NEWSLETTER

NO. 10-12 DEC 09

Multinational Operations

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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Foreword

This inaugural edition of the *Multinational Operations Newsletter* is intended to provide a forum for discussing the ongoing efforts to integrate Army elements into the multinational environment on today's battlefield. This newsletter is a continuation of the Center for Army Lessons Learned increased focus on the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment of global operations. This collection of articles was chosen as an example of the big world of operations and reveals some of the differences among the various combatant commands and the diverse challenges each face in their area of responsibility. Several of the enclosed articles were extracted from foreign journals to provide a counterbalance of thought and conceptual thinking of our global allies in overseas contingency operations.

The primary audiences are leaders, planners, and operators across the Army executing operations integration within a multinational environment. Training and doctrine developers at the tactical level will find opportunities for improved interoperability among our global partners worldwide. This publication captures articles that highlight good examples of multinational integration without shying away from discussing areas of needing improvement. I trust you will find these articles informative.

Robert W. Forrester
Colonel, Armor
Director
Center for Army Lessons Learned

Multinational Operations Newsletter

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

Above: Brigadier-General David Fraser, (the Regional Command South Commander in Afghanistan, 24 Apr 06).

Crucible of Success: Cultural Intelligence and the Modern Battlefield

By Emily Spencer and Tony Balasevicius

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Note: This is an abridged version of the original article. The complete article including all footnotes was published in the March 2009 edition of *Canadian Military Journal.*

Introduction

Increasingly, Canada's military is being called upon to deploy into complex operational environments where it must deal with highly adaptive adversaries seeking to destabilize society through a variety of asymmetric means. Articulating this new paradigm, the Army's *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations*, identifies a security environment in which "...the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges will be eclipsed by irregular warfare conducted by highly adaptive, technologically enabled adversaries ... intent less on defeating armed forces than eroding an adversary's will to fight." The document continues to explain...[that] turmoil will often occur in urban areas, with adversaries taking full advantage of the complex physical, moral and informational environments that large, densely populated cities provide."[1]

In order to succeed in this dynamic and complex battlespace, armed forces will have to focus upon intelligence-driven operations that are grounded in extensive knowledge of both the local populations and the belligerents. Indeed, to be of use, this knowledge must derive from an in-depth analysis of the background and motives of the enemy and the cultures they are seeking to overtake. Brigadier-General David Fraser, former Commander International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Multi-National Brigade Sector South, Kandahar, Afghanistan, recently admitted: "I underestimated one factor – culture." He when went on to lament: "I was looking at the wrong map – I needed to look at the tribal map not the geographic map...Wherever we go in the world we must take into account culture."[2] This forthright acknowledgement from an experienced and decorated warfighter is telling. It underscores the Canadian Forces' (CF) current lack of capability in what is quickly becoming the crucible of success in the modern battle space: the ability to effectively integrate Cultural Intelligence (CQ) into modern military operations.

This article will look at CQ and highlight examples of how it can be used as a force multiplier in military operations. It will then look at the current state of CQ within the Canadian military, and review what other nations are doing in the field. Finally, it will make recommendations as to how the CF can establish a capability that will remain relevant well into the future. However, in order to gain an appreciation of the potential of applying CQ to the battlespace, one must first comprehend the meaning of the concept and how it is applied within the military context.

Background

Essentially, CQ is the ability to recognize and understand the shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of a group of people, and to apply that knowledge toward achieving specific goals.[3] From a military perspective, the idea refers to the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral capacities to understand and effectively respond to the beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals and groups under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect a desired change.[4] In this respect, CQ should be viewed as the 'big picture' that provides direction for where and how specific cultural awareness pieces fit together in the broader global perspective. Moreover, CQ provides a framework within which an organization can be prepared to meet culturally-specific tasks. Interestingly, the military application of CQ is not a phenomenon of the 21st Century battlespace. In fact, it has been widely used by intrepid warriors operating within the realm of conventional and asymmetric warfare from as early as the 5th Century BC.

T.E. Lawrence

Historical Use of Military Cultural Intelligence

During the Peloponnesian War, both the Athenians and Spartans attempted to take advantage of their opponent's cultural 'weaknesses,' while endeavoring to enhance their own cultural 'strengths.' For example, during the planning for the battle of Lesbos in the 5th Century BC, initially, the Athenians decided that the date of attack should occur during a holiday feast and thus achieve greater surprise. However, the idea was ultimately rejected for fear of the retaliation that an attack on such an occasion might foster among the island's allies.[5]

In more recent times, innovative and daring use of CQ has achieved startling military successes with surprisingly few resources. For example, during the First World War, Colonel T.E. Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia,[6] was able to utilize his understanding of Arab culture to win the trust of Feisal, the third son of Sharif Hussein bin Ali. In so doing, he became a major force in organizing and sustaining the Arab revolt against the Turks.[7] The revolt set the conditions for the Allies' campaign into Syria, ultimately allowing a combined British and Arab force to drive the Turkish army out of the country.[8] Although not well understood at the time, the success of Lawrence's endeavor validated the idea that CQ could be used by individuals to facilitate relationships, which could then be leveraged to produce tactical successes. When these smaller operations were combined with conventional forces, as was the case with Lawrence's activities, operational victory could also be achieved.

This pioneering concept became a key operating component for many of the missions carried out by the world's modern Special Operation Forces (SOF).[9] This is because SOF must often leverage their small numbers by training and employing indigenous forces in what is commonly referred to as unconventional warfare activities.[10] These operations rely heavily upon the ability of SOF to overcome cultural and trust barriers in order to build relationships with local militias and/or citizens. If successful, the potential of this concept can be significant, and it was clearly demonstrated in the initial stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. During this operation, American SOF worked closely with opposition forces in Afghanistan to bring about the downfall of the Taliban regime and rid the country of al Qaeda fighters. Within weeks of launching the campaign, US-led forces took control of Kabul, the capital, and secured the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar.[11] This startling success was achieved quickly because SOF was able to bring together both the opposition forces operating in Afghanistan and various elements of America's national power. To accomplish this task, they needed a highly sophisticated level of CQ. This ability, in turn, allowed them to coordinate activities through a number of different and complex cultural domains.

Cultural Intelligence Domains

In seeking to effectively utilize culture to achieve military goals, it is important to realize that there are a number of domains within which CQ must be applied. These include appreciating culture at the national, international, host nation, and the enemy levels.[12] However, in studying each area; one must recognize that there are often competing issues at play, both within and between each domain.

Cultural Intelligence in the International Domain

CQ within the international domain has become much more important in today's operating environment than it has ever been in the past. The increasing emphasis at the international level of operations is due to the complex nature of the current global security situation, which often necessitates the creation of multinational coalitions that share responsibility for global stability. In order to meet these commitments, nations are continuously contributing people to a plethora of military coalitions, as well as to intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Although such cooperation is extremely important, and often encouraged, it is not without its frustrations, as each nation brings different practices, work ethics, and behavioral norms to an already multifaceted situation.

Canadian Colonel Francois Vertefeuille, the former Combined Joint Staff Officer (civil-military operations) of Combined Force Command Afghanistan, explains that working with personnel from a number of different countries is fraught with challenges. One of the many difficulties that he faced during his deployment was dealing with mundane issues, such as the fact that nations had different rules concerning the use of equipment to call home. When some groups of people were able to call loved ones while others were not, perceptions of inequality quickly began to manifest inside the camp. As Vertefeuille notes: "The challenge was not really to solve the problem, but rather to help both sides understand the other's needs and see that their perception of the situation was inaccurate. The problem was solved through technical knowledge...The perception issue was solved using leadership skills."[13]

Although the benefits accrued from CQ within multinational coalitions are obvious, it must be remembered that each nationality also reports to a different national chain of command, and, in these circumstances, complete unity of command is rarely possible. The need for this type of dual command is due to the fact that even though everyone in a 'coalition of the willing' is working toward a common goal, their views and methods of achieving the end-state can differ significantly.

For example, when Canadian soldiers in a United Nations (UN) or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led mission request air support, they do not know which member nation will respond. With different rules of engagement (ROEs), this factor can significantly affect the quality of the support they receive, and this can become particularly frustrating. While ROEs are political restraints, they also represent cultural components of nations. Indeed, relationships between the political and cultural elements of a nation are not easily untangled. In such circumstances, enhanced CQ abilities will facilitate personnel as they integrate into these culturally diverse environments. Unfortunately, many of these issues are not confined to the international arena, as both cultural diversity and varied chains of command are also very evident at the national level.

Cultural Intelligence in the National Domain

Within the Canadian context, both the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) currently have personnel serving in Afghanistan. Although both departments are attempting to carry out the Canadian government's policy goals for that country, the reality is that each has its own way of approaching the situation, and both report through a separate chain of command – thus making unity of command between even these two Canadian agencies difficult. In fact, the CF has acknowledged this problem and has begun moving toward a solution by introducing the idea that future force structures must be joint, interagency, multinational, and public (JIMP)-enabled.

According to a recent paper by Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, each a member of the Army's Directorate of Land Capability Development Staff, "...DND leadership – both civilian and military – have increasingly called for the adoption of a force that is ...JIMP-enabled." The paper goes on to stress: "Such a force would see diplomatic, defense, development and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan and applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would see traditional and nontraditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the 'effects based approach to operations' (EBAO) resulting in greater mission effectiveness."[14] Such initiatives are clearly necessary as specific directives and mandates are usually insufficient to overcome different organizational cultures, and, in some cases, even languages.[15]

The first step in achieving national objectives within a JIMP environment is to acknowledge and adjust to the different cultural nuances that exist within each department or agency. In emphasizing this need for mutual understanding, Colonel Bernd Horn, a former director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, remarks that with respect to working with other Canadian governmental departments "...the greatest problem is one of ignorance." He goes on to note: "None of the players fully understand who the other participants are. Other government departments and civilian agencies are normally not

accustomed to military directness or its command structure."[16] In such instances, accepting and acting on the cultural beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors of other organizations, and appreciating how one's own may be viewed by others (i.e. enlightened CQ), will better facilitate the move toward unity of effort through a process like JIMP.

Cultural Intelligence and Military Operations in the Host Nation Domain: Differentiating Friend from Foe

Enlightened CQ is particularly important when dealing with modern counterinsurgency operations, such as the ongoing mission in Afghanistan. Success in such circumstances can be achieved only through coordinating the efforts of national, international, and host nation (HN) entities, as they help to provide security, and, importantly, the crucial component of counterinsurgency operations, namely 'winning the hearts and minds' of the local population. In these situations, progress is often based on understanding the cultural nuances that are at play within the HN domain.

To understand the cultural nuances within an HN, one must first recognize and understand the makeup of the population. As a general rule, HNs dealing with an insurgency will often be divided. They are generally composed of political elements, security forces, civilian elements, and, of course, belligerent elements. A major feature of insurgencies is the ease with which politicians, security personnel, and local citizens can be tempted to join the insurgents through intrinsic means, such as sympathizing with the ideals and goals of the insurgents, or extrinsic means, such as aligning with insurgents to protect oneself, one's family, or clan. Unfortunately, this reality allows the belligerents to permeate the HN's social structure, which initially makes close collaborative action between coalition forces and the HN's political and security apparatuses difficult.[17] As a result, one of the primary goals of coalition-based counter-insurgency operations must be to separate quickly the belligerents from the other elements of the population.

However, separating 'friendly' HN members from belligerents is not an easy task. It can quickly become extremely difficult to identify and isolate friend from foe in a hostile environment. As a result, security forces must emphasize intelligence-driven operations, based upon knowledge of both the population and the belligerents. According to US Army Major General (ret'd) Robert H. Scales Jr., "...intimate

knowledge of the enemy's motivation, intent, will, tactical method, and cultural environment has proven to be far more important for success than the deployment of smart bombs, unmanned aircraft, and expansive bandwidth."[18] Scales's observation is based upon the fact that understanding the elements of culture at play within the HN domain will allow security forces to pick up nuances in speech and gestures that can provide valuable clues as to the possible location or intentions of belligerents. To this end, experience has shown that good interpreters can do far more than just relay verbatim translations to security forces.

In fact, experience has shown that seasoned interpreters in Afghanistan are able to explain nuances that are missed by those with only a basic understanding of the language. Moreover, they are able to translate these nuances into more meaningful messages. A given message, through the means in which it is expressed (pauses, ambiguities, and facial gestures, to mention a few), might have less to do with what is being said and more to do with how it is being said. Well-developed CQ skills can help security forces to recognize that there is far more to many stories than just what is heard.

Being 'savvy' about picking up cultural cues can also help determine if an area is under the influence of the enemy, and whether the locals are 'willingly' supporting insurgents. Such knowledge can establish how best to influence the thinking of the local inhabitants. For example, in an area where insurgents are coercing locals to cooperate by threat of punishment, securing the area and assuring them of the governmental and coalition long-term commitment to them can persuade them to side with government forces. As US Navy reservist Lorenzo Puertas notes: "Every war is a war of persuasion. ...we must destroy the enemy's will to fight." He continues: "Persuasion always is culturally sensitive. You cannot persuade someone if you do not understand his language, motivations, fears, and desires."[19] And persuasion is based upon a high level of trust that has to be earned – and can only be maintained through concrete action and the perception of established reliability.

Moreover, the ability to establish trust is quickly damaged through the death of civilians due to the actions of security forces, which will cause many within a local population to question the benefits and motives of their government and coalition members. Certainly, belligerents will use this type of situation to their advantage, particularly to enhance their propaganda efforts.[20] Every friendly fire incident, every civilian death, or any amount of collateral damage plays to the opposing side – namely, they provide more evidence of a callous, oppressive government, and, in the case of Afghanistan, of foreign invaders.[21] A lack of sensitivity toward causalities or the disrespectful treatment of civilians by security forces, even at the lowest levels in the chain of command, can have devastating effects.

Human Intelligence operator Master Corporal Lars Penninston stresses that, in Afghanistan, the actions of a single soldier can have far-reaching consequences at the operational and strategic levels. To provide a hypothetical illustration, Penninston offers that a frustrated, misguided soldier in the field might, on occasion, be inclined to kick a goat, simply to relieve tension. Although such actions might appear innocuous to an insensitive soul, as the goat probably belongs to a common farmer, this may not necessarily be the case. Penninston stresses that this 'supposedly unimportant' farmer could, in fact, be the village leader, as Afghan hierarchy is difficult to discern through appearance, and it often requires close behavioral observation to fully understand. Thus, a seemingly inconsequential act to some could have serious implications.[22] To put this situation into context, because one soldier kicked a goat, the counterinsurgency effort was put at risk of losing the support of the farmer, his family, his clan, and his tribe.

