less than \$1 a day. Are they frustrated? Perhaps. Do they all pick up weapons and foster violence? No. Why? Because either they do not have the means to turn their frustrations into violence, or the key actors (government or societal) can mitigate them.

Key actors are people or groups with the means and motivation to transform grievances into instability. In general, these actors gain power or wealth from instability. Drug smugglers or arms traffickers are actors who benefit from instability. Transforming grievances into widespread violence requires a dedicated leadership, organizational capacity, money, and weapons. If key actors lack these resources, they will not be able to foster widespread instability.




Figure 2-2. Instability dynamics

Even when grievances and key actors are present, widespread instability is unlikely unless an **event** links grievances to the key actors. Events are neutral — they simply occur. How they are prepared for or responded to determines whether an event (e.g., military operations, natural disaster, the death of a key leader, economic shocks, or religious holidays) will become a window of vulnerability or opportunity. As an illustration, an election can foster stability or instability. If an election is perceived as fraudulent, it will foster instability.

Even if grievances, key actors, and events exist, instability is not inevitable. For each of these factors, there are parallel mitigating forces:

- Resiliencies.
- Key actors.
- Events—windows of opportunity.

Resiliencies are societal or governmental capacities that can mitigate the population's grievances. Examples include community organizations, an open political process, and/or accessible and legitimate judicial systems.

Key actors are people or groups with the means and motivation to mitigate grievances and foster stability. Just as certain key actors benefit from instability, other actors benefit from stability. An example could be a local imam mediating a land dispute between two tribes.

Events can turn into windows of opportunity if prepared for and/or handled correctly. For example, the tsunami in Indonesia changed the relationship between insurgents and the Indonesian government. The international community pressured both parties to work together to provide relief to the population. This cooperation led to a peace agreement that ended a 30-year insurgency.

While understanding these factors is crucial to understanding stability, they do not exist in a vacuum. Their presence or absence must be understood within the context of the local environment. Examples include geography, demography, natural resources, history, and regional or international factors. These factors do not necessarily cause instability, but they can contribute to grievances or provide the means to foster instability. As an illustration, although poverty does not foster conflict, poverty linked to illegitimate government institutions, a growing gap between rich and poor, and access to a global arms market can combine to foster instability. In summary, instability occurs when the causes of instability overwhelm societal or governmental ability to mitigate them.

Assessment

Effective stability operations require identifying and prioritizing local sources of instability and stability. This means we have to differentiate between needs, priority grievances, and sources of instability.

A **need** is something that would improve the level of human development. Since most stability operations occur in less developed countries, there will always be a long list of needs. Examples include potable water, educational opportunities, access to health care, infrastructure, security, and justice.

A **priority grievance** is an issue a significant percentage of locals — not outside experts — identify as a priority for their community. Examples include potable water, educational opportunities, access to health care, infrastructure, security, and justice. Needs can be the same as priority grievances. The distinctions are (1) a matter of who identifies the issue — the population, because it is a real concern for them or an outside “expert” who assesses the situation based on common development models; and (2) whether a significant percentage of the population identifies the issue as a priority.

Sources of instability are usually a small subset of priority grievances. They are sources of instability because they directly undermine support for the government, increase support for spoilers, or disrupt the normal functioning of society. Examples:

- A conflict between two tribes, with one tribe allying itself with insurgents because the rival tribe controls the local government.
- Insurgents taking advantage of a priority grievance (land conflicts) to gain/expand influence in the community by convening a *sharia* court to resolve them.

The TCAPF identifies sources of instability through a process that combines four streams of information—operational, cultural, instability dynamics, and local perceptions. Analysis often

reveals that the actual sphere of influence is one or more steps removed from a grievance cited by the community. For example, in one case, locals cited water as a problem, but analysis identified the underlying source of instability as competition between two tribes over a well. In summary, the goal of stability operations is to identify and target the sources of instability (i.e., the issues that undermine support for the government, increase support for spoilers, and disrupt the normal functioning of society). After an area is stable, needs and priority grievances can be addressed through traditional development assistance.

Needs Versus Priority Grievances Versus Sources of Instability
Needs: Things required to improve the level of human development (e.g., health care, education, infrastructure, and security).
Priority grievance: An issue a significant percentage of locals — not outside experts — identify as a priority for their community (e.g., health care, education, infrastructure, and security).
Sources of instability: Issues locals identify that undermine government support, increase support for spoilers, and/or disrupt the normal functions of society (e.g., spoilers manipulate/settle blood feud and corrupt police shakedown of locals).

Figure 2-3

Another key part of assessment is understanding the differences between symptoms and causes. Too often activities target symptoms of instability rather than targeting the underlying causes. While there is always a strong temptation to “do something” or achieve quick results, this is often counterproductive, as activities either satisfy a superficial request or even contribute to increasing instability.

For example, an assessment team in Afghanistan identified a “need” to reopen a local school. The team believed addressing this need would increase support for the government and decrease support for the Taliban. The day after international forces reopened the school, the Taliban sent the teacher a night letter that threatened his life. He left, which forced the school to close. A subsequent investigation revealed anti-government sentiment among the local population because the police tasked with providing security for the school was from another area. The police had established a checkpoint on the road into the village and were demanding bribes from people entering the village. The local populace perceived the school — and the police the government sent to protect it — as the source of instability. Instead of increasing government support by reopening the school, the project increased support for the Taliban. While the assessment team identified a need to reopen the school, it did not identify the source of instability in the area. Thus, the project not only increased instability, it also wasted limited resources, decreased government support, and increased support for the enemy.

The Population

Since counterinsurgency and stability operations are population-centric, popular perceptions must be systematically collected and incorporated into planning and operations. The TCAPF survey uses four simple, standardized questions, which are discussed in the “Collection” section on page 13 to gather popular perceptions.

Measures of effectiveness

The only way to measure whether an area is becoming more or less stable is to use standardized impact indicators. Also called “measures of effect,” impact indicators measure the effectiveness of activities against a predetermined objective. To identify impact indicators, ask yourself, “How will I know if the objective has been achieved?” Impact indicators are very different from output measures. Also called “measures of performance,” output indicators simply determine if an activity has been implemented. To identify output indicators, ask yourself, “How can I confirm the activity is being implemented or completed?” Impact indicators should be simple, accurate, practical, and not too resource-intensive to collect. The TCAPF uses the following indicators to measure stability:

- **Civilian night road movement**

Rationale: Jingle truck drivers dominate the roads at night. Since their vehicles are usually the source of their livelihoods, they will not knowingly risk moving at night if there is a high risk of IEDs, robbery, etc. Therefore, traffic movement at night suggests the area is stable.

Information sources: Intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance assets and patrol reports.

- **Government legitimacy**

Rationale: If people believe the government is trying to address their concerns, they will be more likely to support the government and not support the insurgents. The population’s support of the government decreases the likelihood insurgents will be in an area, suggesting the area is stable.

Information source: TCAPF Question #3 (see “Collection” section on page 13) — “Who do you believe can solve your problems?”

- **Public security concerns**

Rationale: If people perceive security to be acceptable, this suggests the area is stable.

Information source: TCAPF Question #4 — “What should be done first to help the village?”

- **Population movement because of insecurity**

Rationale: Since the only tangible asset for most people in developing countries is their land, they will leave it only if their lives are in danger. Therefore, limited population movement away from an area, or conversely people returning to their homes, suggests the area is stable.

Information source: TCAPF Question #1 — “Has the population of the village changed in the last year?”

- **Enemy-initiated attacks on Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)**

Rationale: The ANSF is easy to attack. If attacks decrease, this suggests there is less insurgent activity. Less insurgent activity suggests the area is more stable.

Information source: Intelligence.

- **Afghan civilian casualties**

Rationale: It does not matter if an Afghan civilian is killed by the ANSF, ISAF, or the Taliban. If Afghan civilians are dying from military engagements, this suggests the area is unstable.

Information source: Intelligence.

- **Intimidation of government officials (assassinations or night letters)**

Rationale: If government officials are assassinated or receiving night letters, this suggests insurgents have a significant presence in the area, making the area unstable.

Information source: Intelligence.

It is important to note that these indicators must be used together (i.e., they cannot be used in isolation, as various perspectives are required to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the stability situation). It is also worthwhile to note both subjective indicators (based on the population's perceptions) and objective indicators are included.

Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework Process

The TCAPF is an iterative process that focuses on the population as the center of gravity. Organizations using the TCAPF follow a continuous cycle of *see–understand–act–measure*. The TCAPF has four distinct but interrelated phases (see Figure 2-4):

- Collection.
- Analysis.
- Design.
- Evaluation.

Collection

Collecting information on the causes of instability in an operational area is a two-step process. The first step is gathering operational, cultural, and instability dynamics information. The second step is surveying the local population. The TCAPF survey has four questions:

- Has the population of the village changed in the last 12 months?
- What is the greatest problem facing the village?
- Who do you believe can solve this problem?
- What should be done first to help the village?

Has the population of the village changed in the last 12 months? This question is important because people in developing countries usually do not move unless there is a significant reason, as their livelihood and social connections are tied to the land. Moving away or coming back always indicates something significant.




Figure 2-4

What is the biggest problem facing the village? Giving the local populace a way to identify its grievances helps identify the sources of instability. This practice also lessens the likelihood that intervening forces will make incorrect assumptions about what is important to the population. (This question does not ask people what they “need” or “want.”)

Who do you believe can solve this problem? This question helps identify individuals or institutions the population believes can solve its problems. Responses may include the host-nation government, a local warlord, insurgents, international forces, or a religious leader. If these actors are pro-government, they can be used to help stabilize an area and develop messages in support of strategic communications activities. This question also provides an indication of the level of support for the host-nation government, a key component of stability.

What should be done first to help the village? This question encourages the local population to identify and prioritize its most important grievances. A key goal of the collection effort is to determine the relationship between symptoms and the underlying causes of instability. Too often we focus on the manifestations of a problem rather than the reasons for it. A case study illustrates this point. A unit in Afghanistan conducted an assessment that did not include the population’s perceptions. It identified the lack of security as the main cause of instability in an area. To remedy this situation, the unit helped place an additional detachment of local police in the area.

However, since the assessment failed to identify “why” the area was unstable, additional police did not improve stability. A TCAPF assessment revealed that the local police were the cause of the insecurity; the police routinely demanded bribes from the population and/or discriminated against members of other clans in the area. By addressing a symptom of the problem rather than the cause, the “solution” actually increased instability.

In addition to surveying all segments of the population, collectors should also survey key leaders (e.g., traditional leaders, government officials, business leaders, and prominent citizens). These surveys serve as a control mechanism. If the answers provided by key leaders match the responses from the local populace, it is likely the individual understands the causes of instability and can be useful in helping address the causes. However, if the answers do not match those of the rest of the population, these individuals may be either uninformed or part of the problem. The TCAPF survey information is entered into a formatted TCAPF Excel spreadsheet, which allows the information to be easily analyzed to identify and prioritize the most important grievances of the population (see Figure 2-5).




Figure 2-5. TCAPF survey data (priority grievances)

Analysis

The analysis phase of the TCAPF combines operational, cultural, and instability dynamics with local perceptions to identify and prioritize sources of instability.

- Operational environment: Information can be gathered with the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) and area, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) tools.

- Cultural environment: This is not simply a listing of the major tribes. The relationships between groups, their interests and values, traditional authorities and challengers to them, and how the insurgents may be leveraging those groups and relationships also need to be identified.
- Instability dynamics: These dynamics are societal grievances and resiliencies, the key actors with the means and motivations to foster or mitigate instability, and events that may give those actors opportunities to advance their agendas.
- Local perceptions: Without the local population's perspective, we will fall into the usual trap of imposing our own assumptions on the situation and spreading our efforts/resources across a wide range of potential grievances. Local perception data helps focus efforts on the population (the center of gravity) and what it thinks is important.

Combining all four streams of information helps to not only identify the population's priority grievances but also whether these grievances are a source of instability (i.e., are they decreasing support for the government, increasing support for spoilers, or interfering with the normal functioning of society). These are the issues upon which we want to focus our efforts.

Design

Having identified the sources of instability, the next step is to design activities to mitigate them. At a minimum, develop activities that measurably fulfill at least two of the following:

- Increase support for the government. We might come up with a great program, but if it is operated by USAID, it will not necessarily increase government support.
- Decrease support for individuals or groups fostering instability. For example, you might have an idea for cleaning irrigation channels, but if it is not an issue being exploited by anti-government forces, it is not a stabilization problem.
- Increase the capability and capacity of the local government and/or society to handle their own problems. This is crucial for the long-term exit strategy.

If a proposed activity meets these three stabilization fundamentals, then the next step is to refine the activity by applying the design principles. These principles are drawn from USAID's development principles. They include:

- Sustainability.
- Local ownership.
- Short- versus long-term results.
- Leverage/support other government activities, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and host-nation programs.
- Cultural and political acceptability.

- Strengthen government accountability and transparency.
- Flexibility.

To assist with the analysis and design phases, USAID uses the tactical stability matrix (see Figure 2-6). The matrix is simply a left-to-right process that helps ensure the source of instability being addressed is thought through before jumping to implementing activities. In brief, the columns of the tactical stability matrix and their purpose are:

- Source of instability: A “bumper sticker” title for the source of instability identified.
- Causes (perceptions): The population’s view of the cause of the instability. This information is taken directly from the TCAPF questionnaire as quotes or paraphrased statements from the local populace.
- Causes (systemic): The root problems or issues that may lie behind the population’s statements. This step helps ensure the sources of instability are addressed rather than their symptoms.
- Objective: A succinct statement of what USAID wants to achieve based on an analysis of the systemic causes of instability.
- Impact indicators: Measures of effect that tell whether the objective has been accomplished.
- Impact indicator data sources: Sources of information that track the impact indicators.
- Activities: Projects linked primarily to systemic causes. In some cases it may also be necessary to address symptoms (perceived causes), if only to help the population see near-term improvements in the situation.
- Output indicators: Measures of performance that track the implementation of activities and progress towards their completion.
- Output indicator data sources: Sources of information that help track the output indicators.

The tactical stability matrix and program activities should be the foundations for a local stabilization plan. They are nested within the higher headquarters plan and detail how specific stability tasks will be integrated and synchronized at the tactical level.

Tactical Stability Matrix									
		Analysis				Design			
Source of Instability	Causes (Perception)	Causes (Systemic)	Objective	Impact Indicators	Impact Indicators Data Sources	Activities	Output Indicators	Output Indicator Data Sources	
Lack of govt/ traditional conflict resolution mechanism	Taliban provides swift justice	Taliban justice is seen as fair	Foster conflict resolution mechanisms linked to govt	Increased # disputes resolved by govt recognized entities	TCAPF Questionnaire	Facilitate judicial pay system reform	Pay reforms enacted	Govt financial records	
	Judges support those who pay them the most	Justice officials are not paid in full/on time		Decreased # of disputes resolved by Taliban	Govt records	Establish a mobile dispute resolution unit	Mobile dispute unit establishment	Interviews	
	The elders can't solve our problems	Traditional conflict resolution structures are undermined		Decreased tribal violence	Public surveys	Patrol reports	Facilitate <i>jirgas</i>	# of <i>jirgas</i> held	Assessments
	There is no justice	Justice officials are not trusted		Decreased violence linked to land disputes	Interviews	Assessments	Link <i>jirgas</i> to government	# of <i>jirgas</i> with govt involvement	TCAPF surveys
							IO campaign	# IO radio spots	Patrol reports
							Radio		

Figure 2-6. Tactical stability matrix

Evaluation

The TCAPF provides a comprehensive process for evaluating the effectiveness of activities in diminishing the sources of instability and determining if stability in an area is increasing. Activities are evaluated at three levels:

- Measures of performance: Relate to the output indicators in the tactical stability matrix. These indicators track the progress of an activity and identify when the activity has been completed.
- Measures of effect: Relate to the impact indicators in the tactical stability matrix. These indicators help determine whether the activity achieved the desired effects. Responses to the TCAPF questionnaire are one potential indicator of effect. For example, if we are successful in addressing the targeted source of instability, we should expect to see fewer people citing this issue as their biggest problem in response to TCAPF Question #2.
- Overall stability: After a longer period of time, at least three months, the net effect of all activities should be measured to see if they have improved stability in the area of operations.

Evaluation is critical to measuring the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability and helps ensure the views of the population are tracked, compared, and measured over time.

