Above: Brigadier-General David Fraser,
Crucible of Success: Cultural Intelligence and the Modern Battlefield
By Emily Spencer and Tony Balasevicius
Reprinted with permission from Canadian Military Journal
Increasingly, Canada's military is being called upon to deploy into complex operational environments where it must deal with highly adaptive adversaries seeking to destabilize society through a variety of asymmetric means. Articulating this new paradigm, the Army's Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations, identifies a security environment in which "...the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges will be eclipsed by irregular warfare conducted by highly adaptive, technologically enabled adversaries ... intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding an adversary's will to fight." The document continues to explain...[that] turmoil will often occur in urban areas, with adversaries taking full advantage of the complex physical, moral and informational environments that large, densely populated cities provide."1
In order to succeed in this dynamic and complex battlespace, armed forces will have to focus upon intelligence-driven operations that are grounded in extensive knowledge of both the local populations and the belligerents. Indeed, to be of use, this knowledge must derive from an in-depth analysis of the background and motives of the enemy and the cultures they are seeking to overtake. Brigadier-General David Fraser, former Commander International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Multi-National Brigade Sector South, Kandahar, Afghanistan, recently admitted: "I underestimated one factor - culture." He when went on to lament: "I was looking at the wrong map - I needed to look at the tribal map not the geographic map...Wherever we go in the world we must take into account culture."2 This forthright acknowledgement from an experienced and decorated warfighter is telling. It underscores the Canadian Forces' (CF) current lack of capability in what is quickly becoming the crucible of success in the modern battle space: the ability to effectively integrate Cultural Intelligence (CQ) into modern military operations.
This article will look at CQ and highlight examples of how it can be used as a force multiplier in military operations. It will then look at the current state of CQ within the Canadian military, and review what other nations are doing in the field. Finally, it will make recommendations as to how the CF can establish a capability that will remain relevant well into the future. However, in order to gain an appreciation of the potential of applying CQ to the battlespace, one must first comprehend the meaning of the concept and how it is applied within the military context.
Essentially, CQ is the ability to recognize and understand the shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of a group of people, and to apply that knowledge toward achieving specific goals.3 From a military perspective, the idea refers to the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral capacities to understand and effectively respond to the beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals and groups under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect a desired change.4 In this respect, CQ should be viewed as the 'big picture' that provides direction for where and how specific cultural awareness pieces fit together in the broader global perspective. Moreover, CQ provides a framework within which an organization can be prepared to meet culturally-specific tasks. Interestingly, the military application of CQ is not a phenomenon of the 21st Century battlespace. In fact, it has been widely used by intrepid warriors operating within the realm of conventional and asymmetric warfare from as early as the 5th Century BC.
Historical Use of Military Cultural Intelligence
During the Peloponnesian War, both the Athenians and Spartans attempted to take advantage of their opponent's cultural 'weaknesses,' while endeavoring to enhance their own cultural 'strengths.' For example, during the planning for the battle of Lesbos in the 5th Century BC, initially, the Athenians decided that the date of attack should occur during a holiday feast and thus achieve greater surprise. However, the idea was ultimately rejected for fear of the retaliation that an attack on such an occasion might foster among the island's allies.5
In more recent times, innovative and daring use of CQ has achieved startling military successes with surprisingly few resources. For example, during the First World War, Colonel T.E. Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia,6 was able to utilize his understanding of Arab culture to win the trust of Feisal, the third son of Sharif Hussein bin Ali. In so doing, he became a major force in organizing and sustaining the Arab revolt against the Turks.7 The revolt set the conditions for the Allies' campaign into Syria, ultimately allowing a combined British and Arab force to drive the Turkish army out of the country.8 Although not well understood at the time, the success of Lawrence's endeavor validated the idea that CQ could be used by individuals to facilitate relationships, which could then be leveraged to produce tactical successes. When these smaller operations were combined with conventional forces, as was the case with Lawrence's activities, operational victory could also be achieved.
