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
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
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About our Cover Design: The IO Sphere cover is symbolic of the importance of Information Operations in the global projection of national power. The base layer is a map of the world. The cover colors are a rotation of the US military service colors and the color purple to symbolize the joint nature of Information Operations. Scarlet red represents the US Marine Corps.



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Information Operations in Afghanistan

Afghan National Army (ANA) regional commander talks about ANA values poster with a US Army Task Force IO Officer. The meeting was a discussion of how the Task Force IO office can help the ANA in their values program.

GENERAL SUBMISSION DEADLINES:

IO Sphere welcomes submissions of articles regarding full-spectrum IO, including its core, supporting and related capabilities. *IO Sphere* also welcomes book reviews and editorial commentary on IO and defense-related topics. Submission deadlines are flexible and it is best to send a submission when it is ready and the IO Sphere staff will work to get it included in a future issue.

TEXT - Microsoft Word.

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PHOTOGRAPHS - TIFF, GIF or JPG in 200 dpi resolution or higher. Please place graphs/photographs/charts on separate pages or as file attachments.

FORMAT/LENGTH - 500 words or more double spaced.

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Views from the Top - Comments From the JIOWC Director

Welcome to the June 2011 issue of IO Sphere Journal. I trust that all the IO professionals around the world are achieving success in our chosen and critical profession. In the last issue of IO Sphere, I mentioned that 2011 was going to be an eventful year for Information Operations. At the national and military level, NATO is conducting operations in Libya in support of a UN resolution, and US Special Operations Forces with tremendous support, by precise and actionable intelligence, were able to bring justice to Usama Bin Laden. This accomplishment took the past 10 years and included coordination between multiple agencies that included efforts of Information Operations. There is no doubt that 2011 is shaping up to be a very eventful year.

This issue of IO Sphere is titled "The Future of IO." The IO community is undergoing an evolutionary transformation. In the past year, Psychological Operations have become Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and proponenty and advocacy for Joint Information Operations is transferring from US Strategic Command to the Joint Staff. US Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, issued a memorandum directing fundamental organizational changes, and provided a new definition of Information Operations. The memorandum directed the creation of a new definition for Strategic Communication (SC) and the issuance of operational instructions for the execution of SC in the Department of Defense. Indeed, change is in the air; "The Future of IO" and this issue of IO Sphere is dedicated to advancing and discussing those changes and critical topics.

This edition's keystone article addresses the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center's (JIOWC) transformation. As background, the article covers the history of IO in the context of other operations and conflicts, as well as the JIOWC as part of that history. To be sure, there may be changes in the future that modify our current direction and plan. However, we are now at a critical point to move forward with a plan



of execution to meet the intent and direction provided by the Secretary of Defense.

Other important contributions to this issue are Lieutenant Commander Daniel Fucito's article on Strategic Communication during operations in the Horn of Africa; Captain Royya Sharifsoltani and Mr. Britt Damon's essay on the human terrain analysis and IO from the Afghan perspective; and Captain Mark Springer's contribution on the history and mission of the Joint Operations Security Element. These articles, as well as the other contributions to this issue are key and relevant to the discussion of "The Future of IO."

These coming months and next couple of years will prove challenging for the IO community as we navigate doctrinal and organizational changes and challenges. Change always brings anxiety in any organization or community. However, in the profession of Information Operations, change is constant as we evolve as a major line of operation in warfighting and continue to be a traditional military activity across the spectrum of conflict. The IO community will navigate this new direction with professionalism and expertise; of that, I am completely certain.

Welcome to "The Future of IO." Let us collectively move forward and make it better. ●

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mark H. Johnson". The signature is fluid and cursive.

**Mark H. Johnson, SES
Director, JIOWC
Department of Defense**



Mr. Mark H. Johnson, a member of the Senior Executive Service, is the Director of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. Subordinate to the US Strategic Command, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center is the lead component for Information Operations and Strategic Communication in support of US national security objectives. The Center supports the development of global effects and provides IO planning in support of USSTRATCOM mission areas of strategic deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations. Mr. Johnson served in the US Army from May 1979 to June 2008, achieving the rank of Colonel. Prior to his active duty retirement, Mr. Johnson was the Deputy Commander, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center. He is a master parachutist.

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Religion: The Missing Facet of Intelligence Analysis

By

Dr. Gary W. Buffington

Editor's Note: Dr. Gary Buffington's views on religion and understanding it in the context of intelligence support to Information Operations is a critical missing link in analysis. IO Sphere is very pleased to provide the platform for the sharing of this article. Dr. Buffington's views in this article are his own.

Introduction

In the midst of an admittedly dry academic dissertation on September 12, 2006, to the assembled scholars at the University of Regensburg, Pope Benedict XVI uttered the now famous (or some would say infamous) reference to an otherwise obscure and somewhat historically inconsequential Byzantine Emperor, Manuel II Paleologus. In his talk on "Faith, Reason and the University" and in front of many of the faculty with whom he had served as professor of theology from 1969 to 1977, he repeated by way of illustration these words by the long dead Byzantine: "Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached."

While Pope Benedict XVI was attempting to use this quote to frame the debate on the relationship between religion and violence—namely that spreading any religious faith through violence is unreasonable and anything unreasonable is contrary to the nature of God—this finely tuned scholarly nuance was lost in the worldwide avalanche of criticism from the Muslim world. Sadly, the resultant violence directed at Catholic churches and clergy by rioting Muslims served only to cement false stereotypes in the public mind: Pope Benedict XVI's press-engendered caricature as "Der Panzer Papst" was reinforced along with Muslims being portrayed as adherents to "the religion of the perpetually enraged." Lost in the maelstrom of criticism generated by attention-deficit reportage was Pope Benedict XVI's equally scathing rebuke of Western Culture's relegating religious faith to life's outer fringes. By so marginalizing faith, he said, Europe and America have shown themselves incapable of even understanding religious peoples, let alone conversing with them.

By contrast, the reverse of this same coin has repeatedly been placed on public, if decidedly awkward, display by the seeming inability of government officials to freely discuss what to so many citizens is a painfully obvious, albeit the politically inconvenient, truth; namely, that central to the on-going war on terrorism is the ideological core of radical and violent Islamist teachings.

Adding to the bureaucratic obfuscation are attempts to redirect the national discourse from "Global War on Terror" to "Overseas Contingency Operations" and using the phrase "man-caused disasters" as the euphemism for terrorism.

Both examples, the violent reaction to Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg speech and the increasingly maladroit choice of government terminologies, reflect the seemingly perplexing role of religion in the public square, both in terms of the place



Pope Benedict XVI and Former President George W. Bush

Source: silive.com

***"Pity the nation that is full of beliefs
and empty of religion."***

Khalil Gibran¹

and influence of religion in public discourse as well as how the whole subject of religion is handled and addressed by private citizens, religious leaders and government officials. On all sides of this increasingly contentious debate, elements of blindness exist.

The ancient observation by early Christian Author Quintus Tertullian quoted that, "Two species of blindness easily combine: of those who see not what is; and of those who see what is not", continues to resonate in this on-going discussion of religion, its influence in the lives of people and its role in the unfolding events of this world. In the above examples, we have bureaucrats who apparently fail to see "what is" and a media-driven worldwide reaction that apparently saw what was not. What then is the role and influence of religion within

this controversial and highly contentious subject, and how does religion relate to the disciplines of intelligence analysis?

Religion Has Been Around Since the Beginning

Religion, as an element of culture and a theme of society, recurs throughout human history from the earliest recorded vestiges of civilization. From complex funerary rituals of ancient Egyptians to cultic statuary of ancient Mesopotamian peoples, from Babylon's epic myth of Gilgamesh to Zoroastrian fire temples, religion in its various forms has been a prevalent factor in human culture. Whether one wishes to discuss the one God of the Hebrews or the pantheon of gods heralded in ancient Greece or saluted by imperial Rome, the issue of religion is a prevailing factor across much of recorded human history. Even as contemporary an observer of the Classic World as Saul of Tarsus noted on his visit to Athens in AD 50 that the erudite Greeks had erected an altar "To The Unknown God" just in case they might have missed one in their census of the divine.

Modern day demographics reinforce the role and significance that religion holds in our contemporary 21st century world. Based on 2004 data, 2.11 billion people, or 33 percent of the world's population, adhere to Christianity in

one of its confessional forms. Similarly, 1.28 billion people, or 20 percent of global humanity, ascribe to Islam in one of its major expressions. An additional 2.07 billion people, or 31 percent of the global community, ascribe to some other religious faith or belief system. Taken in totality, 5.46 billion human beings, or 86 percent of the world's population, hold to a religion of one form or another.

"Religion" in this context is defined as "a personal or institutionalized set of attitudes, beliefs or practices relating to or manifesting faithful devotion to an acknowledged ultimate reality or deity." Projections to 2025 indicate percentages of adherents for Christianity, Islam, Other Religions and the Not Religious categories will remain constant with only, at most, a one to three percent shift either up or down among them. Given that the number of "Not Religious" people will shrink to just 12 percent of the whole by 2025, one could assess that the world, if anything, is becoming a more and not a less religious place to live.²

These population figures serve to underscore the hard fact that to ignore religion in one's research analysis will effectively eliminate 86 percent of the world's population from one's analytical calculus. Peter Berger, sociologist at Boston University, puts the matter in stark clarity by stating categorically "those who neglect religion in their analyses of contemporary affairs do so at great peril."³

Samuel Huntington wrote, "Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilization." In referencing Max Weber's earlier study showing that four of the five "world religions"—Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Confucianism—are associated with major civilizations, Huntington asserts "the central elements of any culture or civilization are language and religion."⁴

British historian Christopher Dawson wrote "a culture is the incarnation of religion." Because religion is such a great creative force in culture—"as we see in the case of the transformation of ancient civilizations by Christianity, or the transformation of the society of Pagan Arabia by Islam"—Dawson added, "Almost every historic culture has been inspired and informed by some great religion."⁵

"It is the religious impulse which supplies the cohesive force which unifies a society and a culture. The great civilizations of the world do not produce the great religions as a kind of cultural by-product; in a very real sense the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest. A society which has lost its religion becomes sooner or later a society that has lost its culture."⁶

Christopher Dawson, 1929



Residents of Helmand Province, Afghanistan, Traveling to the Voices of Religious Tolerance Conference

Source: defenseimagery.mil

Barry Rubin wrote, “religion should be seen as a central political pillar maintaining the power of any ruler—a major pole in determining the people’s loyalty—and as a key ingredient in determining a nation’s stability or instability.”⁷ John Milbank said that religion and theology entered early into Western culture’s developing constructs of national sovereignty and property rights. By gradually evolving a theological construct of a “covenantal bond” between God and man, late medieval and Reformation theologians created a model for human interrelationships as “contractual” ones. In so doing, theology gave birth to the new European “science” of politics.⁸

This witness by the academic world to religion’s pervasive influence in culture and politics gives rise to this fascinating conundrum: if “given so great a cloud of witnesses” testifying to religion’s role and importance, why then does religious analysis seem so peculiarly absent from America’s geo-political calculus?

Religion’s Absence from Traditional Secular Analytical Paradigms is the Problem

Symptomatic of this problem are the various acronyms—that peculiar alphabet soup of letters that shapes and informs bureaucratic jargon—that describe differing aspects of the US

government’s strategic analytic process. The classic paradigm has been DIME: Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic. These four elements have defined the “instruments of national power” and, as such, continue to form the foundation for US global analysis, whether diplomatic or military.

A recent extension of this analytic construct, and one that developed as part of America’s national strategy for combating terrorism, is DIMEFIL. This model adds elements of financial, intelligence and law enforcement to the analytic mix. In a peculiar twist of logic, this new construct was reborn in some governmental publications around 2006 as MIDLIFE. This led some to wonder if this was not a Freudian slip implying in the minds of some authors a growing sense of crisis with the government’s analytical paradigm.

Reflecting the growing complexities of the worldwide terrorist threat’s asymmetrical nature in the months and years since 9/11 has been the appearance of yet two more analytic acronyms. Acknowledging that the military phase of the war on terror has a civil affairs function, the US Army’s Field Manual 3-24 uses the term ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events) in an effort to assess the roles that manmade infrastructure and civilian institutions play in influencing the conduct of military operations within a specific area of operations.⁹



US Navy Service Members Hold Easter Services on Board the USS Cleveland

Source: defenseimagery.mil

Further focusing on counter-insurgency aspects of this conflict, the acronym PMESII has developed. This construct applies instruments of national power through facets of political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure fields and disciplines. As valuable as these various analytical paradigms have proven to be in providing US government leaders with necessary information needed to make informed decisions, they all have one glaring weakness: they fail to directly acknowledge religion's role and influence in a particular country or region. As such, these constructs reflect the underlying weakness within these analytical processes.

Root causes for this omission are legion and begin with the pervasive prejudice—itsself a legacy of the Enlightenment Era—resident among Washington policy makers who for decades held to the view that religion was irrational and therefore unworthy of attention. These attitudes are usually accompanied by an equally false assumption that religion is in decline and that its ability to influence affairs of state is on the wane. Reinforcing these prejudices is the US government's commitment to the rational actor model of decision-making, a construct that *ipso facto* excludes religion as an irrational factor.

Added to this must be a realization that most policy makers are reared in the

traditional 1648 Treaty of Westphalia nation-state model of international relations, ironically itself a direct product of various theological doctrines effervescing in Europe in the wake of the Protestant Reformation. As the US government's standard criterion for foreign policy since at least the 1940s, the nation-state model has placed a premium on its attendant emphasis of maximizing power through principles of Realpolitik and in the process making the all-but-total neglect of religion and its dynamics a virtual *fait accompli*.

Within the prevailing rational actor model of US foreign policy—the state is a monolithic unitary actor capable of making rational decisions—it has not helped the discussion of religious-based diplomatic initiatives that the prevalent definition of religious freedom, as a subset of human rights, has effectively placed religion outside the bounds of critical analysis. Nor are arguments for religion's efficacy as an instrument of peacemaking and reconciliation advanced in this context when, on occasion, religious institutions will themselves stray from their original charter and in so doing end up becoming part of the problem rather than a key to its solution. Douglas Johnston of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) has noted, “rather than alleviating human suffering, [religious institutions] end up exacerbating it.”¹⁰

Regrettably, these obvious outlier examples of dysfunctional religious organizations serve only to reinforce existing cultural prejudices of religion as a divisive element in society. Ironically, America's strong historical preference for the separation of church and state—reflecting the Founders' desires to avoid the establishment of a “State Church” and the concomitant sectarian strife that had so bloodied 16th and 17th Century Europe—has had the unintentional consequence of relegating religion to the realm of the personal and exiling it from the public square, further reinforcing false stereotypes of religion as a superstitious irrelevancy.