Benefits of the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework Process

The TCAPF process helps overcome many of the challenges to successful stability operations by:

- Providing a common “sight picture” for various agencies and military units, enabling practitioners to focus resources on sources of instability.
- Measuring the impact of USAID activities.
- Improving their effectiveness through a focus on the center of gravity for counterinsurgency — the population.
- Empowering tactical units/stability teams by providing them with hard data that can be used for decision making at their levels and that can influence decisions made at higher levels. The process lets the tactical level drive operations as opposed to the typical top-down approach.
- Providing a simple and integrated assessment, planning, and decision-making process.
- Identifying strategic communications messages that actually resonate with the population. The best message is, “We understand your priority problems, and here is what we are doing to address those problems.”

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Capturing and implementing best practices and lessons learned are fundamental to adaptive organizations. This behavior is essential in stability operations, where the ability to learn and adapt is the difference between success or failure. The TCAPF leverages this ability to overcome the dynamics of the human dimension where uncertainty, chance, and friction are the norm. Examples of best practices and lessons learned through recent experiences include:

- Activities and projects must be part of a process to change behavior or perceptions.
- Indicators provide insight into the effectiveness of activities by determining whether program activities are effective.
- Measures of effectiveness must include popular perceptions.
- “Good deeds” cannot substitute for effectively targeted stability program activities.
- Activities should:
 - Focus on the underlying causes of instability.
 - Focus on crosscutting issues.
 - Identify and support key actors early to set the conditions for subsequent collaboration.

- Stability activities should not:
 - Mistake “good deeds” for effective action.
 - Address “needs or wants.”
 - Attempt to impose “Western” standards.
 - Focus on quantity over quality.

TCAPF Overview
<p>Implementation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. United Kingdom (UK) 52nd Brigade (BDE), Helmand, Afghanistan (2007)2. 4th BDE, 25th Infantry Division (ID), Regional Command (RC)–East, Afghanistan (2009–2010)3. U.S. Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary BDE–A, RC–South, Afghanistan (2009–2010)4. Elements of 4th BDE, 82nd Airborne Division, RC–East and RC–South (2009–2010)5. Elements of 5th BDE, 2nd ID, RC–South, Afghanistan (2009–2010)6. UK 11th BDE, Helmand, Afghanistan (2009–present)7. Counterinsurgency Academy, Kabul, Afghanistan (2009–present)8. USAID mission, field officers, and implementing partners, Afghanistan (2009–present)

Figure 2-7

Summary

The TCAPF has been successfully used in the field to identify the causes of instability, develop activities to mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability. Since the TCAPF measures the effectiveness of activities and stability across time and space, it is an important tool for conducting successful stability operations.

Sizing the Civilian Response Capacity for Complex Operations

Christel Fonzo-Eberhard and Richard L. Kugler

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A consensus is growing within interagency discourse that the U.S. Government needs to build an improved civilian response capacity for complex operations. How large should this capacity be in terms of manpower, and what missions and tasks should it be expected to perform? More fundamentally, how should the United States go about making calculated decisions in this arena? What analytical standard should it employ to size and design the civilian force to ensure that a proper mixture of skills is available? This chapter addresses these important questions in ways that can help suggest initial answers and set the stage for further analysis and planning. Subsequent chapters assess the kinds and qualities of civilian skills required.

Civilian response capacity force-sizing issues demand urgent attention, as complex operations have become more and more a function of U.S. foreign policy and national security strategy decision-making. Complex operations are those necessitating interagency responses that include not only military forces but also significant numbers of civilians who can perform a wide variety of missions and tasks. These operations can range from relatively small and temporary missions (for example, responding to natural disasters) to quite large and enduring presences (such as performing stabilization and reconstruction [S&R] operations) that could require hundreds or even thousands of civilian personnel for several years. Moreover, these operations do not necessarily occur one at a time. Today, for example, the United States is performing major S&R operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has deployed about 3,000 military and civilian personnel to staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In these teams, military personnel often are assigned tasks better suited to civilians.

As recent experience shows, complex operations of significant size are best not mounted in an ad hoc fashion. The U.S. Government will be best prepared to execute complex operations if it possesses a skilled, well-trained civilian response capacity that can be applied adeptly to the missions at hand, and if it employs a rigorous analytical framework to size and design this force. This chapter proposes that a civilian force be constructed for surge and sustainment of one large, one medium, and four small complex operations.

Main Judgments

The stage for analysis and debate on this subject has been set by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009,¹ which called on the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to create two bodies: a Response Readiness Corps and a Civilian Reserve Corps. The proposed Response Readiness Corps will have 2,250 full-time Federal employees, divided into an active component of 250 full-time personnel and 2,000 standby personnel. The proposed reserve corps will have 2,000 volunteers drawn from the private sector and state and local governments who can provide a mobilization capacity with specific skill sets to supplement the active/standby components when necessary.

Conditions were in place for this architecture before passage of the NDAA; National Security Presidential Directive 44 actually tasked State (S/CRS specifically) to develop a robust civilian response, and then passage of the fiscal year (FY) 2008 supplemental in the summer of 2008 provided S/CRS with \$50 million and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) with \$25 million to begin standing up the civilian response capacity with the hiring of 100 active component personnel and the identification and training of 500 standby component personnel. The NDAA has now officially authorized S/CRS to build the civilian response capacity, including its reserve component. The reserve component has not been funded yet, so the focus is on the active and standby components. Until further appropriations bills are passed, S/CRS will not be able to build up to proposed numbers. The George W. Bush administration requested \$248 million in State's FY09 appropriations request, which has yet to be passed.

The NDAA legislation clearly is a step in the right direction. But in authorizing a civilian response capacity of 2,250 active/standby personnel and 2,000 reservists, does it provide sufficient manpower to meet future requirements for complex operations and S&R missions?

This chapter judges that the proposed 250 full-time and 2,000 standby personnel likely will be too few and argues that the civilian response capacity can best be sized and designed by employing an analytical framework that considers a wide spectrum of potential scenarios and requirements. No single scenario and associated manpower requirement are capable of capturing the multiple possibilities ahead, but a wide spectrum of scenarios can help bound the range of uncertainty and enable the United States to make sound decisions on how to prepare to respond flexibly and effectively to a constantly changing future in which requirements for complex operations ebb and flow. By employing a multi-scenario framework, we conclude that an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel backed by a reserve force of 10,000 personnel makes strategic sense.

Such a force is significantly larger than that envisioned by the NDAA, but it does accord with how the Department of Defense (DOD) goes about sizing its Active and Reserve military forces for multiple contingences. In the *2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)*, DOD assessed that its military forces should be capable of steady-state and surge operations for defending the homeland; prevailing in the war on terror and conducting irregular operations; and conducting and winning conventional campaigns.² Within this framework, DOD calls for forces and capabilities that can carry out simultaneous operations of differing sizes and types. In following a similar approach, we envision a civilian response capacity that could handle confidently the range of concurrent scenarios that plausibly could occur, and provide a sufficiently robust mixture of skills and attributes for tailoring U.S. responses to the specific situations at hand. Simply stated, a smaller civilian response capacity would not be large enough, and a larger force (for example, 7,500 active/standby civilians) would be overly endowed.

Civilian response capacity force-sizing can be aided by employing a 1-1-4 sizing construct that envisions multiple concurrent contingencies. That is, the civilian force should be prepared to carry out and sustain operations for one large (for example, Iraq), one medium (for example, Afghanistan), and four small (for example, tsunami relief and humanitarian operations in Georgia) complex operations. A requirement for an active/standby force of 5,000 civilian response capacity personnel would arise, for example, if the large operation requires 2,000 personnel, the medium operation requires 1,000 personnel, and each of the small operations requires 500 personnel. This civilian response capacity, of course, would be available not only for this particular construct, but also for a range of different contingencies that could require varying sizes and mixes of personnel.

The key point is that this capacity would enable the United States to surge 5,000 active/standby personnel for a number of concurrent contingencies that might arise and to sustain this presence for about a year. A reserve civilian response capacity of 10,000 personnel would permit sustainment of this civilian surge for 2 or more years, following the military practice of preparing one-third of the force for deployment, while one-third deploys and one-third is reconstituted.

Civilian Response Capacity Missions and Tasks—Past, Present, and Future

To create a foundation for appraising future scenarios and their civilian response capacity manpower requirements, analysis can best begin by addressing why and how significant numbers of skilled civilians might be needed for performing specific missions and tasks in complex operations. The term complex operations is relatively new, but the practice of employing U.S. military and civilian personnel to help bring security, governance, and reconstruction to foreign nations is not. After World War II, the United States performed occupation duties in Germany and Japan in ways intended to rebuild these conquered countries, install democratic governments, and ignite economic recovery. In both cases, the U.S. military was mainly responsible for S&R operations, and civilians supplemented the effort. In Germany, about 8,000 U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel were initially employed for this purpose, and civilians numbered about 1,400 during the years in which the Marshall Plan was in full flower. In Japan, about 2,000 Army Civil Affairs personnel were used, and civilians numbered about 200. In both countries, reliance on the U.S. military and indigenous institutions kept U.S. civilian manpower requirements relatively low. Moreover, both countries already possessed modern institutions and economies, which also reduced the need for U.S. civilians.³

The first big U.S. experience performing S&R operations in an underdeveloped country came in Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. In that country, about 1,500 civilian personnel were initially deployed to occupy positions of the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Information Agency. Beginning in 1967, an additional 1,300 civilians were deployed to help staff the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program, which endeavored to bring security and development to 44 provinces and 250 districts across the country. In addition, about 6,400 military personnel were assigned to CORDS, bringing its total to nearly 8,000, plus several thousand South Vietnamese military and civilian personnel. The CORDS program was the biggest S&R effort ever launched by the U.S. Government. On the whole, it made significant progress toward performing its mission, although it was reduced as the United States withdrew from South Vietnam in the early 1970s. In the end, it was negated by North Vietnamese conquest in 1975. Even so, CORDS' large size helps illuminate the substantial number of military and civilian personnel that can be needed when the goal is to bring security and development to a chaotic, violence-plagued country.⁴

Today, the United States finds itself performing major S&R operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where PRTs are the main institutional instrument for performing these missions. Of the 28 PRTs in Iraq, 25 are led by the United States, and Britain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea each lead one. The U.S.-led PRTs are assigned across Iraq's 18 provinces and are headed by State Department personnel, even though several are embedded in U.S. Army Brigade Combat Teams. In Afghanistan, there are 12 PRTs led by the United States, plus 14 led by International Security Assistance Force partners. In contrast to Iraq, the PRTs in Afghanistan are led by military officers. Currently, no standard U.S. Government-approved model exists for designing PRTs. As a result, they are normally sized and designed on a case-by-case basis. In both countries, PRTs typically average 50–100 personnel, although in a few cases the number evidently rises to 250. In Afghanistan, PRTs are manned predominantly by military personnel, who provide such

traditional military services as administration, intelligence, military police, demining, security protection, civil affairs, and logistic support. Also assigned to these PRTs are small contingents of four to eight civilians from the State Department, USAID, and other Federal agencies.

In Iraq, about 2,000 U.S. personnel are assigned to PRTs; at least 50 percent and sometimes up to 75 percent generally are civilians. In Afghanistan, about 1,000 personnel, of who over 90 percent are military, are assigned to PRTs. In both cases, many of these military assignments could be better filled by civilians. Additional civilians are assigned to Embassy staffs in both countries. In Iraq, an Embassy staff of 900, coupled with about the same number of civilians assigned to PRTs, elevates total U.S. Government civilian personnel there to under 2,000. But fewer than 100 civilians assigned to PRTs in Afghanistan means that, even counting U.S. Embassy personnel there, the total U.S. civilian presence in Afghanistan is significantly smaller than in Iraq—a reality that limits the effectiveness of civilian-performed S&R operations there. For both Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of civilians capable of S&R missions is well below the number of civilians assigned to Vietnam, where military personnel were often used to perform civilian functions.

Analysts have questioned whether enough PRTs are present in Iraq and Afghanistan, and whether individual PRTs are large enough to accomplish their S&R goals. The troubled situations in both countries—not only continuing violence but also slow progress toward economic and political reconstruction—suggest that more U.S. civilian personnel would be helpful, especially in Afghanistan.

Particularly in Afghanistan, PRTs are still constituted for military functions and lack the large numbers of civilians needed to perform such duties as building governments, repairing infrastructure, and opening schools. In both countries, PRTs rely heavily on private contractors. Even so, the teams in Iraq and Afghanistan may provide misleading role models for calculating the larger number of civilian U.S. employees required for situations in which emphasis is placed not only on security, but also on development.⁵ Furthermore, we argue that skill sets should not be confined solely to the PRTs, but that critical ones should also reside in Embassies.

Insights into future civilian requirements for complex operations can be gained from table 2–1, which displays the missions and tasks that military and civilian personnel can be called on to perform in various situations.⁶ While the table is not exhaustive, it shows that complex operations can involve fully 60 associated tasks in 6 broad mission categories: restore and maintain security, promote effective governance, conduct reconstruction, sustain economic development, support reconciliation, and foster social change. Although mission category 1 is performed by military personnel, mission categories 2 through 6, which include 48 tasks, are mostly best handled by civilian personnel, with the military in support in some cases. Of course, not all of these missions and tasks need be performed with equal fervor in every situation. But taking into account the wide spectrum of situations that can occur, along with the possibility of simultaneous events, the table supports the judgment that civilian preparedness requirements for these missions could be relatively high. This especially is the case because fairly large numbers of civilians could be required for each category and the full set of tasks within it. For example, if each of the 9 tasks of mission category 4 (sustain economic development) requires 100 active/standby trained personnel, the total requirement for that category is 900 personnel. If the same calculation is applied to all 5 civilian categories and their associated 48 tasks, the total requirement is 4,800, or about 5,000 personnel.

Mission Category 1: Restore and Maintain Security

- Perform critical command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations, including intelligence-gathering and analysis
- Conduct combat, security, and law enforcement operations
- Combat terrorism
- Provide physical security to individuals and groups
- Secure key sites and infrastructure
- Collect, secure, and destroy small arms/light weapons and military equipment; seize illegal weapons
- Conduct demining and ordnance disposal
- Identify, detain, and process insurgents and suspects
- Demobilize and reintegrate former insurgents, militias, and armed factions
- Secure borders and key entry/transshipment points
- Train and support indigenous security and police force
- Eliminate or suppress criminal gangs, militias, and factional violence

Mission Category 2: Promote Effective Governance

- Provide temporary governance in absence of political institutions
- Restore political control over urban areas
- Develop local and national political capacities for effective governance
- Support representative government at the local and national levels
- Conduct, supervise, and safeguard elections
- Establish legal and judicial structures and institutions
- Effect and enforce the rule of law

Mission Category 2: Promote Effective Governance (continued)

- Arbitrate and mediate local disputes and agreements
- Support or conduct war crimes tribunals
- Provide legal and political expertise, training, and education

Mission Category 3: Conduct Reconstruction

- Provide humanitarian relief to indigenous populations
- Operate refugee camps
- Feed and shelter urban populations in the wake of combat and security operations
- Support nongovernmental organization (NGO)/intergovernmental organization (IGO) humanitarian efforts
- Ensure freedom of movement; enable local commerce
- Protect human and civil rights
- Perform civic action and reconstruction projects to restore essential services
- Repair, rebuild, and maintain critical physical and social infrastructure
- Construct housing and rebuild political, cultural, and religious centers

Mission Category 4: Sustain Economic Development

- Secure and protect economic and commercial activities, including local commerce and trade and commercial lines of communication
- Open and protect urban market places
- Operate government or commercial economic activities or infrastructures, including finance systems
- Prevent or suppress illegal smuggling or criminal activities that compete with economic growth
- Support or enforce tax and revenue collection

Mission Category 4: Sustain Economic Development (continued)

- Provide logistics, transportation, or other capabilities necessary for movement and marketing of goods and services
- Encourage and support property ownership
- Restore and protect urban commerce centers and manufacturing
- Protect harvests and agricultural development

Mission Category 5: Support Reconciliation

- Conduct truth commissions and tribunals
- Capture, detain, and try terrorists and criminals
- Conduct war crimes trials
- Facilitate return of displaced persons
- Enforce reparations and restitution
- Mediate and arbitrate disputes
- Build local capacities for conflict resolution
- Support capacity-building agencies, NGOs, and IGOs
- Effect long-term political and social reforms
- Promote civil and human rights
- Prevent reemergence of factions and repressive groups
- Provide for educational system that promotes reconciliation

Mission Category 6: Foster Social Change

- Encourage long-term, grassroots political and social reform
- Enforce civil and human rights and the rule of law
- Build capacities for dispute resolution
- Prevent reemergence of factions and extremism

Mission Category 6: Foster Social Change (continued)

- Avoid the use of repression or other totalitarian measures
- Provide for general education of the populace
- Ensure essential tasks are integrated and support change
- Remain engaged for an extended period

Table 2–1. Missions and Tasks for Complex Operations

This basic methodology of equally allocating civilian personnel requirements among the various mission categories and tasks, of course, is illustrative. A fully developed analysis, especially one used for actual programming, would necessitate a detailed appraisal of manpower needs for each category and task. Final numbers might be lower or higher in each case. For the force-sizing purposes of this chapter, however, what matters is the aggregate total of civilian manpower. An important bottom line is that an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel, if properly distributed, would provide a fairly large pool of trained experts in each category. This sizable, diverse pool, in turn, would help provide the flexibility, adaptability, and modularity to tailor complex operations to the missions and tasks at hand in each case, without concern that the act of responding effectively to one contingency would drain the force of expertise in key areas needed to handle additional contingencies.

