

BULLETIN

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NIGHTMARE IN TRAINING AREA 15

An Initial Entry Training Perspective



**A Story
Similar to
The Defence of
Duffers Drift**



Prepared by Victory University and the Directorate of Basic Combat Training



**Approved for Public Release
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Prologue: Basic Combat Training

Initial entry training is undergoing the most significant changes since our country entered World War II. The forcing function for this current change has been the U.S. Army's involvement in the Global War on Terrorism. Company commanders are expected to develop training plans that are relevant and that prepare our Soldiers for combat operations. Many of these Soldiers will see combat within 18 months of their initial entry training. The training outcomes we endeavor to develop in our Soldiers are high moral character, a commitment to living the Army's values and warrior ethos, confidence, adaptability, mental agility, and physical fitness, while being mentally, spiritually, and emotionally ready to fight as a ground combatant. Soldiers are expected to have mastered critical combat skills, warrior tasks and battle drills, combat weapons confidence, and combat care. Soldiers must be self-disciplined and willing and capable of solving problems commensurate with their positions and experience.

As a company commander, I have the responsibility to train a gender-integrated company of approximately 240 Soldiers and 12 drill sergeants, 6 days a week, 11 and 1/2 months a year. In this series of nightmares, my company prepares and executes our 5- to 7-day culminating field training exercise, which we call Dragon Challenge. This exercise is designed to force Soldiers to execute their tactical tasks in a continuous stressful environment while serving as members of a squad and platoon in combat conditions applicable to our Army's current operating environment. The Soldiers conduct operations from a forward operating base (FOB). These operations consist of improvised explosive device sweeps, security and presences patrols, military operations in urbanized terrain, convoy operations, and FOB security against a free-thinking insurgency threat. Throughout the field training exercise, Soldiers must exhibit confidence in their warrior task and battle drills, weapons confidence, combat fitness, and cultural awareness.

To appreciate what I explain, you must realize that my nightmares occur in the same place, at the same time, with the same cast of characters. The overriding theme throughout is my ability to remember the previous nightmares' lessons which I apply in future dreams. My objective upon awakening is to write down the dream's lessons promptly so I can apply them to my real world training in an effort to avoid misfortune and doom.

Introduction: Captain I. C. Foresight's Family Lineage

These recollections of my training nightmares are dedicated to the men and women of Training and Doctrine Command whose superb and untiring efforts have produced the United States Army's most highly trained Soldiers. The art of transforming civilians into warriors who are capable, confident, and willing to defeat the enemies of our great nation is its charter.

A hundred and thirty-five years ago, my great-great-great Grandpapa Foresight, who happens to be the third cousin of the renowned Lieutenant Backsite Forethought of the Boer War, stood in the snow of Valley Forge with General Washington and Von Steuben, struggling to transform poorly fed and ill-equipped farmers and merchants into American Soldiers. I guess you can say that Grandpapa Foresight along with a few other notable patriots was the first to implement our Army's initial entry training. In addition to his keen sense of drill and tactics, Grandpapa had a tendency to sleep only a few hours nightly; however, he dreamed the most vibrant and realistic dreams, often waking terrified. After a while, he learned to trust his dreams. In fact, the dream he told General Washington about crossing the Delaware River in the vicinity of Trenton, New Jersey on Christmas Day worked out pretty well for the old Continental Army.

To our family's bewilderment, this gift has been passed from generation to generation ever since. My great-great grandpapa trained General "Black Jack" Pershing's Doughboys of World War I. My grandfather used the family talent to train Patton's 2nd Armored Division during the Louisiana Maneuvers of World War II, and my father used it to train infantrymen bound for Vietnam from Fort Polk, Louisiana. Finally, I, Captain Foresight IV, am currently using the family gift to train American Soldiers in support of our Global War on Terrorism. We Foresights, whether cursed or blessed, have had the uncanny ability to dream and re-dream an assortment of training events over and over with sometimes devastating effects and ever-altering outcomes.

