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Handbook 07-34
September 2007

Appendix C

Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The concept of the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) resulted from a joint initiative between the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)/Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Mission Iraq /Department of State (DOS). The intent was to transition the lines of operation of governance and economics at the provincial level from the military to the PRT. PRTs take on the task of developing the political and economic environment within the province.  

Mission Statement of PRTs in Iraq 

The PRT program is a priority joint Department of State (DOS)/Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to bolster moderates, support U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. 

PRTs may be led by the United States or by coalition partners in Iraq. Currently the United Kingdom (U.K.)-led Basrah PRT, Italian-led Dhi Qar PRT, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)-led Irbil PRT are the only coalition PRTs. The Basrah PRT consists of U.K., Danish, and U.S. personnel; the Dhi Qar PRT consists of Italian, U.K., and U.S. personnel; and the Irbil PRT consists of ROK and U.S. personnel. These PRTs are providing their own life support; however, they have a core of civilian agency, military, and contractor personnel. The DOS serves as the lead agency for all PRTs. 

As the title indicates, the focus of PRTs is the provincial government. At the national level, the U.S. has several agencies engaged, including DOD, DOS, and others. Below the provincial government, at the district/city government level, the maneuver commander takes the lead. In the spring of 2007, embedded PRTs were assigned to brigade/regimental combat teams to facilitate the maneuver commanders’ interaction at the district/city government level in the Anbar, Baghdad, and Babil provinces. At this same time, all PRTs, with the exception of the Babil PRT, were paired with a brigade/regimental combat team (BCT/RCT) or division/force headquarters. 

PRTs in Iraq focus on coaching, teaching, and mentoring Iraqis in governance and economics. The PRT structure is modular in nature, with a standard core structure tailored to each province. The DOS takes the lead for PRTs, supported by DOD and other civilian agencies. 

Graphic - PRT footprint
Figure C-1: PRT footprint 

PRT Management 

Key interagency components from Washington, D.C., to Baghdad, Iraq

Key interagency decisions for U.S. PRTs within Iraq are coordinated primarily through biweekly meetings of representatives from the DOS, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), DOD, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and other agencies delivering assistance. This formal, interagency working group system provides a uniform process for making policy and logistics decisions and for sharing information among agencies. In Iraq, U.S. assistance is coordinated through the U.S. embassy country team with PRT direction emanating from the Joint Executive Steering Committee (an interagency, multinational organization). (See Figure C-2.) 

The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) is a civil-military organization established by a joint DOS and DOD initiative under the operational guidance of the Joint Executive Steering Committee. The OPA’s task is to coordinate the deployment and supervise the civil-military operations of the PRT capacity-building program.  The intention of the Joint Executive Steering Committee and coalition is to deploy PRT support to all Iraqi provinces for capacity development. Selected provinces will receive support from a provincial support team from a neighboring province.

Graphic - Major U.S. interagency Iraqi assistance coordination mechanisms
Figure C-2: Major U.S. interagency Iraqi assistance coordination mechanisms 

Key military components from Tampa, FL, to Baghdad, Iraq 

The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is the combatant command authority for military personnel. Its areas of responsibility (AORs) include the Middle East, East Africa, and Central Asia. Its mission is “to conduct operations to attack, disrupt, and defeat terrorism; to deter and defeat adversaries; to deny access to WMD; to assure regional access; to strengthen regional stability; to build the self-reliance of partner nations’ security forces; and to protect the vital interests of the United States within the AOR.” 

USCENTCOM has a forward headquarters located in Qatar to serve American strategic interests of the Iraq and Afghanistan region. 

MNF-I is one of two military commands that stood up in Iraq in May 2004 to replace Combined Joint Task Force 7 (the other command was Multi-National Corps-Iraq [MNC-I]—see below). MNF-I conducts offensive operations to defeat remaining noncompliant forces and neutralize destabilizing influences in Iraq to create a secure environment. MNF-I organizes, trains, equips, mentors, and certifies credible and capable Iraqi Security Forces to transition responsibility for security from coalition forces to Iraqi forces. Concurrently, MNF-I conducts stability operations to support the establishment of government, the restoration of essential services, and economic development to set the conditions for a transfer of sovereignty to designated follow-on authorities. 

MNC-I, a suborganization of MNF-I, is the tactical unit responsible for command and control of operations throughout Iraq. MNC-I is headquartered by the U.S. Army at Camp Victory, Baghdad, and is divided into the following major AORs, maintained by forces from 26 countries plus a logistical support area: 

  • Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W): MNF-W operates in the western region, including the cities of Ar Ramadi and Fallujah. MNF-W is headquartered by U.S. Marine Expeditionary Forces. 
  • Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B): MND-B is also known as Task Force Baghdad. Its major AOR is the city of Baghdad. 
  • Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C): MND-C covers Karbala, Najaf, Babil, Wasit, and North Babil areas. 
  • Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS): MND-CS covers the province of Diwaniyah. The division is headquartered by the Polish military. 
  • Multi-National Division-North (MND-N): MND-N is responsible for an area including the cities of Balad, Kirkuk, Tikrit, Mosul, and Samarra. 
  • Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE): MND-SE operates in the southeastern region, including the cities of Basrah, An Nasiriyah, As Samawah, and Al Amarah. The division is headquartered by elements of the British military. 
  • Multi-National Division-Northeast (MND-NE): MND-NE is centered around Irbil. Its main tasks are to provide medical services and to build and repair roads, power lines, schools, and other public works. The original contingent consisted of combat engineers of the South Korean Zaytun (“olive-peace”) Division. 
  • Logistical Support Area (LSA) Anaconda: LSA Anaconda is responsible for providing logistical support throughout the theater. 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I):  MNSTC-I, commonly called “min-sticky,” is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces throughout the country. 

Iraq’s Governance Structure 

Iraq has a history of a repressive national government under the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein. As a result, the devolution of substantial authority to provincial and district/city governments is a new concept in Iraq. The PRTs are part of the long-term transition plan that will help to decentralize some of the responsibilities from the national government to the provincial government. 

National government 

On January 30, 2005, Iraq held its first open election and chose members of the transitional 275-member National Assembly, establishing its legislature. Iraq’s national government might be described as a federal parliamentary representative republic, where the prime minister is the head of the government and has the authority to appoint a cabinet for the various ministries, such as the Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Interior, and so on. Iraq also has a president and two vice presidents; however, most of the power resides with the prime minister.  National government is not the focus of the PRTs. 

Provincial government 

PRTs focus their efforts on the provincial level of government. In the January 2005 election, the people voted for political parties, representatives of which were designated to the Provincial Council (PC). The political parties have a pro-rata share of the seats depending on the election results. Within the PC, 25 percent of the members must be female. Once the PC is elected, it appoints the governor. The governor or the chairman of the PC is important to the provincial government’s success. 

Within the provinces, each ministry that has relevant matters may have a director general (DG) who is responsible for various functions. For example, the Ministry of Transportation is responsible for airports. Therefore, if an airport is located within the province, there would be a DG who serves the district. Presently, there appears to be no link between the DGs and the PCs. 