Tragically, this bias is more than just an intellectual prejudice; failure to understand religious dynamics at work in a given country or geographic region can have disastrous consequences for the US with its own bill of lading coming due marked payable in blood and treasure. Two examples will serve to prove the point: Iran, 1979, and Belgrade, 1999.

Iran, 1979

To admit that the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 caught Washington policy makers, and indeed the watching world, by surprise is an understatement of monumental proportions. To begin with, the revolution lacked many customary causes for such an event: Iran had



Easter Sunday Service in Afghanistan

Source: defenseimagery.mil

suffered no disastrous wartime defeat as had Czarist Russia in 1917; no overwhelming financial crisis gripped the nation as had threatened the Weimar Republic in 1921-23; peasants were not rioting in the countryside with torches and pitchforks in revolts reminiscent of medieval Europe's great uprisings of the 14th and 16th centuries; and Iran's military was content to stay in their barracks.


To the secular observer, events unfolding in Iran in the late 1970s presented a contest of wills that should have been a no-brainer: On the one hand was Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who had ruled since 1941, survived the Mossadeq crisis of 1953, possessed arguably the largest and best-equipped military in Central Asia if not the greater Middle East that US technology could provide, and directed a highly efficient internal security apparatus, SAVAK, trained by the CIA and the Mossad. Arrayed against the power and majesty of the Peacock Throne was one grumpy old man, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, living in

exile in the French village of Neauphle-le-Chateau who was armed with audio-cassette tapes. Yet within a matter of months a pro-Western, modernizing monarchy heavily protected by lavishly financed military and state security forces was swept away and replaced by a retrograde medieval theocracy advocating the obscurantist religious doctrine of *velayat-e faqih* ("Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists").

In the intervening decades since these tumultuous events, numerous theories and treatises have been written to explain this time period. This reflects the not too dissimilar discussions from the famous "Who Lost China" debates of the 1950s following the overthrow of the Nationalist Chinese Kuomintang government in 1949. What becomes painfully obvious in this dialogue is that US failures, while legion, can be traced back to a secularizing reductivism that refused to acknowledge that religion had any significant role at all to play in events as they were unfolding in Iran. Because US policymakers refused to acknowledge what was actually happening before their eyes—"those who see not what is"—their analytical conclusions were therefore skewed. Issues at play in Iran were alternatively described as economic, political, social or constitutional even as street protestors proclaimed theirs to be an Islamic revolutionary movement reacting to perceived Westernizing and modernizing trends by an authoritarian and highly secular regime.

In the midst of this fog of myopic evaluations, one known attempt was made by mid-level intelligence analysts to include the religious dimensions at play in Iran by staying knowledgeable of the attitudes and activities of the country's more prominent Shi'a clergy. Their initiative was dismissively rejected by the CIA as a mere study in "sociology," bureaucratic shorthand for anything considered to be a "time-wasting study of factors deemed politically irrelevant."¹¹ To officials in Washington, the pious Muslims in the streets, because they were religious, were obviously the party in decline whereas "modernizing and secularizing" Iranians were the wave of the future. Thus Washington fell into the trap of interpreting facts to fit a preexisting paradigm (religion is irrational and its influence is fading) rather than crafting new initiatives to meet the facts as they existed on the ground in Tehran.

This intractable clinging to a "preferred reality" led to a series of decisions, actions and blunders by Washington policy makers that eventually culminated in the Shah's abdication, summary executions of thousands of Iranian royalists, and the storming of the US embassy. What cannot be answered is whether or not a thoroughgoing US intelligence analysis of religious dynamics and undercurrents in the Iran of the 1970s would have changed the eventual outcome of events in Tehran. But what can be said is the refusal to even entertain an analysis of these religious dynamics guaranteed the failure of US policies in Iran, the fall of the Shah, and the rise of a theocratic regime that continues to bedevil Washington 31 years later.



Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran

Source: ibtimes.com

Yugoslavia in the 1990s

Neither the results of Tehran 1979 nor the passage of two decades served to improve either Washington or NATO decision makers' perception of religion's importance. The slow and agonizing dissolution of Yugoslavia that began after the death of Josip Broz Tito, arguably history's first and last true Yugoslav, brought to mind Bismarck's infamous observation, "If there is ever another war in Europe, it will come out of some damned silly thing in the Balkans." With Tito's death, Yugoslavia lost its organizing core and, in the words of William Butler Yeats, "Things fall apart, the center cannot hold."

As the 1980s progressed, growing regional, ethnic and religious tensions began tearing at the fragile fabric of what had once been the dream of a single homeland for all Europe's southern Slavs. Slovenia became the first to leave in 1991 although not without violence: an 11-day war with the Yugoslav People's Army (26 June 1991 – 6 July 1991) left 67 dead. Compared to what was to come, however, this was an incredibly small price to be paid in blood and misery.

Croatia was the next domino to fall, followed shortly by Macedonia. Whereas the Macedonians were allowed to leave the Yugoslav union without incident—most probably because there were few if any ethnic Serbs living in Macedonia—Croatia was not as fortunate. Ethnic Serbs inside Croatia's borders organized their own separatist Republic of Serbian Krajina. This action precipitated a five-year war for Croatian independence that left at least 20,000 dead and upwards of one-half million displaced persons (IDPs).

Increasing the ethnic violence was the phenomenon labeled by Huntington as "civilizational rallying": Catholic Europe (primarily southern Germany) supported a predominantly Catholic Croatia; Orthodox Russia came to the aid of Orthodox Serbia; and Bosnian Muslims received support from both Saudi Arabian Sunnis and Iranian Shi'as, perhaps one of the few historical examples where these two diametrically opposed expressions of Islam laid aside centuries of animosity in order to make common cause against the infidel.¹²

Adding to the religious overlay, Croatian Defense forces proclaimed

their war "a Christian crusade against both Serbian communism and Islamic fundamentalism." With no discernable efforts to stop this accelerating phenomenon, religion became the mobilizing vehicle for what were long simmering national and ethnic passions in Yugoslavia. What started as another "silly damned thing in the Balkans" quickly gained an international life of its own, and one can almost imagine the ghosts of 1914 beginning to take their seats at the council tables of European capitals. The November 1995 Dayton Accords finally restored peace to the Balkans.

Whatever euphoria may have been engendered in the western alliance by the signing of the Dayton Accords with its ephemeral promise of "peace in our time" was rudely shattered a few months later. Armed conflict began in April 1996 between Serbs and Kosovars—who are predominantly ethnic Albanians—in the previously autonomous region of Kosovo. This led to a series of escalating incidents of Kosovar attacks and Serbian reprisals culminating in the Račak Massacre of January 1999 when Serbian troops murdered 45 Albanians. This event proved the tipping point for NATO.



President Bill Clinton, Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović, Franjo Tuđman at the Dayton Peace Negotiations in November 1995

Source: britannica.com

The alliance drafted plans to introduce military peacekeeping forces in the region and, if necessary, to conduct an aerial bombardment campaign against selected Yugoslavian targets to compel Serbian compliance. Following failed negotiations conducted at Rambouillet, France, in February, 1999, and later in Paris to resolve this crisis, NATO initiated its air campaign, Operation Allied Force, on 23 March.

Despite numerous appeals from Orthodox Church officials, leaders of countries with majority Orthodox populations such as Greece and Romania, and even the Yugoslavian government requesting an Easter cease-fire, NATO warplanes continued to drop bombs on Belgrade on Orthodox Easter. In so doing, NATO joined Adolf Hitler's Luftwaffe—which conducted their air raids in 1941—and the US Army Air Corps' 15th Air Force which carpet bombed Belgrade on 16-17 April 1944 as the only other air forces to strike Belgrade on Easter. While it is neither the purpose of this paper to second-guess the target selection process nor to question the need to conduct such air operations, it must be noted, however, that the decision to bomb Belgrade on Orthodox Easter Sunday was both heinous and unnecessary. By failing to factor in the religious dynamics in their tactical decisions, NATO commanders gave Serbia a propaganda windfall of profound psychological and spiritual dimensions.

"By bombing the Serbs during Orthodox Easter—just as the Nazis did in 1941—[NATO] played into a view by some Serbs that NATO is a force of Western Christianity attempting to crush the Eastern Orthodox underdog," said Father Alex Kartoutos, an Orthodox priest in New York. Alexis II, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, said, "If they [NATO] carry on bombing over Orthodox Easter, what kind of Christians are they? They are not Christians, they are barbarians." Metropolitan Archbishop Pavlos of the Greek Orthodox Church wrote to President Bill Clinton, "I presume your advisors have decided to bring peace by bombing one of Europe's oldest Christian civilizations into oblivion. Throughout history, it is this very civilization that has always been the bulwark against those who came from the east to threaten Europe. ... Do we want to eliminate one more Orthodox Christian civilization before the end of our century?"

Yugoslavia's Deputy Prime Minister, Vuk Draskovic, condemned NATO's attack as "a crime against the Serbian nation. Downtown Belgrade is on fire on the biggest Christian day of Easter," he told the British satellite station Sky. "The last time Belgrade was on fire [over] Easter was in 1941 when Hitler bombed it." Russian State Duma Deputy Speaker Sergey Baburin said the latest NATO raid showed "a cannibal" had appeared in Europe.

While the degree of success that this bombing campaign may have achieved from a purely military perspective may be debated for years, what remains unchallenged is the clear and devastating impact this event had upon the Serbian people. For them, what had been an ethnic struggle between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo was transformed into a war between Western and Eastern Christianity. This further reinforced their sense of isolation from the rest of Europe. These Easter airstrikes on Belgrade convinced Serbs that the world was against them and that they must stick together for their own survival. It was just not mere happenstance that a song by the Belgrade rock band, Fish Stew, became

an instant hit for its chorus: "Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava" – "ONLY UNITY SAVES THE SERBS."

Religious Dimensions of Conflict Resolution as the Solution

A cursory overview of wars and conflicts occurring over the past half century reveals the majority can be categorized as either identity-based conflicts, ethnic disputes or tribal warfare. The common thread weaving through these conflagrations is a religious element. Contextually, religion can be the root cause of conflict such as reoccurs with dismal regularity in the Middle East. In this case two great religions are locked in a dispute over competing religious claims for the same piece of territory. Or religion can serve as a badge of identity and be co-opted by demagogues such as Slobodan Milošević to serve as the mobilizing vehicle for nationalist or ethnic passions as evidenced in Yugoslavia's breakup and the resultant Balkans bloodshed.

Whether one describes conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Indonesia, Chechnya, or Kosovo, to name just a few, religious dynamics are at play in each of these battlegrounds to a greater or lesser extent. In what may be American—and by extension European—diplomacy's worst nightmare is that these "irrational actors"—ethnicities, tribes, cultures and religions—are running amok in their well-ordered world of Realpolitik and they have no intellectual framework with which to deal with them.

However, before one relegates religion to a "backbencher" role at best in this debate or dismisses it outright as the source of all that is evil in this world, one must realize that religion can also be the central actor with important roles in international peacemaking and restorative reconciliation. Given that most of the world's flashpoints appear to have a Muslim interface—driven in large part by the collision between westernizing globalization and traditional values deeply imbedded in Islamic beliefs—if religion is to play a positive and efficacious role in reducing these diplomatic fault lines it needs to be given a fair and impartial hearing. Two examples among many will serve to indicate that religion can be the key element in resolving seemingly intractable disputes.



US Army Documentation Team at Wreckage of Yugoslav Fighter During Allied Force

Source: defense.gov

Beagle Islands in 1978

The first example is the Beagle Islands Crisis of 1978 between Chile and Argentina. This long-standing dispute involved three barren and decidedly inhospitable chunks of rock—Picton, Lennox and Neuva—located to the south of Tierra del Fuego near the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn. The area was a point of controversy between these two countries since at least 1881. At issue were conflicting claims of fishing rights, navigation routes, and possible oil exploration zones. Even their respective slices of Antarctica were wrapped up in this dispute. By 1978, the state of affairs had deteriorated to the point that by December 1978 war between Chile and Argentina seemed highly likely if not imminent. The Argentine junta had set 22 December as the date for an invasion but held off for 24-hours due to unfavorable weather conditions.

On the morning of 23 December, Pope John Paul II spoke directly with the heads of each country's government and indicated that he was sending a

papal envoy, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, to mediate the dispute. Referred to in the press as “the Vatican’s Kissinger,” Cardinal Samoré’s immediate achievement was gaining agreement by both governments to a peaceful resolution of the immediate crisis. In what came to be known as the Act of Montevideo, both sides agreed 9 January 1979 to abide by papal mediation. Although the process proved long, frustrating, convoluted and not without its share of cumbersome setbacks, by November 1984 both sides had agreed to and signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship resolving this dispute. While he did not live to see the signing of this treaty in Rome, Cardinal Samoré’s influence as a moral authority and his ability to serve as an honest broker were key factors in achieving a peaceful resolution to this potentially deadly crisis.

Mozambique Civil War

The Mozambique Civil War (1975-1992) forms the second example. Erupting barely two years after their war for independence from Portugal,

this internecine and mutually destructive conflict pitted Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) against the forces of Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO). The almost 17-year conflict had devastating results for the East African country: estimates ranged upwards to one million dead with 4.5 million IDPs and more than \$15 billion in destroyed infrastructure. In the midst of the ongoing carnage, members of the Community of St. Igidio, a Roman Catholic lay organization, came to realize that they had developed trusted relationships with members of both RENAMO and FRELIMO. This came about mainly because the Community had not taken sides in the conflict and had treated members of both groups fairly and equitably.

This realization led Community members, together with Archbishop Jaime Goncalves, to begin exploratory discussions in July 1990 with both groups seeking a peaceful resolution to this conflict. In the course of these talks Community members discovered



British Imam at the Religious Tolerance Conference in Afghanistan

Source: defenseimagery.mil

that both RENAMO and FRELIMO had come to accept war and violence as their only option. It was in the context of the religious dialogue guided by Archbishop Goncalves and the Community that they were able to offer an alternative solution other than war. After eight rounds of talks, diplomats from the US, Portugal, France and the UN were brought in to work out final details but the groundwork had already been finished. By October 1992, all sides signed the Rome General Peace Accords ending Mozambique's civil war.

Conclusion


At their core, religions subscribe to laudable principles of caring for the stranger, the widow and the orphan, seeking the betterment of humanity and in so doing forging "the bond between man and God, between human society and the spiritual world."¹³ In many ways, religion stands at the intersection of language and culture. It forms an individual's organizing center and informs a person's worldview. How he or she relates both to the Creation and to the Creator is founded in a religious belief system.