The following tales are my recounts of dreams I have had while serving as a company commander of an initial entry training company. I hope that by reading this narrative you are able to glean some knowledge from the basic training principles and lessons that I have learned. I hope that by highlighting these agonizing, nightmarish experiences you can use this knowledge to train more effectively our country's most valuable resource—America's sons and daughters.

With respectful acknowledgement of *The Defense of Duffers Drift* by Captain E.D. Swinton, DSO., R.E. (later Major General Sir Ernest Swinton, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O.) and Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter 08-39, Nightmare on Wazir Street.

The First Nightmare: Complacency Kills

My dream, which later became a nightmare, began with my company just finishing our convoy live fire exercise, and in my opinion, my cadre executed it flawlessly. In fact, this had been the best-executed training event since I became their commander. I remembered feeling a sense of achievement as I spoke with First Sergeant Hill, thinking that my company knew what it was doing, and I was tremendously proud if not downright cocky. I spoke with the first sergeant and executive officer about our preparation for our upcoming tactical exercise, Dragon Challenge. It was the culminating field exercise for our Soldiers and our last prerequisite for graduation. However, we had done it before and based on our latest positive experience, our company was tracking. I reviewed what I thought to be the main tasks and asked if anyone had any questions. With no questions, I thought to myself, "It is good to be the commander." I left feeling confident as the senior drill sergeant smiled and said, "Sir, we got it; this is not rocket science." I was eager to get back and brief LTC Charles, my battalion commander, on what a fantastic training event we had executed that day.

I walked to my truck and noticed some Soldiers gathered around a Soldier lying on the ground. I ran over there to find the Soldier unconscious and Drill Sergeant Jones removing the Soldier's clothing while yelling for ice sheets. The temperature had remained in the mid-80s all day, and we had implemented our heat mitigations in accordance with our risk assessment. I was somewhat stunned that we were suffering a heat casualty. However, Drill Sergeant Jones was doing everything correctly. He quickly wrapped the Soldier with an ice sheet while simultaneously Drill Sergeant Smith called for a ground medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Shortly afterward, the Soldier regained consciousness and began speaking. She said she had been drinking water, but in an attempt to lose weight, she had not been eating much and had also been taking cold medicine for the last three days. As I watched them load her into the ambulance, I spoke with Drill Sergeant Jones and commended him on a job well done. I told him to determine what measures we could have done to prevent this injury and to give me an update this evening. I left the scene pleased with our training and my drill sergeants' responses to the heat casualty.

My joyfulness was short-lived because I saw my battalion commander, also known as old "Mad Dog" Charles. He told me he received a Congressional that alleged my 3rd Platoon sergeant, SFC Johnson, abused a new Soldier. I thought, how could this be? SFC Johnson was not the sharpest tool in the shed, but he did not seem to be the type to abuse Soldiers. The accusation of SFC Johnson striking a Soldier did not make sense to me. I left the battalion commander's office brooding on what to do.

The Soldier who made the allegation was a new start from last cycle and was still in the company. I called First Sergeant Hill to give him the news. He told me he was coming back with the Soldier to discuss the matter, and he would leave the senior drill sergeant to clear the range. While waiting on the first sergeant, I notified Criminal Investigative Division (CID), told them of the possible assault, and coordinated a time and place for them to linkup with the Soldier as soon as she returned. After I spoke with the first sergeant about the situation, I walked out into the bay and was stunned to see SFC Johnson speaking with the battle buddy of the Soldier who had accused him of misconduct. I had forgotten to remove him from the company pending completion of the investigation. Wondering how I could have missed that, I sent SFC Johnson to the battalion S3 shop pending the investigation, thinking all the time that I hoped old "Mad Dog" Charles wouldn't find out about my blunder.