Unfortunately, this type of experience appears to occur all too commonly during the stress of modern operations. Puertas illustrates this point by describing the potential consequences of one corporal and his decisions after being fired upon in an alley in Iraq. He asserts: "Without cultural training, his reaction will be a product of his personal experiences and beliefs...He might have cultural misunderstandings that lead to serious errors in judgment. He might fail in his mission – and he might find himself despised by one poor neighborhood, or by a billion horrified TV viewers." Puertas cautions: "Cultural knowledge of the battlespace should not be left to on-the-job training."[23]

The Cultural Intelligence/Cultural Awareness Gap

If cultural knowledge should not be left to 'on-the-job training,' then the question that must be asked is: What is the CF currently doing to prepare soldiers to meet the cultural challenges on the battlefield? Research has shown that existing cultural awareness training within the CF is designed to provide cultural knowledge to personnel prior to deployment. It normally consists of some language training to understand a few key phrases, an overview history lesson, and general lectures on social morals and values, provided by experts in the field. This aspect of training is usually brief, and, according to several Afghanistan veterans, quite inadequate to prepare soldiers for the realities of the situations that they are facing in theatre.[24]

In fact, CQ doctrine and training within the CF is so deficient that many members are forced to supplement their formal cultural awareness training with additional readings, and more often than not, they are seeking information on the subject from 'old hands' with experience, or from interpreters assigned to the unit.[25] During an after-action interview, a young veteran suggested "...[that] maybe as part of the pre-deployment training, doing a little bit more cultural awareness, rather than just a couple of days of language, would be a good step ahead."[26]

His reasoning was that "... [while] language [training] is good, you want to know about the culture. You want to know what gets in their heads; why they do the things they do; how they act; how they react to certain things; their attitudes towards timelines; that sort of thing."[27] One of his colleagues commented: "I know cultural aspects are so important in the conduct of COIN [counterinsurgency], and I just felt that [pre-deployment cultural awareness training] was not applied with that in mind."[28] This sentiment was supported by several of his colleagues. In the words of another young veteran of the war in Afghanistan, the lack of common and thorough pre-deployment cultural awareness training does not allow for a "balanced perspective across the battle group."[29]

Closing the Cultural Intelligence Gap

In order to address this deficiency, and to provide a solid foundation for future capabilities, the CF must move toward institutionalizing CQ. In fact, many of our allies have already come to the same conclusion. Montgomery McFate, a well-known cultural anthropologist, points out: "Although success in future operations will depend on cultural knowledge, the [American] Department of Defense currently lacks the programs, systems, models, personnel, and organizations to deal with either the existing threat or the changing environment."[30] She goes on to suggest: "A Federal initiative is urgently needed to incorporate cultural and social knowledge of adversaries into training, education, planning, intelligence, and operations." In order to address the issue, she recommends: "Across the board, the national security structure needs to be infused with anthropology, a discipline invented to support war

fighting in the tribal zone."[31] Interestingly, many of McFate's recommendations have begun to be adopted by the American military.[32]

For example, the US Marine Corps has developed what they refer to as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). According to its mandate, the CAOCL is responsible to provide "...operationally focused training and education in individual training, PME [professional military education], and pre-deployment phases, reflecting current and likely contingencies and functions, to ensure Marines and leaders deploy with a grasp of culture and indigenous dynamics for use as a force multiplier."[33]

From the Canadian perspective, the best way of achieving the general goals of institutionalizing CQ is to take a holistic approach, starting with the creation of a CF Centre for Cultural Studies. The centre would serve as the focal point for CQ research, but it would also include the capability to provide advisers, to produce CQ doctrine, and to conduct individual training. Because language and culture are so intertwined, it would be highly desirable that the mandate of the centre include all language training other than French and English, and consideration should be given to carrying out cultural and language training concurrently and in the same location.

Research Section/Technical Advice Section

An American veteran of several foreign interventions once observed that, with respect to the US military: "What we need is cultural intelligence." He continued, "What I [as a soldier] need to understand is how these societies function. What makes them tick? Who makes the decisions? What is it about their society that is so remarkably different in their values, in the way they think compared to my values and the way I think?"[34] In this respect, an important part of the centre's work would focus upon research in the area of cultural (social) anthropology.

Anthropology is the study or science of man, and it includes, "...the study of human physiology, human psychology, the study of human societies (origins, institutions, religious beliefs, social relationships, etc...) and all the other aspects of human culture, whether past or present."[35] In order to meet CF requirements, the centre's research would need to include general anthropology studies that would provide a baseline of cultural research. This baseline would include exposure to some of the basic concepts existing in the field, such as Geert Hofstede's four value dimensions: Power Distance; Uncertainty Avoidance; Individualism-Collectivism; and Masculinity-Femininity, and how they relate to cultural development.[36] Once this initial work has been completed, research would gradually be expanded to include gaining better insights into the interaction of cultures within and between each of the four CQ domains.

Specific research to support planning for contingency operations – and for ongoing missions such as Afghanistan – would also be done by the centre.[37] Along this line; commanders have come to recognize the need for advisers who have a good understanding of local culture, politics, social structure, and economics. With the establishment of a Centre of Excellence, a pool of technical advisers could be recruited and trained to meet specific mission requirements.

Doctrine

Another important area of engagement for the centre would rest in the production of CQ doctrine. Doctrine can be defined as "...the formal expression of military knowledge and thought that the army accepts as being relevant at any given time, which covers the nature of conflict, the preparation of the army for conflicts and the method of engaging in them to achieve success." It is based upon "...fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives."[38] Although it is authoritative, it requires judgment based upon experience, and knowledge in application. The centre would be expected to develop and update CQ doctrine for the CF. However; it would not necessarily incorporate that doctrine into existing manuals. Nonetheless, the centre would be available

to provide advice on content. Once completed, the doctrine would be used to adjust CF training, and, if necessary, to adapt the conduct of operations appropriately.

Training Section

As explained earlier, CQ refers to the cognitive, motivational, and behavioral capacities to understand and effectively respond to the beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors under complex and changing circumstances in order to effect a desired change. Within this context, soldiers must be able to clearly understand national objectives, and then apply cultural awareness skills toward achieving those outcomes through appropriate behavior.

To accomplish this goal, the centre's training section should have the capability to develop and carry out such tasks as pre-deployment and continuation training programs using on-site facilities or mobile training teams, as well as distance learning (DL) tools. Such tools would include CD as well as Web-based materials that could be easily accessed by soldiers and instructors anywhere in the world.[39]

Another of the centre's training capabilities should be an ability to carry out advance training focused upon developing and applying CQ skills toward achieving operational outcomes within the international, national, HN, and enemy domains. This training would be given to commanders, liaison officers, negotiators, advisers, and, when practical, to interpreters. More importantly, the training of intelligence specialists should also be considered as a possible task for the centre.

Administrative Support Section

A sufficient amount of administrative support would also be necessary to keep the centre running. The primary function of the support section would be to carry out the necessary administrative and finance functions needed to run the facility. At a minimum, it should consist of an Administration Officer, Central Registry and Administration Clerk, and a Finance Cell that would include a Financial Services Manager and an Accounts Payable and Claims Clerk.

Summary

The creation of a Canadian Forces Centre for Cultural Studies would bring together research, doctrine, and training – providing the CF with a unique institution capable of quickly gathering and then turning information from various sources into knowledge that could be used at the front lines. As modern armed forces move toward a heavier reliance upon information and intelligence-driven operations, the need to rapidly turn information into knowledge, and then into a useful product, will increase considerably in the near future. In this respect, the centre could become a prototype of the military organization of the future whereby small, self-contained units can identify issues, develop solutions, and quickly adapt those solutions to practical problems on the battlefield. At the very least, such an organization would move the CF to the forefront of CQ innovation.

Conclusion

History has shown that intrepid warriors have routinely leveraged CQ to produce great victories. What is interesting is that although this capability has played an important part in many military successes, few armies have really leveraged its potential to the fullest. Moreover, if current trends continue, success in the modern operating environment will become impossible unless a well developed CQ capability is fully integrated into training, education, planning, intelligence-gathering and other military operations. In fact, commanders in the field have already come to realize that a fully integrated CQ capability is a key enabler of today's intelligence-driven operations. This capability is essential when carrying out military operations near or among civilian populations. Despite its proven record of success, CQ doctrine and training within the CF is deficient, and many members are being forced to supplement their formal cultural awareness training with additional research that they must conduct on their own. In order to address this deficiency, the CF needs to take a holistic approach and to recognize CQ as an operational capability. To develop this capability properly, it needs to create a CF Centre for Cultural Studies. Although, the centre would serve as the focal point for CQ research, it should also include the capability to produce CF doctrine, and have the ability to develop and conduct training. Cultural Intelligence is a capability whose time has come. The question is: What does the CF intend to do about it?

Notes

1. Department of National Defence, Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow, (Kingston, ON: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), p. 2.

2. Brigadier General David Fraser, former Commander ISAF Multi-National Brigade Sector South, Kandahar Afghanistan, presentation to Canadian Infantry Association Annual General Meeting, Edmonton, 25 May 2007.

3. Emily Spencer, *Crucible of Success: Applying the Four CQ Domain Paradigm, the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan as a Case Study* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report, July 2007), p. 3.

4. Ibid.

5. Donald Kagan (ed.), *The Peloponnesian War* (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 2003), pp. 100–102.

6. Interestingly, Lawrence was not a soldier by profession. In fact, after graduating from Oxford University in 1910, he was awarded a post-graduate scholarship at Magdalen College and spent much of his research time in the Middle East, touring and carrying out archaeological work. When The First World War broke out in 1914, Lawrence entered military service and was commissioned into the British Army as an intelligence officer.

7. General Edmund Allenby used Lawrence as a liaison officer to the Arabs, which operated to the east of the British. He combined their efforts to push his mechanized forces north against the Turks, with lightning attacks, while the Arabs hampered Turkish efforts to move troops and supplies.

8. T.E. Lawrence, *Evolution of a Revolt: Early postwar writings of T.E. Lawrence*, Stanley and Rodelle Weintraub (eds.) (London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), pp. 9–29.

9. Cited in Bernd Horn, "Avenging Angels': The Ascent of SOF as the Force of Choice in the New Security Environment," in Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius (eds.), Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2007), p. 159. SOF are

"...specially organized, trained and equipped military and paramilitary forces that carry out special operations to achieve specific military, political, economic or informational objectives..."

10. <http://www.goarmy.com/special_forces/ the point that foreign troops will eventually unconventional_warfare.jsp>. go home, but that the belligerents are already

11. Ibid.

12. Spencer, p. 3.

13. Colonel Francois Vertefeuille, "Civil-Military Operations in Combined Force Command – Afghanistan," in Bernd Horn, (ed.), *In Harm's Way: The Buck Stops Here* (Kingston, ON: CDA Press, 2007), p. 181.

14. Peter Gizewski and Lieutenant–Colonel Michael Rostek. *Towards a JIMP-Capable Land Force*, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Army Journal Vol. 10.1, Spring 2007), p. 55.

15. Elizabeth Baldwin-Jones, Deputy Director, Regional Security, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, emphasized this point in an address at the 2007 Women Understanding Adversary Culture (National Leading in Defence Symposium, *Gender Matters: Leadership and the Changing Defence Environment*, held in Ottawa on 6 March 2007. Her talk dealt mainly with the relationship between personnel from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and CF members while working in Afghanistan in 2006.

16. Bernd Horn, "Full Spectrum Leadership Challenges in Afghanistan," in Horn, (ed.), *In Harms Way: The Buck Stops Here*, pp. 197–198.

17. David Kilcullen, "Counter-Insurgency Redux," in *Survival*, Vol. 48, 2006–2007, p. 122.

18. Robert H. Scales Jr., "Culture-Centric Warfare," in *Proceedings*, October 2004, p. 32.

19. Lorenzo Puertas, "Corporal Jones and the Moment of Truth," in *Proceedings*, November 2004, p. 44.

20. NATO definition for Information Operations is as follows: "Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives." Cited in Colonel W.N. Peters (ret'd), *Shifting to the Moral Plane: The Canadian Approach to Information Operations* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Technical Report, 2007), pp. 20–21.

21. In the case of Afghanistan, this plays into the ancient tribal custom that has often been described as, "...my brother and I against my cousin. My cousin, my brother and I against the world." It also underscores the point that foreign troops will eventually go home, but belligerents are already at home.

22. Master Corporal Lars Penniston, interview with Colonel Bernd Horn, PhD, and Dr. Emily Spencer, 9 May 2007, Ottawa, Ontario.

23. Puertas, p. 43.

24. Interviews conducted by Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Emily Spencer at CFB Edmonton,January 2007.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," Defense University Press: *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 38, 2005), p. 42.

31. Ibid.

32. For an example of this new emphasis on CQ, one can consult the University of Military Intelligence website at <http://www.universityofmilitaryintelligence.us/tcc/cultural/IntCACurr.asp>.

33. U.S. Marines, CAOCL Home Page <http:// www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/>, accessed 19 February 2007.

34. Cited in Frank G. Hoffman, “Principles for the Savage Wars of Peace,” in Anthony Mc Ivor, (ed.), *Rethinking the Principles of War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 304.

35. Glossary of terms <http://www.geocities.com/ amuns_temple/Glossary.htm>, accessed 15 July 2007.

36. Hofstede’s four value dimensions are described in Martin M. Chemers, *An Integrative Theory Leadership* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997). Hofstede has also published extensively and has added a fifth value dimension to his list: long-term orientation. This last dimension explores the differences between long-term goals expressed through economic thrift and perseverance, and those that are more immediate, such as respect for tradition, committing to social obligations, and saving face.

37. McFate, pp. 42–44.

38. Canadian Forces Defence Terminology Bank <http://terminology.mil.ca/term¬eng.asp>, accessed 15 October 2007.

39. The website should also allow commanders and technical advisors to access up-to-date research when necessary.

NATO Deploys Command And Control Tool In Afghanistan

By Henry S. Kenyon

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July 2009, Copyright 2009
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4400 Fair Lakes Court, Fairfax, Virginia 22033-3899
(703) 631-6100. Printed in the U.S.A.

Coalition forces in Afghanistan are using a situational awareness system that alerts military patrols about mined roads and warns civilian relief convoys about traffic jams and possible insurgent activity. The capability fuses intelligence alerts and real-time tracking information to provide users with the location of civilian and NATO forces.

The recent upsurge in Taliban attacks on humanitarian aid workers and convoys, along with the planting of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along major supply routes, led NATO to issue an urgent need request for a real-time situational awareness capability. The alliance's Technology for Information, Decision and Execution Superiority, known as TIDE, integrates existing national communications systems to move operational data across all echelons and security levels.

This capability to avoid IED attacks and to manage convoys originated from a NATO urgent operational requirement issued in October 2008. Dag Wilhelmsen, general manager of the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A), Brussels, states that the requirement allowed the agency to combine a number of efforts to solve this coordination and logistics challenge. He explains that the agency had several technologies available that could be combined into a new capability. The components came from NATO's Allied Command Transformation program, which examines requirements and technologies to enhance interoperability between alliance nations.

The rapid development process enabled TIDE to be fielded initially in Afghanistan this past April. Wilhelmsen notes that this initial deployment will grow to include additional data and information sources as the capability evolves. The NC3A also is working with information assurance technologies to allow data to be transported across various secure coalition domains. He describes this capability as an "information diode" that permits information to travel across classification levels. The diode also allows data to be imported securely into higher classification domains.