District/subdistrict/city government 

Within each province there exist districts/municipalities where local councils serve their respective communities. In support of the military surge in Baghdad and Al Anbar province and in coordination with the PRT-Baghdad and PRT-Ramadi, the newly established embedded PRTs (ePRTs) work at the subprovincial level assisting districts and municipalities in reconnecting with their provincial governments. They also empower moderates in local government, business, and civil society. This has been particularly pronounced in Al Anbar where the return to government control has seen the re-emergence of subprovincial government. 

PRT Structure 

Nominal PRT 

Because PRTs are modular in nature, staffing may vary in number of personnel, including civilian, military, and contractors. PRTs task-organize their respective PRTs based on their mission, so the structure of each PRT may vary. 

Graphic - Nominal PRT organization chart
Figure C-3: Nominal PRT organization chart 

Note: See “PRT roles and responsibilities” below for definition of abbreviations. This PRT organization chart reflects the functional areas but does not imply that PRTs must task-organize in the same fashion. This chart also reflects a personal security team (also referred to as a military movement team) in direct support of the PRT but does not specify the number of personnel. DOS Cable 4045 specifies between 4 to 20 civil affairs military members; however, in some instances, the smallest unit practicable to deploy in direct support of the PRT is a company. 

PRT roles and responsibilities 

  • PRT team leader. The PRT leader is responsible for implementing the DOS-led joint coalition PRT initiative at the provincial level of government. The team leader (TL) is the leader/coordinator of a multiagency, multidisciplinary team comprised of military, civilian, and locally employed staff. A senior foreign service officer, with leadership experience in a foreign government environment, leads the PRT. 
  • Deputy team leader (DTL). The DTL is the senior military member (O-5 or O-6) of the PRT and is responsible for assisting the TL in implementing DOS’s PRT initiative at the provincial level of government. The DTL is the TL’s chief of staff and directs the coordination of the multiagency, multidisciplinary team. The DTL, acting as the chief of staff, manages and plans the day-to-day operations and coordinates the scheduling of internal and external events. The DTL is the senior military representative for the MNF-I commander and the approving authority for the security of PRT off-site operations and all convoy operations. 
  • Agriculture specialist. Agriculture consistently has been identified as a key growth area in the provinces. The agriculture specialist may be a USDA specialist and works to enhance the PRT’s ability to work with local governments to develop policies and programs that will support this vital economic sector. 
  • Bilingual bicultural advisor (BBA). The BBA program is a DOD contract established to provide professional-level advisors who are expatriate Iraqis with U.S. or coalition citizenship who can help bridge the gap of understanding between USG agencies and their Iraqi counterparts. BBAs possess Bachelor’s degrees (or equivalent) or higher and speak fluent English, Arabic, and sometimes Kurdish. They function as a key interface between the PRT members and provincial-level government officials and should be integrated into the PRTs where their backgrounds and education will be of most use. 
  • Civil affairs company (CA CO). The CA CO is responsible for the integration and planning of CA missions in support of the PRT capacity development work plan.  As the commander of a unit with military vehicles, the CA CO is responsible for planning and coordinating CA convoy missions with the major subordinate command liaison officer and DTL. The CA CO employs Soldiers and their various skill sets to the best advantage of the PRT; conducts integrated planning with the local governance program (LGP), Iraq Transition Assistance Office, and rule of law efforts; and works in the areas of governance, economics, public works, infrastructure, assessment, metric collection, project inspections, and report writing. 
  • Economic development. This new position serves as the technical lead for economic development and focuses on new programs such as the focused stabilization strategy. This position may be filled with a specialist from any of several civilian U.S. Government (USG) agencies. 
  • Engineer officer (ENG). The ENG trains, coaches, and mentors his Iraqi engineer/reconstruction counterparts on all aspects of project and reconstruction development and management. The ENG ensures that the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC) is capable of performing engineering assessments, designing scopes of work, conducting quality assurance and quality control, accomplishing construction processes, and managing projects. The ENG advises the TL and DTL on the daily situation and changes to reconstruction efforts and activities in the province. 
  • Iraqi provincial action officer (IPAO). The IPAO is responsible for reporting on the provincial atmospherics, including political reporting on the progress toward self-reliance and governance capacity. The IPAO may also report on public affairs. The IPAO, in consultation with the TL, interfaces with local officials and private citizens in support of the PRT public diplomacy work plan to advocate U.S. and chief of mission (COM) policy and collect political information through engagement and observation. The IPAO is responsible for crafting weekly executive summaries and analyzing Iraqi political events and routine political and economic reporting. 
  • Iraq Transition Assistance Office provincial program manager (ITAO PPM): The PPM provides oversight of USG reconstruction efforts and coordinates, liaises, coaches, and mentors PRDC members in all phases of project execution. The ITAO PPM works closely with the PRT ENG. 
  • Locally employed staff (LES): The USAID offices may hire local nationals to support various programs. LES work directly with the local nationals and are used in training provincial council members and their support plan. 
  • Military liaison officer (MIL LNO): The MIL LNO coordinates PRT activities with the local coalition military commander. The LNO coordinates route security, communication, and emergency/contingency planning between PRT and military units. The LNO provides the PRT with provincial security assessments and intelligence alerts completed by the military and passed via secure communications. The LNO is responsible for active battle tracking of all convoy missions from the PRT operations center for the purpose of coordinating with local units. 
  • Public diplomacy officer (PDO): The PDO is a full-time public diplomacy professional dedicated to effectively communicating the good work of the PRT and assisting in developing a public outreach capacity in the provincial government. 
  • Rule of law (ROL) coordinator: The ROL coordinator is responsible for coordinating ROL initiatives at the provincial level, focusing on public law enforcement; a fair civil and criminal judicial system; citizens’ equal access to the Iraqi justice system and legal representation; and a humane corrections system, as well as a range of issues that will assist Iraq in transitioning into an effective ROL society. ROL coordinator support to Iraqi governance helps to develop both civil and criminal law and assist police, judicial, and detention institutions by coordinating with Iraqi governmental structures. It also provides support to the civic sector, such as law faculties, lawyer associations, and other rights-based institutions, both governmental and nongovernmental. 
  • USAID officer: The USAID officer coordinates USAID efforts with the PRT, LGP, and provincial leaders. The USAID officer synchronizes the LGP through the development of the PRT work plan. The USAID officer trains and coaches members of the PRT on the principles and important points of the LGP and explains the USAID and LGP to the provincial leaders to gain support for training provincial leadership and local government employees. The USAID officer supervises and supports the efforts of LGP employees, identifies staffing requirements tied to the work plan, and recommends the hiring and release of LES.  See Appendix 6 of this annex for an explanation of LGP. 

Taking into consideration all the various positions, the following diagram provides a suggested team breakout. The sections are intermixed with available personnel resources, both civilian and military. 

Graphic - Suggested PRT breakout flowchart
Figure C-4: Suggested PRT breakout flowchart

Embedded PRTs 

Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) support BCT/RCT counterinsurgency efforts, empower moderates, foster economic development, and build the capacity of local government and other local institutions in order to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. The ePRT represents the civilian contribution to the military surge. Their establishment was announced in January 2007 during President Bush’s speech highlighting the USG’s new strategy for Iraq. The roles and responsibilities of the positions identified in Figure C-4 are the same as stated for nominal PRTs. 