The company, under the supervision of my senior drill sergeant, cleared the range. It was about 1830 hours, a lot later than I had hoped. I knew everyone wanted to get back, so the Soldiers and cadre could get a good night's rest before deploying on the Dragon Challenge. However, our motor move arrived 20 minutes early, and this amplified the pressure to clear the range quicker than normal. We threw equipment onto the back of the trucks and started herding Soldiers onto the buses. The company returned around 2000 hours. We issued the Soldiers meals, ready to eat and gave them 30 minutes to eat before getting them to the barracks.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The next morning we got the Soldiers up and were supposed to begin our Dragon Challenge precombat inspections (PCI) and rehearsals at 0800. However, chow was late, and we still had to download our equipment from the previous night. Still frustrated over the misconduct allegation, I told the first sergeant I wanted to address the company concerning the drill sergeant's misconduct. Therefore, we started our PCIs around 1030. Sensing there was not enough time, I made the decision not to conduct rehearsals or our normal cadre back-briefs in order to allow additional time for the platoons to execute better PCIs.

My first platoon was deploying at 1300, and I was not going to miss our start time. I recalled that on a previous cycle, one of my fellow company commanders took a major butt chewing from LTC Charles for not starting training on time, even though LTC Charles always said, "If you have a good reason to adjust training, then do it." I did not want it to appear that the company could not adapt to the situation and still execute as intended. Also, I had no updates on the misconduct investigation, and I knew the colonel would ask.

At this point, my dream turned into a nightmare. The first element, 3rd Platoon, Mad Dawgs, began its tactical foot movement. The Mad Dawgs were led by Drill Sergeant Kelly who had just taken over platoon sergeant duties from SFC Johnson because he was being investigated for misconduct. Drill Sergeant Kelly was new to our company, and this was his first Dragon Challenge. However, the platoon did leave on time, and everything looked good as I watched them depart. The Soldiers were in the proper uniform, rucksacks were worn correctly, and weapons were at the ready. Three hours later when the Mad Dawg platoon began executing the react to contact training event, the opposing force (OPFOR) began firing. The platoon took cover, returned fire, and reported. After several rounds had been fired, someone yelled, "Cease fire, cease fire, cease fire! Soldier down, Soldier down!"

To my horror, three Soldiers had been struck: two by live rounds and one by a blank adapter fragment. Drill Sergeant Kelly ran to aid the wounded Soldiers, yelling to his fellow Drill Sergeant Currie to call for MEDEVAC. Drill Sergeant Currie dropped her rucksack, grabbed her brick radio, and anxiously called, "Range control, range control, this is Mad Dawg 3." Receiving no response, Drill Sergeant Currie again yelled, "Range control, range control, this is Mad Dawg 3. Request MEDEVAC." Again, there was no response. I thought, why was range control not answering? Then Drill Sergeant Currie yelled, "The brick battery is dead, and I don't have another battery. Do you have a cell phone?" Drill Sergeant Kelly angrily replied, "No!" as he opened the platoon's combat lifesaver bag to find no bandages and both IV bags expired.

The last thing I remembered before waking up petrified was the OPFOR Soldier who had shot the Mad Dawgs. He was crying and saying he had used the same magazines from yesterday's convoy live fire. Drill Sergeant Currie was running to the rear of the column to get the trail vehicle while Drill Sergeant Kelly feverishly conducted cardio-pulmonary resuscitation on the injured Soldier who had stopped breathing. I woke up abruptly, quickly gathered my thoughts, took a drink of water, and grabbed a pen to capture the lessons I had just experienced in my nightmare. The following are my thoughts:

No matter how confident you are, do not take shortcuts. Taking them for whatever reason will, at a minimum, degrade your training or in this case kill someone. The facts that you are tired, buses arrive early, and you are planning for an upcoming training event are not excuses. You must remember, "Resources do not drive training; training drives resources." By taking shortcuts, we did not properly have our Soldiers check for live rounds in their magazines. This oversight resulted in the loss of two American Soldiers.