Given, therefore, the role both for great good or, when distorted or hijacked, the great evil that religion can accomplish, it becomes incumbent upon the analyst to treat this subject with all the seriousness that it deserves. Religion is a prime variable in the actions and conduct of individuals, groups or even nations. One must understand that religion is not something that an individual "does" for one hour on a given day of worship but that it permeates all aspects of a person's life, actions, decisions and relationships.

In the course of doing analytical research, analysts must also learn the language of religion; otherwise one risks an inherent failure in communication and discernment. As an example consider that Muslims and Christians, whose religions share much that is in common, tend to talk past each other. Muslims speak the language of integration: religion and politics are one. Christians in the West, particularly Americans, speak a language of separation: church and state are divided. Thus when the West speaks of "secular democracy"—considered a noble and laudable achievement and the guarantor of human rights and civil law—and gives voice to the desire to establish the blessings of this form of government in Iraq, the Islamic world only hears "godless government." No self-respecting Muslim will have anything to do with any godless institution.

Finally, analysts must not be hobbled by the rigorous American cultural construct of "separation of church and state." To do so self-limits one's research and analysis. It is not without a certain bit of irony that Americans, considered amongst the world's most religious peoples, find the research and analysis of religion to be such an awkward topic. By contrast, the French, considered paragons of secularism and staunch defenders of *laïcité*, when mired in the morass of Algeria's war for independence would often send their military chaplains to negotiate with Muslim insurgents. Despite their dominant secularism, the French understood the need to deal with the religious imperative confronting them in North Africa. Similarly, the analyst must understand how religious factors shape and inform the perceptions and political aspirations of others. This will require a rigorous evaluation of facts and evidence with an open mind free from the biases of a purely secular mindset. Failure to do so will leave the analyst, to

paraphrase Pope Benedict XVI, incapable of understanding religious peoples let alone analyzing them. ●



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The Human Terrain of Information Operations from the Afghan Perspective

by

Captain Roya Sharifsoltani and Mr. Britt Damon

Editor's Note and Abstract: The authors of this paper have worked together conducting missions and research in Afghanistan over the past several years. By sharing knowledge gained through interviews and practical ground experience, they provide a glimpse of Coalition Information Operations from the eyes of the Afghan military, police and greater population. *IO Sphere* is delighted to be the forum to publish this article.

Local Afghans are often the intended audience for Information Operations (IO). To best reach them, Coalition Forces (CF) IO personnel must gather appropriate information for IO themes, determine which IO themes are most useful and decide on distribution mechanisms. While there is an overwhelming amount of literature that discusses American methods and perspectives, less attention has been given to the collection, development, and dissemination of themes that Afghans find appropriate. The information presented here is based on a limited number of ethnographic interviews. What this paper provides, is an avenue through which the Afghans can voice their perspective on CF IO and interrelated issues.

Local Opinions

When attempting to reach an audience, IO personnel must understand local perspectives in order to make their information truly relevant. The lack of emphasis on local perspectives was an early U.S. IO weakness, and Afghans recognized this. They listened to radio broadcasts, watched TV ads, and read literature from the CF and often asked, "Who wrote this?" They immediately identified the information as being culturally inappropriate, written by foreigners and out of touch with their

lives. In order to reach the local populace, IO messages should be created and delivered by Afghans.

By interviewing Afghans, CF create a better information pool from which IO personnel can study and develop proper IO themes. For example, during interviews, Afghans often expressed concern about social issues. Without security, employment, healthcare, or education (which Afghans have identified as areas of need that impede their trust in the local government), official messages may be totally ignored. IO themes unrelated to the daily lives of the target audience will certainly fail.

Anti-Afghan National Government Atrocities

Documenting and providing information on Anti-Afghan Force (AAF) (e.g. Taliban, HIG) murders and atrocities on non-combatants is very important, especially the indiscriminate killing of women and children. The targeted research of local stories about Taliban or Al Qaeda violence toward the Afghan community is the method for obtaining these accounts. The stories resonate and appeal to people from the village or local area where it happened. Interviews with Afghans indicate that reminding people of Taliban crimes is effective. While many are afraid of the Taliban, their desire to tell these stories openly took precedence during interviews, and many recommended highlighting these atrocities.

Religion and the Importance of the Mullah

While *mullahah* (plural form of *mullah*) are still significant, interviews with villagers indicate that they have less influence among younger generations. The older generations tend to follow the *mullah's* advice, while the younger generations are



British General Officer Meets with Afghan Provincial Governor

Source: defenseimagery.mil

more selective when listening to the mullah. Still, Afghans described how they often defer to the mullah for guidance, thereby relying on his interpretation of the Quran. The following story exemplifies this.

The traditional Muslim greeting is “*A-salaam a-laykum*” (peace be upon you), to which the reply is “*w-laykum o a-salaam*” (and upon you be peace). However, this wasn’t being used between Afghans and Americans in some cases. We asked several Afghans, “When an American Soldier tells you *asalaam-a-laykum*, do you respond with *w-laykum o a-salam*?”

Their answers varied. First, we questioned a group of workers on the Forward Operating Base (FOB). Their ages ranged from 20 to 60, and almost all were Pashtun. Younger men confirmed they do respond with *w-laykum o a-salam*, but a few between the ages of 35 to 45 years old said they do not. When asked why, one man said because soldiers are “non believers” therefore they should not say, “upon you be peace,” as this is only for Muslims.

Almost all agreed they should ask the mullah, because he knows the answer and can advise them. A younger Afghan quietly said, “The mullah does not know anything; he does not matter.” The mullah reportedly said that the response to a non-Muslim should be different from a Muslim; however, some disregarded this guidance.

This account contrasted the response from another different group of Afghans that worked at the FOB. This group held higher paying jobs and were high school or college educated, able to speak English and about 22- 35 years old. When asked the same question, one of them said, “we do not distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim, we answer all with the same

response.” Meanwhile, another man speaking in Pashto said, “yes, we distinguish and we should not answer the same way as we do to Muslims.” Even among a much more homogenous group, there was a clear difference of opinion: some would rather gloss over the issue of responding to Muslim versus non-Muslim, while others were more upfront about their opinion.

The key takeaways from these two stories are:

- The mullah has an important role to play in Afghan society. Most Afghans can’t read and have not read the Quran; instead, they rely on mullahah to tell them what it says.
- Most Afghans accept what mullahah and religious leaders say as the final answer on that particular matter.
- The mullah has less effect on younger people than he does on the elderly, but the youth seem to keep the appearance of accepting a mullah’s decision, even if they do not agree with it.
- Often peer pressure will lead an Afghan to follow advice from a mullah even if they do not agree. In most cases, when someone asks the mullah for advice, their family and friends expect they will abide by the answer.

Mullahah are important in all areas of Afghan society. In Pakistan, for instance, the mullahah are not speaking out regarding suicide bombers. A prevailing attitude amongst Afghans is that most suicide bombers come from Waziristan. It is important to note that mullahah in the Waziristan/RC-East border area reportedly travel to Islamabad for religious and political directives from their religious leaders. Thus, IO

ONE STOP COLLABORATION



**A JOINT AND INTER-AGENCY INFORMATION OPERATIONS
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planning must treat religious and political matters as inextricable concepts. It is also vital that anti-violence messages come from local religious leaders and not Americans.

Interviewees suggested that in order to relate to an Afghan audience, religion and faith can be familiar and important themes. They interpreted some verses in the Quran as discrediting aggression towards non-Muslims and even suggested tolerance to the point of developing friendships with Christians. Below are some examples voiced by Afghans of how the Muslim faith can be a positive authority with the power to speak intimately to each person.

You cannot force anybody to convert to your religion. Do not force people to change to your religion. Al Baqarah 2:250

“That if any one slew a person unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land, it would be as if he slew the whole humanity, and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole humanity.” Al’ Ma idah, verse 32

“Never kill or destroy yourself.” Al Nisa, 4:29

Several Afghans highlighted the first example, indicating that some believe it is wrong to convert with coercion people from other faiths. It also suggests the virtue of being tolerant of people from other religions, especially *Ahl kitab* or “People of the Book.”

Afghan authors, writing in the *Pashto Journal*, recommended CF refer to the latter two *suwar* (chapters) and verses in reference to suicide bombers.¹ These passages clearly relate the Muslim perspective on killing and suicide bombing. While some mullahah may not teach this, allowing Afghans to present an accurate representation of Quranic texts will have a powerful impact on the faithful.

Rules of war in Islam

Through radical teaching in *masjed* (Dari term meaning mosque), some Islamic leaders are selling the idea of taking part in a holy war – an idea that is not faithful to the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad (PBuh). For instance, *Jihad* means “struggle” and *Jihad Filqital* means “armed conflict.” *Jihad Filqital* is being misrepresented as the former in many modern teachings. Neither of these gives license to kill indiscriminately. There are regulations for *Jihad Filqital*. Regarding armed conflict, the Prophet Mohammad (PBuh) forbade the killing

of children, women and the elderly, and the raising of one’s hands against people in churches. He also said not to cut down trees or burn them (which really means not to destroy others’ property) and not to destroy residential compounds. For example, when there was fighting in Jerusalem and Medina, after the Muslim victory, Muslims protected the churches and promised not to replace them with masjeds. Outsiders and non-Muslims cannot invoke these religious concepts. However, respected *mullahah* must recognize this message and incorporate it into messages in the local and wider communities of interest.

The rules of armed conflict are further illustrated in the story about an *Asahab* (holy companion of the Prophet Mohammad [PBuh]) named Abubakr Sadiqi. He sent his troops to Shum, in modern-day Syria, for Jihad, and he told the troops that there are 10 rules they must follow (Figure 1). None of these would appear to support what is being taught about the current *Jihad Filqital* in some *masjed*.

The Prophet Mohammad (PBuh) said in the *Hadith* that if anyone commits suicide, he would go to hell and burn forever. Below is a summary of a story given during an interview, regarding the above-cited **Pashto-Journal** article. Here, by illustrating that any means of



Afghan Children Give Thumbs up to Combat Photographer

Source: defenseimagery.mil



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committing suicide is not allowed, the Afghans interviewed further supported their anti-suicide-bomber message.

In the *Hadith*, the interviewees reported, during one of the Ghazvah (Islamic wars), there were two companions of the Prophet who were fighting bravely. Another companion said to the Prophet that “these two are brave men.” The Prophet then said that they were going to hell, which surprised the companion and he did not yet understand. It was not until later, during the two wars of Ohod and Badar, that the two companions were seriously injured and were in great pain. They stuck their swords in the ground, blade up, and committed suicide by falling on them. The companion saw this and finally understood the Prophet’s words. This narrative explains that no matter your rank or standing in Islam, if you commit suicide it is a sin and you will go to hell forever. There are no exceptions.²

Again, CF must reach out to the Afghan’s religious leadership to ensure that these and other lessons from their tradition are heard. There are rules of war presented in the *Hadith* which are generally known and accepted in Islamic tradition. Just as it is mentioned above, regarding *mullahah* and speaking out against violence, CF must also ensure that the Afghan voice is heard regarding these rules of war.

Inhibitors to the IO Message

When discussing information operations with the Afghans, many conversations involved inhibitors to our messages. More specifically, what is it that prevents us from communicating effectively with them, from their perspective?

Lack of Trusted Leadership:

In conversation about what problems face their country, Afghans will often refer to the lack of leadership in the Afghan government. According to locals, most of the officials in the districts are corrupt. Thus, in their eyes, when the Coalition supports local officials it is a statement of Coalition acceptance of this corruption. Moreover, the general population knows, or at least has an opinion on, who in the government is reputable. Some of the Afghans we interviewed advised us not to support those who are known to be corrupt. Instead, CF should support

leaders who are viewed as “less-corrupt,” thereby empowering those who are respected among local Afghans. These respected leaders should deliver IO messages. According to the locals interviewed, this will increase Coalition effectiveness in communicating to the general population.

Although interviewees advised that CF limit contact with less-than-reputable leaders in the Afghan government, they still would like to see more cooperation between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) and CF. They felt even stronger that the Afghan National Army (ANA) and CF should work together whenever possible. Such cooperation would invite people to join the Afghan government and help with reconstruction and rebuilding efforts. Afghans interviewed generally felt that if they participate and contribute to the process, they will be further compelled to safeguard those projects in which they have a stake. In addition to cooperation, known problems need to be addressed. Unaddressed problems within the Afghan police force cause a lack of respect and result in diminished trust of the organization. This was a significant theme during interviews with high-ranking personnel in the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA).

Since the establishment of the ANA in 2001, thanks to the training and mentoring of the U.S., the ANA is generally more respected among the Afghan population when compared to the ANP. The ethnic and regional diversity among the ranks of the ANA moves them toward impartiality and enables them to bring a national identity to the Afghan people. The ANP, however, have suffered from the late involvement of the U.S. in their training and mentoring. A lack of diversity and lack of trained leadership works against them. The fact is, most of the ANP are from the same area where they serve and in many cases they influence the legal procedures there, causing people to lose trust in them (Figure 2).

Transportation:

While discourtesy on the road may seem disconnected from IO messages, the Afghans see them as one and the same. A routine procedure, such as local traffic being blocked for an ANA or CF convoy, affects how they view those forces. This reduces the effectiveness of future communications. Specifically, villagers complained of those instances when, due to security issues, civilians could not pass a convoy, even if they were transporting the injured or sick to the hospital. This sends the message that their lives and well being are less important than those of the CF.

Reconstruction:

The manner in which reconstruction is conducted is very visible and often cited by Afghans as a problem. Some of their recommendations to combat this are:

1. Contact local *mullahah*, offering to fix their masjeds and help their communities. After offering assistance, make sure that money or goods go where they are intended; i.e., not in the *mullah*’s pocket.
2. Have a checks-and-balances system in place for contractors. If CF pays money to build a school or for school supplies, they should have a system to make sure that the money was utilized correctly.

1) Do not betray.	1) Do not be misled.
1) Do not kill children.	1) Do not kill women or old people.
1) Do not touch the dead body (you have to respect the dead body).	1) Do not cut down the palm trees.
1) Do not cut down the fruit trees.	1) Do not kill goats, sheep, and camels (because they are only slaughtered for eating purposes).
1) Do not say anything to those who are in the churches.	1) People will offer you different types of food; you can eat them after saying in the name of God.

Figure 1: Rules of Armed Conflict in Islam

3. Create an incentive program that rewards people who deliver IO messages and help CF (but again, this will only be effective if rewards go to those who are not corrupt).

4. Use local workers for projects whenever possible. The effect of employing an Afghan is that it helps to separate him from the Taliban.

5. Listen to the people's requests regarding the reopening of schools, hospitals, *masjeds*, roads, and bridges.

6. When CF builds a school, they should also build a *masjed* next to it; so if enemies burn down that school, their actions imply that they burned a *masjed* as well.