Logistics planning and coordination is another part of TIDE. NATO is working with its member nations to manage the reception, staging and onward movement of supplies and materiel into and across Afghanistan. This international collaborative program allows NATO nations to deploy simultaneously into the region and to deconflict their movement from their staging areas to deployment into their operational areas. The joint effort covers all of the aspects of logistics planning, execution and support, Wilhelmsen explains.

He notes that a variety of civilian and military vehicles use Afghanistan's roads. Civilian contractor convoys provide supplies of food and equipment to NATO bases. Military convoys consist of combat, transport and supply vehicles from all coalition nations operating in the region. He discloses that most nations have their own deployment tracking systems. The goal of TIDE is to import all of these tracks, with their varying standards, and translate them into one language.

Wilhelmsen observes that many of the information sources needed by NATO forces and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are available on the Internet. This Web-based data can be imported into a single repository managed by TIDE, so a multidisciplinary team working under the NC3A has combined these various capabilities into TIDE.

Wilhelmsen adds that TIDE's capabilities will grow as new data sources are brought into the network. This information will come from a variety of sources such as military blue-force tracking systems, incident databases and local reports of IEDs. Threat incidents and suspected ambush areas will be sited onto digital maps that can be displayed in command posts and on vehicle-based command and control systems.

TIDE also includes military information such as the location of troops and command posts. Wilhelmsen says that this military data is useful in situations where civilian convoys report an attack or IED incident, because it allows commanders quickly to determine the location of the nearest troops to respond to the situation.

Other organizations such as the United Nations and the Red Cross also operate in the region. Wilhelmsen explains that one of the main challenges is obtaining data from and providing security information for groups such as the World Food Organization while not appearing to openly support them: It is critical that NATO avoid interfering with their work or making them targets. Trust between the civilian organizations and NATO is key in this tactical situation, he says.

TIDE allows these groups to have a standoff security presence that enables them to work with the local population without the need for obvious heavy military escort. "The key point here is joint situational awareness for all parties involved in supporting the Afghan government in rebuilding the country and ensuring secure governance and the livelihood of the Afghan people," he says.

However, Wilhelmsen notes that IEDs pose a threat to everyone traveling the nation's roads because these weapons do not distinguish between civilian and military targets. Unlike the more sophisticated weapons used by insurgents in Iraq, the IEDs in Afghanistan often are triggered by a simple pressure plate, which presents a danger to all vehicles. "From an interagency point of view, it's very important that better protection can be offered from those providing security to those that move on the roads and terrain of Afghanistan," he remarks.

TIDE also features a planning and deconfliction capability that permits convoys to plan around traffic jams. The system allows commanders and civilian convoy coordinators to know if there are traffic issues or insurgent activity in a region. Local military units can enter situational data into the network to alert other groups operating in the area. Wilhelmsen explains that the roads winding through the mountains can become blocked with traffic quickly, which attracts potential attacks. "You don't need to send 400 trucks to a jammed border crossing," he says.

The tracking capability is built around a service-oriented architecture. Wilhelmsen notes that its structure is similar to other NC3A data fusion programs that collect data from different sources and merge them into a common operational picture.

TIDE is designed to move data across all echelons, so information can be displayed at the NATO International Security Assistance Force headquarters in Afghanistan and at regional command centers and individual task force units. "The aim is to distribute information to all levels where it is required," remarks Dario Cadamuro, a senior NC3A scientist.

Designed for coalition operations, TIDE can transfer data to individual national command and control systems. But while TIDE provides information across echelons and nationalities, Wilhelmsen cautions that the data transfer is not entirely seamless because of security devices between domains. He believes that it will take several additional developmental steps to smooth out information sharing before the system achieves full operational capability. TIDE initially is being deployed to military units before being provided to civilian users.

To ensure interoperability and real-time unit tracking, NATO is working on datalink standardization and translating different national formats into a common, Web-based, extensible markup language

(XML)-based code. This language allows data to be imported from different systems into a unified operational picture.

TIDE uses two different symbols sets to graphically display data: the Over-The-Horizon Gold text format and an XML-based protocol. Data is contained in individual tracks with basic operational information about a convoy. This information is harmonized with military blue-force tracking systems and air data to prevent conflicts, Cadamuro says.

The software uses a machine-generated and -read symbology to avoid errors in the operational and location data. “To ensure quality, we base all our implementation on XML standards in machine-readable formats,” Cadamuro explains.

Wilhelmsen adds that the NC3A is working with a variety of technologies and requirements to field TIDE over short- and long-term schedules. The agency now has a structure in place that allows it to respond quickly to urgent requirements by finding and placing solutions into operational systems. But he cautions that it is important to provide not only the technology but also the full training and documentation to make it sustainable in the field.

To ensure that all of the alliance’s command and control systems are fully operating and serviced, the NC3A has established a field office in Kabul. The agency also operates with the NATO Programming Centre, which is responsible for several key software products used to support operations in the region.

These technologies include data fusion software used by the NATO Network Enabled Capability, or NNEC, program to consolidate information into a single battlefield situational picture in a command post.

Craddock: NATO Must Find Better Ways For Nations to Participate

Gen. John Craddock, the recent NATO supreme allied commander Europe, and former commander of U.S. European Command, speaks July 9, at the Reserve Officers Association (ROA) in Washington, D.C., as part of a presentation titled "NATO and Afghanistan: Equitable Burden Sharing."

Jul 10, 2009
By C. Todd Lopez

Photo credit C. Todd Lopez

WASHINGTON (Army News Service, July 10, 2009) — Options exist to help members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization better meet their obligations within the alliance, said the former NATO commander, who left the post less than two weeks ago.

Gen. John Craddock, the recent NATO supreme allied commander Europe and former commander of U.S. European Command, spoke July 9, at the Reserve Officers Association in Washington, D.C., as part of a presentation by the Heritage Foundation titled "NATO and Afghanistan: Equitable Burden Sharing."

The general addressed concerns that some NATO nations weren't as active in the alliance as others, in particular, to commitments in Afghanistan. He also suggested ways NATO could help member nations be more active in the alliance, including the development of shared NATO resources and the expansion of the NATO mission to include non-military, nation-building activities.

Craddock said that NATO can do more to enable member nations to provide support — to meet their commitments to the alliance.

"We as an alliance need to make it easier for individual nations to make those contributions," he said. "We need to help nations financially who are willing to deploy to an operational theater."

Such assistance could come, he said, through the use of common or shared resources — including a funding system that could reduce the strain on national defense budgets.

“We must bring new modern interoperable capabilities to the nations of the alliance, and also collectively to the alliance itself,” he said. “I think we should further explore the acquisition of the commonly owned assets.”

Even more, he said, NATO could redefine its mission in such a way as to enable some nations to participate in non-military ways.

“The vast majority of the new and emerging threats that we face collectively: transnational terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, energy security, mass migration, cyber attack — these cannot be defeated by military means alone,” he said.

Those threats to national security call for international solutions built on international partnerships and cooperation, he said.

“When we plan for the operations of today and tomorrow, perhaps NATO should ask whether it can provide capabilities outside the military domain,” he said. “I would suggest that it is perhaps time for NATO to consider a greater role in areas that are traditionally non-military. Future transformation could be more comprehensive in nature, enabling the alliance to participate more actively in new tasks, tasks such as nation-building, and the construction of systems of justice and good government.”

The role of the United States, he said, is to continue building partner capacity in NATO — to assist partner and member nations in building what they have to contribute to increasing demands by the alliance.

“We currently provide essential support to our multi-national operations by building partner capacity,” he said. “We must expand our efforts to assist allies in increasing their capabilities. The multinational operations we conduct today, and the one that we will conduct tomorrow, can succeed only if allies work together effectively. Interoperability and increased partner capacity are indeed essential.”

Craddock also discussed the perception that some NATO nations did not seem as committed to the alliance’s operations as others — particularly when it involved Afghanistan.

“I believe that our European allies play an important and invaluable role in Afghanistan and other NATO operations,” Craddock said. “But I also believe that we have issues to resolve. We as an alliance have remained well short of our agreed-upon statement of requirements in the Afghan theater. And also in Afghanistan, our NATO forces are riddled with caveats which restrict the flexible employment of the military force.”

But the general fell short of accusing any particular nation of not doing its part.

“To simply say that our allies don’t pull their weight in Afghanistan, I believe, is an oversimplification,” he said.

Craddock said NATO asks member nations to commit 2-percent of their gross national product to defense, but that today, only a handful of member nations meet that goal, and that in the future he expects the number of countries meeting that expectation to drop even further.

“I think today that number is four; it was six this time a year ago and it may well be two within six months,” he said. “Those are the current trends.”

In Afghanistan, Craddock said, some nations participating there have restrictions on troops — restrictions that limit their ability to contribute to the goals of the alliance.

The general explained that nations not as active in NATO can be divided into two categories: those who cannot participate as fully as expected, and those that will not.

"The United States has spent a lot of time, effort and resources developing our military as a powerful force, with a wide spectrum of cutting-edge capabilities and highly trained units to conduct military operations whenever and wherever we're called for," he said. "But not all of our allies have the resources to develop similar force strength and similar capabilities."

Those nations with limited resources, he said, may instead focus on very specific, specialized capabilities they can bring to the fight. Their commitment, with limited, niche capabilities, must not be interpreted as being less committed, he said.

"Some nations are strong in certain areas and are weak in other areas. Some lack certain capabilities altogether," he said. "We must not look at specialization as a shortcoming. Rather, for many, it is a sensible way to increase alliance capability in total. By encouraging nations to focus their efforts in different capability areas, we can benefit as an alliance from the law of comparative advantage."

The general also said that during the Cold War, many nations focused on building defensive forces to protect their own borders. The end of the cold war, and new requirements from NATO, have meant that nations must transform their militaries to support expeditionary operations. But recent conflict between Russia and Georgia, he said, have been cause for some nations to reconsider their rapid transformation to an expeditionary force.

Providing an expeditionary force is also expensive, Craddock said. And for some nations, the logistical cost of deploying a force commensurate with their military's size is prohibitively expensive.

"Due to NATO's cost-lie-where-they-fall policy, the costs of deployment fall to individual nations committing and deploying to the theater," he said. "For a larger nation, such as the United States, we are able to benefit from economies of scale as we've realized logistics costs. Contrarily, the logistics tail for a smaller force contingent in Afghanistan is proportionately much more significant than for that of a larger force."

Some nations, he said, may also be unwilling to support all NATO operations because of political pressure and because of a government's inability to communicate to its own population the importance of participation in some actions that aren't readily seen as important to its own national security.

"The decision of a nation to deploy military force, putting its sons and daughters in harm's way, and expending national treasure, is not and should not be an easy decision," he said. "We must remember that even the Article V guarantee of NATO provides only that a nation take action it deems necessary in restoring and maintaining security — it is a national decision."

Currently, NATO is asking member countries to provide resources to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, to K4 in Kosovo, to a headquarters in Bosnia, to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean, to training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, to a counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, and to the NATO response force.

He said a national government, in making a decision to commit to those requests, must consider national will inside its borders and how to sell providing support to the populace that elected it.

"It must consider public opinion as it endeavors to deploy its military force," he said. "In some nations, public support for the operation in Afghanistan is quite limited."

Still, the general said, he believes each nation in NATO has a responsibility to the alliance and to communicate to its people the importance of the military action it has committed to NATO. Leaders, he said, must not be followers.

“To lead rather than follow polling data on public opinion,” he said. “Politically, this can be a real challenge for European nations — when a coalition government’s hold on power rests with a single seat in parliament, that government may be more than a bit tentative in vocalizing unpopular positions.”

Finally, Craddock said operations in Afghanistan need more support from NATO countries if the goals of the alliance are to be met.

“The ISAF mission, in Afghanistan in particular, needs increased commitment by individual NATO allies and partners to enable meaningful progress toward objectives,” Craddock said.

Complex Operations in Africa

Colonel Henri Boré, French Army, Retired

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France has deployed some 8,000 French troops around the world, and the way they interact with foreign populations and military organizations overseas is the direct result of a successful, 100-year-old marriage between ethno-anthropology and the French military experience in the 19th and 20th centuries in Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The French military definition of operational culture takes note of this alliance: "Operational culture is the understanding of foreign cultural norms, beliefs and attitudes: it is an operationally relevant field guide used by general officers as well as infantry squad leaders to navigate a complex human terrain."[1]

Deployed French Army units learn about a foreign country's culture by studying its customs, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions. This anthropology angle became part of the military learning process as a result of lessons learned in two centuries of counterguerrilla wars, or what we today refer to as irregular war or "hybrid war."[2] The French military experience led to two counterintuitive principles:

- Effective leaders of small combat arms units must think like human intelligence collectors, counterpropaganda operators, nongovernmental organization workers, and negotiators.
- The combat arms battalion is the nexus of operational cultural training and education for complex military and nonmilitary tasks.

French Operational Culture Concept

The colonial era influenced the development of operational culture concepts throughout the 19th and 20th century. The colonial campaigns from 1862 to 1962 linked anthropological studies with strategic and tactical military courses of action.

Marriage of anthropological studies and irregular war. During the colonial expansion in Africa and Indochina in the second half of the 19th century, French military officers returning from campaigns in Asia and Africa travelled to Paris to share their observations and lessons learned with a large audience of politicians, journalists, geographers, and ethno-anthropologists.[3] A common interest in unknown populations led these military thinkers to share their cultural awareness with these groups. Colonial officers hosted anthropologists overseas who assisted them in the study of violence among nonstate groups.[4] This laid the foundation for the strong influence of ethno-anthropological studies on the colonial Army throughout the 19th and 20th century. Officers compared written reports with ethno-anthropologists' observations on lifestyle, customs, social structures, and tribal governments in the unexplored territories of Africa and Asia. In 1885, for instance, Captain Savorgnan de Brazza returned to Paris with ethno-anthropological information gathered during his exploration of the Ogoue, Congo, and Kouilou-Nari basins in Central Africa.[5]

Anthropologists also became more familiar with the planning and execution of military campaigns. Two French colonial military figures enforced this process: Marshals Joseph Gallieni and Hubert Lyautey. In 1899, building on 20 years of colonial campaign experiences, they established the first principles of expeditionary operations later integrated into operational culture.[6] In his *The Colonial Role of the Army*, Lyautey, then a colonel, called for permanently stationing a reservoir of units overseas to develop staff and small-unit leaders with expertise in foreign cultures and languages, and in mediation and negotiation

techniques. Lyautey set the conditions for integrating operational culture into irregular-warfare concepts.