This pioneering concept became a key operating component for many of the missions carried out by the world's modern Special Operation Forces (SOF).9 This is because SOF must often leverage their small numbers by training and employing indigenous forces in what is commonly referred to as unconventional warfare activities.10 These operations rely heavily upon the ability of SOF to overcome cultural and trust barriers in order to build relationships with local militias and/or citizens. If successful, the potential of this concept can be significant, and it was clearly demonstrated in the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. During this operation, American SOF worked closely with opposition forces in Afghanistan to bring about the downfall of the Taliban regime and rid the country of al Qaeda fighters. Within weeks of launching the campaign, US-led forces took control of Kabul, the capital, and secured the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar.11 This startling success was achieved quickly because SOF was able to bring together both the opposition forces operating in Afghanistan and various elements of America's national power. To accomplish this task, they needed a highly sophisticated level of CQ. This ability, in turn, allowed them to coordinate activities through a number of different and complex cultural domains.
Cultural Intelligence Domains
In seeking to effectively utilize culture to achieve military goals, it is important to realize that there are a number of domains within which CQ must be applied. These include appreciating culture at the national, international, host nation, and the enemy levels.12 However, in studying each area; one must recognize that there are often competing issues at play, both within and between each domain.
Cultural Intelligence in the International Domain
CQ within the international domain has become much more important in today's operating environment than it has ever been in the past. The increasing emphasis at the international level of operations is due to the complex nature of the current global security situation, which often necessitates the creation of multinational coalitions that share responsibility for global stability. In order to meet these commitments, nations are continuously contributing people to a plethora of military coalitions, as well as to intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Although such cooperation is extremely important, and often encouraged, it is not without its frustrations, as each nation brings different practices, work ethics, and behavioral norms to an already multifaceted situation.
Canadian Colonel Francois Vertefeuille, the former Combined Joint Staff Officer (civil-military operations) of Combined Force Command Afghanistan, explains that working with personnel from a number of different countries is fraught with challenges. One of the many difficulties that he faced during his deployment was dealing with mundane issues, such as the fact that nations had different rules concerning the use of equipment to call home. When some groups of people were able to call loved ones while others were not, perceptions of inequality quickly began to manifest inside the camp. As Vertefeuille notes: "The challenge was not really to solve the problem, but rather to help both sides understand the other's needs and see that their perception of the situation was inaccurate. The problem was solved through technical knowledge...The perception issue was solved using leadership skills."13
Although the benefits accrued from CQ within multinational coalitions are obvious, it must be remembered that each nationality also reports to a different national chain of command, and, in these circumstances, complete unity of command is rarely possible. The need for this type of dual command is due to the fact that even though everyone in a 'coalition of the willing' is working toward a common goal, their views and methods of achieving the end-state can differ significantly.
For example, when Canadian soldiers in a United Nations (UN) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led mission request air support, they do not know which member nation will respond. With different rules of engagement (ROEs), this factor can significantly affect the quality of the support they receive, and this can become particularly frustrating. While ROEs are political restraints, they also represent cultural components of nations. Indeed, relationships between the political and cultural elements of a nation are not easily untangled. In such circumstances, enhanced CQ abilities will facilitate personnel as they integrate into these culturally diverse environments. Unfortunately, many of these issues are not confined to the international arena, as both cultural diversity and varied chains of command are also very evident at the national level.
Cultural Intelligence in the National Domain
Within the Canadian context, both the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) currently have personnel serving in Afghanistan. Although both departments are attempting to carry out the Canadian government's policy goals for that country, the reality is that each has its own way of approaching the situation, and both report through a separate chain of command - thus making unity of command between even these two Canadian agencies difficult. In fact, the CF has acknowledged this problem and has begun moving toward a solution by introducing the idea that future force structures must be joint, interagency, multinational, and public (JIMP)-enabled.