Always do a thorough PCI in accordance with Field Manual 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, no exceptions. If you need more time to train, ask for it. "Train to standard, not time." I should have asked LTC Charles to move my start point time back three hours. In doing so, I would have allowed the company the opportunity to conduct a PCI to standard, which would have included checking radios and combat lifesaver bags and test firing weapons. Remember, PCI is training; do not shortcut it.

The strength of our company has always been that we plan, back brief, and rehearse all training prior to execution. I should have followed and made my subordinates follow our standing troop leading procedures. By simply following our established standing operating procedures execution checklists, we could have prevented this tragedy. Again, if we had not been complacent or lazy, the mistakes would not have happened.

Training to standard is our number one priority. Getting distracted by a misconduct investigation, although extremely important, resulted in me not being focused on training. Once the Soldier was under care, the drill sergeant removed pending an investigation, and CID actively worked the investigation in accordance with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Regulation 1-8, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Operations Reporting and TRADOC Regulation 350-6, Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET) Policies and Administration; I had done my duty. I should have looked for a time at the end of the training day to speak to the company that would not have taken valuable training time. As a result, my eagerness to fix a potential problem contributed to more serious issues.

Although we had followed our risk mitigation measures correctly, we had failed to monitor the heat casualty's lack of food intake and medication use. The cumulative effect of the lack of food, dehydrating medicine, and training in the heat all day contributed to the heat injury. Cadre supervision must include monitoring Soldiers' medication use and the lack of food consumption.

The Second Nightmare: Outcomes-Based Training

After capturing my thoughts from my first nightmare, I nervously drifted off to sleep. It wasn't long before I began to dream again. My second nightmare began much like my first; the company had just finished our convoy live fire exercise. It had been a really good training day, but I knew why this time. It was not my great leadership; no, it was because we had planned, back-briefed, and rehearsed the training event twice before execution just as our standing operating procedure (SOP) required.

However, I still felt a sense of accomplishment as I spoke with First Sergeant Hill. This time, although proud, I was not cocky at all. I spoke with the first sergeant and executive officer about clearing the range and preparing for our upcoming Dragon Challenge. I knew it was getting late, so I instructed the executive officer to push the company's motor move back, allowing time to properly clear the range. I also said I was going to push back our start point (SP) time the following day to support clearing the range properly, getting the Soldiers and cadre some rest, and conducting our troop leading procedures to standard. I told the first sergeant that according to our range clearing SOP, he was in charge of clearing the range and to make sure we checked all magazines to ensure we didn't have any live rounds. He looked at me kind of odd after that comment, but being the true professional, he said, "Yes sir, got it on the checklist." I asked if anyone had any questions. Without questions, I was feeling confident about our plan.

As I left, I heard the senior drill sergeant, who handed the checklist to the first sergeant, murmur under his breath, "Gee whiz, the Captain acts like we haven't done this before; we got it." Once again, I was eager to get back to brief LTC Charles on what a great training event we had executed that day and to inform him that I pushed back our Dragon Challenge timeline. However, as soon as I walked into battalion headquarters, I heard LTC Charles voice, "Captain Foresight, see me in my office now." He told me he had received a Congressional, and a new Soldier alleged misconduct by my 3rd Platoon sergeant, SFC Johnson. I told LTC Charles I would work the issue and provide him an update. I also told him the reasons why I had shifted our SP times. He looked at me and said, "Good deal, Captain. Makes sense. It's good to see you are thinking. Now get out of here. I have papers to sign and e-mails to write before I go to my kid's soccer game." I left the battalion commander's office knowing exactly what to do.

I called First Sergeant Hill to give him the news about SFC Johnson. He told me he was coming back with the Soldier to discuss the issue, but I told him to stay on the range. I wanted him to send the Soldier back with the executive officer and have the senior drill sergeant bring SFC Johnson to my office. I notified the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and they linked up with the Soldier as soon as she got back. After notifying SFC Johnson of the misconduct accusation against him, I assigned someone to escort him to the battalion S3, pending the completion of the CID investigation. Once the company made it back to the barracks around 2100 hours, I asked the first sergeant if everything went well. He said it had, but they found two Soldiers with live rounds in their magazines. The company unloaded its equipment; accounted for everything; issued the Soldiers meals, ready to eat; and gave them about 30 minutes to eat before getting them to the barracks to clean up and get some rest.