Graphic - ePRT organization chart
Figure C-5: ePRT organization chart

Provincial Support Team (PST) 

For a variety of reasons, the province may not have a PRT; therefore, OPA may deploy only certain elements of a PRT. These elements are referred to as a PST and often are located outside the province. Under this structure, the PSTs receive a dedicated PRT staff, but they execute much of the work through limited engagements (visits to the province and visits to the regional embassy office from provincial leaders) and the use of LES. Although this is a structure that is still evolving, the following elements may be part of a PST: 

  • PST TL 
  • IPAO 
  • ROL coordinator 
  • USAID coordinator 
  • LES living and working in the province 

Command and Control 

According to the 22 February 2007, DOS/DOD Memorandum of Agreement on Iraq PRTs, the COM, through the Office of Provincial Affairs, provides the political and economic direction of PRTs and ePRTs. The BCT/RCT commander “will exercise his authority over security and movement of personnel for PRTs embedded in military units based on security concerns but will not direct members of the PRT as to who they should see, nor deny the members of the PRT the ability to make the contact with certain interlocutors, based on a judgment of priorities other than security.” Their primary mission is to support counterinsurgency operations, focusing on political and economic development, ROL, and reconstruction at the city, district, and neighborhood levels. The ePRT leader has the lead for implementation of political and economic policies and is supported by BCT/RCT. The BCT/RCT commander has the lead for security and movement issues and is supported by the PRT.

Paired PRTs take guidance and direction from the COM conveyed through OPA and coordinate with the local commander at the forward operating base (FOB). They focus on political and economic development, ROL, and reconstruction at the provincial level. The FOB commander has lead for security and movement. Paired PRTs coordinate with embedded PRTs working in their province. 

Graphic - PRT command structure
Figure C-6: PRT command structure 

Annex C, Appendix 1 

Extract of the Department of Defense/Department of State Memorandum of Agreement on Iraq PRTs 


The purpose of this Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is to specify operational requirements, authorities, and responsibilities shared between the U.S. Mission-Iraq (USM-I) and the Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) or successor organizations for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (“PRTs”) in Iraq. The PRT program is a priority joint Department of State (DOS)–Department of Defense (DOD) initiative to bolster moderates, support counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, and shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency. Each agency agrees to support the program to the maximum extent provided for in this MOA. 

The MOA supplements the agreements and authorities listed under “References” below and does not amend, revise, or change these agreements or authorities except as specified herein.


a. Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense for Support Services in Iraq, dated June 10, 2004. 

b. Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense Regarding Physical Security, Equipment and Personal Protective Services, dated June 10, 2004. 

c. U.S. Mission Baghdad/MNF-I coordinated cable 4045, dated 010330Z, Oct. 2005, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments.” 

d. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36: United States Government Operations in Iraq, dated May 11, 2004. 

e. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Commander, U.S. Central Command, and Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission Iraq Regarding Security Responsibility, dated June 28, 2004. 

f. The Economy Act (31 USC Section 1535).

g. Title 22, United States Code, Sec. 3927: Chief of Mission Authority. 

h. President’s Letter of Instruction to the United States Ambassador to Iraq. 

i. Supplemental Agreement to the Memorandum of Agreement between Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, and Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission Iraq Regarding Security Responsibility on PRT Security Responsibilities and Requirements, dated November 9, 2006. 


a. This MOA covers all PRTs, including Regional Reconstruction Teams (RRTs), Provincial Support Teams (PSTs), and embedded PRTs, all of which are hereafter referred to collectively as PRTs, existing or to be established in Iraq. 

b. This MOA is not intended to identify each and every support requirement or to prejudice the ability of the Chief of Mission (COM) or Commander, MNF-I to make requests for support not specifically stated herein. Rather, this MOA is intended lo address the majority of support issues and to provide baseline direction for support responsibilities. Except in emergency circumstances, requests for additional support beyond that provided for herein will take the form of a written request from the COM to the Commander, MNF-I or from the Commander, MNF-I to the COM, as specific circumstances dictate. Such requests may be for reimbursable or non-reimbursable support. 

c. This MOA will be implemented consistent with available funding and applicable law. The parties’ ability, as a practical matter, to implement this MOA depends on their ability to obtain adequate supplemental funding for this purpose. 


a. Authority: 

(i) PRTs are a joint Department of State–Department of Defense mission, and they operate under joint policy guidance from the COM and Commander, MNF-I, harnessing both civilian and military resources against a common strategic plan. The PRT/BCT will function as one team. Together they will receive guidance from both COM and Commander, MNF-I that will follow a common plan for their joint AOR. 

(ii) The Department of State will lead PRTs and is responsible for recruiting, hiring, and managing civilian PRT personnel.

(iii) Embedded PRTs will also coordinate their activities with the paired PRT in their area (e.g., the existing Baghdad and Anbar PRTs, which will maintain primary responsibility for provincial-level engagement). The COM and Commander, MNF-I will jointly decide whether PRTs are considered to be paired with or embedded in military units for purposes of this memorandum. 

(iv) The COM provides political and economic guidance and direction to all PRTs. The BCT Commander will exercise his authority over security and movement of personnel for PRTs embedded in military units based on security concerns but will not direct members of the PRT as to who they should see, nor deny the members of the PRT the ability to make contact with certain interlocutors, based on a judgment of priorities other than security. 

(v) All parties will coordinate closely in the development of relevant guidance on PRT activities, not only to deconflict relevant activities, but more importantly so that all activities work together toward the common goal of bolstering moderates, supporting U.S.  counterinsurgency strategy, and strengthening the capacity of provincial governments to accelerate the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. 

(vi) Any disputes between BCT Commanders or other military commanders and PRT leaders concerning the policies, procedures, or activities of PRTs will be submitted promptly to the COM and Commander, MNF-I or their senior representatives for resolution. 

(vii) All military personnel providing support to PRTs will fall under the UCMJ authority of their respective chains of command as determined by the appropriate command relationships. 

b. Performance Reporting: 

(I) PRT Team Leaders are responsible for the overall performance of their joint civil-military team and will monitor the individual performance of all members of their team. Evaluation reports will be prepared in accordance with Mission policy and employing agency 

(ii) MNF-I units provided in direct support to the PRT will follow their internal raring chain. DOD and Military Department Service regulations and procedures will be followed. 

c. Regulations and Policies: 

(I) PRTs will observe COM directions, rules, policies and procedures, to the extent applicable. In relation to matters of security for which Commander, MNF-I is responsible, PRT members will comply with MNF-I safety and force-protection measures as provided in Reference 2(i) above. 

(ii) Each PRT member who is a Federal employee remains an employee of his or her department or agency and subject to the regulations, policies, and procedures of that department or agency to the extent not inconsistent with COM or Commander, MNF-I requirements. Military personnel shall continue to observe MNF-I regulations in their personal and professional conduct in support of the PRT mission. 