An active civilian force of 5,000 personnel, with an internal distribution of 100 specialists for each of the 48 tasks, would provide significantly better performance features than only 2,500 personnel and 50 specialists for each task. Such a force would help ensure that if the 1–1–4 construct must be fully carried out, there will be not only enough civilians in aggregate, but also enough to perform all 48 tasks in each contingency. For example, there would be enough task-specialized civilians to simultaneously perform the full set of tasks for such key missions as promoting effective governance, conducting reconstruction, and sustaining economic development in all contingencies of this construct. In addition, this force could provide valuable flexibility and adaptability for situations in which requirements for individual tasks in one or more contingencies might rise above the norm. That is, extra civilians could be diverted from places where they are not needed to places where they are needed. A smaller force of 2,500 personnel would not provide nearly this amount of flexibility.

In evaluating this judgment, a sense of perspective can be gained by examining how a civilian response capacity of 5,000 active/standby personnel compares to alternative forces of lower and higher numbers. Table 2–2 displays three options. Option 1 is 2,250 personnel; option 2 is 5,000 personnel; option 3 is 7,500 personnel. Compared to option 1, option 2 is better not only because it provides over twice the number of total personnel, but also because it provides more than double the number in each category. The risk of option 1 is that it might be overwhelmed by multiple contingencies that create a higher level of total manpower requirements, or by individual contingencies that could create unusually high demands in one or more categories. By virtue of being larger and better endowed internally, option 2 significantly reduces these risks, while buffering against the additional risk those shortages in civilian manpower could compel unduly high reliance on scarce military forces to perform missions and tasks that are better carried out by trained civilians.

Option 3 is 50 percent larger than option 2, costs 50 percent more, and would be proportionately harder to create and sustain over a long period of time. Compared to option 2, the issue is whether the strategic benefits of option 3 would be commensurate with its higher costs and difficulties. Whereas some observers may argue in favor of option 3 (or even larger forces), economists likely would apply the logic of a curve of diminishing marginal returns to the calculus to determine whether option 2 falls on the knee of the curve—the point at which most strategic benefits have already been attained and the expense of additional assets would not be justified because the marginal payoffs would be relatively smaller. The latter could be the case for civilian response capacity force-sizing if, for example, the probability of each option is being fully needed at any one time decreases as the size of these three options increases. In this event, the “strategic payoff” of option 3 might be only 10 percent higher than option 2, even though option 3 has 50 percent more manpower.

Finally, it is important to note that, if an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 personnel is selected, it does not define the total number of civilian response capacity personnel that would need to be available. Reserve personnel assets would also be needed, especially to provide long-term sustainability by permitting rotation of deployed personnel after their tours of duty are completed and replacement with trained substitutes. The need for such reservists is a key reason why the NDAA called for a Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) of 2,000 personnel. But are 2,000 reservists enough to execute the missions and tasks outlined above? An answer to this question can be suggested by examining how the U.S. military handles the task of maintaining a large rotational base to back up forces that might be initially deployed to overseas contingencies. Essentially, all three Services seek to have two units of usable reserves for each initially deployable unit—for example, two Army divisions to back up each deployed division to provide long-term sustainability. By following this practice, DOD seeks to have sufficient forces in its rotational base to perform two additional tours of duty in the lengthy period after initially deployed units have completed their tours. As a result, military personnel are called on to perform deployment missions only 1 year out of every 3.

Active Personnel			
	Total	Per Category	Cost/Year (\$ Billion)
Option 1	2,250	450	0.94
Option 2	5,000	1,000	2.1
Option 3	7,500	1,500	3.2

Table 2-2. Alternative civilian response capacity forces

If this logic is applied to the civilian response capacity calculus, it suggests that an active/standby force of 2,500 personnel should be backed up by a reserve force of 4,500 personnel, not 2,000. It further suggests that an active/standby CRC of 5,000 personnel should be backed up by a reserve force of 10,000 personnel. In addition to providing long-term sustainment, a reserve civilian response capacity of this size would provide a valuable surge capability in case the active/standby force becomes overwhelmed by unexpected events, plus additional manpower pools for performing specific missions and tasks that might arise. The key conclusion is that if an active/standby civilian response capacity of 5,000 civilians is created, a backup reserve force of 10,000 personnel would serve more purposes than one.

Civilian Response Capacity Scenarios and Requirements

The future U.S. civilian response capacity will be deemed adequately large only if it can meet manpower requirements for complex operations that might lie ahead. How can these deployment and performance requirements best be gauged? Scenarios—hypothetical contingencies abroad—can help answer this question. As any experienced analyst knows, scenarios cannot be used to predict the future, nor should they bind the United States to specific dictates. Actual contingencies can prove to be very different from the events contemplated by scenarios. But scenarios can help illuminate the broad trends ahead, facilitate sensitivity analysis, and ensure that U.S. policies, plans, and programs are in the right strategic ballpark. By postulating specific contingencies, they also can be used to help gauge overall civilian response capacity manpower requirements and judge how alternative policy options perform in light of these requirements. In essence, they can be employed to generate yardsticks for determining how future civilian response capacity requirements are best satisfied by concrete capabilities.

A 1–1–4 force construct could be used to size the future civilian response capacity and, as argued below, would help affirm S/CRS’s requirement for 5,000 active/standby personnel. Using this single-point standard exclusively, however, would be unwise in current circumstances. In the recent past, DOD has been able to use such a standard because the strategic rationale for its existing force posture has been developed and tested for many years, and its current task is mostly limited to making marginal upward or downward changes in force levels. By contrast, the act of shaping the civilian response capacity is plowing entirely new strategic ground, and there is no lengthy backdrop of much-debated theories to help govern the process of deciding. Also important, the surrounding issues are unfamiliar, complex variables are at work, and uncertainties abound. No single-point standard is capable of firmly identifying a fixed civilian response capacity manpower level above which success is ensured, and below which failure is guaranteed. Such a standard would merely endorse one particular theory of requirements in absence of other theories that might show different results, and it would ratify one policy option without showing how it compares to and contrasts with other options. As a result, senior decision makers would be hard pressed to gauge the choices open to them and the soundness of their own judgments.

In the eyes of senior U.S. officials in pursuit of sound judgments, the critical issue is likely to be the confidence level. These officials are likely to ask two interrelated questions: how much confidence and assurance does the United States want to possess in a world of proliferating complex operations and S&R missions, and how much risk is it willing to run? How do alternative levels of civilian response capacity provide different levels of confidence and risk? These important questions can best be addressed not by relying on a single-point theory of scenarios and requirements, but instead by postulating a spectrum of scenarios and requirements ranging from relatively undemanding to quite demanding settings, and then using this spectrum to weigh and balance alternative policy responses in terms of confidence and risk. Such an approach is followed here.

A good place to begin constructing such a wide spectrum is by displaying a range of individual scenarios that might plausibly occur, together with a range of notional civilian response capacity manpower requirements for each case to staff Embassies as well as PRTs. Table 2–3 illuminates how and why, even for individual scenarios, civilian response capacity requirements are a variable, not a constant. In particular, requirements are influenced by two key variables: the size and population of the country in which complex operations are to be mounted, and the nature of security conditions within that country, along with the scope of U.S. goals and missions in dealing with these conditions. As the size of these two variables increases, civilian response

capacity requirements grow proportionately. For example, a country of 20 million people would require twice the number of civilian response capacity personnel as would a country of only 10 million people, if all other calculations are equal. That country of 20 million might necessitate 1,000 civilian response capacity personnel if security conditions, goals, and missions yield a requirement for 1 person per 20,000 population. But if security conditions, goals, and missions mandate a larger presence of 1 person per 10,000 population, the civilian response capacity requirement would increase to 2,000.

Another important variable is the presence or absence of coalition partners: as coalition contributions increase, U.S. requirements decrease, and vice versa. Assuming that coalition partners, plus nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), will normally contribute about one-third of total manpower requirements, table 2–3 postulates that the United States will regularly be called on to commit the remaining two-thirds. With this division of labor in mind, table 2–3 displays a spectrum of categories of contingencies, varying from small to very large as a function of the population in each case. Within each category, it displays a likely range of U.S. civilian response capacity manpower requirements—as a function of population levels, security conditions, and U.S. goals and missions—and a midpoint estimate of requirements.

The numbers in table 2–3 should be treated as illustrative rather than definitive, but even so, they impart important strategic messages—one of which is that civilian response capacity manpower requirements for a single contingency can vary significantly. Using midpoint estimates, requirements could range from as few as 450 personnel to as many as 3,350, but could rise to a high of 4,450 in the event a very large contingency occurs in which the United States pursues ambitious goals. Another message is that an active/standby force of 5,000 personnel could handle the entire spectrum of individual contingencies; indeed, it could handle most of them even if coalition partner contributions were less than postulated in table 2–3. By contrast, even assuming a one-third contribution by coalition partners, a smaller force of 2,250 active/standby personnel could meet requirements only for contingencies that are no larger than the midpoint range of the large category. In other words, the United States would possess insufficient civilian response capacity manpower if it becomes involved in a large or very large contingency for which it must pursue ambitious objectives.

The bottom line is that in preparing for a single contingency, the United States will enjoy higher confidence levels, and face fewer risks, if it fully funds and deploys an active/standby force of 5,000 personnel rather than 2,250. The same conclusion applies to a reserve force of 10,000 personnel rather than only 2,000, because it would provide much greater staying power. Assuming funding is allocated and matches the requirements, this force would allow for the launch and sustainment of a surge.

Category	Population (millions)	Moderate Goals	Ambitious Goals	Midpoint
Small	1-10	300	600	450
Medium	10-25	650	1,350	1,000
Large	25-50	1,400	2,800	2,100
Very Large	50-75	2,250	4,450	3,350

Table 2-3. Civilian manpower requirement for two scenarios

Endnotes

1. See S. 3001, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Title XVI—Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management.
2. During the 1990s, DOD employed a 2-major-theater-war force-sizing standard, which called for sufficient forces to wage two major concurrent wars in the Persian Gulf and Korea. In 2001, DOD switched to a more flexible 4–2–1 standard that called for sufficient forces to handle daily strategic affairs in four key regions, to rebuff major enemy aggression in two theaters, and to wage decisive operations, including major counterattacks, in one of these theaters. DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review of 2006 put forth a more generic construct, but called for a force posture similar to that mandated by the 4–2–1 construct. See Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006).
3. For historical data on civilian manpower in Europe and Japan after World War II, see U.S. Department of State Foreign Service List, 1944–1954. The occupations and reconstruction of Germany and Japan were significantly aided by the facts that combat had ended there and, in both countries, the populations were responsive to U.S. leadership in building democratic governments and capitalist economies.
4. See chapter 11, Civilian Surge, for CORDS data and analysis.
5. For analysis, see U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008, available at <http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf>.
6. Table 2-1 is adapted from a presentation by Dr. Robert Scott Moore. Used with permission.

Complex Operations: Recalibrating the State Department's Role

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What role should the U.S. Department of State play in efforts to stabilize countries beset by internal crises, conflict, and dysfunctional governance? The question defies a simple response. The risks associated with fragile or failing states vary widely. In cases where state collapse carries with it the specter of insurgency, mass violence, terrorist safe havens or human dislocations, the tasks of paramount importance for the U.S. Government span traditional bureaucratic boundaries.

Like any foreign ministry, the State Department's focus traditionally has been Westphalian—to manage U.S. relationships across sovereign boundaries with other functioning states, be they allies, partners, competitors, or enemies. Yet recent years have witnessed the steady rise of empowered transnational actors—militia groups, terrorist networks, narcotraffickers, pirates, and other criminal enterprises—whose strength and agility may far exceed what weak governments can muster to police their own territories. When American forces toppled Afghanistan's Taliban regime in 2001 and Saddam's tyranny in Iraq barely 18 months later, policymakers in Washington did not imagine they would find themselves embroiled in extended irregular warfare campaigns. As history has chronicled, the United States greatly underestimated what it would take to orchestrate successful stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) efforts following the initial phases of these interventions.

From a security perspective, effective state-building is the essential element of any complex operation. Devising effective ways and means to assist in the construction or restoration of governance and all that goes with it—economic opportunity, public welfare, and the rule of law—is vital in any strategy for winning wars, not merely battles. That fact inevitably makes this mission a joint civil-military enterprise—one that soldiers cannot do alone. “We cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” observed Defense Secretary Robert Gates. “America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically under-funded for far too long.” And even if doing the job under fire may not be all that common in the future, Gates added, “What is likely . . . is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.”¹

Turning this essential insight into concerted action is nevertheless a Herculean task. To start with, outdated perceptions need to be tossed aside. Just as military commanders have had to move beyond the notion that irregular warfare is basically about destroying the enemy rather than protecting local communities, diplomats and aid providers must let go of the notion that they can sit safely on the sidelines of conflict until the smoke clears. Indeed, while many observers worry about foreign assistance becoming “militarized,” it is not just the instrument but also the environment that is changing. Today's prevalent conflicts have become progressively “civilianized” in terms of the state-building tasks on which a decisive outcome hinges. Thus, mutual effort is required, which raises the obvious, if awkward, question of who leads on the civilian side.

For many, the answer is found in Foggy Bottom. After all, the State Department is like no other institution—it sits at the apex of America’s foreign policy apparatus. Its statutory base, Presidential taskings and global writ give it a clear and unquestioned authority to speak for and act on behalf of the United States in any foreign affairs domain. As a candidate, President Barack Obama expressed strong support for the concept of building greater civilian capacity to work alongside the military in complex operations.² As his administration takes stock of its options, any new initiatives in this area will inevitably be compared to or contrasted with prior transformative efforts. This inevitably puts the spotlight on the State Department: broadly, how well has the department done in boosting civilian capacity to prepare for and conduct S&R missions? What progress or challenges have such efforts encountered, and why? And how might State’s role be recalibrated in light of that experience?

Harbingers of Change

In response to state-building shortfalls that have plagued post invasion operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the George W. Bush administration in its second term embarked on a Department of State–centric remedial approach. At the broadest level, the administration’s “Transformational Diplomacy” initiative became an umbrella of sorts for the pursuit of departmentally focused capacity-building. Launched by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, its core objective was to realign diplomatic resources away from Western Europe and toward regions of the world facing transnational challenges and, in so doing, strengthen pursuit of U.S. democracy-building objectives and forge closer connections between the State Department and civil society actors in foreign venues.³ A separate, but closely related, initiative was the establishment of a new State Department post, the Director of Foreign Assistance—the so-called “F” office—as a way to improve government-wide coordination of aid programs, but especially to more fully integrate programs managed by bureaus within State and those managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The ultimate goal was to ensure that foreign policy objectives in the areas of security, economic growth, democracy and governance, health, education, and humanitarian assistance would be reflected in programs and funding decisions.

While these two steps are emblematic of the Bush administration’s aspirations to realign and better integrate State’s capacities, it was actually a third step—the creation of in-house capacity for undertaking S&R missions—that sought to relate the department’s larger transformational agenda to more immediate on-the-ground needs. By Presidential directive, the Secretary of State was empowered to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct S&R activities, and to coordinate efforts with the Department of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or on-going U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”⁴ At State, this task was given to a newly created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), which reports directly to the Secretary. Its mandate, as defined by the Presidential directive, is to improve “coordination, planning, and implementation for reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.”⁵ This mission also called for steps to ensure overall program and policy coordination and to develop a larger civilian talent pool from which to draw for field expertise across such public service sectors as civil administration and basic services to economic development, the rule of law, and security sector reform.

Lightning-rod Issues

Any effort to restructure or strengthen the State Department immediately confronts a basic reality: a crowded field. It is hard to find another executive branch institution that has been more buffeted by criticisms, complaints, and calls for reform than State. The recent effort to launch State-centric initiatives into the arena of complex contingencies is only the latest twist in a long-running controversy over how best to recalibrate the department to overcome its own limitations or compensate for weaknesses elsewhere.

