



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**INFLUENCE STRATEGY: PRINCIPLES AND LEVELS OF
ANALYSIS**

by

Bryan M. Pickett
Charles M. Lingenfelter

December 2011

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

John Arquilla
Ray R. Buettner

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2011	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Influence Strategy: Principles and Levels of Analysis		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Bryan M. Pickett and Charles M. Lingenfelter		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number _____N/A_____.	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) U.S. strategy in current conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan, and against al-Qaeda) has focused predominantly on heavy U.S. military involvement (mostly kinetic operations), while using influence components, for the most part, in a reactive manner. There seems to be no grand influence strategy that informs U.S. policy and current military operations. There are multiple descriptive formulations, but no prescriptive formulations on how to develop an effective influence strategy using influence principles. There is also a lack of systematic studies analyzing the impact and effectiveness of influence strategy in conflicts. This thesis explores strategy and influence theory to identify key components of an effective influence strategy and how one should modify these components to increase strategic effectiveness. Using five levels of network analysis we propose six hypotheses regarding an effective influence strategy most likely to help achieve the desired political end-state. We test these hypotheses using comparative studies of five major strategic conflicts of the past century: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists. Analysis indicates that: 1) the quality of the competing narratives will prove of decisive importance and 2) any communication strategy will need to address inconsistencies to be effective.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Influence, Strategy, Social Movement Theory, Principles, Levels of Analysis, Narrative, Doctrine, Social, Organizational, Technology, Networks, Boer War, World War I, World War II, Cold War, Trans-National Terrorism, jihadi, Information Operations, Military Operations, Message and Deeds, Consistency, Legitimacy, Media		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 264	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified		16. PRICE CODE	
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified			

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

INFLUENCE STRATEGY: PRINCIPLES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Bryan M. Pickett
Major, United States Air Force
B.S.; B.A., College of Charleston, 1997
B.S., College of Charleston, 1999
M.S., University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, 2001

and

Charles M. Lingenfelter
Major, United States Army
B.A., Texas A&M University, 1999

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2011**

Authors: Bryan M. Pickett
Charles M. Lingenfelter

Approved by: John Arquilla
Thesis Advisor

Ray R. Buettner
Second Reader

John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

U.S. strategy in current conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan, and against al-Qaeda) has focused predominantly on heavy U.S. military involvement (mostly kinetic operations), while using influence components, for the most part, in a reactive manner. There seems to be no grand influence strategy that informs U.S. policy and current military operations. There are multiple descriptive formulations, but no prescriptive formulations on how to develop an effective influence strategy using influence principles. There is also a lack of systematic studies analyzing the impact and effectiveness of influence strategy in conflicts. This thesis explores strategy and influence theory to identify key components of an effective influence strategy and how one should modify these components to increase strategic effectiveness. Using five levels of network analysis we propose six hypotheses regarding an effective influence strategy most likely to help achieve the desired political end-state. We test these hypotheses using comparative studies of five major strategic conflicts of the past century: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists. Analysis indicates that: 1) the quality of the competing narratives will prove of decisive importance and 2) any communication strategy will need to address inconsistencies to be effective.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE	1
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
B.	STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE	2
C.	INFLUENCE: MEDIA OR MESSAGE	5
II.	PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE	9
III.	INFLUENCE: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS	17
IV.	FROM PRINCIPLES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS TO HYPOTHESIS	21
A.	NARRATIVE	21
1.	Consistency	25
2.	Legitimacy	29
B.	SOCIAL	32
C.	ORGANIZATIONAL.....	34
D.	DOCTRINAL	35
E.	TECHNOLOGICAL	36
V.	HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY.....	37
A.	HYPOTHESES	37
1.	Narrative.....	37
2.	Social	37
3.	Organization.....	37
4.	Doctrinal	37
5.	Technological.....	38
B.	DESIGN FRAMEWORK/METHODS.....	38
1.	Choosing Representative Case Studies	38
VI.	COMPARATIVE STUDY 1: THE BOER WAR	41
A.	BACKGROUND	41
B.	HISTORICAL PRELUDE.....	43
C.	SUMMARY OF THE WAR	45
D.	DATA	45
1.	Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?	45
2.	Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?	48
3.	Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?	49
4.	Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?	52
5.	Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?.....	53
6.	Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?.....	55
7.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?.....	59

8.	Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?	61
9.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?.....	62
10.	Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?	64
11.	What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?	66
12.	What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?	67
E.	RESULTS	68
VII.	COMPARATIVE STUDY 2: WWI	73
A.	BACKGROUND	73
B.	DATA	75
1.	Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?	76
2.	Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?	79
3.	Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?	82
4.	Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?	87
5.	Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?.....	90
6.	Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?.....	91
7.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?.....	94
8.	Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?	97
9.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?.....	98
10.	Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?	101
11.	What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?	102
12.	What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?	103
C.	RESULTS	104
VIII.	COMPARATIVE STUDY 3: WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE (GERMANY/ITALY VS. U.S./U.K./U.S.S.R.)	109
A.	BACKGROUND	109
B.	SUMMARY OF THE WAR	111
C.	DATA	120
1.	Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?	120
2.	Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?	125
3.	Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?	127

4.	Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?	129
5.	Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?.....	132
6.	Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?.....	133
7.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?.....	140
8.	Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?	147
9.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?.....	148
10.	Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?	149
11.	What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?	150
12.	What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?	151
D.	RESULTS	152
IX.	COMPARATIVE STUDY 4: THE COLD WAR	155
A.	BACKGROUND	155
B.	DATA	155
1.	Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?	156
2.	Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?	160
3.	Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?	161
4.	Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?	163
5.	Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?.....	164
6.	Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?.....	165
7.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?.....	166
8.	Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?	169
9.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?.....	171
10.	Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?	172
11.	What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?	172
12.	What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?	173
C.	RESULTS	174
X.	CASE STUDY 5: U.S. VERSUS TRANS-NATIONAL JIHADI TERRORISTS.....	177

A.	BACKGROUND	177
B.	DATA	180
1.	Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?	180
2.	Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?	182
3.	Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?	185
4.	Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?	188
5.	Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?.....	191
6.	Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?.....	193
7.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?	195
8.	Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?	197
9.	Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?.....	198
10.	Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?	200
11.	What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?	200
12.	What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?	202
C.	RESULTS	202
XI.	ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS	207
1.	Narrative.....	207
2.	Social	212
3.	Organization.....	214
4.	Doctrinal	217
5.	Technological.....	221
XII.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	227
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	235
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	242

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Example of Islamist belief structure (From Tugwell, 1990).....	14
Figure 2.	McAdam's causal sequence (From McAdam, 1999)	23
Figure 3.	Hypothesized relationship between network topography and effectiveness (From Everton, 2009).....	33
Figure 4.	Map of South Africa, 1899–1902 (From Farwell, 1976).....	42
Figure 5.	German Leadership, 1939–1945 (From Jacobson & Smith, 1970)	135
Figure 6.	Leadership of U.S. and Great Britain, 1944 (From Jacobson & Smith, 1970)	138
Figure 7.	German propaganda organization in WWII (From Welch, 1993).....	140
Figure 8.	Soviet Organization for Active Measures (From United States, 1989).....	167
Figure 9.	U.S. Information Agency in Relation to the Executive Branch (From Henderson, 1969).....	168
Figure 10.	Strands of Islamic thought	178

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Summary of key influence principles by theorist	17
Table 2.	Principles of influence by level of analysis	19
Table 3.	List of Allies and Central Powers in WWI (From Thinkquest.org)	74
Table 4.	Summary of findings from case studies.....	226

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BIPO	British Institute of Public Opinion
CA	Civil Affairs
CCDRs	Commanders
CENTCOM	Central Command
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CO	Colonial Office
COCOMs	Combatant Commands
COI	Office of the Coordinator of Information
CPI	Committee on Public Information
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
EW	Electronic Warfare
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIS	Foreign Information Service
FM	Field Manual
IO	Information Operations
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KGB	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
MEW	Ministry of Economic Warfare
MILDEC	Military Deception

MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MOI	Ministry of Information
MSO	Minister of Special Operations
NSC	National Security Council
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OKH	Oberkommando des Heeres (High Command of the German Army WWII)
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High Command of the German Armed Forces WWII)
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSS MO	OSS Morale Operations Branch
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
OWI	Office of War Information
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PWE	Political Warfare Executive
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
Rand	Witwatersrand
RKK	Reich Chamber of Culture
RMVP	German Ministry of People's Enlightenment and Propaganda
RRG	Reich Broadcasting Company
SC	Strategic Communication
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
U.K.	United Kingdom

U.S.	United States
USD(P)	Under-Secretary of Defense (Policy)
USIA	United States Information Agency
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WPr	Division for Wehrmacht Propaganda
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to express our sincerest appreciation and gratitude to our advisor, Dr. John Arquilla, for his direction, support, and patience during this thesis process.

We would also like to thank Dr. Ray Buettner for his guidance and serving as a second reader.

Lastly, we would like to express our love and gratitude to our families who encouraged and supported us during this process.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE

A. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to explore influence strategy and theory to identify what the key components of an effective influence strategy are and how to modify these components, when necessary, to increase strategic effectiveness. “In a basic sense, strategy is the methodical art of relating ends and means to deal with other actors” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 348). The “QDR acknowledges that victory...depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of kinetic effects” (United States, 2006b, pp. A-4–A-5). Yet, the U.S. strategy in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as with al-Qaeda globally has focused predominantly on heavy U.S. military involvement (with a high proportion of kinetic operations), while using influence components (media, public diplomacy, CA, MISO, and PA), for the most part, in a reactive manner. There seems to be no grand influence strategy by the U.S. to inform U.S. policy and current military operations.

In this thesis, we will begin by examining the relationship of influence strategy with grand strategy, then progress to examining several key influence theories as proposed by Cialdini, Ellul, Pratkanis and Aronson, Tugwell, McLuhan, and Reilly. From our review, it appears that there are multiple descriptive formulations of the components of influence, but no specific formulations on how to develop an effective influence strategy using these principles. There is also a lack of systematic studies analyzing the impact and effectiveness of influence strategy in conflicts. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) proposed five levels of analysis (or practice) to assess the design and performance of networks. In Chapter III, we propose to expand this concept to apply to any organization (whether network, nation-state, or non-state actor) in conflict with another organization. In Chapter IV, we propose key variables that need to be present in an influence strategy as well as the relative importance of each to determine the level of effort or changes that would be more likely to help achieve the desired political end-state.

For our methodology, we will use comparative studies and adopt a comparative case methodology with standard focus questions to apply to each case study in order to provide structure and focus to the design. To choose the case studies for structured comparison, we selected the five major strategic conflicts since the beginning of the 20th century that have had a major impact on how influence operations are conducted, namely: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and the current conflict of U.S. versus trans-national Jihadi terrorists.

B. STRATEGY AND INFLUENCE

B.H. Liddell Hart (1975) stated that “nations do not wage war for war’s sake, but in pursuance of policy. The military objective is only the means to a political end” (Lykke, 1989, p. 351). Thus, military strategy in all cases is the “art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force” (JCS Pub 1, 1987, p. 232). Now if “[s]trategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved)” then what are the optimal military ways and means for achieving political ends (Lykke, 1989, p. 9)? In the past, military strategy often focused on the destruction of forces; however, this was required only as a necessary step to ultimately reach the decision maker to achieve the political concession of those who controlled the military. The “QDR acknowledges that victory...depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of kinetic effects” (United States, 2006b, p. 230). This end is the same for the full spectrum of war, from potential conflict with nuclear powers to low-intensity conflicts: “Countering the ideological appeal of the terrorist network of networks is an important means to stem the flow of recruits into the ranks of terrorist organizations. As in the Cold War, victory will come only when the ideological motivation for the terrorists’ activities has been discredited and no longer holds the power to motivate streams of individuals” (United States, 2005, p. 244).

Many believe that the goal is always the opposing political leader, the adversary’s decision making network, or war-making network; hence the debate during the birth of

airpower over the concept of strategic paralysis. Strategic paralysis was conceived of as a third type of warfare which did not seek the destruction of enemy armed forces in battle via annihilation or attrition, but rather sought a strategy of bypassing battle with enemy forces in favor of attack upon the sustainment and control of those armed forces (c.f. Giulio Douhet, J.F.C. Fuller, Hans Delbruck, B.H. Liddell Hart, Lord Trenchard, & Billy Mitchell for more details both for and against this concept). This ultimately gave rise to the concept of strategic attack or strategic strike which is used to destroy the enemy's center of gravity. Colonel John Warden proposed the existence of five rings or centers of gravity, with the most important one being leadership, followed by organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and finally the warfighting capability itself (Carlino, 2002). However, the true strategic center of gravity is the support (explicit or implicit) of any movement or political entity by the domestic population: "in the final analysis, the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness" (Galula, 1964, p. 7–8 as cited by Gregg, 2009, p. 19).

The support of the people is not only physical but ideological; the population either believes that the movement or political entity is the best choice to provide a safe, secure, stable environment or is the best choice to help them achieve their goals. Sometimes, however, it is merely the absence of a competing movement, or political entity that engenders their reluctant support for the current situation. This can be seen in the modern conflict where "Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism attacks the enemy's strategic center of gravity—extremist ideology" (United States, 2006a, p. 289). Although there may not be a single, identifiable physical center of gravity (i.e., a person, leader, or nodes in a network); the "glue" that holds the adversary together is the narrative that binds that organization. So, the "way we conduct operations...can affect ideological support for terrorism. The conduct of military operations should avoid cutting the credibility and legitimacy of moderate authorities...Key to this is Muslims populations' belief that terrorism is not a legitimate means to pursue political goals" (United States, 2006a, p. 301). Although the Muslim population may not believe

terrorism is a legitimate means if it is not consistent with their religion, the population may still support an insurgency; but, as argued above, only implicitly if there is no valid alternative.

If we assume that the strategic end is to achieve political concession via influence over the populace, what are the best means to achieve this end? The “erosion of traditional boundaries between foreign and domestic, civilian and combatant, state and non-state actors, and war and peace is but one indication of” a “rapidly changing strategic initiative...In response, the President has heightened U.S. Government strategic emphasis on countering violent extremism through effective strategic communication (SC) and information operations [IO]” (United States, 2011, p. 1). Accordingly, the government and military services have continued to invest in multiple studies and assessments, and have recently realigned responsibilities for IO and individual capabilities, as well as proposed a new definition for IO. The new definition will be “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own” (United States, 2011, p. 2). The key change between the previous definition and the proposed current definition is the elimination to any explicit references to key capabilities such as OPSEC, MILDEC, MISO, EW, and CNO. The reason for this change is to eliminate the distinction between the capabilities and IO as an integrating function. “Successful IO requires the identification of information-related capabilities most likely to achieve desired effects and not simply the employment of a capability” (United States, 2011, p. 2). It is clear that IO and SC are important to achieve strategic military and political ends in ideological conflicts in the information age, but the hardest concept is how to employ these means in the appropriate ways. “In addition to military information operations, this strategic communication plan ensures unity of themes and messages, emphasizes success, ...and reinforces the legitimacy of US goals” (United States, 2004, p. 280). As stated above, the ultimate goal of IO is to influence the decision maker, often via influence over the masses or public along the way, which implies the need for a theory of influence.

C. INFLUENCE: MEDIA OR MESSAGE

Within influence theory, there is a debate as to whether the means should focus more on the content of the message or on the media used to deliver the message. Marshall McLuhan (1965), a proponent of the latter view, states that the “‘hot’ wars of the past used weapons that knocked off the enemy, one by one. Even ideological warfare in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries proceeded by persuading individuals to accept new points of view, one at a time. Electric persuasion...works, instead, by dunking entire populations in new imagery” (p. 339). He also argues that too much focus has been put into the “content” of the media. McLuhan states that the “medium is the message”; therefore, we need to pay attention to the media in contrast to the traditional focus on the “content.” “Political scientists have been quite unaware of the effects of media anywhere at any time, simply because nobody has been willing to study the personal and social effects of media apart from their ‘content’” (p. 323). We are completely immersed in media everyday which alters our viewpoints. For McLuhan, media does not stop at radio, T.V., movies, and print; but also includes money, clothing, architecture, telephone, telegraph, etc. In other words, “‘the medium is the message’ because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action...the ‘content’ of any medium blinds us to the character of the medium” (p. 9). Therefore, “the use of technology, conforms men to them...It is this continuous embrace of our own technology in daily use that...is why we must, to use them at all, serve these objects” (pp. 45–46).

However, McLuhan also admits that each “mother tongue teaches its users a way of seeing and feeling the world, and of acting in the world, that is quite unique” (p. 80). Although he believes that the medium is the key factor, McLuhan is still forced to argue that different cultures approach different media in different ways, which may make a difference in how things are perceived as seen in the following sets of quotes: “technological media are staples or natural resources...this pervasive fact creates the unique cultural flavor of any society” (p. 21). “The meaning of a message is the change which it produces in the image” (p. 26). “As we move out of the Gutenberg era of our

own culture, we can more readily discern its primary features of homogeneity, uniformity, and continuity” (p. 87). In other words, despite his focus on the power of the media, ultimately we can conclude that the underlying content itself is unchanging, but simply perceived differently based on culture and the type of media used which he inadvertently admits when he states that the “current assumption that content or programming is the factor that influences outlook and action is derived from the book medium, with its sharp cleavage between form and content” (p. 314). If there is a sharp cleavage between the content (message) and the form (medium); then the message is not the medium but alters the way the content is formed and received. In other words, if radio “changed the form of the news story as much as it altered the film image” (p. 53), then there was content present that was modified by changing media. This does not discount the effect that media have on the message. Although ultimately, it is the message content that is important, the persuasion practitioner must take into account how that message will be changed and perceived by other cultures based upon the media used and the presence of countervailing media in the society.

While McLuhan (1965) focused on the media, Robert Reilly (2009) focuses more on the message itself. Reilly makes the case that the proper job for U.S. public diplomacy is to explain, promote, and defend American principles to audiences abroad. However he states that since 9/11, “U.S. public diplomacy is generally acknowledged as a failure” and that those whose job it is to influence “will not even admit that it is their mission” (p. 9). Reilly points out the main reasons for failure stem from confusion regarding what it is we are defending, and against whom we are defending it. The problem is one of message content. Reilly criticizes the heavy use of advertising models in the promotion of democracy. He argues that promoting, practicing, and defending democracy requires the primacy of reason over passion but advertising is a form of manipulation that does not appeal to reason and relies on emotional impulse. While the US tends to focus on technology over content, our adversaries have been able to overcome technological disadvantage through the content of their message by staking a claim on ultimate legitimacy (p. 10). Reilly describes it as the most powerful form of narrative. The heart of the problem is that the U.S. has failed to address the war of ideas

“in order to fight a war of ideas, one has to have an idea” (p. 14). However, this “is not as simple as it may sound. A war of ideas is a struggle over the very nature of reality for which people are willing to die. Therefore, the first thing one must do is formulate the ideas that are so central to one’s life that one is not willing to live without them. For a nation to successfully project such ideas, there must be a broad consensus within it as to what those ideas are” (p. 14). So what are the key principles of influence (how we should formulate and transmit these critical ideas) that inform our strategy? In Chapter 2, we will further explore influence strategy and theory to identify the key components of an effective influence strategy.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. PRINCIPLES OF INFLUENCE

So, what principles are most important in order to influence people to join specific social movements? There is a large literature on influence, its various characteristics, tactics, and components. Below we will briefly summarize some of the schools of thought as expounded by Ellul, Cialdini, Tugwell, and Pratkanis and Aronson to see if there is any commonality about how best to craft an influence strategy.

In *Propaganda*, Jacques Ellul (1965) defined five external and five internal characteristics of propaganda (or the messages that influence people). The external characteristics determine how propaganda relates to the outside world and how to best set up its use to achieve its goals. Meanwhile, the internal characteristics determine what should be known about the target and environment for propaganda to be most effective. We'll summarize the external characteristics first. The first is that propaganda is targeting both the individual and the masses at the same time. "The most favourable moment to seize a man and influence him is when he is alone in the mass: it is at this point that propaganda can be most effective" (p. 9). The second characteristic is that propaganda must be total, to include "the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing. Modern propaganda must utilize all of these media" (p. 9). It is at this point that Ellul differentiates between propaganda and pre-propaganda. "Direct propaganda, aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes, must be preceded by propaganda that is sociological in character, slow, general, seeking to create a climate, an atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes. No direct propaganda can be effective without pre-propaganda" (p. 15). Additionally, "[o]ral or written propaganda, which plays on opinions or sentiments, must be reinforced by propaganda of action, which produces new attitudes and thus joins the individual firmly to a certain movement" (p. 15).

The third characteristic is that propaganda must be continuous and long in duration "continuous in that it must not leave any gaps...lasting in that it must function over a very long period of time" (p. 17). The fourth characteristic is that an organization is required that controls the mass media, uses them correctly, and calculates the effects of

one slogan or campaign over another as well as the interaction between them. “We can hardly expect great results from a simple dissemination of words unless we prepare for it by education (pre-propaganda) and sustain it by organization and action” (p. 22). Additionally, the “manipulation of symbols is necessary for three reasons...it persuades the individual to enter the framework of an organization...it furnishes him with reasons, justifications, motivations for action...it obtains his total allegiance” (p. 23). The fifth external characteristic of propaganda is orthopraxy (from thought to action), which states that “the aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to provoke action...its aim is to precipitate an individual’s action, with maximum effectiveness and economy” (p. 25). The “action exactly suited to its ends must be obtained...orthopraxy-an action that in itself, and not because of the value judgments of the person who is acting, leads directly to a goal...[this]...action makes propaganda’s effect irreversible...he is now obliged to believe in that propaganda because of his past action” (pp. 27–29).

Ellul (1965) also defined five internal characteristics of propaganda, the first of which is knowledge of the psychological terrain. Propaganda must be tailored to fit the terrain and never make a direct attack on an established, reasoned opinion or an accepted cliché. “We frequently find that psychological manipulations do not appreciably change an individual’s firmly established opinion, a Communist or a Christian with strong beliefs is very little, if at all, shaken by adverse propaganda” (p. 33). “Attacking an established opinion or stereotype head on would make the propagandee aware of basic inconsistencies and would produce unexpected results. The skillful propagandist will seek to obtain action without demanding consistency, without fighting prejudices and image, by taking his stance deliberately on inconsistencies” (p. 35). Additionally, “propaganda is confined to utilizing existing material...above all...the needs of those he wishes to reach. All propaganda must respond to a need, whether it be a concrete need (bread, peace, security, work) or a psychological need” (pp. 36–37).

The second characteristic covers the fundamental currents in society. “Propaganda must be familiar with collective sociological presuppositions, spontaneous myths, and broad ideologies. By this we do not mean political currents or temporary opinions that will change in a few months, but the fundamental psycho-social bases on which a whole society rest” (p. 38). The third internal characteristic is timeliness. Man will be “moved to action only if the propaganda pushes him toward a timely action” (p. 43). Additionally, propaganda “can succeed only when man feels challenged. It can have no influence when the individual is stabilized, relaxing in his slippers in the midst of total security” (p. 44).

The fourth characteristic is the effect of propaganda on the undecided, “those people whose opinions are vague, who form the great mass of citizens, and who constitute the most fertile public for the propagandist” (p. 48). The final internal characteristic is the relationship between propaganda and truth. Propaganda must be based on truth and facts, while the falsehoods are the moral elements in the realm of intentions and interpretations. Facts must remain facts (or else the public can discover and be dissatisfied with the inconsistencies), but they can be hidden or presented out of context. However, intentions cannot be definitively disproven. “The propagandist must insist on the purity of his own intentions and, at the same time, hurl accusations at his enemy...the mechanism used here is to slip from the facts...to moral terrain and to ethical judgment” (p. 58).

A couple of other key points by Ellul (1965) include the idea that people in society need propaganda, especially so in the modern era, when a person is cast out of the microgroups of the past (family, church, village) and plunged into mass society (thereby highlighting his own inadequate resources, his isolation, his loneliness, and his ineffectuality). Propaganda hands him what he needs: a *raison d'être*, personal involvement and participation in important events. Ellul also states that mass media, an average standard of living, education, and information are required for propaganda and manipulation.

The next major influence theorist is Robert Cialdini (1993), who presents six different categories of fundamental psychological principles that encompass virtually all of the different tactics that compliance professionals (primarily in the marketing world) use to influence people. The principles are consistency, reciprocation, social proof, authority, liking, and scarcity. These principles are necessary, fixed-action patterns that are required to allow humans and civilization to advance by extending the amount of information and the number of things we can do without thinking about them, cognitive shortcuts. The first principle is reciprocation, which states that “we should try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided us” (p. 17). Human society derives a significant competitive advantage from the reciprocity rule, so societies ensure members are trained to comply with and believe in it. The second principle is commitment and consistency. Cialdini states that “consistency is valued and adaptive. Inconsistency is commonly thought to be an undesirable personality trait. The person whose beliefs, words, and deed don’t match may be seen as indecisive, confused, two-faced, or even mentally ill” (p. 60). The underlying key to consistency is commitment. “If I can get you to make a commitment...I will have set the stage for your automatic and ill-considered consistency with that earlier commitment. Once a stand is taken, there is a natural tendency to behave in ways that are stubbornly consistent with the stand” (p. 67). Consistency to this commitment can be increased if the commitment is active, public, and effortful.

The third principle is social proof where we determine what is correct or acceptable by finding out what other people think and observing how they act. The fourth principle is liking where we automatically assign positive traits to people whom we like, who are attractive in some way, who flatter us, or who we have become accustomed to due to familiarity, similarity, or conditioning. The fifth principle is authority. We are trained that obedience to proper authority is right and disobedience is wrong. Information from a recognized authority can provide us a valuable shortcut for deciding how to act in a situation. The final principle is scarcity, where opportunities

seem more valuable to us when their availability is limited. We must rely on these six principles (and associated cognitive biases) more and more since modern society gives us an avalanche of information and choices.