(iii) Each PRT member who is made available through an institutional contractor will be responsible for performing his/her PRT duties in accordance with the statement of duties prescribed in the contract and shall be subject to the general guidance of the department or agency that awarded the contract, to the extent not inconsistent with COM or Commander, MNF-I requirements. Further, any conflict between the terms and conditions of the contract under which institutional contractors are employed, their specific agreement with their employer, and COM rules, policies, and procedures should be resolved prior to their assignment to a PRT. 

d. Concept of Support:

(I) PRTs are critical elements in achieving the goals of the USG in Iraq. As such, they will be provided the highest level of support available, and the support PRT members receive will be without distinction based on their home organizations, or whether they are USG employees, contractor personnel, or foreign nationals, except as otherwise provide herein or by separate agreement or contract. 

(ii) DOS will be responsible for providing, or reimbursing DOD for all operational support and life support for PRTs, consistent with sections e and f of this MOA. “Operational support” means necessary facilities and facilities services (e.g., office space, office supplies, and related equipment and services), logistic and infrastructure support (e.g., facilities upkeep and management), and basic utilities/services (e.g., power water, sewer, fire protection, drainage, waste management, hazardous material management, and environmental services). “Life support” includes lodging, food, water, bath and sanitation, and any morale, recreation and welfare facilities or services (e.g. laundry services, food service operations, postal operations, check cashing, and Army & Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) mail order service). 

(iii) DOD will be responsible for providing on a non-reimbursable basis all in-theater air and ground transportation and associated support to PRTs, consistent with the terms of Annex A of this MOA. 

(iv) DOD will be responsible for providing all medical support including necessary primary care, to PRTs collocated with US military units, as well as medical evacuation and mortuary services as required for PRT personnel regardless of locations. PRT contractors and foreign government personnel will be provided medical support, medical evacuation and mortuary services in accordance with the terms of applicable contract provisions or agreements. DOS or the relevant contracting agency, as appropriate, will reimburse DOD for medical support, medical evacuation, and mortuary services provided to PRT members. DOS will be responsible for any arrangements for PRT primary medical care at non-collocated PRTs and for primary care for civilian PRT members in the International Zone. 

(v) Communications and information systems support to non-collocated and paired PRTs shall be provided to PRTs consistent with the terms of Annex B of this MOA. At embedded PRTs, DOD will provide communications and information support, and DOS will reimburse. 

(vi) For PRTs located on Mission facilities or on Non-U.S. Coalition facilities, the COM or his designee will have overall decision authority on the PRT location. For PRTs collocated with U.S. military units, the responsible Major Subordinate Command will have overall decision authority on the PRT location, facilities management, and administrative and logistic support. The COM and the Commander, MNF-I, or their designees, will coordinate regarding PRT locations. 

(vii) DOS and DOD will finalize reimbursement procedures for life and operational support within 30 days of signature of this MOA. 

(viii) If factors arise that affect the continued maintenance of a PRT at a specific location, its status, or the provision of support, the Commander, MNF-I and the COM, or their designated representatives, will consult with each other and with their respective chains of command so that appropriate alternative arrangements can be made. 

(ix) To facilitate PRT operations, PRT members will be issued appropriate facility access badges in accordance with the applicable security policies. PRT members will hold an appropriate security clearance, background investigation, or employment verification check based on the requirements of the assigned position.  Verification will be established through security channels.

e. Support Levels and Funding for PRTs Collocated with U.S. Military Units: 

(I) DOD will provide operational and life support for PRTs collocated with BCTs or other U.S. military units, regardless of whether such support is organic to the military unit except as provided in subparagraph (v) below. DOS will reimburse DOD for such support. 

(ii) DOD will provide all support specified in this MOA for PRTs collocated with BCTs or other U.S. military units at the levels provided to MNF-I personnel of similar grade at similar locations. 

(iii) DOD will provide operational and life support for PRT contractor personnel serving on PRTs collocated with U.S. military units on a reimbursable basis. In the case of a DOD contractor, DOS will reimburse DOD for the cost of such support. In all other cases, the contracting agency will reimburse DOD for the cost of such support. 

(iv) Foreign government personnel assigned to PRTs will be provided the same level of support as other PRT members, subject to the terms of funding arrangements as agreed in the particular case in view of the mission of such personnel and any governing agreement with their respective countries.

(v) DOD is responsible for funding repair and maintenance of all DOD equipment and vehicles, and DOS is responsible for funding repair and maintenance of all DOS equipment and vehicles. All maintenance support provided by DOD for DOS equipment and vehicles will be reimbursed by DOS. 

f. Support Levels and Funding for PRTs Not Collocated with U.S. Military Units: 

(I) DOS will provide operational and life support for PRTs not collocated with U.S. military units on a non-reimbursable basis, except as provided in subparagraph (v) below, unless arrangements are made for DOD to provide such support on a reimbursable basis, or unless a coalition partner agrees to provide such support. 

(ii) DOS will provide any support for PRTs not collocated with U.S. military units at the levels provided to DOS personnel of similar grade. 

(iii) Except where the contract provides that the government will provide support, arrangements will be made for contractors serving on PRTs not collocated with U.S. military units to reimburse the non-DOD service provider directly (i.e., DOS or Coalition partner as applicable) for the operational and life support they receive.  Where the contract provides that the government will provide support, the contracting agency will reimburse the non-DOD service provider for the cost of such support. 

(iv) In cases where DOD provides operational and life support for PRT contractor personnel serving on PRTs not collocated with U.S. military units, such support will be provided on a reimbursable basis.  In the case of a DOD contractor, DOS will reimburse DOD for such support. In all other cases, the contracting agency will reimburse DOD for the cost of such support. 

(v) Foreign government personnel who are PRT members will be provided support on the same basis as other PRT members, with funding arrangements as agreed in the particular case in view of the mission of such personnel and any governing agreement with their respective countries. 

(vi) DOS is responsible for funding repair and maintenance of all DOS equipment and vehicles. All maintenance support provided by DOS for DOD equipment and vehicles will be reimbursed by DOD. 

g. Transitional Agreements: 

(I) DOD will pay salary costs for the initial DOD staffing for the PRT surge, anticipated to include 129 positions for a period not to exceed 12 months. DOS will fund all non-DOD agency salary costs for PRT positions thereafter, to the extent that funds are made available to DOS specifically for this purpose. 

(ii) DOS will initiate measures to identify replacement personnel for the 109 specialist positions DOD will fill during Phase II. Where advantageous for achieving the PRT mission, DOS will be prepared to replace all of these DOD-provided specialist personnel no later than 90 days after receiving funding for that purpose. In any event, DOS will be prepared to replace these DOD-provided specialist personnel within 12 months of their deployment. 


The following Annexes are included and made part of this MOA: 

A. Air and Ground Transportation Support 

B. Communications and Information System Support 

C. Appendix 1: Communications Support Matrix 

D. PRT Matrix [removed] 


This Memorandum of Agreement will become effective upon signature by both Parties. PRT support extended prior to signature of this MOA will be inclusive.  MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq will review this MOA annually for currency and applicability. This MOA may be amended in writing as mutually agreed by the Parties. 