Expeditionary campaigns in Upper Tonkin (1885-1897) and Madagascar (1896-1900) served as on-the-ground laboratories to develop this approach. Company- to platoon-sized units operated independently to gain control of wide areas of operations. Captains, lieutenants, and sergeants learned that collecting the right intelligence at the right time was the key to mission success.[7]

Superior in their knowledge of the terrain but inferior in their equipment, organization, and fire-power, the French Army's adversaries often waged guerrilla warfare.[8] French colonial campaigns were first and foremost expeditionary operations whose success depended on the support of the local population and the intelligence-gathering skills of infantry platoon commanders. Commanders discovered that an ethno-anthropological lens was an effective tool to develop situational awareness. It remains at the core of the French operational culture domain.

In *The Colonial Role of the Army*, Lyautey noted that "captains, lieutenants and sergeants must perform with excellence in areas such as local politics, as well as social, education and economic development of the population."[9] Gallieni's "instructions" during the campaign of Madagascar in May 1898 stressed what is now a paramount principle in modern irregular war: "We must bear in mind that in colonial conflicts, which are unfortunately forced on us by the unruliness of rebellions, we must never destroy except in the last extremity. Every time that warlike incident obliges one of our colonial officers to proceed against a village and occupy it, he must never lose sight of the fact that his first responsibility is to reconstruct the village, set up a market, and build a school."[10]

The success or failure of expeditionary campaigns depended on two factors about small-unit leaders:

- Their knowledge of the local population regarding cultures, traditions, customs, and languages.
- Their ability to conduct CMO and information operations.

By the end of the 19th century, operational culture was part of every layer of the military planning process, from the strategic to the tactical. Commanders integrated CMO and information operations into small-infantry-unit operational orders.

Lyautey and Gallieni's influence led to the creation of a military center for foreign cultures in 1906 that integrated anthropological studies into expeditionary or irregular war practices to prepare deployed officers and NCOs at the farthest reaches of the empire "to command inaccessible outposts, live with the indigenous population, [and] work as combat leaders, diplomats, and political administrators of areas of responsibility as vast as half the size of France."[11] In such environments, cultural knowledge of tribal and clan lifestyles, social orga-nizations, and family and kinship lineage served one paramount objective: to successfully navigate and control complex human terrain.

The 102-year-old center, Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l'Outre-Mer et l'Etranger (EMSOME), located in Paris' western suburbs, maintains and continues to develop the anthropological knowledge to help officers and leaders understand the complexity of cultural interactions in foreign countries and regions. For instance, 1908 reports on the Tuareg, Bambara, and Dogon ethnic groups in the French Sudan provide insight into 2008 Mali sociocultural parameters.

Operational culture, HUMINT, PSYOP, and CMO. Gallieni and Lyautey's concepts influenced many officers during the first half of the 20th century, including Colonel Roger Trinquier and Lieutenant Colonel David Galula. The American military has studied their writing extensively since 2004.[12]

Over the years, operational culture became the cement holding together many tasks across the irregular war spectrum. As Trinquier and Galula note, the tasks include—

- Assessing the political effect of any military action.
- Supporting the population.
- Mapping the insurgency.
- Clearing and holding areas of operations to "box" the insurgent influence.
- Relying on a web of mobile- and light-infantry units.
- Performing a variety of nonmilitary tasks that benefit the local population.



Joseph Simon Gallieni (1849–1916) | Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey (1854–1934)

Trinquier and Galula echoed principles already outlined by Gallieni and Lyautey a century earlier. For Trinquier, "the sine qua non of victory in modern warfare is the unconditional support of the population," because "the inhabitant in his home is the center of the conflict."[13] Control of this center of gravity is "as necessary for the counterinsurgent as for the insurgent," Galula says, and requires small-unit leaders to train in a broad variety of tasks ranging from human intelligence (HUMINT) collection to psychological operations (PSYOP) as counterpropaganda and CMO.[14]

French combat arms platoon and squad leaders have used their knowledge of local cultures to carry out these tasks. For instance, in Algeria, they spent a great deal of time trying to convince potential insurgents that politics could be a substitute for guns in the ongoing battle to control resources and power. In the countryside, commanders received substantial support from chiefs of villages with whom they were on excellent terms. (They shared common interest to keep the National Liberation Front at large.) As a result, operational culture in France acquired a strong political and ideological component, combined with anthropology studies. Some regimental and company commanders integrated this model into their combat training to prepare infantry squad leaders to become as skilled in PSYOP and HUMINT as they were in marksmanship.

In 1962, the French military began to keep a low profile in the aftermath of France's bitter Indochina and Algerian wars, and such counterinsurgency concepts as psychological and counterpropaganda operations vanished from official terminology and curricula. After 9/11, the timeless principles of irregular warfare were back in the limelight. Today, PSYOP, HUMINT, CMO, and information operations once again define the content of operational culture curricula.

The French military's operational culture syllabus examines foreign societies' cultural habits, traditional customs, social and political constructs, moral ideas, codes of honor, and ways of thinking. Such knowledge helps commanders quickly identify and take advantage of psychological points of weakness and strength of the insurgent they are—or will be—fighting, as well as the local force they are—or will be—training. Furthermore, understanding what drives local authority and identifying who is really in charge helps commanders establish and enforce lines of communication with local political, religious, and military leaders, thus working "with the mandarin, not against him," as Lyautey advised in 1899.[15]

Recent counterinsurgency, stability and support, and peacekeeping operations in Africa, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan have reinforced the French model of integrating anthropology into irregular warfare planning and execution and helped battalion commanders develop operational culture programs of instruction for small-unit leaders.

After 9/11, the timeless principles of irregular warfare were back in the limelight.

Operational Culture for Small-Unit Leaders: Win the People First

Nineteenth and 20th century counterguerrilla operations laid the foundations for modern coun-terinsurgency doctrine by integrating HUMINT, PSYOP, and CMO into a common warfighting continuum. As Galula demonstrated, success often comes from combined-arms battalions whose squad leaders are savvy operators in all these fields.

History teaches us that destroying the enemy is not the strategic goal of counterinsurgency operations. As Lyautey states, "The raison d'être of our colonial military operations is always and foremost economic." A colonial commander's role was to gain control of a territory and its population to integrate the region into the French empire ideologically, politically, and economically. In this respect, the population was the center of gravity, even at the sergeant level. Knowledge about the culture of the people was paramount.

At the operational level, colonial commanders applied the now famous methodology of the spreading "ink blots" or "oil stains." From secure bases, small light and mobile units gradually spread out over the theater of operations from one base to another until they covered the region with interconnected bases and outposts, progressively controlling each area. Gaining the trust of tribes and villages depended on proper cultural behavior by the troops.

Maneuver was the decisive tactical element at company level and below. Isolated company commanders and platoon and squad leaders had to take crucial, timely initiatives to obtain strategic goals. To control wide areas of operations, they sought to impose a stable and secure environment by interacting with villagers, training local militias, and containing hostile enemy forces by either the use of force, the threat of it, or negotiation. "Win the people first," Lyautey ordered in 1901 in Madagascar. "Each time we find

ethnic groups that are politically structured within organized institutions, we must rely on them and work with them."[16] Again, the general principle of colonial expansion in Asia was to "work with the mandarin, not against him."[17] This policy required an in-depth knowledge of local and regional alliances and powers. Operational culture training and education programs address these irregular warfare principles.

The battalion as nexus of operational culture training. The French Army's operational cul-ture domain relies mainly on the combination of anthropological-centered EMSOME teaching and the combat arms battalion's mission-oriented application of it. Although EMSOME offers a central repository for cultural knowledge, the knowledge spreads at the combat arms battalion level, the cradle of the expeditionary culture. From 1882 to 2007, more than 120 years of expeditionary campaigns have driven the operational culture training and education at the 2d Infantry Marine Regiment and provided it with unique cultural expertise.

EMSOME emphasizes the "so what" of operational culture in its seminars, while small-unit leaders convey their experiences to each other at the battalion level. The knowledge acquired does not depend on rank but on mission, task, and military-occupational specialty.

As mentioned earlier, anthropology drives pre-deployment operational culture programs to explore the dynamics of tribes, clans, traditional beliefs, and religion. Understanding local moral values and codes of honor helps officers and soldiers negotiate with powerful local religious, political, tribal, and administrative authorities.

What makes this program so unique is that it does not use a template approach. Each combat arms battalion has the autonomy to tailor the training to its own level of experience. The program's purpose is to help company commanders train their platoon and squad leaders. In addition, studying a country's culture, history, economic issues, social norms, and traditions addresses one key question: Who are the people in our area of operations? Infantry company commanders, platoon leaders, and squad leaders learn the answer during predeployment training that covers:

- Human terrain.
- Counterinsurgency operations.
- Training and advising national forces.
- Operating civil-military operations.

Battalion commanders can easily translate each domain into two-hour classes in their programs of instruction.

...knowledge acquired does not depend on rank but on mission, task, and military occupational specialty.

Course 1. Navigating the human terrain: a combat arms skill. Learning how to navigate complex human terrain is a combat arms skill that requires more time and energy than learning how to fire a weapon, use a compass, or drive a truck. The first course, therefore, covers the traditional domains of ethno-anthropology studies through a cultural approach. Officers and enlisted members take the same classes in human geography, history, religion, traditional beliefs, moral values, social and political organization, family structure, kinship lineages, economic challenges, customs, and individual societal abilities and habits.

The studies highlight the complexity and nuances of these human structures and warn against the oversimplifications in many Western matrix approaches. The training puts into perspective concepts of land ownership, family lineage, generation networks, and traditional clan struggles for power. Further, it highlights the political influence of ethnic groups or subgroups. Officers and enlisted men learn about subtle differences within the Northern Teda group, the Goranes, and Toubous. They study the traditional influence of the Zaghawa, Tama, and Bideyat clans in the Wadai region of eastern Chad as well as the differences between "black" Saharan nomads, "Arab" Chadians, and the Chari-Baguirmi group.

EMSOME

French Marines in Chad, 2006.

EMSOME mobile teams provide much of this teaching. However, during predeployment training, they use the expertise available within the combat arms battalion itself. Officers and soldiers who have operated in the country of deployment give additional briefs based on their own experiences.

Instructors also teach their students how to interact with street vendors, local imams, and marabouts; what greetings to use; which "codes" to apply when conducting a meeting; how to quickly identify dominant families or individuals in the neighborhood; how to understand the social value of bargaining with vendors in a market; how to bargain; and how to follow rules of hospitality.

At this stage, small-unit leaders benefit from a two-hour basic language course providing them with about 50 key "icebreaker" sentences and numbers. Language proficiency, however, is not a priority for the battalion commander. Proficiency in a foreign language requires years of in-depth study combined with immersion in the country and is beyond the scope of predeployment training. Instead, the combat arms battalion effort focuses on teaching officers and soldiers how to use an interpreter.

Course 2. Counterinsurgency and operational culture: conducting military and nonmilitary tasks. Examining the legacy of Lyautey and Galula, this course is military-oriented, yet covers a broad variety of nonmilitary tasks. Personnel in the battalion play an important role by conveying their knowledge of a specific country. In addition to EMSOME insights, their briefs address and update the following topics:

- The military impact of geography and climate, accessibility of the roads, and the location of available airfields and reliable medical facilities in the area of operations.
- The required combat readiness level (rapid reaction force structure, etc.)
- The history of guerrilla operations in the area. (When? Which tribes and clans? Where? How?)
- The history of counterguerrilla courses of action in the area, when relevant.

Course 3. Training and advising foreign units. This course prepares infantry platoon and squad leaders to execute ad hoc training and advisory tasks with national forces and nongovernmental armed groups. The course goal is to teach officers and soldiers how to adapt to their counterparts' cultures. It usually addresses the following topics:

- History of conflicts.
- Specific military traditions.
- Civil-military relationships.
- Types of recruitment and resources available.
- The level of training and equipment available.
- Types of forces and organization.
- Uniforms and ranks.
- Morale and esprit de corps issues.
- Counterguerrilla combat skills.

Operational culture remains the core of the pre-deployment course.

Course 4. Civil-military operations. This course provides in-depth information on the status of CMO in the battalion area. EMSOME updates the information provided by previous rotations in the country, giving the battalion commander situational awareness of the support the local population needs in his future area of operations: schools to renovate, wells to dig, and bridges to repair. This allows the commander to include two or three CMOs in his warning order. The number varies depending on whether it is a counterinsurgency, stability and support, or peacekeeping operation.

The warning order might tell company commanders to include soldiers who are skilled as carpenters, plumbers, and electricians. A CMO project is a critical tactical course of action to "win the people" in the area of operations. After meeting with local authorities in the country, the commander integrates the CMO into the battalion's operation order. Then the company accomplishes the CMO mission under the battalion commander's watch.

Operational culture is a combat skill that is critical to mission success.

Cultural Understanding as a Long-term Process

The French Army developed the operational culture concept from lessons learned during more than 100 years of colonial military campaigns. These expeditionary counterguerrilla operations were similar to what we now refer to as irregular warfare. Three generations of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men learned the hard way how to interact with foreign cultures to "win the people." The experience of one generation energized the expeditionary training and education of the next.

The primary lesson learned is that operational cultural understanding is a long-term process. For over a century, the marriage of ethno-anthropological studies and military experiences have developed cultural standards small-unit leaders still follow today in operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa.

The history of counterinsurgency operations has taught us that winning people's hearts and minds and changing the adversary's mind-set always matter more than physical destruction of the enemy. Operational culture is a combat skill that is critical to mission success. Like many other Western armed forces, the French military views it as the core of warfighting for combat arms units conducting irregular wars. For all combat arms leaders, from commanders to squad level, operational culture training and education is paramount to achieving success in both military and nonmilitary missions within a foreign environment. This training aggregates capabilities ranging from the restrained use of force to mediation and negotiation. In short, it develops the transverse capabilities required to fight a four-block war.[18]

Ultimately, the battalion commander's operational culture training is driven by the idea that teaching leaders and soldiers how to think and operate in a foreign environment matters more than just teaching them what to think about it.

Notes

1. Interview with BG Philippe Roisin, former director of the Ecole Militaire Spécialisée dans l'Outre-Mer et l'Etranger (EMSOME), 12 December 2006. Located in Paris western suburbs, EMSOMEis the French Army school specializing in training and education for units and individuals deploying to overseas French territories and theaters of operations.

2. LTG James N. Mattis and LTC Frank G. Hoffman, "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," *Proceedings* 132, May 2006. "four-block war" is Mattis's expansion of former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak's concept of "three-block war." General Krulak claimed that today's expeditionary unit must be able to fight in one city block, hand out humanitarian supplies in the next block, and then make peace between warring factions in yet another block. To this requirement, "Hybrid Wars" adds the necessity of conducting effective information operations.

3. Georges Balandier and Marc Ferro, "Au Temps des Colonies" *L'Histoire Seuil* (1984), 76.

4. André *Lyautey*, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 268.

5. Pierre Kalck, *Un explorateur au centre de l'Afrique*, (L'Harmattan, 1993), 9.

6. The "Report of General Gallieni on the situation in Madagascar," by General Joseph Gallieni and "Colonial Role of the Army" by Lieutenant Colonel Hubert Lyautey, an enlightened plea for the creation of a colonial army, were both published in the same year, 1899.