Cialdini devised his six principles on the basis of his immersion in the culture of the salesman. His work is very reminiscent of a similar book, *The Hidden Persuaders*, by Vance Packard (1957) who interviewed many top salesmen, advertisers, and practitioners of motivational methods. Motivational research is the study began by psychologists and sociologists into the second and third level of consciousness. “The second and lower level is called, variously, preconscious and subconscious but involves that area where a person may know in a vague way what is going on with his own feelings, sensations, and attitudes but would not be willing to tell why. This is the level of prejudices, assumptions, fears, emotional promptings, and so on. Finally, the third level is where we not only are not aware of our true attitudes and feelings but would not discuss them if we could” (p. 25). The ad agencies used this understanding of our psychological processes sell billions of dollars’ worth of products based upon successfully manipulating peoples’ guilt feelings, fears, anxieties, hostilities, loneliness feelings, and inner tensions in order to provide “‘the illusion of rationality’ that the buyer needs” (p. 79). Packard, unlike Cialdini, ventures past the realm of capitalism and consumers to consider “the potentialities from the public’s viewpoint...for here the goal is mind-molding itself...The aim now is nothing less than to influence the state of our mind and to channel our behavior as citizens” (p. 178). Although extremely enlightening as to the state of psychological research into advertising, politics, and public relations at the time, Packard does not provide any overarching principles or theories of influence to incorporate into our search for a strategy, but rather stays on the level of “tactical application.”

The next influence theory we will discuss is the concept of the mobilizing trinity by Maurice Tugwell (1990), which rests on the proposal that governments and their peoples, or revolutionaries and their followers, fight or resist so long as three essential beliefs are held. This trinity of convictions consists of: first, a belief in something good to be promoted or defended; second, a belief in something evil to be destroyed or resisted;

and third, a belief in the ultimate victory of the good cause. If one of these three convictions is changed or damaged it leads to the process of the asset-to-liability shift. Over and over, the asset-to-liability shift proved to be the turning point across a range of conflicts. For instance, in Mandatory Palestine, the British resisted Zionist demands for a Jewish state because Palestine, as a valuable military base, was viewed as an asset. However, pro-Zionist militant terrorist groups conducted a series of terrorist attacks that the authorities could not defeat. The actions of the militant group made British rule seem illegitimate to international audiences, and expensive to the British public. “Lacking an intellectual argument. Britain weighed its options on a profit-loss basis. The Zionist campaign had robbed Palestine of its value as a base; human and financial costs were rising; the world was watching. By February 1947, Palestine was seen in London as a liability. The government handed the problem to the United Nations and the way was clear for a Zionist victory. The utility of terrorism as a means to change minds had been proven” (Tugwell, 1990, p. 4). In another example, Islamists and violent trans-national jihadi terrorists groups define the trinity as depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Example of Islamist belief structure (From Tugwell, 1990)

Whatever their content, such triads provide today's terrorists with certainty. They are doing what is right; their victims deserve to die; it is not a waste of lives and effort because their cause is bound to triumph in the end. For their enemies, the psychological situation is rather different.

During the past two decades, the nature of international terrorism has changed considerably; the shift is away from publicity-seeking dramas, from lengthy hostage

situations designed to force governments to make concessions such as the release of political prisoners, and towards low-intensity wars of attrition apparently intended to have strategic rather than tactical consequences. They operate from strong beliefs in their own righteousness, in the evil of their enemies, and in eventual victory.

Finally, Anthony Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson (2001) provide an overview of what social psychologists and other investigators have discovered about how we are persuaded. For instance, humans conserve energy by taking cognitive shortcuts (as noted earlier, Cialdini's framework is also based upon this assumption). Additionally, no matter how irrationally people may behave, they attempt to appear reasonable to themselves and others. There are two routes to persuasion peripheral (weak arguments taking little cognitive effort to process) and central (strong arguments taking much cognitive effort to process). The personal relevance of the issue determines which route is persuasive. Thus, Pratkanis and Aronson discuss the Law of Cognitive Response where the "successful persuasion tactic is one that directs and channels thoughts so that the target thinks in a manner agreeable to the communicator's point of view; the successful tactic disrupts any negative thoughts and promotes positive thoughts about the proposed course of action" (p. 31).

The authors then discuss four stratagems of influence (rooted in Aristotle's *atechnoi, ethos, logos, and pathos*). The first stratagem is pre-persuasion which consists of establishing how an issue is defined and discussed (similar to SMT framing narrative). With this stratagem, we can define an event in such a way that the recipient of our message accepts our definition of the situation and is pre-persuaded before argument begins. The second stratagem is source credibility meaning that the communicator/medium must appear to possess attributes that facilitate positive reception of the message. The third stratagem is the message; the intent is to focus the audiences' attention and thoughts on exactly what the communicator wants. The fourth stratagem is emotion where the focus is on arousing emotion and offer a way of responding that just happens to be the desired behavior (again similar to the action frame in SMT). Pratkanis and Aronson continue to discuss what factors determine when we will be influenced, how

we respond in general to a persuasion attempt, and finally, what may possibly be done to limit the effectiveness said campaign (which essentially consists of 24 items in a checklist that basically sum the techniques of persuasion so one is aware of them and understands them so that you can be on guard against them).

III. INFLUENCE: LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

This is just a small taste of the many important aspects of influence strategy and operations, but even at this basic strategic level we are left with 6 principles by Cialdini, 10 characteristics by Ellul, 4 stratagems with multiple tactics or techniques for influence by Pratkanis and Aronson, and the mobilizing trinity by Tugwell (Table 1).

Ellul	Cialdini	Tugwell	Pratkanis & Aronson
The Individual and the Masses	Consistency	Belief in Good	Pre-Persuasion
Total Propaganda	Reciprocation	Belief in Evil	Source Credibility
Continuity and Duration	Social Proof	Belief in Ultimate Victory	Message
Organization	Authority		Emotion
Orthopraxy	Liking		
Knowledge of Psychological Terrain	Scarcity		
Fundamental Currents in Society			
Timeliness			
Propaganda and the Undecided			
Propaganda and Truth			

Table 1. Summary of key influence principles by theorist

Is there any overarching theme that the common influence practitioner can use? How are we able to combine these diverse elements into one cohesive framework? Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) discussed the lack of a standard methodology for analyzing network forms of organization. Based upon their familiarity with the theoretical literature, Arquilla and Ronfeldt proposed a framework consisting of five levels of analysis in order to best determine what makes a network effective, which include the organizational level, the narrative level, the social level, the doctrinal level, and the technological level.

The organizational level examines the organizational design and specifies the extent to which an actor, or set of actors is actually organized as a network and the topology of the network (i.e., chain, hub, or all-channel network). Arquilla (2009) further explains that “networks typically manifest a mix of some or all of these archetypal forms.

The mixtures may vary, but the three forms will undoubtedly appear” (p. 3). Fighting networks must also be assessed in terms of factors that unite their adherents, namely the narrative and social levels. In line with social movement theory, Arquilla (2009) describes the narrative dimension as the story that organization members tell each other about the origins and purpose of their coming together as well as a rough guide to action, mobilize and guide masses, and spark recruitment. Narratives express a sense of identity and belonging; differentiates the organization from the masses; communicates a sense of cause, purpose, and mission. The social level continues to tighten the bonds of the organization and “helps both to convey ‘staying power’ to members and to foster deep levels of trust and cooperation” (p. 5). In Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), the doctrinal level is described as very “important for explaining what enables the members to operate strategically and tactically, without necessarily having to resort to a central command or leader” whether via a ‘leaderless’ network (otherwise described later as ‘panarchy’) or via swarming (p. 333). Finally the technological level discusses the information and communications technologies which are crucial for empowering the organization. These five levels of analysis are proposed primarily for evaluating the effectiveness of networks, but are they as applicable to the more ‘traditional’ forms of organizations and how do they relate to the principles of influence discussed above?

We propose that these five levels of analysis are equally valid in evaluating the effectiveness of the more ‘traditional’ forms of organizations and that the principles of influence can be mapped to the five levels as indicated in Table 2.

Narrative	Social	Doctrinal	Organizational	Technology
Orthopraxy - Ellul	Fundamental Currents in Society - Ellul	The Individual and the Masses - Ellul	Organization - Ellul	McLuhan
Knowledge of Psychological Terrain - Ellul		Total propaganda - Ellul		
Timeliness - Ellul		Continuity and Duration - Ellul		
Propaganda and the Undecided - Ellul				
Propaganda and Truth - Ellul				
Consistency - Cialdini	Reciprocation - Cialdini			
Scarcity - Cialdini	Social Proof - Cialdini			
Belief in Good - Tugwell	Authority - Cialdini			
Belief in Evil - Tugwell	Liking - Cialdini			
Belief in Ultimate Victory - Tugwell	Emotion - Pratkanis & Aronson			
Pre-Persuasion - Pratkanis & Aronson				
Source Credibility - Pratkanis & Aronson				
Message - Pratkanis & Aronson				

Table 2. Principles of influence by level of analysis

Based upon the principles of influence and the levels of analysis, we will generate several hypotheses below.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

IV. FROM PRINCIPLES AND LEVELS OF ANALYSIS TO HYPOTHESIS

A. NARRATIVE

The first level of analysis we will discuss is the narrative. As we have seen above, in the modern version of warfare the battle or war has become less of a force-on-force conflict and less kinetic. Instead, the battle has become more immersed in the context of information, ideology and non-kinetic actions. The objective is no longer to grind down the enemy army until you are able to reach the strategic center of gravity, whether it is the decision maker of the nation state or the national will of the populace. Rather, the fight is more diverse and set within an ideological context where “commanders and staffs analyze the culture of the society as a whole and that of each relevant group in the society. They identify who holds formal and informal power and attempt to understand why. They then consider ways to reduce support for adversaries and gain support for allies” (Jackson, 2009, p. 1). It is possible to induce individuals to modify their behavior to achieve your objectives through multiple methods including force. However, coercion through force can only be maintained as long as that force is present and will, more often than not, cause increased resentment towards the occupying force such that the occupying force often ends up doing more harm than good. An alternative method is to engage in the battle of the “narrative” and present stories that resonate with the various populations, otherwise known as target audiences, in an attempt to convince them to pursue an alternative course of action which will help you achieve your objectives. In all warfare, including Irregular Warfare as demonstrated in the current war against terrorists, crafting a credible narrative is a central requirement to countering irregular threats. As such, a major focus of the Department of Defense (DoD) and special operations is on researching how to win the battle of the narrative while conducting irregular warfare. In other words, what narratives and counter-narratives should be developed to undermine and discredit those of our enemies?

To better answer this question, we first need to understand what a narrative really is. According to Jackson (2009),

a narrative is a story relating a causally linked set of events that explains some aspect of a group's history and expresses the group's values, character, or self-identity...Each individual belongs to multiple groups through birth, assimilation, or achievement. Each of these groups provides some component of the individual's identity and influences his beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors. (p. 1)

Beliefs are concepts and ideas accepted as true, values are enduring beliefs which assert that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is preferable to alternatives, while attitudes are affinities for and aversions to groups, persons, and objects based upon underlying beliefs and values which affect how an individual selects, evaluates, and organizes available information (Jackson, 2009). The goal for commanders and staff is to understand the population's interests and then convince them either logically (winning their minds) that one alternative behavior is better than another, regardless of the underlying values or beliefs, or convince them that they must change their underlying attitudes and beliefs (winning their hearts) which influence their subsequent behaviors. Either change within the target audience, be it hearts (attitudes and beliefs) or minds (logic) will cause a positive and long-lasting change in the target audience's behavior. It is in this battle of the narrative, best achieved through Military Information Support Operations (MISO), where trans-national jihadi terrorists groups are currently perceived to have the edge. These groups are able to exploit their knowledge of local history, culture, and religion to affect perceptions by framing their actions positively, thus gaining support from the local population. As stated by Liddell Hart (1991), "the prospects and progress of a guerrilla movement depend on the attitude of the people in the area where the struggle takes place—on their willingness to aid it by providing information and supplies to the guerrillas by withholding information from the occupying force while helping to hide the guerrillas" (p. 378). The U.S. must increase its capabilities to counter the narrative presented by these trans-national jihadi terrorists groups, while presenting its own narrative. So why the focus on narrative and how does the narrative truly affect a population?

Within the social sciences, a current theory on the formation of social movements (social movement theory or SMT) has tried to describe why social movements form (to include terrorist networks and insurgent networks). Social movement theory as a whole seeks to explain why social mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social, cultural, and political consequences. Many different explanations have been given as to why social mobilization occurs including: collective behavior, relative deprivation, rational choice, and resource mobilization. In his book, Doug McAdam (1999) discusses several models of social movement theory including the classical theory, mass society, collective behavior, status inconsistency, rising expectations, relative deprivation, and Davies J-curve theory of revolution. McAdam readily admits that these models are not interchangeable; however, each of them consistently follows a three-part general causal sequence to account for the emergence of social movements. “This sequence moves from the specification of some underlying structural weakness in society to a discussion of the disruptive psychological effect that this structural ‘strain’ has on society. The sequence is held to be complete when the attendant psychological disturbance reaches the aggregate threshold required to produce a social movement” (p. 7). This causal sequence is depicted in Figure 2:




Figure 2. McAdam's causal sequence (From McAdam, 1999)

Regardless of what the individual components in the overall sequential model are, McAdam (1999) states that there are three general weaknesses with the overall model. The first is that many structural strains exist and are endemic to society; however, he also states that relatively few social movements have produced great social upheavals. Thus, social grievances are necessary, but not sufficient. McAdam's second critique is that any attempts to identify the underlying psychological components that predispose certain individuals to join social movements have again generally failed to identify a sufficient cause for social movements. Additionally, any focus on personal psychological

explanations for social movements do not adequately explain why group movements occur. Wiktorowicz (2004) agrees that studies and scholars have produced “almost inexhaustible lists of precipitating factors, including the failure of secular modernization projects, blocked social mobility, economic malaise,...the legacy of colonialism and cultural imperialism, and political alienation” to understand the rise of multiple movements to include extremist movements (including Islamic extremism); but have been unable to discriminate among them and simply agree that “individuals join groups and movements in response to crisis” (p. 3). McAdam’s final critique is that social movements are represented as psychological movements rather than political movements. In other words, he believes classical social movement theorists deny a link between problem and action.

Although we agree with McAdam (1999) that the underlying social discontent is necessary, but not sufficient, we also believe that he misses another critical factor, namely: the existence of a viable alternative movement and the ability of that movement to recruit participants. There are thousands of social movements that help individuals deal with any number of underlying social and individual discontents to include social friends, clubs, church groups, political groups, etc. Not all social movements that help people with discontent need be massive political social movements that can lead to violent actions. For the purposes of our research, we will focus on another key explanation, namely the process of framing (Goffman, 1974). In framing, a movement must first express the three key frames: the diagnostic frame (meaning “what went wrong”), the prognostic frame (where the movement attempts to explain “what is to be done”), and the motivational frame (this is the final call to arms that propels the people to action). In this framework, there is the explicit understanding that there is an underlying social or individual grievance (which is expressed in the diagnostic frame) as well as a social movement that explains how best to deal with the social grievance (the prognostic frame). If there is no alternative social movement, then discontent individuals have no recourse but to live in the society as it exists until a valid social movement arises. Or the prognostic frame may simply be to go to clubs with friends, pray more, or vote for another political party. However, the key part of framing is that these frames must be

articulated and elaborated in a specific fashion that resonates with the target audience because “groups often diverge in terms of diagnosis, prognostication, the best way to mobilize support, and identity. These struggles are contests to influence the direction of the movement; how resources should be used...in short, a struggle to assert authority” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 163). It is this process of articulating and elaborating the frames that we believe best corresponds to the problem of building an effective influence strategy. It is also in the framing process that opposing social movements are most easily diminished. By either addressing the underlying social grievance or by showing that there is an alternative movement, and thus an alternative frame, it is possible to minimize social support for other social movements.

It is thus critical to focus on the “content, the prime weaponry of the struggle for influence” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 49). Therefore, our main hypothesis is that the most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient). However, how should we best formulate this content? We propose that to successfully articulate and elaborate frames which resonate with the target audience, the narrative requires two main components each which will be discussed separately. We will show how these two components are expressed in each of the prominent theories above.

1. Consistency

The first key component we propose is consistency. Although this component appears intuitively self-evident, as seen above; it is only explicitly identified as a key principle by Cialdini (1993). We have already covered commitment and consistency by Cialdini in the previous section; however, it is interesting to note that all of Cialdini’s principles work because they are necessary fixed-action patterns that are required to allow humans and civilization to advance by extending the amount of information and the number of things we can do without thinking about them. All of the principles work because we must stay consistent with these biases to help us process an overabundance of information. Additionally, once we have committed to certain ideals, norms, and beliefs; we are compelled to stay consistent with our previous commitments.

Consistency is also a key factor in the principles by the other key theorists (including McLuhan and Reilly). Packard (1957) gives an example of the power of consistency in future Presidential elections (based upon practices emerging in the 1956 Presidential election) where there will be a “scientific selection of appeals; planned repetition...Radio spot announcements and ads will repeat phrases with a planned intensity. Billboards will push slogans of proven power” (p. 187). Even though McLuhan (1965) focused on media over content, he also understood that the “the lineal structuring of rational life by phonetic literacy has involved us in an interlocking set of consistencies” (p. 85). The constant presence of media has created a perception of logic and consistency such that all “organizations, but especially biological ones, struggle to remain constant in their inner condition amidst the variations of outer shock and change” (p. 98). Additionally, McLuhan states that the increase in speed and distribution of media and technology “produces division of function, and of social classes, and of knowledge” (p. 103). This increase of information is a centrifugal force that leads to division and specialization in our lives that people struggle against. The counterforce to this is homeostasis or consistency. Reilly (2009) also makes the case for consistency of message when he states, “[p]olicies and administrations change; principles do not” and that the main failure in U.S. public diplomacy since 9/11 stems from confusion regarding what it is we are defending, and against whom we are defending it (p. 9). Therefore, a nation must formulate the ideas that are so central to one’s life that one is not willing to live without them and there must be a broad consensus within it as to what those ideas are. Implicit in this statement is the acknowledgement that central ideas that form the foundation of a nation are consistent over time.

At first, Ellul (1965) seems to disagree with the principle of consistency when he states that “propaganda can indulge in sudden twists and turns...the propagandist does not necessarily have to worry about coherence and unity in his claims. Claims can be varied and even contradictory” (p. 18). However, the reason that propaganda does not necessarily need to be consistent is because it is merely the wave on the ocean that can move and vary, but it must always follow the larger current on which it rides. Thus “[d]irect propaganda, aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes, must be preceded by

propaganda that is sociological in character, slow, general, seeking to create a climate, an atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes. No direct propaganda can be effective without pre-propaganda” (p. 15). Only after having established total, direct, and continuous control over the propaganda, can the propagandist attempt to engage in sudden twists and turns. Also, Ellul argues that the “skillful propagandist will seek to obtain action without demanding consistency, without fighting prejudices and image, by taking his stance deliberately on inconsistencies” (p. 35). In other words, Ellul proposes indirect attacks on a person’s beliefs. If you try to directly attack a consistent view, then the pre-existing cognitive bias will reject the propaganda. Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) agree with this latter argument by Ellul. In their book, they discuss that people will seek to eliminate cognitive dissonance. Creating dissonance, i.e. being inconsistent, is a good way to get a message rejected. However, exposing dissonance in their pre-existing beliefs can change behaviors.

This principle of consistency is also expressed in other reviews of influence specifically addressing military use of the information environment as well as the principle of war itself. Cone, Rayfield, and Stach (2006) state that “[i]nformation exists in a continuum, from the tactical to the strategic, that must remain synchronized and coordinated to ensure ‘unity of effort’ or ‘unity of message’ at all levels. In order to be truly effective, all contributions to the informational component of national power (both military and diplomatic) must speak with the same voice and carry the same message” (p. 13). They further state that a second benefit provided by “unity of effort” is the ability to control the discussion, set the agenda, and maintain the desired idea in the minds of the target audience. Unity of effort is a principle of war taught in all U.S. military institutions of higher learning and provides reinforcing fires to the message, giving it greater impact, meaning, and importance. Finally, Dunlap (2006) proposed modifying the principles of war to account for changes in warfare in the modern age. One such principle is the concept of “Strategic Anchoring—consciously anchoring every action in a strategic context...In the information age, few objectives are exclusively tactical or operational, or even military...Each has latent strategic implications, some of profound importance” (p. 73).

Simon (1957) introduced the concept of bounded rationality, which states that the “capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality” (p. 198). Because of these limits, man must construct simplified models of reality and then work within this mental model. Heuer (1979) states that Simon’s theory was based on an understanding of psychological research on perception, memory, attention span, and reasoning capacity that documents human limitations in perception and cognition that cause us to employ simplifying strategies when processing information. Many of these biases are based on an inherent psychological need for consistency based upon prior commitments. For example, motivational biases (what we want to see) result from the need to perceive our past behavior as consistent. There are perceptual biases that indicate that we have a set of assumptions and biases about the motivations of people and that events that are consistent with these expectations are perceived and processed easily while contradictory evidence is ignored or distorted. Heuer continues to explain that these perceptual biases are often reinforced by organizational pressures favoring consistent interpretations. Heuer also discusses important cognitive biases (what we expect to see) including an oversensitivity to consistency when evaluating evidence. With this bias, people tend to “have more confidence in conclusions drawn from a very small body of consistent information than from a larger body of less consistent data” (p. 50). Heuer continues to use these perceptual and cognitive biases based upon Simon’s concept of bounded rationality to discuss their impact on one component of influence strategy (deception and counterdeception), but it is enough for the purposes of this paper to indicate the psychological basis and need for consistency

We not only propose that consistency is a main component of an effective influence strategy. We also propose a new construct (based upon statistical principles) of further subdividing the component of consistency into three sub-components. We propose the following construct, internal consistency, external consistency and construct consistency. Internal consistency implies that the argument is logical internally.

“Although some social movements might question issues of logic and reason, most value rational thought and argument. Popular intellectuals who are inconsistent might appear wavering, ill-informed, or hypocritical” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 168). Internal consistency should also ensure the messages are consistent with each other. External consistency implies consistency of words and deeds. An effective narrative must be the primary consideration over actions (not equal or subordinate) and the actions must flow from and be consistent with the information strategy. As Ellul’s (1965) concept of orthopraxy indicates, “Oral or written propaganda, which plays on opinions or sentiments, must be reinforced by propaganda of action, which produces new attitudes and thus joins the individual firmly to a certain movement” (p. 15). This “action makes propaganda’s effect irreversible...[man]...is now obliged to believe in that propaganda because of his past action” (p. 29). Arquilla (2009) states that the most important aspect in engaging the enemy at the level of ideas “will lie in improving our use of strategic communications and public diplomacy...[which necessitates that]...there should be special attention given to the role that physical actions play in message sending. Unambiguously clear actions...make it harder for the enemy’s propaganda to take hold, and make it more likely that our own intended message will come through the clutter” (p. 8). Construct consistency implies that the major theories and underlying assumptions and terms, as well as the messages themselves, are consistent over time. Otherwise, any inconsistency may call into question the basis and process of judgment which then may call into doubt the veracity of the frame in question (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

2. Legitimacy

The second principle, legitimacy, also appears intuitive. Unlike consistency, it is more prevalent in the above principles; however, like consistency, legitimacy can occur in many forms. At its most basic level, legitimacy is derived from the pure Manichean distinction between good and evil. This moral justification is important in framing social movements since movement groups must “distinguish themselves from other groups...[and]...justify its *raison d’être*...[by drawing]...sharp in-group/out-group distinctions. This often generates stark bifurcations...the world is divided into two

camps in Manichean fashion” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, pp. 164-165). This provides both sides with “a sword as well as armour” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 336). The trick is trying to justify why one side is good and one side is bad. “The propagandist must insist on the purity of his own intentions and, at the same time, hurl accusations at his enemy...the mechanism used here is to slip from the facts...to moral terrain and to ethical judgment” (Ellul, 1965, p. 58). Moral legitimacy can be justified through religion where one group is defined as truly devoted to God (and into the best interests of the group) as opposed to selfish (morally corrupt) purposes. Moral legitimacy can also be justified by philosophical or rational appeal to universal principles. Sometimes moral legitimacy is simply assumed simply due to in-group/out-group distinctions, an implied connection to something that is believed to be inherently good or evil, or by positions of authority or status.

Although Cialdini (1993) does not directly label moral legitimacy as a key principle, three out of six of his principles are directly relevant to this component. With the principle of reciprocity, people are morally defined as good or bad depending on if they choose to follow this societal principle. Similarly, his principles of liking and authority are based on the concept that we unconsciously assign good, positive traits to some people based either on cognitive bias, perceived beauty, or inherent legitimacy based upon a positive social role. For this reason, we are more likely to be persuaded by them. Moral legitimacy is the primary basis behind Tugwell’s (1990) mobilizing trinity. The entire process is based upon labeling one side as good and the other side as evil. One side operates from strong beliefs in their own righteousness, in the evil of their enemies, and in eventual victory. Since these beliefs are essential to continued operations, Tugwell specifies that attempts to delegitimize or neutralize hostile trinities are the number one priority in any conflict. Interestingly, Simon (1957) is most direct about the relationship about influence and legitimacy: “It is clear from the definition that authority is a form of influence: when A exercises authority over B, he exercises influence over B...authority denotes power based on legitimacy” (p. 75).

One of the strategies proposed by Pratkanis and Aronson (2001) is to focus on source credibility (a key part of legitimacy) since the communicator must appear to possess attributes (such as authority) that facilitate positive reception of the message. Therefore, much of their tactics concern ways of building credibility or trying to associate concepts with other items that are inherently good or bad. Finally, Reilly (2009) again argues that by using pop culture the U.S. actually undermined its own justness and is perceived as deliberately trying to corrupt youth (evil), thereby undermining credibility as a serious superpower. Further, U.S. attempts to establish the moral legitimacy of “multiculturalism” as a common value or to divert attention away from the difference between the western world and the Muslim world actually serve to further fan the flames since Muslims are likely to be insulted further by attempts to devalue the importance of religion or distract believers from its primacy in their everyday lives. To fight and win a war of ideas, you have to understand and articulate the justness of your cause. Arquilla (2009) stated that “it is the perceived justice of our cause that will determine ‘whose story wins’...This is the key to success at the narrative level...All the rest is commentary” (p. 58). Ellul, Pratkanis, and Cialdini’s work may illuminate the methods and techniques available to establish the ultimate moral legitimacy of our cause in the minds of our adversaries.