The next morning we let the Soldiers sleep in until 0700. We ate breakfast and then around 0830 began our precombat inspections (PCI) and rehearsals for Dragon Challenge. I told the first sergeant I wanted to address the cadre once training was complete and we were all in the forward operating base (FOB) in reference to the misconduct issue. I reviewed our revised troop leading procedure timeline. I discussed with the executive officer and the first sergeant who would spot check the various tasks within the platoons. I highlighted that Drill Sergeant Kelly would be taking over as the platoon sergeant (since SFC Johnson was reassigned to the S3 shop), and that I would focus my efforts to make sure he was squared away. I had Drill Sergeant Kelly back brief me on his plan and his risk mitigation measures, and I inspected one squad for the proper equipment. All in all, the company seemed ready to go.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Third Platoon Mad Dawgs began its tactical foot movement at 1500 with everything in order. Third Platoon was followed by 1st Platoon at 1530 and 2nd Platoon at 1600. Each platoon had to conduct a four-mile tactical movement that included reacting to an improvise explosive device (IED) attack, indirect fire, and sniper fire along its route before closing in our FOB. The cadre knew my intent that all field training had to include reacting to IED and to sniper fire because those were the two biggest killers on the current battlefield.

As the day continued, I received a call from Drill Sergeant Kelly. He and the Mad Dawgs had closed in on the FOB with no issues. I had learned my lessons well, I thought: Everything was going well; no hurt Soldiers; we were following our SOPs; training to standard; and I had handled the misconduct investigation properly.

About that time my brick radio went off. It was range control issuing a severe weather-warning. Thunderstorms were 25 miles out and heading right for us, and if that wasn't bad enough, the weather forecast for the next 24 hours called for more of the same. As I stood there with my radio in hand, I thought, "Good grief, how could I have missed the weather forecast? The first thing I do every morning is to check the training schedule and check the weather." After my short period of disbelief, I snapped out of my aggravation and called all platoons to get an update on their locations.

Third Platoon again confirmed they were in the FOB. Second Platoon was about 20 minutes out, so I told the platoon leader to continue movement directly to the FOB and seek lightning protection. Receiving no response from 1st Platoon, I began to get anxious; however, I did have about 40 minutes before the lightning storm would hit, and I did have a good idea of where the platoon would be. I instructed the company executive officer, 1LT Ortiz, to take our three five-ton trucks and transport 1st Platoon as rapidly as possible to the FOB. As I got in my truck and began driving to the FOB, I was still irritated with myself for not verifying the weather, but I was pleased that I had handled the situation fairly well.

About the time I got to the FOB, the skies became darker, and I could hear the thunder in the distance. Then over the radio 1LT Ortiz exclaimed that one of our trucks had rolled over on its side. My heart sank; I could just see my Soldiers lying injured all around the wreck. I thought, "This nightmare is worse than the first." 1LT Ortiz continued his situation report (SITREP). He stated there were no injuries, and the accident occurred prior to picking up 1st Platoon. With a sense of relief, I acknowledged his SITREP and told him to continue his mission with the remaining trucks and to be vigilant. I turned to my senior drill sergeant and told him to call range control and post safety and notify them of the accident. I would notify the battalion commander. I realized news of this incident would spread across the post so I grabbed the first sergeant, and we went directly to the accident site. Once we arrived and got out, the driver told me he was not licensed to drive a five-ton truck because he had missed the driver's training during our company certification. He said he missed the training because he had been tasked by the command sergeant major to support a public affairs office tasking. After hearing this, the first sergeant looked at me and said, "This one is going to hurt, sir."