7. General Joseph Gallieni, "Report on the situation in Madagascar," 1899.

8. Le Révérend, 228.

9. Raoul Girardet, *La Société Militaire de 1815 à nos jours*, (Perrin, 1998), 228

10. Gallieni [no page number given].

11. 278.

12. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare-Theory and Practice* (Westport, CTPraeger, 1964) and Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency* (London and Dunow: Pall Mall Press, 1964).

13. Ibid, 8.

14. Galula, 74

15. Le Révérend, 203.

16. Ibid., 279.

17. 278.

18. Mattis and Hoffman, *Proceedings* 132, May 2006

Using Sustainability to Build Stability in Africa: Strategic Policy Issues for the Army
Building a Dialogue for Using Sustainability as an Approach to Engagement

By Dr. Kent H. Butts, Colonel Arthur L. Bradshaw, Jr. (USA, Retired), and Mr Brian Smith

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The Center for Strategic Leadership hosted the second *Using Sustainability to Build Stability in Africa: Strategic Policy Issues for the Army* workshop at the Collins Center on 2-4 October 2007. This workshop series is sponsored by the Army Environmental Policy Institute and its partner organizations: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership (CSL), the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), the Environmental Change and Security Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center (WWC), and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Sustainability means meeting the demands placed on the system today without compromising the needs of future generations. Thus, the over consumption, abuse, or pollution of a country's natural resource base today will cause the country to fail when it cannot meet the demands placed upon the political system by future generations. The workshop series aims at to examine how the Army can leverage sustainability as an approach to engaging African nations. Working within the context of U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) strategic vision, sustainability provides an approach to engagement that will support the capacity of African militaries so that they may help civilian governments address sustainability issues and maintain the legitimacy necessary to prevent state failure and instability.

The U.S. has a number of strategically important national security interests in the security, stability, and development of Africa, including maintaining access to resources, maintaining U.S. influence in the region, and the denial of safe havens to international terrorists. The primary challenge to each of these interests is the persistent specter of political and societal instability. By using the concept of sustainability as an approach to engagement in Africa, the Army, through its participation in the new USAFRICOM, can address the underlying conditions that lead to instability and protect vital U.S. interests on the continent. As stated in the Army Strategy for the Environment, "Local and regional issues, such as famine, natural disasters, ecological degradation, economic decline, political upheaval, and disputes over precious and sometimes scarce natural resources are evolving into global issues that influence how the United States must respond and interact through political, economic, and when necessary, military engagement."

This most recent workshop is part of a series to examine how the Army can use the concept of sustainability as an approach to engagement activities in Africa. The series is focused on identifying opportunities for leveraging sustainability to further U.S. capacity building, security, stability, and development objectives on the continent, and to identify policy requirements to take advantage of those opportunities.

The first workshop, *Factors Shaping the Strategic Environment in Africa*, was held 18-19 July 2007 at the U.S. Army War College. A diverse group of stakeholders discussed why Africa is important to U.S. foreign policy and the issues that are currently shaping the strategic environment in Africa. The workshop brought together speakers and participants from the WWC, USAID, the Department of State, the U.S. Geological Survey, the Army Staff, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Installations and Environment (I&E), the U.S. Military Academy, the Air War College, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy (Africa), OSD Policy (Humanitarian Affairs/Disaster Relief), and the U.S. Forest Service.

Key Points from Workshop #1

- The presentations and discussion of the first workshop brought out a number of key points:
- The Army will lead few of the development or aid efforts in Africa, while supporting an array of others
- Active and persistent engagement now will prevent problems later
- Sustainability is a national security issue because it contributes to stability
- Sustainability as an approach to engagement protects U.S. strategic interests
- The environment is an important component of sustainability
- African views of security are more rooted in human security than national security
- Climate change effects in Africa will exacerbate current tensions and threaten stability

The second workshop, *Building a Dialogue for Using Sustainability as an Approach to Engagement,* had an equally diverse group of senior officials and stakeholders that included the U.S. European Command/Africa Command, OSD for Policy (Africa), Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Environmental Safety and Occupational Health (ESOH), U.S. Geological Survey, Bureau of Ocean, Environment, and Science from the State Department, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (I&E) ERS, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PKSOI, numerous academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector representatives. Discussions focused on:

- Identifying programs and operations to support sustainability in Africa
- The challenges and the opportunities for building stability in Africa
- Opportunities for cooperation among the organizations that are working sustainability issues in Africa to support USAFRICOM

Workshop participants included Ms. Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, and Mr. Tad D. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health.

Key Points from Workshop #2

The presentations and discussion of the second workshop brought out a number of key points.

- The United States should take a longer term view for its programs in Africa and should base them on a strategic vision shared by African states.
- USAFRICOM provides an opportunity for a more coherent and comprehensive strategy on the continent.
- Government agencies need to emphasize interagency cooperation with regional organizations, states, and NGOs and collaboration over primacy in Africa.
- The main focus of government programs in Africa is on health, development, trade and governance.
- A key role for USAFRICOM is to develop the African militaries' capacity to proactively address sustainability issues
- Engagement programs must be sustainable by the countries in Africa; the U.S. Government should ensure the future resources required to sustain these programs or not initiate them
- Training and equipment to enable sustainability should be a key element of effects based planning for USAFRICOM
- Sustainability needs to be incorporated into the National Security Strategy in order to make it a U.S. Government requirement for interagency support

Mr. Tad D. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, addressed the subject of Sustainability as a path to Stability.

The Role of Engagement in Africa

Through early, active, and persistent capacity building engagement with partners on the continent, USAFRICOM will be able to address destabilizing issues and limit the occurrence or escalation of

threats to U.S. interests and coalition partners in Africa. Engagement should be preventive in nature, addressing issues when they are more manageable in terms of the resources required and the immediate consequences to the affected nations and societies. Sustainability has the potential to enhance USAFRICOM's Theater Security Cooperation Plan.

Sustainability as an Approach to Engagement and as a Protector of U.S. Interests

Sustainability in Africa is a national security issue because it relates directly to the stability of the respective nations. States that can sustain their economic growth and diversification, social development, democratic maturation, and their natural resources and service base will maintain their legitimacy and be more stable than states that have difficulty managing these same issues. Sustainability is a catalytic concept with the potential to build partnerships of NGOs, militaries, other governmental agencies, and the private sector to achieve the strategic effect of stability; it is key to protecting U.S. strategic interests in Africa. Political instability is the primary challenge to the United States in the post-Cold War strategic environment, in part because it feeds the root causes and underlying conditions of issues such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other illegal activities that erode and degrade the human condition.



Environment and Sustainability

Sustainability recognizes the importance of a suitable balance between the long-term viability of the *environment* and the use of natural resources; the importance of *economic* development and valuation of ecosystems; and concern for *community* and related *equity* in the distribution of resources. It remains a dynamic concept and may have different meanings in different contexts. Sustainability strives to satisfy the legitimate interests of different stakeholders, not only by providing an equitable distribution of resources today, but by ensuring that these resources will be available to support future generations. The Army views sustainability through a "triple bottom line" lens (Mission-Environment-Community) that recognizes the importance of simultaneously meeting current and future mission requirements worldwide, safeguarding human health, improving quality of life, and enhancing the natural environment.

Human Security and National Security in Africa

A key feature in the strategic environment in Africa is the importance of human security relative to the traditional national security issues that are of importance in the West and the developed world in general. Africans view their security as more closely tied to the security of individual lives in terms of the ability to address food, shelter, disease and education on a regular basis. The differences between the African and U.S. views of security are key to understanding and addressing common issues and opportunities for cooperation. Given the unique nature of the African continent, USAFRICOM will need to take a different approach to its engagement program development than the other Combatant Commands.

Ambassador George E. Moose, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, was the workshop's keynote speaker.

The Impact of Global Climate Change on Africa

Climate change is a critical issue in Africa where it is more likely to exacerbate tensions over natural resource and health issues, radical Islam, reconstruction and stabilization, and create significant legitimacy issues for weak or failing state. Swings in agricultural production, the availability of food resources and prices for commodity products on world markets will become more difficult to manage and challenge the legitimacy of democratically elected governments. Sustainability offers an opportunity for defense cooperation between regional states on significant sustainability issues of common interest. This opportunity can enhance governmental legitimacy, diminish conditions terrorists seek to exploit, reduce regional instability, and enhance U.S. access and influence.

TSC ENGAGEMENT in EUROPE—Building Coalitions

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael R. Eastman, FA

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Bulgarian CPL Ivan Tanev of the 38th Infantry Battalion helps SPC Zachary Baker of 1st Battalion, 94th Field Artillery (1-94 FA), load a Bulgarian light machine gun during joint weapons familiarization at the Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria. (Photo by PFC Crystal Abbott, Southern European Task Force Public Affairs)

Given the demands of modern coalition warfare, theater security cooperation (TSC) is a priority mission for Army forces assigned to the US Army Europe (USAREUR). The Field Artillery (FA) has been and will continue to be a major contributor to TSC in Europe.

Several factors combine to create unique advantages for Artillery forces stationed in Europe in the TSC arena. USAREUR units enjoy a geographic proximity to dozens of nations eager to train with the US. Additionally, many of our current partners, particularly those in Eastern Europe, retain a military structure centered on mechanized and armored forces, with significant numbers of FA units available for targeted engagement.

Finally, the world-class training environment provided at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Grafenwoehr, Germany, and the wide availability of ranges in our neighboring countries provide challenging settings for a variety of training opportunities at relatively low cost. Current operational demands have limited our ability to leverage these advantages in recent years, but an enormous potential exists—and the FA community in Europe will be a key participant in TSC for years to come.

USAREUR's first priority has been and is providing trained and ready forces for our commitments to the War on Terrorism (WOT). The operational tempo in Europe, like that in the continental US, ensures that the vast majority of our operational units are in the predeploymentdeployment-redeployment cycle. This has posed challenges for the Army's ability to resource many desired multinational exercises and has impacted on the frequency of TSC events over the last several years, but certainly does not diminish their importance.

TSC Plan. Peacetime military engagement, as defined by the recently released *Field Manual 3-0 Operations,* consists of "all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the

security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners."

The European Command's (EUCOM's) TSC plan guides execution of this important function, setting priorities for military engagement across Europe, and USAREUR units execute this plan as the Army component in theater. In fact, Artillery units in Europe are positioned uniquely to interact with many of our European allies, and USAREUR leadership has set the conditions for building on this potential in the coming years.

The investment in TSC in Europe during the past several decades has paid enormous dividends. One needs to look no further than our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for evidence. The vast majority of countries contributing land forces to both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom are from the EUCOM area of responsibility.



A Bulgarian soldier (right) observes a US Soldier from 1-94 FA. The US and Bulgarian troops are training alongside Romanian infantrymen at Romania's Babadag Training Area during the final phases of a joint task force exercise at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania. (Photo by SGT Aimee Millham, US Army, Europe Public Affairs)

Ties Strengthened. There are a range of factors that impact a nation's decision to participate in WOT. However, the fact that both longstanding allies and new partners from across Europe are willing and have the expertise to operate seamlessly in coalition warfighting with US forces is attributable directly to TSC engagements. These TSC engagements are designed to build partner capacity, ensure interoperability and strengthen military ties between these nations and the US. The common procedures, equipment interoperability and shared confidence, so vital to successful operations, are the result of years of cooperation and engagement.

FA Benefits. Artillery units enjoy additional benefits and opportunities as a result of TSC in Europe. Many of our partner countries, and particularly those in Eastern Europe, retain a force structure that is based around heavy and mechanized forces, and FA is frequently a major component of their ground forces. This presents dual opportunities for engagement.

Not only is there increased interest in developing the nonlethal integration skills critical for success in the current counterinsurgency fight, but many of our European allies retain a strong desire to share tactics, techniques and procedures related to our more traditional core competencies. Forward deployed Artillery units enjoy the advantage of geographic proximity to these European partners, so opportunities

for live-fire exercises in countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania present another exceptional way to build partner capabilities and close relationships through TSC.

Operational demands have hampered USAREUR efforts at TSC somewhat, but FA remains a key contributor to our ongoing activities. During the past 12 months, successful NCO exchanges have occurred between the United Kingdom (UK) and US Army National Guard units from Indiana, Michigan, Kansas and Illinois. B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 123 FA (B/2-123 FA) (105mm) from Macomb, Illinois, conducted a successful reciprocal small unit exchange with the UK Territorial Army from 16-30 June 2007.

For the active Army, FA played a central role in one of the highlights of USAREUR TSC activities in the past year. From August to October 2007, Soldiers from the 1-94 FA (Multiple-Launch Rocket System or MLRS) worked alongside units from Bulgaria and Romania as part of the first rotation to Joint Task Force–East (JTF-E), USAREUR's premier training site in Eastern Europe.

The battalion served as the core of a multinational task force for this multinational exercise, participating in various training events ranging from individual small arms and crew-served ranges, squad live-fire exercises, situational training exercises and other soldiering skills with Romanian and Bulgarian counterparts. Task Force 1-94 conducted exercises at locations in both countries, including Novo Selo Training Area, near Bezmer Air Base in Bulgaria, and at a forward operating site at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania.

The JTF-E rotation was received extremely well by all participating countries, and future rotations will expand to include the deployment of additional US active and Reserve Component Army units to Bulgaria and Romania, greater joint participation and the potential for live-fire exercises incorporating mortars, cannon artillery and a range of sensors.

Recent FA Missions. Given the demands of the contemporary operating environment, however, FA participation in TSC in Europe during the past year has been focused on nonstandard missions rather than our traditional core competencies. This is an understandable consequence of both the demand on our operational forces and the emphasis placed on developing partner capacity for employment in a counterinsurgency environment.

Recent multinational rotations to the JMRC, for example, generally have not focused on the integration of lethal and nonlethal effects. Artillery training of late has been limited to preparing partner units for the current fight, emphasizing battle drills such as "react to enemy indirect fire" and instructing international soldiers on core tasks such as performing crater analysis. However, the potential remains for increasing emphasis on the planning, delivery and integration of lethal and nonlethal effects in future years.

In short, USAREUR's Artillery units enjoy several advantages that hold great promise for TSC in the coming years. Geographic proximity to our international partners, a high density of European artillery units eager for joint cooperation and a training environment that provides multiple venues for a wide range of training combine to make Europe an exceptional place to conduct TSC. Our investments in this program have paid enormous dividends to the US, its coalition partners and emerging allies. The FA community stands ready to play a central role as the USAREUR TSC program moves into the future.

Cyber Attacks Reveal Lessons

By Henry S. Kenyon

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July 2009, Copyright 2009
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4400 Fair Lakes Court, Fairfax, Virginia 22033-3899
(703) 631-6100. Printed in the U.S.A.

Estonia is the first nation in history to have experienced massive cyber attacks directed at its government and key infrastructure. The event, which took place over a three-week period in April and May 2007, marked the beginning of a new type of amorphous, hard-to-track threat to international security. Coming in successive waves, the attacks almost shut down the Baltic country's government, which relies extensively upon online transactions and e-commerce. In the aftermath of the incident, the European Union and NATO launched a series of initiatives to strengthen national infrastructures and to improve communications between national and multinational organizations in the event of another cyber attack.