From a strategic perspective, almost any conflict can be simplified to a disagreement over political goals. When such conflicts, whether purely diplomatic, low-intensity, terrorist, insurgent, or full-scale war, exist; there is an automatic assigning of one side versus another side. However the two sides try to justify it (referring to religious beliefs, philosophical beliefs, or implied value beliefs), one side is considered good and the other side is evil. In order to maintain support, each side must then frame their argument to show what the problem is and how they propose to fix the problem. Depending on how the issue is framed, people will choose to support one side or another. Directly attacking their property, lives, or deeply held convictions only serves to galvanize their position and create additional moral justification. In any case, the only key to victory is to either remove the underlying conflict or to undermine the support of the opposing side by forcing them to question the moral legitimacy of the group or the

inconsistency between the group's goals and other potential solutions to the problem. Any kinetic solution must be regarded only as a holding action until longer-term strategies are able to work. Therefore, we posit our first sub-hypothesis 1: that to be most effective, the narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate. (A narrative may be modestly effective if it is either consistent or morally legitimate, but will not be effective if it is neither consistent nor morally legitimate).

B. SOCIAL

The next level of analysis is the social level. Everton (2009) lays out two interrelated but analytically distinct topographical dimensions of networks that appear to affect network performance: the (1) provincial-cosmopolitan and (2) heterarchical-hierarchical dimensions. The first topographical dimension is based upon Granovetter's study (1973, 1974) which found that people were far more likely to have used personal contacts than other means in finding their current job; but the more critical factor was that most jobs were found through weak ties (i.e., acquaintances) rather than strong ones (i.e., close friends). As Everton (2009) cites "weak ties often connected otherwise disconnected groups. Thus, whatever is to be spread (e.g., information, influence, and other types of resources), it will reach a greater number of people when it passes through weak ties rather than strong ones" (p. 3). Stark (2007) defines provincial ties as consisting primarily of strong, redundant ties with very few weak ties as contrasted with cosmopolitan ties as consisting of numerous weak ties and very few strong ties. Everton (2009) cites several examples which indicates that social network density has a curvilinear (or inverted U) relationship such that individuals who are embedded in very sparse (i.e., cosmopolitan) and very dense (i.e., provincial) social networks are far more likely to commit suicide, engage in deviant behavior, fail in organizational goals (marketing or writing musicals) than are people who are embedded in moderately dense networks. Everton's second dimension, heterarchical versus hierarchical identifies two ideal types of organizational form on either end of a spectrum: networks, which are decentralized, informal and/or organic, versus hierarchies, which are centralized, formal and/or bureaucratic. Everton proposes that "networks that are too provincial (i.e., dense,

high levels of clustering, an overabundance of strong ties) too cosmopolitan (i.e., sparse, low levels of clustering, an overabundance of weak ties), too hierarchical (i.e., centralized, low levels of variance) and/or too heterarchical (i.e., decentralized, high levels of variance) tend not to perform as well as networks that maintain a balance between these extremes” (p. 2). He also provides a graphic depiction of his hypothesis, included below:




Figure 3. Hypothesized relationship between network topography and effectiveness (From Everton, 2009)

Everton (2009) lists several ways of using social network analysis tools and calculations to determine the network topography and proposes that strategy ought to be based on an understanding of the network topography more than simply identifying and taking action on key nodes within the network itself. The network topology can be seen as the interaction between the informal, emergent properties based upon the social ties (trust, kinship) which is mediated by the level of properties by a specific organization as espoused in its doctrine. Sub-hypothesis 2: organizations are more effective when the organization topography (as measured by the density of connections and organizational design) is medium (versus low or high).

C. ORGANIZATIONAL

Obviously, there is some overlap between the network topology of a social group and the level of organizational design, the heterarchical versus hierarchical distinction. The term ‘network’ itself is often difficult to define. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) highlight the proliferation and confusion over the concept of network highlighting at least three distinct usages. The first one the authors discuss defines networks in terms of the communications grids and circuits which form the technological backbone for the organization enabling information sharing and flow (a very limited view). The two other prominent usages refer “either to social networks or to organizational networks (or to a conflation of both). But social and organizational networks are somewhat different organisms” (p. 315). The social level of analysis focuses on networks as sets of actors (nodes) and the links or ties between them, which form a patterned structure of the social relationship of its members. This is an informal and highly fluid structural pattern that shifts based upon changes in the relationship among its members. A social network simply consists of a finite set or sets of actors that share ties with one another (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 21). However, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) distinguish between social networks that consider any set of actors that have any kind of tie (trust, familial, etc.) as a network versus a distinct form of organization (as different from other organizational designs such as hierarchies or matrices) where individuals recognize that they are operating in a specific network and are committed to operating as a network. The network form of organization is often viewed by organizational network analysts as having “advantages over other (e.g., hierarchical) forms, such as flexibility, adaptability, and speed of response” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 319).

Using this latter definition of network for the organizational level of analysis, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) then define three major typologies of networks: chains, hubs, and all-channel meshes. The authors also acknowledge that there are also complex combinations and hybrids of networks as well as organizational designs that are hybrids of networks and hierarchies, which in fact cover the predominant majority of organizations vice the “pure” types listed above. Terrorists and other violent netwar

actors often operate as dark networks since these covert networks “must have a very flexible structure that enables them to react quickly to changing pressures from nation-states and other opponents in order to survive”; the network form is an optimizing function based upon their need for stealth and secrecy (Raab & Milward, 2003, p. 431). Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) “often posit that it may take networks to fight networks. Yet, government interagency design...will have to be built around hybrids of hierarchies and networks” (p. 327). Thus we posit sub-hypothesis 3: that organizations that are hybrids of networks and hierarchies are more effective at influencing others than either pure networks or pure hierarchies.

D. DOCTRINAL

As discussed above, this level of analysis is critical for understanding how members of an organization are enabled to operate both strategically and tactically. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) highlight two key doctrinal practices that are particularly useful for covert networks. The first is to organize and present as “leaderless” a network as much as possible. The lack of central leadership prevents opponents from being able to cut the head off the snake making the organization defunct. However, “leadership remains important, even though the protagonists may make every effort to have a leaderless design” (p. 327). The second principle is the importance of swarming strategies and tactics. Swarms are small, distributed, semi-autonomous groups that are capable of converging simultaneously on a target (swarming) or multiple targets, attacking the target(s) from multiple angles, and then quickly dispersing after an attack to prepare for the next attack. One such example of swarming techniques included the simultaneous suicide attacks in February 2009 of three Afghan government ministries in Kabul by a total of just eight terrorists following a “new “Mumbai model” of swarming, smaller-scale terrorist violence...[where]...hitting several targets at once, even with just a few fighters at each site, can cause fits for elite counterterrorist forces that are often manpower-heavy, far away and organized to deal with only one crisis at a time...[similar to]... Mumbai, India, last November, where five two-man teams of Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives held the city hostage for two days, killing 179 people” (Arquilla, 2009). This

generates our fourth sub-hypothesis: organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) continue to state that the key to the performance of networks depends “on the existence of shared principles and practices that span all nodes and to which the members subscribe in a deep way” (p. 333). It is the strength of the narrative that keeps individuals bound and committed to the organization. Therefore, we propose sub-hypothesis 5: Swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak.

E. TECHNOLOGICAL

The final level of analysis is the technological level which covers the pattern and capacity of information flow using technology. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) state that the new information and communications technologies have been crucial for enabling network forms of organization and doctrine. The most recent and prominent example of the technological importance is the rise in the use of cyberspace by covert networks. Arquilla (2009) highlights the “tremendous capacity of cyberspace to act as a spreading device for narrative” (p. 41). As noted above, McLuhan considers the medium of the message as more important than the content of the message itself. Many other analysts, politicians, and military strategists stress the importance of technology especially the need to continuously strive for newer and better technologies as the key for waging future warfare. Yet, “netwar can be waged without necessarily having access to the internet and other advanced technologies...Human couriers and face-to-face meetings may still remain essential, especially for secretive actors like terrorists and criminals” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 339). Often, covert networks may find that they gain an asymmetric advantage over their enemy by relying on low-tech or no technology especially when their opponent is heavily invested in technology. Therefore, we posit sub-hypothesis 6: that technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organizational effectiveness.

V. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

A. HYPOTHESES

From our preliminary literature review, we propose to test one main hypothesis and several additional sub-hypotheses grouped by the five levels of analysis (as discussed above).

H1: The most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient).

1. Narrative

Sub-hypothesis 1: To be most effective, the narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate. (A narrative may be modestly effective if it is either consistent or morally legitimate, but will not be effective if it is neither consistent nor morally legitimate).

2. Social

Sub-hypothesis 2: Organizations are more effective when the organizational density (as measured by tight coupling of connections, levels of clustering, and ratio of strong vs. weak ties) is medium (versus low or high).

3. Organization

Sub-hypothesis 3: Organizations that are hybrids of networks and hierarchies are more effective at influencing others than either pure networks or pure hierarchies

4. Doctrinal

Sub-hypothesis 4: Organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command.

Sub-hypothesis 5: Swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak.

5. Technological

Sub-hypothesis 6: Technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organization effectiveness.

B. DESIGN FRAMEWORK/METHODS

By using a comparative study, we are able to identify patterns that would be difficult to identify through just single-case phenomena. As stated by Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, “single-case studies...have considerable virtues, notable depth and richness of detail; but for purposes of theory building single-case studies also suffer from profound limitations, most prominently in overemphasizing the unique features of each case” (p. 15). By adapting a similar comparative case methodology, there is a structure and focus to the design of the study.

1. Choosing Representative Case Studies

To choose the case studies for structured comparison, we selected five major strategic conflicts over the past century that have had major impacts on how influence operations are conducted, namely: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and the current conflict of U.S. and allies versus trans-national Jihadi terrorists.

As stated earlier, to help structure the case studies, we will use a structured/focused comparison approach by asking the following questions:

- 1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)?
- 2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)?
- 3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)?
- 4) Is the narrative morally legitimate?
- 5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other source?

- 6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two?
- 7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, hierarchy, or hybrid?
- 8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices?
- 9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices?
- 10) Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium?
- 11) What was the political goal (end)? Was it achieved?
- 12) What other capabilities (means) were used? Relative importance of the other capabilities in achieving the end?

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. COMPARATIVE STUDY 1: THE BOER WAR

A. BACKGROUND

First, it is important to note that the Boer War actually has many synonymous names: the Anglo-Boer War, the Great Anglo-Boer War, the Second War of Independence, etc. which may all be used interchangeably in this chapter. The war was fought in the southernmost part of Africa (see map below) and consisted mainly of the British (Anglos, or Khakis) against the Boers (Afrikaners). The Boers (the word means “farmers”) were a distinct people created by the merger of Dutch colonists in the 1650’s, French Huguenot refugees in 1688, and German immigrants soon after. For reasons which will be discussed below, the Boers declared war on 11 October 1899. The “British public expected it to be over by Christmas [but] it proved to be the longest (two and three quarter years), the costliest (over £200 million), the bloodiest (at least twenty-two thousand British [out of approximately 450,000 troops], twenty-five thousand Boer [out of approximately 87,000] and twelve thousand African lives)...for Britain between 1815 and 1914” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xix).

The Boer War is often overshadowed in historical analysis due to the fact that it was followed quickly by both World War I and World War II. However, it is important to analyze this war from an influence strategy perspective “because it was the first major British War since the advent of mass literacy after the 1870 Forster Education Act [therefore] There was a mass readership anxious to read the popular press, while technical advances in telegraphy and news gathering had transformed the methods and scope of the British newspaper industry” (Morgan, 2002, p. 2). Badsey (1999) continues to note that by “the revolution in communications technology...allowed...the transfer of information on scales, at speeds, and over distances that were unprecedented in human history” (p. 2). This communication technology included the electric telegraph, the cine-camera, and the widespread use of lightweight still cameras which allowed dramatic images to be sent back to England for popular consumption “making it possible for the first time for events on a distant battlefield to be reported to the metropolis, by methods

other than those under government and military control, with sufficient speed to have direct political consequences” (Badsey, 1999, p. 2).



Figure 4. Map of South Africa, 1899–1902 (From Farwell, 1976)

However, the “developments of most importance before the war were the introduction 1896 by Alfred Harmsworth of the London *Daily Mail* as the first popular circulation newspaper, and the establishment in 1898 of the Imperial Penny Post which

made it possible for letters to be sent virtually anywhere in the Empire. This, together with the telegraph, meant that the Boer War could be reported in a manner and on a scale not seen before in history” (Badsey, 1999, p. 2). And reported it was, there were probably over 200 individuals involved in the media process at the height of the war and included reports by such prominent people as Rudyard Kipling, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Winston Churchill, and the first woman war reporter, Lady Sarah Wilson (Badsey, 1999; Morgan, 2002). The scale and availability of communication and media also allowed for pro-Boer or anti-British sentiments such as the graphic reports of concentration camps by Emily Hobhouse as well as pro-Boer newspapers in England such as the *Daily News*. As Morgan notes: “the Boer War was a seminal and crucial period in the evolution of the British press. It launched a new phase in Britain’s self-definition and self-image” (p. 8).

B. HISTORICAL PRELUDE

The Boers were rugged people who disliked any government control (which was originally Dutch under the Dutch East Africa Company, before transferring to the British in 1795). The British government took permanent possession of Cape Colony in 1806. In 1834, England ordered slaves to be emancipated throughout all of its colonies. This led to the Great Trek of 1835–1837 where about 5,000 *voortrekkers* (Boer pioneers) pushed Northeast into the frontiers and established two new Boer republics: Transvaal and the Orange Free State. As can be inferred from one of the names, what is now called the Boer War is actually the second war that occurred between the British (in Cape Colony and Natal, a second Boer colony which England annexed in 1843) and the Boers (in Transvaal and the Orange Free State). In 1877, England annexed Transvaal in an attempt to federate South Africa. The first war began as a rebellion in December 1880 and lasted until August 1881 when British forces were ordered to arrange an armistice following the last battle of the war at Majuba where British forces were completely overrun: “never before in its long history had British arms suffered such a humiliating defeat: a group of unsoldierly farm boys had completely routed a British force containing...some of the most famous regiments in the British army, and a force, moreover, that was six times larger than that of the Boers and in what ought to have been

an impregnable position” (Farwell, 1976, p. 19). During the armistice, Transvaal regained its independence under Paul Kruger, later elected President of Transvaal.

In 1870, there was a diamond-rush to Kimberly (a town in Cape Colony). Then in 1886, there was a gold rush to the *Witwatersrand*, or the Rand, in Transvaal, which made it the richest nation in South Africa with a powerful military. Most of the new immigrants, Uitlanders (or outlanders), to the Transvaal were British. Yet Transvaal had very strict franchise laws which prevented the immigrants from gaining any political rights even though the immigrants now outnumbered the Boers. “In 1895 two multi-millionaires, Cecil Rhodes and Alfred Beit, conspired to take over the Transvaal for themselves and the Empire” by seizing upon the political hunger of the Uitlanders (Pakenham, 1979, p. xiv). The resulting Jameson Raid ended up being a complete fiasco. Four hundred Rhodesian police (Rhodesia was a new British Colony established and administered by Rhodes and Beit) plus one hundred and twenty five volunteers from Cape Colony rode to Johannesburg in Transvaal to ostensibly support a planned uprising by the Uitlanders in Transvaal for political rights. However, when the Jameson group reached the outskirts of Johannesburg, their Uitlander friends did not revolt as planned, but had made peace with the Boers. In the resulting skirmish, the Jameson group had sixteen dead and forty-nine wounded compared to one dead Boer. “The Jameson Raid was the real declaration of war in the Great Anglo-Boer conflict...in spite of the four year truce that followed” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 1).

Despite the four-year truce, there were several conflicts involving the Afrikaners (Boers) who still lived in British-controlled Cape Colony as well as conflicts involving British Uitlanders who lived in Transvaal, which culminated when one drunk Uitlander was shot by a Boer policeman. This led to an Uitlander protest (funded by Rhodes and Beit) in which the Uitlanders appealed to England for protection. There were several attempts by President Kruger of Transvaal to offer reforms to avoid war with England, but the British representative of Cape Colony, Milner, deliberately prevented any truce from being signed between England and Transvaal to precipitate a war. Transvaal understood that Milner was deliberately trying to incite a war and thus decided to take the

offensive with the assistance of their ally, the Orange Free State, and laid siege to two British towns: Ladysmith in Natal and Mafeking in Cape Colony thus officially starting the Boer War.

C. SUMMARY OF THE WAR

As stated earlier, the Boers declared war on 11 October 1899. The war began as a traditional war with Boer sieges of two British towns. The British tried to march relief forces to these two towns, but used direct frontal assaults by infantry at close-rank despite lethal, accurate, and rapid fire, due to the recent revolution in small arms, by the Boers. The Boer commandos (individual army units) also took advantage of defensive positions in trenches using smokeless gunpowder and supporting artillery resulting in frustration, delays, and massive casualties by the British at key points such as: Modder River, Riet River, Magersfontein, Colenso, and Spion Kop. Despite the lack of any strategic, operational, or tactical brilliance by the British, they finally managed to relieve Ladysmith and Mafeking by the application of sheer brute force. Following the relief of the two towns, British forces continued to mass and finally marched into the heart of Transvaal and the Orange Free State taking over the capitals: Pretoria and Bloemfontein, respectively. The Boers were then forced to resort to a guerrilla campaign in their republics while trying to raid and inspire revolt by Afrikaners in the British colonies. However, the British forces continued to track down Boer forces while following a scorched earth policy and creating “concentration camps” in Transvaal and the Orange Free State, all of which eventually forced the Boers to surrender in 1902.

D. DATA

As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused comparison approach to explore the selected case studies. Thus data is structured below as answers to each of our stated focus questions.

1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?

Morgan (2002) states that the British newspapers focused [primarily] on home readers” (p. 13). From our quick review of the history leading up to the war, we can see

that England was very inconsistent with its narrative towards the Boers and the two Boer republics beginning with the emancipation of the slaves in 1835: for “the next sixty years the British government blew hot and cold in its dealings with the Boers” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xiii). “Wavering British attitudes were reflected in wavering British policies over a long period” (p. 10). In fact, during “most of the century British policy was weak and vacillating...On three occasions a positive attempt was made to solve the Boer question by adopting an active ‘forward’ (that is, expansionist) policy. On each occasion...impatience and the see-saw of party politics” led to disaster (Pakenham, 1979, p. 7). The most important example was the first Anglo-Boer conflict after the British tried to enact their expansionist policy by annexing Transvaal. After a relatively brief conflict with a minor skirmish (especially compared with those that would occur later, the “British wanted peace. The Transvaal did not seem important enough to shed blood over” (Farwell, 1976, p. 19). Several years later, after the Jameson Raid fiasco, England still did not attempt to exert its influence over Transvaal. Pakenham (1979) refers to England’s “bigger blunders: years of drift and compromise” (p. 7). So when the British reversed their policy again in 1899 and decided to support the petition by the Uitlanders for protection, many within the Boer leadership again felt that if there was a war with England where she suffered any major setback; England would once again change its position and leave Transvaal free to govern itself. In fact, despite the petitions by the Uitlanders, many people within England were reluctant to go to war with the Boers again, but Milner was “determined to reverse Chamberlain’s ‘no-war policy’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 120).

The narrative also changed during the course of the war. Many believed that the root cause of the war was a combination of imperialism and greed which we shall address in greater detail when discussing the legitimacy of the war. In fact, the Boers were “often compared favourably with the cosmopolitan and shifting population in the goldfields of the Rand whom the British were supposedly defending” (Morgan, 2002, p. 5). However, England also declared ‘lofty’ principles to justify its participation in the war. The first being “we are bound to show that we are both willing and able to protect British subjects (Uitlanders] everywhere when they are made to suffer from oppression and

injustice...The second principle is that in the interests of the British Empire, Great Britain must remain the paramount Power in South Africa” (Farwell, 1976, p. 31). The protection of British subjects, Uitlanders, soon morphed into a need to provide protection for the natives and colored people under oppression, particularly when most of the Uitlanders fled the Boer republics at the beginning of the conflict. However, as the war slowly progressed, “in the popular mind, the Uitlanders and their problems were already forgotten and the reason for fighting was reduced to the slogan: ‘Avenge Majuba!’” (Farwell, 1976, p. 142). Thus, we can safely conclude that the British narrative was definitely not consistent over time.

The Boer narrative consisted of three main components. The first was their dislike of any form of government, especially British imperial control. “To Africa these pilgrim Fathers brought a tradition of dissent and a legacy of resentment against Europe...the Boers of the frontier, resented imperial interference” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xiii); “the terms of the ultimatum...were absolutely uncompromising...It accused Britain of breaking the London convention of 1884 by interfering in the internal affairs of the Transvaal” (p. 104); “from the beginning they were discontented with the rule of the Dutch East India Company” (Farwell, 1976, p. 4); the “Boer complained of too much government and the British settlers of too little” (p. 6); and “the Boers left, carrying with them an abiding sense of injury and injustice, a bitter hatred of the British who had robbed them of their land for which they had fought and bled” (p. 9).

The second component of their narrative was just as consistent, if not morally questionable: slavery. “The *voortrekkers* (pioneers) quarreled among themselves, but shared one article of faith: to deny political rights to Africans and Coloured people of mixed race” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xiii) for “the Boers believed in the right of every white man to ‘beat his own nigger’ and that the relationship between a master and his servants and slaves was a private, domestic affair” (Farwell, 1976, p. 5). Again, as we saw in the brief overview leading to the Boer War, it was the decree by London that all slaves should be emancipated in her colonies which precipitated the Great Trek.

The third component of the Boer narrative was the refusal to grant political rights to the Uitlanders until they had been franchised. Although the basic premise of the narrative was expressed consistently, it was applied very inconsistently. “The reluctance of the Boers to give the Uitlanders the franchise was understandable...but they were unsophisticated in their methods. Before 1882 only one year’s residence had been required...then the requirement was raised to five years. In 1890 fear of the uitlander vote caused the volksraad to raise the residency requirement to fourteen years, and the clamour grew” (Farwell, 1976, p. 31). The fear of the Uitlander vote was not just paranoia, but seemed an existential threat. The “uitlander population increased so rapidly that it was frightening: they were fast outnumbering the Boers themselves, and they made little or no effort to settle into Boer ways; they were in fact strident in their demands for concession...they wanted things done the right way. Their way” (Farwell, 1976, p. 21). During the negotiations leading up to the war, the Boers were willing to reduce the franchise to five years applied retroactively to prevent war, but by then Milner was dead set on war and sabotaged the negotiation process. Overall, the Boer narrative was consistent over time, but morally questionable.

2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?

Although the British narrative consisted of protecting all of its subjects, non-colored and colored, they continued to place undue emphasis on the security of their white subjects. Milner’s second principle “was to secure the loyalty of the very men—the Uitlanders—who were determined to keep the natives oppressed. And this second principle, of course, took priority...even if the ultimate solution was to see the natives ‘justly governed’” (Pakenham, 1979, p.121). Additionally, the Uitlanders were just as grievous as the Boers in their treatment of the colored population. There “was only one set of laws in the Transvaal that the Uitlanders considered really ‘excellent’: the laws ‘to keep the niggers in their place’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 124). More to the point, despite winning the war, during the peace conference the British allowed the “‘question of political rights of natives to be settled by colonists themselves’...[which]...made mockery of Chamberlain’s claim that one of Britain’s war aims was to improve the status

of Africans” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 599). Additionally, Beit and Wernher’s (the British financiers of the Rand goldmines) “strongest single motive for making that secret alliance with Milner, which had set Britain and the Transvaal on a collision course, was to reduce the cost of African labour on the Rand” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 270). “It was illogical, he thought; for like almost all other patriotic Englishmen, Churchill refused to believe that this was a war fought to win control of the gold-mines” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 451).

The Boer narrative is also logically inconsistent. The three basic strands of the narrative are contradictory to each other. The primary theme is nationalism and the expressed belief that they should be free to rule their country without interference from an external imperial power. Yet, the Boers then denied political rights and autonomy that they so coveted from the majority of the population (both Uitlanders and their native African slaves and servants).

3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?

Both sides claimed that this was to be a “white man’s war.” As such, both sides expected the opponent to abide by certain rules of civilized war. The First Peace Conference at Hague declared that dumdums (bullets created to expand on contact making wounds by them much more gruesome than those of standard bullets) were “too barbarous to use...[yet] both sides indignantly accused the other side of using them, and there is ample and reliable evidence that both sides did” (Farwell, 1976, p. 41). On the topic of weapons not to be used in a civilized war, the Boers particularly hated the cavalry, “for they regarded the lance as a barbarous weapon—a long-handled assegai—not to be used by civilized men” (Farwell, 1976, p. 73). The assegai was a particularly lethal weapon used by the Zulus and other South African tribes against the Boers during the expansion and Great Trek. Additionally some Boers felt that it was un-Christian to attack a fleeing enemy, which the cavalry excelled at. Both sides accused the other of misusing and abusing the white flag during battle with reports that some soldiers would fly the white flag to draw the enemy out while other concealed soldiers would then shoot them. Plus, despite “the twelve-foot-high Red Cross flag...shells crashed into the field hospitals beside the military camp. A stampede ensued” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 146). Yet,

some times the incongruity ran the other way: “I bayoneted him as gently as I could. And I gave him water, too”; “Churchill was puzzled by the contrast between the violent words and the generous acts” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 381). There are multiple other instances where the two sides were found to behave in a civilized manner during the war despite being at war, such as refusing to shell each other or fight on Sundays in some places, or playing cricket against each other in other places. Interestingly, Morgan (2002) notes that after the war “the British media attempted to project the chivalrous, almost light-hearted nature of the war...the atrocities were forgotten...The Afrikaaner Deneys Reitz...commended English officers and men for their general humanity on the field of battle” (p. 14).