Over the past decade, the department's administrative and resource deficiencies have received the lion's share of attention. High-level commissions and study groups have called attention to, *inter alia*, deficiencies in State's recruitment and personnel management practices, budgeting, facilities and information technology infrastructures, and other administrative incapacities.⁶ Shining a spotlight on these types of shortfalls is important—and some progress has been made in correcting them—but if the problem of “fixing” State were purely a matter of rectifying management gaps or expanding resources, the path to a solution would be obvious, if not necessarily easy. In fact, the controversy about State's track record arises from two sets of neuralgic, “lightning-rod” issues. The first concerns State's purported inability to balance competing internal priorities, and the second centers on its problems in reaching across bureaucratic boundaries.

Balancing Challenges

The State Department is certainly not alone in its institutional need to balance day-to-day needs against looming challenges, but its penchant for focusing on current diplomatic priorities at the expense of long-range planning has long been a rallying point for its critics. No less a luminary than former Secretary of State Dean Acheson lamented this problem nearly a half-century ago, citing it as one reason for the U.S. Government's belated recognition of the looming threats posed by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan during the 1930s.⁷ Similar complaints have been voiced many times since then.

Another balancing-act issue has involved how to navigate between specific geographic perspectives and crosscutting functional priorities. State's natural proclivity has been to place a high premium on the work of its regional bureaus, where policy development and day-to-day diplomacy are orchestrated via the foreign official community in Washington and through American Embassies and diplomatic posts in more than 180 countries. The fate of certain functional specialties—public diplomacy, trade, human rights, law enforcement, arms control, refugee and migration assistance, environmental assistance, and women's issues, to name just a few—has always been contentious. The approach of embedding expertise in separate agencies has led to “who's in charge” criticisms, while merging or (re)aligning such functions back into State has triggered debates over resources and “fit” with State's professional culture.⁸

Cross-boundary Challenges

In terms of State's interagency reach, the criticisms have been sharp and at times partisan. Without question, the biggest issue has been State's relationship with the White House, in particular its alleged support of, indifference to, or hostility toward a given President's agenda. President Truman berated the department for trying to undermine his support for the creation of Israel.⁹ President Nixon's animus toward State, which he regarded as disloyal and a source of press leaks, was legendary.¹⁰ More recently, in 2003, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich

charged that the State Department was engaged in a “deliberate and systematic effort” to undermine President Bush’s foreign policy.¹¹ One observer who learned from his own personal experiences—Henry Kissinger—has framed the tension more in institutional terms, citing an inevitable mismatch between State’s enormous span of responsibility and a President’s inherent need for focus.¹²

Beyond the White House lies the rest of the interagency community. Here, the refrain has been that State lacks the necessary clout to drive policy formulation or the technical expertise to manage implementation processes, especially on issues where bureaucratic equities overlap. Whether the problem stems more from bargaining dynamics (for example, the need for an impartial arbiter) or institutional character traits (for example, a Foreign Service culture that places a greater premium on artful compromise than forcing hard choices) is open to debate. What is clear, and starkly so, is that State has long climbed a steep hill of skepticism whenever it has found itself attempting to forge unity of effort on contentious issues.

Although some of these criticisms might be dismissed as echoes from the past, they are relevant to assessing State’s potential role in complex operations. Without question, each of the lightning-rod issues noted above weighs heavily in this mission area. Having a robust capability for complex operations requires maintaining a judicious balance between oversight of current contingencies and readiness to undertake long-range planning. It also requires a careful blending of functional disciplines, program management, regional expertise, and diplomatic skill. The key tasks at every stage are, perforce, interagency activities, with multiple funding streams and legal authorities, so assertive White House backing is a sine qua non for success.

It is against this background that we take stock of the State Department’s efforts with a view to assessing whether current trend-lines, on balance, suggest a reinforced or altered approach to building civilian capacity via State-centric initiatives.

State’s Accomplishments

The best measure for State’s progress in the S&R domain is found in the office set up for this purpose. After nearly 4 years, S/CRS remains a work in progress. Its size—a staff of nearly 80—gives it heft by comparison to other offices. But how is it progressing in terms of its mission?

Since its inception, S/CRS’s efforts have revolved around five core missions, each of which can be considered a building block of a comprehensive strategy for S&R activity:

- interagency planning and management
- early warning, conflict assessment, and conflict prevention
- training for S&R operations
- support to Embassies for integrated stabilization assistance programs
- civilian expeditionary capacity-building.

S/CRS has achieved some noteworthy progress in each of these areas, as set forth below.

Interagency Planning and Management

On the interagency planning front, S/CRS can fairly claim credit for significant steps forward. From late 2004 through 2005, the office led an interagency effort to validate, expand, and obtain broad support for a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks framework—an endeavor that, as former S/CRS head Ambassador Carlos Pascual observed, helped to create a “common approach and vocabulary between civilians and the military.”¹³ S/CRS led a series of interagency working group discussions to reaffirm and amplify tasks contained in the original framework. That framework was divided into five technical areas, significantly expanded, and reshaped into a three-phased response framework: initial response (short-term), transformation (mid-term), and fostering sustainability (long-term). The goal was to provide a widely agreed menu of issues that should be considered when working in conflict-stricken environments. Completed in late 2005, the Essential Task Matrix has become a foundational element in comprehensive post conflict planning.¹⁴

The essential tasks effort aimed at the structure and functions of S&R activities at the field level. A second initiative was developed to forge closer connections between task-driven planning activity and the larger policy formulation and implementation environment. To this end, a U.S. Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation has been developed to identify the overarching U.S. policy goals to be achieved, as well as the operational objectives foreseen in those goals, the measures of effectiveness to be applied, and the specific activities aimed at achieving each objective.¹⁵ This effort was developed in close collaboration with Defense Department components and USAID. S/CRS also reached out to other departments and agencies to participate in strategic planning efforts for S&R operations, including the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Justice.

Building on these efforts, S/CRS also spearheaded an initiative to elaborate the larger architecture for integrating crisis response efforts across the interagency community. The Interagency Management System (IMS) consists of three interlinked elements: a country reconstruction and stabilization group, an integration planning cell, and an advance civilian team.¹⁶ The IMS is a multi-tiered organizational design for country-specific planning and implementation activities not only at the strategic and policy levels in Washington, but also at the operational and tactical levels—an innovation compared to 1990s-era efforts.¹⁷

Conflict Assessment and Prevention

The Bush administration’s National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 mandated that State-centric S&R activity should also focus on states or regions at risk of conflict, leading S/CRS to press into assessment and prevention-related efforts. In 2007, the Conflict Prevention team within S/CRS led an interagency effort, in collaboration with USAID, to develop a methodology and process for assessing international conflict, the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF). The ICAF is a tool for developing shared understanding among the interagency community of several factors:

- the causes of violent conflict or instability in a country or region
- the situational factors and dynamics that either manage or mitigate the instability (“mitigators”) or cause instability and violent conflicts to increase (“drivers”)

- who the relevant political elites and power brokers are
- what constitutes relevant context and potential triggering events.

The ICAF is a useful tool for mapping U.S. Government efforts to address conflict or instability and remedial action by nongovernmental actors. It can assist in setting priorities for the drivers and mitigators with the greatest impact on conflict. The framework can assist in identifying entry points for possible U.S. Government action and formulating recommendations to strategic and operational level planners. In summer 2008, in conjunction with USAID, S/CRS tested the ICAF in two Washington-based application workshops in which a large segment of the interagency participated. S/CRS is now socializing the ICAF with various regional bureaus in the State Department and the geographic combatant commands.

S/CRS first addressed its mandate to invigorate the conflict early warning structure by collaborating with the Intelligence Community to generate and maintain a watch list of countries at risk of destabilizing conflict. In 2008, S/CRS convened the Intelligence and Analysis Working Group with more than 30 members from the interagency, including the Intelligence Community. The group is examining and improving the usefulness of existing conflict early warning tools and integrating them with the analysis, prevention, and response components of S/CRS.

In 2007, in conjunction with U.S. Joint Forces Command, S/CRS conducted a limited objective experiment using a conflict prevention planning approach of its own design. S/CRS is continuing to develop and will test the approach throughout 2009. A key component of the approach intentionally links interagency prevention planning with existing planning and funding streams, such as the F Country Assistance Strategy and the geographic combatant commands' so-called phase zero and theater security cooperation plans.

Training for S&R Operations

Since its inception, S/CRS has placed strong emphasis on providing training for civilians from various U.S. Government departments and agencies in S&R concepts, principles, strategic planning for conflict transformation, and S&R operations. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, S/CRS engaged the Foreign Service Institute as a partner in developing curricula, hiring subject matter experts, and implementing training courses. As of late 2008, S/CRS had conducted 73 courses with 1,638 students in all courses, reaching 656 participants from 2006 through 2008.¹⁸

S/CRS has also provided leadership in training to U.S. Government personnel who are being assigned to the U.S. Embassies and USAID missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to civilians, military officers, and contractors who are being deployed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to teaching personnel about the organization, mission, and function of PRTs, training focuses on recent political developments in each country, current government leaders, national development plans, cultural factors and context, and U.S. Government programs in country. Current or previous PRT officers are available to share lessons learned. A unique feature of the training for Afghanistan is that civilians from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture train and live with their military counterparts for 2 weeks at the U.S. Army post in Fort Bragg, NC, home of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The predeployment training provides learning tools and improves key skill sets (such as communication, analysis, flexibility, and teamwork) to ensure success of the PRT. Training is also provided in combat lifesaving skills and hands-on force protection procedures.

Integrated Stabilization Assistance Programs

Since 2005, S/CRS has provided technical assistance consultations to regional bureaus or Embassies in response to specific tasks or requests for assistance. This assistance has consisted of preparing conflict assessments, conducting national and provincial level planning for reconstruction and stabilization programs, and keeping monitoring and reporting metrics. Small teams have been deployed to Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti, Nepal, and Cuba, among other countries. S/CRS has not been successful in obtaining congressional authorization under the Foreign Assistance Act for a Conflict Response Fund for urgent contingencies, so it did not have program funding to lend to these efforts. But S/CRS provided technical assistance (by deploying staff) to regional bureau offices and/or Embassy country teams to help design or coordinate S&R programs using the bureau's or Embassy's funds.¹⁹

DOD, as one of S/CRS's biggest supporters, recognized the need to develop a whole-of-government approach to planning and implementing S&R operations and supported the Bush administration's unsuccessful attempts in FY04 and FY05 to obtain funding under the Foreign Assistance Act for unspecified urgent contingencies. In a welcome initiative, the congressional committees that oversee DOD authorized the transfer of uncommitted DOD operation and maintenance funds to the Department of State. Section 1207, "Security and Stabilization Assistance," of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY06 and FY07 authorized DOD to provide up to \$200 million over 2 years for funds, services, and defense articles to State for security, counterterrorism, stabilization, and reconstruction. In addition to promoting a whole-of-government approach to security and S&R, these funds are to be used for urgent contingencies to prevent escalation of conflict, thereby avoiding the need to deploy U.S. military forces.²⁰

In FY06, DOD transferred \$10 million to State for a program to support basic and investigative training for the Internal Security Forces in Lebanon and to remove unexploded ordnance along the Israel-Lebanon border. In late FY07, DOD transferred over \$99 million to State to reduce gang violence in Haiti; improve governance and security programs at the district level to ensure the rule of law in Nepal; provide small, discrete community-based grants for community mobilization in Colombia; support conflict prevention training and employment opportunities in Yemen; promote security sector reform in Somalia; support rural radio and vocational training in schools in Mali, Mauritania, and Niger to counter Islamic extremism; and strengthen indigenous law enforcement capabilities and eliminate terrorist financing in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

S/CRS assisted Embassy Beirut in determining those Lebanese sectors most in need of funding for the \$10 million FY06 effort, sending out a senior officer in the summer of 2006. Similarly, S/CRS developed the parameters and rationale for the Haiti Stabilization Initiative, a \$20 million program targeting instability and a lack of governance in Cité Soleil, traditionally one of the most volatile urban areas of Port au Prince. These programs have been cited by congressional staffers as most closely reflecting the type of integrated stabilization assistance project legislators envisioned when writing the 1207 section of the NDAA for FY 06.

During FY08, S/CRS sent representatives to Liberia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Horn of Africa to assist in outlining potential 1207 projects while informing country teams of the nature and purpose of this foreign assistance instrument. At the same time, S/CRS's Office of Conflict Prevention designed, in collaboration with DOD, a more deliberative process for receiving, reviewing, and approving Embassy proposals for 1207 projects. Ultimately, S/CRS, along with officers of USAID, F, OSD, and Joint Staff (J5) reviewed 31 proposals from around the world,

eventually approving 7, and requesting the entire \$100 million from DOD for these projects. This process, which took place in mid-2008, is chaired by S/CRS, underlining the civilian character of the design and implementation of this authority. Section 1207 of the FY09 NDAA, which was signed into law October 14, 2008, reauthorized the program until September 30, 2009, with an increase in funding up to \$150 million.

Building an Expeditionary Talent Pool

S/CRS has devoted significant effort for the past 4 years to developing the concepts for an expeditionary civilian response capacity to support S&R operations. S/CRS has also worked strenuously to obtain interagency support for the concept and obtain approval of a civilian response capacity from the National Security Council. Expeditionary field operations to meet new S&R challenges require additional, and more specialized, personnel than the U.S. Government's existing capacity can provide. Current response teams are limited to security, consular, critical incident response, and humanitarian relief. The current reliance on contractors to fill the gap is also problematic. The solution requires State, USAID, and other agencies to have a sufficient number of dedicated, trained personnel who can deploy rapidly and a management system that can access trained staff from across the interagency community to follow the first responders. To that end, Secretary Rice and President Bush proposed the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, for which the President requested nearly \$249 million in his FY09 budget.²¹ The civilian response capacity would be under the authority of the Secretary of State.

The initiative was based on the need to address three types of concurrent, high-priority missions overseas. The first type would be a small mission involving little to no military presence, or primarily civilian police, with the United States providing support (for example, an S&R mission like Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti). The second would be a medium mission that would involve U.S. military and civilian support to an international peacekeeping mission (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Operation Joint Guardian in Kosovo). The third would be a large S&R engagement that could include a major military and civilian intervention in a nonpermissive environment, with the United States responsible for executing or supporting a full range of mission components (for example, a mission like Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan).

The initiative would create a government-wide civilian Response Readiness Corps "to provide assistance in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations in countries or regions that are at risk of, in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife." The Response Readiness Corps has been authorized as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY09.²² The Response Readiness Corps is composed of active and standby components consisting of U.S. Government personnel, including employees of the Department of State, USAID, and other agencies who are recruited and trained (and employed in the case of the active component) to provide such assistance when deployed to do so by the Secretary. These active and standby components constitute the U.S. Government's internal surge capacity.

In addition, plans are under way to establish an external surge capacity, the Civilian Reserve Corps, which would authorize the Secretary to employ and train individuals who have the skills necessary for carrying out reconstruction and stabilization activities, and who have volunteered for that purpose. The Civilian Reserve Corps would be made up of 2,000 volunteer experts from the private sector and local and state governments.

The FY08 Iraq and Afghanistan supplemental provided S/CRS and USAID with funds to create, train, and equip 100 new members of the active component and 500 standby officers. As of early 2009, Congress was still debating a bill for an additional \$75 million for the active and standby components of the Response Readiness Corps. When fully funded, there will be 250 active officers and 2,000 standby officers.²³ Funding has not been provided yet to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps.

Assessing the Challenges

How should the foregoing record be assessed? Clearly, S/CRS can fairly claim credit for a number of positive steps. For each of the distinctive areas that S&R capacity comprises—diagnostic assessments, planning, programmatic assistance, training, and the personnel talent pool—there is definite progress to report. But it should also come as no surprise that S/CRS has endured its share of challenges. As with any newly established advocacy office, it has found itself sailing into strong political and bureaucratic headwinds, cast in the role of a “constructive irritant” acting to promote new patterns of collaboration and change. In a pressurized policy environment, that role inevitably generates some degree of uncertainty and acrimony, as offices with overlapping portfolios and resource claims at State and elsewhere adapt to adjustments in organization and procedure.²⁴

Looking broadly, S/CRS has had to wrestle with political, conceptual, bureaucratic, and operational challenges—none of them surprising in light of the circumstances surrounding its establishment, but all nevertheless daunting in terms of the deeper problems they reveal. Let us consider them in order.