According to a recent paper by Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, each a member of the Army's Directorate of Land Capability Development Staff, "...DND leadership - both civilian and military - have increasingly called for the adoption of a force that is ...JIMP-enabled." The paper goes on to stress: "Such a force would see diplomatic, defense, development and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan and applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would see traditional and nontraditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the 'effects based approach to operations' (EBAO) resulting in greater mission effectiveness."14 Such initiatives are clearly necessary as specific directives and mandates are usually insufficient to overcome different organizational cultures, and, in some cases, even languages.15
The first step in achieving national objectives within a JIMP environment is to acknowledge and adjust to the different cultural nuances that exist within each department or agency. In emphasizing this need for mutual understanding, Colonel Bernd Horn, a former director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, remarks that with respect to working with other Canadian governmental departments "...the greatest problem is one of ignorance." He goes on to note: "None of the players fully understand who the other participants are. Other government departments and civilian agencies are normally not accustomed to military directness or its command structure."16 In such instances, accepting and acting on the cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of other organizations, and appreciating how one's own may be viewed by others (i.e. enlightened CQ), will better facilitate the move toward unity of effort through a process like JIMP.
Cultural Intelligence and Military Operations in the Host Nation Domain: Differentiating Friend from Foe
Enlightened CQ is particularly important when dealing with modern counterinsurgency operations, such as the ongoing mission in Afghanistan. Success in such circumstances can be achieved only through coordinating the efforts of national, international, and host nation (HN) entities, as they help to provide security, and, importantly, the crucial component of counterinsurgency operations, namely 'winning the hearts and minds' of the local population. In these situations, progress is often based on understanding the cultural nuances that are at play within the HN domain.
To understand the cultural nuances within an HN, one must first recognize and understand the makeup of the population. As a general rule, HNs dealing with an insurgency will often be divided. They are generally composed of political elements, security forces, civilian elements, and, of course, belligerent elements. A major feature of insurgencies is the ease with which politicians, security personnel, and local citizens can be tempted to join the insurgents through intrinsic means, such as sympathizing with the ideals and goals of the insurgents, or extrinsic means, such as aligning with insurgents to protect oneself, one's family, or clan. Unfortunately, this reality allows the belligerents to permeate the HN's social structure, which initially makes close collaborative action between coalition forces and the HN's political and security apparatuses difficult.17 As a result, one of the primary goals of coalition-based counter-insurgency operations must be to separate quickly the belligerents from the other elements of the population.
However, separating 'friendly' HN members from belligerents is not an easy task. It can quickly become extremely difficult to identify and isolate friend from foe in a hostile environment. As a result, security forces must emphasize intelligence-driven operations, based upon knowledge of both the population and the belligerents. According to US Army Major General (ret'd) Robert H. Scales Jr., "...intimate knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proven to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expansive bandwidth."18 Scales's observation is based upon the fact that understanding the elements of culture at play within the HN domain will allow security forces to pick up nuances in speech and gestures that can provide valuable clues as to the possible location or intentions of belligerents. To this end, experience has shown that good interpreters can do far more than just relay verbatim translations to security forces.
In fact, experience has shown that seasoned interpreters in Afghanistan are able to explain nuances that are missed by those with only a basic understanding of the language. Moreover, they are able to translate these nuances into more meaningful messages. A given message, through the means in which it is expressed (pauses, ambiguities, and facial gestures, to mention a few), might have less to do with what is being said and more to do with how it is being said. Well-developed CQ skills can help security forces to recognize that there is far more to many stories than just what is heard.
Being 'savvy' about picking up cultural cues can also help determine if an area is under the influence of the enemy, and whether the locals are 'willingly' supporting insurgents. Such knowledge can establish how best to influence the thinking of the local inhabitants. For example, in an area where insurgents are coercing locals to cooperate by threat of punishment, securing the area and assuring them of the governmental and coalition long-term commitment to them can persuade them to side with government forces. As US Navy reservist Lorenzo Puertas notes: "Every war is a war of persuasion. ...we must destroy the enemy's will to fight." He continues: "Persuasion always is culturally sensitive. You cannot persuade someone if you do not understand his language, motivations, fears, and desires."19 And persuasion is based upon a high level of trust that has to be earned - and can only be maintained through concrete action and the perception of established reliability.
Moreover, the ability to establish trust is quickly damaged through the death of civilians due to the actions of security forces, which will cause many within a local population to question the benefits and motives of their government and coalition members. Certainly, belligerents will use this type of situation to their advantage, particularly to enhance their propaganda efforts.20 Every friendly fire incident, every civilian death, or any amount of collateral damage plays to the opposing side - namely, they provide more evidence of a callous, oppressive government, and, in the case of Afghanistan, of foreign invaders.21 A lack of sensitivity toward causalities or the disrespectful treatment of civilians by security forces, even at the lowest levels in the chain of command, can have devastating effects.