    Original signed

Extract of the Department of Defense/Department of State Memorandum of Agreement on Iraq PRTs 


1. Type of Support Being Provided 

a. In light of DOD’s mission to provide security for U.S. government personnel serving in Iraq, the joint PRT mission, and the current circumstances within Iraq creating an inseparable connection between security and transportation for PRTs, DOD will provide transportation support to PRTs on a non-reimbursable basis. 

b. Type of support provided to PRTs is the same as stated in Annex D of reference 2.a. except as modified below regarding PRTs. 

c. In addition to those stated in reference 2.a., Annex D section 2, Coalition members assigned to PRTs may be support recipients. Such Coalition members may be provided transportation as provided herein on a non-reimbursable basis where there is no additional cost to DOD. In circumstances where there will clearly be an additional cost to DOD, such transportation may be provided on a reimbursable basis under arrangement to be worked out on a country-by-country basis. 

2. Air Movement of PRTs 

a. Military air support provided in theater to the PRTs will be provided in accordance with reference 2.a and existing Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs). 

b. Local Rotary Wing (RW) Support. PRTs will normally submit RW air mission requests (AMRs) to the Major Subordinate Command (MSC) G-3 Aviation in whose area of responsibility the PRT resides, which will consider them as priority requests. For RW movements that extend beyond that MSC’s area of responsibility, MNF-I will establish procedures for integrating such movements across other MSCs, including using MNC-I general support (GS) airlift (including scheduled ring routes) when appropriate. PRT rotary wing support requirements will be prepared and submitted in accordance with established MNF-I, MNC-I, and MSC timelines and procedures. 

c. MNF-I in coordination with the U.S. Mission-Iraq, will monitor changes to RW movement patterns generated by PRT airlift requirements and may adjust or establish new scheduled flight routes to optimize the use of its GS and MSC-assigned RW fleets lo best meet MNF-I customer base needs most effectively. 

d. Integrated Fixed Wing (FW) Air Movement Support. PRTs will submit airlift support requirements for FW support to the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad Joint Area Support Group-Transportation (JASG-T), a subordinate unit of MNF-I, which will consider them as priority requests. The JASG-T will forward these FW airlift requirements using the Intra-Theater Airlift Request System (ITARS). The JASG-T will also coordinate for FW support to accomplish relief-in-place operations and the FW transport of goods, programs, supplies, and services. FW support requirements will be prepared and submitted in accordance with USCENTCOM/USCENTAF AMD timelines and procedures. 

e. Chief of Mission (COM) Airlift Assets. DOS dedicated RW assets will be used as a means of PRT personnel movement when available. These RW assets are only available between Baghdad and Hillah. 

f. The Commander, MNF-I and the COM will address the priority to be accorded PRT air support requests in the joint guidance cited in paragraph 4.a.(i). of the MOA. 

3. Ground Movements of PRTs 

a. The commander of the relevant military unit is responsible for providing all ground movement for the PRTs that are collocated with U.S. military units. Readily available ground movement capability is critical to the success of the PRT mission, and the military commander will make every effort to accommodate requests by PRT learn leaders for such transportation. 

b. Recognizing that the need for PRT ground movement assets is dependent upon a range of factors (e.g., size of the PRT, specifics of the common plan, geography of the AOR, etc.), and that the availability of ground movement assets is similarly dependent (e.g., combat situation, maintenance considerations, etc.), the BCT will make convoys available in accordance with existing agreements, absent compelling circumstances that preclude doing so. 

c. The PRT leader will submit a prioritized list of movement requests for ground transportation assets at least 48 hours in advance of the travel. 

d. Convoy requirements are specified in reference 2.j. of the MOA.

Extract of the Department of Defense/Department of State Memorandum of Agreement on Iraq PRTs 


1. Concept of Support 

This annex outlines roles: responsibilities, functions, and lines of authority for communications and information systems support of the PRTs. PRTs will require communications systems to include: automation and information processing, telephones, and radios. Information operating systems and software must be compatible and establish commonality, regardless of supporting activity, to the greatest extent feasible. The National Coordination Team (NCT) will appoint a member responsible for PRT communications oversight to achieve this objective. 

2. PRTs Communications and Information Systems Capabilities 

The communications and information capabilities outlined in Appendix 1 to this annex represent capabilities PRTs may require in various capacities to perform their missions. PRT team leaders will determine what capabilities are essential to the mission of their specific PRT, and identify requirements for network access, number of telephones, computers, radios, etc. These requirements will be coordinated with the NCT and forwarded to DOS Information Management Office (IMO) Iraq (for non-collocated PRTs) or MNF-I Chief of Information S (for collocated PRTs), as appropriate. Level of fulfillment of those requirements will be dependent on availability of assets and on-site support. The SCT functions as the node of operations and communications center for PRT communications: and will establish and enforce standards and procedures for interoperability. The NCT will consult DOS/IMO Iraq and MNF-I CIS regarding communications management. 

3. Concept of Information Support 

a. Roles and responsibilities: DOS/IMO Iraq and MNF-I CIS are responsible for providing communications and information systems support to non-collocated PRTs and collocated PRTs, respectively, consistent with standing orders and regulations, and in accordance with this MOA. 

b. Policy: DOS and DOD regulations, procedures, and policies pertaining to communications and information systems support will retain their inherent authority in their respective systems. This MOA does not abrogate, supersede, or invalidate standing regulations, policies, or procedures that are intended to ensure the inherent security of the systems. 

c. Network Services: Requests for network services support will be directed through NCT to MNF-I CIS or DOS/-IMO Iraq, as appropriate. Network Services will include, at the component level, base-lining of computer systems, internet connectivity, Help Desk support, trouble shooting, and repair and replacement. IT specialists at either collocated or non-collocated sites will not be required to provide unique or special equipment nor normally available. DOS/-IMO Iraq and MNF-I CIS are responsible for the security of their respective networks and will retain the authority to manage network services consistent with organizational regulations, policies, and procedures. 

d. Network Access: In cases where the PRT is not collocated with a U.S. military unit solely supported by a Regional Embassy Office (REO), DOS/ IMO Iraq will provide appropriately cleared personnel with access to both ClassNet and OpenNet systems. Where a PRT is collocated with a U.S. military unit, MNF-I will provide appropriately cleared personnel with access to both SIPRnet and NIPRnet. A minimum of 1 SIPR line per every 3 PRT members with appropriate security clearance and 1 NIPR line per PRT member with authorized access are required per collocated PRT. DOS/ IMO Iraq will provide additional access for the PRT to an unclassified network and commercial telephones via a commercial satellite system. USG IT contractors with a Secret or higher security clearance will be provided network access to the extent permitted by DOD/DOS regulations, but will include—at a minimum—administrative rights on any commercial systems. 

e. Terminal Equipment: The PRT leader is responsible for identifying numbers of equipment each learn will require (telephones, radios, computers, monitors, printers, etc.). Requests will be made through the NCT to either DOS/ IMO Iraq (for non-collocated PRTs) or MNF-I CIS (for collocated PRTs), as appropriate. 

f. Maintenance of ADPE and Radio Equipment: DOS/ IMO Iraq will maintain DOS-provided equipment. MNF-I will maintain DOD-provided equipment. 

g. Voice Communications: 

1) Telephones: Telephone service will be provided to the PRT through the existing telephone capacity of the supporting activity (non-collocated/collocated REO/FOB/other facility). Telephone services provided by MNTF-I normally include only the DSN line, and not the telephone instrument. MNF-I will provide SVOIP, SIPRNET, and VOIP telephones from NIPRNET. DOS/ IMO will provide unclassified telephones via a commercial satellite system.  Telephone service will provide, at a minimum, internal communications; access to the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq; access to Headquarters MNF-I and MNC-I; and access to U.S. commercial telephone numbers. 