Political Obstacles

The fate of S/CRS is unavoidably tied to U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. In one sense, that connection has been beneficial to the office’s visibility: the S&R mission has become concrete. It is not some contrivance of theorists or policy wonks; Iraq and Afghanistan have made it real. On-the-ground field organizations, most notably Provincial Reconstruction Teams, have become laboratories for innovation in state-building strategies and programs.²⁵ What is more, complaints by U.S. military commanders about having to fill the void in field expertise on the civilian side have definitely helped to focus attention in Congress on the problem.

But along with this reality have come political complications. While U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated how underinvested our country really is in civilian S&R capacity, their sheer size, complexity, and cost have also sucked up enormous amounts of attention, energy, and resources, sometimes to the detriment of systemic reform. Not only have senior American policymakers been distracted by the immediate management demands of these complex operations, but the larger controversy that still swirls around Iraq—as a war of choice—and its tarring effect on the Afghanistan campaign have served to revive Vietnam-era skepticism on the political left regarding the whole concept of counterinsurgency, and on the political right regarding the idea that nation-building, even post-9/11, should ever be a practical aim of U.S. policy.

Politically, these crosscurrents have held S/CRS back. Even with a Republican administration in office, there was trepidation among the organization’s loyalists in Congress that strengthening U.S. state-building capacity would tend to draw the country into ill-advised future contingencies.

This tendency springs from the premise that interventions like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo are more likely to be the exceptions than the rule in the future, and that just as military commanders sometimes mishandle defense preparedness by preparing to “fight the last war,” so too should Americans be careful lest S&R operators waste valuable resources by preparing to “manage the last post-war.”²⁶ Closely coupled with this is skepticism that the State Department can ever be “operationalized”—that is, turned into an on-the-ground service provider rather than an instrument of traditional diplomacy. Both reservations have factored into congressional reluctance to agree to flexible, discretionary funding for S&R operations, and to the more ambitious aspects of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative.²⁷

Conceptual Hurdles

Even as the fortunes of S/CRS are bound, for better or worse, with the Nation’s two ongoing, irregular conflicts, State has wrestled with another, more conceptual challenge: how expansive should its S&R portfolio be?

While S/CRS focused its early efforts, understandably, on post conflict scenarios, it has begun to devote more effort to identifying states at risk and refining concepts and tools for mitigating in advance the conditions that might engulf states in conflict. To be sure, this growing emphasis on a preventive, rather than simply responsive, posture is not inconsistent with NSPD-44’s charge for State S&R activities, but it also raises the issue of where to draw the line between S&R-focused activities and the much larger universe of foreign assistance aimed at promoting peace and security, good governance, health and education, economic growth, and stability. This in turn puts S/CRS into a no-win situation. Efforts to draw that line predictably have been viewed by some functional offices in State and USAID as usurping their core functions, while not drawing the line opens up S/CRS to the criticism that it is trying to be everything to everyone—with the attendant risk that if tries to do everything well, it will end up doing nothing well.

Bureaucratic Barriers

While figuring out the place of conflict prevention within the S&R portfolio has generated its share of problems, the Presidential injunction that S/CRS develop “detailed contingency plans” for integrated efforts has raised the question of where, geographically, the office should focus its attention. Providing support for current operations has not been a problem. Indeed, S/CRS has played a helpful role in providing experts for assessments and other analytic support for organizations already in the field. The harder question has been where to shine the spotlight for possible future operations.

Absent any immediate requirement to generate plans for major new contingencies, S/CRS’s initial focus has been on building the architecture for an interagency system that would conduct such planning. The resulting IMS framework gives a prominent place to regional perspectives. Thus, the central coordinating mechanism for orchestrating the planning effort would be a country-focused S&R group based in Washington. A regional assistant secretary would co-chair the proceedings with the coordinator of S/CRS. Members of the Response Readiness Corps (active and standby) would constitute the field presence in-country, operating under Chief of Mission authority.

Despite these attributes, the IMS has run into strong headwinds from State’s regional bureaus. It has yet to be used, even for small-scale contingencies. Its size and scope have made regional offices reluctant to pull the trigger. IMS language hints at this problem by acknowledging that

standing up a new, country-specific group for S&R must take account of political sensitivity surrounding “prospective interventions,” and that steps should be taken to help mitigate potential implications arising from public knowledge of the effort—steps that could include tracking the process in a lower profile manner.²⁸ For the affected regional bureaus, the lowest profile may be to ensure the process is not activated at all. Ironically, in its effort to be collaborative, S/CRS has required regional bureau representatives from State and USAID to participate in an extraordinarily large number of working groups, meetings, discussions, and even a Government Accountability Office audit, as S/CRS was busy developing its concepts, tools, planning methodologies, and civilian capacity-building initiatives. This requirement has triggered complaints about the distracting effect that S/CRS has had on the bureaus’ day-to-day work in specific countries or regions.

Such problems indicate something deeper than garden-variety, bureaucratic turf battles. The onset of a foreign crisis that carries with it the specter of violence on a scale sufficient to engage the United States invariably triggers two different types of bureaucratic activities: the first focuses on crisis management, conducted mainly by senior policymakers and regionally focused diplomats, the aim of which is to contain or defuse an explosive situation; the second activity is contingency planning, orchestrated mainly by functional specialists operating at mid-levels, which aims to manage the consequences of a rapidly unfolding situation by developing response options that address foreseeable needs, advance core U.S. goals, and minimize the risk of unintended effects. Ideally, these two activities should be complementary; in the real world, tensions arise that can delay or complicate a coherent U.S. response.

Crisis managers tend to operate in an exclusive manner. Their inner circle typically is kept very small. This is hardly surprising, for the messages they seek to convey to foreign interlocutors must be carefully targeted and untainted by “noise” within the bureaucracy. Unauthorized leaks of information could embroil delicate mediation between hostile parties whose forbearance is being sought. In some cases, knowledge that preparations are under way to cope with failure could trigger the very explosion that crisis managers are trying to stave off. For contingency planners, however, this exclusivity poses a problem. Holistic planning is by definition inclusive. Any office or component with legal authority and resources needs to be at the table. Personnel staging for deployment need to be prepared for their tasks. Funding allocations or resource mobilization more generally may require affirmative congressional action.

Given these natural bureaucratic asymmetries, it is not surprising that those who shoulder the S&R portfolio would encounter inhibitions on gaining support for the orchestration of major planning activity. The question—as yet unaddressed—is how to bring these two functions more nearly into sync.

Operational Challenges

Developing the operational capability of S/CRS has been most problematic, due to a lack of resources, high-level commitment, authority, and funding, deficiencies that have prevented S/CRS from testing practically every concept it has developed in the last 4 years. The biggest remaining challenge is to take those concepts and make them operational.

Civilian response system concepts are more fully developed at the strategic level (for example, the Washington-based, country-specific S&R group). At the tactical level—such as in the affected countries—the response mechanisms are also clear. The forward-based teams would be composed of active or standby officers who are hired into the Response Readiness Corps as part

of the Civilian Stabilization Initiative. Advance Civilian Teams and Forward Advance Civilian Teams would be first responders.

Other operational concepts in the IMS are much less fully developed. It is not yet clear how the Response Readiness Corps concepts will be integrated into military planning efforts. Small teams of civilians are supposed to be collocated and integrated at the geographic combatant commands during the contingency planning phase for several months as integrated planning cells (IPCs). After the planning phase, the entire IPC team or several of its members would deploy into the affected country. This concept has not been fully developed or tested.

Some critics, particularly in DOD, contend that a permanent civilian presence of a sufficiently robust size, with particular regional expertise and authority to bring resources to the table, is needed in the combatant commands. A temporary IPC team that “parachutes” into the command for a single contingency effort is not sufficient to fully integrate short- or long-term civilian and military planning and operations. Another operational challenge is the need for agencies to “ramp up” efforts to hire, train, and develop deployment mechanisms for the officers (current and projected) who will be hired as part of the Response Readiness Corps over the next several years. Plans for this expansion are still being developed.

Endnotes

1. Robert Gates, remarks before the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign, July 15, 2008, available at <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1262>.
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3. See, most recently, Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy,” Georgetown University, February 12, 2008, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100703.htm>.
4. National Security Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” The White House, Washington, DC, December 7, 2005.
5. Ibid.
6. See, most recently, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Henry L. Stimson Center, “A Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future: Fixing the Crisis in Diplomatic Readiness,” October 2008, available at <www.academyofdiplomacy.org/publications/FAB_report_2008.pdf>. In the recent past, see U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (The Hart-Rudman Commission), Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change: Phase III Report, January 31, 2001, 52–56, available at <<http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/PhaseIIIFR.pdf>>; and Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Independent Task Force on State Department Reform, State Department Reform (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 7–10. See also Cindy Williams and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program Occasional Paper, June 2008.
7. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), 39. Acheson attributed to State during his tenure a “basic weakness” that reflects a more general characterization of the American personality offered by Townsend Hoopes: “Our difficulty is that as a nation of short-term pragmatists accustomed to dealing with the future only when it has become the present, we find it hard to regard future trends as serious realities.” For more recent criticisms of the U.S. Government, see Aaron Friedberg, “Strengthening U.S. Strategic Planning,” The Washington Quarterly 31, no. 1 (Winter 2007/2008), 47–60.
8. Road Map for National Security, 53
9. See Richard Holbrooke, “Washington’s Battle over Israel’s Birth,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2008, A21.
10. While Nixon may have been an extreme case, long-time observers noted a Cold War–era tendency for Democratic administrations to see the department as hide-bound and unprogressive, while Republican Presidents viewed State as a bastion for liberals and left-wingers. See Duncan L. Clarke, “Why State Can’t Lead,” Foreign Policy 66 (Spring 1987), 130.

11. Newt Gingrich, "Rogue State Department," *Foreign Policy* 137 (July-August 2003).
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13. Carlos Pascual, "Building Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction," Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, January 29, 2008. S/CRS's post conflict reconstruction framework has been based on the pioneering efforts of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the U.S. Army. See Robert C. Orr (ed.), *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).
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21. Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks at the Civilian Response Corps Rollout," U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, July 16, 2008, available at <www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/07/107083.htm>.
22. P.L. 110-417, Title XVI of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2009, "Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008."
23. The recommended composition of expertise to be embedded in the active and standby components of the Response Readiness Corps includes: S&R Planning & Operations Management (primarily State and USAID): core personnel to do assessments, set up base/operations, planning, program design, military liaison, and local engagement; Criminal Justice (primarily State, USAID, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security): police, legal, judicial, and corrections personnel to assess, plan, and start up full-spectrum criminal justice operations and development; Economic Recovery (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce, and USAID): specialists in agriculture, rural development, commerce, tax systems, monetary policy, business services to help stand up economic recovery programs; Essential Service (USAID and Department of Health and Human Services): experts in public health, infrastructure, education, and labor to establish or reestablish essential public services; Diplomatic Security (State): agents to serve as Regional Security Officers and security planners; Diplomacy and Governance (State and USAID): addressing rule of law, human rights, humanitarian protection, governance and democracy, conflict mitigation, civil society and media development, and security sector reform to set up these programs in a crisis environment.
24. For background and perspectives on State's S&R activities, the authors are grateful for the insights of a number of staff officers and officials at S/CRS, as well as the State Department's Policy Planning Office and other components in the State Department, USAID, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, who agreed to be interviewed for this project during June-July 2008.
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Connecting Government Capabilities for Overseas Missions

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While interagency cooperation is important at the strategic and operational levels, it is at the tactical level that it becomes essential to the success of an operation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognized these findings in a December 2006 report: “It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics and division of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”¹ As this chapter will illuminate, most efforts at interagency collaboration on the ground have taken place within the confines of a military structure.

This chapter examines civil-military integration in the field under a range of circumstances. The first section looks at daily, ongoing, interagency cooperation at Embassies and geographic commands. Within geographic commands, closer examination is given to Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs), advisory groups with varying degrees of interagency representation on combatant command (COCOM) staffs. U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) have taken the JIACG concept further by organizing their commands in a new way that integrates the interagency into regional command activities.

The second section discusses interagency cooperation in complex operations using three vastly different examples: Vietnam’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program; Afghanistan and Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); and the 2004 tsunami humanitarian relief operations. The third section assesses the nature of civil-military leadership during various complex contingencies. The fourth section presents options for improving civil-military integration. The conclusion offers suggestions for strengthening civil-military integration in the field and presents findings that, if implemented, would create a far greater on-the-ground civilian presence than currently exists—a civilian presence that is independent of COCOM structures.

Interagency Cooperation on a Daily Basis

Embassies and Country Teams

The Embassy and country team is the oldest example of integration. “All embassies are interagency platforms,”² with the country team being “the critical intersection where plans, policies, programs, and personalities all come together.”³ As the scope and scale of representation from other Federal components grow steadily at Embassies all over the world, so too does the importance of integrated efforts. Since 9/11, Embassies have hosted an influx of personnel involved in counterterrorism activities. Concomitantly, the number of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and noncombat activities has increased significantly.⁴ In some large Embassies, Department of State representation relative to other Federal agencies can be less than one-third of full-time U.S. personnel. While most of the increases have come from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, 27 U.S. departments and agencies are represented at overseas Embassies.⁵

Country teams, in which Federal representatives at the country level meet under the leadership of the Ambassador, have limited capabilities and generally do not address issues at the regional level. Also, no amount of asserting the Ambassador's authority, whether by Presidential decree or memorandum of understanding, has been able to overcome conflicting agency agendas, resources, and authorities. The Ambassador has little influence over the non-foreign affairs agencies represented at an Embassy, which take their direction from their headquarters in Washington—and sometimes that direction conflicts with the Ambassador's vision. In a recent study advocating the creation of "frontline country teams," the authors stress that the success of the country team depends on enhancing the Ambassador's authority.⁶

Nonetheless, the country team can serve as a clearinghouse for information-sharing and program de-confliction, as can the geographic commands, where interagency presence is expanding.

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups and Regional Commands

All regional commands have a JIACG or JIACG-like capability embedded in their staff structures.⁷ What initially started as an urgent post-9/11 need for interagency coordination on counterterrorism issues has since evolved into varying capabilities, depending on the needs of the command, including full-spectrum interagency coordination.

JIACGs are advisory staff elements with varying degrees of interagency representation on COCOM staff designed to meet the specific needs and organizational structures of the command. It should be noted that these JIACGs do not have operational authority. Ambassadors and country teams have no direct relationships with JIACGs.⁸ Briefly:

- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has renamed its JIACG, calling it the Commander's Interagency Engagement Group, a special staff element under the chief of staff.
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has reorganized its JIACG into an Interagency Task Force for Irregular Warfare, a combined operations, intelligence, and interagency organization.⁹
- U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM's) JIACG is a division under J5 and J3.
- U.S. Northern Command has an interagency directorate, the largest interagency component of the COCOMs with the participation of over 60 U.S. departments and agencies.¹⁰
- U.S. Transportation Command's JIACG is a special staff element under the chief of staff.
- USAFRICOM has created a Deputy for Civil-Military Affairs and has been stood up with the intention to be a fully integrated civil-military staff.
- USSOUTHCOM has transformed its JIACG into a J9 interagency "partnering directorate" with a civilian deputy.

The creation of USAFRICOM and expansion of USSOUTHCOM's interagency composition (both of which are discussed in more detail below) represent a growing recognition that many U.S. national security priorities are transnational in nature and are best addressed within a

regional, multiagency approach. A 3D security framework recognizes diplomacy, development, and defense as equal pillars in the implementation of national security policy.¹¹ Phase zero operations, which focus on preventing conflict and addressing the root causes of insecurity, require a concerted, whole-of-government, 3D approach. Existing national security structures do not accommodate a broad regional approach. The 2008 National Defense Strategy states, “A whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, mission, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals,” and points to USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM as moves in the right direction.¹²

The reach of country teams in Embassies is limited to individual nations. While COCOM areas of responsibility encompass entire regions, those organizations are military and, until recently, did not have interagency components. Attempts to increasingly involve interagency components at COCOMs represent a regionalization of the country team concept. However, no amount of interagency cooperation at the COCOM level can overcome the following facts:

- JIACGs and JIACG-like elements lack operational capability.
- There is no civilian-led regional structure (as a COCOM counterpart) to focus on conflict prevention.
- During crises, the organization with the money has the de facto lead.
- Stovepiping and competing interests of various agencies translate into the pursuit of narrow objectives with their own monies.
- There do not exist in the U.S. Government people who are concerned with the government as a whole and can make choices that are not turf-related.
- The commander (or, for that matter, the Ambassador) lacks real authority over other agencies represented at the command (or Embassy).
- The civilian agency has limited capacity to support the broad array of COCOM activities. The civilian agencies do not have the people to spare except at the expense of their organizations’ missions.
- Incompatible networks and collaboration software (including security protocols, policy, and culture) pose challenges to sharing information and knowledge.
- There are impediments to coherent regional policy development and implementation caused by inconsistent geographic boundaries among U.S. Government agencies.