Human Intelligence operator Master Corporal Lars Penninston stresses that, in Afghanistan, the actions of a single soldier can have far-reaching consequences at the operational and strategic levels. To provide a hypothetical illustration, Penninston offers that a frustrated, misguided soldier in the field might, on occasion, be inclined to kick a goat, simply to relieve tension. Although such actions might appear innocuous to an insensitive soul, as the goat probably belongs to a common farmer, this may not necessarily be the case. Penninston stresses that this 'supposedly unimportant' farmer could, in fact, be the village leader, as Afghan hierarchy is difficult to discern through appearance, and it often requires close behavioral observation to fully understand. Thus, a seemingly inconsequential act to some could have serious implications.22 To put this situation into context, because one soldier kicked a goat, the counterinsurgency effort was put at risk of losing the support of the farmer, his family, his clan, and his tribe.
Unfortunately, this type of experience appears to occur all too commonly during the stress of modern operations. Puertas illustrates this point by describing the potential consequences of one corporal and his decisions after being fired upon in an alley in Iraq. He asserts: "Without cultural training, his reaction will be a product of his personal experiences and beliefs...He might have cultural misunderstandings that lead to serious errors in judgment. He might fail in his mission - and he might find himself despised by one poor neighborhood, or by a billion horrified TV viewers." Puertas cautions: "Cultural knowledge of the battlespace should not be left to on-the-job training."23
The Cultural Intelligence/Cultural Awareness Gap
If cultural knowledge should not be left to 'on-the-job training,' then the question that must be asked is: What is the CF currently doing to prepare soldiers to meet the cultural challenges on the battlefield? Research has shown that existing cultural awareness training within the CF is designed to provide cultural knowledge to personnel prior to deployment. It normally consists of some language training to understand a few key phrases, an overview history lesson, and general lectures on social morals and values, provided by experts in the field. This aspect of training is usually brief, and, according to several Afghanistan veterans, quite inadequate to prepare soldiers for the realities of the situations that they are facing in theatre.24
In fact, CQ doctrine and training within the CF is so deficient that many members are forced to supplement their formal cultural awareness training with additional readings, and more often than not, they are seeking information on the subject from 'old hands' with experience, or from interpreters assigned to the unit.25 During an after-action interview, a young veteran suggested "...[that] maybe as part of the pre-deployment training, doing a little bit more cultural awareness, rather than just a couple of days of language, would be a good step ahead."26
His reasoning was that "... [while] language [training] is good, you want to know about the culture. You want to know what gets in their heads; why they do the things they do; how they act; how they react to certain things; their attitudes towards timelines; that sort of thing."27 One of his colleagues commented: "I know cultural aspects are so important in the conduct of COIN [counterinsurgency], and I just felt that [pre-deployment cultural awareness training] was not applied with that in mind."28 This sentiment was supported by several of his colleagues. In the words of another young veteran of the war in Afghanistan, the lack of common and thorough pre-deployment cultural awareness training does not allow for a "balanced perspective across the battle group."29
Closing the Cultural Intelligence Gap
In order to address this deficiency, and to provide a solid foundation for future capabilities, the CF must move toward institutionalizing CQ. In fact, many of our allies have already come to the same conclusion. Montgomery McFate, a well-known cultural anthropologist, points out: "Although success in future operations will depend on cultural knowledge, the [American] Department of Defense currently lacks the programs, systems, models, personnel, and organizations to deal with either the existing threat or the changing environment."30 She goes on to suggest: "A Federal initiative is urgently needed to incorporate cultural and social knowledge of adversaries into training, education, planning, intelligence, and operations." In order to address the issue, she recommends: "Across the board, the national security structure needs to be infused with anthropology, a discipline invented to support war fighting in the tribal zone."31 Interestingly, many of McFate's recommendations have begun to be adopted by the American military.32
For example, the US Marine Corps has developed what they refer to as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). According to its mandate, the CAOCL is responsible to provide "...operationally focused training and education in individual training, PME [professional military education], and pre-deployment phases, reflecting current and likely contingencies and functions, to ensure Marines and leaders deploy with a grasp of culture and indigenous dynamics for use as a force multiplier."33
From the Canadian perspective, the best way of achieving the general goals of institutionalizing CQ is to take a holistic approach, starting with the creation of a CF Centre for Cultural Studies. The centre would serve as the focal point for CQ research, but it would also include the capability to provide advisers, to produce CQ doctrine, and to conduct individual training. Because language and culture are so intertwined, it would be highly desirable that the mandate of the centre include all language training other than French and English, and consideration should be given to carrying out cultural and language training concurrently and in the same location.