I replied, "Yep, first sergeant, I can see the Training and Doctrine Command's safety gram now with my picture on it and a caption saying, 'Company commander or idiot? You decide.'" After gathering my composure, I phoned LTC Charles, who answered quickly, unnerving me even more. I explained to him the details of the accident, and to my astonishment, he took it well. He told me he was thankful nobody was injured and to execute a safety stand-down to make sure all my drivers were licensed. He asked me what my training plan was for the inclement weather. I told him that we were going to conduct training in and around lightning protection areas, and that I saw this as an opportunity to conduct the company's first "outcomes-based training." I explained that I was going to allow my platoons to develop and implement a training plan that would achieve building Soldiers' confidence in the warrior tasks of react to IED, react to sniper attack, and request a MEDEVAC. My intent was to allow the Soldiers the initiative to plan, to request resources, and to execute and assess their training with me as an observer. The colonel responded saying, "Okay, Captain Foresight, I understand but make sure your training still

has a task, condition, and standard—no winging it.” As soon as I got off the phone, the first sergeant asked me how it went. I told him that it went surprisingly well, but that I had to get the platoon sergeants together to talk about our outcomes-based training plan as soon as possible.

About an hour later after everyone had occupied the FOB, and the exhilaration of the day had dissipated, I brought the platoon sergeants together to explain my outcomes-based training intent. This concept was new, but the platoon sergeants were supportive because it allowed them the flexibility to train as they saw fit as long as they met the outcome. Amazingly, there were no questions. Normally change and platoon sergeants are two words that don't go together. Without further discussion, I let them get back to their platoons to get started. Pending breaks in the weather, they were to plan that night and execute vicinity of the FOB in the morning.

The night passed without incident, although it did storm. I headed out to check training around 0800. I got to 1st Platoon's location shortly thereafter. The training looked great. The Soldiers were moving down a squad lane where they would encounter an IED, perform the 5 Cs, and continue moving while being engaged by sniper fire. During the engagement, the squad would suffer casualties, and the Soldiers would have to perform combat care and MEDEVAC. I was extremely satisfied with their efforts. The platoon sergeant had rehearsed the task that night and conducted a good PCI. The Soldiers knew why the tasks were significant, and even their Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System equipment was operational, although wet. The Soldiers were executing the tasks to standard, and I was ecstatic.

When I called the first sergeant, who was with 3rd Platoon, to give him the good news, he told me that was great, but that I might need to linkup with him at 3rd Platoon's location. It was about 0930, and I headed over there just in time to see LTC Charles and the brigade commander arriving. As I got out of my truck and saluted the colonels, I saw 2nd Platoon Soldiers hanging out around their tents. LTC Charles promptly interjected that he invited the brigade commander, COL Ranger, to watch the battalion's first attempt at outcomes-based training. LTC Charles told me to walk the colonel through the training with the platoon in front of us, which to my distress was 2nd Platoon. I fretfully turned around and started moving toward the platoon while asking First Sergeant Hill to find me the platoon sergeant. When the platoon sergeant came forward, I asked him to explain his outcomes-based training plan. He looked at me and said, “Sir, I chose not to do it this morning. We had two Soldiers fall asleep on guard last night, and I caught a Soldier smoking, so I am having Soldiers dump out their gear for a health and welfare inspection.”

As the sweat poured off my forehead, he continued to say that he did have a plan to give classes that afternoon on IEDs and MEDEVAC, but he didn't really see a necessity to practice reacting to snipers because he believed the only way to defeat a sniper was to never get out of your armored vehicle. Before I could react, COL Ranger dismissed the platoon sergeant, looked directly at me, and said, “That's not it, Captain. In fact, one week from today you will present an officer professional development lesson to all the officers within the brigade on outcomes-based training, and you'd better know what you are talking about.” He walked off. Seeing my career diminish, I couldn't even speak.

Mercifully, I woke up and was delighted that it was only a dream and that I still had a career. This time I sat there for a while trying to figure out what had just ensued. I finally gathered my thoughts and began to put in writing the lessons I had learned.