2) Mobile telephones: Where possible, cellular telephones may be a significant enhancement to the PRT communications plan and may even supplant land-line telephone communications. There is no single nationwide cellular service provider in Iraq; therefore, mobile telephone support must be based on area of operation. In instances where the supporting activity has an established account or relationship with local service providers, the activity will extend those services lo the PRT. 

3) Satellite telephone: DOS/ IMO Iraq will provide two satellite telephones and service per PRT. These telephones will be assigned to PRT Team Leaders and Deputy Team Leaders for use by PRT members, as appropriate. PRT Team Leaders will be responsible and accountable for satellite telephone usage. 

h. Frequency Management: MNF-I CIS is responsible for frequency allocation and management for military band UHF and HF. DOS IMO Iraq will coordinate frequency management and allocation for DOS unique frequency requirements through MNF- I CIS. 

i. Communications Operations: PRTs will manage internal team communications. The team leader will establish liaison with the supporting site for integration and coordination of PRT Emergency and Evacuation (E&E) communications with existing force protection procedures. 

j. COMSEC Operations: As appropriate, DOS/DOD will provide COMSEC for systems at each location. All USG COMSEC regulations, policies, and procedures will apply to PRT operations. 

k. Military Movement Teams: Military movement teams used to transport PRT personnel will provide their own communications for both movement and site/venue security.

Extract of the Department of Defense/Department of State Memorandum of Agreement on Iraq PRTs 

Appendix 1 Communications and Information Systems Arrangements
in Place for Current PRTs

Functional Area 


Non-Collocated PRT 

Paired PRT 










DOS will provide Help Desk support. 





Minimum of 1 per PRT member. DOD will provide Help Desk support. 









DOS will provide Help Desk support. 





Minimum of 1 line per every 3 cleared PRT members. DOD will provide Help Desk support. 

Commercial Internet/Data




Minimum of 50 users. DOS contractors will provide Help Desk support. This service must also provide 30 commercial VoIP phones as well. 


Unclassified Voice 


Functional Area 


Non-Collocated PRT 

Paired PRT 











Satellite Phone 








Coverage is limited to Baghdad. 

Commercial Iraqi Cell Phone 




Dependent on commercial carrier availability. 

Classified Voice 







Data Sharing Capability 


Need to determine hosting organization and parameters. 


GRD/PCO Database 




GRD/PCO is integrator. 





Radio nets will be determined by hosting organization. Cross-compatibility can be realized via the technical integrator. 

Radio Equipment 




Needs determined individually per PRT site. 






Bandwidth and requirement dependent. 

Functional Area 


Non-Collocated PRT 

Paired PRT 






COMSEC accounts are not available at some sites; compatibility requirements may require military support. 

*Note: This matrix indicates capabilities suggested for PRTs and commonly available means to achieve them. The actual means by which these capabilities are realized will vary from site to site. PRTs will inform NCT of local solutions and will request support when capability shortfalls exist. Data services include basic functionality and support including, but not limited to: transmission path; Help Desk support; limited ADPE repair and maintenance; and workstation administration. Application administration will be supported to the best abilities of the supporting agency (DOS or DOD). Network security requirements will remain as required by the respective supporting agency. 

Annex C, Appendix 2 

Iraq Background Notes 

Official Name: Republic of Iraq 


  • Area: 437,072 sq km (168,754 sq mi)—slightly more than twice the size of Idaho. 
  • Cities (2005 est.): Capital – Baghdad (6,956,562); other cities – Mosul (1,174,022), Basrah (1,100,790), Irbil (910,381), Kirkuk (618,149). 
  • Terrain: mostly broad plains; reedy marshes along Iranian border in south with large flooded areas; mountains along borders with Iran and Turkey. 
  • Climate: mostly desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers; northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq. 


  • Type: Parliamentary democracy. 
  • Independence: 3 October 1932. 
  • Constitution:15 October 2005. 
  • Branches: Executive – president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government); Legislative – bicameral Council of Representatives (275 seats) and a Federation Council (membership not established and authorities undefined); Judicial – Higher Juridical Council, Supreme Federal Court, Federal Court of Cassation, Public Prosecution Department, Judiciary Oversight Commission, and other federal courts. 
  • Political subdivisions:18 provinces. 
  • Suffrage: Universal at 18 years. 


  • GDP (2006 est.): $40.66 billion. 
  • GDP growth (2006 est.): 2.4%. 
  • GDP per capita (2006 est.): $2900. 
  • Natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur. 
  • Agriculture (estimated 7% of GDP): Products – wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, cotton, cattle, sheep, poultry. 
  • Industry (estimated 67% of GDP): Types— petroleum, chemicals, textiles, leather, construction materials, food processing, fertilizer, metal fabrication/processing. 
  • Services (estimated 26% of GDP): Transport, retail, and telecommunications. 
  • Trade (2005-06 est.): 
    • Exports – $32.19 billion: crude oil 84%, crude materials excluding fuels 8%, food and live animals 5%; Major markets – U.S., Europe, Canada. 
    • Imports – $20.76 billion: food, medicine, manufacturers; Major suppliers – Middle East countries, U.S. 
  • Currency: The currency is the New Iraqi dinar (NID) as of 22 January 2004. As of 17 July 2007, $1 U.S. equals approximately 1,250 dinar. 


  • Nationality: Noun and adjective – Iraqi(s). 
  • Population: 27,499,638 (July 2007 est.). Approximately two million Iraqis have fled the conflict in Iraq, with the majority taking refuge in Syria and Jordan and lesser numbers to Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, and Turkey. 
  • Annual population growth rate (2007 est.): 2.618%. 
  • Main ethnic groups: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian, or other 5%. 
  • Religions: Muslim 97% (Shi’a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian, or other 3%. 
  • Main languages: Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian. 
  • Education: Literacy (2000 est.) – 74.1% (male 84.1%, female 64.2%). 
  • Health: Infant mortality rate (2007 est.) – 47.04 deaths/1,000 live births; Life expectancy (2007 est.) – 68.04 yrs. (male), 70.65 yrs. (female). 