The other side of the inconsistency with calling it a “white man’s war” was the impact of the war on the Africans: “perhaps as many as a hundred thousand were enrolled to serve the British and Boers...nearly ten thousand Africans were serving under arms in the British forces. Many non-combatants were flogged by the Boers or shot. In Mafeking alone, more than two thousand...were shot by the Boers or left by Baden-Powell [British officer later famous for establishing the Boy Scouts] to die of starvation” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xxi). “The siege pinched the Africans worst...coloured children died at an annual rate of 93.5 per cent...To say that Rhodes deliberately starved his African workers to death would be absurd...Still, the business-like principles that governed the running of the Kimberly compounds did not allow much room for sentiment” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 341). One British officer had served at Omdurman and had seen fifteen thousand Dervish corpses, yet in a battle in the Boer War where 158 British soldiers had been killed and 221 wounded, “somehow this was different. ‘White corpses are...far more repulsive than black...Civilized war is awful’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 288). “Now the Africans found that their celebrations of Roberts’ victory...had been premature...This was one set of Transvaal laws that the conqueror’s had no intention of changing: the laws affecting the natives...now to be applied with an efficiency that the Boers had never been able to muster” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 454).

One final inconsistency between words and deeds was the practice of the British army under Lord Kitchener of sweeping the *veld* clean, burning farms, looting, and putting women and children in concentration camps to deny the guerrillas food and intelligence in the latter stages of the war. Between twenty and twenty-eight thousand Boer civilians died in the concentration camps and these methods were often “self-defeating...The removal of civilians added to the bitterness of the guerrillas. It also freed them from trying to feed and protect their families...Kitchener’s methods...proved a gigantic political blunder. The conscience of Britain was stirred by the holocaust in the camps” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xxii). The key figure in this was Emily Hobhouse, whose “graphic description of the mass deaths in the concentration camps in 1901 was fully reported in the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Speaker*, and other Liberal journals and had a powerful impact on opinion” (Morgan, 2002, p. 11). Morgan continues to note that with Hobhouse’s “horrific news (and pictures) of the mass burial of thousands of tiny children and their mothers, imperialism lost the moral high ground...Her devastating findings soon had an immense impact on the public consciousness...Henceforth imperialists like Joseph Chamberlain were swimming against the tide of opinion and the public conscience...It all reinforced the part that the media played in leading the way in promoting an increasingly negative, guilt-ridden view of the once-glorious war in South Africa” (pp. 11–12). The increasing publicity over the concentration camps created moral outrage and led to significant changes in media reporting and the political process as typified in a speech by the Liberal Leader of the opposition, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in 1901: “A phrase often used is ‘war is war’. But when one comes to ask about it, one is told that no war is going on—that is not war. When is a war not a war? When it is carried on by methods of barbarism in South Africa” (as cited by Badsey, 1999, p. 8).

Kitchener’s legacy in South Africa “is the camp—‘concentration camp’, as it came to be called. The camps have left a gigantic scar across the minds of the Afrikaners: a symbol of deliberate genocide” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 524). “At least twenty thousand whites and twelve thousand coloured people had died in the concentration camps, the majority from epidemics of measles and typhoid that could have been

avoided” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 549). Despite, the horrid conditions in the camp, one of Kitchener’s most decisive weapons occurred by accident as a result of the political and moral backlash against the camps. By the end of 1901, Kitchener reversed the concentration camp policy. However, “this was perhaps the most effective of all anti-guerrilla weapons...It was effective precisely because, contrary to the Liberals’ convictions, it was less humane than bringing them into the camps,” since the only other alternative was to leave the civilians stranded in the inhospitable veld after a scorched earth policy (Pakenham, 1979, p. 581).

4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?

In line with the inconsistency of the British narrative, England itself prophetically implied that a war in South Africa would be immoral as seen by a quote by Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, speaking to the House of Commons in 1896: “‘A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars...in the nature of a Civil War...a long war, a bitter war and a costly war...to go to war with President Kruger, to force upon him reforms in the internal affairs of his state, with which [we] have repudiated all right of interference—that would have been a course of action as immoral as it would have been unwise’,” yet it was a course England would embark on four years later (Pakenham, 1979, p. 18). Chamberlain did not only prophesy the role of a moral issue in England’s involvement in the war, but also had knowledge of the plan by Rhodes and Beit to conduct the infamous Jameson Raid in 1895 leaving him and other political leaders in London “to tread a moral and political tightrope” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 21). So what would serve as a legitimate narrative to justify war?

Although England stated that one intent of the war was to end the “ill-treatment of coloured British subjects, [their] plight would hardly wring the heart of everyone in England” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 39). Meanwhile, Milner was intent on increasing the imperial power of England while Rhodes and Beit wanted unfettered access to the goldmines of the Rand. Between their maneuvering and scheming, they propped up the issue of the Uitlanders who “were treated like ‘an inferior race, little better than Kaffirs or Indians whose oppression has formed the subject of many complaints’” (Pakenham,

1979, p. 91). Yet England realized that Milner, the Uitlanders, and Beit “had outmanoevred Chamberlain and the Cabinet. ‘His [Milner’s] view is too heated...But it reckes little to think of that now. What he has done cannot be effaced. We have to act upon a moral field prepared for us by him and his jingo supporters’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 93).

From the Boer standpoint, “morally the most powerful and the most unyielding...was to keep alight, in its purest form, the fierce flame of Afrikaner nationalism” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 197). The key point of the Boer narrative as expressed in the quote above was nationalism, freedom from the dictates of an over-bearing imperial government, and the inherent right to set their own policies. Analyzing just this part of the narrative, many would undoubtedly claim that the Boer narrative is morally legitimate. When viewed retrospectively, the question becomes morally ambiguous (and inconsistent) when one factors in the methods by which the Boers sought to maintain their national control (by denying franchise and ultimately any political rights to the Uitlanders) as well as one of their main points of contention (that the Boers should be allowed to have slaves and treat them in any manner they deem fit). However, in all three strands of their narrative, the Boers themselves viewed their narrative as morally legitimate while the British reluctantly may have considered only nationalism as morally legitimate as seen above. Interestingly, the Boers tried to avoid war by giving in to British demands, such as reducing the time for British subjects, Uitlanders, to franchise all while trying to preserve only the most basic part of their narrative, their right to self-rule; but the British by this time continued to push for war while fearing the lack of any moral standing. Chamberlain once told Milner: “‘I dread above all the whittling away of differences until we have no *casus belli* left’” (Farwell, 1976, p. 36).

5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?

The British viewed the source of their moral legitimacy as purely philosophical and it consisted of two parts. The first part consisted of “British concepts of justice and humanity [which] conflicted with those of Britain’s truculent white South African

subjects” with which many people would agree with today (Farwell, 1976, p. 5). The second part of their philosophy was the English belief at the time that they had an imperial duty and right as a superior race to protect, rule, and administer over any inferior race or country (see Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden” published in 1899 as an example). The Boers “were often described in animal terms as ‘herds’ or ‘flocks’, whose defeat by the superior civilization of the British was an inevitable result of social Darwinism and the influence of the scientific principle of natural selection” (Morgan, 2002, p. 5). As Farwell (1976) explains, the “concept of an imperial mission, of the desirability—the nobility even—of one nation assuming suzerainty over another, or of one nation arrogating itself a position of paramountcy in a part of the world containing other nations, is today an unpopular one. Yet it was commonly held prior to World War I” (p. 30). Yet, some imperialists expanded this popular philosophical notion even further: “To believe, as Milner did, that other races or people of other cultures ought not to rule over Englishmen, that it was not right that they do so, that it was somehow morally wrong—this was a new conception of the imperial doctrine” (Farwell, 1976, p. 28). Based upon this philosophy, England was morally honor-bound to “take under its imperial wing this immoral, bankrupt country” (Farwell, 1976, p. 11).

The source of moral legitimacy for the Boers had two components. The first was experience-based. During the early periods of colonization, expansion, and the Great Trek, the Boers were frequently attacked by the native Africans and forced to defend themselves against hordes of what they perceived as barbaric people. Therefore, they viewed it as morally legitimate to kill Africans and keep them subjugated as slaves in defense (without consideration for the fact that they were encroaching on their lands). Based upon this belief, several British government practices were clearly immoral. “To them it appeared monstrous that the government would send Hottentots [Africans] to arrest a white man. Even more monstrous that the government would sanction Hottentots killing a white man—and this over a mere matter of a man’s treatment of his servant...The executions were, from the British point of view, a simple act of justice; they underestimated or failed to understand their significance for the Boers” (Farwell, 1976, p. 6).

The second and more powerful source of their legitimacy sprang from religion. As “a people the Boers faced the war with confidence and determination; their morale was high, their cause was just, and surely God would help them, provide miracles, and give them ultimate victory” (Farwell, 1976, p. 51); and “it was ever characteristic of the Boers to be disdainful of numerically superior enemies and to put their faith in their own fighting capabilities and in God...they expected His active cooperation and support. No Christian people in modern times have so firmly and wholeheartedly believed in the righteousness of their causes and so confidently relied on God’s support” (Farwell, 1976, p. 9). This perceived religious legitimacy was quite clearly understood by even the opposing British forces as one remarked that he “had heard a sound...which was worse, even, than the sound of shells: the sound of Boers singing psalms. ‘It struck the fear of God into me. What sort of men are we fighting? They have the better cause—and the cause is everything—at least, I mean to them it is the better cause’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 291).

6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?

The Boer army was extremely heterarchical and “consisted simply of every able-bodied male between the ages of sixteen and sixty...without uniforms, medals, bands, insignia of rank, or pay: there were none of the trappings usually considered necessary...and there were none of the rules and regulations” (Farwell, 1976, p. 42). “The men of each district formed a commando of indeterminate size under a commandant, also elected...Mobilization was a simple matter: the field cornet...called up the local burghers...they assembled on a convenient farm, each man with his horse, bridle, saddle, rifle, thirty or more cartridges, and eight days’ provisions. They were then ready to move and to fight” (Farwell, 1976, p. 43). Every commando (fighting unit) was capable of acting independently and indeed every Boer “was capable of acting in emergencies without waiting for orders...the men...were highly motivated and trusted...Battle plans were agreed upon at krygsraads, and each man knew the plan and could act independently to carry it out” (Farwell, 1976, p. 44). Additionally every Boer

owned a horse; therefore, the army was likened to being composed entirely of mounted infantry which had great mobility and could fight in “swarming” tactics: “Every Boer organization seems susceptible of immediate dissolution into its component units, each of independent vitality, and of subsequent reunion in some assigned place.’ The British found this disconcerting...Boer units were like those living organisms which can be cut apart without destroying the individual life of the fragments” (Farwell, 1976, p. 44)

As seen above, at times they worked well as a network “their organizational structure was simpler and better suited to the type of war they would have to fight” (Farwell, 1976, p. 42). But at other times there was such a lack of structure that the army splintered and could disintegrate without warning. If “a man did not like his field cornet or commandant, he simply left his unit and joined another. A burgher was supposed to obtain permission from his officers to go on leave, but frequently, when a man’s wife or his cow took sick, or he himself became homesick, he simply left the war and went home. This unauthorized leave-taking was the bane of every Boer general’s existence” (Farwell, 1976, p. 44). This lack of structure not only impacted the structure of the army, but frequently caused operational and strategic errors to be committed if the democratic process within the krygsraad led to a consensus decision that a minority opposed, i.e., the Boer decision to leave the Modder river when they had an excellent defensive position, had stopped the British advance to Mafeking, and had inflicted huge losses on the British forces with relatively little damage to their own forces. There are several other times throughout the war (i.e., Spion Kop, Colenso) when the Boer forces either melted away prematurely or did not achieve an even greater amount of success because of the independence of each commando and the subsequent lack of direction, unity of purpose, and communication. “They had no overall strategy, no master plan for winning the war. The activities of the various commandos were not coordinated, and there was not even a statement of policy regarding purposes or objectives” (Farwell, 1979, p. 324). So although the heterarchical nature provided benefits when they acted as a cohesive network, the extreme lack of structure had the potential, and sometimes did, devolve to the point where the army was no longer a network, but several isolated components.

“The truth was that the loosely organized Boer armies, as ill-disciplined in the ranks as they were ill-coordinated at the higher level, had always been unsuited to large scale offensive strategy” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 508).

By contrast, the British army began the war as the prototypical hierarchical institution which could be a blessing, but most of the time ended up being a curse. There were two main pitfalls to the British organizational structure. First, British forces were heavily constrained by the logistical requirements incumbent upon a hierarchical army which severely hampered their mobility and strategy. There are multiple instances during the war where British forces were unable to keep up with the more mobile Boer forces to take advantage of their own numerically superior forces. Additionally, it tied their lines of advance to the railroad lines which allowed the Boer army to predict their movement and pick the points of engagements to ensure they had the better strategic defensive position to spring devastating ambushes (i.e., Modder River, Riet River, and Colenso). Compounding the issue for the British was their inability to perform any flanking maneuvers thereby forcing the British to perform massed frontal assaults. Such tactics were “tragically anachronistic. The days of stand-up, shoulder-to-shoulder attacks were past. Casualties were almost 50 percent” for British forces at Modder River (Farwell, 1976, p. 95)

The second problem with their hierarchical organization consisted of the strategic errors that were made because the person-in-charge was either personally engaged in a fight and unable to keep a strategic view of the battlefield, or was so disengaged from the battles that they refused to follow the advice or countermanded the orders of their men vice letting people who had a better grasp of the situation on the ground take the initiative. Again compounding the issue was the fact that most British generals were severely deficient “in planning a battle, in the deployment of troops, in the coordination of the available arms and services, in overall strategy, in the organization of proper staffs and their best employment, in the use of the increasing technology which was available to them” (Farwell, 1976, p. 87).

Later in the war, several leaders within the British army understood the pitfalls of the hierarchical structure and tried to move (slightly) towards a more networked structure. One example included the recognition that forces spread out from each other needed more autonomy in their action vice being forced to report to one individual. A second example was the need to become more mobile, which both allowed British forces to cut their reliance on the railroads for logistical support as well as to track down and swarm roving bands of Boer commandos and guerrilla forces. A final example was the development of the blockhouse system by Lord Kitchener, which Pakenham (1979) cites as the turning-point of the guerrilla war leading to the final, successful phase by the British. Kitchener had originally asked for more troops from England to be able to track down the guerrilla forces, but the government was looking to cut costs in the war, especially given the decreasing public support now that the war was essentially over since the British had captured the Boer capitals as well as the backlash from the concentration camps.

The blockhouse system consisted of lines of barbed wire fences, guarded at intervals by blockhouses (small, fortified posts made of earth and iron manned by a few infantrymen). The blockhouses had originally developed as ways of protecting the rail lines, then morphed into a defensive system to protect inner areas of the country which had been cleared of guerrilla forces. Finally, Kitchener turned the network into an offensive weapon, “as cages in which to trap [the enemy], a guerrilla-catching net stretched across South Africa...[with]...over eight thousand blockhouses, covering 3,700 miles, guarded by at least fifty thousand white troops and sixteen thousand African scouts” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 569). Overall, the British army stayed completely hierarchical and still conducted sweeps with columns, but they had made some minor accommodations to a more-networked style to better combat the enemy’s mobility and guerrilla tactics.

7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?

During the war itself, there were little to no attempts by either side to influence the opposing army on the battlefield itself. “The most common and most fruitful form of military battlefield propaganda this century has been the humble leaflet distributed to enemy troops. This did not feature in any significant manner in the Boer War, except perhaps in the form of the safe-conduct pass” (Badsey, 1999, p. 1). Badsey continues to note that each sides’ influence campaigns were designed primarily to gain and maintain public opinion for the war within their own constituencies or for other neutral countries: “Apparently without exception, each side in the increasing conflict aimed its propaganda at its own supporters and treated the other side as a lost cause...there was no real attempt by the British to close down or regulate Afrikaans-language newspapers in Cape Colony and Natal...the Transvaal and the Orange Free State made little to no effort in creating a co-ordinated media strategy” (p. 4). Ultimately, both “sides neglected one of the most valuable, perhaps *the* most valuable, guerrilla warfare weapon...Kitchener had all the printing presses in his hands, but he failed to make full use of them...and was ignorant of the power of propaganda” (Farwell, 1976, p. 350).

However, the influence campaigns that did exist to enlist support for the war were extremely significant. For example, Milner had to create and justify a *casus belli*, gain the support of the British population at home, and downplay the negative effects of the concentration camps as reported by Emily Hobhouse. To begin the war, Milner encouraged contacts in Transvaal to “keep the pot boiling on the Rand and keep it well publicized,” which his contacts achieved via mass meetings at mines all along the Rand (Pakenham, 1979, p. 53). But his biggest issue was that it was hard to stir up British public opinion for the plight of people half a world away. During a trip to England, Milner attended parties and meetings incessantly trying to drum up support for the Uitlander cause while maintaining pressure on the British cabinet. He even wrote several letters for publication including one particularly fiery one known as the ‘Helot Despatch’ to alert the British press and public about the plight of the Uitlanders. In the beginning, “the British public, even the Cabinet, had shown little interest in South Africa, but the

dramatic dispatch created a sensation...there were anti-Boer demonstrations, public meetings, petitions, and incidents of all kinds...Chamberlain had now thrown down the gauntlet...They [his party and the Cabinet] had either to go along with him or disown him. Since he was too powerful a political figure to be dismissed, the Cabinet reluctantly supported him” (Farwell, 1976, p. 35). Milner relied on his network on school friends (from Balliol) to push his points in the Cabinet, and to keep the issue in the press in England ““The Press are ready and under complete control. I can switch on an agitation at your direction”” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 85) until such a time that “Chamberlain thought that the British public had now been sufficiently propagandized to accept the war” (Farwell, 1976, p. 46). Although he was the driving force behind the influence campaign, Milner utilized an informal network of friends and school ties to support him and spread the news.

By contrast, the principle source of influence for the Boer was more hierarchical. President Kruger controlled all of the political negotiations regarding Transvaal’s stated agreements. His Ambassador, Dr. Leyds, tried to persuade France, Germany, and Russia to support them with an attack on Britain, but all “Dr Leyds achieved was to inspire a couple of hundred foreign volunteers to fight on the side of the burghers” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 267). However, Kruger’s authority and influence within Transvaal was granted to him only by virtue of his personal character: “there was no one capable of imposing his will on the volk, now that Oom Paul’s [Kruger’s] gigantic shadow had faded from the scene” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 508). Beyond him, “there was no highly organized machinery of administration, and the central government carried little influence or authority” (Pakenham, 1979, p, 398). As the war slowly turned against the Boer, President Steyn of the Orange Free State sent a Boer diplomatic mission permanently abroad to serve as “a continuous source of vague hope to the burghers,” meanwhile, President Kruger did not believe that they should stress the possibility of foreign intervention, but simply “trust in themselves, and trust in the Lord” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 410).

So although the Boers tried to stir up anti-British sentiments, by far the biggest impact in British public opinion came from within England itself. Morgan (2002) notes that as the war progressed there “arose growing admiration for the social and moral qualities of the Boer peoples...these views were shared by many British Army officers in the field [who] found the Boers to be doughty enemies whose qualities, physical and moral, they respected” (p. 5). In fact, when “the news of ‘black week’ was announced in the House of Commons, the Irish Nationalist MPs stood up and cheered: after all, they wanted the Boers to win” (Morgan, 2002, p. 13).

8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

One interesting problem within the British army at this time was a division within the organization, “the senior generals were split into two ‘Rings’—Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley’s ‘Africans’, [and] Field-Marshal Lord Roberts’ ‘Indians’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 71). The ‘Africans’ were those military officers who had primarily seen service in Africa under Lord Wolseley and his protégés as opposed to the ‘Indians’ who had mostly served in India under Lord Roberts. Although there may often be disagreements or factions within any army or organization, this particular division is cited as having many repercussions for the British in the Boer War. “Certainly this astonishing War Office feud at the end of the nineteenth century explains much that would otherwise be inexplicable in Britain’s bungled preparations for war and her reverses during it” (Pakenham, 1979, p. xxi). There are several other instances where British forces in the Boer War were antagonistic to each other as well as claims of which ‘Ring’ was better equipped (both with the right leaders and the right strategy) to have avoided or minimized perceived blunders with the British execution of mobilization and the war itself. This feud is still perceptible in the various histories and accounts of the Boer War as some authors defend Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener (one of Robert’s protégés) while others try to defend the actions of Sir Redvers Bullers (one of Wolseley’s protégés). “The bitter and sometimes childish feud...between ‘Indians’ and ‘Africans’—was the root cause of

so many of the disasters in South Africa...the fundamental strategic mistake of the war consisted in sending out too few troops in September, led by the wrong commander” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 261).

With the Boers, there had always been some differences of opinion between the two Boer republics, Transvaal and the Orange Free State. “From the beginning of the war—indeed, shortly before its outbreak—relations between the two allies had been dangerously variable...[earlier, the] Free State had dragged its feet. But since then, the Free State had been setting the pace, and had virtually accused the Transvaal of cowardice. The two states were, of course, fundamentally opposite kinds of state: a sheep-and-cow-republic compared with a gold-republic. Hence the divergent attitudes to war and peace. There was also the cleft of personalities” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 498). During the guerrilla warfare part of the war, the two sides jointly developed a strategy to take the fight to the British colonies to prevent the problems of farm burning in their own republics. “Had it been carried into effect as a joint offensive, it might possibly have changed the whole course of the war. But the divisions between the two allies ran too deep” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 501).

9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

Early in the conflict, Milner was the main impetus behind turning British public opinion, but he only had to push the rock so far before it created an avalanche of public support so that by the end, “there was wild enthusiasm for the war. The disgrace of Majuba Hill, the humiliating peace terms of the first war, the fiasco of the Jameson Raid, could all be put behind them...never before, nor since, had Britons swelled with such an intensity of imperial pride” (Farwell, 1976, p. 54). Once public support was aroused, it quickly spread and went viral: “More typical was the reaction of Rudyard Kipling, who embraced the war with fervor. He formed a volunteer company...then turned to raising money,” then wrote over two dozen poems to support the war, some of which were recited daily for fourteen weeks in the palace theatre by celebrated actresses to raise money (Farwell, 1976, p. 54). Soldiers took a reduction in rank just to go to war, orders

were a cause for celebration, soldiers deploying waded through throngs of cheering men and women while friends showered them with gifts and anything khaki was all the rage including pajamas, songs titled “Khaki,” and dyeing horses a khaki color (Farwell, 1976).

From that point on, all news on the war in South Africa stayed in the public consciousness and was followed religiously and reported by independent press reporters who traveled with the British Army (and sometimes served in the army as in the case of Winston Churchill). Meanwhile, “refugees were happy to provide the Natal and Cape newspapers with a steady supply of atrocity stories” (Farwell, 1976, p. 56). “To those living in this dim and dismal land there came daily news from the southern hemisphere where their soldiers were fighting...The news they received that second week in December [Black Week] was all bad, and it arrived in profusion...‘There were no outward signs of panic...all the same, the nation was more deeply stirred, more profoundly alarmed, than perhaps at any period since the eve of Trafalgar’” (Farwell, 1976, p. 141). Later as more reports of tragedy came into England, “[t]ens of thousands of men besieged the recruiting depots, and it was now that the most famous of the English volunteer units was formed...For the first time in British history social classes other than the highest and lowest were part of the fighting force...A popular magazine reported: ‘The sole fear of the soldiers who are going out late is that the war will be over before they arrive...many young men about town justified their existence for the first time’” (Farwell, 1976, p. 143). “The government found that the new Imperial Yeomanry caught the imagination of Press and public...people began to talk of the war as a ‘national’ war” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 264). The impact of the Boer War “was not confined to Britain. Australians, New Zealanders, and Canadians sank their complaints about the mother country in a fierce pride in the empire” (Farwell, 1976, p. 144).

However, there was a “small but literate and vocal minority opposed to the war from the beginning to the end” in England (Farwell, 1976, p. 144). Farwell continues to note that “there was, and there remained for the duration of the war, a small but vocal band, damned as pro-Boers, who denounced the war” (p. 314). One of the most vocal was David Lloyd George, future prime minister of England. Farwell also notes that many

believed the war was prolonged by the activities of the antiwar minority in England since their statements gave many Boers the idea that England would drop out of the war, or that foreign intervention would soon appear, or merely just sustain Boer morale. Yet, Farwell concludes that the antiwar movement had no real influence on the government or public opinion and that never “before nor since has a war been so popular” (p. 316). Later on in the conflict, Emily Hobhouse became much more influential in revealing the atrocities in the concentration camps and helping to turn public opinion against the war as discussed earlier.

From the Boer side, they had to try to sway public opinion in many of the great nations through their diplomatic delegations, “a violent propaganda war had broken out on the Continent. Kruger’s envoy in Brussels, Dr Leyds, fanned the fervour of the Anglophobes. The press of all the major European powers was rabidly anti-British” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 260). There was a “flood of hatred for the British which swept Europe [and] was deeply felt...The Boers were encouraged by all this pro-Boer, anti-British sentiment to hope that one or more of the European powers would intervene, but...as Winston Churchill later said...‘No people in the world received so much verbal sympathy and so little support’” (Farwell, 1976, pp. 144–145). In fact, the “bulk of popular sentiment in the United States favoured the Boers, but...the American government was well aware of the embarrassing moral position” of the U.S. at that time who had just completed an imperial expansion and was actively suppressing freedom in the Philippines (Farwell, 1976, p. 145). Towards the end of the war, Milner was concerned that “these ‘rebels’ had seized on certain ‘acts of harshness’ by British troops in the last few embittered months of guerrilla war and distorted them to create an atmosphere of ‘national hysteria’” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 514).

10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?