There seems to be general agreement that an integrated whole-of-government approach is needed to effectively implement U.S. policies and plans during complex operations. Agreement is lacking over the best way to organize government assets in both peace and conflict.

USAFRICOM

The command, formally established October 1, 2008, came about in response to the evolving geostrategic environment in Africa and a defense strategy that focuses on conflict prevention, or

phase zero operations.¹³ Combining a geographic area that formerly was divided among three geographic commands (USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM), USAFRICOM has the advantage of starting with a clean slate and has established a command structure that fully integrates civilian and military staffs. Sometimes referred to as a “combatant command plus,”¹⁴ USAFRICOM has dispensed with the J-codes common to other unified commands, organizing itself instead across six categories that are focused more broadly and that integrate interagency leadership and representation:¹⁵

- Outreach: responsible for interagency partners and the international community; directed by a Department of State civilian
- Intelligence and Knowledge Development: capacity-building to avert crises that may lead to conflict; headed by a senior intelligence civilian
- Strategy, Plans, and Programs: more expansive than a typical J5; the director of programs will be a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) civilian, and the Department of Treasury will provide a Senior Executive Service–level civilian
- Operations and Logistics: functions combined to ensure a coherent effort; the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (in USAID) and Department of Homeland Security are both represented in this branch
- Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
- Resources: not only the typical financial aspects, but also the manpower pieces; deputy director is from the Department of Commerce.

Senior positions from USAID and the Departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce have been approved. Representation from the Department of Agriculture and Department of Energy is pending. Less senior positions will be determined by the civilian agencies.¹⁶

The primary focus of the command remains military-to-military relations with African partners. The command treats the region as a whole rather than applying the single country framework of Embassies. USAFRICOM will also support U.S. Government agencies and international organizations that have activities in the region, working on a “sustained basis to build capacity, support the humanitarian assistance efforts of USAID and others, working with our African partners to get ahead of the problem set to head off impending crises if necessary, or to respond as necessary.”¹⁷

DOD has not escaped the controversy. Some, including Africans, other U.S. agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), assert that the creation of USAFRICOM is an example of the militarization of U.S. foreign aid.¹⁸ Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, Deputy for Military Operations at USAFRICOM, has addressed this criticism, reiterating that DOD would be playing a supporting role to the activities of other U.S. agencies and international organizations and focusing on security sector reform that builds local capacity.¹⁹ In spite of the criticism, it is also widely acknowledged that USAFRICOM represents a positive development for U.S. Africa policy, drawing additional resources and attention to the region.²⁰

To underscore the importance of working with interagency partners, from the outset, USAFRICOM created a new organizational structure, establishing two deputies to the

commander: a military deputy (Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations) and a new civilian deputy (Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities). A foreign policy advisor still reports separately to the commander. Another new command element calls for a senior development advisor, a position specifically envisioned for a senior officer from USAID who will report directly to the new civilian deputy. When fully staffed, the command will have approximately equal numbers of uniformed personnel and civilians, with a large component of the civilians being from DOD.

Another feature that will set USAFRICOM apart from other commands is that it will not have assigned or allocated forces, relying instead on the global force management process. The decision was made to stand up USAFRICOM under the new National Security Personnel System, which forced the command to think in concrete terms about the kinds of skills its personnel needed. Having to familiarize themselves with the civilian personnel system, including training, professional development, and recruitment, has been challenging for the military component of the command but has served to unify military and civilians. Most notably, all employees from other U.S. Government agencies will be dual-hatted as DOD employees, allowing them the same benefits enjoyed by DOD personnel.²¹ The ongoing issue of the limited capacity of other U.S. Government agencies to divert their personnel to these missions remains a significant problem.²²

Although USAFRICOM will be headquartered at Kelley Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany, consideration is being given to options for representation on the African continent, including the expansion of military representation in Embassies. The initial reaction to locating the command on the continent has been negative. Both domestic and international criticism has centered on the perception that moving the command to Africa is part of a larger goal to establish a U.S. military foothold on the continent, despite DOD assurances that the intent is to establish a staff headquarters and not a military one. African countries' concerns range from having a foreign military presence within their borders to an American presence emboldening domestic terrorist groups.²³

Finally, USAFRICOM is set to build upon the experiences of the only forward U.S. military presence in the region, Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), located in Djibouti. CJTF–HOA was established in October 2002 to detect, deter, and defeat transnational terrorist groups in the region. Its approximately 1,500 civilian and military personnel, however, work on a range of activities from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance. CJTF–HOA has supported 11 humanitarian missions, such as airlifting supplies to Ethiopia and Kenya, and many civil-military operations that involve digging wells and building and repairing schools, hospitals, and roads. CJTF–HOA is an example of an ongoing regional phase zero operation.²⁴

USSOUTHCOM

USSOUTHCOM is responsible for U.S. military efforts in Central and South America. Like USAFRICOM, its focus is on operations that are not combat-related, including counternarcotics and Plan Colombia. Unlike USAFRICOM, USSOUTHCOM is a mature command that is undergoing a transformation toward a joint and interagency operation,²⁵ although it has a long history of working within the interagency community.²⁶ Like USAFRICOM, it has abandoned J-coding in favor of staff structures that integrate individuals from other U.S. departments and agencies into the command, and it is in the process of reorganizing to accommodate dual deputies to the commander, adding a civilian deputy from the Department of State. Civilians will head the Stability Directorate, the Partnering Directorate (formerly the JIACG), and the

Resources and Assessment and Enterprise Support sections; the Security and Intelligence Directorate and the Policy and Strategy Directorate will be led by military officers. Where civilians lead a directorate, the deputy will be a military officer and vice versa.²⁷ Once the reconfiguration is fully implemented, no military staff growth is foreseen; civilian staff growth will depend on agency decisions.

Approximately 35 interagency personnel are currently embedded in USSOUTHCOM staff, including those from USAID, the Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, and Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community.²⁸ Interagency interaction takes the form of coordination group meetings, which are convened to address regional topics of shared interest to the interagency community (such as hostage situations, support and operation of migrant camps, and hurricane relief operations, to name a few).²⁹

Within USSOUTHCOM, Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is an example of an interagency, joint, international task force working to address a specific, regional issue, drug interdiction.³⁰ Coordinating the operations of eight U.S. agencies, the four U.S. military services and representatives from 11 foreign countries, JIATF-South, based in Key West, Florida, may be a model of integration. The fight against illegal cocaine in Latin America requires coordinated interagency efforts to interdict the flow of drugs across many boundaries and terrains (land, sea, air) in the region. Coca plants are grown and cocaine is produced in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, known as the “source zone.” The “transit zone” includes every country between the source zone and the United States.

Interagency Cooperation in Complex Operations

Three models of interagency cooperation are discussed in this section. The CORDS program in Vietnam is the most complex and intense example of civil-military cooperation in the field to date. The PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq attempted to emulate the CORDS program in some respects, but comparisons show that the two actually have little in common. Finally, a discussion of the 2004 tsunami relief operation highlights civil-military coordination during a humanitarian response to a regional problem.

Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program

The challenges to civil-military coordination are not new. The CORDS program in Vietnam was an innovative effort to integrate interagency programs and conduct nation-building in a theater of war. There has been no structured solution for civil-military integration during conflict at the country level since that time.³¹ CORDS was preceded by the unsuccessful Strategic Hamlets Program, designed to deploy USAID, the United States Information Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and military advisors into the provinces of South Vietnam. These agencies worked at cross-purposes, despite President John F. Kennedy’s intervention.³² CORDS, on the other hand, brought together over 2,500 military and civilian U.S. advisors, unified under a civilian deputy to the commander of the military assistance command, and is cited as a model for today’s interagency challenges.

However, using CORDS as a model misses several fundamental points. The implementation of CORDS, after other failed attempts at asserting civilian control over the Vietnamese pacification mission, represented a massive change to the U.S. organizational and operational approach to the Vietnam War. A change of this magnitude was possible because of President Lyndon Johnson’s full support. The comprehensive nature and massive scale of the effort were products of the

circumstances and constraints of the time: it came late in the day, after costly U.S. military intervention, with time constraints uppermost in U.S. policymakers' minds.³³ CORDS was a last-ditch effort to turn the tide by building a counterinsurgency organization that worked alongside local security forces. Particularly important to CORDS success was the fact that the South Vietnamese provided a significant security component, an element that has not been matched in either Afghanistan or Iraq.³⁴ The Vietnamese-to-U.S. advisor ratio, even at the peak of American involvement, was over 100:1.³⁵

The architect of the organization, Ambassador Robert Komer, described CORDS as:

a unique experiment in a unified civil/military field advisory and support organization . . . [where] soldiers served directly under civilians, and vice versa, at all levels. They even wrote each other's efficiency reports . . . and CORDS was fully integrated into the theater military structure. The Deputy for CORDS . . . [was] perhaps the first American of ambassadorial rank to serve directly in the military chain of command as an operational deputy, not just a political advisor. The cutting edge was unified civil-military advisory teams in all 250 districts and 44 provinces.³⁶

Even so, during a lessons learned conference after the war, Ambassador Komer observed that "the military operated, and, I might add, also the civilians, on the basis of their own internal goals, rather than in terms of any concept of overall national, as opposed to parochial service requirements."³⁷ That problem still exists today.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

PRTs are America's newest model of civil-military integration, designed from the onset as 3D interagency organizations, operating by consensus rather than clear military or civilian leadership. The first PRT was stood up in 2002 in Afghanistan, where 15 different nations now run 26 PRTs. The first PRT went to Iraq in 2005.³⁸ As of March 2008, 24 PRTs operated in Iraq's 18 provinces.³⁹

Afghanistan. Of the 26 PRTs in Afghanistan, the United States leads 12; International Security Assistance Force coalition partners lead the other 14.⁴⁰ The size and composition of PRTs vary. In Afghanistan, U.S.-led PRTs typically consist of 50–100 personnel, of which only a handful are U.S. Government civilians or contractors. An Air Force lieutenant colonel or Navy commander heads the U.S.-led PRT but does not command the non-DOD civilians. In addition, U.S.-led PRTs have two Army civil affairs teams and typically include a military police unit, a psychological operations unit, an explosive ordnance/demining unit, an intelligence team, medics, a force protection unit, and administrative and support personnel. An Afghan representing the Ministry of the Interior may also be part of the team.⁴¹

Iraq. In Iraq, there are two types of U.S.-led PRTs: 11 "original" PRTs and 13 "embedded" PRTs, which, unlike the original PRTs, are embedded in brigade or regimental combat teams. In addition to PRTs, other kinds of units do similar work, including Provincial Security Teams and Regional Reconstruction Teams. Coalition members Britain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea each lead a PRT. Unlike those in Afghanistan, Department of State personnel lead the Iraq teams. Civilians (including many contractors) staff the original PRTs. Security for the original PRTs is provided by either a contracted personnel security detail or a military movement team from a nearby unit. The original PRTs may have as many as 100 team members, including personnel

from the Departments of State, Agriculture, and Justice; Multi-National Force–Iraq; the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers; USAID contractors; and locally employed Iraqi staff. These PRTs are located on forward operating bases.⁴²

The subject of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq has been thoroughly covered by others;⁴³ the intent here is to focus on some lessons learned. These can be summed up as “no doctrine, no training, no people, and no money.”⁴⁴ The organization and operations of the PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq are different, but they share many problems—and those problems reside within the U.S. Government, not in Iraq or Afghanistan. A House Armed Services Committee report and the PRT Lessons Learned Workshop identified the following examples as challenges facing PRTs across the board:⁴⁵

- lack of unity of command/effort in the field, resulting in multiple U.S. Government voices that confuse host-government officials and hamper the effectiveness of efforts
- absence of doctrine/policy/mission, creating a personality-driven/-dependent environment
- limited or no understanding of PRT role by host country
- lack of integrated civil-military training
- no ownership, resulting in no single organization being responsible
- lack of “unity of funding”
- problematic staff selection, creating uneven skill sets
- no metrics for measuring success
- shortfalls in coordination mechanisms with host country.

The lack of ownership of PRTs, identified at the PRT Lessons Learned Workshop as the core problem,⁴⁶ means that no agency or institution is responsible for providing the capability for stability and reconstruction support in situations where there has been a failure of governance. By extension, no one agency is responsible for providing trained personnel and equipment, and there is no doctrine or commonly accepted conceptual model for how this capability should be integrated across the interagency and within the host country. Remarkably, Ambassador Komer identified the lack of a single department charged with counterinsurgency as the most important factor in the failure to carry out a pacification program on a scale commensurate with the need: “[Counterinsurgency] was everybody’s business and nobody’s, because there was no vested interest, no great department charged precisely with this function.”⁴⁷

Current PRT organizations are ad hoc, personality-driven operations succeeding in spite of themselves because talented, dedicated individuals are working creatively to solve myriad problems. These are fortuitous tactical successes rather than planned strategic ones.

The House Armed Services Committee report notes that, after 5 years’ experience with PRTs, there is no way to discern when they will have fulfilled their mission and will no longer be needed.⁴⁸ How will PRTs transition as security conditions and our military posture change?

Comparing CORDS and PRTs

Beyond the fact that both CORDS and PRTs are combined interagency elements with an embedded security component, the two types of organization have very little in common. CORDS was embedded in a large military headquarters responsible for an entire country. The unity of planning and effort extended to the province, village, and even hamlet level of CORDS and its South Vietnamese counterpart structure. Perhaps the most notable difference between CORDS in Vietnam and our current efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan is the scope and size of the CORDS mission as compared to the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in terms of the civilian commitment.

Humanitarian Crises—Tsunami Relief

The ability to respond successfully to humanitarian disasters requires coordinated interagency surge and organizational capacity. The 2004 tsunami that affected six countries in Southeast Asia (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) is a case in point. With no regional interagency infrastructure in place, the U.S. Government had to create a series of ad hoc organizations to confront and coordinate the problems suffered by several nations.⁴⁹ Still, the response to tsunami relief was successful due to several factors. First, it was a disaster of rapid onset, the extent of the destruction was readily apparent, and the decision to intervene was made quickly, resulting in an overwhelming international response. When the onset of a disaster is slower, assessment of the problem and the decision to intervene can take time. In addition, while the 2004 tsunami had a big impact over a wide region, the effects were contained to areas along the coastline. Finally, with the enormous outpouring of money, funding was not an issue for relief agencies. As a result, NGOs that might have requested funding from United Nations (UN) agencies or USAID raised funds elsewhere, and their coordination with these agencies was thus voluntary.⁵⁰

The important role of the U.S. Navy in the tsunami relief effort, particularly in flight support and medical assistance, is widely recognized, although it was downplayed by USPACOM. Within hours of the crisis, USPACOM dispatched assets ranging from carrier strike groups to water purification ships to aircraft to provide emergency support. The USPACOM commander issued a directive spelling out that its role was as a supporting element to the general relief effort. USAID characterized the interagency cooperation as a “comfortable set up where everyone was doing what they do best—the military was not making the humanitarian decisions.”⁵¹

The most significant aspect of the U.S. military support was the availability of almost 60 helicopters, which shuttled relief supplies, including fresh water, from U.S. ships and other staging areas to towns and villages.⁵² In addition to the delivery of relief supplies, the military participated in search and rescue missions, evacuated the injured, and provided military forensic teams and preventive medicine units.