Research Section/Technical Advice Section
An American veteran of several foreign interventions once observed that, with respect to the US military: "What we need is cultural intelligence." He continued, "What I [as a soldier] need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that is so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think compared to my values and the way I think?"34 In this respect, an important part of the centre's work would focus upon research in the area of cultural (social) anthropology.
Anthropology is the study or science of man, and it includes, "...the study of human physiology, human psychology, the study of human societies (origins, institutions, religious beliefs, social relationships, etc...) and all the other aspects of human culture, whether past or present."35 In order to meet CF requirements, the centre's research would need to include general anthropology studies that would provide a baseline of cultural research. This baseline would include exposure to some of the basic concepts existing in the field, such as Geert Hofstede's four value dimensions: Power Distance; Uncertainty Avoidance; Individualism-Collectivism; and Masculinity-Femininity, and how they relate to cultural development.36 Once this initial work has been completed, research would gradually be expanded to include gaining better insights into the interaction of cultures within and between each of the four CQ domains.
Specific research to support planning for contingency operations - and for ongoing missions such as Afghanistan - would also be done by the centre.37 Along this line; commanders have come to recognize the need for advisers who have a good understanding of local culture, politics, social structure, and economics. With the establishment of a Centre of Excellence, a pool of technical advisers could be recruited and trained to meet specific mission requirements.
Another important area of engagement for the centre would rest in the production of CQ doctrine. Doctrine can be defined as "...the formal expression of military knowledge and thought that the army accepts as being relevant at any given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflicts and the method of engaging in them to achieve success." It is based upon "...fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives."38 Although it is authoritative, it requires judgment based upon experience, and knowledge in application. The centre would be expected to develop and update CQ doctrine for the CF. However; it would not necessarily incorporate that doctrine into existing manuals. Nonetheless, the centre would be available to provide advice on content. Once completed, the doctrine would be used to adjust CF training, and, if necessary, to adapt the conduct of operations appropriately.
As explained earlier, CQ refers to the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral capacities to understand and effectively respond to the beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect a desired change. Within this context, soldiers must be able to clearly understand national objectives, and then apply cultural awareness skills toward achieving those outcomes through appropriate behavior.
To accomplish this goal, the centre's training section should have the capability to develop and carry out such tasks as pre-deployment and continuation training programs using on-site facilities or mobile training teams, as well as distance learning (DL) tools. Such tools would include CD as well as Web-based materials that could be easily accessed by soldiers and instructors anywhere in the world.39
Another of the centre's training capabilities should be an ability to carry out advance training focused upon developing and applying CQ skills toward achieving operational outcomes within the international, national, HN, and enemy domains. This training would be given to commanders, liaison officers, negotiators, advisers, and, when practical, to interpreters. More importantly, the training of intelligence specialists should also be considered as a possible task for the centre.
Administrative Support Section
A sufficient amount of administrative support would also be necessary to keep the centre running. The primary function of the support section would be to carry out the necessary administrative and finance functions needed to run the facility. At a minimum, it should consist of an Administration Officer, Central Registry and Administration Clerk, and a Finance Cell that would include a Financial Services Manager and an Accounts Payable and Claims Clerk.