Security:

The lack of passable, adequately surfaced roads is reportedly a big problem for most civilians. It impairs security and reduces access to markets. To help alleviate this problem, interviewees suggested that responsibility for security should be given to the elder of a particular area. Furthermore, CF should use *shuras*—community gatherings—as a means of delegating authority for security.

Educated vs Non-Educated:

Interviewees believe that most Afghans have a low literacy competency. They recommend that messages should be in simple language and include pictures so everyone can understand them. Not being able to read or understand printed material is shameful so most Afghans will not admit their inability to do so. Knowing this, the CF must ensure that all printed material is comprehensible because the audience will not speak out directly on this issue.

Methods of Communication

When asked about how to best communicate with the Afghan populace, interviewees suggested that all means of communication should be employed. This includes television, radio, speaking engagements, schools, bazaars, music, poetry, and newspapers. They also insisted that distribution of the message must be an on-going effort.

Using radio and TV is very effective for sending messages to locals; however, the timing is very important. According to locals interviewed, the best time to deliver an IO message is during dinner,

Question	“What do you think about the ANA and ANP?”	“Did you ever ask your superiors why the ANP’s salary is less than ANA’s?”	What are the problems with the ANP?
Respondent	ANP	ANP	ANA
Themes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Some ANP officers report that their salary is \$80 per month. -According to them, the ANA get \$350 per month. -One officer said that they were promised \$350 per month and they received it for the first month. He then said that it changed to \$80 per month, “and that is not enough.” -Lack of equipment and training is another shortcoming for the ANP. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The answer was that Americans set the salary, and if they wanted to raise it, they would tell us and we would raise it. -Using an analogy, one respondent said, “our country is poor and if foreigners give to us we eat, if they don’t we die.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -ANA was established in 2001 with the help of U.S, but United States did not take over the operation of the ANP until recently. ANP does not have enough training. Lack of equipment is another shortcoming for the ANP. -Many of the ANP are corrupt. -The ANA has a better living and working condition. -Lack of good leadership for ANP. -Lack of funds and support. -ANP is part of the interior ministry and ANA is part of defense ministry. -ANA is more organized. There is a rivalry between the two. It is hard for ANP to ask for help from ANA, but for this operation they were forced to ask for equipment and training. The ANP also wants to minimize its casualties.

Figure 2: ANA and ANP Survey

between 6:00 and 8:30 p.m., and the messages should be broadcast on popular stations during popular programs. To make these two mediums more effective, Afghans recommended consulting locals and coming up with a short program (for radio or TV) that is dramatic and powerful, yet still delivers the message. By using locals, CF may ensure the information is given in context and uses relevant media and stories to reach their audience.

Of the several means recommended for getting a message across, the preeminent medium is through the *masjed*, especially during Friday prayer. Even a small village of less than 1,000 people will often have multiple *masjeds*. However, there is generally one main *masjed*, and this is where locals often distribute their information to the remainder of the village.

Schools are also highly recommended by Afghans as a medium for distributing public messages. Leaflets given to children and teenagers at school give the children a chance to read the leaflets first before bringing them home to their families. Afghan families usually have around 30 - 40 people in the

household, which means an individual leaflet could have an enormous impact. This untapped resource would allow CF to utilize a grassroots-style campaign to communicate to an entire household: male and female, young and old.

Universities are another good place to spread messages, even though it only affects a specific group of people: those who are in school, educated, and of a general demographic. It seems that most locals find schooling important, since they often refer to a lack of education in Afghanistan during conversation. As a remedy, interviewees suggested CF have guest lecturers sent to local colleges, which would allow greater interaction between the educated students who are the future of Afghanistan, and their American / Coalition counterparts.

When asked where locals get news and information, a very common answer is “the bazaar.” In many Middle Eastern countries, bazaars are the centers of gravity for financial and social activities.

When communicating with Afghans, CF must understand that, they are a very passionate people, in love with music and

poetry. Younger Afghans especially like to listen to music on the radio. During discussion, Afghans commonly quote poems or talk about poets from long ago. Almost all videos made by insurgents use background music while they do their training or killing. The music is meant to get the audience's attention and sympathy. This music even affects people who do not understand its lyrics. This presents an opportunity: use songs, poems, and verses from the Koran. One way is to use poems that have deep meaning to Afghans, such as those by Khyam, Rumi, or other poets from the past. Using historical facts, figures, and heroes from ancient and recent times is another. These stories evoke their personal and collective sense of honor (e.g., *Pashtunwali*).

One way to identify stories that may resonate among the locals is to research local incidents of Taliban or Al Qaeda violence towards the Afghan community. The story will probably have the same effect in surrounding communities, but the range of distribution needs to be identified through localized research. In one example from the area of Khost, the Taliban were about to execute some teenage boys accused of gambling. When the punishment was to be enacted, the mothers responded by placing a Koran over them. The mothers hoped that out of respect for the holy book, the Taliban would stop the killing. Despite the implications, the Taliban killed the teenagers by shooting through the Koran. This story stirs deep anger towards the Taliban among some Khost residents and may evoke a strong anti-Taliban emotive response when used in an IO message.

Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP): Interviewees confirmed that Humanitarian Assistance and MEDCAP missions are

valuable outreach venues and recommended CF utilize these opportunities more. When interviewing an Afghan IO official on this topic, several themes came up that should be considered in overall planning.

1. Humanitarian missions should be done in the areas that Taliban are active. "Novelty" items, which the interviewees defined as food or gifts, should be given during these missions.
2. Medical Aid items should be included in humanitarian aid. Female doctors should accompany these missions.
3. ANA should participate in humanitarian missions, in order to gain legitimacy among the local populace.
4. Assistance should go to religious schools as well, as it may decrease the Taliban influence and therefore separate Taliban from the populace.

Key Communicator:

Engaging key leaders and involving them in the decision-making process is important to effective communication. Messages should be written and delivered (with CF input in the background if needed) by local Afghans, religious leaders, respected community leaders, and tribal elders. Key leaders should be invited as true peers to the planning sessions and if there is a disagreement, an open and honest discussion should be conducted until an agreement is reached. This point is often difficult for American military officers because they feel they are engaging the Afghans when the Afghans say they are not. Often this is a matter of perspective. However, it may be that CF



CF Cultural Support Team of Women Speak with Afghan Women in a Women's *Shura* or Consultation

Source: defenseimagery.mil

are not engaging the proper people or that CF are not engaging in an effective manner.

Mullah vs Traditional Leadership:

In some areas there seems to be a declining importance of tribal structures. Tribal leadership is important, but they are losing some influence in the communities. In its stead is an increase in Islamization, as demonstrated by the rising importance of *mullahah* and other religious leaders.

Not only are the leaders changing, but also CF currently spends a great deal of time engaging military and government leadership who do not truly represent the population. Often, engaging the proper people can be determined by asking the leader or their subordinates and population in the area.

As has been noted, when conducting any engagement, it is necessary to consider whom CF are talking with and how to talk to them. When meeting with a government official in Afghanistan, it is common for the coalition element to go straight to business and leave shortly after the presentation of several slide shows. At this point, the Afghans are still waiting for the real conversation and meeting to happen. Until CF members and planners understand what an Afghan expects during a meeting, they cannot fully communicate in an appropriate fashion or succeed in distributing the message.

Conclusion

When the authors of this article first arrived in Afghanistan, they showed up eager to learn what was being accomplished by the Coalition and to learn more about the Afghan populace in general. After participating in planning sessions and being an integral part of the Fire Effects Coordination Cell at the Brigade, they were faced with requests to help with IO planning. This article has attempted to provide lessons learned from this IO planning experience. It is not intended to be a critique of current efforts. It is simply a peek into the perspective of the audience and key figures. Our experience led us to that audience who were the targets of the Information Operations.

Often, CF members unintentionally impede their ability to communicate. Hearing what Afghans are saying can have a profound influence on the effectiveness of their communication, the amount of unnecessary conflict that CF face, and the lives of those people with whom CF interact. If CF learn nothing else, they must remember this – communicate. More importantly, listen.

Footnotes:

1. *Pashto Journal* (printed in Pakistan), Chief Editor Noorul Basher Naveed, March 2007, Volume 15. Translated from Pashtu by local interpreters, Khost Afghanistan, July 2007.

2. Interviewee referring to the Hadith. *Sahih Muslim, Book 1, # 206.* http://www.iiu.edu.my/deed/Hadith/muslim/001_smt.html.



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A BRIEF HISTORY OF IO EVOLUTION IN STRUCTURE AND CAPABILITY

In 1980, the Joint Electronic Warfare Center (JEWEC) activated at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio Texas as a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Controlled Activity (CCA). Along with the traditional military capability of targeting and physical destruction of enemy command and control capability, electronic warfare (EW) was a prominent activity in the various Military Services. The US Air Force and Navy maintained the majority of the EW capability in terms of platforms designed to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum, and that dominance was critical to the Cold War defense strategy. The DoD needed a joint organization that could provide linkage between Service EW capabilities.

In 1994, the JEWEC was re-designated as the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center (JC2WC) and assigned to US Atlantic Command (USACOM). USACOM later became US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). The change of the JEWEC to the JC2WC was a result and reflection of the lessons from Desert Storm and the tremendous success against Iraqi command and control capability in a 40-day targeted air campaign on Iraqi forces and communications facilities. It was also the first time that information-related aspects of IO became integrated into the warfighting command's war plans in such a deliberate and prominent way. The emergence of computer network operations and how those operations were planned for, and integrated into joint planning and operations became part of the JC2WC portfolio as well.

IO gained wide acceptance in joint doctrine in the mid-1990s with the release of Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 titled "Information Operations." Correspondingly, the JC2WC was renamed the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) in 1999 and was assigned to US Space Command (USSPACECOM). The

assignment to USSPACECOM was a result of the mission changes at USJFCOM to focus on joint training and doctrine.

As a result of the attacks of September 11, 2001, USSPACECOM was renamed as US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) in 2002 and given a primary mission focus of homeland defense. The JIOC transitioned to become a component of US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) as a result of that change in mission. In 2005 the JIOC was reflagged as a command and became the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC). In 2009 the command designation was removed and the JIOWC became a "center" once again. USSTRATCOM has remained the higher headquarters for the JIOWC from 2002 to the present.

In October of 2011, the JIOWC will again become part of the DoD Joint Staff as a CCA. It truly has been a full-circle evolution through the years from a Chairman's activity in the beginning of the JEWEC, through three different combatant commands, and back to a CCA 31 years later. It is a remarkable legacy to the evolution and change of the JIOWC and of the traditional warfighting activity of IO. Through all the changes, the JIOWC remains an operationally focused organization that has strived to provide the best services possible to warfighters at all levels. It is a legacy to be proud of and a foundation for an even brighter future.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Looking at the future of IO, to include recent discussions that will shape its future is instructive. The changes all reflect demand signals that have existed since the inception of IO as a core competency of the DoD. Joint commanders intuitively understood the potential of the capability, but were frustrated in getting the feedback reflecting actual IO efficacy. This frustration resonated through the DoD. There was not, and still is not, a standardized certification process for a joint IO

HOW DID WE GET HERE

- **FY10 Congress requested more fidelity related the nature/effectiveness of IO activities**
- **SecDef ordered Front End Assessment**
- **Various studies/reports within DoD have addressed SC/IO issues; these include: SC CBA, JIOFOS, McCarthy Quick Look Assessment, PSYOP Policy & Program Review, IG and several recent congressional reports**
- **SecDef memo; codified SC/IO/PYSOP definitions, roles & responsibilities, management & oversight, resources/training & education**

Slide from Brigadier General Rowayne Schatz Jr. Town Hall Meeting with the JIOWC Staff in Feb 11

Source: Joint Staff J39

planner. Unlike other military disciplines, there is no specific Service specialty that seamlessly generates a joint IO planner capable of stepping into a joint IO staff position. The intelligence community did not, and still does not, have the relevant training nor the collection capability to easily support IO planning and execution. IO requirements do not easily dovetail with acquisition processes and when resources are allocated to IO programs or tasks, there is no standardized way to respond to resource managers on task efficacy. The first major effort to address these problems was the DoD "Information Operations Roadmap," published October 30, 2003.

The Roadmap provided DoD a plan to advance the goal of having IO as a core military competency. It outlined 57 recommendations, and assigned responsibility for them to various DoD component heads, all reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, the related and collateral joint responsibilities hindered enforcing implementation of the 2003 recommendations, and as a result, the Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)) closed them and identified current deficiencies in the IO career force.

The "USSTRATCOM Combatant Command IO Assessments," from January and March of 2008, identified shortfalls; recognized themes and trends; identified high-impact, cross-cutting solutions; and made specific recommendations for improvement. The overall conclusion of the assessments was that, despite previous efforts to address IO deficiencies, shortfalls remained. In 2008, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) for Joint and Coalition Warfighting Support, at the time responsible for IO, conducted a Defense Wide IO Program Review (DWIOPR). Thirty-four organizations actively engaged in planning and executing IO within DoD were solicited for input for the DWIOPR. The report concluded that resource accounting was one of the key shortfalls: "Long term IO investment strategy development, growth, and execution has stalled within the Department due to inadequate resource accounting processes."

The Quadrennial Defense Review, (QDR) conducted in 2009 contained a subgroup co-led by OUSD(I), and the Office for Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)), that studied issues related to IO. This working group produced an issue paper, (Package ID: 4591-01,

OUSD(I) "Redefinition and Organization Improvements to Information Operation-Information Operations Integration Organization") and concluded that the solution should include a new organization. The specifically defined organization never materialized, but it is interesting to note the needs this organization was to meet: manage Joint IO Force Development, Force Employment and Force Management processes.

This new organization was to integrate plans and capabilities laterally across the Joint IO Force. It was to establish IO integration metrics to measure operational success and merit, and establish the capability to create the foundation for assessment activities, data normalization, and knowledge management needed for the reporting of programmatic effectiveness and efficiency. The organization was also supposed to synchronize and de-conflict multiple regions' information activities. According to the issue paper this need had been met primarily through the JIOWC; however, it noted that the JIOWC had neither the resources nor the capacity to effectively conduct this mission. This gap in IO assessment was also affirmed in the Joint Center for

JOINT IO FORCE OPTIMIZATION STUDY (JIOFOS)

- **Sponsored by USD(I), USD(P), and JS**
- **Objective: Provide recommendations on policy, organizational, and procedural COAs that enable the Joint Force to optimally develop, integrate, assess and employ Joint IO**
- **Stakeholders: USJFCOM – Lead, USSTRATCOM, USSOCOM, USD(I)**
- **Scope:**
 - **Recommended solution became the basis for engaging DoD leadership on re-aligning or changing IO structures and processes required to effectively organize, train, manage, assess, and employ the Joint IO force.**
 - **Evaluated and assessed if present IO capacity was sufficient to meet COCOM requirements.**
 - **Recommended means and methods for determining IO measures of effectiveness and assessment**

- **Characteristics of effective IO management:**
 - **Coordination with Department and national policies**
 - **Understanding of all elements of IO capabilities**
 - **Integrated with military operations**
 - **Coordinated with interagency IO policies and activities (covert/overt)**

Slide from Brigadier General Rowayne Schatz Jr. Town Hall Meeting with the JIOWC Staff in Feb 11

Source: Joint Staff J39

Operational Analysis (JCOA) in-depth analysis of IO in Iraq between April 2008 and June 2009, as stated in the I2A Report, published 21 August 2009.