In analyzing British organizational density, there are actually two separate components. First, as we saw earlier, one key factor in precipitating the war was Milner’s imperialistic position and the vast network of support he received from his school contacts, his “Balliol friends at ‘headquarters’...who trusted him and supported

him uncritically”; “backed him at every twist and turn of the crisis”; helped “him steer clear of rocks and sands in the CO and the Cabinet”; and “who could help swing parliament behind Milner’s policy” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 85). “As regards Milner’s network of Liberal admirers, they had helped keep the House of Commons from a division” while the “second skein of Milner’s invisible network was provided by the English (and British South African Press)...Milner’s other cronies...were now in a position to show their loyalty...Such was Milner’s invisible nexus of loyalty, the old friends on whom he could rely...In addition, and still more active on his behalf, were his secret allies, the London ‘goldbugs’—especially the financiers of the largest of all the Rand mining houses, Wernher-Beit” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 86).

The second component was highlighted earlier which discussed the two factions within the British army and the impact this had on the mobilization and conduct of the Boer War. One such impact was the frequent number of selections of certain individuals to fill certain posts based upon their affiliation with either ‘Ring’. This indicates a high level of density as leaders and officers are selected for positions based upon the contacts with a high level of loyalty for each other and distrust if not downright hatred for the other side. Meanwhile, Lord Roberts “was the epitome of the ‘political’ general...he had inherited power—transmitted through the nexus of British families...He knew where the most decisive battles are won: in the War Office and the Cabinet room. He knew that politics, for a general, is war by other means” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 253). So the British army would be classified as high density (although separated into two distinct cliques).

By contrast, we classified the Boers as medium density. Although all commandos were locally formed and everyone knew each other, individual fighters were free to come and go as they please, there were conflicting groups and goals among the Boer senior military leadership. Most importantly, as discussed earlier, the army was so heterarchical that they sometimes acted as completely separate units to the detriment of operational and strategic goals. Sometimes, President Kruger was able to unify and solidify the various groups through sheer will, but often the army seemed to dissipate of its own accord.

11. What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?

“Britain won the great Anglo-Boer War, but at the cost of its reputation. The number of men, the amount of materiel, and the length of time required by mighty Britain to subdue a relative handful of South African farmers jolted Britain and amazed the world...The exact extent to which the Kaiser and his generals were influenced by the spectacle of the British army’s performance in South Africa cannot be determined, but certainly they saw little to discourage their aggressive ambitions” (Farwell, 1976, p. xii). Meanwhile, Morgan (2002) notes that for “97 years, from 1902 to 1999, the media representation of the Boer War took the form of trying to create a sanitized impression of a ‘gentleman’s war’, a war that led to reconciliation and in which, morally, there were no losers. The fact that the outcome was the permanent riveting of white supremacy upon the black population...was swept aside” (p. 15).

Even the process of the peace talks themselves were unique as “Kitchener provided all facilities for his rebel enemies to hold a closed, secret meeting; furthermore, he granted immunity to all their leaders, military and political, the very men he had been trying to catch and imprison...an acceptance by the British of the Boers’ contention that the republics still existed” (Farwell, 1976, p. 431). In the end, “Milner’s failure to change the composition...to assure a predominance of Anglo-Saxons was a bitter disappointment to him, for in his mind this was the prime purpose of all his schemes, the justification of the war itself” (Farwell, 1976, p. 448). Additionally, the determination of England to allow the colonies to gradually rule for themselves ultimately gave the Boers everything they had fought for and more when in 1910, the Union of South Africa came into being and the “Boers now controlled not only the Transvaal and orange River Colony but Natal and Cape Colony as well...Not only were they already self-governing: their leaders were becoming world figures...The wildest, most improbable political dreams of Kruger’s and Steyn’s Boers—to be free of British interference and make all South Africa a Boer republic—became reality for their children and grandchildren” (Farwell, 1976, pp. 453–454).

12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?

One striking aspect of the Boer War was the impact of technology (or lack of). Farwell (1976) notes that both sides used machine guns (though neither side new how to effectively employ them), while neither side used mortars or hand grenades. The use of the telephone and telegraph was limited. Observation balloons were used sparingly (and not effectively) by the British. The British also had a photographic unit which was scorned in favor of sketches. Overall, the “British officers, representing one of the most technologically advanced nation in the world, scorned the fruits of technology and were hidebound traditionalists” (Farwell, 1976, p. 45). Overall, both sides were similarly equipped and technologically symmetrical forces with two key differences. First, although both sides had access to railroads, the British were tied to the rail lines often to their detriment), while the Boers maintained their freedom of movement by using horses and shunning the railway. Second, smokeless powder had a huge impact, not because the technology was so revolutionary; but rather because the British army retained anachronistic tactics ill-suited to recent developments in small arms. By conducting massive, closed rank, linear frontal assaults against well-entrenched, and hidden defenders many British soldiers were needlessly led to slaughter: “the other correspondents had seen one thing that was to be the dominant theme of every battle of the war: invisibility...the warfare of the new, long-range, smokeless magazine rifle...The enemy were an army of ghosts” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 184). Despite the military blunders, public opinion for the war remained high in England during the conventional phase of the war. After Lord Roberts declared victory, the war shifted to a guerilla campaign and British support eroded sharply, partly due to the concentration camps.

The second striking aspect of the Boer War is the vast difference in fighting strengths between the two opponents. According to Pakenham (1979), roughly 365,693 imperial and 82,742 colonial soldiers (nearly 450,000 total) fought in the war for the British compared to only 87,365 Boers, a ratio of over 5:1. The willingness to continue to send vast amounts of men and material around the world was certainly a key factor in

England's eventual victory (in addition to the scorched earth policy and concentration camps which are estimated to have caused the deaths of between 18,000 and 28,000 Boer civilians as opposed to only 7,000 Boer fighters).

The final capability utilized during the war was diplomatic. This also had a semi-significant impact. Because of the uncomfortable moral position of the United States, Transvaal was unable to enlist the aid of the U.S. in its struggle to remain free. During diplomatic discussions, the Boers were able to convince the French and the Russians to fight the British, but only if the Boers could convince the Germans to fight as well. Unfortunately for them, the Boers were unable to convince the Germans to join the war on their behalf or else the entire course of the war (and potentially the rest of the century) could have been dramatically altered.

E. RESULTS

Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the influence strategy in the Boer War based upon our structured questions:

1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? **British – No; Boer – Yes**
(but consistent on morally questionable beliefs)

2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? **British – No; Boer – No**

3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? **British – No; Boer – No**

4) Is the narrative morally legitimate? **British – No; Boer – No** (at least these are the values that would be assigned today, but it is interesting to note that the majority of each respective population found their narratives completely morally legitimate)

5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other source? **British – Philosophy; Boer – Historical/Religious**

6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? **British – Hierarchical, but incorporating minor network-like tendencies during the latter stages; Boer – Heterarchical but with some capability of acting as a coherent network at times**

7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, hierarchy, or hybrid? **British – Networked with one man (Milner) at the head; Boer – Hierarchy/ Personality-driven**

8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **British – Many small voices; Boer – Many small voices**

9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **British – Many small voices; Boer – Many small voices**

10) Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? **British – High; Boer – Medium**

11) What was the political goal (end)? Was it achieved? **The political goal for England was ultimately to annex Transvaal. It was achieved, but at severe cost to itself. One proclaimed political goal, protection for coloured subjects was never achieved ultimately leading to apartheid.**

12) What other capabilities (means) were used? Relative importance of the other capabilities in achieving the end? **Technology had minimal impact (except for the British reliance on the railway system and refusal to adopt different tactics in the face of technological changes in small-arms fire. Sheer force strength and morale had a huge impact on the war for the benefit of the British. Diplomacy was also a key factor which hindered the capability of the Boer to secure strategic allies against the British.**

We will analyze these findings more in depth alongside the results of the other case studies in Chapter XI, but how do these preliminary results relate to the six main hypotheses? We will briefly analyze each hypothesis in light of the Boer War. For the

main hypothesis we stated that the most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative. We added a sub-hypothesis that stated: to be most effective, the narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate. In terms of the Boer War, the data indicates that neither side was consistent in all three measures (internal, external, construct) in their narrative either before the war or during the war. However, the Boers were consistent over time particularly with respect to nationalism. During present times, we would consider both sides as morally questionable even though each side considered their own position as morally defensible. However, British atrocities in the concentration camps and the resulting public outrage from press reports (particularly those of Emily Hobhouse) resulted in undermining perceived British legitimacy. Therefore, the post-war settlement was decidedly pro-Boer, although it was morally wrong as it led to continued white supremacy over the native African population throughout the majority of the 20th century. Additionally, the Boers were gradually allowed to become self-governing which allowed them to gradually take political control over all of South Africa as a nation independent of Great Britain. Thus despite being rated as nearly equal on all measures on narrative, the loss of legitimacy by the internal British audience resulted in a Boer advantage in this category consistent with the hypotheses.

Additional sub-hypotheses discussed the effectiveness of organizations (both overall and in influence) based on organizational density as well as type (network versus hierarchy versus a hybrid of the two). Despite significant numerical disadvantages, the Boers were more successful militarily when the density of the army was medium and more networked (but not so loosely networked based that they were more heterarchical). Meanwhile despite their numerical advantage, the British Army was generally unsuccessful at the operational and tactical level until they incorporated more network-like tendencies (to shift closer to a hybrid) by adopting the blockhouse strategy while simultaneously pushing the Boer army to become less hybrid and more heterarchical.

In terms of influence, pro-British sentiment was centrally directed by a few key proponents (Milner and his band of friends who could semi-manipulate the media) while

at the same time spontaneously supported and disseminated by the public at-large. Pro-Boer influence was not very effective when it was centrally managed by Dr. Leyds for although they gained many supporters, none of the supporters provided any physical assistance. However, once the concentration camp atrocities were discovered by Emily Hobhouse, anti-British sentiment quickly spread from a central hierarchy of key political figures through a network quickly turning public sentiment against the war. Again, the data in this case supports the hypotheses that medium density organizations that are a hybrid of network and hierarchy vice either type alone are more effective overall and in influence specifically. Based upon the data, it appears that organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless (Boer Army when it is completely heterarchical) or that have a central command (British Army).

Finally in evaluating the impact of technology, both sides were similarly equipped and technologically symmetrical forces. However, the British were actually negatively affected by either a reliance on technology (being tied to the rail lines), or a failure to modify anachronistic tactics ill suited to recent developments in small arms. Therefore, technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organization effectiveness and can often have a negative impact rather than a positive impact.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VII. COMPARATIVE STUDY 2: WWI

A. BACKGROUND

Like the Boer War, World War I (WWI) was also known by other names including, The Great War, The War to End all Wars and, very early on, was thought of as the Third Balkan War. Indeed, WWI was sparked in the Balkans by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (who was heir apparent to the throne of Austria) on the morning of June 8, 1914 by a young Slav nationalist who belonged to a secret society of Serbian officers known as the “Black Hand.” Austria’s own police investigation found no proof of the Serbian Government’s complicity in the assassination (Liddell Hart, 1939), yet the ruling body jumped on the opportunity to defeat Serbia and destroy the Slav movement within its own borders since “nationalism outside the empire threatened the survival of the empire within” (Strachan, 2003, p. 6). Austria, part of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, felt compelled to finally settle issues with Serbia to insure its credibility both as a regional player in the Balkans as well as within Europe itself.

The Austro-Hungarian government issued a forty-eight hour ultimatum on 23 July, 1914, before mobilizing and declaring war on Serbia on 25 July. Serbia mobilized on 25 July and appealed to the Tsar of Russia for support, prompting Russia to order general mobilization on 30 July. On 31 July, Germany began mobilization in support of Austria-Hungary and delivered an ultimatum to Russia and France stating that mobilization meant war. The Germans formally declared war on Russia on August 1 and on France on August 3, while demanding free passage for German troops through Belgium on August 2. This threat on a neutral country drew Britain to deliver an ultimatum to Germany, which expired on August 4 officially drawing Britain into the war. Thus the major players of WWI were set with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary versus the Entente powers of Russia, France, and Britain. Italy, though a treaty ally of the Germans and Austrians, stayed neutral until 1915 when it joined the Allies. However, the war would not stay confined to Europe alone.

Although Europe was the key battleground, in “1914 conflict spread from the European centre to the periphery, and it did so because the states of Europe were imperial powers. War for Europe meant war for the world” (Strachan, 2003, p. 69). From the beginning of the war on, there were multiple theaters as well as several countries that declared war or dropped out of the war on both sides. A list of the Allies and Central Powers and the dates that they joined are as follows (Thinkquest.org):

The Allies

Belgium (August 4, 1914)	Guatemala (April 23, 1918)	Panama (April 7, 1917)
Brazil (October 26, 1917)	Haiti (July 12, 1918)	Portugal (April 7, 1917)
British Empire (August 4, 1914)	Honduras (July 19, 1918)	Romania (August 27, 1916)
China (August 14, 1917)	Italy (May 23, 1915)	Russia (August 1, 1914)
Costa Rica (May 23, 1918)	Japan (August 23, 1914)	San Marino (June 3, 1915)
Cuba (April 7, 1917)	Liberia (August 4, 1917)	Serbia (July 28, 1914)
France (August 3, 1914)	Montenegro (August 5, 1914)	Siam (July 22, 1917)
Greece (July 2, 1917)	Nicaragua (May 8, 1918)	United States (April 6, 1917)

The Central Powers

Austria-Hungary (July 28, 1914)	Germany (August 1, 1914)
Bulgaria (October 14, 1915)	Ottoman Empire (October 31, 1914)

Table 3. List of Allies and Central Powers in WWI (From Thinkquest.org)

However, this list does not fully cover the nationalities of all who were involved most significantly the Arab tribes as well as the participants from the British and French colonies to include: Algeria, Australia, Canada, French Indo-China, India, Senegal South Africa; as well as “over a million carriers for the East African campaign, drawn from the Belgian Congo, Ruanda, Uganda, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Mozambique” (Strachan, 2003, p. 83). The war officially ended November 11, 1918 at

11:00 symbolizing the major hostilities of World War I were formally ended "at the 11th hour of the 11th day of the 11th month" of 1918 with the German signing of the Armistice.

As O'Connell (1989) states: "It is a singular fact that all three major Continental powers, Germany, Russia, and France, entered the Great War intent on going on the offensive immediately, which they did with disastrous results. Everybody attacked, and everybody suffered, the consequences of which set the conditions for four subsequent years of stalemate and misery" (p. 243). O'Connell (1989) further states that around ten million men were killed in combat and that most of the victims died for nothing more than a few feet of rat-infested mud.

So why is this war important when defining the importance of strategic influence? As Strachan (2003) states,

This was a great war because it was a war fought over big ideas. What had begun in the Balkans and had been originally driven by issues of ethnicity and nationalism was now clothed with principles whose force lay precisely in their claims to universality. In due course these ideologies became the basis of propaganda, but that could only happen because they expressed convictions with which the belligerent populations could identify. They were deemed to be so fundamental that they sustained the war despite both its length and its intensity. The peoples of Europe fought the First World War because they believed in—or at least accepted—the causes for which their nations stood. It was emphatically not a war without purpose. (p. 61)

Thus the Anglo-German antagonism became the pivot of the conflict. The polarity was best expressed in competing ideologies: liberalism and individualism against militarism and collectivism...However, the bitterness of the rhetoric could not be easily converted into strategy. (Strachan, 2003, p. 201)

B. DATA

As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused comparison approach to explore the selected case studies. Thus data is structured below as answers to each of our stated focus questions. Despite the global nature of the conflict, the data will focus primarily on the Central Powers of Germany and Austro-Hungary, the

Triple Entente (France, Britain, and Russia), as well as the U.S. which joined the war on the side of the Entente in 1917 (although other theaters of war and countries will be referenced in key points).

1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?

Leading up to the war, in “1878 Austria had occupied the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina: she had never fulfilled her promise to evacuate them after restoring order and prosperity” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 11). Then, in “1912...Austria prepared to fight [Russia and]...Germany gave her assurances of unflinching support” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 12). Meanwhile, the “French Third Republic...was notorious for the instability of its ministries, and hence for the inconsistencies of its policies. But Poincare...had more than once affirmed France’s support for Russia’s position in the Balkans” (Strachan, 2003, p. 15). Leading up to the war, Britain and France had been traditional European rivals; but they had started to work at several points on treaties to forge a closer relationship with each other. Policies amongst all nations involved tended to be inconsistent fleeting alliances.

Leading up to the war, the “general feeling was that the Serbs were a bloodthirsty and dangerous crew. Even on 31 July:

the British prime minister, H. H. Asquith, told the Archbishop of Canterbury that the Serbs deserved ‘a thorough thrashing’...[there was a]...widespread perception that Austria-Hungary was in the right and Serbia in the wrong...But...Nobody in the Triple Entente was inclined to see Austria-Hungary as an independent actor. Vienna had taken a firm line because it was too anxious to capitalize on Germany’s backing while it had it...The conflict with Serbia would not be localized because by July 1914 the experience of earlier crises had conditioned statesmen to put events in the broader context of European international relations” and thus international opinion swung in favor of Serbia. (Strachan, 2003, p. 16)

So public opinion shifted because Austria-Hungary was consistently viewed as intimately tied to and directed by Germany.

Once the war began, the Germans were again seen as inconsistent in their narrative as Germany did not keep to its promises of Belgian neutrality and invaded

France via Belgium: the “Germans contemptuously swept aside all protests against their breach of Belgian neutrality by dismissing the guarantee as a ‘mere scrap of paper’....Here was the issue to unite the nation. Even the doubters—with few exceptions—rallied to the defence of ‘brave little Belgium’” (Roetter, 1974, p. 31). In fact, the Central powers and Germany in particular suffered the most in defining and disseminating their narrative. As Roetter (1974) continues to explain, “Imperial Germany...began the war with nothing...resembling a co-ordinated propaganda effort. Nor, if it had had the necessary apparatus, would there have been a cause to disseminate. The Germans...were...so certain of the self-evident justice of their cause that they did not feel the need to explain...a call stressing the necessity to fight for and defend German *Kultur* scarcely had the universal appeal of a call to defend human dignity and the right of small nations” (p. 37). “Socialists and trade unionists might feel beleaguered in Germany, but they knew that they would suffer far more under the heel of tsarist autocracy. The defence of what they had gained...now required them to protect the nation” (Strachan, 2003, p. 131).

In terms of some of the other countries involved in the war, the “Kaiser was still not sure whether he should combat Japan as the Yellow Peril or associate with her as the Prussia of the East” (Roetter, 1974, p. 55). Meanwhile Italy initially began the war as a neutral by cutting loose from her engagements to Germany and Austria. The “most blatant in its exploitation of the opportunities which the war presented was Italy...[who’s] aim was simple, to gain ‘frontiers on land and sea no longer open to annexation, and [to raise] Italy, in reality, to the status of a great power’” (Strachan, 1974, p. 152). Thus Italy was caught in a tug of war between the two sides, the Alliance versus the Entente while both were effectively bidding against each other to gain Italy’s support. “Czarist Russia had no real propaganda apparatus or message for either its own people or the world at large. For the outside world it clothed itself in the mantle of protector of all Slavs...and was as far as possible played down” by the Entente (Roetter, 1974, pp. 41–42).

Finally, “America was not unified when war was declared. The necessary reversal of opinion was too great to be achieved overnight” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 4).

Everyone wore the same patriotic buttons, put up the same window stickers, passed the same clichés, knew the same rumors...everyone assumed the stories must be true because salesmen...brought with them the same thrilling narrative. Uniformity of testimony is convincing. And testimony seemed nearly uniform...throughout the nation...it was overwhelmingly and wholeheartedly on the side of the Allies and in favor of our belligerence. (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 8)

“When war was declared there was a sharp intensification of feeling, a speeding up in the process of unifying opinion, but there was not the sharp break with the past that we sometimes think of...The Committee [on Public Information] was no inner clique imposing unwanted views on the general public...[it] was representative of the articulate majority in American opinion” which only codified and standardized ideas already widely current (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 10).

In many respects, although there was a change “in the President’s attitude toward the war...we were fighting not for Europe’s war aims but for Wilson’s, and that the hope of a new world, of universal democracy, and of permanent peace” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 18), which were ideals that were not constantly shifting but rigorously adhered to, not only then, but throughout American history. When viewed in this light, America’s standpoint on the Great War was not inconsistent over time. The U.S. and President Wilson always kept to the same overarching narrative and vision of democracy and peace, but realized that the strategy toward the war had to change in order to secure this vision. Therefore, we would rate the U.S. as consistent.

Although there was inconsistency within each of the Entente powers and among them, it was the Wilsonian ideal which ultimately strengthened an underlying thread within the narrative of each Entente power: “British propaganda sought to convey the impression that for its rulers and people the War was a crusade for the whole of mankind...The French, too, in their propaganda stuck to themes that were of universal appeal...France was fighting for democracy” (Roetter, 1974, p. 41). This was the consistent thread among the Entente powers and the U.S. which was the most significant

in garnering and maintaining worldwide global opinion, even undermining the narrative of the Triple Alliance as the nationalities with Austro-Hungary yearned for the right of democracy and self-determination.

2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?

During the war, one piece of their narrative that was always important for the Germans was the justification for their submarine (U-boat) campaign against commercial shipping. One primary argument used by the Germans to try to gain U.S. support was by highlighting the ill-effects of Britain's naval blockade. Germany's Imperial Ambassador to Washington, Count Bernstorff "knew what the effect of stories of children deprived of milk, butter, bread and other essential foodstuffs would have on large sections of American public opinion" (Roetter, 1974, p. 15). The Count viewed this negative effect of the blockade as the only way to justify a return to unrestricted U-boat operations without upsetting America. Germany had begun the war using submarines to sink merchant ships, but had stopped following international pressure and condemnation. Afterwards, there was considerable debate in Germany amongst government and military leaders regarding the utility and risks of resuming unrestricted submarine warfare. Count Bernstorff therefore organized a tour of American press and journalists in Germany to show the ill-effects on the children due to the blockade. Unfortunately for him, the Berlin War Ministry was at the same time providing a tour to U.S. journalists trying to prove that Britain's naval blockade was having no real impact on food supplies and that the diet of German children was as healthy as it had ever been. The conflicting goals in the above example shows how a logically inconsistent narrative can cloud one's information strategy.

This inconsistency in the logic of the German narrative continued throughout the war: "there was no co-operation, the propaganda put out by the military and the civil authorities was frequently conflicting, and as the War wore on, the conflict between the military and the civil authorities became increasingly pronounced...And so German propaganda continued to speak with different voices until the end of the War" (Roetter, 1974, p. 39). Another example of the inconsistency of the German narrative was their

continuing rage at the “activities of Belgian *franc-tireurs*—civilian snipers who shot at German troops from doorways and rooftops...Americans, especially, were incapable of understanding what the Germans were getting at. After all, it was Germany which had violated Belgian neutrality, so why complain?” (Roetter, 1974, pp. 40–41) Additionally, Roetter (1974) points out that Germany tried to present itself “as the champion of the negro against his white oppressor, while in Europe Germany was calling the use of coloured soldiers by the French and British an ‘atrociousness’” (p. 56). In another example, Germany tried to gain the support of the immigrant German population within the U.S. that “‘blood calls to blood’...[and to] rally round the Kaiser...[yet] thousands of Germans had left for America....to get away from Germany’s growing militarism...and its elaborate bureaucracy...None had uprooted themselves...and become Americans to turn their backs now on America at a distant Kaiser’s command” (Roetter, 1974, p. 57).

During the war, Germany gained the Ottoman Empire as an ally, partly as a result of inconsistencies between the Allies external consistency discussed in the next section. In doing so, Germany tried to rely on the dual narratives of religion and nationality “but in doing so they sent a message that was contradictory. Islam was universal in its appeal, while nationalism was particular...the nationalism...translated into imperialism when carried beyond the frontiers of Anatolia. It therefore conflicted with the message of genuine independence that the Germans wished to convey” (Strachan, 2003, p. 127).

Yet, Germany was not the only belligerent with an issue of internal consistency. The Allied campaign was based on the premise of nationalism and self-determination of the many different nationalities with the Central Powers particularly in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. President Wilson and the Allies had assured that an independent Czecho-Slovak state and a separate state for Poles would be established; however, the stumbling block “was the Southern Slavs. Much of their homeland had been offered to Italy in a secret treaty...in order to induce Italy to enter the War on the Allied side. The promises in this treaty were completely incompatible with the unification of all the Southern Slavs in one state” (Roetter, 1974, p. 77). Despite Britain’s claim against imperialism during the war, in 1917 the “Bolsheviks published the secret agreements on

war aims reached between the Entente powers: Britain, France and Italy stood convicted, it seemed, of annexationist ambitions comparable with those of the monster which they were pledged to extirpate, German militarism” (Strachan, 2003, p. 265).

The biggest aspect of this logical inconsistency was “the incompatibility of President Wilson’s war aims with their own [Britain and France]...This anti-Wilson program, later made evident in the skilful [sic] maneuvering of the Wilson entourage before the Peace Conference, as well as in the negotiations on the Conference itself...Wilson realized that the Allies were with him only until the last shot was fired, and then they were to be against him” (Mock & Larson, 1939, pp. 284–285). The authors continue to cite an example where a member of the French Embassy was reported to have told a prominent Spaniard, ““President Wilson may think he is going to be the arbiter of this war but he is fooling himself. When the time comes, the French and the British will settle it as they please”” (p. 274) as well as a report that stated ““after using America to win their war [Britain] will crush all our aims and ideals at the Peace Conference”” (p. 299).

A second inconsistency in the Allied narrative of promoting freedom and democracy was evident with the existence of an authoritarian ally in Russia. However, on “March 19 [1917] occurred the most significant event of the war prior to America’s entrance—the preliminary revolution in Russia...With the disappearance of the Czar, the black sheep vanished from the democratic herd and the war could now be safely said to be a war to save democracy” (Tuchman, 1958, p. 196). Although, the loss of their ally in the east resulted in an overall material loss for the Allies, the informational gain to their informational strategy was significant. A third inconsistency arose in conjunction with imperialism: Britain “renounced the conquest of territory...These principles proved mutually incompatible...Britain did not see the outbreak of the First World War as an opportunity to acquire German colonies; however, others on whom it relied did...‘sub-imperialism’ flourished” (Strachan, 2003, p. 71).