When planning an operation, always consider the impact of the weather. The weather, just like the enemy, gets a vote. To disregard either is a plan predestined for failure. Always have an inclement weather-training plan that will permit you to complete your training objectives. Too many risk-adverse commanders will use weather as justification not to train.

A commander must be hardnosed in certifying his drill sergeants/platoon sergeants in accordance with Field Manual 7-1, *Battle Focused Training* and Training and Doctrine Command Regulation 350-6.

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

There can be no exceptions. Cadre cannot train to standard if they do not know the standard. In this case, I was lucky that no one was killed or seriously hurt. Leaders are responsible for implementing certification programs within their units that validate and, if necessary, train the trainers. Commanders must monitor and sustain these programs regardless of cycle breaks. Quality training must be our prime mission.

Outcomes-based training is a concept that defines the desired outcome, promotes initiative, and allows freedom to maneuver to achieve the training goal. However, a commander must provide guidance and set boundaries by which to operate. An experienced and inspired platoon sergeant, such as in the 1st Platoon, is capable of understanding and executing the task and achieving the outcome. In the case of the 2nd Platoon's sergeant, knowledge or enthusiasm is missing. A commander must know his cadre's capabilities, prepare them, employ them, and guide them as necessary to meet the desired outcome. The commander must be cognizant of the mental intangibles required for the outcomes and ensure the Soldiers are gaining the intangibles from the training. The outcome must be a measurable standard.

The Third Nightmare: Train to Standard

After capturing the lessons from my second nightmare, I really wanted to go back to sleep as soon as possible so I could change the results and save my mediocre career. My third nightmare began with my radio cracking with range control's conveyance of the severe weather report, but this time the company was tracking. I had checked the weather forecast that morning, and we had already deployed by truck. We used the occasion to train the Soldiers on convoy operations as well as reacting to improvised explosive devices while in route to the forward operating base. The lightning storm hit hard just like in my second nightmare. I had previously briefed the battalion commander on my inclement weather plan and my efforts to allow my platoons to conduct outcomes-based training. This time, however, when I got my platoon sergeants together, I gave my intent, identified the desired outcome, and gave an example on how to obtain the outcome. I told them regardless of their approach to the training, the training support package lesson plan would serve as the assessment tool in evaluating the Soldiers' performances. I also provided a tentative timeline to start and end training based on the weather. After finalizing their resource requirements, I directed the platoon sergeants to back brief me on their outcomes-based training approach during our evening battle update brief.

The next morning I went to training. I started with 3rd Platoon just in case the battalion and brigade commanders decided to show up to view training like in my second dream. At 0930, I looked over my shoulder, and the brigade and battalion commanders were approaching. Again LTC Charles told me he had invited COL Ranger to view our outcomes-based training. I explained our training approach as the first sergeant retrieved the 3rd Platoon sergeant, who knew the guidance and desired outcomes I had provided to the platoon sergeants last night. The 3rd Platoon sergeant did a masterful job illuminating his training approach to the colonels as they viewed the execution. I knew it was going well when the brigade commander turned to me and said, "Captain, you are tracking, my friend. In fact, I require your assistance. I want you to brief your outcomes-based training concept to your peers during next week's officer professional development so we can share our best practices."

I responded, "No problem, sir." The brigade commander went on say, "I am exceptionally pleased; you have a lot of potential, Captain. There is no doubt you will be a fine battalion commander if you keep it up, young man."