U.S. Central Command used 172 contract vehicles for IO in Iraq totaling \$270.1 million during FY 2006 through FY2008. In September 2009, DoD IG published their summary report on these contracts in response to a request from the Commander, U.S. Central Command to evaluate the IO requirements in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The commander asked DoD IG to identify and evaluate the process to establish and execute IO requirements and to identify the resources applied to meet those requirements. Additionally, the DoD IG was requested to evaluate the contracting process and the use of private contractors in support of IO.

The Joint Information Operations Force Optimization Study, (JIOFOS), sponsored by OUSD(I), OUSD(P) and the Joint Staff, was a USJFCOM-led study, with USSTRATCOM, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and OUSD(I) as the key stakeholders. JIOFOS was conducted in the Spring of 2010. Its objective was to provide recommendations on policy, organizational, and procedural courses of action that would enable the Joint Force to optimally develop, integrate, assess and employ Joint IO.

The recommended solution was to be used as the basis for engaging DoD leadership on realigning or changing IO structures and processes required to effectively organize, train, manage, assess, and employ the Joint IO force. JIOFOS was also to evaluate and assess whether present IO capacity was

sufficient to meet combatant command requirements. Lastly, the study was to recommend means and methods for determining IO measures of effectiveness and assessment.

As the JIOFOS study neared completion, other capability-based assessments and studies into related issues were also being completed. These included studies into electronic warfare, psychological operations/military information support operations (PSYOP/MISO), and strategic communication (SC). Questions about IO funding levels were also being raised by the House Armed Services Committee.

The culmination of all of these issues, reports, assessments and studies rose to the Defense Secretary's awareness level, particularly after congressional inquiries about IO funding and efficacy, and also because of a rising demand signal from the combatant commanders for support securing funding for critical IO programs.

Based on verified demand for IO support and information-related capability and activities, the Secretary of Defense directed a Front End Assessment of strategic communication and information operations, (SC/IO FEA). The SC/IO FEA was sponsored and led by the OUSD(P). Its objective was to provide the Secretary of Defense with recommendations on SC/IO and MISO definitions, DoD roles and missions, management and oversight, resources and also training and education. The SC/IO FEA was principally concerned with joint IO organization and integration above the combatant command level, and leveraged work from several IO studies surveys

28 September 2010 SECDEF Decides

- **JS (J39) designated as Joint Proponent for IO**
- **JS to develop and execute a detailed implementation plan to reorganize IO oversight and management**
 - **JS gains advocacy responsibility for military deception and operations security**
 - **US Special Operations Command retains advocacy for Military Information Support Operations**
 - **US Strategic Command retains advocacy responsibility for Computer Network and Electro-Magnetic Spectrum Operations**
- **Reorganize the Joint IO Warfare Center (JIOWC) to become part of the Joint Staff to assist in execution of proponent responsibilities**
 - **Ensure comprehensive assessment and reporting in response to DoD demands**
 - **Develop a force of trained and educated joint IO professionals**
 - **Provide joint IO force management**
 - **Provide enterprise and reach back support to COCOMs**
 - **Facilitate the integration of plans and capabilities and share best practices**

DECISIONS WERE ANNOUNCED IN THE 25 JANUARY 2011 SECDEF MEMORANDUM

SECDEF 28 SEP 2010 Decisions Presented by Brigadier General Rowayne Schatz Jr. Town Hall Meeting with the JIOWC Staff in Feb 11

Source: Joint Staff J39

and reports as stated above to provide analysis and recommendations. Secretary Gates' decisions regarding the SC/IO FEA recommendations were published as Secretary of Defense Memorandum titled "Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DoD," dated 25 January 2011 (See slide on Page 25). In terms of structure, the importance of the 25 January memorandum is the alignment of information-related capabilities to various organizations that would advocate for the capability and serve as its proponent. Per the memorandum, proponent responsibilities are: Military Information Support Operations (MISO), remained with US Special Operations Command; Electronic Warfare and Computer Network Operations remain with US Strategic Command; Military Deception and Joint Operations Security transition to the Joint Staff.

The Secretary's vision of IO reorganization was directly related to his view of current and future national security threats. With this background as

context, his view is summed up in recent Secretary of Defense memorandums to the department:


"Adversaries leverage multiple communications platforms to proselytize, recruit, fund, exercise command and control, share tradecraft, and perpetuate their ideology. Understanding the increasing complexity of the information environment and the compelling need to leverage information effectively as an element of national power is critical to achieving the Department's military objectives. Department of Defense policies recognize that information capabilities, including but not limited to, operations security, computer network operations, military information support operations, and military deception, can be developed and employed as traditional military activities in operational environments." (USSECDEF Memo

dated 6 December 2010, Request for Support of Funding Authorities to Conduct Information Operations)

In addition to the request for support of funding authorities the Secretary of Defense further clarified the direction of SC and IO in a Memorandum titled; "Strategic Communication and Information Operations in the DoD" that was released on January 25, 2011. The essence of that memorandum is highlighted in the following excerpts:

"Across the US Government, all departments and agencies are struggling to adapt anachronistic programs and policies to acclimate to the evolving environment. Within DoD, combatant commanders have consistently communicated to me the importance of maintaining adequate resources and funding levels to conduct critically important information programs, especially within the context of increased

WAY AHEAD



Slide from Brigadier General Rowayne Schatz Jr. Town Hall Meeting with the JIOWC Staff in Feb. 2011
 Source: Joint Staff J39

congressional scrutiny and reporting requirements in these areas.”

“On October 1, 2010, the Principal Staff Advisor function and responsibility for IO oversight and management moved from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The USD(P) will revise DoD Directive 3600.1 and DoD directive 5111.1 accordingly. This realignment of responsibility provides a single point for all components of the Department and our interagency partners. This realignment also assigns a single point of fiscal and program accountability; establishes a clear linkage among policies, capabilities, and programs; and provides for a better integration with traditional strategy and planning functions.”

“At the Joint Force level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) will reorganize joint force IO development and management by assigning proponentcy for joint IO to the Joint Staff. This will create a single proponent for joint IO integration with designated, clear capability proponents...The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will develop and execute a detailed implementation plan that reorganizes elements of the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC). The JIOWC, which is located in San Antonio, Texas is currently assigned to USSTRATCOM. The JIOWC’s Joint Electronic Warfare Division will remain assigned to USSTRATCOM, and the remaining elements of the JIOWC will be aligned with the Joint Staff.”

The intent of aligning JIOWC to the Joint Staff is to have the JIOWC become the “engine room” for IO governance in the IO enterprise. JIOWC will still maintain its close, personal and symbiotic relationship with the combatant commands; however, its new mission, while retaining certain aspects of its current mission of lateral support to operational joint force commanders, now has a new aspect of supporting and informing IO governance with accurate and relevant information. JIOWC will not make policy; however, JIOWC will inform and support policy makers. In order to conduct this new mission, JIOWC is in the process of reorganizing to prepare for CCA designation on 1 October 2011. Accordingly, JIOWC will be organized into five divisions that align to these tasks: Intelligence; Operations and Assessments; Mission Support; Advocacy and Force Development; and Operations Security support.


The JIOWC will continue to provide IO subject matter expertise and advice to the Joint Staff and combatant commands; facilitate combatant command and service collaboration efforts to identify and develop joint IO concepts and solutions; develop and maintain a joint IO assessment framework that measures and reports performance of IO capabilities supporting joint operations; assist in advocating for and integrating combatant command IO requirements; and, assist in coordinating IO force development requirements.

The streamlining of IO executive governance within OUSD(P), designation of the Joint Staff J39 as the joint IO proponent, and realignment and reorganization of the JIOWC as the “engine room” change the face of IO support to the joint force for the better. These changes in the future of the IO enterprise will enable it to focus on the IO requirements in the national security strategy. In the SC and IO memorandum, the Secretary

of Defense put it this way:

“These decisions will better prepare DoD for today’s rapidly evolving strategic environment. DoD must operate effectively in the information environment to defend the nation and to prevent, prepare for, and prevail in conflicts. These changes will advance IO and integrate the lessons we have learned into our organization and process.”

With a fully mission capable date of October 1, 2012, the JIOWC and the entire IO enterprise across the DoD will be uniquely positioned and transformed to meet the security challenges of information-related activities for the future. It is no small task to accomplish these revolutionary changes, but they will most certainly enhance the IO force and national security.



JOINT STAFF J3 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR GLOBAL OPERATIONS (DDGO) Presents
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More than Just Words

Effects Based Strategic Communication in the Horn of Africa

by

Lieutenant Commander Daniel R. Fucito, US Navy

Editor's Note: LCDR Fucito's work as the Engagement Chief for the Strategic Communication Directorate in the Horn of Africa Task Force makes him uniquely qualified to comment on those operations and lessons learned by the organization. Those lessons are useful to all IO practitioners. LCDR Fucito's views in this article are his own. Captain Kenneth R. Carmichael, USAF, significantly contributed to the article.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly demonstrated, words and actions can be more important to the attainment of our strategic objectives than bombs and bullets. Indeed, without the support of the populace, it is impossible to attain peaceful governance, increased security capacity and an end to the threat of violent extremism. However, how do we effectively sway such intangible things as people's perceptions, loyalties and attitudes? As the U.S. shifts its focus towards phase-zero (conflict prevention) operations, strategic communication must occupy a place that is, at the very least, equal to traditional planning considerations. The purpose of this article is to describe the basic concepts and processes behind the highly successful external communication strategy developed and implemented by Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Strategic Communication Directorate.

Let us begin by establishing a clear and concise definition of strategic communication for use in phase-zero environments. In the Commander's Handbook for Strategic Communication and Communication Strategy, Version 3.0 (2010), the U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center offered the following definition:

“Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable



JTF Horn of Africa Change of Command Ceremony
Source: defenseimagery.mil

for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”

Although this definition covers all of the pertinent bases, it utilizes broad concepts that fail to provide useful guidance to the Joint Force Commander on the proper employment of strategic communication at the tactical level. As an alternative, the Strategic Communication Directorate at CJTF-HOA has developed the following definition:

“A methodology which incorporates political and socio-cultural knowledge into the planning process, in order to maximize the ability of tactical operations to garner support from the populace for strategic goals.”

This definition was carefully worded and intended to double as a “mission statement”, which focuses the command's strategic communication efforts on the desired end-state of popular support for U.S. strategic objectives in the region. The word “methodology” was specifically chosen to illustrate the fact that strategic communication is a process, a way of thought and action, rather than a finite event. Building upon this new definition, we established that the purpose of phase-zero strategic communication is to align the command's words, messages and actions to support the attainment of this end-state. That is no small task for a relatively small command whose Combined Joint Operating Area (CJOA) encompasses 13 sovereign nations and covers a land mass roughly equivalent to that of the continental United States. Therefore, to maintain the focus of our efforts, it was necessary to de-scope this tremendously complex problem and clearly define the responsibilities of the Strategic Communication Directorate. After careful analysis, it was determined that there are three main “pillars” for strategic communication employment in phase-zero environments:

DEFINE - Holistically analyze the strategic communication environment in the regions where mission teams are deploying.

SUPPORT – Develop tailored tactical messages that are specific to the regions where mission teams are operating and provide in-depth training to the mission teams on personal interaction and message presentation techniques in that particular region.

ASSESS – Continually assess both the short-term and long-term effects of our regional engagements, as well as the perceptions of the country as a whole.

Now that we have defined phase-zero strategic communication and established the responsibilities of the Strategic Communication Directorate, how do we implement an effective external communication strategy? To this end, we identified four core questions which must be answered:

1. How well is strategic communication integrated into the command's planning process?

2. How does the command train its messengers?
3. How does the command frame the pre-mission strategic communication environment?
4. How does the command assess its strategic communication effects?

Although developed specifically for CJTF-HOA, these four questions are the foundation for strategic communication success in any command.

Question 1: How well is strategic communication integrated into the command’s planning process?

There is a famous cartoon that depicts a pair of scientists laboring over an elaborate set of equations. In the middle of the blackboard, at the most complex point, one of the scientists writes “then a miracle occurs” and continues with the rest of his mathematical proof. In the complex equation of phase-zero operations, we must avoid viewing strategic communication as being that

“miracle” which occurs at just the right moment and results in overall mission success. To be truly effective, strategic communication must be woven into the very fabric of the command’s mission planning cycle. It must be considered early and often, and given the resources and respect that it requires. Unfortunately, to most planners, strategic communication is an alien concept that is often sacrificed or ignored while more traditional planning considerations are explored in detail. In light of this fact, it becomes obvious that the key enabler for strategic communication success in any command is senior leadership support. Without strong and continual vocal support from the Commander, strategic communication will always be pushed to the sidelines as the planning and execution cycle kicks into full swing.

Shortly after our turnover in February 2010, the Strategic Communication Directorate conducted an in-depth review of CJTF-HOA’s mission planning cycle. We worked hand-in-hand with representatives from the Future Plans

Directorate to map out each stage of the process from beginning to end. The result of this effort appears in Figure 1.

Affectionately called the “Rosetta Stone”, this simple flow chart allowed us to quickly identify where strategic communication was not fully integrated into the mission planning cycle. The processes and lines of communication in BLUE were well established and functioning. The lines of communication and processes in RED are ones in which the Strategic Communication Directorate was not fully integrated or not involved at all. It became readily apparent that there were three main areas of concern.

First, the CONOPS development process did not view strategic communication as a key component, which must be addressed early and often. Rather, it was treated as a last minute “check in the box” to get tactical messages to the teams before they headed out the door.

Second, the Future Operations branch did not inform the Strategic Communication




Figure 1-JTF HOA Mission Planning Cycle
Source: Author

Directorate when a team was assigned to a mission. This failure in communication resulted in the mission teams requesting tactical messages from the Strategic Communication Directorate as little as 1-2 days before their Confirmation Brief Rehearsal. This extremely short turnaround time forced us to be highly reactive in our message development and resulted in tactical messages which were not fully researched and less than effective.