A fourth inconsistency was the incursion of the government in democratic countries into their own populations’ rights and civil liberties. In Britain the Defence of

the Realm Act of 8 August 1914, permitted the trial of civilians by court-martial, press censorship, food regulations, and the right to intervene in the economy (Strachan, 2003). Although many would see this as a serious internal consistency that could completely undermine the narrative of freedom and democracy, in both Britain and France the “press and public grew angry more because not enough was done, than because the state had become the enemy of civil liberties...the popular cry was for more government direction, not less” (Strachan, 2003, p. 237). At first, this issue presented a bigger issue in America. At one point the press was adamantly opposed to perceived censorship and opposed the passage of the Espionage Bill. Interestingly, the “press itself was the most important agency in spreading fear of espionage, and at the same time was attempting to limit the provisions of the Espionage Bill...Apparent inconsistency of this sort was seized upon by supporters of the bill” (Mock & Larson, 1939, pp. 33–34).

A final interesting inconsistency, particularly with respect to the U.S. narrative, was President Wilson’s key concept of national self-determination, yet given “that the United States was itself a community made up of predominantly of immigrants, Wilson’s presumption against multi-ethnic empires was arrogant and naïve...30 million found themselves on the wrong sides of frontiers...they would generate problems” (Strachan, 2003, p. 333). A review of this section would indicate that neither side’s narrative was logically consistent.

3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?

Unlike the Boer War, which was explicitly called a “gentleman’s war” by the belligerents (even though this concept was not always rigorously held to, i.e. the concentration camps); The Great War was a total war with no such explicit expectations in the conduct of war. Although certain weapons and specific atrocities committed during the war did not directly contradict the declared narrative of any belligerent country; these deeds had an enormous impact on the course of the war, the perceived legitimacy of the belligerents, and especially on the decision by the U.S. on whether to remain neutral or to enter the war. One such inconsistency (discussed above) was the refusal by the Germans to honor the neutrality of Belgium by using it as a pathway to

invade France and having to conquer it in the process. This single deed, the breach of Belgian neutrality, led directly to the involvement of the British in the war. France's western fortifications and the Schlieffen plan forced Germany to choose between honoring Belgium's neutrality versus the military advantage of sacrificing their informational position. Had Germany respected Belgium's neutrality, then Britain may never have entered the war and history may have changed significantly. However, Germany made several other important missteps with its deeds. In Belgium, "the killing of civilians...was condoned and promoted from above...674 civilians were killed in Dinant...on the orders of their corps commander...as a pre-emptive strike against anticipated *franc-tireur* activity" (Strachan, 2003, p. 51).

First, Professor Haber developed the idea of using gas on enemy troops. However, "higher command was slow to appreciate its potentialities. It was their skepticism rather than their scruples which limited" their first use so the "Germans incurred the odium of introducing a novel and horrifying weapon without adequate profit" (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 78). Subsequently, gas became a regular weapon of warfare during WWI (it is important to note that WWII saw little to no use of gas) and was freely used by both sides; yet the burden of blame rested forever with the Germans. As another example, the Turks "massacred over a million Armenians in the Autumn of 1915 and deported another few hundred thousand to the North Syrian desert where most of them starved" (Roetter, 1974, p. 50). Strachan (2003) later cites the calculations ranging from 1.3 million to about 2.1 million (p. 114).

In another highly publicized incident, in "August 1915 Nurse Edith Cavell, who had been working at a Red Cross hospital in German-occupied Brussels, was found guilty by a German court-martial of helping British and French soldiers to escape into neutral Holland. She was sentenced to death and executed by a German firing squad" (Roetter, 1974, p. 11). Interestingly enough Roetter (1974) states that several weeks after the execution of Nurse Cavell, two German nurses working at a Red cross hospital in France were executed by a French firing squad for helping German prisoners of war escape; however, this was given very little press in France, German, or British newspapers and

none in the American Press. One German officer responsible for propaganda in the U.S. explained that the German nurses, “like Nurse Cavell—had behaved bravely and patriotically and they had paid the penalty for acting outside the rules of war...there was no case for trying to score propaganda points out of a situation like that” (p. 13).

The author continues to explain that ordinary Americans viewed the atrocity stories of the reckless looting, maiming, killing, and raping underlying the justification of the Allied cause with skepticism, but the execution “provoked one of the most significant reactions among ordinary Americans in favour of the Allies and against Germany” (pp. 11–12). Roetter continues to discuss other controversial German deeds such as the use of unrestricted submarine warfare to try to reverse the effects of the British naval blockade by mounting a counter-blockade, which included sinking any vessel, not just military ships often without firing warning shots, surfacing, or boarding. This led to the sinking of the *Lusitania* on 7 May 1915 killing 1,198 people including 128 Americans. The Germans argued, with some justification, that the “ship had been carrying arms, and munitions. Furthermore, it had been armed, and even if it should prove not to have been, its captain and officers had instructions to use the ship’s superior speed to ram any U-boat” (Roetter, 1974, p. 48). The Allies did indeed carry munitions in passenger ships, arm merchantmen, and ram U-boats; “on 19 August 1915 the crew of the British Q-ship, *Baralong*, sailing under the American flag until she opened fire, sank the U 27 and then killed out of hand the boarding party the Germans had put on a captured merchant vessel. British attempts to justify the *Baralong*’s action...were somewhat specious but worked in the United States” (Strachan, 2003, p. 225). However, these deeds did not compare to the death of innocent civilians being killed without warning.

In short, the cumulative effect of the way Imperial Germany behaved was to project an image to many Americans of a country prepared to flout any moral and civilized mode of conduct...although they were deemed wrong in international law—the moment it felt them to be in its own self-interest. Here surely was a tragic example of inhuman and barbaric conduct. America had no choice but to come down on the side of righteousness!” (Roetter, 1974, p. 12)

Finally, in perhaps one of the more bizarre acts of the war, Germany's Foreign Secretary, Zimmerman, sent a telegram to his ambassador in Washington to deliver to the President of Mexico (Tuchman, 1958). In the telegram, Zimmerman informed the Mexican president that Germany would once again begin unrestricted warfare. Fearing that America could enter the war, Germany was proposing an alliance with Mexico and promised "to assist Mexico 'to regain by conquest her lost territory in Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico'" (p. 7). Germany felt that Mexico would prove no match for the U.S., but wanted to cut off America's war supplies to the Allies, shut off the supply of oil from Mexico to Britain, and find a strategic port for U-boats to keep the Americans out of Europe.

By this time, multiple stories and evidence had surfaced showing various German plots to incite a war between the U.S. and Mexico including the Albert portfolio, the Archibald papers, and the Rintelen-Huerta conspiracy and "four-fifths of the regular Army was tied up inside or along the borders of Mexico. Pershing's twelve thousand troops were still vainly chasing [Pancho] Villa through the hills of Chihuahua" and breeding negative resentment in Mexico towards the U.S. (Tuchman, 1958, p. 105). However, the essential features in this episode were that Zimmerman's proposal was not contingent upon America entering the war, but was asking for action while America was still neutral; Zimmerman acknowledged that he had sent the telegram rather than denying it; and the telegram had been sent over a direct line between Germany and the U.S. Government that had been set up for diplomatic purposes under the auspices of possible negotiations to end the war. The messages were coded, but the British had managed to decipher the codes and gave the message to the U.S. in such a way as to protect their secrets as well as to intentionally draw the U.S. into the war on their side. Tuchman (1958) explains the impact best when she writes:

Zimmerman's admission shattered the indifference with which three-quarters of the United States had regarded the war...The nation sat up and gasped, "They mean us!" Nothing since the outbreak of war had so openly conveyed a deliberately hostile intent toward Americans...the *Lusitania* had shocked the nation, but that shock was humanitarian, not personal...This was Germany proposing to attack the United states,

conspiring with America's neighbor to snatch American territory... This was a direct threat upon the body of America, which most Americans had never dreamed was a German intention... the Zimmerman telegram, was clear as a knife in the back and near as next door. Everybody understood it in an instant... there could no longer be any question of neutrality. (pp. 184–185)

It was shortly after the revelation of the Zimmerman telegram that the U.S. formally declared war on Germany alone, while Mexico chose to stay neutral. According to Tuchman (1958), President Wilson never stated whether the Zimmerman telegram was the deciding factor that finally drove him from neutrality, but that the British viewed this event as quite dramatic. She continues to cite several sources including President Wilson's official biographer, Baker, "'no single more devastating blow was delivered against Wilson's resistance to entering the war'; as well as England's lord Chancellor "'The United States were in fact kicked into the war against the strong and almost frenzied efforts of President Wilson"' (p. 199). In the end, Tuchman (1958) herself argues that the telegram was the "kick that did it, to the people whether or not to the President" (p. 199).

As briefly discussed above in reference to the U-boat problem, the Germans were not the only country guilty of deeds that could have undermined their narrative. Early in the war, Turkey was waffling between an alliance with Germany versus an alliance with Russia and the Entente. However, "the British admiralty's action in taking over two Turkish battleships which were being built in British shipyards produced an outburst of wrath which tilted the scales" in Germany's favor who subsequently sent two warships of their own to Turkey (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 82). "Legally, the terms of the contract allowed the British to take over the vessels... Strategically the decision was the right one; politically the outcome was a gift to Young Turk propaganda, because the purchase of the ships had been funded by a high-profile public subscription" (Strachan, 2003, p. 107).

Additionally, Britain was responsible for establishing a complete naval blockade that undoubtedly had a huge impact not only on German soldiers, but also on the innocent civilian populations of the Central Powers. In fact, the "British official history attributed 772, 736 deaths in Germany [alone] during the war to the blockade, a figure comparable

with the death rate for the British armed forces...the blockade breached the principle of non-combatant immunity” (Strachan, 2003, p. 215). However, as discussed earlier, Germany was unable to capitalize on the effect due to mismanagement and contradiction in their efforts to tell their own narrative. The naval blockade also caused some distress in America over the disruption of free trade. Strachan (2003), however, states that “In this battle for the ideological high ground, Britain had a clinching if less idealistic argument. America’s protest about the obstacles created by free trade were silenced by the profits that allied orders generated” (p. 216). Finally, in “1917, with a disregard for neutrality which accorded ill with their defence of Belgium, the British blockaded Greece and the French landed at Piraeus” (Strachan, 2003, p. 321). So although Britain claimed that the violation of Belgium’s neutrality was a just cause for war, they subsequently committed a similar violation of another country’s neutrality later in the war.

In conclusion, both sides committed acts which, if not directly contradictory to their narrative, were extremely damaging to their cause. In this case study, as perhaps in no other, it is possible to see the direct and enormous impact that these deeds had on the war. In the case of World War I, deeds caused both Britain and the U.S. to enter the war against Germany when they may have otherwise remained neutral.

4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?

At the very beginning of the conflict, Serbia responded to Austria’s ultimatum and “the Serbian Government had yielded so far that the Kaiser...admitted that ‘every reason for war drops away’...To overcome the aged Emperor’s doubts, [Berchtold] told him that the Serbians had already fired on Austrian troops: having obtained the Emperor’s signature to the declaration of war, in which this fictitious justification was inserted, he deleted this particular statement before sending out the document” (Liddell Hart, 1939, pp. 15–16). Although Austria’s heir to the throne had been murdered, there was no direct evidence of involvement by the Serbian government as discussed earlier. Serbia was prepared to make concessions to Austria; however, this manipulation certainly calls into question the issue of Austria’s moral legitimacy.

Prior to the war, Germany's Count Schlieffen believed that the military advantage of attacking France via Belgium "outweighed the moral stigma of violating Belgian neutrality, and also the practical dangers of British hostility" (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 23). Additionally, Germany's submarine campaign and the resulting deaths of noncombatant civilians "had borne meagre results and had done disproportionate moral damage to the German cause" (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 149). Even in their already weakened moral position, Germany, "which should have been alive to the importance of winning goodwill and support for Germany among the neutrals, seems to have made no preparations at all for putting over Germany's case...the officials...appeared to feel that the rightness of Germany's cause was self-evident and needed no justification" (Roetter, 1974, p. 39). In this paragraph, we find that Germany was confronted with a moral decision multiple times in which they could choose between the moral high ground vice sacrificing this high ground for what was perceived as immediate operational or tactical military advantages. In both instances listed above, Germany chose the military advantage to the detriment of their own narrative. By all evidence, Germany did not take the potential consequences of these decisions lightly; however, analysis after the fact seems to imply that more weight should be given to the moral effects over operational military advantage in these calculations.

By contrast, Roetter (1974) argues that the British understood very early the implications of the legitimacy of entering the war. Prior to the invasion of Belgium by the Germans, there was intense debate in Britain as to the justification of entering the war, especially on the heels of the Boer War. "As a result Britain was compelled to recognize the fact—before any of the other belligerents—that it had to justify the righteousness of its cause, in short that propaganda was an essential part of the war effort" (p. 32). "Moreover the special circumstances surrounding Britain's entry gave Britain...a cause...to spread among its own people and the world at large—the cause of 'brave little Belgium', of small nations at the mercy of ruthless military giants, of the sanctity of treaties, of people to live in freedom as they chose, of humanity, of the ideals of democracy and liberty" (Roetter, 1974, p. 37).

As mentioned earlier, the same universal theme was evident in French beliefs and propaganda that this was a morally just war to fight for the principle of democracy: “France and Belgium had been invaded, and their soldiers were fighting either to protect their homes and hearths or to liberate them. The purpose of the war was clear: it was not a war of dubious morality but a struggle for basic freedoms” (Strachan, 2003, p. 59). And even if the Russians couldn’t claim democracy as its basis for moral legitimacy, it was still the protector of all Slavs who had been unjustly attacked. The overarching moral theme was embodied in “H. G. Wells’ famous phrase that this was ‘the war to end war’ because it was a war to defend humanity everywhere” (Roetter, 1974, p. 40).

This struggle to define and justify their narratives as morally legitimate was important in maintaining the support of their own populace, but the struggle was even more important with respect to the neutral countries in order to garner their support or, at the least, continued neutrality. This was most evident in the propaganda efforts by each side in trying to gain the support of the U.S. As Roetter (1974) explains two of the powers eliminated themselves from the struggle for American public opinion and played no significant part after that: “neither Czarist Russia nor the Hapsburg Empire...had popular propaganda appeal. To most Americans they represented all that was worst about the old World, about Europe. Their rule depended on dynastic claims, backed up by rigid bureaucracies and ruthless, cruel police forces. Minorities were ignored, and if they protested at their treatment, suppressed...The main belligerent powers...therefore, tended to be silently discreet about two of their most important allies” (pp. 53–54). In the view of the British, they were convinced that “their cause was just and right, and that the enemy’s was not only unjust but a menace to the fabric of society on this earth. A cause so obviously right, each side argued, was bound to appeal to the people of the United States and the noble ideals on which their country was founded” (Roetter, 1974, p. 54). Yet the Allies were wary about U.S. involvement in the war. Liddell Hart (1939) states that for two and a half years President Wilson was able to maintain the neutrality of the U.S., but was unable to establish a basis of peace between the belligerents since his “chances of persuading the Allied people were hindered by the fact that, carrying

neutrality into the realm of moral judgment, he seemed not to recognize any distinction between the aggressor and the victim” (p. 177).

Regardless, both sides acknowledged that they had to hold the moral high ground to gain America’s support; however, as seen earlier, the British were consistent with their messaging while the multiple inconsistent acts by the Germans considered in the previous section virtually undermined their entire narrative. This ideological battle eventually won America to the side of the Allies and intertwined with President Wilson’s thoughts forming the basis for his famous Fourteen Points. It was “Wilson’s fourteenth and best known point, the formation of ‘a general association of nations’...[which] in the popular imagination...captured the moral high ground for the Entente” (Strachan, 2003, p. 304).

Interestingly, in another theater of the war, Liddell Hart (1939) describes the campaign in the Middle East by Lawrence as similar in methods and styles to the German submarine campaign where “Camel-raiding parties in the one element played the same game as submarines in the other, the main difference being that the former were careful to avoid killing non-combatants” (p. 149), although atrocities were committed against the Turkish soldiers themselves. Lawrence (1918) himself writes, “We ordered ‘no prisoners’ and the men obeyed, except that the reserve company took two hundred and fifty men...Later, however, they found one of our men...pinned to the ground by two mortal thrusts with German bayonets. Then we turned our Hotchkiss [machine gun] on the prisoners and made an end of them, they saying nothing” (pp. 171–172).

5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?

As evident in the preceding sections, both sides overwhelmingly derived the legitimacy of their narratives from philosophy and ideology, primarily democracy, freedom, the right of nations, nationalism, or a combination of all three, and will not be covered again here. However, there was also some inter-mixing of religious legitimacy throughout the war. In Britain, “a former President of the National Free Church Council and leader of the Pacifist opposition to the Boer War...proclaimed support for this war to be as much a religious duty as ever opposition to the Boer War had been” (Roetter, 1974,

p. 31). Meanwhile, the Inter-Allied Commission tried to win support from the various nationalities of the Hapsburg Empire by appealing to both the nationalist and religious aspirations of the suppressed minorities. Similarly, Germany tried to gain the support of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire by also appealing to nationality as well as to religious aspirations of Islam citing the necessity of waging jihad to establish a caliphate. However, these sources of legitimacy in this latter example led to greater problems and inconsistencies in the German narrative as discussed above.

6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?

There is no doubt that the organization, both politically and within the armies themselves were extremely hierarchical in nature for all major belligerents. In fact, the massive mobilization of millions actually drove the militaries to become even more hierarchical and unwieldy than in previous wars: “another flaw which the gospel of mass revealed...‘multitudes serve only to perplex and embarrass’...it was difficult to handle armies of millions...Their very mass stultified the dreams of Napoleonic manoeuvres...Their inability to control the forces...precipitated the war” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 21). To deal with this issue the staffs of all of the armies themselves became more hierarchical: “The custom of all the armies erected the principle that no one was fit to have a voice in matters of strategy unless he had nearly forty years’ practice of military routine. It was certainly a novel principle, since it would have excluded nearly all the great commanders of history...although the principle flew in the face of historical experience and modern knowledge, it was rigidly maintained...throughout the four years of war” (Liddell Hart, 1939, pp. ix-x).

This hierarchy led to many problems early on in the war, especially when combined with the myth of the power of the offensive. The critical assumption was the “relative ease of offense and defense at the strategic level of war” (Lieber, 2000, p. 74) where “relative ease” refers to the relative costs of attacking versus defending. At the time, all major powers thought that the capabilities of the offense heavily outweighed the capabilities of the defense and that any lapse in mobilization would be immediately

translated into lost territory. This “Cult of the Offensive,” meant that “all three major Continental powers, Germany, Russia, and France, entered the Great War intent upon going on the offensive immediately...and everybody suffered...for four subsequent years of stalemate and misery” (O’Connell, 1989, pp. 242–243). This became readily apparent to anyone on the Western Front as the war dragged into stalemate, trench warfare, and reckless offensives against well-fortified defenses. Many commanders and troops desired a stop in fruitless offensives, yet “plans for a fresh offensive went forward—so strong is the binding power of the chain of command” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 80). Later when Joffre, France’s Chief of the General Staff, was confronted by rumors regarding the inadequacies of the defenses at Verdun, he “indignantly denied that there was any cause for anxiety, and demanded the names of those who had dared to suggest it: “I cannot be a party to soldiers under my command bringing before the Government, by channels other than the hierarchic channel, complaint or protests about the execution of my orders” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 126). Meanwhile, “Communications went up the command chain from battalion to brigade, from brigade to division, and at last reached corps headquarters...Orders had to be transmitted back down the line of command, acquiring more detail as they went...forward brigades were attacking but without...effective lateral communications between themselves” (Strachan, 2003, p. 176).

Eventually, all the belligerents realized the limitations of strict hierarchical structures and had to make minor modifications at all levels of warfare to try to become more effective despite the limitations of hierarchy. At the strategic level, the Allies decided that there needed to be more communication and coordination between the main powers and General Foch was given the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, but this gave him no real power of command, he could coax the three main Commanders (Haig, Pershing, and Petain), “but not control them. Thus plans remained a compromise, sometimes with ill-effect. Still as the fighting troops assumed that the united command was a reality, its effect on them was, and remained, real” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 227). One of the main strategic problems faced by the Allies was that Germany occupied a central position and was in a good position to shift its reserves around to strengthen defenses in the face of opposing attacks. This gradually led to outline of a

broader Allied strategy that ““Decisive results will only be obtained if the offensives of the allied armies are delivered simultaneously”” (Strachan, 2003, p. 184). Even at the strategic level, the allies realized that their independent forces had to be networked to be more effective while simultaneously “swarming” the enemy on multiple fronts in an attempt to overwhelm their defenses. Meanwhile, at the operational level, other attempts were made to minimize the handicaps of hierarchy, for example: “The German army paid deference to seniority, but it had a way of getting over the handicap of senility by placing the real power in the hands of picked staff officers, without regard to their rank” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 57). Liddell Hart specifically refers to the case of Ludendorff whose success at Liège earlier in the war led to his nomination to lead the German army on the Eastern Front. However, since “Ludendorff was comparatively junior in rank, he had to be provided with a titular chief, and for this function a retired general, Hindenburg, was chosen” (pp. 56–57).

Similarly, at the tactical level, there was an increased focus on developing solutions to the hierarchically-controlled and staged attacks on well-placed and heavily defended enemy positions. “It was not sufficient to say that the defensive was the stronger form of warfare...To win, an army had eventually to attack. The general solution was for the attacking troops to approach under cover, to close by breaking into small groups, advancing in bounds, and then to build up fire superiority before the final rush” (Strachan, 2003, p 47). “By 1918 squads or groups of seven to ten storm-troopers were trained to bypass strong points, maintaining the momentum of the advance by seeking soft spots. Supporting formations would mop up” (Strachan, 2003, p. 295).

There were a couple of notable exceptions to the traditional hierarchical structure that were present in other theaters of war. One such example is General Lettow-Vorbeck who waged a guerrilla campaign in German East Africa “with a bare five thousand men...[yet] caused the employment of 130,000 enemy troops” at the estimated cost to Britain of £72 million (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 61). General von Lettow-Vorbeck became a legend because he was never defeated despite the overwhelming numerical odds and did not surrender until two weeks after the armistice was signed in Europe ending the

war. His tactics consisted of organizing his soldiers into “independent field companies...Lettow’s strength lay in dispersal and in striking against weakness, forgoing the temptation to concentrate for battle” (Strachan, 2003, pp. 80–81).

The second example is in the exploits of T.E. Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia. Lawrence found that the “strength of the Arab forces in the field oscillated wildly, and the difficulty in military terms was holding the tribesmen together in any coherent body” (Strachan, 2003, p. 285). As Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (1968) explains, “The Arab forces were primitively armed and undisciplined [sic], their military virtue lying in their mobility. Lawrence quickly saw how to use them as an independent irregular force...his strategy was to make tip and run raids on [Turkish] long communication lines, particularly against the Hejaz railway, and to spread the revolt northwards to Damascus by propaganda...They succeeded in diverting considerable Turkish forces from the front at Gaza, and at the same time they protected Allenby’s flank” (p. 489). In the following sections, we shall see how organizational forms affected influence strategy.

7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?

Britain was the first of the belligerent powers to set up an official war propaganda apparatus, headed by Charles Masterman who was a personal friend to the Prime Minister, Asquith, as well as to Grey at the Foreign Office. “The War Office, the Admiralty, the Home Office, the Foreign Office and General Headquarters in France all had sections or at least groups of individuals who concerned themselves with some aspect of propaganda, and Masterman spent much of his time and energy in trying to coordinate these diverse efforts” (Roetter, 1974, p. 34). So the organization appeared to be a hierarchy that was facilitated by networks. However, as everyone in Britain started to realize how powerful propaganda was everyone tried to expand their own propaganda departments, which led to several attempts to reorganize Britain’s influence organizations. “At the beginning of 1917 the new Prime Minister, Lloyd George, sought to consolidate and centralize Britain’s propaganda work by forming a Department of

Information...divided into four divisions” and the organization became more hierarchical (Roetter, 1974, p. 35). However, there was still infighting amongst several different departments so in 1918, Lloyd George abolished the Department of Information and set up the Ministry of Information with two powerful newspaper proprietors. “In strict hierarchically bureaucratic terms Lord Beaverbrook was Lord Northcliffe’s superior, but neither press lord was willing to make an issue of the point, and Lloyd George...effectively silenced his two most vociferous critics” (Roetter, 1974, p. 36). In the end, Britain established a propaganda apparatus early in the war “and no matter how often that apparatus was tinkered with, there was throughout the war an organization equipped to disseminate propaganda” (Roetter, 1974, p. 37). Again, Britain’s propaganda was more hierarchical but with network-like tendencies.

By contrast, “Germany was fighting what Ludendorff in later life called a ‘total war’, but with the administrative structures of a small nineteenth-century state...it never collected its various propaganda agencies into a ministry of information” (Strachan, 2003, p. 275). “The only formal co-operation was a Press Conference at which representatives [from at least 10 different agencies] met a committee of journalists...two or three times a week...These Press Conferences were at best little more than channels for official hand-outs...certainly not instruments for a dynamic propaganda drive” (Roetter, 1974, p. 38).

Meanwhile the French propaganda was put out “by their established diplomatic, military and naval agencies, supported by the newly created *Maison de la Presse* which had agents attached to all the French diplomatic and trade missions abroad” (Roetter, 1974, p. 41). As discussed earlier, Czarist Russia as well as Austria-Hungary had no real propaganda apparatus and were frequently silenced by their more powerful allies. , Germany was actually able to capitalize on the lack of Russia’s propaganda apparatus when in “March 1917...Arthur Zimmerman [famous for the Zimmerman telegram discussed earlier] convinced the Kaiser and the army that the Bolsheviks’ leader, Lenin, who was living in exile in Switzerland, should be smuggled back into Russia...This was one revolutionary effort which reaped spectacular returns, albeit in a situation where

spontaneous revolution had already occurred” (Strachan, 2003, pp. 262–263). The Bolshevik revolutionaries under Trotsky and Lenin then generated propaganda in Russia undermining and eventually replacing the Russian government.