I was elated to hear such remarks from my senior rater. I saluted, the battalion commander escorted the brigade commander to his vehicle, and he departed. I anticipated LTC Charles' departure as well; however, he walked back to my position. He told me well done, but then said he had some bad news for me. He stated that the brigade chaplain informed him that a female Soldier had come to him with an allegation of sexual misconduct concerning Drill Sergeant Johnson. My elation was quickly replaced with disbelief. He informed me that while in the chow line, a Soldier overheard one of my Soldiers talking about having sex with Drill Sergeant Johnson in order to pass her Army Physical Fitness Test last week. LTC Charles then departed, and I relayed the details to the first sergeant. Since Drill Sergeant Johnson was already reassigned to the battalion S3 pending the investigation of the earlier assault misconduct, I instructed the first sergeant to ask the unit's victim advocate to take the Soldier back for support and allow the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to investigate. I told him while he was transporting the Soldier, I would call CID and let them know. I knew this could not be a restricted report since the command had found out through a third party and was mandated to investigate. Therefore, if the allegation was true and the Soldier cooperated, SFC Johnson would be looking at some prison time. Not more than 15 minutes after I had informed CID, the agent called me back and told me SFC Johnson had confessed to the sexual and physical abuse. Not only had SFC Johnson disgraced and dishonored the U.S. Army, he had devastated his own life. The seventeen years that he had served were gone, his career was over, and his retirement was lost. Not to mention the fact that he would have to explain his actions to his wife and three children.

Later that afternoon the weather broke, and the company was able to get back to its normal Dragon Challenge training model. As I stood there proudly watching the company march on to the Rites of

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Passage field, marking the conclusion of Dragon Challenge, I felt a push. I looked around, and it was my lovely wife. Our alarm clock was going off, and as she was shoving me. “Honey, you need to get up. Don’t you have convoy live fire today?”

“Convoy live fire today! You’re correct; it is today!” I woke up at once and dove out of bed. I threw on my uniform, kissed my wife good-bye, and went to work with great anticipation.

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PROVIDE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES (TTP) OR SUBMIT AN AFTER-ACTION REVIEW (AAR)

If your unit has identified lessons learned or TTP or would like to submit an AAR, please contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

NIPR Email address: call.rfimanager@conus.army.mil

Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned, ATTN: OCC, 10 Meade Ave., Bldg 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350.

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PRODUCTS AVAILABLE "ONLINE"

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CALL produces the following publications on a variety of subjects:

- **Combat Training Center Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends**
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**COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)
Additional Publications and Resources**

The CAC home page address is:

[<http://www.leavenworth.army.mil>](http://www.leavenworth.army.mil)

Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS)

BCKS supports the online generation, application, management, and exploitation of Army knowledge to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units in order to share expertise and experience, facilitate leader development and intuitive decision making, and support the development of organizations and teams. Find BCKS at [<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/bcks/index.asp>](http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/bcks/index.asp).

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and research. CAL integrates and synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and Civilian Education System. Find CAL products at [<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CAL/index.asp>](http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CAL/index.asp).

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history "think tank" that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at [<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CSIPubs.asp>](http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CSIPubs.asp).

Combined Arms Center-Training: The Road to Deployment

This site provides brigade combat teams, divisions, and support brigades the latest road to deployment information. This site also includes U.S. Forces Command's latest training guidance and most current Battle Command Training Program Counterinsurgency Seminars.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps and division level. Find the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing Directorate (APD) <<http://www.usapa.army.mil>> or the Reimer Digital Library <<http://www.adtdl.army.mil>>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth under the TRADOC G-2. FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on emerging and asymmetric threats, regional military and security developments, and other issues that define evolving operational environments around the world. Find FMSO products at <<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/recent.htm>> or <<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm>>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense. Find MR at <<http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview>>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant organization on Fort Leavenworth. TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence products to support the policy-making, training, combat development, models, and simulations arenas. Find TRISA Threats at <<https://dcsint-threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx>> (requires AKO password and ID).

United States Army Information Operations Proponent (USAIOP)

USAIOP is responsible for developing and documenting all IO requirements for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities; managing the eight personnel lifecycles for officers in the IO functional area; and coordinating and teaching the qualification course for information operations officers. Find USAIOP at <<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/usaioop.asp>>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an advocate and integrator for COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency arena. Find the U.S. Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at: <<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>>.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about your successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.



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