Finally, and most importantly, it became painfully obvious that there was no process to systematically train the mission teams on how to interact with the local populace and disseminate their tactical messages. In essence, we were cramming business cards full of poorly written tactical messages into the hands of our mission teams and shoving them out the door with no idea as to what the messages meant or how they were supposed to transmit them.

Upon completion of our analysis, the first order of business was to turn all of the red arrows and boxes blue as quickly as possible. Breaking into the established mission planning processes was no easy task; however, thanks to tremendous amounts of hard work, cooperation and the support of the Commander, the Strategic Communication Directorate now enjoys a higher level of integration during the CONOPS development process. In addition, it has become standard operating procedure for the Future Operations branch to notify the Strategic Communication Directorate as soon as a mission team is identified.

Before leaving the topic of integration, the importance of the Strategic Communication Working Group (SCWG) must be

addressed. The SCWG is the primary vehicle by which the Strategic Communication Directorate projects itself into the mission planning process.

Originally, the SCWG was used to review and approve tactical messages prior to their dissemination to the mission teams. Although sound in theory, this construct failed miserably in practice. The previously noted shortcomings in strategic communication's integration, combined with the elevated pace at which new missions arose and moved through the planning process, rendered the SCWG completely ineffective. The meeting was cumbersome and involved too many participants who were not direct stakeholders in the strategic communication process. In addition, it was chaired by an O-4 action officer and attended by O-5 and O-6 directorate deputies. This rank misalignment severely inhibited effective task assignment and completion. As a result, the SCWG was canceled, reworked and eventually reborn with a new charter.

Primarily, the new SCWG serves as a hard-scheduled, quarterly meeting to review the overarching country themes that guide CJTF-HOA's tactical message development. At any time, however, the Strategic Communication Directorate can call an ad-hoc SCWG to address sudden concerns or unanticipated strategic communication issues. The most important change to the format is that the SCWG was elevated to a staff principals-level meeting, chaired by the Director of Strategic Communication, and limited to those who are immediate stakeholders in the strategic communication process. This adjustment lent greater credibility to the event and drastically improved the task assignment and deliverable flow. Under this new construct, the SCWG now provides the Strategic Communication Directorate with a flexible, adaptive and responsive framework to address strategic communication issues throughout the mission planning process.


Question 2: How does the command train its messengers?

General David Petraeus once said: "Knowledge of the cultural terrain can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, the knowledge of the geographical terrain." Although written specifically about operations against our enemies, this principle is equally applicable when working with our partners and allies. In order to operate effectively in a foreign country, we must make every attempt to see our actions through their eyes.

The ultimate goal of CJTF-HOA is to counter the effects of violent extremism in and around the Horn of Africa. We accomplish this mission through continuous engagement with our Partner Nations to increase security capacity and promote regional stability. To this end, strategic communication success in the Horn of Africa is contingent upon two basic principles.

First, every Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine must realize that **WE ARE THE MESSAGE**. Too often we are wrapped up in the deliverables such as wells, schools, veterinary civic action programs (VETCAP), and medical civic action programs (MEDCAP). All of these are secondary in importance. It is our *words*, our *actions*, and our *example* that have the greatest impact on the African people. To be successful we must maximize our interaction with the populace and endeavor to set an example that they desire to emulate. This concept goes well beyond the old adage of "You are an ambassador of the United States". In phase-zero environments, every service member is responsible for the following:

1. Understanding regional cultural sensitivities.
2. Knowing the mission-specific themes and messages.



US Navy Construction Team Member in Uganda

Source: defenseimagery.mil

3. Interacting with the host nation populace.

4. Reflecting on who was met, what was said and how the message was received.

In our strategic communication training, we stress that the two most important responsibilities for the mission teams are *interacting* and *reflecting*. It doesn't matter how much fresh water the wells produce or how many animals were treated during a VETCAP. If a team goes downrange on a mission and does not interact with the local populace, their mission is a failure. If they come back and do not provide detailed reflections on their experiences, their mission is a failure. Remember, it is not the school, the well, the MEDCAP, the VETCAP or even the military-to-military (mil-to-mil) training that is important. **THE MESSAGE IS THE MISSION!** This concept is summed up in the Directorate's motto:

"We are the message and the message is the mission"

Second, we must **TRAIN THE MESSENGER**. CJTF-HOA employs two types of downrange teams to accomplish its missions: Civil Affairs (CA) and non-Civil Affairs. The CA teams are trained in personal interaction and are operating in their element. The non-CA teams are not specifically trained in personal interaction, and are typically mission focused (drill the well, build the school, train the soldiers). The question is: Which of these two teams require regional-specific cultural interaction training prior to executing their mission? The answer is both. In HOA, this is accomplished through the

Strategic Communication Directorate's Strategic Communication Training (SCT) program.

The SCT was developed to systematically train CJTF-HOA's mission teams on personal interaction techniques and ensure they fully understand how to apply the tactical messages for their mission. This training goes far beyond the generic cultural sensitivity training that is provided to all U.S. service personnel prior to deployment. To our knowledge, the SCT program is not replicated anywhere else in the Department of Defense for phase-zero environments. The SCT is divided into five segments that were identified as essential to training effective messengers: Local Culture, Themes and Messages, Personal Interaction Techniques, Strategic Communication Assessment and the Question and Answer session that we refer to as "The Gauntlet." Let us look at each of these sections in detail.

Segment 1-Local Culture: This regionally specific brief lasts approximately 30 minutes and is both prepared and presented by CJTF-HOA's Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Team (SCRAT). SCRAT is responsible for bringing socio-culturally relevant insights and advice into the mission planning processes at HOA. SCRAT is composed of civilian cultural experts who have extensive personal knowledge on a particular country that they have studied for an extended period. Their knowledge of relevant social issues, local economy, cultural taboos, and customs/courtesies provide the mission team with valuable insight into the region where they will be working. To be clear, this is not a generic

country brief. The information presented to the teams is tailored to the specific area where the mission will occur (e.g., Garrisa, Kenya; Pemba Island, Tanzania; or Dire Dawa, Ethiopia).

Segment 2-Themes and Messages: This brief lasts approximately 10 minutes, and is given by the Strategic Communication Directorate. During this segment, the overarching country themes and tactical messages the teams use to frame their interactions are reviewed and discussed. It is important to pause here and explain how the team's tactical messages are derived. The overarching guidance for CJTF-HOA's messaging efforts is found in U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM's) Theater Campaign Plan, which establishes six Theater Security Objectives (TSOs) for East Africa. These TSOs are listed below.

TSO 1: Al Qaeda Network is defeated in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.

TSO 2: U.S. and designated African states maintain assured access throughout the area of responsibility.

TSO 3: The American population is protected from deadly contagions emanating from Africa.

TSO 4: Identified African states cooperate in the creation of an environment inhospitable to the unsanctioned possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction capabilities and expertise.

TSO 5: Military support to comprehensive, holistic and enduring U.S. government efforts in designated states has improved security sector governance and has increased stability.

TSO 6: Continental peace support operations effectively meet mission requirements; peace operations capacity

Table 1: Alignment of CJTF-HOA Objectives with USAFRICOM Theater Security Objectives

	CJTF-HOA Objectives (CHO)	Supported USAFRICOM Theater Security Objective (TSO)
1	Access to designated African states is improved or maintained.	2,5
2	Partner nation security capacity is improved or maintained.	1,2,3,4,5,6
3	Regional security organizations security capacity is improved or maintained.	1,2,5,6
4	Designated populations have increased confidence in and support for governance by partner nations.	1,2
5	Violent extremist organizations are disrupted in the combined joint operating area & area of interest	1,2,4

exists to respond to emerging crises.

Nested under the USAFRICOM theater security objectives are CJTF-HOA's operational-level objectives known as CHOs. This alignment is shown in Table 1 on page 33.

Using the CJTF-HOA objectives as a guide, specific themes are developed for each country in the operating area. These country themes in turn provide the foundation for the mission team's tactical messages. Figure 2 illustrates this linkage using the tactical messages written for a team that deployed to Nairobi, Kenya for a training evolution with the Kenyan Military Defense Force (KMOD). The letters after each tactical message indicate the Kenya country theme it supports. The Kenya country themes, in turn, are each linked to one or more CHOs. By constructing our messages in this manner, the Strategic Communication Directorate can trace each tactical message back to the CJTF-HOA objective it supports which, in turn, can be linked to one or more USAFRICOM theater security objectives. This method of construction helps ensure the alignment of our strategic communication efforts and promotes unity of message between CJTF-HOA and USAFRICOM.

Now that we have established the link between AFRICOM's theater security objectives and CJTF-HOA's tactical messages, let us take a deeper look at the form and function of the tactical messages themselves. These messages are not intended to be restrictive in any way. The Strategic Communication Directorate cannot and should not try to "script" everything the mission teams say. Not only is it impractical, it is impossible. The tactical messages simply provide a basic framework for

possible conversations. To facilitate their ease of use, the messages are kept to no more than four, and are written in such a way as to be applicable to any persons t the team may encounter. They are also kept as simple as possible. Usually written at a 5th-8th grade level, the tactical messages cover broad concepts such as valued relationships, strong partnership and sharing best practices. By doing this, we make the messages both simple to remember and more easily conveyed using an interpreter.

The tactical messages for a specific type of mission also remain constant over time. For example, the tactical messages used for a VETCAP in Uganda may be worded exactly the same as those for a VETCAP in Rwanda or Burundi. This serves to promote consistency and unity of message as our mission teams meet and collaborate with several local populations over time.

Although we want our mission teams to interact with as much of the local populace as possible, there remains a definite need to seek out and engage certain influential audiences as well. Commonly referred to as "Key Leader Engagements", it became readily apparent that this term is misapplied when dealing with East African audiences. Typically Americans will identify the politician, military general or the Chief of Police as a key leader when, in many East African societies, the person with the most *influence* may actually be the village elder, the Priest or the Imam. To combat this bias, we now employ the concept of the "key influencer." By approaching the problem in this way, we identify and then interact with persons who will have the most "influence" over the local populations and avoid limiting our contact to those who we traditionally see as "leaders."




Figure 2: Strategic Communication Country Themes and Tactical Messages
Source: Author

Segment 3-Personal Interaction

Techniques: This portion of the brief is delivered by the Public Affairs Office and lasts approximately 10 minutes. The primary objective is to introduce common interview techniques such as ‘hooking’, ‘flagging’ and ‘bridging’, which can be used to guide unanticipated questions back to the tactical messages. During this time, the use of social media is also introduced. Although currently accessible in only 30% of the African continent, social media sites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Flickr offer an additional forum to spread CJTF-HOA’s message of partnership and peace. Toward this end, the Public Affairs Office provides mission teams with basic training on how to take effective photographs of their engagements and post them, along with their own reflections and those of the African people, to the CJTF-HOA Facebook page.

Segment 4-Strategic Communication

Assessment: This portion of the brief lasts approximately 10 minutes and is delivered by the Strategic Communication Directorate. During this time, the mission team is presented with specific information requirements regarding their interactions with the local populace. These requirements are intended to capture local questions, attitudes and perceptions towards the U.S., as well as observations on who are the key influencers. The teams are instructed to record this information and summarize it in their after-action report to the Commander. This is yet another key area where strong support from the Commander is crucial to strategic communication success. If the teams are not held to task on their strategic communication reporting responsibilities, the subject is quickly dropped from the after-action reports, depriving the Strategic Communication Directorate of feedback, which is critical to the adaptation, and improvement of both our training processes and message generation.

Segment 5-The Gauntlet: This portion of the training lasts approximately 30 to 45 minutes and is the capstone of the entire evolution. The Gauntlet provides the mission teams with an opportunity to exercise all of the cultural knowledge and personal interaction skills imparted to them by the SCT. To prepare for this event, the Strategic Communication Directorate researches previous after action-reports and contacts the deployed Civil Affairs Teams to collect commonly encountered questions from the region where the mission team

will be operating. Listed below is small sampling of the questions collected for the previously mentioned mil-to-mil engagement with the KMOD. Notice how the questions can range anywhere from simple questions about home and family to pointed political and military inquiries.

1. What country/state are you from?
2. Is your country/state beautiful like Nairobi?
3. Are you married? Do you have children?
4. What did you think the Kenyan people would be like?
5. Why is U.S. interested in Kenya?
6. How long will the U.S. be staying?
7. Why should we trust you?
8. Isn’t your job to fight?
9. Are you building your own base in Nairobi?
10. How will YOU make us safer?
11. Why do you keep coming and going every few months?
12. Why don’t my friends like people from the U.S.?
13. What other countries/organizations are you working with?
14. Can you do this for me? Build a school, a well, give me books, computers, etc.
15. Why aren’t you staying after your project?

During the Gauntlet, CJTF-HOA’s coalition officers assume the roles of the local populace, local government and the partner nation’s military. It is very important that the people asking the questions be non-native English speakers because it affords the mission team members an opportunity to work through language barriers. Whenever possible, a coalition officer from the specific country where the mission is being performed will participate in the Gauntlet to add his/her insight and experiences to the evolution.

Behind the mission, the team assembles a steering group composed of U.S. service personnel drawn from the Information Operations cell, the Public Affairs office and the Strategic Communication Directorate. Questions are asked of individual team members, not of the team as a whole. This prevents any team member from dominating the event and

allows the steering group to evaluate each answer and provide guidance when necessary.

Taken together, the entire training program requires approximately one-and-a-half hours to complete. Although the Strategic Communication Directorate prefers the SCT be conducted as a single block of instruction in a defined venue, the lack of available conference room space often requires us to break the training up into a modular form. Under the modular SCT, mission teams travel to each individual office (SCRAT, PA, SC) to receive that particular portion of the brief. The order of the SCT is always kept the same and every team finishes with the Gauntlet, which is conducted at the Strategic Communication Directorate. To date, the SCT program has prepared 201 messengers in support of 30 missions and has received outstanding reviews from all those who have experienced it. Both USAFRICOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command have lauded the program as a “Best Practice.”

Question 3: How does the command frame the pre-mission strategic communication environment?

To paraphrase an old saying: the key to success is not having all the right answers - it’s knowing the right questions to ask. In order to effectively execute a communication strategy that attempts to alter people’s perceptions through sustained personal interaction, we must first understand the inter-personal environment in which we are operating. Although this basic concept may seem incredibly obvious, it has been completely overlooked in practice. Originally, the Strategic Communication Directorate constructed its tactical messages based solely on the mission statement developed for the CONOPS brief. There was absolutely no attempt to evaluate the existing strategic communication environment in which the mission teams would be operating.

To address this shortcoming, a new pre-mission planning process was developed which characterized the existing strategic communication environment by defining the quality of our relationships with the U.S. Embassy Public Affairs office, the Partner Nation’s media and the local populace. Let us take a closer look at each of these three key areas.