The U.S. established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) as soon as it entered the war in April 1917 to deal with propaganda at home and abroad headed by George Creel with the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy as the other members (Roetter, 1974; Mock & Larson, 1939). “Mr. Creel assembled as brilliant and talented a group...as America had ever seen united for a single purpose...and the breathtaking scope of its activities was not to be equaled until the rise of totalitarian dictatorships after the war” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 4). The CPI lacked the authority for censorship authority, but Creel had official membership and personal contacts with the military intelligence agencies and the law enforcement agencies effectively granting them indirect legal force. In terms of actual structure, the CPI “defies blueprinting. It was developed according to no careful plan. It was improvised on the job...the Committee’s organization, activities, and personnel changed incessantly...the work itself underwent continual change of scope and direction” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 48). The authors continue to state that it “is indicative of the impromptu organization and development of the Committee that no one can draw a definitive outline of its work...bureaus and divisions sprang up overnight and were modified, amalgamated, divided, extended, or entirely demobilized” (p. 65). The CPI was definitely set up to run like a hierarchy and Creel was at the top of the hierarchy, but the fluid nature of the organization and the willingness to continually revise the organization to be more effective presented more network tendencies. Overall, the U.S. influence organization was a hybrid of hierarchy and network.

Overall by 1918, with “the coalescence of their war aims, the allies were able to coordinate their efforts in propaganda as in other spheres” (Strachan, 2003, p. 318). Although there was a “unified and large-scale attack on the propaganda front...in the opinion of Americans at least, actual unification was never achieved...American representatives were not at first permitted to join wholeheartedly in the work, although the symbols of Wilson and America were used in all Allied appeals to the peoples of

Germany and Austria-Hungary” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 248). In one example, James Keeley was directed to work coordinating American propaganda with the three Inter-Allied Propaganda Boards, but he reported that “Those boards are ghosts” (as cited by Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 258). Overall, the Allies tried to form a networked organization to coordinate their propaganda, although it suffered from limited coordination.

8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

Early in the war, the Entente powers were divided into two separate schools of thought. The first was the “Eastern” school who advocated that the Allies should attack and defeat Germany’s allies first as opposed to the “Western” school who viewed Germany as the main enemy and the Western Front as the main battleground. The “Eastern” school argued that “the enemy alliance should be viewed as a whole; pointing out that a stroke in some other theatre of war was merely the modern form of the classic method of attack on an enemy’s strategic flank” (Liddell Hart, 1939, pp. 83–84). This division led to stagnation in the naval attack on the Dardenelles led by Ian Hamilton, whose forces were not reinforced in time. Although there were other causes for failure, including lack of initiative after securing the initial objectives, strategic miscalculation, and lack of leadership; “The root cause of this fatal hesitation was the opposition, open and underground, of the French and British commanders on the Western Front, who begrudged every man diverted from the services of the main offensive there” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 95).

Even on the Western Front, there were critical differences of opinion that detracted from the Entente strategy. “Haig had an eye also for his offensive aims. But he had to yield his desire for a stroke in Flanders to Joffre’s preference for one on the Somme...From now onwards there was to be a continual conflict between the French desire that the British should take over more of the front, and Haig’s desire to keep his strength for a decisive blow made in his own way” Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 123). By the beginning of 1918, this internal strife “provided a fresh incentive to the movements for

unity of direction among the Allies...[and] the necessity of forming an Inter-Allied General Staff” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 213). The position was soon established and although it was relatively powerless, the understood need to speak with a single, overarching voice gradually allowed the Allies to trend closer to cooperation and coordination via a series of strategic councils relative to where they stood at the beginning of the war.

The Central Powers and Germany, herself, were also plagued by internal division and distraction. In 1915 Falkenhayn, then Chief of the German General Staff, “was engaged in ceaseless struggle with the leaders on the Eastern Front, Conrad and Hindenburg...Their desire was to concentrate on crushing the Russian armies...The outcome was a conflict of wills damaging to the German Strategy” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 100). The internal conflict in Germany was not confined to the military, but resulted in a huge division between the military and the statesmen themselves with one of the most critical being the “decision to embark on ‘absolute war’ at sea...Hitherto the political power had been allowed to keep a hand at the helm; now it was under the hand of the martial helmsman” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 160). In these examples, we find that the overall organization for the major powers on both sides of the war were speaking with many separate, uncoordinated and often conflicting voices vice a single, overarching voice with a single, coordinated strategy.

9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

As discussed previously, propaganda efforts by Britain were carried out by no fewer than ten different agencies. Despite the number of agencies involved, the narrative was universal and Charles Masterman closely coordinated the efforts of the various agencies (Roetter, 1974). Even more important was their method of dissemination in the U.S., Wellington House, the key component of foreign influence within the various reorganizations of the British propaganda organization began “compiling a list of all the key political, academic, industrial, social, newspaper, financial and civic personalities in the United States [whose] circle of personal friends and acquaintances was vast, and they

supplemented that list by carefully going through *Who's Who in America*...[and] compiled a mailing list...to include almost 250,000 people...The whole elaborate operation was kept on a personal basis” (Roetter, 1974, p. 64). In effect, they recruited the key personalities in the U.S. as their own multitude of small voices. Wellington House also focused on small town and country newspapers which appreciated the personal attention and supplied everyone with articles from such notables as Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, H.G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, and Rudyard Kipling to name just a few (Roetter, 1974).

In the U.S., the CPI “had the advantage of being backed by the prestige of three of the most important and powerful Departments in the Federal Government...And [Creel] was a close friend of President Wilson and had ready access to the White House—which made it possible to integrate the formulation of policy and propaganda very closely at every stage” (Roetter, 1974, p. 42). Additionally, the CPI was able to utilize every known channel of communication to carry the message of Wilson’s idealism straight to the people to include newspapers, periodicals, speakers, circulars, press, billboards, posters, photographs, cartoons, exhibits, other existing social organizations, and traveling salesmen (Mock & Larson, 1939) One of the most unique methods of delivery consisted of the Four-Minute Men where more “than 75,000 volunteer speakers gave their four-minute talks in movie houses, theaters, and other public places from Maine to Samoa” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 72). In the absence of commercial radio, the Four-Minute Men “served as America’s ‘nation-wide hookup’ during the World War. Instead of the voice of a single speaker carried through the ether to distant points, there was a mighty chorus of 75,000 individual voices...united under CPI leadership for coordinated and synchronized expression of Wilsonian doctrine” (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 113). Originally, the Four-Minute men spoke primarily in movie houses, but the work was expanded “to cover more and more kinds of meeting—churches, synagogues, Sunday Schools, lumber camps, lodges, labor unions, social clubs,” gatherings of Indian tribes, schools, and cantonments (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 125).

Another unique delivery method was in recruiting the commercial travelers of America to carry the message and contradict the rumors, criticisms, and lies spread by the Kaiser's paid agents and unpaid sympathizers (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 176). A third tactic was the encouragement "of civil discontent and the advancement of separatist movements in enemy lands [which] formed part of the CPI effort abroad...[through] Americanized foreign groups...secret agents abroad, and through financial help" (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 230). A final key point is that despite having an informal ability to censor the press, the CPI rarely had to resort to that measure as most businesses self-regulated themselves and Creel "could afford to overlook unimportant details in a small number of papers because all the rest of the press was pounding out an anvil chorus of patriotism under the direction of CPI" (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 89). Additionally, through "whatever means of pressure or patriotic inspiration, publishers were induced to donate advertising space in such abundance that is almost impossible to pick up a periodical of the war years without finding one or more pages devoted to the message of the CPI" (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 100).

Meanwhile, in Germany "there was no co-operation, the propaganda put out by the military and the civil authorities was frequently conflicting, and became increasingly more pronounced...And so German propaganda continued to speak with different voices until the end of the War" (Roetter, 1974, p. 39). "Moreover, reports on atrocities were published by German government departments; hence they carried...the stigma, of officialdom instead of enjoying the veneer of the prestige conferred on them by being written by independent scholars...they tended to be enormously bulky and unwieldy and virtually unreadable...And, finally—most astonishing of all—most German atrocity propaganda material was not translated into foreign languages. The neutral world...was blithely assumed to be able to speak and read German" (Roetter, 1974, pp. 50–51).

In answering this question, it becomes apparent that the question "Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices?" is not a simple dichotomy and has many different layers. A single, overarching voice has been shown to be beneficial in establishing and maintaining

the overall direction and coherency of the message (i.e., work of the CPI); but not beneficial if interpreted as run and constrained by the government (i.e., German government stigma on the propaganda or even more narrowly defined as only in one's own native language). Similarly, many small voices can be construed as negative (i.e., the multiple agencies in Germany that were not coordinated in their message) or as positive (i.e., the amplification of the message through multiple dissemination channels and multiple voices within each channel as exemplified by the Four-Minute Men). The most effective organization appears to be one that has a strong, central, well-defined narrative that is broadcast and amplified on multiple channels. In other words, the narrative is more effective when there is strategic centralization with a single, overarching voice yet tactical decentralization via many, small, but independent voices.

10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?

Based upon the answers in the previous sections, we would classify the overall “density” (based upon the number of inter-connections, clustering, and strength of ties within the organization) of the Central Powers and Germany specifically as low. There was no real coordination or linkage between the countries beyond the political level and even these connections were tenuous at best. Within Germany itself, there was no strong density of linkages between the various parts of the government, between the various organizations that were conducting propaganda, or within the military itself as the various generals were all working at furthering their own agenda to the exclusion of others.

Within the Allied countries, we would classify the overall density as medium. Although there were some indications of rivalries within the various militaries, within the government, and within the influence organizations themselves; most of the time the various parts of the organization strove towards the same end goal. In doing so, many individuals were able to forge personal or organizational relationships to increase the functionality of the various players or to leverage already existing links to increase the overall strategic efficiency of the influence organization, the military, the government, and the overall Alliance. As just one example, take the impromptu organization within CPI. “A ‘come at once’ telegram would be dispatched to some journalist, scholar, or

public figure; he would catch an afternoon train; and presto! the next dawn would break on a brand new unit of the CPI...Some of the Committee's most useful men arrived unheralded, but the majority were summoned because someone already in the work knew their particular talents and the help that they could give" (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 65). While not all aspects of the Alliance worked as well as this example, the Allies were much more adept at conceiving, building, or utilizing links within the network to achieve their objectives as compared to the Central Powers.

11. What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?

Looking at the results of the war at face value, most people would readily agree that the Allies achieved their political goals, namely to reclaim lost territory, establish the justness of their cause (democracy and freedom), and eliminate the Central Powers as threats to establish security for the future. However, not all of these goals stand up under closer scrutiny. "Despite its defeat, Germany manufactured its own feeling of victory out of the war...the German army...still stood deep in enemy territory on all fronts when it laid down its arms; its fronts had been neither broken through nor enveloped; thus, none of the feature of an operational defeat on the battlefield was present...[which] fitted in with the argument that the army had been stabbed in the back by the revolution at home" (Strachan, 2003, pp. 330–331).

In addition, despite any actual objective facts of the settlement, "What mattered was the rhetoric that accompanied the settlement. Before the peace treaty was signed...John Maynard Keynes, resigned in protest at the harshness of the terms...The allies' failure at Versailles was a failure of resolve in implementing its terms...The reality was that, given the enormity of the task that confronted the victors, they drew up a settlement which promised far more than it proved able to deliver in practice" (Strachan, 2003, p. 333). Additionally, as alluded to in a previous section, the Wilsonian idea of national self-determination, while noble, was a difficult concept to implement: "about 30 million found themselves on the wrong sides of frontiers...Clear ethnic divisions were particularly hard to draw" (Strachan, 2003, p. 333). Italy felt aggrieved that the deal promised for land was not kept and Japan was angered by the refusal to accept a clause

on racial equality. Initially, the Arabs did not get the nationhood they had been led to expect. Although after several revolts and uprisings in the Middle East, Britain participated in the 1921 Cairo conference, in which Churchill and Lawrence participated to “sort out the unsatisfactory state of the Middle East created by the Dispositions agreed in Paris. As a result...Feisal was installed on the throne of Iraq while his brother Abdullah became ruler of Transjordan...The settlement...allowed Lawrence...to conclude that he was ‘quit of our wartime Eastern adventure with clean hands’” (Brown, 2005, p. 249). For all these reasons and more, “the First World War did not end as neatly...as the celebration of Armistice Day suggest” (p. 336). “Liberalism’s comparative failure in the inter-war years was in large part due to its own fundamental decency. It lost the determination to enforce its own standards” (p. 339).

In the end, the “First World War broke the empires of Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Turkey...it provided a temporary but not a long-term solution to the ambitions of the Balkan nations. Outside Europe it laid the seeds for the conflict in the Middle East” (Strachan, 2003, pp. 339–340). “President Wilson was given the military victory he wanted...and it seemed that his spokesmen of the CPI had likewise triumphed. But in those final weeks of the Committee on Public Information the realistic members of the staff asked themselves if, after all, they had won their fight for the mind of mankind”—prophetic words in 1939 (Mock & Larson, 1939, p. 334).

12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?

Obviously, one key factor in this war was the interplay of the mobilization of millions with the interaction of mobility and logistics. For instance, “Russia had more millions to draw upon than any, but her mobilization was slower, a large part of her forces were in Asia, and her eventual strength was hampered by lack of munitions” (Liddell Hart, 1939, p. 19). However, reliance on manpower, technology, and mobility alone can be deceiving. “The combined populations of the four Central Powers totaled 144 million in 1914; those of the principal Entente powers of 1918 (including their colonies) 690 million. However, economic potential and military capability were not the

same. Turkey, despite its backwardness, had twice defeated Britain in battle, and its military contribution [as measured by manpower alone, not material] to the war as a whole was greater than that of the United States” (Strachan, 2003, p. 304). In fact it was partly Turkey’s strength in manpower, but weakness in material which influenced Lawrence’s strategy in the Middle East: “In the Turkish army materials were scarce and precious, men more plentiful than equipment. Consequently our cue should be to destroy not the army but the materials.” (Lawrence, 1920, p. 266).

In terms of overall military technology, both sides were relatively comparable with each other in munitions available on the field with the exception of the tank developed late in the war. One key technological factor was that the British severed Germany’s telegraph communication cables in the North Sea which had a negative impact on Germany’s ability to communicate in a timely fashion with outlying areas and neutral countries, particularly the United States. Another important technological factor was Germany’s reliance on code to cover its communication signals that Britain was able to intercept. Although Germany had the technological superiority to develop the code and could have changed the ciphers, in their arrogance they assumed the Allies could not break the codes. This had a significant impact on the ability to bring the Zimmerman telegram to light spurring the U.S. to join the war.

A final key factor to keep into account was the impact of the British naval blockade, which certainly had a huge impact on Germany’s ability to fight as well as influencing its decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare. All of these factors played a role in impacting the narrative as well as the dissemination of the narrative.

C. RESULTS

Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the influence strategy in World War I based upon our structured questions:

1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? **Central Powers – no; Entente powers – no, U.S. – yes**

2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? **Germany – no; Allied powers (including U.S.) – no**

3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? **Germany – no; Allied powers (including U.S.) – no;** however, Germany was comparatively worse on this measure than the Allies and this comparative difference was highly propagandized in favor of the Allies

4) Is the narrative morally legitimate? **Germany – within Germany, yes; external to Germany, no; Allied powers (including U.S.) – yes**

5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other source? **Primarily philosophy (Nationalism, Freedom, Democracy) with minor religious strands**

6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? **Germany – Hierarchy; Allied powers (including U.S.) – Hierarchy (note: both sides experimented with organizational innovations at all levels of warfare to minimize the problems of hierarchy and exhibit minor network-like trends**

7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, hierarchy, or hybrid? **Germany – Heterarchical; Entente – Hierarchy; U.S. – Hybrid of Hierarchy and Network**

8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **Central Powers (including Germany) – many small voices (uncoordinated, conflicted), Allies overall – many small voices (uncoordinated, conflicted) but working to resolve issues and tend towards single, overarching voice**

9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **Germany – many small voices (uncoordinated, conflicted); Allies (including U.S.) – Single, overarching voice (coordinated) and many small voices (dissemination) See discussion at end of section above**

10) Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? **Central Powers (including Germany) – Low; Allied powers (including U.S.) – Medium**

11) What was the political goal (end)? Was it achieved? **End war, promote nationalism and democracy, and eliminate Germany as future threat. Partially achieved – ambitious, not-well implemented**

12) What other capabilities (means) were used? Relative importance of the other capabilities in achieving the end? **Technology both in war and specifically in relation to influence – moderate impact; Economic blockade – major impact, inconclusive if sufficient to end war by itself without other means; interesting interplay between technology, blockade, and narrative**

We will analyze these findings in further detail in Chapter XI along with the details of the other case studies; however, two preliminary findings should be highlighted from this particular case study. The first is the major impact from negative deeds (such as unrestricted submarine warfare and violations of neutrality), regardless of whether the deeds directly conflicted with the stated narrative. Any action that served to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the belligerent had a major impact on the course and outcome of the war. Specifically, in this case study, Germany's willingness to flaunt the neutrality of Belgium was the key factor in the British declaration of war and popular public support. The perceived German atrocities and intent (the execution of Nurse Cavell, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the Zimmerman telegram) dragged the U.S. into the war despite the struggle by President Wilson to remain neutral. Without either Britain or the U.S. entering the war against Germany, the result of the war and subsequent history may have been significantly different. Additionally, we found that Germany was confronted with multiple decisions between the moral high ground versus an immediate operational or tactical military advantage. In their decisions to violate Belgium neutrality and resume unrestricted submarine warfare, Germany chose the military advantage to the detriment of their own narrative. By doing so, Germany knowingly sacrificed its informational advantage for material gain when the analysis of the narrative seems to imply that more

weight should be given to the moral effects over operational military advantage in these calculations.

The second major discussion in this case study is the need to be more specific when analyzing the question “Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices?” This was already discussed above, but is important enough to bear repetition here. The question as formulated is vague which is useful in allowing the exploration of all the relevant content here, but the analysis above shows that the choice between a single, overarching voice versus many, small voices should not be viewed solely as a simple dichotomy and in reality the answer has many different layers. A single, overarching voice has been shown to be beneficial in establishing and maintaining the overall direction and coherency of the message (i.e., work of the CPI); but not beneficial if interpreted as run and constrained by the government (i.e., German government stigma on the propaganda or even more narrowly defined as only in one’s own native language). Similarly, many small voices can be construed as negative (i.e., the multiple agencies in Germany that were not coordinated in their message) or as positive (i.e., the amplification of the message through multiple dissemination channels and multiple voices within each channel as exemplified by the Four-Minute Men). The most effective organization appears to be one that has a strong, central, well-defined narrative that is broadcast and amplified on multiple channels.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VIII. COMPARATIVE STUDY 3: WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE (GERMANY/ITALY VS. U.S./U.K./U.S.S.R.)

A. BACKGROUND

World War II affected the policies and actions of nearly every nation in the world and its battles took place across a vast portion of the world's terrain, both geographical and ideological. The conflict took place between the Axis Powers (principally Germany, Japan, and Italy) and the nations aligned against Axis aggression (the "Big Three" were Britain, The United States, and the Soviet Union) known commonly as the Allies. There were many other minor powers aligned with the Allies, but the study will focus on the three major powers. Although the Axis powers were allies having signed formal treaties, the goals and national interests of Japan and Germany diverged greatly and their alliance was based more on a common enemy rather than common objectives. Additionally Italy, although more closely aligned with Germany both geographically and through fascist ideology, proved a minor partner in Europe and could perhaps be considered to ultimately be more hindrance than help to the Nazi effort. Therefore, we will focus primarily on Germany and Italy for the Axis powers.

A clear distinction can be made as well on the Allied side regarding the Soviets with respect to the U.S. and U.K. Just before the war Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact designed to prevent hostilities between the two countries as well as providing agreement to the partitioning of Eastern Europe (Arnold-Forster, 1973, pp. 28–29). Another difference of note is the political/ideological chasm that lay between the Soviet Union and the U.S. and U.K. Both the United States and the United Kingdom had adopted varying forms of liberal constitutional democracy while the Soviet Union had since embarked on its drive to the ideal of Soviet Communism. Although they may have both possessed designs on the future control of Europe, those visions were not the same. It is reasonable to conclude that outside the objective of defeating Nazi Germany, the British and Americans shared few goals in common with the Soviets, ideologically or geographically, regarding the conduct of the war or their post-war vision for Europe.

Therefore, this comparative study will focus on the battle for influence that occurred between Germany and the United Kingdom/United States largely in Europe, North Africa, and on the Atlantic Ocean. It is acknowledged that the effects and outcomes of other efforts in other locations in the larger war cannot be completely isolated from what occurred specifically between Germany and the U.S./U.K. The world is after all a system of systems. However, in order to narrow the scope of something that can be said to be global in proportions, data and evidence will be primarily focused on what occurred between Germany and the United States/United Kingdom. The primary exception to this will be the inclusion of German policies and propaganda that simultaneously attacked the Allies as a whole; such as attempts to tie together the threat of Communism and Western plutocracy as well as turning points in the war that cannot be discussed without reference to other belligerents.

A large amount of weight in this study is placed on propaganda for, as noted by Clayton Laurie, “The struggle to influence the thoughts and behavior of friends and foes alike made World War II a contest of ideologies as well as of arms...In a general sense the ideological and political conflicts among propagandists concerning the content and goals of the...campaign against Germany were similar to the conflicts experienced by American politicians, diplomats, and soldiers...as to the shape of...policies, war aims, and postwar goals” (Laurie, 1996 p. 3). The apparatus each side established to wield this influence reflects the social/political systems from which each emerged and therefore useful for illustrating their forms.

An additional reason for a focus on propaganda is its perceived importance it obtained following World War I. Balfour (1979) notes that:

The Germans by overestimating the part which Allied propaganda had played [in WW I], were led to exaggerate the part which propaganda could play. They determined that a skillful depiction of the partial truth of a situation could alter reality in order to bring it in line with that truth. Additionally, by overplaying the degree to which German defeat had been due to a failure of will rather than to being overwhelmed materially, they developed the conviction that greater will, brought about by more ardent conviction, could by itself produce a new result. (p. 10)

Similar conclusions were made on the Allied side with respect to the importance of propaganda as well if for no other reason than a strong recognition that Nazi ideology must be countered and that deliberate effort would be needed to achieve this (Laurie, 1996, p. 4).

The words of Joseph Goebbels, Germany's lead propagandist, describe this new faith in propaganda well. "You can go on shooting up the opposition with machine-guns until they acknowledge the superiority of the gunners. That is the simpler way. But you can also transform the nation by a mental revolution and thus win over the opposition instead of annihilating them. We National Socialists have adopted the second way and intend to pursue it" (Balfour, 1979, p. 48).

This is not to ignore other elements of influence. The government structure and command staffs of each side will be considered. Additionally consideration will be given to other elements such as technology and industrial output.

B. SUMMARY OF THE WAR

This section serves as a brief history of the major events of the war. Specific evidence deemed reflective of the battle for influence will be addressed in greater detail in the Data section.

Germany in 1938 under Adolf Hitler was in all respects a totalitarian state. It had chosen to dismiss the terms imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and rebuild its military power. The treaty, the embodiment of the lingering results of WW I, has been viewed by some as a direct precipitator of Germany's aggression. Germans perceived the treaty as unfair as well as an obstacle to their post-war reconstruction (Fuller, 1949, pp. 17–23). As recorded by Balfour, "The Germans had been led by Wilson's language to expect that they would be treated on equal footing with everybody else; instead, they were discriminated against" (Balfour, 1979, p. 9).

The treaty had cost Germany some of its territory in Europe as well as all of its pre-war colonies. Germany also lost the majority of its pre-war Navy, half of its iron production, almost one fifth of its coal production, and a sixth of its population. The

terms of the treaty along with the devastation wrought by the war left Germany in a severe state that would only be exasperated by a worldwide economic depression (historylearningsite.co.uk/treaty_of_versailles.htm). The resulting frustration and desperation would assist in creating the conditions that allowed for the rise of National Socialism and Hitler's ascent to power (Fuller, 1949, p. 22). The treaty created conditions that would provide a sense of legitimacy to German military aggression. Legitimacy at home to right previous wrongs as well as legitimacy abroad to prefer appeasement of Hitler as long as a nation was not directly threatened itself.

In early March 1938 open German aggression began. Under the guise of political unification German troops occupied Austria with little opposition voiced by other European powers. Subsequently Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and other eastern territories under the pretense of protecting ethnic German populations. Western Europe again took no direct action in response. The reluctance of other European powers to initially oppose German aggression is attributed to, having just ended WWI, a reluctance to enter another war as well as an underestimation of Hitler's intentions. James Stokesbury in *A Short History of World War II* references A. J. P. Taylor's argument that the full blame cannot be placed on Hitler. He was merely acting as he should by expressing the interests of his state, while the Allies failed to firmly express their interests thus encouraging German aggression (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 54–64).

In August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union signed the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact which also secretly included plans for dividing Eastern Europe. Germany then invaded Poland under a ruse of self-defense and quickly occupied its Western half. The Wehrmacht was primarily responsible for the defeat of the Polish army and occupation but was quickly followed by elements of the S.S. would engage in the rounding up and execution of Polish citizens, particularly Jews. Two weeks after the German invasion Soviet forces invaded Poland from the East to complete the defeat and parceling of the country. Germany's operations in Poland are widely viewed as the first use of Blitzkrieg. Stokesbury (1980) notes that at this point military intervention by Britain and/or France could likely have halted German aggression, but the influence of

war weariness from WW I combined with overestimation of German strength prevented action (pp. 69–76). The treatment of Jewish Poles had negative repercussions for the legitimacy of German actions.

After the fall of Poland, Britain and France declared war on Germany but took little direct action. Britain did however engage in a propaganda effort against Nazism by delivering leaflets using its bomber fleet to little effect. Russia invaded Finland in November 1939 and in April 1940 Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. Denmark fell quickly. In Norway, although the capital would fall, a resistance movement supported by the Allies would hold out longer (Arnold-Forster, 1973, pp. 30–42).