One outcome of the attacks is that they elevated the concept of cyber warfare from the focus of a small circle of defense, intelligence and network security specialists to the attention of decision makers in national governments, says Lauri Almann, former permanent undersecretary of the Estonian Ministry of Defense. Almann, who is now a member of the Aare Raig law firm in Tallinn, Estonia, was involved directly in dealing with the incident and its aftermath.

The attacks coincided with political and social events taking place in Estonia during spring 2007. The government had moved a Russian war memorial statue in central Tallinn to a military cemetery. The statue was a touchstone for civil unrest between Estonians, many of whom see the statue as a symbol of Soviet oppression, and Estonia's ethnic Russian population, who view the monument as a commemoration of Russia's sacrifice during World War II. The dispute set off two nights of riots in Tallinn and saw Russian demonstrators besiege the Estonian embassy in Moscow. The event also generated extensive negative coverage by the Russian media. At the time, Estonia's government and law enforcement agencies were involved fully in trying to calm the situation.

Almann explains that he was at a police situation center when the attacks began. The facility housed a combined task force of personnel from the ministry of defense, the prime minister's office and police public relations. This group was responsible for publishing press releases and government statements reacting to the situation surrounding the statue's relocation. He notes that online briefings were the Estonian government's primary means of informing the public about the situation.

In the early morning hours of April 28, the public relations staff told the situation center that they could not post responses on the government's Web site. Almann concedes that in the heat of the crisis, the inability to post messages first was viewed as a technical difficulty. However, it quickly became evident that the government was under cyber attack. "It sounded like a science fiction movie," Almann recounts. He remembers sending a text message to the minister of defense very early in the morning describing the attacks and wondering if the minister would believe him. Although the Estonian experience now sets the standard for a national-level cyber attack, he explains that at the time, such incidents had only been the subject of panel discussions at network security conferences.

The attacks came in waves, and at their height, the Estonian government's ability to communicate was greatly limited. Almann says that during the first part of the attacks on April 28, government public relations personnel and officials struggled to send their messages out. "If you cannot get your message out, you completely lose your focus. It is a very effective tool in psychological warfare," he concedes.

Estonia is proud of its status as an e-country, which gave the denial-of-service attacks additional psychological weight because Estonians rely heavily on the Internet for their information. Online media outlets were the second target of the attacks, which limited coverage of the event to traditional media such as radio and television.

The most economically serious part of the incident involved attacks on Estonia's banking sector. According to Almann, 97 percent of his country's banking transactions are made online. "It's one thing if a citizen cannot get access to a government Web site or an online media site. But if you can't get access to your money, that's a serious problem," he says.

Those three weeks also saw targeted attacks on Estonia's critical infrastructure nodes. These pinpoint strikes took place late at night and sought to knock out important national communications capabilities. But they were limited in scope and when Estonian officials analyzed the attacks, they determined that their goal was mainly to exhaust cybersecurity personnel.

Much is still not known about the incident. Almann speculates that the attacks could have been an excellent diversion or veil for a more serious type of activity that the Estonian government has not yet detected. During the course of the attacks, the government and the national computer emergency response team (CERT) successfully kept vital national systems operating. As the attacks unfolded, the Estonian national CERT immediately began arranging cooperation via formal and informal channels with international groups. Almann notes that formal communication channels worked well but adds that in many cases, the informal channels proved vital.

Almann says that cooperation between the CERT and private sector firms such as banks and Internet service providers was a key factor in mitigating the attacks. Another lesson learned was the need for more formal arrangements to be in place. However, he cautions that when formal networks are put into place, existing informal networks should not be undone.

In the wake of the cyber attacks, Estonian government officials also asked about the obligations of other NATO or European Union (EU) countries in providing backup hosting of Web sites in such cases This consideration goes beyond Article 5 of the NATO charter, which mandates intervention in the case of an attack on an alliance member, Almann says.

During the attacks, other nations refused many of Estonia's requests for backup hosting out of concern that they might be targeted by whoever was launching the attacks. "What can governments do in this area? Can we have a contingency plan for things like this? If governments can do something, who should pay? Is it good value for money?" Almann asks, noting that these questions still remain unanswered.

As a result of the attacks, Estonia's cyberspace infrastructure is more robust. Almann explains that since 2007, a considerable amount of national-level investment has led to development of policies and regulations for the government and private sector. NATO also has adopted a cybersecurity strategy based on the events in Estonia and established a NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre in Tallinn. He adds that cyberdefense was highlighted as one of the alliance's priorities at a recent NATO summit. The EU also has launched several new initiatives and projects focused on critical infrastructure protection. But he adds that additional work is needed to create more robust networks across Europe and beyond.

Botnets – networks of compromised computers – were the main type of cyberweapon used against Estonia. The botnets launched a massive, distributed denial-of-service attack that swamped e-mail accounts with spam, causing the entire government network to nearly shut down. Almann argues that the threat from botnets has declined since 2007 as cyber attackers have moved on to other methods such as domain name server attacks. But he shares that botnets still can create considerable damage in a widespread attack.

Determining exactly who launched the attack is extremely difficult in cyber war. The attacks on Estonia are believed to have originated in Russia, although the botnets used to deliver the denial-of-service attacks were located all over the planet. The Russian government has denied any responsibility, claiming that private citizens and groups were involved.

Because state borders are meaningless to cyberthreats, international cooperation is key to containing and countering cyber attacks. Almann notes that some nations, such as Russia, have put forward ambitious ideas on cooperation and limiting the use of cyberweapons. However, he believes that the international community should build any initiatives on the basic principles used to fight cybercrime.

Almann maintains that very effective initiatives exist, such as the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, which provides guidelines for governments wishing to develop their own anti-cybercrime legislation. Non-European states can sign onto the convention, which provides a framework for international cooperation on this issue. “It is one of the most effective international instruments existing in that field,” he says.

Major nations such as the United States and Japan have signed onto the convention. Almann contends that international cybersecurity cooperation begins with the convention, which he says serves as a litmus test of a country’s readiness to cooperate in the cybersecurity area. Russia is not a signatory, and it has withdrawn from joining the convention.

Almann praises the work by the EU, but he adds that much remains to be done. He believes that one of the greatest challenges in the area of critical infrastructure protection in Europe is that EU member nations have different rules and requirements for network security, which is an impediment for any type of cooperation. NATO also is doing good work with its cybersecurity strategy, which he says should be enforced vigorously. International cooperation is another imperative. Almann explains that this coordination should extend to allied nations that are not EU or NATO members, such as Australia and Japan.

On a national level, government/private sector cooperation is key to a cyber emergency response. Denmark, the Netherlands and Estonia are good examples of nations with active public-private sector coordination, Almann says. He adds that another worrisome trend internationally is agency-level competition. He explains that in his government experience, pressure exists for a single agency to provide leadership and oversight. But because of the large and diverse nature of the Internet, a more horizontal approach is necessary to spread responsibility among a number of agencies, allowing them to act effectively. “Responding to cyberthreats cannot, by their nature, be the sole responsibility of a ministry of defense or a department of home affairs or intelligence service,” he declares.

Awareness needs to be raised among strategic decision makers, Almann explains. He observes that cybersecurity decisions often are made by politicians or civil servants who may not view network security as an issue affecting all sectors. He adds that national cybersecurity issues cannot be discussed adequately until awareness has been raised among members of world governments. “Among the strategic decision makers, we do not have enough discussion. The cybersecurity discussion should be brought into the mainstream of national security discussions. It’s not an area for techies only,” he remarks.

It is important not to focus only on the last incident. Almann explains that a variety of cyber attacks exist, ranging from the penetration of sensitive systems to manipulating data. He notes that a distributed denial-of-service attack is not what nations should fear, although it should not be discounted because it still can cause major disruptions. “We shouldn’t be focusing on what happened to Estonia because what happens next time is going to be much worse and more dangerous,” he warns.

The Deployable Joint Staff Element and Joint Warfare Centre

By Col Charles Attwood, CAN AF

Reprinted with permission from *The Three Swords* Magazine

The Deployable Joint Staff Element (DJSE) is a concept borne from the realities of providing Command and Control (C2) of operations in today's security environment. The Level of Ambition outlined in Ministerial Guidance '06 requires the NATO Command Structure (NCS) to provide appropriate C2 for a number of concurrent operations, including Major Joint Operations (MJO) and Smaller Joint Operations (SJO). In order to achieve the Level of Ambition, each Joint Force Command may necessarily be tasked to conduct concurrent operations. For success in such an ambitious endeavour, the assigned Commander will require a robust and flexible C2 capability. With an increased focus on deployable, expeditionary capabilities coming at the same time as the NATO Command Structure Peacetime Establishment Review, it was necessary to develop a concept that could realistically provide C2 at the operational level, which was both feasible for the future and effective for current operations. The structural review endorsed the creation of the DJSE to enhance the deployability and usability of operational level command and control in the NATO Command Structure, with a view to replacing existing models.

The DJSE concept, reflecting an innovative and pragmatic approach to dealing with today's security environment, is clearly expeditionary in nature, and aims to provide a small agile Forward Command Element to establish the commander's presence quickly, while minimizing the in theatre footprint. DJSEs are an appropriate means of enabling a mission focused C2 capability consistent with the general principle that execution should be stronger at Forward; and assessment/analysis stronger at Main HQ.

The DJSEs will be on a very short notice to move and, on a rotational basis, will be designated to support the NATO Response Force (NRF). Depending on the operational/strategic environment, the flexibility inherent in the model will enable the DJSE to remain in situ for the duration of the operation or be replaced on operations by a follow on DJSE.

Being a compact package, the DJSE is to be supported and enabled by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency for capability packages and contractual logistics support; deployed CIS units from the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency; and other mission enabling units as required. Collaborative tools and function al services will also be key to success for the DJSE.

Basic preparations to develop the concept began in mid 2008, following the release of the Military Committee guidance. Allied Land Component Command (ALCC) Heidelberg, who will provide the first DJSE for certification, began fully fledged training in the Autumn of the same year. JC Lisbon, with full support from the JC Headquarters and ALCCs Heidelberg and Madrid, has had the lead in the development, testing and implementation of the new structure. A great deal has been accomplished in a very short time frame, and more lies ahead in anticipation of the certification of

Above: Lieutenant General Korte hosted JWC DJSE Seminar "DJSE Concept and Training Implications", 27 and 28 November 2008

the first DJSE, provided by Heidelberg as part of NRF?13, during Exercise STEAD FAST JUNCTURE 09 Phase III.

NATO's Component Commands have long had an affiliation with the Joint Headquarters (JHQs). However, the DJS Es provided by the NATO Force Structure have for the most part been land operations oriented. To enhance their abilities to function at the joint level, the DJSEs will profit from a robust set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). All three Joint Headquarters have been heavily involved in advancing the DJSE concept in general, with a particular investment in the cooperative development of SOPs. While the SOPs will provide a solid baseline of expectations, there will necessarily be exceptions to account for structural differences between the Joint Commands.

The Model

The DJSE model consists of a deployed staff of approximately 210 personnel in three functional areas: a Forward Element, a Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) Core Staff Element, and a Forward Support Element. The DJSE is not a subordinate or intermediate level of command; it is complementary to the Main HQ. The intent is to ensure a single cohesive operational level staff, supported by synchronized structures and common processes and procedures. The DJSE is designed to perform those operational functions that must be con ducted in theatre. The main responsibility to set up the joint logistics posture rests with the operational level commander. The JLSG HQ element core staff will support the JFCs in developing the concepts and procedures necessary to ensure the correct theatre level logistics support. On order, the JLSG will be augmented to a tailored size. The Forward Support Element will be responsible for ensuring Real Life Support, CIS, and force protection.

Implications For JWC

What does the DJSE concept mean for JWC? Clearly, our most comprehensive exposure to the concept will occur within the bounds of the STEADFAST series of exercises, the first occasion having been the crisis response planning phase of STEADFAST JUNCTURE in February of this year. However, work has been progressing apace at JWC outside of the exercise environment in preparation for our support to ACO's training responsibilities, on behalf of Allied Command Transformation. For example, a Bi SC



Implementation Working Group has been established in recognition that a coordinated and coherent approach to implementing this new Command and Control concept would be best realized by incorporating the perspectives of both of the strategic commands. JWC has had ongoing representation at the Working Group.

Secondly, in consideration of the potential challenges ahead, COM JWC hosted a seminar of interested parties in late November of 2008, with the aim of better informing key JWC personnel on the status of DJSE developments, and its implications for JWC. Joining the JWC personnel were representatives from SHAPE, Joint Force Training Centre, Joint Command Lisbon, Allied Land Component Command Heidelberg, and the Operational Preparation Directorate (OPD). The seminar provided a great opportunity over a two day period to discuss issues such as the origins of the concept; the degree and nature of the cooperative work between the three joint commands; the implementation and employment of the DJSEs; perspectives from the provider of the DJSEs; DJSE processes and structures; certification of the DJSE; and some round table discussions on the training of these new operational elements.

Thirdly, we followed up with an internal training day in March, just prior to Exercise STEADFAST JOIST Phase III, to ensure a common level of understanding of the concept as it currently stands, across JWC.

Outside of the above mentioned events, our ongoing focus has been on studying the content of the SOPs. One must understand that much of the practical "proving" work on this new concept has already been undertaken via methods such as the Battle Staff Training. So, while the DJSE will be new to us at the Joint Training Level, it will be more familiar to those working at the coalface. Until we from JWC get a chance to actually see the templated structure play out, we will have been working in the domain of the theoretical. However, even at that, we are aware that challenges lie ahead of us and have been taking measures to address them.

JWC's Capability Development Division clearly will have the lead in our contributions to the doctrinal development related to the DJSE, while the Joint Training Development Division (JTDD) will continue with its traditional role of providing Observer/Trainers to the various training audiences. JTDD is composed primarily of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) whose experiences lie within the traditional J code structures. Even a cursory examination of the new DJSE concept reveals a considerable change in

the traditional organization of a Joint HQ. For example, what we clearly understood as an ops organization (J3, J5, J3/5) is replaced by an organization now known as the Operations Directorate in JHQ Main, including a Plans Branch; an Effects Management Branch; an Assessment Branch; a Synchronization and Execution Branch; and a Situation Centre. With the increasing importance of the Effects Based Approach to Operations, and PMESII analysis, disciplines such as CIMIC and Info Ops may increase in prominence in the new construct. For JWC, one of our first priorities will be a close examination of the structure of our training teams to ensure that we are putting the right expertise in the right location to meet the training demands of the DJSE structure. That work is currently underway. While we can be confident that we have the capacity to address the associated needs, what we will be looking to accomplish during STEADFAST JOIST is how best to organize our resources against the challenge. The training and readiness of the DJSE is the responsibility of the commanders of the NATO Force Commands and the NATO JFCs. The envisioned training follows a building block approach comprising Individual Training, Functional Area Training, Integrated Training, preparatory exercises and major joint exercises, like STEADFAST JUNCTURE. JWC's involvement really commences with the joint level exercise process, as detailed in the MTEP. Phase II of STEADFAST JUNCTURE, with JC Lisbon and its NRF components, gave JWC Observer/Trainers their first real look at the concept at work, albeit in the planning mode. The necessity for frequent close liaison and interaction between the JHQ, its components and DJSE elements was very apparent, particularly when using an Effects Based Approach. The execution phase of STEADFAST JOIST, with the JFC functioning under deployed "operational" conditions, will permit JWC to make further observations pertinent to its role in supporting this important change to the way NATO goes about its operational business.