Historical information: Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I. In 1920, it was declared a League of Nations mandate under U.K. administration. In stages over the next dozen years, Iraq attained its independence as a kingdom in 1932. A “republic” was proclaimed in 1958, but in actuality a series of military strongmen ruled the country until 2003; the last was Saddam Hussein. Territorial disputes with Iran led to an inconclusive and costly eight-year war (1980-88).  

In August 1990, Iraq seized Kuwait, but was expelled by U.S.-led, United Nations (UN) coalition forces during the Gulf War of January–February 1991. Following Kuwait’s liberation, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) required Iraq to scrap all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles and to allow UN verification inspections. Continued Iraqi noncompliance with UNSC resolutions over a period of 12 years led to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime. Coalition forces remain in Iraq under a UNSC mandate, helping to provide security and to support the freely elected government. 

The Coalition Provisional Authority, which temporarily administered Iraq after the invasion, transferred full governmental authority on 28 June 2004 to the Iraqi Interim Government, which governed under the Transitional Administrative Law for Iraq (TAL). Under the TAL, elections for a 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA) were held in Iraq on 30 January 2005. Following these elections, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) assumed office. The TNA was charged with drafting Iraq’s permanent constitution, which was approved in a 15 October 2005 constitutional referendum. An election under the constitution for a 275-member Council of Representatives (CoR) was held on 15 December 2005.  The CoR approval in the selection of most of the cabinet ministers on 20 May 2006 marked the transition from the ITG to Iraq’s first constitutional government in nearly a half-century. 

Annex C, Appendix 3 

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq 

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) was heralded in Security Council Resolution 1500, adopted on 14 August 2003, as a one-year follow-through mission in the wake of the Oil-for-Food program handover on 21 November 2003. 

In the aftermath of direct attacks on the United Nations (UN) in Iraq and the subsequent evacuation of the UN international staff from Baghdad by November, political and security concerns vis a vie mandate and re-entry were urgently reviewed by the Secretary General. During this period, a core UNAMI forward planning team supported the development of innovative operational options for continued UN involvement in Iraq and established a centralized coordination and information sharing mechanism for the relocated humanitarian community in Amman. 

Graphic - Organizational chart
Figure C-7: Organizational chart 


In accordance with Security Council Resolution 1546, the mandate of UNAMI is as follows: 

… in implementing, as circumstances permit, their mandate to assist the Iraqi people and government, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), as requested by the Government of Iraq, shall: 

  • Play a leading role to: 
  • Assist in the convening, during the month of July 2004, of a national conference to select a Consultative Council 
  • Advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, on the process for holding elections 
  • Promote national dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people of Iraq 
  • Advise the Government of Iraq in the development of effective civil and social services 
  • Contribute to the coordination and delivery of reconstruction, development, and humanitarian assistance 
  • Promote the protection of human rights, national reconciliation, and judicial and legal reform in order to strengthen the rule of law in Iraq 
  • Advise and assist the Government of Iraq on initial planning for the eventual conduct of a comprehensive census. 

UN Country Team 

The UN Country Team, a family of UN organizations involved in Iraq, consists of 16 UN agencies and programs, coordinated by UNAMI. 

UN agencies, funds, programs, and offices: 

  • Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
  • Food and Agriculture Organization 
  • International Labor Organization 
  • Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
  • United Nations Development Program 
  • United Nations Environment Program 
  • United Nations Education, Science, and Cultural Organization 
  • United Nations Population Fund 
  • United Nations Center for Human Settlements 
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
  • United Nations Children’s Fund 
  • United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
  • United Nations Fund for Advancement of Women 
  • United Nations Office for Project Services 
  • World Food Program 
  • World Health Organization 

Affiliated bodies: 

  • International Organization on Migration 
  • World Bank 

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 

UNSCR 1483 (22 May 2003): Lifts nonmilitary sanctions. It also recognizes Britain and the United States as occupying powers (‘The Authority’) and calls on them to attempt to improve security and stability and provide opportunities for Iraqis to determine their political future. It creates the position of ‘UN Special Representative to Iraq’ to coordinate UN activity, and requires the establishment of the Development Fund for Iraq. 

UNSCR 1500 (14 Aug 2003): Welcomes the creation of a governing council and establishes a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, as proposed by the Secretary General in a report on July 17. (Extended by UNSCR 1557, 12 Aug 2004; 1619, 11 Aug 2005; 1700, 10 Aug 2006). 

UNSCR 1511 (16 Oct 2003): This resolution mandates the UN to ‘strengthen its vital role in Iraq’ and ‘underscores . . . the temporary nature of the Coalition Provisional Authority.’ Supporting moves towards self-government under its auspices, it invites the Governing Council to draw up, by 15 December, a timetable for drafting a constitution and holding elections, and requests the CPA to report to the Security Council on progress towards the transfer of power. A multinational security force is authorized. States are urged to contribute financially by providing required resources and by transferring assets of the former regime to the Development Fund for Iraq. It also requests the Secretary General to report on UN operations in Iraq; requests the US to report, at least every 6 months, on military matters; decides that the Security Council should review the mission of the UN force within a year; and states that its mandate will expire once power has been transferred to an Iraqi government. 

UNSCR Resolution 1546 (08 June 2004): Endorses the formation of the interim government, welcomes the end of the occupation, and anticipates the prospect of elections in January 2005. It also reaffirms the authorization for the multinational force under unified command established under resolution 1511 (2003) and decides that the multinational force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the multinational force. 

UNSCR 1637 (08 Nov 2005): Extends the mandate of the multinational force in Iraq until December 2006, though it includes the proviso that the Iraqi government should review this mandate no later than the 15th of June 2006. It also extends current arrangements for the depositing into the Development Fund for Iraq of proceeds from export sales of petroleum, petroleum products, and natural gas until December 2006, also to be reviewed by the Iraq government no later than the 15th of June 2006. 

UNSCR Resolution 1723 (28 Nov 2006): Extends the mandate of the international force in Iraq until the end of 2007, using language essentially identical to that of the previous year’s resolution 1637.

Annex C, Appendix 4 

NATO’s Assistance to Iraq 

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does not have a direct role in the international stabilization force that has been in Iraq since May 2003, the alliance is helping Iraq provide for its own security by training Iraqi military personnel, supporting the development of the country’s security institutions, and coordinating the delivery of equipment. All NATO member countries are contributing to the training effort either in or outside Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. 

Aim of the Operation 

NATO is involved in training, equipping, and technical assistance—not combat. The aim is to help Iraq build the capability of its government to address the security needs of the Iraqi people. 

Policy Evolution 

At their summit meeting in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO heads of state and government agreed to assist Iraq with training its security forces. A training implementation mission was established on 30 July. 

In a letter sent to the NATO Secretary General on 22 June 2004, the interim Iraqi prime minister Ayad Allawi requested NATO support to his government through training and other forms of technical assistance. Alliance presidents and prime ministers responded positively, offering NATO’s assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces. They also encouraged member countries to contribute to the training of the Iraqi armed forces. 

The North Atlantic Council, NATO’s senior decision-making body, was tasked to develop, on an urgent basis, the modalities to implement this decision with the Iraqi interim government. 