First, given CJTF-HOA’s extremely limited footprint in relation to the size of its CJOA, it is clear that the effects of our tactical missions can only be maximized through the larger exposure, which comes from Partner Nation mass-media

reflections. This is why the quality of our relationship with the U.S. Embassy Public Affairs department is so very important. In phase-zero environments, they are the final release authority for all U.S. media submissions. If the Embassy is receptive, it will pass the press advisory to the local media. If it is not receptive, then CJTF-HOA's Public Affairs office must work closely with embassy counterparts to foster an atmosphere of trust and confidence, which will open the door to future media submissions. Indeed, Public Affairs importance to a successful communication strategy cannot be understated. An active Public Affairs office that is closely integrated with the Strategic Communication Directorate and willing to aggressively report on our interactions with the African people is crucial to overall mission success. That being said, CJTF-HOA cannot rely solely on Public Affairs to disseminate its message. It is one thing for an American to write an article about our missions. It is quite another for a local (i.e., African) reporter to write the same article. This is because so much is lost in translation. A local population can tell the difference between an article that has been written by an American and translated into their native tongue and one that was written by a native speaker. To this end, it is desirable to maximize the amount of reporting conducted by indigenous persons.

Second, to effectively interact with the media, one must understand any inherent prejudice in their reporting. This analysis of media bias is used to set expectations on whether or not Partner Nation media outlets will follow up on the press advisories released to them by the U.S. Embassy, and what the expected tone of their reflections may be. This information is gathered from independent media research reports, as well as observations made by local CA teams. Once collected and analyzed, a summary is generated that outlines the names and locations of the major media outlets, their distribution

and the nature of their bias towards the U.S. Government. It is important to note that this information sets expectations on Partner Nation media reflections as a whole, and is not necessarily focused on the local media in and around our mission teams.

Third, to interact positively with the local populace, we must first understand regional perceptions and attitudes towards the U.S. By working closely with the Intelligence Directorate's Fusion Cell (regional atmospheric research team) we compiled relevant information concerning local views and opinions, which helped define the environment in which the mission team will be working. Although this collaboration provided valuable information, it could not deliver the level of detail needed to identify possible strategic communication pitfalls in future missions. This data could only be gathered by visiting the actual mission area. Before planning begins for most missions, CJTF-HOA sends out a small team to conduct what is known as a Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS). It was recognized early on that placing a strategic communication representative on each PDSS team was critically important to the success of our communication strategy. Again, thanks to strong support from the CJTF-HOA senior leadership, there is now a permanent place for the Strategic Communication Directorate on each of these survey teams. During the PDSS, the strategic communication representative is charged with answering the following questions.

1. What are the characteristics of the relationship between the Maritime Civil Affairs Team/Army Civil Affairs Team and the Partner Nation military/local populace in this area?
2. Has the U.S. previously executed any projects in this area?

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What were the results/lessons learned? How are we using this knowledge to set proper expectations for this mission?

3. What are the population atmospherics concerning the U.S. government, U.S. military, local military and local government?
4. Who are the key influencers (names/positions)? Do we have a relationship with them?
5. What actions have we taken to garner key influencer support for our upcoming missions?
6. Have we asked the key influencers to assist in getting our message out both pre- and post-mission? Have they been effective in doing so (why/why not)?
7. What opportunities are there to include the local population/vendors in the execution of this project?
8. What cultural factors may affect the success of this mission? What measures have we taken to address these factors?
9. What media outlets prevail in this area? What is their slant on stories about Partner Nation interaction with the U.S. (positive/negative/neutral)?

These questions were developed to address basic strategic communication concerns and identify possible areas of friction often overlooked during the mission planning process.

By combining the information gathered on the quality of our relationships with the U.S. Embassy Public Affairs office, the Partner Nation's media and the local populace, the Strategic Communication Directorate generated a more complete picture of the pre-mission environment. This in turn has greatly improved the quality of our injects to the mission planning process, enhanced the training that we provide to our downrange messengers, and set realistic expectations for local message reception and secondary reflections within the Partner Nation's media.

Question 4: How does the command assess the post-mission strategic communication effects?

Are we doing things right? Are we doing the right things? These two questions are universally accepted as the foundation of strategic communication assessments. But how do we answer them? In order to understand the strategic communication assessments, we must recognize the dual nature of the problem.

In the short term, we use site visits, after-action reports, situation reports and mission team debriefs to answer the question: Are we doing things right? It is important to realize that these three tools are essentially feedback mechanisms that should be used to evaluate and refine a command's strategic communication processes. Although, in theory, they can be compiled over time to reveal changes in perceptions and attitudes, the reality is that they are far too limited in scope and rely too much on "American" interpretations of our interactions to be effective.

The key to accurately assessing our strategic communication efforts lies in answering the second question: Are we doing the right things? Measuring changes in perception requires 'long-term' assessments free from our inherent bias. In order to gather this data, we need to utilize tools such as focus groups and polls commissioned by the United States and conducted by indigenous persons. By removing 'America' from the equation, we provide the greatest chance for open and honest responses to our questions. In addition to polling, media analysis can be a powerful assessment tool. By observing the extent to which our message is reflected by Partner Nation media and what sort

of slant (positive or negative) is being associated with it, we can gain insight into the larger and wider spread opinions of the populace. Only through the effective application of 'long-term' assessment techniques can we begin to quantify any changes in the perceptions of the Partner Nation's populace.

Implementing this method of assessment is the biggest challenge facing CJTF-HOA's Strategic Communication Directorate. There is promise, however. Several polls, like the one described above, have already been conducted by USAFRICOM. Developing a detailed schedule to contract and execute these polls will be the key to finally gaining insight into the effect of our sustained presence on the perceptions of our Partner Nations in the Horn of Africa.

Conclusion

CJTF-HOA's Strategic Communication Directorate has taken the lead on several fronts to develop well defined and repeatable processes that establish a framework for successful phase-zero communication strategies. Although constantly adapting to unforeseen demands, these processes are sound and are being employed every day. While anticipating America's role in global conflict over the next twenty years, we must recognize that a drastic change is taking place. The Department of Defense finds its efforts increasingly directed towards conflict prevention, which favors enduring relationships and building partner-nation capacity over traditional military methods. As our nation continues to lean towards a non-violent, effects-based approach to the application of military force, we must remain open to the significant challenges that lie ahead of us and realize that strategic communication will lead the way.



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Raising the Purple Dragon: Evolution of OPSEC Support to the Joint Community



By

Captain Mark Springer, US Navy

Editor's Note: Operations Security, or OPSEC, is a very important aspect of Information Operations. US Navy Captain Mark Springer serves as the Director of the Joint Operational Community's premier OPSEC organization. As part of the JIOWC, the Joint OPSEC Support Element, or JOSE, is a highly valued resource in the Joint Operational Community. This article gives some background on that organization. The Purple Dragon is the symbol for Joint OPSEC.

Today's war fighter faces many challenges protecting information in an ever-changing information environment. It is easier for our current and potential enemies to collect the bits and pieces of data to construct their intelligence picture than ever before. Of course, this vulnerability is recognized, and one of the most effective tools to mitigate it is through the use of Operations Security (OPSEC). In the Joint arena, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center's (JIOWC) Operations Security organization is the nucleus for OPSEC support.

Known as the Joint OPSEC Support Element (JOSE), the JIOWC's OPSEC Support Directorate provides OPSEC support through three main avenues, as defined in DOD Directive 5205.02, DoD Operations Security Program: training and

program development; planning and exercise support; and the evaluation of OPSEC programs through OPSEC surveys. The Primary customers for these services are the ten US Combatant Commanders and their task forces. Support over the years, has also been provided to the Service components, other US government agencies, as well as allied and coalition forces. Support can be provided via reach-back capability, or more likely than not, forward deployments across the globe, including combat zones in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa.

To place context on the scope of the demand for Joint OPSEC support, in 2010 the JOSE deployed 32 mobile training teams, training 720 students on how to be OPSEC program managers; performed 37 OPSEC surveys to identify exploitable vulnerabilities and recommend fixes; provided 7 program management consultations to assist the development of command OPSEC programs; assisted in 9 Information Operations planning efforts; and supported 11 joint exercises.

The ability to provide this level of support grown immensely in the past seven years. Although the JIOWC has provided limited OPSEC support as a core capability of Information Operations for years, the foundation of the current JIOWC/OS was born out of renewed awareness of the need to protect



Joint OPSEC Support Element Team Member Conducting Photo Surveillance

Source: Joint OPSEC Support Element

critical unclassified information brought out of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and verified by documents such as the Manchester Document. In 2004, as a result of the intelligence findings of these events, and based on a 2002 Program Decision Memorandum, the JIOWC (then the Joint Information Operations Center) participated in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) FY 04 OPSEC Working Group, which directed ASD (C3I), in conjunction with the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff, to improve OPSEC practices throughout DOD. Resulting from this decision process was the formation of an OPSEC Support Element (OSE) for the joint community, which became the JIOWC's JOSE under USSTRATCOM.

The JOSE, working closely with the Interagency OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS), the US government lead for OPSEC, and the Services, quickly attacked its new mission and leaned forward to support the war fighter's OPSEC needs while studying, developing, and adopting the best possible techniques, tactics and procedures to improve the joint community's OPSEC posture. Within the first year, the JOSE was deploying fulltime OPSEC planners to Iraq, where OPSEC inputs increased mission effectiveness and reduced losses. By taking the approach it "is more important to teach a man to fish..." the JOSE trained and surveyed forces about to deploy, as well as assisted standing Joint headquarters to build and improve their OPSEC programs.

While creating dynamic OPSEC programs became the initial focus of the JOSE, the world continued to evolve and so did the JOSE, including a name change to the Joint OPSEC Support Center (JOSC) in 2006 as a JIOWC Center. Continuing its effort to improve the OPSEC posture, the JOSC looked for avenues to attack OPSEC vulnerabilities based on the real-world environment. Initiatives included working with Allies and Coalition partner nations to take OPSEC into the combined world. Countries that have benefited from JOSE OPSEC initiatives include the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, Canada, and Columbia.

Another area where the JOSE proved the value of OPSEC was in the Cyber world. Working closely with USSTRATCOM in their Unified Command Plan (UCP) role as Cyber guardians, the JOSE brought another avenue of approach to defend against Cyber vulnerabilities. In addition to the "high tech" side such as firewalls, software patches, etc., the JOSE took the basic "low tech" approach, applying OPSEC principles to the Cyber arena, resulting in a DOD-wide USSTRATCOM Order on how to protect critical information in 2008.

The JOSE, again working closely with the IOSS and the Service OSEs, has had great success in building the core OPSEC backbone among the Joint commands. Where in the beginning, OPSEC might have been a program "in a binder on a shelf" managed as a collateral duty, joint commands have evolved to where the OPSEC Program Manager is now, in many cases, a full-time position, and a key part of IO planning, improving the security and capability of the command. Where once the JOSE stepped in to provide OPSEC planning to the commands during a crisis or real world event, the commands are now better prepared to help themselves as a result of the OPSEC training, mentoring, and assistance the JOSE and others have provided over the years. Of course the JOSE is always still available to assist when needed in crisis or contingency.

Although the joint community has had great growth in the application of OPSEC, the current JIOWC/OS directorate's work is not complete. Evolving again, the JIOWC/OS will be



JOSE Team Member Checks Dumpster for Critical Information

Source: Joint OPSEC Support Element

moving under the Joint Staff for proponentcy and remain part of the JIOWC upon its designation as a Chairman's Controlled Activity (CCA). The organization will continue to use the name JOSE. Under this name, the JOSE will continue to provide the same services as directed in DOD 5202.05 to support the joint war fighter.

Although OPSEC practices across DOD have increased, so has the OPSEC threat from our adversaries. The growth, ease of use, and speed of social media have created new vulnerabilities that our adversaries will exploit. Whether it is another WikiLeaks situation or a well intentioned but unaware Facebook posting, critical unclassified information can be lost to the enemy in the click of a mouse. The JOSE is leaning forward with the OPSEC community to develop solutions to prevent the enemy from being able to collect information and use it to act against us.

Looking toward the future while continuing to improve OPSEC programs, the JOSE strives to evolve toward "operationalizing" OPSEC to make it a mission effectiveness multiplier. By integrating OPSEC into planning for operations, and incorporating its principles and application into Joint exercises based on real-world lessons learned from the OPSEC survey process – we have the right formula for making this an operational success.



US Navy Captain Mark Springer is the Director of the Joint Operations Security Element (JOSE). He is a P-3 pilot with over 3,400 hours of flight time. He has served in worldwide deployments in various squadrons and as ships company on the USS Constellation (CV-64). He is a native of Oregon and holds a bachelors degree from the US Naval Academy and a masters from the National War College.

Conventional Operations *Must Be* Less Expensive Than Information Operations

By
Mr. Mark A. Ochoa

Editor's Note: Mr. Ochoa's essay on Information Operations compared to traditional military activity in terms of "cost vs benefit" is an important topic. Although, IO is a traditional military activity, far too often and because of the inability to quantify IO, the emphasis on it is lost and the benefit of the activities are not fully realized. Mr. Ochoa's thesis is based on the supportable facts that IO is a bargain in cost for the effect obtained even if it is hard to assess and quantify, and when compared to other military activities and those costs, the benefit is obvious. His discussion of this topic is important and very current.

Perhaps we don't use Information Operations enough because IO is too expensive. Intuitively, we know that non-combat force is less expensive than conventional combat. If IO is so great, then why does it seem IO 'magic dust' tends to get sprinkled on top of a contingency plan as if it was some sort of very expensive dinner plate garnish?

This essay is intended to graphically illustrate the cost effectiveness of employing IO as early as possible in the planning process. Notwithstanding, some economic license is assumed to derive the cost effectiveness of IO. However, "With passage of the FY2010 supplemental, cumulative war funding totals \$1.12 trillion including \$751 billion for Iraq, \$336 billion for Afghanistan...."¹ With \$1.12 trillion already spent, we have a basis for advocating a national military strategy that focuses more resources on IO and less on conventional combat warfare to stave off the exorbitant cost of conventional warfare.

For quite some time, the IO community has advocated mainstreaming IO into joint operations. Unfortunately, most of the advocacy has been confined to the IO community. Only more recently have IO capabilities become more prominent in the thinking of senior leadership. Still, IO is somewhat disjointed in the Joint warfighting arena. We know IO works, but IO isn't glamorous, it takes time to plan, execute, and sometimes even more time to assess.

Yet, as a nation, we have been talking about IO for decades. Each Service has some elements of IO capabilities but cohesive IO strategy and integration with kinetic strategy has been lacking. Perhaps the planning process is flawed in its approach, but not in its objective of achieving peace and stability.

Clausewitz said that physical warfare is the political tool of last resort.