Focus Areas

Internal considerations as to whet her JWC needs to make significant changes to our support to joint level training has led us to the conclusion that within the STEADFAST series of exercises, currently planned out for a further five years, there exists sufficient flexibility in scenarios, settings, etc., to provide commanders wide opportunity to exercise the concept, according to their specific needs. Based on observations from previous exercises, close examination of the SOPs and discussions with involved parties across NATO, we have identified key aspects of the DJSE concept on which to focus our training effort. Those items include:

- the command and control working relationships within the JFC and with external units and HQs;
- the development of the Commander's situational awareness, including fusion and maintenance of varied operational inputs;
- the use of boards and their links to the Commander;
- the handling of reports and returns from higher, adjacent and subordinate units and agencies;
- the assessment process. JWC is also committed to providing the maximum possible support to the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre with the view to contributing to the refinement of the concept. There is no question that the DJSE concept poses many challenges as we proceed to implementation. JWC is very excited about being involved with such an important aspect of NATO's transformational effort and looks forward to contributing towards its successful conclusion.

U.S. Pacific Command: A Command of Partnership, Readiness, and Presence

Michael J. Silva, Interagency Senior Military Analyst at the Center for Army Lessons Learned

Admiral Timothy J. Keating, commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), outlined the command's strategy and discussed current Asia-Pacific topics with the Pentagon press corps on 22 July 2009. USPACOM is the oldest combatant command for the U.S., its presence spanning more than 60 years in the Asia-Pacific region.

USPACOM covers about half the earth's surface with a very diverse range of cultural, social, economic, and geopolitical differences among the countries within its span of influence. Within the geography of USPACOM are 36 countries speaking 3,000 languages, and is home to over half the world's population. USPACOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes the world's most populous nation (China), along with two of the four largest economies in the world. Conversely, the AOR also contains 10 of the 14 smallest economies in the world; the largest Muslim-majority nation (Indonesia), and the world's largest democracy (India).



Trade is the keystone to prosperity within the Asia-Pacific region and a significant contributor to world economic output. Asia's trade with the U.S. is currently in excess of $1 trillion. Trade within the region is also vital to regional economies, increasing a nation's output, and gaining international economic status. Conflicts can thus arise as trade increases competition between trading partners and cultural rivalries.

Many threats exist within USPACOM's AOR. Terrorist sponsorship by both state and nonstate actors contributes to criminal activity, potential terrorist acts, and the constant fear of terrorists acquiring nuclear technologies or devices. Transnational violent extremism and criminal activity promotes disorder, disrupts stability, and diminishes the advancement of freedom and democracy. Drug trafficking and piracy are also prevalent within the region.

USPACOM exerts influence throughout its AOR using approximately 250,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines within its 4 component commands: U.S. Pacific Fleet; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC); and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. About two thirds of the U.S. Marine Corps' combat strength resides within U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. U.S. Pacific Fleet includes 5 aircraft carrier strike groups, U.S. Pacific Air Forces has 350 aircraft, and USARPAC has 4 Stryker brigades.

Equally important is the command's integration with other U.S. agencies and the command reliance upon bilateral agreements, multinational agreements, and exercises to keep forces ready to respond to potential threats to security, stability, and freedom in the Asia-Pacific region.

Bilateral exercises, and other engagements, are cornerstones to the defensive readiness of USPACOM. Examples of bilateral exercises are: Talisman Saber, Cobra Gold, *Balikatan*, Keen Sword/Keen Edge, Rim Of The Pacific, Ulchi-Focus Lens, and *Ichi Ban*.

Talisman Saber is a biennial Australian/U.S. exercise providing a key opportunity for combined forces from these two nations to engage in a mid- to high-intensity exercise of combat operations using training areas in Australia. The commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet uses this exercise as a combined task force (CTF) training venue for practicing a short-notice, power-projection, forcible-entry scenario. This exercise trains Australian and U.S. forces in planning and conducting CTF operations leading to increased combat readiness and interoperability.

Cobra Gold is a joint/combined forces training exercise between the U.S., Thailand, and other nations from the Asia-Pacific region. It is designed to improve combat readiness and interoperability between these nations.

A similar goal exists with the Republic of the Philippines and the U.S. through the *Balikatan* exercises.

Japan's Self Defense Forces and the U.S. conduct a joint, bilateral training exercise titled Keen Sword/Keen Edge for the defense of Japan.

A biennial, large-scale, multinational power projection/sea control exercise called Rim of the Pacific includes the U.S., Canada, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea (ROK), Chile, and the United Kingdom.

Ichi Ban (one team) is an exercise between the Japanese Army and USARPAC. Each year a different part of the Japanese Army participates. This year's participant is the the Japanese Northern Army Ground Self Defense Force. This year USARPAC exercised its new entity, the contingency command post (CCP), during this staff exercise.

Currently, planning and preparation is ongoing for the annual, large-scale, warfighting command post exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, formerly known as Ulchi-Focus Lens, between ROK forces and the U.S. Combined Forces Command.

All of these exercises, and others not mentioned, prepare and sharpen USPACOM and its component commands for the challenges they face in countering the threats within the region—a command in partnership, readiness, and presence.

Anti-Maritime SOF

Using Innovation and Synergy to Solve a Very Real and Substantial Threat

Released to the public by Public Affairs, U.S. Forces Korea, June 2009

SOF Challenge

Over the last two years, Combined Forces Command (CFC) developed and implemented a unique concept for defeating threat maritime Special Operations Forces (SOF) likely to infiltrate the shores of the Republic of Korea (ROK) from the sea. The CFC designed the concept to defeat a SOF threat specific to the Korean Theater, but other commands can apply the concept wherever U. S. forces are deployed.

After a brief description of the North Korean maritime SOF threat, this article describes how CFC developed and practiced a technique whereby Army attack helicopters, under the control of CFC's Naval Component Command (NCC), are used to destroy threat maritime SOF before they reach friendly shores.

Above: During 1996 this North Korean submarine floundered within 50 meters of shore. North Korea will attempt to penetrate ROK rear areas in war just as certainly as they historically have done during the armistice.

Overview on Concept Development

CFC's mission is to maintain the armistice, deter war, and if necessary fight and win. The Combined Defense Team has performed this vital mission every day for the past 44 years. The strength of the Combined Defense Team is the main reason that peace and stability exists on the peninsula. Yet the military threat from North Korea has not subsided. The "Cold War" is not over and the North's military remains formidable, unpredictable and dangerous. A significant concern is the North's SOF, designed to wage war on a "second front." The North's SOF are well equipped to infiltrate the ROK from the sea. The sea affords the North's SOF their best avenue of approach. It is against this backdrop that CFC developed a concept and practiced a promising technique to counter the problem posed by North Korea's maritime SOF.

The CFC now cross attaches Army AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, from its Ground Component Command (GCC), to its Naval Component Command (NCC) on a temporary basis, depending on the situation, to attack enemy maritime-SOF assets before they reach ROK shores. CFC initially experimented with the concept in October 1996 during its annual, theater wide, Combined Field Training Exercise: FOAL EAGLE. FOAL EAGLE is an ideal setting for practicing the anti-maritime SOF concept since the focus of the exercise is on rear area operations, and security and protection from enemy SOF. Following initial success on a small scale, CFC moved to expand the concept in time for ULCHI FOCUS LENS (UFL) 97. UFL is the CFC's theater wide, simulation driven, Combined Command Post Exercise designed to practice execution of various parts of the theater campaign plan. UFL 97 provided an opportunity to practice the anti-maritime SOF concept on a grand scale without being cost prohibitive.

Through a series of round table discussions, CFC's Ground Component Command and Naval Component Command developed unit training programs to fine-tune the new anti-maritime SOF concept in time for UFL 97. Analysis from UFL 97 proved that the concept was very effective in defeating an enemy maritime SOF threat.

After more refinement on Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) and Army attack helicopter handoff procedures to Naval airspace command and control authorities, the concept was put to test again under field conditions during FOAL EAGLE 97. CFC's overall conclusion from these training exercises is that AH-64s enhance NCC's ability to intercept and destroy infiltrating enemy maritime SOF elements before they reach ROK shores. This unique joint and combined team is an example of the synergistic use of capabilities from more than one service and more than one nation to effectively attack and destroy an elusive enemy target. The concept itself is an example of innovative thinking to solve a complex problem.

The Korean Challenge - Forces and Geography

The North Korean maritime SOF threat is very real, substantial and dangerous. The CFC must intercept and destroy infiltrating maritime SOF elements to prevent them from reaching the ROK coastline and infiltrating into the ROK interior to disrupt CFC's rear operations. This is a challenging task because 86% of the ROK border is coastline, inundated with thousands of rocky islets, and is conducive to maritime infiltration operations by the North. The defense of the ROK is further complicated by the relative ease of access to its coastline from the sea and by the extraordinary size of the North's special purpose forces, the largest in the world.

North Korean naval forces have significant numbers of watercraft of various sizes and capabilities allocated exclusively to a maritime infiltration mission. These craft include a variety of submarines, coastal patrol craft, high-speed semi-submersible craft, air-cushioned amphibious craft, and rubber raiding craft.

Above: This SILC is a high-speed semi-submersible craft that can be used to infiltrate North Korean Special Forces. North Korea has adapted technology to focus on invading the ROK; this boat is powered by three inboard-outboard engines and is capable of submerging for limited periods.



Above: This hovercraft is an example of what North Korea could use to infiltrate forces into the ROK.

The North Koreans expect to use these craft to infiltrate large numbers of maritime SOF units into CFC rear areas just prior to hostilities, followed by a surge of other SOF and conventional maritime forces at the outset of a major offensive. These craft will transport SOF forces capable of sustained independent operations. They will gather intelligence, perform sabotage, and disrupt CFC's critical rear area activities supporting current and future operations. The North's SOF are capable of a wide variety of insurgent operations and terrorist activities. CFC expects them to attack utility systems, lines of communication and population centers.

The North Korean Navy itself has over 130 air-cushioned vessels. Each is capable of carrying up to fifty fully equipped personnel. These amphibious craft can reach speeds up to 50 knots per hour and are hard

to detect and interdict. Within a short period of time, North Korea can move approximately 7,000 maritime SOF personnel to many disbursed debarkation points along both coastlines of the ROK. Once ashore these small teams will attempt to evade CFC forces and move into CFC's rear areas and ROK population centers. The key to CFC's success is to detect the North's maritime SOF teams early, while they are still off shore, and destroy them before they land on ROK soil.

The Naval Challenge in Perspective

In organizing the defense of the ROK against North Korean aggression the CFC designated the Commander 7th Fleet (C7F): Commander, NCC and made him the supported commander for maritime interdiction operations. While NCC surface combatants are well organized to defend the blue-water areas surrounding the ROK, the littoral areas pose a different challenge. The littoral area, generally within 12 miles of the ROK shore, restricts ship movement. Also, ships that do move in the littoral area are more vulnerable to enemy land based weapon systems. It is in this littoral area that the North intends to move its tremendous numbers of maritime SOF forces to land on ROK soil.

CFC naval forces intend to detect North Korean movement in the littoral area with their own helicopters, airplanes, shore based radars and patrol craft. However, the NCC's helicopters and airplanes are mainly for target detection and not interdiction. That role is assigned to the NCC's fighter aircraft, surface combatant ships, and submarines. The NCC simply doesn't have enough resources to detect, track and destroy every enemy surface vessel, submarine, and aircraft in both the "blue water" and the littoral. Yet, the NCC's ability to detect, track, and destroy all enemy vessels operating anywhere along the ROK coast and along sea lines of communication is critical to CFC's campaign during the early stages of hostilities.

CFC planners considered a number of options to address North Korea's massive maritime SOF threat. Fixed wing fighter aircraft are always an option, but it is unlikely CFC will be able to employ fighters in the anti maritime SOF role since they will be busy with counter air (CA) and air interdiction (AI) missions in support of land based operations, and defense of the fleet.

Special Operations Component-Korea (SOCKOR) could provide AC-130 Spectre gunships to attack enemy maritime-SOF, but Spectre's are a finite resource and are vulnerable to enemy air defense systems and enemy fighter aircraft. Since Spectre is a scarce and valuable resource the CINC, CFC determines the priorities for Spectre gunships while considering the risks associated with each employment decision.

In proposing the use of Army Apache attack helicopters, planners discovered a match between the best "window" of AH-64 availability and time of greatest need in an anti-maritime SOF role. During the early stages of hostilities, when the North's anti-maritime SOF threat is expected to be the greatest, the GCC's AH-64s are the least committed. While the Apache's primary mission is not anti maritime SOF, it is very capable in that role. The speed, armament, navigation, and communications suite of the Apache is ideally suited for long range target detection and attack, even in the littoral areas of the ROK .

In the early stages of hostilities, Ground Component Apache helicopters await employment against critical targets. A number of them can be called upon to complete anti maritime SOF missions if the situation warrants their release to NCC control.

Planning and Execution

By using its experience from many exercises the past two years, CFC created a sequence of planning and execution for Apache anti maritime-SOF missions. The Assistant Chief of Staff, C2, monitors the North's military activity 24 hours a day. As soon as C2 detects unusual or threatening North Korean military activity they warn CFC forces and surge collection systems on specific indicators of an impending attack. In the meantime, the CINC directs CFC forces to initiate defensive measures

appropriate to the situation. Off the ROK shores, the combined coverage of ROK and U.S. P-3 aircraft, AWACS and ROK Navy coastal radars focus detection operations on the most likely littoral areas and maritime approaches.

Either AWACS or P-3 aircraft coordinate attack of detected targets until U.S. Navy combatants arrive off the coast of the ROK. The NCC then uses the Navy Tactical Data System, a digital communications system that blends U.S. and ROK sensor outputs into an integrated common operational picture, to deconflict, handoff and attack threat systems.

Once CFC recognizes the appropriate indicators, the C7F requests the CINC's release of GCC attack helicopters to anti maritime-SOF operations. When the CINC decides to use AH-64s in that role, the Army attack aviation brigade gets the mission and begins its preparation.

The brigade itself remains under the operational control (OPCON) of the ground component commander, but two attack helicopter battalions are placed under the tactical control (TACON) of the NCC for planning and execution. CFC can release these two battalions to NCC control, for anti maritime SOF operations, when they are not involved in ongoing deep attack. Under this command and control relationship, the NCC has the authority to move and position attack battalion assets once they enter the NCC area of operations. The CFC commander can terminate the mission at any time if the battalions are needed elsewhere. By using two battalions, the brigade commander can respond quickly to missions occurring on both coasts from assembly areas that facilitate rapid interdiction well off both shores of the ROK.