The creation of a Canadian Forces Centre for Cultural Studies would bring together research, doctrine, and training - providing the CF with a unique institution capable of quickly gathering and then turning information from various sources into knowledge that could be used at the front lines. As modern armed forces move toward a heavier reliance upon information and intelligence-driven operations, the need to rapidly turn information into knowledge, and then into a useful product, will increase considerably in the near future. In this respect, the centre could become a prototype of the military organization of the future whereby small, self-contained units can identify issues, develop solutions, and quickly adapt those solutions to practical problems on the battlefield. At the very least, such an organization would move the CF to the forefront of CQ innovation.
History has shown that intrepid warriors have routinely leveraged CQ to produce great victories. What is interesting is that although this capability has played an important part in many military successes, few armies have really leveraged its potential to the fullest. Moreover, if current trends continue, success in the modern operating environment will become impossible unless a well developed CQ capability is fully integrated into training, education, planning, intelligence-gathering and other military operations. In fact, commanders in the field have already come to realize that a fully integrated CQ capability is a key enabler of today's intelligence-driven operations. This capability is essential when carrying out military operations near or among civilian populations. Despite its proven record of success, CQ doctrine and training within the CF is deficient, and many members are being forced to supplement their formal cultural awareness training with additional research that they must conduct on their own. In order to address this deficiency, the CF needs to take a holistic approach and to recognize CQ as an operational capability. To develop this capability properly, it needs to create a CF Centre for Cultural Studies. Although, the centre would serve as the focal point for CQ research, it should also include the capability to produce CF doctrine, and have the ability to develop and conduct training. Cultural Intelligence is a capability whose time has come. The question is: What does the CF intend to do about it?
1. Department of National Defence, Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow, (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), p. 2.
2. Brigadier General David Fraser, former Commander ISAF Multi-National Brigade Sector South, Kandahar Afghanistan, presentation to Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, Edmonton, 25 May 2007.
3. Emily Spencer, Crucible of Success: Applying the Four CQ Domain Paradigm, the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as a Case Study (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report, July 2007), p. 3.
6. Interestingly, Lawrence was not a soldier by profession. In fact, after graduating from Oxford University in 1910, he was awarded a post-graduate scholarship at Magdalen College and spent much of his research time in the Middle East, touring and carrying out archaeological work. When The First World War broke out in 1914, Lawrence entered military service and was commissioned into the British Army as an intelligence officer.
7. General Edmund Allenby used Lawrence as a liaison officer to the Arabs, which operated to the east of the British. He combined their efforts to push his mechanized forces north against the Turks, with lightning attacks, while the Arabs hampered Turkish efforts to move troops and supplies.
9. Cited in Bernd Horn, "Avenging Angels': The Ascent of SOF as the Force of Choice in the New Security Environment," in Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius (eds.), Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), p. 159. SOF are "...specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces that carry out special operations to achieve specific military, political, economic or informational objectives..."
13. Colonel Francois Vertefeuille, "Civil-Military Operations in Combined Force Command - Afghanistan," in Bernd Horn, (ed.), In Harm's Way: The Buck Stops Here (Kingston, ON: CDA Press, 2007), p. 181.
15. Elizabeth Baldwin-Jones, Deputy Director, Regional Security, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, emphasized this point in an address at the 2007 Women Understanding Adversary Culture (National Leading in Defence Symposium, Gender Matters: Leadership and the Changing Defence Environment, held in Ottawa on 6 March 2007. Her talk dealt mainly with the relationship between personnel from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and CF members while working in Afghanistan in 2006.
20. NATO definition for Information Operations is as follows: "Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives." Cited in Colonel W.N. Peters (ret'd), Shifting to the Moral Plane: The Canadian Approach to Information Operations (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report, 2007), pp. 20-21.
21. In the case of Afghanistan, this plays into the ancient tribal custom that has often been described as, "...my brother and I against my cousin. My cousin, my brother and I against the world." It also underscores the point that foreign troops will eventually go home, but belligerents are already at home.
36. Hofstede's four value dimensions are described in Martin M. Chemers, An Integrative Theory Leadership (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). Hofstede has also published extensively and has added a fifth value dimension to his list: long-term orientation. This last dimension explores the differences between long-term goals expressed through economic thrift and perseverance, and those that are more immediate, such as respect for tradition, committing to social obligations, and saving face.
Last Reviewed: May 18, 2012