Although DOD played down its role in the tsunami relief, its most valuable contribution was its unique capabilities in command, control, and communications and in coordination. These capabilities, critical in wartime, proved equally vital in ensuring an effective, coordinated response. Within 2 days of the disaster, USPACOM had established a joint task force—Combined Support Force 536 (CSF 536)—to coordinate and conduct humanitarian assistance. CSF 536 collaborated closely with U.S. Embassies and USAID field teams, including deployed USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs). The Combined Coordination Center (CCC) at Utapao, Thailand, became the hub of international relief coordination; liaison officers

from Britain, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia, USAID DART officials, a civil-military coordination cell, and a local representative from the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs met several times per day to coordinate efforts among their respective organizations. This provided an essential element of on-scene coordination that helped to avoid duplication of effort and facilitated accurate assessments of the extent of the damage and identification of the areas most in need of assistance. The CCC also helped facilitate the efforts of the international “Core Group” (Australia, Canada, India, Japan, United States, and others) that was established to coordinate the first stages of the international relief effort, identify and fill gaps, and avoid or break logistical bottlenecks, until the United Nations was able to mobilize and play a more central role in the relief response.⁵³

At the country level, to support the multination, multi-organization relief effort more effectively, CSF 536 established Combined Support Groups (CSGs) in each of the affected countries, headed by one-star officers, to coordinate with local agencies and NGOs as well as with U.S. DART teams. The CSGs played an important role in coordinating local public health relief efforts.⁵⁴ The CSGs essentially filled an organizational gap, providing the framework and managerial skills that were the foundation for both the local government and the broader relief efforts. Under Secretary of State Alan Larson underscored USPACOM’s on-scene efforts, noting “the remarkable things they accomplished to establish the logistical backbone for the entire relief operation and to facilitate the work of the United Nations, NGOs, and other donors.”⁵⁵

The U.S. military filled the organizational need for a coordinating structure at the tactical level. The response to the tsunami disaster highlights the inadequacy of Embassies to take on a coordinating role of the magnitude and breadth required for a regional disaster. While the U.S. Embassies in the affected countries held daily country team meetings to assess logistics requirements for their specific country,⁵⁶ the tactical organization, coordination, and implementation of assistance was led by the only organization that had the capability to do so at a regional level—USPACOM.

Civil-Military Leadership

DOD has been working on the incorporation of non-kinetic operations and all that they entail for many years. Those efforts and the terminology used to describe them have evolved to include military operations other than war; stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR); and humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

A phasing model forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and is used to help commanders and staffs to visualize and think through an operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The actual number of phases used will vary (they may be compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) from operation to operation and will be determined by the commander.

Only in 2006 did the core document establishing the joint warfighting doctrine expand the phasing model to six phases—zero (shape), one (deter), two (seize the initiative), three (dominate), four (stabilize), and five (enable civil authority)—and establish a “stability operations” construct and military support to SSTR.⁵⁷

So-called command leads for each of the six phases seem clear in theory: phases zero (shape), one (deter), and five (enable civil authority) would appear to be the purview of civilian authorities, where diplomacy and aid theoretically are the main focus of an operation. Phases

two (seize the initiative) and three (dominate) would imply a military lead. Phase four (stability) would involve a transition from military to civilian leadership and focus. In practice, the civilian/military focus and leadership during the various operational phases have worked differently.

These differences are not confined to phase four operations, where some ambiguity might be expected during a transition from military to civilian lead. As discussed earlier, the establishment of USAFRICOM suggests a regional military lead during phases zero, one, and five, especially given its mission, which is solely focused on soft power. USSOUTHCOM, which is modeling itself after USAFRICOM, is also undertaking more soft power missions. By contrast, the country teams in the regions covered by the work of USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM are at best equals with their military counterparts, not unequivocal leads. The civilians lack a regional equivalent to COCOMs in the field.

Similarly, phase four stability operations are meant to be civilian-led. The PRT experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq indicate otherwise. While the nominal heads of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are military officers and the nominal heads of U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq are Foreign Service Officers, in reality, the lead belongs to the person representing the agency with the resources. Leadership is de facto determined by the goals of a particular PRT and the agency from which the resources are available to meet those goals. Therefore, no designation of command lead, whether civilian or military, will be meaningful unless the designated lead has the resources to back its leadership.⁵⁸

Is the phasing model still relevant to today's national security challenges? The writers of doctrine point out that the phasing model is only a tool for the commander to use in planning an operation. Rarely are the phases clear-cut with precise boundaries—they do not necessarily fall into tidy categories, but instead tend to overlap. Furthermore, a whole-of-government approach to complex operations means that resources other than those of DOD should be brought to bear on an operation. However, resource restrictions and the lack of an operational capacity prevent other organizations from taking a clear lead. DOD remains the only organization with the capability to organize, manage, and move people and resources to and within an operation.

Options for Improved Civil-Military Integration

Choosing which model of civil-military cooperation is most appropriate to the task will depend on the broader strategic environment. Different models may be appropriate, depending on the scenario, but a system that can accommodate the model must be in place to enable a decision when it is made.

The following suggestions for improved civil-military integration (which are not mutually exclusive) merit reflection in the context of:

- the evolving nature of threats to U.S. national security interests
- the extent of change we are prepared to consider in response to the changing security environment
- the increasing tension between country-centric versus regional approaches
- the current focus on agency equities at the expense of broader U.S. interests.

Create a Surge-absorption Capability at Embassies

The Embassy of the Future report suggests organizing the Embassy along functional rather than agency lines.⁵⁹ Currently, members of various U.S. agencies are segregated from each another. One suggestion involves “doubling the size of substantive State”— Civil Service and Foreign Service Officers, excluding support staff—and creating at each Embassy a function dealing with stability and reconstruction missions.⁶⁰ These positions would be staffed at all times, just as political, economic, consular, and public diplomacy functions are staffed today. In addition to staffing the new functional area with Department of State personnel, it would also accommodate other U.S. agency personnel. During a time of crisis, this unit within an Embassy would absorb any additional influx of government personnel. This would also mean fully integrating USAID into State to underscore its integral role in foreign policy rather than keeping it as a separate humanitarian assistance/development organization.

Clarify/Strengthen the Role of the Ambassador

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed that the leadership qualities of an Ambassador are a determining factor in the success of the campaign against terror. However, under current constructs, the Ambassador has no effective authority over non-foreign policy personnel at the Embassy. Recommendations for empowering the Ambassador include the authority to override directives from other government agencies to their staffs in the Embassy; the ability to approve all military-related programs implemented in country; and creation of a memorandum of understanding governing the activities of Special Operations Forces in country.⁶¹ Among the recommendations in *The Embassy of the Future* report that merit consideration is to grant Ambassadors authority over performance evaluations not only for all foreign affairs agencies, but also for all agencies on the country team.⁶² (Similarly, military commanders should have authority over performance evaluations for the interagency members at their command.) Along similar lines, Griffin and Donnelly advocate the creation of frontline country teams in which the U.S. Ambassador, supported by a military assistance and advisory group within the Embassy, would direct U.S. security partnerships. They stress that the success of the country team depends on enhancing the Ambassador’s leadership authority and effectively integrating interagency operations on the ground.⁶³

Place Military Assets at the Command of Civilian Authorities

For some foreign affairs civilians, placing more civilians at COCOMs and relying on the transfer of DOD funds to implement programs under State authority only exacerbate the problem of the unbalanced resource equation. True civil-military integration would include the option of putting military assets at the command of civilian authorities up to the point where we go to war. After the military fights and wins the war, assets would be turned back over to civilian leadership. This would require creating and paying for a robust civilian infrastructure to take on the responsibility of civilian leadership.

Restructure Country Teams

Robert Oakley and Michael Casey propose restructuring Embassies along functional lines relevant to issues facing a particular country. At larger Embassies, positions for two deputy chiefs of mission would be created—one for substantive issues and one for program management. The deputy for management would be responsible for the country team’s policy agenda; the other deputy would oversee the functional components of the Embassy, such as law enforcement,

trade promotion, and crisis planning and response. For an integrated approach, employees from various U.S. agencies would occupy appropriate components. The activities of military elements assigned to the mission would fall unambiguously under the authority of the Ambassador, except in the context of forces engaged in hostilities when the independent authority of combatant commanders would be activated.⁶⁴ Ambassadors would have input into the performance reviews of all employees, including those from non-foreign affairs agencies.

Reinforce Informal Coordination Mechanisms

The personalities of civilian and military leaders and their staffs, and their proximity to one another, can contribute to successful coordination of efforts. During Somalia's Operation *Restore Hope*, the civilian Presidential special representative and the military Combined Joint Task Force commander and their staffs collaborated successfully because of their personal commitment. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the Ambassadors and military commanders collocated their offices within the Embassies to ensure a coordinated approach. The examples set by these leaders trickled down to their staffs. By contrast, during the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, the Ambassador's and military commander's offices were separate and their staffs rarely coordinated with one another. Currently in Iraq, the Ambassador has authority over U.S. personnel, with the exception of those involved in military and security matters, who come under the authority of the military commander.

Restructure Regional Commands Using CORDS-like Structure

Using USAFRICOM and USSOUTHCOM as the prototype, a civilian deputy is integrated into a military command, and members of the interagency are represented throughout the command organized along functional lines to better accommodate an interagency approach. Where a civilian heads a directorate, its deputy is a military official, and vice versa. To be effective, this structure would be replicated at all levels to create a clear hierarchy⁶⁵ and would be reinforced when performance reviews are written without regard to civilian or military status.

Reconsider COCOM versus Ambassador Authority over In-country Pre-insurgency Military Operations

Currently, military assistance and training programs remain under the execution authority of the COCOM commander. Certainly, collaboration and coordination take place, but this arrangement tends to place the COCOM commander in a preferred position in the eyes of host country officials. Bob Killebrew proposes achieving unity of command in a pre-insurgency theater by subordinating to the Ambassador all military forces charged with advising a host country's military forces, with the regional combatant commander in a supporting role. The size of the military presence should be expandable as needed, depending on the host country's requirements. Should a crisis occur, a Presidential envoy and a three-star deputy commander to the geographic combatant command would supersede the Ambassador. The country team, including the military element, would continue to function under the authority of the Ambassador up to the point of warfare, at which point the Ambassador would support the military operation.⁶⁶ The key to this scenario is the foundational presence of a military component in country that can swell to accommodate combat operations when needed.

Create Regional Civilian-led Interagency Organizations

Richard Downie proposes a complete restructuring of the U.S. foreign policy apparatus to make Federal departments and agencies “service providers” to a global system of regional civilian-led interagency organizations (RCLIOs), analogous to the way the military services are service providers to the combatant commands. An RCLIO would supervise both the COCOM and the Embassies in the region. The civilian RCLIO leaders would report to the President through a revised NSC system, which would reflect an interagency version of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Embassies would be under the RCLIOs, the National Command Authority would also be changed to include the Secretary of State, along with the President and the Secretary of Defense.⁶⁷

Endnotes

1. “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign,” Report to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, December 15, 2006.
2. George L. Argyros, Marc Grossman, and Felix G. Rohatyn, *The Embassy of the Future* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 47.
3. Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America’s First Line of Engagement,” *Joint Force Quarterly* 47 (4th Quarter 2007), 146.
4. “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign.”
5. Argyros, Grossman, and Rohatyn, 47.
6. Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, “The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement,” *American Enterprise Institute*, June 2008.
7. Information on JIACGs provided to author informally by U.S. Joint Forces Command J9 Interagency Division, April 2008.
8. “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-terror Campaign.”
9. USCENTCOM characterizes the reason for the May 2008 reorganization as including the desire to move from soft coordination to action, to increase intelligence leverage, and to support the Pentagon’s move for an irregular warfare requirement. Extracted from USCENTCOM brief “JIACG to IATF-IW,” presented June 11, 2008, and provided to author informally by USJFCOM J9 Interagency Division.
10. Richard D. Downie, “Reforming U.S. Foreign Policy Implementation: Creating a Global System of Regional Civilian-Led Interagency Operations,” April 30, 2008.
11. Lisa Schirch and Aaron Kishbaugh, “Leveraging ‘3D’ Security: From Rhetoric to Reality” (Silver City, NM, and Washington, DC: *Foreign Policy in Focus*, November 16, 2006).
12. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, June 2008), 17–18.
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15. Robert T. Moeller, “AFRICOM: The Road Ahead for United States Africa Command,” speech at the Brookings Institution, May 27, 2008.
16. “Best Practices for Geographic Combatant Command Transformations: SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM,” *Institute for Defense Analyses*, April 9, 2008.

17. Moeller.
18. “Transforming National Security: AFRICOM—An Emerging Command: Synopsis and Key Insights,” notes from conference on USAFRICOM sponsored by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, available at <www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/NCW_course/AFRICOM%20Summary%20Notes.pdf>.
19. Moeller.
20. “Transforming National Security: AFRICOM—An Emerging Command Synopsis and Key Insights.”
21. Moeller.
22. In general, other agencies are not authorized manpower for overseas missions, and their contributions to these missions are “diversions” from their legislative charter and authorized funding.
23. Ploch, 10.
24. *Ibid.*, 18–19.
25. USSOUTHCOM’s interagency partnering and reorganization brief, CAPT Kevin C. Hutcheson, Deputy Director for Interagency Integration, Interagency Partnering Directorate (J9), source: USJFCOM.
26. Plan Colombia was a bilateral, whole-of-government approach between the United States and Colombia that involved successful security sector reform and an interagency team. The 500-person Joint Interagency Task Force–South conducts counter–illicit trafficking operations with personnel from all the military Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, the Intelligence Community, and 11 allied civilian (law enforcement) and military organizations. See “Best Practices for Geographic Combatant Command Transformations.”
27. Downie.
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60. Interview with member of the Senior Foreign Service, June 17, 2008.
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Preemptive Post-Conflict Stabilization and Reconstruction

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Any decent surgeon will tell you that all operations are complex; none are simple, routine or risk-free. Any doctor who would say otherwise is ignorant or arrogant and, in either case, potentially lethal. A successful surgical operation requires competent, experienced leadership, strong staff work, training and experience, an understanding of the risks and possible complications, and the necessary back up and a willingness to call it in when the situation warrants. It also begins with a proper diagnosis of the problem. And so it is with complex operations.

There were four major decision points on Iraq: whether to go in, how to go in, what to do the Day After and, in 2006, how to change course significantly to pull Iraq back from the brink of the abyss. This is not the place to debate whether there was good and sufficient cause to invade Iraq in 2003. Most of the rationales and excuses are threadbare by now. The merits of the Rumsfeld Doctrine, “shock and awe” and the size of the force General Franks ultimately had at his disposal, and related issues of martial law all played in the debacle of the Day After, and the need to create (or recreate) counterinsurgency doctrine.

These also have been examined in great depth by others.

Much has been made of the revolutionary nature of the new COIN doctrine, often called the Petraeus Doctrine: the maxim that force can lose a counterinsurgency but not win one; the primacy of the political over the military; the centrality of protection of the population over the killing of the enemy; and, the unity-of-effort or whole-of-government approach.¹ What is revolutionary is not that these lessons were new, that they were unique to Iraq, or to 21st century conflict. What is revolutionary was that these lessons had been learned, known, and consciously forgotten—ghosts of conflicts past and lost. What is revolutionary about the COIN doctrine is that it reached into the past, brought it forward, and updated it. It was not the reinvention of the wheel, but a rediscovery that the principles of the wheel still applied. A core element is not the demilitarization of broader counterinsurgency operations, but the de-civilianization of the military. It is a recognition that the complexity of an operation and the broad scope of an operation—interagency, civilian-military, and multilateral—are potential strengths, not inherent weaknesses.

After leaving the State Department, I was fortunate to land as a fellow at the Kennedy School of Government’s Institute of Politics. Early on, I gave a lecture entitled “Ad hoc’ing our way to Baghdad,” about how our refusal to plan, to draw on the work of the 18-month interagency Future of Iraq Project, to adequately staff (we had about 120 civilians to run a shattered country of 25 million), and our lack of a clear mandate or authority made a mockery of our vaulted political rhetoric. Regime change in Iraq was not a repudiation of President Bush’s pledge not to do nation-building but its manifestation.

The Rumsfeldian version of unity of effort through not only unilateral military action, but also uni-agency operations (both covered by fig leaves of coalition partnerships and interagency

participation) was seductively simple and streamlined on the surface, but ultimately counterproductive. It forfeited the expertise, legitimacy, and checks and balances of multiple players. Over time, it became insular, isolated, and detached. The costs were evident as Iraq spun out of control and we lacked not only the doctrine and the tools to respond, but also the expertise to properly understand and diagnose the problem.

The working assumption was that we would go in, dust off the Iraqi bureaucracy (which would be in its offices as if on “pause”), patch up the infrastructure, install a government (the famously oxymoronic concept of “imposed democracy”), and be gone by the end of summer. General Jay Garner, the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), precursor to Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), missed few opportunities to remind his staff of the short tenure of his contract, which turned out to be even shorter than advertised.

To the extent there was a plan, it was drafted in Kuwait (by a British officer), was no more than an inch thick, explicitly was not shared interagency, reflected a grudging acceptance of coalition civilian contributions, had little apparent Iraqi contribution beyond OSD’s chosen few, and was not systematically coordinated prior to or after our arrival with the U.S. military. An insurgency may have been inevitable in Iraq, but the size and intensity of the conflagration was not. The Future of Iraq Project, even if fully implemented, was no silver bullet, but to ignore Eisenhower’s dictum that the value of a plan is in the planning—and the planners—and to go in without either evidenced a fatal combination of arrogance and idiocy.