*"It is of course well known that the only source of war is politics -- the intercourse of governments and peoples. . . We maintain . . . that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."*²

That statement is almost 200 years old. More recently, former President Kennedy said:

Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, paramilitary and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political

*warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and [service] men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of the mission."*³

At the 2010 Worldwide Information Operations Conference, panel members described 'getting into the head of the adversary'⁴ at least twice. Based on these ideas, IO must involve the entire government, not just the diplomatic and military instruments of national power.

During Operations Noble Eagle and Iraqi Freedom, senior leaders spoke of winning the hearts and minds of the adversary as a means to erode supporters of violence. Thus, affecting the behavior of a belligerent to prevent all-out war is the default position of a government that seeks peace and stability.

A generally accepted depiction of warfare is shown in Figure 1. Time increases along the horizontal axis. However, adding shades to the original diagram presented to Congress in 2007,⁵ notionally relates the level of combat effort in each phase. For this discussion, let Combat Effort mean the traditional military 'force on force' of opposing adversaries. Once one side dominates the other in Phase III, then the situation stabilizes. Victors impose their rules, forcing the losers to abide by them. In democratic societies, civilian authorities take over in Phase V and the civilian population has its rights restored. Military forces return to their home bases and transition into Phase I as they prepare for the next conflict.

Figure 2 is, for the most part, the same as Figure 1, except that an assumed stereo-typical combat effort of a victor is shown on the curved line in the chart. The assumption is based on anecdotal accounts of major wars from the American Revolutionary War to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

However, Figures 1 and 2 show each phase as being nearly equal in length; in reality, the length of each phase will vary substantially. Similarly, distinct boundaries are not always easily identifiable. Presuming Figure 2 represents the relative level of actual combat effort by phase, it follows that a greater combat effort will incur greater cost. Thus, the cost of the war is directly proportional to the increase in effort. This axiom should not surprise anyone. The majority of military combat effort occurs in phases II, III, and IV. Thus the greatest costs will also occur during these phases.

Figure 3 depicts the notional cost per phase and the accumulated cost over time. Like figures 1 and 2, the darker shades represent "Higher" effort and thus higher the cost of the greater effort.

Figure 3 does not indicate specific values; though intuitively, the costs can be subjectively and reasonably correlated to each phase. The vertical cost scale is not necessarily a linear scale. In actuality and for this discussion, values on the vertical scale are assumed to more closely approximate exponential increases. Militarily, the lowest costs (effort, money, and friendly lives

lost) occur in Phases I and II.

To achieve victory, a combatant commander is forced to move not only into Phase III, but also into Phases IV, and V. Once Phase III begins, the only way to return to pre-combat costs is to dominate, achieve stability, and return to normal operations and control. Even if a cease-fire is declared in Phase III, combat preparedness and cost must remain high if and/or when combat resumes.

Whether the comparative costs in Phases II through IV are 10, 100, or even 10,000 times greater than in Phase I, the point is they are higher nonetheless. Only during Phase V will the combat costs associated with war decrease to pre-Phase III levels. Nevertheless, enormous money and effort is spent to accomplish Phases III and IV. Enabling of civil authority in Phase V will include substantial reconstruction costs as well, although they are not considered in the graph.

Combatant Commanders seldom engage and succeed in war without a viable plan. Even when an adversary unexpectedly initiates offensive action, a Combatant Commander will first direct his forces to modify an existing plan (perhaps with only a few hours notice) to engage the enemy before committing troops to battle. Short of force-on-force combat, Combatant Commanders in their respective areas of responsibility (AOR) are always either in Phase I and Phase II, but planning for Phases III, IV, and V. After all, **Combatant Commanders must not only plan for combat, but they must plan to win the war.** Nevertheless, is enough deliberate planning occurring to prolong Phases I and II, and perhaps avoid Phases III, IV and V for the foreseeable future? Is this possible? The answers are “no” and “yes”, respectively.

The concepts presented below may require a temporary suspension of prejudice as to what IO really is, or is not. Joint doctrine defines IO one way, though the military services do not necessarily align themselves accordingly. For example, the United States Air Force (USAF) construct of IO has substantial merit, especially considering senior leaders acknowledge the necessity of ‘getting inside the head of the adversary’ and ‘winning the hearts and minds of the people.’

The USAF considers IO the integration of three distinct pillars or disciplines: Influence Operations (IFO), Electronic Warfare Operations (EWO), and Network Warfare Operations (NWO).⁷ However, both EWO and NWO exist only because of the manufactured range of the electromagnetic dimension, the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).

One current school of thought in and outside the USAF believes Cyber = IO + EWO. Another group believes Cyber = IO. Yet another school contends the EMS is merely a vehicle to exploit to facilitate and conduct IFO. Notwithstanding and by extension, the question still reverts back to Clausewitz: can a nation exercise political will to conduct warfare [though not necessarily in the electromagnetic dimension]?

The answer, of course, is yes. However, today the military uses the EMS to short-circuit the traditional four dimensions: length, width, height, and time. Nonetheless, warfare has been, and can be conducted without either party accessing the EMS. Conversely, when one party conducts warfare using the EMS, then the opponent will have a difficult time winning or even maintaining the status quo without also entering the electromagnetic dimension, even if only for a few seconds.

Before warfare of the 1800s, no military force used the EMS as a means to circumvent the four known dimensions.

CURRENT PHASES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

	Phase 0	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III	Phase IV	Phase V
Primary Activities	Shape	Deter	Seize Initiative	Dominate	Stabilize	Enable Civil Authority
	Prepare & Prevent	Crisis Defined	Assure Friendly Freedom of Action & Access Theater Infrastructure	Establish Dominant Force Capabilities	Establish Security	Transfer to Civil Authority
				Achieve Full Spectrum Superiority	Restore Services	Redeploy
	Time Intensity of Combat Low → High					

Figure 1-Current Phases of Military Operations (Shaded to Indicate Effort)⁶

NOTIONAL RELATIVE COMBAT EFFORT BY PHASE




Figure 2-Notional Relative Combat Effort Over Time

NOTIONAL RELATIVE COMBAT COSTS BY PHASE




Figure 3-Notional Combat Cost Compared to Level of Effort

Clausewitz based his views about war as occurring only within the traditional dimensions. The victorious force was able to impose its will on the loser, and, in turn affect, the behavior of the vanquished population. **Thus, the goal of warfare is the ability to influence behavior by deliberate violence when persuasion, intimidation, or coercion fails.**




Figure 4-Depiction of USAF Information Operations Pillars

In figure 5, Operations Security (OPSEC), Military Deception (MILDEC), Public Affairs (PA), counter-intelligence (CI), and counter propaganda (CP) are common to each Service. Though common, the Services by necessity vary in how they apply them.

Some may be surprised to learn the USAF has a capability for planning and executing operational-warfare level MISO, especially since MISO (PSYOP) is stereotypically an Army mission. However the USAF views its Service-unique capabilities as more than delivery platforms for Army-generated MISO leaflets and broadcasts. USAF airpower and its supporting functions also have components that can be used psychologically for MISO. USAF MISO planners are degreed officers with social science credentials who attend the Army's Psychological Operations Qualification Course. Through reachback, USAF MISO planners conduct behavioral influence analyses to target audiences at the operational level of warfare.

So the USAF has a MISO capability...why is that important? This is important because the USAF plans and executes airpower capabilities and supporting functions to demonstrate the mutually beneficial activities which help build and sustain partnerships in various areas of responsibility (i.e. IFO). Thus, the Joint Force Commander uses his air component staff to plan a campaign at the operational level of warfare. So if the USAF plans operational-level IFO, then comparing IFO effort to combat effort presents an opportunity for relating IFO costs to combat costs.

Overlaying the USAF IFO disciplines onto the notional combat effort graph produces Figure 6. However, by the time costs to employ, deploy, supply and resupply combat forces are considered, they far exceed the costs associated with the employment of IFO forces. Transposing the combat and IFO effort curves result in Figure 7. Like Figure 3, the vertical cost scale should not be assumed a linear scale.

Figure 7 intuitively illustrates that by the time Phase III begins

USAF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS DISCIPLINES



Figure 5-Depiction of USAF Influence Operations (IFO) Paradigm from AFDD 2-5




Figure 6-Notional Comparison of IFO Effort to Combat Effort




Figure 7-Notional Costs Compared to Level of IFO and Combat Effort

combat costs will exceed the cost of IFO activities. Moreover, the cumulative combat costs will far exceed the IFO costs by the time Phase V is completed.

War is inevitable; but war is not necessarily imminent. The increasing connectedness of populations to visual and audio messages through the electromagnetic dimension provides senior leaders with opportunities to engage as they never have before. Yet simultaneously, the EMS also provides belligerents quick access to garner support for their points of view, whether by telegraphing impending threats or by peacefully disseminating persuasive counter-themes.

Regardless, expanding the sphere of IFO to include capabilities of sister Services produces a diagram shown in Figure 8. Though each Service does not doctrinally align these capabilities the same way, the capabilities exist nevertheless and alignment as depicted below is worth examining.

Civil Military Operations (CMO) and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy already are defined in doctrine; however, Fused Communications is not defined. This proposed new term is similar to Strategic Communication.

Strategic Communication (SC) is still widely misunderstood, even by those in the IO business. Complicating matters, Strategic Communication is frequently abbreviated as STRATCOM and confused with the abbreviation for combatant command, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), especially when used in conversation.

To help eliminate confusion, tailoring the SC definition to Fused Communications (Fused Comm or FC) is worth reflection. For this discussion, propose FC to mean;

“Coordinated statements (written, verbal, or multimedia) from senior leaders across government, to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.”

This definition of Fused Comm provides vehicles for

JOINT INFLUENCE OPERATIONS DISCIPLINES




Figure 8-Proposed Joint Influence Operations Categorization (USAF IFO in Blue)

CURRENT EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES – JIFO VS. COMBAT




Figure 9-Current Employment of Forces - JIFO vs Combat

articulating intent to foreign and domestic audiences. When senior leaders do not communicate horizontally, or subordinates speak without understanding leaders’ respective intentions, then influence fratricide occurs.

Fused Communications, as defined above, allows military forces to synchronize planning vertically (chain of command), horizontally (across the Service components), and temporally (over time) to achieve a commander’s intent and desired effect. Presuming the ultimate goal is to prevent escalation into Phase III, the concept of Joint IFO (JIFO) takes on particular significance.

The dilemma then becomes how not to acquiesce to a belligerent just to avoid the costs of war and still maintain freedom. Relabeling Service IFO forces to JIFO forces, then mapping JIFO against the backdrop of the current phases of military operations does not achieve any new results (See Figure 9). This construct has been used over several decades. Comparing costs of JIFO and Combat forces in the current construct produces Figure 10.

Allocating greater effort to JIFO forces as shown in Figure 11, and remembering the horizontal time axis is not on a linear scale, suggests that the onset of Phase III could be delayed for

NOTIONAL COSTS OF CURRENT EFFORT – JIFO VS. COMBAT




Figure 10-Notional Cost of Current Effort - JIFO vs Combat

several years if JIFO was given more resources for operating in Phases I and II.

Given the planning process referred to in Joint Doctrine, a joint force commander (JFC) can employ Fused Comm to communicate intent not only to subordinate forces, but the JFC can also communicate to domestic and foreign civilian audiences. A JFC can use the PA staff to articulate themes and messages to domestic audiences. Parallel to the PA staff efforts, JIFO forces can articulate themes and messages to foreign audiences.

The JIFO element would produce, develop and execute a JIFO Tasking Order (JIFOTO) using themes, messages, and programs derived from the coordinated goals and objectives of the Combatant Commander and the regional ambassadors. In addition to all the multimedia venues such as social networking, cell phone communications, community projects, billboards, etc., JIFO elements also can use all the non-kinetic tools of electronic warfare and computer network operations to varying degrees as mediums to conduct JIFO.

Just as the threshold of each phase in a campaign is defined by the accomplishment of various military combat objectives, a JIFOTO also should contain milestones that delineate, or at least describe, conditions when influence tasks have been completed. Similarly, the JIFOTO also should contain milestones that are in concert and congruent with the combat milestones defining the phases of a campaign.

It stands to reason that greater effort and resources allocated to JIFO elements to prolong Phases I and II are likely to cost substantially less than the costs of combat (Phases III, IV, and V) necessary to impose favorable conditions and induce a belligerent to act accordingly.

In Phases I and II, the purpose of the JIFOTO is to stave off progression into Phase III by developing and synchronizing programs, plans, themes, messages in concert with senior leaders' Fused Comm intentions. Overlaying the curves from the proposed allocation of forces diagram onto a cost scale produces Figure 12. Keep in mind that the total cost to employ JIFO forces in all five phases, conservatively estimated, will be approximately 10 to 100 times less costly than the employment of combat forces.

In Figure 13, as shown in previous graphs, time increases along the horizontal axis. Furthermore when considering the axiom, "War is inevitable; but war is not necessarily imminent," then the time axis can also be used to indicate the likelihood of combat risk.

Combat risk also will increase along the horizontal axis, just like time. Thus if JIFO is funded and employed at significantly higher than currently assumed levels, then more military planning for combat risk can be taken beyond the fiscal year defense plan (FYDP), because the risk of Phase III engagement also will get pushed to the right on the Time axis. Figure 13 illustrates and presumes the successful application of more JIFO resources and successful JIFO results over time, against the backdrop of costs.

If traditional Joint Operations are coordinated in the four dimensions of the air, land, and sea domains, then by extrapolation, there is no valid reason not to coordinate IO in the manufactured EMS dimension. Nonetheless, successful Joint Operations begin with a coordinated and well thought-through strategy.

Those who advocate cyberspace as the warfighting dimension

PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF FORCES – JIFO VS. COMBAT




Figure 11-Proposed Allocation of Forces - JIFO vs Combat

NOTIONAL COSTS – JIFO VS. PROPOSED JIFO VS. COMBAT




Figure 12-Notional Costs - JIFO vs Proposed JIFO vs Combat

ANTICIPATED INCREASED JIFO EFFECT ON COST & RISK OVER TIME




Figure 13-Anticipated Increased JIFO Effect on Cost and Risk Over Time

of the future are only partially correct. Agreeably, cyberspace is the domain of the electromagnetic dimension. But like air, land, and sea, cyberspace ops must be coordinated to reduce fog and friction of warfare, and to reduce fratricide. Thus, successful joint operations rely on coordinated strategy.

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"The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries, and potential adversaries while protecting our own."

New Definition of Information Operations from Secretary of Defense Memorandum,
Strategic Communications and Information Operations, Jan 25, 2011.



"My view is that strategic communications, information operations are critical to our efforts around the world and in particular in the wars that we're in."

- Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, March 25, 2010

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