Figure 1

Once the Brigade Commander gets his mission he establishes initial communications through the Peninsula C4I Network, using the Tri-service Tactical Communications System (TRI-TAC), in order to talk to the NCC. The commander dispatches a brigade liaison (LNO) team, including S-2 (intelligence) and S-3 (operations) representatives, to board the designated Navy command and control ship. The attack battalions move to both coastlines to establish assembly areas and to prepare for operations. The brigade headquarters coordinates land and local security requirements with the responsible ground commanders. The battalions then move to, occupy and stage from designated assembly areas to perform their missions in the Navy's maritime area of operations.

The Navy command and control ship has control over all maritime activity in the naval operational area. The command and control ship exercises both functional and geographic control. The NCC establishes a functional Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) command for each coast. Each ASUW Commander (AUSWC), located aboard a cruiser or destroyer, is responsible for functional control of surface warfare within his assigned geographic area.

The NCC Waterspace Management Scheme allocates each Naval surface and subsurface combatant decentralized responsibility for portions of the NCC's area. The NCC also establishes a separate Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) command, generally located aboard an AEGIS equipped cruiser or destroyer. The AAW Commander (AAWC) is functionally responsible for anti-air warfare in his area of operations. The AAWC coordinates engagement of hostile aircraft and protection of friendly aircraft within his respective area, similar to the ASUW function.

Each attack battalion dispatches an LNO team aboard the anti-air warfare (AAW) ship on its respective coast to ensure that attack operations are properly coordinated with the NCC and its subordinate functional and geographic commands. *(Diagram 1: C4I)*

Target Detection and Engagement



Figure 2

Above: An AH-64 team flies off the coast enroute to a bullseye. Typically this mission would be conducted at night. Close crew coordination becomes more important due to the low contrast conditions over water.

The aircraft or surface combatant that first detects an unknown contact is usually designated the Scene of Action Commander (SAC). The SAC determines whether the contact is friend or foe and coordinates an attack against positively identified enemy contacts unless the mission is transferred to another SAC. The responsible SAC communicates with the appropriate ASUW or AAW to obtain execution authority.

For surface targets, the ASUW designates the nearest capable surface ship to attack the target. For enemy targets in the air, the AAW ship coordinates the attack with a system best able to respond quickly. In the event the NCC command and control ship designates an aircraft to strike a surface target, the AAW coordinates the airspace and the ASUW directs its attack against the enemy vessel.

When the NCC commander decides to use attack helicopters, the command and control ship sends an execute message to the aviation brigade. Each attack helicopter battalion has two aircraft on standby, ready to respond to missions from the NCC. The message contains the necessary information to enable the crew of the AH-64s to communicate with the AAW ship.

The attack battalion coordinates movement to and from the coast through Army airspace command and control (A2C2) channels. Army A2C2 provides a transponder identification friend or foe (IFF) squawk for flight-following. An IFF code prevents fratricide of the Apaches since it gives the A2C2, air defense and Air Component Command (ACC) elements the ability to track the attack helicopters throughout the GCC area of operations. This minimizes the risk to the Apache crews while they transit CFC rear areas. Once the aircraft reach the coast, they cross into the NCC Commander's area and must comply with naval airspace coordination measures. The aviation brigade and attack battalions determine any change to the NCC's procedures during planning and coordination for each mission.

After the Apaches reach the coast the crews radio the Army LNO team aboard the AAW ship using either UHF or VHF. The AAW ship vectors the AH 64s to either an airspace entry and exit point, called a "bullseye", or directly to the target. *(Diagram 2: Sketch)*

The AAW ship also uses an IFF code to track the movement of the Apaches. As an added measure of fratricide prevention, the NCC's airspace is procedurally de-conflicted by altitude as well. The Apaches remain at or below 200 feet above sea level (ASL) while naval fixed wing aircraft stay at 600 feet or higher ASL.

The Apaches then contact the SAC that is tracking the inbound enemy target or targets to arrange for battle hand over. The Apache crews use the aircraft's speed and in-flight navigation systems to quickly arrive at the target area. Once on the scene they acquire the target using their onboard day-TV or forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) systems.

The Apaches must positively identify a target as enemy before they get authorization to attack. The ASUWC authorizes an attack when enemy contact is confirmed by the Apache crews. Upon authorization from the ASUWC, the Apaches use running fire from a standoff position as many times as necessary to destroy the enemy force. The crew's principle weapon for the mission is Hellfire but they carry an appropriate supply of 30MM cannon ammunition on board too.

Since the enemy's maritime SOF teams are small and the vessels they ride in are point targets, the Apache crews are able to coordinate their fires with each other to prevent waste of ammunition and target overkill. If during an engagement the ASUWC designates additional targets, the AAWC can send the same aircraft to the new contact or arrange the launch of the next Apache team waiting back in the holding area.

The Apache crews perform their own battle damage assessment (BDA) and send their assessment through the SAC to the ASUW. At the end of the mission the NCC may direct other assets to perform a more detailed BDA. The Navy could direct SEALs to perform boarding, rescue and scuttle missions.

In the event an Apache is shot down, the NCC immediately performs search and rescue operations.



Above: An AH-64 team flies off the coast enroute to a bullseye. Typically this mission would be conducted at night. Close crew coordination becomes more important due to the low contrast conditions over water.

Issues Resolved

CFC Component Commanders raised several issues during the development of the theater anti maritime SOF concept. CFC felt the vulnerability of two widely separated ROK coastlines necessitated the allocation of two GCC attack helicopter battalions TACON to the NCC to cover both coasts simultaneously.

Two battalions can position forward arming and refueling points near each coast to maximize response time, aircraft availability and station time. Also, by using external fuel tanks the battalions can extend their range of operations and loiter time.

Over several exercises, the attack battalion's learned that it was easier to operate from land rather than sea, even though they are trained to operate from NCC ships. The NCC concurred because this facilitates a ship's freedom of movement, reduces its vulnerability to shore-based weapons, prevents disruption of concurrent deck functions, and eliminates cross-service logistical requirements.

Clearly stated command and control relationships enable the battalions to remain responsive to the CINC's priorities for contingencies ashore and facilitate rapid turn around from the anti maritime SOF role to more traditional missions.

The aviation brigade can sustain crew anti maritime SOF training with as little as 6 flying hours per month. The NCC can easily support joint training with Army aviation with minimal impact.

Should weather turn unfavorable, the Apaches land on a helicopter capable ship or return to shore whichever is closer and safer. During one training exercise on the ROK west coast, heavy fog did not affect the ability of an Apache to either acquire or attack simulated enemy targets.

Conclusion

Three times during the past year, CFC's Army attack helicopter units practiced the anti-maritime SOF concept with the Navy. Aviation commanders believe this is an important mission for which the Apache is well suited. While the Apache's primary role continues to be anti-tank in the land battle, it is a system just as formidable in an anti maritime-SOF role.

A little over two years ago, what began as an idea evolved into a viable concept. The CFC carefully planned, trained, and tested its AH-64 anti maritime SOF concept before accepting the technique as a viable alternative. As a result of some innovative thinking and the synergistic effects of the GCC and NCC, the CFC is stronger and better prepared to protect the ROK in the event of renewed hostilities.

The CFC also accumulated other intangible benefits associated with the concept development process. Working on a solution to a very real and substantial l North Korean threat brought the Joint and Combined Team closer together. Each component's understanding of each other's abilities and capabilities grew while working together to solve a common problem. Joint and Combined team work is essential for unity of effort in time of peace or conflict.

The CFC developed a concept with a specific North Korean threat in mind. The CFC anti maritime SOF concept enables joint force planners to maximize a finite number of resources to achieve the best possible effect against an illusive enemy. The result in the Korean Theater is a Joint and Combined Defense Team better able to deter aggression and if necessary to fight and win.

U.S. Southern Command: Security, Stability, and Partnership

Michael J. Silva, Interagency Senior Military Analyst at the Center for Army Lessons Learned

U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is often thought of solely as a counterdrug- and counternarcoterrorism-focused command. While these missions are a key focus, they are complimented by the inclusion of interagency coordination, public/private cooperative efforts, human rights attention, humanitarian assistance, and a full theater security cooperation strategy. These focus areas are supported, tested, revised, and improved upon as a result of the various exercises and operations conducted by the command.

During the 1970s, Central and South American regions were mired with authoritarian regimes, intraregional conflicts, numerous civil wars, and governmental instability. The implementation and focus of USSOUTHCOM, in concert with other governmental agencies, has had a very positive impact throughout South and Central America. Today, there exists a strong collection of fledgling democracies—a testament to the U.S.' influence, focus, and support. This is especially true in Central America where governments have adopted democratic principles, support for the rule of law, and a growing respect for human rights.

This area of responsibility is as diverse a geographical region as any in the world. Within this region can be found steamy jungles, lush rain forests, snow-capped mountains, large swaths of savannas, harsh deserts, and swamps.

Interagency partners have been a key factor in advancing the ideals of democracy and improving economies within Central American, South American, and Caribbean countries. USSOUTHCOM has taken the lead in working with other agencies to achieve such success. A few of their goals are listed below:

- Improve synchronization of operations and activities between USSOUTHCOM and other U.S. government organizations operating in this part of the world to create a collaborative, effective, and efficient command.
- Engage interagency partner decision-makers and integrate personnel from these agencies on a full-time basis into the USSOUTHCOM staff.
- Ensure all USSOUTHCOM exercises and conferences include participation from interagency partners.
- Ensure USSOUTHCOM has a 21st century facility to meet the challenges of the future. The new facility must enable discussions across the command, interagency, and throughout the region encompassing all levels of unclassified, proprietary, and classified information.

Encouraging partnerships between private sector entities and public agencies within the region has been key to providing stability and security in countries by encouraging healthy economic policies and practices. USSOUTHCOM has served as the fusion center for these activities and leveraged its interagency connections to further progress toward greater regional security and stability through prosperity of nations and their people.

USSOUTHCOM has a robust human rights approach. It focuses on human rights training programs—not just reporting programs. USSOUTHCOM advances respect for human rights among countries through support of regional initiatives. Again, implementing a fusion center approach

USSOUTHCOM engages all tools such as interagency, intergovernmental, international, and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to advancing human rights.

Humanitarian assistance has been a core part of the USSOUTHCOM security and stability strategy. A series of disaster preparedness exercises and response programs combined with a generous series of humanitarian assistance efforts produce positive venues for progress. The two main exercises focused upon humanitarian assistance are the Beyond the Horizon (BTH) and New Horizons exercises. The BTH exercise provides regional construction support over a three-year period. Construction projects are typically schools, clinics, water wells, and other forms of quality of life infrastructure. Simultaneous to the exercise is the deployment of doctors, nurses, and dental teams providing much needed medical care to mostly rural areas of supported countries. New Horizons exercises are conducted semiannually as a mirror to the BTH except they are one-year engagements instead of three.



Counterdrug and counternarcoterrorism remain key USSOUTHCOM missions to halt the flow of illegal drugs into the U.S. All of the aforementioned efforts contribute to this effort through the building of greater trust, more stable and secure governments, and more prosperous and healthy economies. This is truly a multinational effort to stem the flow of drug traffic. Counterdrug operations concentrate on detecting, monitoring, tracking, and interdicting drug trafficking. Counternarcoterrorism operations concentrate on multinational and regional efforts to fight drug/terrorist groups within a country's borders. This is also an interagency, intergovernmental effort to eradicate threats from drug trafficking and is a part of the U.S.' national drug control strategy.

June 09, 2009
SOUTHCOM, Drones, and Counternarcotics

By Abigail Poe

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Over the past month, the United States Southern Command, in collaboration with the Salvadoran military and civil aviation officials, has been evaluating the suitability of using unmanned aircraft, or drones, for counternarcotics operations throughout Latin America. As drug traffickers increasingly use semi-submersible submarines to transport cocaine from ports like Colombia to the United States, it has become increasingly difficult for manned aircraft to remain in the air long enough (due to fuel and pilot safety issues) to confirm the identity and location of the semi-submersibles and other drug-running boats. The use of drones, such as the Heron, appears to be how SOUTHCOM proposes to respond to this problem.

The Heron is "an unmanned air vehicle (UAV) designed for medium altitude, long endurance air operations and capable of sustained flight for up to 20 hours without the need for aerial refueling when configured for counter illicit trafficking detection missions," according to SOUTHCOM. The Heron carries a sophisticated sensor package that includes "advanced flight, navigation and communications systems and a mix of multi-mode radar, infrared and electro-optical surveillance capabilities."

In addition to being a potential option for improving maritime interdiction, *Time Magazine* also suggests that the United States' increasing interest in using drones for its fight against drugs could be a result of the sentiment that after Ecuador did not renew the lease on the United States' Forward Operating Location (FOL) at the Manta air base, SOUTHCOM "can no longer take Latin America roosts like Manta for granted - and that long-range drones are one of the best ways of making up for their loss." Thereby suggesting that the instead of relying on remaining FOLs for its counternarcotics missions in the future, such as the FOL in Comalapa, El Salvador, the United States may begin to use drones capable of flying long distances for its counterdrug missions.

The United States is increasing the use of drones in its military strategy throughout the world, in an effort to lower the cost of war - even though some critics would argue that the use of drones is ineffective and counterproductive and therefore a waste of money. This is taking place most notably in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where drones are used to identify and take out top al-Qaeda leaders, an operation which has received much criticism. Pakistani officials claim, according to Time Magazine, that the majority of strikes miss their targets and kill innocent civilians. And the Time article continues, citing a Pakistani daily report which quantifies that of the 60 strikes since 2006, only 14 al-Qaeda leaders have been killed, in comparison to 687 civilian deaths.

While the use of drones in counternarcotics operations will not result in the bombing of innocent civilians, as they are equipped for surveillance and not bombing or direct interdiction, it does seem that their use is not free of problems - and complaints about the Heron have included being unresponsive at times to their human operators on the ground, and crashes due to human error or other technical problems. If SOUTHCOM uses the Heron primarily for maritime surveillance at the onset of the program, crashes will not be of major concern - other than large amounts of money wasted on a drone now at the bottom of the ocean. However, the future could include using drones for surveillance over populated areas - such as the regions in Colombia where coca is grown - which could result in the loss of innocent lives if these unmanned drones do crash or decide not to listen to their "human commanders."

The U.S. Congress would have to authorize the use of a larger drug-drone fleet for this program to become a major part of SOUTHCOM's counternarcotics mission. However, the Time article notes that the money saved by not having to use as many manned vessels "will be hard to "the cost savings Washington has found with drones in real war will be hard to resist in the drug war." Perhaps the money saved in interdiction could be redirected to more economic and social aid to the region, as part of an effort to reorient the United States' counternarcotics program toward better civilian governance and development rather than military action.

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