Many have asked when we knew we had a train wreck on our hands. It was clear in April 2003 in Baghdad, late March in Kuwait, and even early March in the Pentagon. The Presidential mandate giving DOD the lead on reconstruction of post-invasion Iraq was not bestowed until late January 2003. The Coordinator for Reconstruction for Baghdad and the Central Governorates was not recruited until the end of February 2003, and started on March 2, 2003. There was no staff, no structure, no recruiting process, and no resources. The pretense that ORHA was a civilian organization was perhaps more palatable to the American public, but the effect of the policy was obscure to those within ORHA, ambiguous to the U.S. military, and befuddling to the Iraqis. Donning a suit does not make one civilian anymore than my donning desert cammies made me military. The top ORHA leadership and the coordinators for two of the three regions were retired Army generals. All lacked sustained regional expertise and broad post-conflict credentials, and all evidenced minimum interagency or multilateral experience. The 120 or so civilians in ORHA to manage a shattered country of 25 million were dwarfed by the military and nearly crippled by a leadership culture that denied interagency and coalition experts the communications, transportation, and translation resources necessary to get outside the Green Zone to do our jobs.

This last point was brought home tellingly at the conclusion of my ad-hoc’ery lecture. A young man came up afterwards, a former Army officer and West Point graduate who had been in Baghdad the same time as I. He had been assigned to the Dura neighborhood, later one of the bloodiest districts in the city. He recounted his frustration and anger at the reconstruction tasks he faced, the expectations of the Iraqis in his charge, and the lack of any tools with which to work. How was he to fix the electrical grid, the sewage problem, the water, or any of the other challenges his district faced? Who could he turn to for advice, assistance, or access to city plans? Were there any city plans?

The irony is that, as he was coping as best he could at the district level with no guidance, just a mandate to get it done, my small team and I were meeting daily with the mayoralty, the deputy

mayors and director generals who ran the city before the invasion and had stayed after liberation to keep it running. Most were dedicated technocrats who had operated under the radar of the Ba'ath Party. In a sense, they were those Iraqi bureaucrats we had counted on to run the city, the ministries, and the country on our behalf. We had access to the officials with the knowledge, the plans, and the experience to fix many of that Army major's problems. The tragedy is that our structure was set up in such a way that neither my team and I nor the Baghdad technocrats had any way of knowing what the major and his neighborhood needed, or any way to get it to him, and he had no way to communicate with us. In fact, until we met in Boston, he did not even know there was an American operation in the city he could turn to. The firewalls between the reconstruction effort and the military effort were impenetrable. The cost to our mission and to the Iraqis is incalculable.

The tectonic shift in approach under the COIN doctrine, the creation of provincial reconstruction teams, the establishment of State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization Office (S/CRS), and the Center for Complex Operations make manifest the necessity of thinking through and planning for complex operations, of breaking through that firewall we faced in Iraq in 2003. They leave open the critical question of how to avoid the next Iraq, the Iraq of the Day After. It is not just a question of complex post-conflict operations, but complex pre-conflict intervention and planning.

What is the lesson we are trying to learn here? How to do the next Iraq better? How to do Afghanistan? Or how not to have to do Iraq or Afghanistan again? If our focus is simply on post-conflict operations, or counterinsurgency, we may consign ourselves to an endless round of low-grade conflicts. The principle threats to our national security, global economic interests, and national values will not come from rival superpowers, but rather from weak, failing, or failed states. Of the countless lessons of 9/11, an important one is that to ignore the remote is to invite disaster. We walked away from post-Soviet Afghanistan and paid the price. We refused to plan for a post-Saddam Iraq and paid a price. And, given the scourge du jour—piracy—we may have ignored Somalia long enough to pay a price. If our lessons learned are how to better respond to a Taliban, an anti-occupation insurgency, or the Barbary Pirates redux, then keep a copy of the FM 3-24 handy and learn its basic lessons well. Internalize whole-of-government and unity-of-effort approaches, protection of the population, the primacy of the political, the centrality of legitimacy, and the requirement for sustainable economic development. Those are good lessons and the right lessons, and if used as touchstones rather than a template, we will do the next Iraq and the next Afghanistan well. (I would strongly encourage we resist the temptation to try this in Somalia.)

Option B to managing the next post-conflict operation well is to take these principles of counterinsurgency and post-conflict stabilization and front load them. This is not a plea for the hoary matrices that seek to predict the next failed state with the same degree of accuracy as predictions of California earthquakes. This is not an endorsement of the concept of responsibility to protect, which has much to recommend it, but also significant drawbacks. But short of an over-quantification of the problem, or an over-internationalization of the response, most decent analysts and practitioners know which states and governments are fraying around the edges but have not yet disintegrated.

I would propose Yemen as an example. Yemen is the always almost failing state. In the late 1970s there was a famous if now forgotten series of cables from the Embassy entitled "Yemen at the Crossroads." Yemen is still at the crossroads. It remains impoverished, with a capacity-deficit governing structure, an illiterate population, inadequate health and medical care, and neighbors who wish it no good. It has had to deal with every flavor of insurgent threat, from Marxist-

inspired, to Saudi-funded, to al-Qaeda wannabes, and, possibly, Iranian provocateurs. It has no resource base and no exportable commodity of any quantity, other than migrant workers.

What is remarkable is not Yemen's fragility but its durability. It is held together not by rentier largesse or police-state controls. Rather, it sits somewhere between viable if emerging democracy and liberal autocracy. It holds together largely because the Yemenis want it to and see no credible alternative to the current arrangement—the primordial federalism practiced deftly by the central government and the tribal leaders. Centrifugal and centripetal forces act as checks and balances on the power and aspirations of both sides. There is no viable secessionist movement, and neither the regionalism nor the clan structure rise to a level that would presage another Somalia or Iraq, or even the warlordism of Afghanistan. A strong Yemeni identity predates any artificiality of the colonial period and trumps but does not replace tribal/clan identities. Yemenis, like the rest of us, can and do hold multiple identities simultaneously and comfortably.

But not failing is not the same as succeeding. It is as dangerous for us to overvalue subsidiary identities, such as regionalism or clans, as it is to undervalue legitimate grievances of income distribution and corruption, or the willingness of outside players to meddle in the affairs of state. I was in Yemen in January 2009. U.S. policy toward Yemen has become singularly focused, to the point of distortion, on security and counterterrorism, and al-Qaeda specifically. And the dialogue has become increasingly narcissistic—what has Yemen done for us today? How does it support our game plan and our priorities? The embassy looks like a mini-Green Zone.

No serious Yemeni suggests that al-Qaeda and its followers are not a problem and a legitimate issue for the United States, or that there are not serious security issues in the country that the government needs to address. Their lament is that U.S. policy is focused solely on the short-term and security—the military and the police. The United States is no longer seen as being willing to engage with the Yemeni government and to seek to address chronic problems of education, health, development, and, yes, corruption. The Yemenis suggest rebalancing the relationship in terms of a balance between security, development and core diplomacy, and also a balance through a broader dialogue.

What would a policy of preemptive stabilization and reconstruction look like, of playing the lessons of complex operations forward, in a place like Yemen?

Security first becomes security only. In most weak states, the military and the police are very weak links, but an over-reliance on building these two sectors prior to strengthening the broader state capacity can distort the civilian-military balance, send mixed signals on the primacy of civilian control, undermine efforts at governance reform and liberalization, and fail to build the core pillars of the state, including a competent judiciary, not just competent cops. An over-reliance on catching or killing the bad guys without equal commitment to the structures of justice and state services is as hollow and self-defeating as the conflation of democratic processes (elections) with democratic governance.

The military and the police are instruments of state legitimacy, not substitutes for or precursors of the state. State legitimacy is critical to state security but reflects a broader sense of social contract through equitable provision of services, accountability, transparency, and rule of law.

Extension of the authority of the state must be done in parallel with, if not on the heels of, expansion of the legitimacy of the state. This means education, health, rule of law, and structures of trade and commerce. The same investment in teachers, clinic workers and midwives, local judges, and the like as in police and military; the same investment in the building of schools,

hospitals, and courts as in police stations and equipment; the same attention to an education system, health system and judicial system. This is not social engineering, or “nation-building” but state capacity-building. This also need not be a U.S.-only endeavor but should be broadly multilateral.

Diplomats and development officers need to get outside the comfort (and confines) of the embassy. We need to understand and work within the realities of pragmatic “risk management” and not cling to the fantasy of “risk avoidance.”

The Department of State needs to regain its footing as the coordinator for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy writ large—not just the validation of the Chief of Mission authorities, but recognition that, as a properly functioning NSC staff coordinates the policies of the President and acts as honest broker to the many department and agency stakeholders, both the embassy country team and the Department of State need to get comfortable again with the obligations and responsibilities as policy coordinators in Washington and in the field.

We need to approach failing states, or potentially failing states, with the same unity-of-effort/whole-of-government policies and programs we now recognize are critical for success in failed states and post-conflict environments. We need to recognize it will take the same commitment of time but, if done properly, need not demand the same commitment of resources as we now understand are required for post-conflict operations or for counterinsurgency. While it may be useful to have a corps of professionals and reservists who can deploy quickly to a crisis or post-conflict situation, we must be wary of creating too insular a corps, however interagency it may be. The tools and mindset needed to work complex operations, and the discipline to go when called, should be encouraged, supported, rewarded, and expected throughout the civilian interagency. Creating too narrow a community would let everyone else off the hook.

Endnote

1. See Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 2006), available at <<http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf>>.

NGO Structure, Authority, Standards, and Coordination

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A non-governmental organization (NGO) is a legally constituted, non-governmental organization created by natural or legal persons with no participation or representation of any government. In the cases in which NGOs are funded totally or partially by governments, the NGO maintains its non-governmental status by excluding government representatives from membership in the organization. Unlike the term “intergovernmental organizational”, “non-governmental organization” is a term in general use but is not a legal definition. In many jurisdictions, these types of organization are defined as “civil society organizations” or referred to by other names.

Nongovernmental organizations emerge from communities, civil society organizations, collective activities, religious organizations, universities and individual initiatives. Often started as small volunteer projects, NGOs are sometimes referred to as grassroots organizations, voluntary organizations, charities or nonprofits, all names that denote the voluntary, public service, and community orientation that NGOs have.

In legal and organizational terms, there is little difference between an NGO and a nonprofit or not-for-profit organization in the United States. Nonprofits and NGOs are the same thing, and only when nonprofits extend their activities overseas are they popularly called NGOs or private voluntary organizations (PVOs). The term NGO denotes an organization that is based nationally or locally but that raises money and organizational capacity to participate in international relief and development activities. This, of course, is only sensitive to organizations based in western or donor countries that extend services through NGOs in developing countries. Nonprofit organizations in developing countries are also often called NGOs but are defined as local NGOs when deciphering differences between international and indigenous organizations that work locally.

Types of NGOs

NGO type can be understood by their orientation and level of operation.

NGO type by orientation:

- Charitable orientation
- Service orientation
- Participatory orientation
- Empowering orientation

NGO type by level of operation:

- Community-based organization
- Citywide organization
- National NGOs
- International NGOs

NGOs have constituencies and develop specialties or areas of interest in which its programming, solicitations, fundraising and growth is oriented. When NGOs are met in the field, there are wide variances in size, appearance, activity, and expertise. It is crucial to understand that when various NGOs operate in the same emergency, there are large but often subtle differences between them.

NGO Foundations and Structure

NGOs founded in the United States to serve populations outside the United States fall under the same rubric that nationally based and local organizations do. An NGO is an incorporated or organized body that abides by laws, can make contracts, employ people, make legally binding relationships with other entities, and generally operate as a corporation within the country or state of origin. For those NGOs based in the United States, each state has different regulations, although most require that the organization fulfill several requisites:

- establish and maintain a mission or charter, and articles of incorporation or association;
- establish a board of directors or trustees that assume responsibility for the organization's financial, operational and general well-being as well as legal status;
- establish tax-exempt status from both the federal government Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the appropriate state government entities should the organization want to accept tax-deductible and to remain somewhat free of federal and state taxes themselves;
- maintain audited and accredited financial records; and
- remain financially, legally, and organizationally sound, and abide by specific rules or guidelines set forth by federal and state law.

The trend is for NGOs to join or propose coordination mechanisms and as donor pressure continues to mount on NGOs to maintain credible, accountable, and transparent programming while providing effective services, NGOs have created a series of standards and best practices that help to improve the overall quality, consistency, and fluidity of NGO programming worldwide. This is helpful for outside agencies that have to deal with NGOs, for NGOs themselves, and ultimately for the recipients of NGO programming.

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee

The IASC is a unique interagency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The IASC was established in June 1992 in response to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the need to strengthen humanitarian assistance. General Assembly Resolution 48/57 affirmed its role as the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance.

The IASC develops humanitarian policies, agrees on a clear division of responsibility for the various aspects of humanitarian assistance, identifies and addresses gaps in response, and advocates for effective application of humanitarian principles. Together with Executive Committee for Humanitarian Affairs (ECHA), the IASC forms the key strategic coordination mechanism among major humanitarian actors.

The objectives of the IASC are six fold: (1) to develop and agree on system-wide humanitarian policies; (2) to allocate responsibilities among agencies in humanitarian programs; (3) to develop and agree on a common ethical framework for all humanitarian activities; (4) to advocate for common humanitarian principles to parties outside the IASC; (5) to identify areas where gaps in mandates or lack of operational capacity exist; and (6) to resolve disputes or disagreement about and between humanitarian agencies on system-wide humanitarian issues.

The following IASC guidelines are available (effective late 2009):

- *Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster*
- *Women, Girls, Boys & Men: Different Needs—Equal Opportunities. IASC Gender Handbook for Humanitarian Action*
- *IASC Policy Statement Gender Equality in Humanitarian Action*
- *Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response—Guidance and Indicator Package for Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework*
- IASC advocacy paper *Humanitarian Action and Older Persons: An Essential Brief for Humanitarian Actors*
- *Checklist for field use of IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings*
- *Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets in Disaster Relief—Oslo Guidelines (Revision 1.1, November 2007)*
- *Civil-Military Guidelines and References for Complex Emergencies*
- *Guidelines for HIV/AIDS Interventions in Emergency Settings*
- *Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations of Internal Displacement. Guidance for UN Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams*

- *Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse*
- *Plan of Action and Core Principles of Codes of Conduct on Protection from Sexual Abuse and Exploitation in Humanitarian Crisis*
- *Respect for Humanitarian Mandates in Conflict Situations*
- *Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field*
- *Exit Strategy for Humanitarian Actors in the Context of Complex Emergencies*

SMART Indicators

SMART is a voluntary, collaborative network of all humanitarian organizations: donors, international and UN agencies, NGOs, universities, research institutes, and governments. It includes organizations and humanitarian practitioners who are leading experts in emergency epidemiology and nutrition, food security, early warning systems, and demography.

SMART addresses the need to standardize methodologies for determining comparative needs based on nutritional status, mortality rate, and food security and establishes comprehensive, collaborative systems to ensure reliable data is used for decision-making and reporting.

SMART was initiated in response to the lack of a coherent understanding of need, in turn attributable to the use of many methodologies, consistent, reliable data for making decisions and reporting, the necessary technical capacity to collect and analyze reliable data and comprehensive, long-term technical support for strategic and sustained capacity building. The goal of SMART is to reform the system-wide emergency responses by ensuring that policy and programming decisions are based on reliable, standardized data and that humanitarian aid is provided to those most in need.

The SMART methodology uses crude death rate (CDR) and nutritional status of children under five as the most vital, basic public health indicators of the severity of a humanitarian crisis. These two indicators are used to monitor the extent to which the relief system is meeting the needs of the population and the overall impact and performance of the humanitarian response. NGOs with certain U.S. government funding are required to report using SMART to retain funding.

NGO Codes of Conduct and Standards

The *Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programs* is also a staple reference document for many NGOs. Although not universally accepted, these norms normally are accepted by U.S.-, Canadian-, and European Union–based NGOs and provide the language for what most NGOs feel is their creed or most basic elements of service. The language is general and includes the primary theme that every person deserves and should receive humanitarian assistance when needed. As well, it suggests that aid should be given impartially and without stipulation or restriction, and that beneficiaries are humans and should be treated as such. InterAction has a series of PVO standards that each of its member NGOs must follow. These are compiled in an extensive document that serves as a guiding tool for NGO management. The intent was to ensure and strengthen public confidence in the integrity, quality, and effectiveness of member organizations

and their programs. The standards cover budgetary allotments, gender balance on governing boards, financial accountability, and hiring practices, and provide a baseline series of standards in management activities to promote professionalism and accountability among the InterAction members.

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