The Training Implementation Mission 

These modalities were agreed on 30 July and established a NATO Training Implementation Mission in Iraq. Its goal was to identify the best methods for conducting training both inside and outside the country. In addition, the mission immediately began training selected Iraqi headquarters personnel in Iraq. The first elements of the mission deployed on 7 August. 

Expanding NATO’s assistance 

On 22 September 2004, based on the mission’s recommendations, the North Atlantic Council agreed to expand NATO’s assistance, including establishing a NATO-supported Iraqi training, education, and doctrine center in Iraq. In November 2004, NATO’s military authorities prepared a detailed concept of operations for the expanded assistance, including the rules of engagement for force protection. On 9 December 2004, NATO foreign ministers authorized the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to start the next stage of the mission. 

The activation order for this next stage was given by SACEUR on 16 December 2004, paving the way for an expansion of the mission to up to 300 personnel deployed in Iraq, including trainers and support staff and a significant increase in the existing training and mentoring given to mid- and senior-level personnel from the Iraqi Security Forces. It also changed the mission’s name from NATO Training Implementation Mission to NATO Training Mission-Iraq. By the time of the NATO summit meeting in February 2005, the new mission was fully staffed and funded. 

Who is in charge? 

The NATO mission is distinct, under the political control of NATO’s North Atlantic Council. It is coordinated with the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). 

The commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq is also the commander of the NATO effort . On NATO issues he reports up the NATO chain of command to NATO’s SACEUR and, ultimately, the North Atlantic Council. 

MNF-I provides a secure environment for the protection of NATO forces in Iraq.  The NATO chain of command has responsibility for close area force protection for all NATO personnel deployed to Iraq or the region. 

The National Defense University, set up by NATO, comes under the authority of the Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command, which establishes the framework of training matters for all Iraqi military schools.

Annex C, Appendix 5 

Engagement With the Media 

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) have an important role to play in ensuring that progress is being made and that the benefits are communicated to local communities, to the Iraqi people as a whole, and to international audiences. Having an Iraqi face associated with success is key to building the legitimacy of local governance, which greatly assists in building and maintaining public understanding, acceptance, and support for the work of the U.S., international community, nongovernmental organizations, the government of Iraq, and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)—both in Iraq and more widely. Without this support, both in Iraq and among the international public, PRTs cannot achieve operational success. The media is the key conduit to both these audiences. 

To help convince people that PRTs and the coalition are making a real difference, it is essential that PRTs are able to identify examples of success; develop these into useable media products; and exploit the information through local, regional, and international media outlets, as well as through face-to-face contacts with key local leaders and influencers. This procedure requires close coordination with key delivery partners and developing excellent relationships with the media, through regular, personal contact at a senior level, which also help associate PRTs with positive outcomes. 

While a proactive approach to media relations is important, so is the ability to counter negative coverage of U.S. military activities. PRTs should monitor media outlets to maintain effective situational awareness of media reporting trends and be prepared to rebut inaccurate reporting promptly when necessary. Interpreters and locally employed civilians can be used to assist in this regard. 

Embassy PRT Media Relations Guidance 

It is important that PRTs in Iraq communicate about their activities and achievements through the media. The U.S. embassy has considerable expertise in a wide range of areas, and PRTs can use this expertise to ensure accurate reporting on issues and events of importance to the U.S. Government. 

While encouraging dialogue with the media by mission staff, the ambassador has directed that all mission personnel coordinate their interactions with the press through the embassy spokesman’s office. PRTs should follow the guidelines below in matters involving the media: 

  • If you are contacted by a journalist for an interview or comment on an issue in your area of expertise, please refer them to the embassy spokesman’s office. A press officer, working with the embassy spokesman, will follow up with the journalist and then get back to you. 
  • If a journalist contacts you concerning an issue outside your area of expertise, likewise have them call the embassy spokesman’s office, which will evaluate the request and send it to the appropriate embassy officer for a response. 
  • If you are contacted by a journalist and asked for an impromptu comment or interview on any subject, politely decline and refer the person to the embassy spokesman’s office. 

Once the embassy spokesman’s office gives you permission to speak with the media, your discussion with the journalist should, as a general rule, be “on background” with agreed attribution (e.g. “Western official,” “Western diplomat,” etc.)—the journalist can then quote you, using the agreed-upon attribution. 

When speaking about a particularly sensitive issue, your comments should be “off-the-record,” meaning that the journalist cannot attribute the information to anyone or any source. With few exceptions and unless explicitly approved, you should not speak “on-the-record” because that means you will be quoted and your name will be used. Only the ambassador, deputy chief of mission, directors of the Iraq Transition Assistance Office and U.S. Agency for International Development, and embassy press officers should speak on-the-record. 

If requested, the embassy spokesman’s office will provide a press officer to sit in on media interviews and also will provide a tape recorder for taping interviews. 

Be circumspect—be aware that any exchange with a journalist, even in an informal setting, can be used by that journalist in their reporting. 

Questions about matters related to MNF-I will be handled by the MNF-I public affairs office. 

Regional Embassy Offices (REOs) 

The mission’s REOs should refer media requests to the foreign service officer responsible for the REO’s public affairs portfolio. If the request is from local media and concerns local or regional issues, that officer will coordinate with the journalist as described above; there need be no embassy involvement. Media requests to REOs involving national or international media or highly-sensitive/controversial issues, should be referred to the embassy spokesman’s office.

Annex C, Appendix 6 

Local Governance Program 

The Local Governance Program (LGP) supports Iraq’s efforts to establish local government that is transparent, accountable, and responsive to its constituents.  LGP, which began in April 2003, operates under a contract from the U.S. Agency for International Development. LGP was expanded in 2005 to include a new phase of support for local governance programs in Iraq. 

Under terms of its contract, LGP: 

  • Supports Iraq’s efforts to improve the management and administration of local, municipal, and provincial governments. 
  • Provides technical assistance and training to local elected officials concerning the roles and functions of local government officials and agencies. 
  • Assists in establishing a legal framework for a democratic, representative, and participatory form of decentralized government in Iraq. 

Since May 2005, LGP has been training and mentoring provincial councils elected in January of that year in the roles, responsibilities, and authority of the provincial councils and also providing similar training to Iraq’s network of local councils. 

LGP’s earlier work in Iraq (June 2003–April 2004) included supporting the establishment of more than 700 local government councils. During that time, an in-country team of nearly 3,000 Iraqis and more than 220 international development specialists worked throughout Iraq’s 18 provinces on a wide range of locally selected priorities. These included such varied topics as increasing access to basic utilities and health care and establishing and training local governing councils. The work with Iraqi civil society focused on empowering women, youth, businesses, farmers, and others to organize, advocate, and work for a democratic and tolerant Iraq. 

LGP supports the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) effort in nine provinces across the country by providing technical advisors in areas related to governance, policy reform, and economic development. From its headquarters in Baghdad, LGP oversees operations of its regional hub offices in Irbil, Hillah, Basra, and Baghdad, serving all 18 Iraqi provinces. 

LGP is implemented by RTI International and its technical partners include Bearing Point, Inc., Creative Associates International, the International City/County Management Association, and VNG International.


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