Germany invaded France via Belgium and the Netherlands using combined air and land forces on a two-pronged advance and capitalizing on lessons learned regarding Blitzkrieg from the Polish campaign. The Allied attempt to defend Belgium resulted in a complete rout as the German advance through the Ardennes separated British and French forces. British forces and 100K French narrowly escaped across the channel via Dunkirk thus leaving the remaining French forces on their own. Following the evacuation of the British, France surrendered to Germany. Clive Ponting notes that the swift fall of France may be attributed as much to British unwillingness to commit a decisive force to the defense of the European mainland as to the swiftness of the German assault (Ponting, 1993, pp. 78–95). Additionally, many in England were fearful of potentially losing all of its aircraft thereby leaving England vulnerable to the Luftwaffe and aerial bombardment. In effect the British were faced with the dilemma of committing additional forces to help France versus preserving the combat power necessary to defend the British Isles.

Germany's next focus was the attempt to subdue Britain via establishing air dominance over the isles, to be followed by a cross-channel invasion. Britain, recognizing its survival hinged on preventing an amphibious invasion, focused on preparing itself by fortifying at home via materials provided from the United States as well as securing its position at sea. This included attacking the French fleet to insure that it could not become a resource for Germany. This action caused enduring tension with the French.

Meanwhile, the fortification at home consisted largely of air-defense and air-combat systems recognizing that the Germans would have great difficulty mounting a cross-channel invasion without air-dominance. (Ponting, 1993, pp. 120–137). This fortification was not possible without material assistance from the United States which was not provided until the U.S. lifted an embargo against loans to belligerents that had been put in place after WW I (Ponting, 1993, p. 45). Had Hitler not pushed the limits of the legitimacy of redressing Germany's humiliation under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the United States may not have provided the British with an external source of material support for defense of the British homeland.

British resistance during the Battle of Britain owed as much to force of will as to force of arms. Balfour notes that “the British had little to say to the Germans...except that we were not going to give in” (Balfour, 1979, p. 195). The Royal Air Force was able to defeat the German air campaign through combination of skill and home field advantage. German aircraft would be engaged over Britain rather than over the channel placing them at the limits of their operational range. Failure to defeat the RAF or to crush British defenses is only one part of what convinced Hitler to postpone an attempt at a land invasion. Another part was the perceived German naval defeat at Jutland, after which German Naval surface forces never left base again. Additionally, Hitler was not entirely set on the total defeat of Britain. As long as Germany dominated Europe, the British Empire need not be dismantled. Peace was acceptable on those terms. Dealing with the Soviet Union was also increasingly seen as a strategic priority (Ponting, 1993, pp. 120–137).

Italy declared war in June 1940 and by September was attacking Malta, which it would besiege for three years, and invaded British holdings in North and East Africa. Italian forces suffered heavy losses in material and territory to British defenders, prompting Germany to send its own forces under Rommel to their aid. Italy additionally failed in its invasion of Greece again forcing Germany to commit forces. Germany invaded Yugoslavia to effect passage to Greece. Subsequently British forces were forced out of Greece and Crete. Italy's failed efforts would plant the seeds of another of the

war's major turning points which would take place in North Africa (Arnold-Forster, 1973, pp. 95–113). By forcing the Germans to commit forces there, an additional front was effectively opened that tied down German resources and altered German strategy.

In a bid to obtain more territory and resources for the German effort as well as neutralize the threat of Soviet Communism Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 in an operation code named Barbarossa. Hitler had long considered the Soviet Union the *real* enemy and defeating the U.S.S.R. would also eliminate another possible source of assistance to the British (Ponting, 1993, p. 124). The Barbarossa plan included a deception scheme to portray the preparations for the invasion of Russia as preparations for the invasion of England (Fuller, 1949, p. 90). This cover played well to Stalin's desire to maintain peace with Germany, at least in the near term, to the point of ignoring British and American warnings that a German invasion was imminent. German forces attacked along three separate axis of advance towards, Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev. Germany expected the Soviets to collapse within months, if not weeks. The German military achieved almost total surprise destroying half of the Soviet air force within the first week, much of it on the ground, as was achieved against British and French air forces previously. The Soviet command, consisting of relatively inexperienced officers due to Stalin's late 1930s purges, was paralyzed by confusion and contradictory orders. Soviet troops, as well as citizens, however would prove stubborn and determined in their resistance.

Although the German forces advanced rapidly, each mile of advance extended already stretched lines of communications reaching across a three axis front of close to one thousand kilometers. The United States and Britain would respond by providing intelligence from decoded German communications as well as shipping large amounts of equipment and material to the Soviets. The Soviets would adopt a scorched earth policy destroying any useful resources before advancing German units. The shifting relative supply advantage, stubborn resistance of the Soviets, and the onset of the Russian winter severely slowed the German advance in the North. In the South however, along the Southern axis, the Ukraine fell to Germany. In the center the battle for Moscow halted

the German advance as Hitler issued orders to shift from the offensive to the defensive. Two factors of influence are important to note with respect to the invasion of Russia. First is Hitler's relationship with his generals. Stokesbury (1980) notes that after achieving success in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France, despite the misgivings of his General Staff, he possessed an inflated sense of his own military infallibility. This led him to overrule the generals' recommendation that Moscow was the center of gravity, thus diverting forces from the center to the north and south. Secondly is the influence of Nazi Ideology that regarded Slavic populations as subhuman. German mistreatment of Russians who might have joined them against communism served instead to drive them to the relentless defense of the Russian motherland (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 150–160).

German forces attempted another advance in the South to Stalingrad in mid-1942. Making heavy use of air power the German military encircled and entered the city but never cut off Soviet access via the Volga River. This access proved essential to the Soviet defenders' ability to resist. With the onset of another Russian winter, German ability to supply and reinforce was again hampered. A subsequent Soviet counter attack achieved the double envelopment of the German Sixth Army, which Hitler refused to allow to make any attempt to escape. In early 1943, all German forces caught in the envelopment had either surrendered or were destroyed (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 150–160).

Germany's failure to achieve its objectives in the Soviet Union was a major turning point in the outcome of World War II. Germany suffered not only huge material and human losses, but sustained a serious blow to the morale and determination of its citizens revealed in attempts by German propaganda to de-emphasize the events surrounding Stalingrad. The German public's optimism about what Germany could and would accomplish decreased while pessimism about the results of the war increased (Balfour, 1979, p. 290). The German defeat shattered the myth of German invincibility in the field (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 142). Subsequent Russian success would reveal to Germany's adversary's that a culminating point in German aggression had been reached. Germany's failure to achieve and maintain its objectives with regard to Russia also

served to vindicate the British and American strategy of building up their own power while Germany expended its own.

The United States formally entered the war on in December 1941 following the Japanese surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. Less formally however, and despite the official status of neutrality, the United States had provided material support to both the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union for the first two years of the war. Britain declared war on Japan the same day. Germany declared war on the United States three days later. Although Germany had no obligation to declare war against the United States, doing so allowed the opening up of rich new hunting grounds for its U-boat fleet. The consequence of doing so was to insure that the United States and the Soviet Union would combine their power against Germany. Something that was previously unlikely. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. were more prone to be adversaries than allies, and following Pearl Harbor American sentiment was that the war against Japan belonged to the U.S. while the war against Germany was for Europe (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 155). Hitler's actions again pushed a neutrally disposed America into opposition.

The first major campaign that the British and Americans mounted jointly was the invasion of North Africa in late 1942. The campaign, although meeting stubborn resistance from German forces, succeeded in routing Axis forces from Northern Africa by May 1943. Similar to the outcome of the Italian incursion into Greece and Crete, the actions in North Africa forced Germany to commit and sacrifice a large amount of manpower and resources that might have been otherwise applied to the battle against the Soviets. The British and Americans did not initially agree that North Africa should be the focus of the initial involvement of U.S. Forces. The U.S. military was interested in an invasion of France. President Roosevelt ultimately decided on North Africa partly for reasons of political influence believing that American forces should engage the Germans at the earliest opportunity and North Africa being the only reasonable option. This also served to appease Russian demands for opening a new front as well as appease the American public's desire for action (Stokesbury, 1980, p. 224).

The Allies followed their success in North Africa by seizing the island of Sicily. Preparations for this assault were aided greatly by a detailed deception effort. The objective of the deception, Operation Mincemeat, was to convince German intelligence that the next Allied move would not be against Sicily, but that the appearance of a coming invasion of Sicily was merely a cover for the 'real' invasion elsewhere. The Allies gained control of Sicily in August 1943. The Mincemeat deception resulted in the repositioning of German forces to defend Greece, some of which were diverted from Sicily (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 15). Additionally, the Mincemeat deception by posing the truth (an invasion of Sicily) as a lie, can be argued to have set-up German intelligence for the Bodyguard deception for the invasion of France.

Success in Sicily was followed by an Allied invasion of the Italian mainland. Although Italy had formally surrendered by late 1943, there still remained a considerable German military presence that seized control of the nation. The Allies landed at two separate points and within one month seized Naples. German resistance was determined, inflicting heavy losses on the Allies. The German defense of Italy consisted of a series of defensive lines stretching east to West across the peninsula. The first line called the Winter Line was established to prevent an Allied advance into Rome. This line held for six months through mid-1944. After the Allies seized Rome the Germans established the Gothic Line across northern Italy which held until early 1945. The invasion of Italy was another source of disagreement between the U.S. and U.K. The U.S. again had focused attention on an invasion of France while the U. K. had argued for Italy as a jumping off point for further actions as well as a relatively easier location to achieve more success against the axis (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 291–309).

The defeat in North Africa, losses in Italy, and reversals on the Eastern Front placed Germany firmly on the defensive. New Soviet offensives in the Ukraine in late 1943 and the lifting of the siege of Leningrad in early 1944 set the stage materially and psychologically for the Soviet summer offensive that pushed the German military back to Poland. The timing of events in the Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front, however

accidental, would be coined by the British as “the month that changed the war” (Balfour, 1979, p. 291).

In June 1944, the Allies invaded France with Operation Overlord, a series of amphibious landings on the Normandy coast. This operation was preceded and accompanied by a deception aimed at creating ambiguity for the German command as to where the landings would take place. Germany, having expected an invasion of Europe at some point, established a network of coastal defenses known as the Atlantic Wall. The success of the deception effort prevented the German command from committing reserve forces early to oppose the landings. The Allies were able to overwhelm the defenders locally and secure landing sites on the first day. A breakout from the landing sites was achieved, with difficulty, within two months of the initial landings.

An additional landing was conducted in Southern France in August and by late 1944 the Allies controlled the country as well as parts of Belgium. The Allies could now bomb Germany from airfields on the European mainland. Simultaneously in the East, Soviet forces moved into Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Germany was effectively cut off from its external fuel supplies. Internal doubts arose as to Hitler’s competence as evidenced by an internal attempt at assassination and military coupe in July 1944 (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 261).

Germany conducted its last major offensive of the war in the Ardennes Forest. In December, 1944 under cover of a snowstorm, three German armies pushed into French territory and surrounded United States forces at Bastogne. This counter-offensive resulted in the diversion of allied combat power to counter the bulge in allied lines. Clear weather allowed Allied air power in combination with forces moved from Southern France to break the German offensive, rescue the besieged forces, and place the German military back on the defensive. The Soviets meanwhile continued to advance steadily across Poland and the East (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 349–363).

As the various armies advanced on Berlin from all sides Hitler refused to allow surrender and issued instructions that all citizens were to defend the city to the last. Surrender of German military units was not orderly as some fought bitterly and others

gave in. Following Hitler's suicide, the formal surrender was made in May 1945 (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 361–363). The lines roughly established by the presence of Soviet, British, and American forces would solidify into the Iron Curtain and set the stage for the Cold War.

C. DATA

As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused comparison approach to explore the selected case studies. Thus data is structured below as answers to each of our stated focus questions. Despite the global nature of the conflict, the data will focus primarily on Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States (although other theaters of war and countries will be referenced in key points).

1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?

The U.S. narrative changed over the course of the war. The U.S. narrative began as peaceful, neutral and isolationist. In part America was wary of a repeat of the First World War where some felt the U.S. was pulled into the war based on a need to ensure payment of allied war purchases. The British had defaulted on those payments in the interwar period. The American Congress had therefore passed several acts to prevent the sale of arms to belligerents as well as deny any loans to nations that had defaulted on debt from the previous war (Ponting, 1993, p. 36). America's involvement in the League of Nations was crippled by Congress's desire to avoid the affairs of Europe. President Roosevelt, seeking a third term in office, was also not in a position politically to push for increased involvement (Ponting, 1993, p. 36). Roosevelt appealed to the Italian King Victor Emmanuel II to assist in resolving European territorial issues peacefully in August 1939 (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 23). With the Declaration of Panama in October 1939 and the Neutrality Act of November 1939 America sought to further prevent involvement in European hostilities (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 32).

The U.S. narrative shift away from strict neutrality begins around May 1940 with President Roosevelt's message to congress. Roosevelt described America's vulnerability and prescribed of how America should arm itself for defense as well as allow provision

of arms by foreign nations. By September an agreement was reached for the lease of military facilities between the British and the U.S. (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 89). In December 1940 in a radio address Roosevelt shifted the narrative further way from neutrality describing the incompatible nature of Nazi government and American democracy. He criticized Germany's appeasers and proposed that to avoid direct involvement in the war America had to ensure that the free nations of Europe did not collapse. This is the inception of the arsenal of democracy and the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941 (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, pp. 132–137). American and British military staff met in secret to discuss how U.S. and British forces could be integrated should America enter the war (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 126). The Atlantic Charter further illustrated that the American narrative was firmly shifting to that of an adversary of Nazi Germany, even if not a party directly involved in the war.

America required the shock of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in order to popularly embrace a narrative for war (Fuller, 1949, p. 133). Even then, Americans viewed the war in Europe as an issue for Europeans. The war in the Pacific was for America. It required a decision by Germany to declare war on the U.S. to bring America into direct military confrontation with Germany (Arnold-Forster, 1973, p. 155).

In a message to congress in January 1942 Roosevelt laid out the argument that was essentially the American narrative for the remainder of the war. He argued that the war is about preserving freedom, democracy, and common decency. He also established the objectives of smashing militarism, liberating subjugated nations, and securing freedom in the world. Additionally Roosevelt made assertions that these objectives would not be compromised (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 189).

The British narrative shifted over time as well. At the beginning of German aggression Britain sought appeasement of Hitler. A combination of weariness from WWI, a difficult economic situation, and misinterpretation of Hitler's full intentions placed Britain in a position where immediate, direct confrontation with Germany was infeasible, and also seen as not urgently necessary. As established by Clive Ponting, Britain had "too many commitments and too few resources (Ponting, 1993, p. 23).

Confronting Hitler directly would leave other parts of the empire vulnerable. Additionally, Britain's policy was traditionally focused on maintaining the balance of power on continental Europe by ensuring the strongest power on the continent had a rival (Fuller, 1949, p. 24). If Hitler's aims were territorial and limited this did not necessarily upset the balance and appeasement was preferable to war. Even after Hitler's invasion of Poland the British, willing to sacrifice Poland, attempted to seek terms with Germany to avoid war (Ponting, 1993, p. 39).

After being forced to declare war on Germany, based on agreements with Poland, Britain saw its narrative shift slightly. If Germany could not be appeased, it must be opposed through strength and deterred into settlement (Ponting, 1993, p. 41). Opposing Hitler did not, however, take priority over preserving the British Empire. Efforts against Germany during the Phoney War were peripheral and designed at weakening Germany into settlement rather than defeating it (Ponting, 1993, pp. 44–45). The British sacrificed as little as possible in the defense of Belgium and France in order to preserve the resources deemed necessary to protect the British homeland. The battle for France was not viewed as crucial. Maintaining the ability to defend Britain and negotiate with Germany from some position of strength was (Ponting, 1993, p. 85).

After the fall of France, the general British narrative of perseverance until victory was well established through the speeches of Winston Churchill throughout 1940. The internal narrative of the government is more complex. Throughout 1940 the British government was undecided about what course to pursue. The crux of the debate was whether to settle on whatever terms Germany offered to achieve peace, or to fight on in the hope that Germany would weaken or at least limit its objectives and accept a settlement more favorable to Britain. Basically it was a discussion about how much must be sacrificed to achieve peace while preserving Britain. The argument for continuing the fight to achieve a more favorable position won out (Ponting, 1993, p. 119). This decision would necessitate a continued narrative to the public of victory through perseverance.

The British policy and propaganda response to Hitler's invasion of Russia remained consistent with the narrative of perseverance from the Battle of Britain yet

inconsistent with previous views of the Soviet Union. The Ministry of Information, MOI, focused on three primary objectives regarding this. First, “to disabuse the public of the idea that the invasion was a sign of desperation on Germany’s part” (Balfour, 1979, p. 229). This was seen as necessary to maintain the people’s conviction, established during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, that the war would be a long and difficult endeavor and to undercut the notion that Germany was weak and therefore approachable for a peace settlement. Second, “to bring home the idea that it was a deliberate move, part of a wide scheme for world domination” (Balfour, 1979, p. 229). This is consistent with the narrative that Hitler and the Nazi regime were set on the domination of Europe and the Western world as is explained further in question 4. Third, “to discourage the idea that it was good for Britain. While it might lead to great trouble for Germany, it was just as likely to bring a vast access of resources and strength” (Balfour, 1979, p. 229). Again this is consistent with the policy of avoiding anything that might create the perception that a peace settlement with Germany would be possible. The narrative was inconsistent as it began to portray the Soviet Union, out of practical necessity, as an ally rather than a threat. The British had opposed the Soviet invasion of Finland. Chamberlain had described Soviet Communism as the greatest danger and even alluded in the past about uniting with Germany against it. Now the narrative would seek to rationalize the Soviet Union as an ally.

The German narrative remained philosophically consistent over the entire war. From the beginning it was about correcting the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles as noted by Fuller (1949). It was also heavily influenced by the concept of *Lebensraum*, that Germany needed space to grow and assume its rightful place as a dominant power in Europe. This did not change over the course of the war. Germany’s objective remained gaining territory and influence and then maintaining it. Germany’s policies and propaganda however would flip-flop several times between swift domination of Europe vs. a many year struggle against old European powers. A solid example of this is the effect of the hope placed in Blitzkrieg doctrine. Initial victories in Eastern Europe and France established the expectation that victory for Germany would come swiftly once an enemy was engaged. This narrative was forced to change over time beginning with the

failure to knock Britain out of the war early and again with the fall of Stalingrad and the encirclement of an entire German army in the East.

Hitler's decision to attack Russia provides an example of problems coding the consistency of the German narrative over time. Germany had viewed Bolshevism as a threat since 1920's and *Lebensraum* was primarily viewed as expansion against the Russians. However, Germany's primary foe up to this point in the war had been painted as Britain. Indeed it was largely the British ultimatum regarding Poland that was used by German propaganda to justify the idea that Germany had had war forced upon it rather than by choice. Now the majority of Germany's resources were to be abruptly shifted against a renewed emphasis on the Communist menace, a menace that was firmly established as a major theme of German propaganda since 1924, but downplayed during the initial stages of the war (Welch, 1993, p. 99). Balfour (1979) notes that:

The idea of war with Russia was familiar enough after so many years of anti-Communist propaganda, yet the ordinary man had not expected it to break out when it did. If the news did not exactly depress people, it made them draw a deep breath...But many people complained that, instead of finishing off England, Germany was taking on a major new enemy. Voices were heard saying that Russia was a large place, while others wondered how Germany was going to keep so many non-Germans under control. (p. 226)

Another shift in the propaganda narrative is evidenced by Goebbels's response to a statement made by British Air Marshal Harris explaining the purpose of British air raids on Germany. Initially German propaganda attempted to cover up the extent of damage caused by the air raids and to minimize the perception of devastation by the German populace (Balfour, 1979, p. 266). Goebbels eventually concluded that a change in policy was desirable.

He admitted in public that Germany must to some extent stand on the defensive in the West as long as her main energies had to be concentrated on Russia...Instead of trying to minimize the effects of raids or pretending that the English were getting as good as they gave, the line adopted by the English during the 'Blitz' should be copied...and everything done to impress the rest of Germany with the severity of their ordeal. (Balfour, 1979, p. 268)

2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?

The Allied narrative was intentionally vague to avoid internal conflict and rarely contradictory. “The MOI came more and more to the conclusion that the best way of sustaining morale was to provide plenty of factual information and guidance. Propaganda had to be regarded as the natural accompaniment of individual political or administrative policies, not as something operating on its own” (Balfour, 1979, p. 70).

The British’ German Service news was aware that German listeners would be listening to British home broadcasts and thus kept inconsistencies between the German Service and the Home Service a minimum. Throughout Balfour’s (1979) study of propaganda in WW II, it appears that the British government was keenly unified in its wartime narrative. There was effectively a truce between Britain’s political parties that deterred any political activity that was not oriented towards winning the war. While this may have kept some serious political questions from being addressed until the war was over, it assisted in keeping the British narrative internally consistent.

The German narrative could be viewed as inconsistent between what was presented to the people and what was presented to the outside as well as inconsistent within itself. A split in German press and propaganda control illustrates this inconsistency.

There are thus good grounds for saying that from at least 1942 until the closing months of the war Goebbels had lost control over Nazi policy towards the Press and over the handling of news in general...a number of important decisions in these fields were taken by Hitler and executed by Dietrich [head of the Nazi party Press Department] with little or no reference to the Minister [Goebbels] nominally responsible, who often...thought them misguided. (Balfour, 1979, p. 109)

Public opinion reports as referenced by Welch (1993) suggest that Nazi propaganda was not able to adequately cover the perceived inconsistency of German anti-communism with the signing of the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Although, German propaganda at this time shifted the focus away from the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, the majority of the German public continued to expect war with

Russia to occur eventually. The shift of Russia from adversary to ally to adversary is logically inconsistent.

The narrative used to explain to the German people why war with Russia was necessary is well explained by Balfour and also illustrates inconsistency. “The Fuhrer claimed to have detected a conspiracy against Germany in which capitalism had been allied with Communism and plutocracy with Bolshevism...The plot involved stabbing Germany in the back while she was in the middle of her fight for existence by forcing her to keep strong forces in the East, thus making an attack on England impossible...the quickest route to London lay through Moscow” (Balfour, 1979, p. 227). Hitler described this as the work of the Jews. Interestingly enough Hitler was correct; an alliance was being created between Britain and Russia, but as a response to German aggression rather than prior to it. It is inconsistent to equate capitalism to communism or plutocracy to Bolshevism and the common denominator of the Jew is hardly enough to cover this.

Additionally Balfour (1979) notes “This line of argument...may have simplified...the problem of showing how National Socialism differed from both. But it ruled out any open suggestion that Germany’s object in Russia was to obtain the raw materials and foodstuffs which she...needed to withstand the pressure of the Sea Powers. For that would have meant admitting that Germany had attacked Russia, whereas the whole emphasis was that the new war was one of self-defence, not of conquest” (p. 227). There is internal inconsistency in the narrative regarding Germany’s motives. Welch also makes note of the inconsistency of German propaganda messages during the Russian campaign stating “Nazi anti-Bolshevik propaganda was inconsistent and unconvincing...the German people had not been prepared for a drawn-out war in Russia...Goebbels was unable to reconcile regime’s ideological position that the Bolshevik system was reactionary and bankrupt with the failure of the Wehrmacht to defeat the Red Army (Welch, 1993, p. 105).

Goebbels, as Germany’s lead propagandist, was often pre-empted by or at odds with Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief. The latter, often at the urging of Hitler, promoted a highly optimistic and offensive oriented narrative that regularly put the claim of victory

ahead of the proof of victory, while Goebbels regularly urged caution in pronouncements of success and more and more became convinced that the German public needed to hear the difficult truth in order to guard itself against failures and setbacks (Balfour, 1979, p. 282). This inconsistency existed through most of the war so long as Hitler himself and Dietrich as his press secretary were capable of issuing statements of unmitigated optimism.

3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?

Except in cases of deception allied narrative largely presented an honest representation of what people witnessed in the physical realm. During the Battle of Britain, the MOI Home Planning Committee recognized that “the morale of the majority of the public who are not in a position to know the truth for themselves depends on the amount of confidence which they are prepared to put in official statements and this in turn depends on the extent to which the man in the street, when in a position to place any check on official statements, finds them unreliable” (Balfour, 1979, p. 202).

British German Service news output possessed one primary characteristic. “The view was taken that people who were listening through jamming and at the risk of their lives did not want entertainment or speculation...‘our main task at present in broadcasting to Germany is to provide not statements of policy, appeals or discussions of a post-war world but accurate and interesting information” (Balfour, 1979, p. 95).

Political Warfare Executive regional directors innately recognized the need for deeds to remain in line with actions in their response to a 1942 plan for a campaign of operational propaganda in German occupied areas when they “complained that as long as ‘we were sitting at home and not doing anything active in the way of fighting’, advice and instructions from Britain to workers in occupied countries would do more harm than good” (Balfour, 1979, p. 215). They realized that calling for subversion without also providing real support to those involved would have negative results.

The German narrative regularly and deliberately did not depict what people both foreign and domestic were experiencing in their lives. Balfour (1979) noted that:

Announcing victories is...so straightforward that they [German government] did not go very wrong while the Wehrmacht was being successful...But as soon as mishaps began to make discretion advisable they signally failed to display it, as in the claim on 8 October 1941 that the war against Russia had been decided, the assurance a year later that Stalingrad was going to be captured, the failure to admit that the Sixth Army had been surrounded, the claim that the Allies were being driven back into the Sea at Salerno, the excessive optimism about the V 1s and the broadcast on 21 July 1944 [playing down of assassination/coupe attempt]. (p. 121)

Essentially two major errors in external consistency were repeated again and again. The first regarded premature claims of victory. The second regarded hushing-up of bad news. Both, once realized by the audience, result in frustration and doubt.

During the Battle of Britain German expectations, promoted by propaganda, did not meet reality. "German Air Intelligence estimated the number of British fighters at the start of the battle...they grossly overestimated British losses and underestimated the rate of replacement. They also failed to appreciate the extent to which radar and 'Ultra' were giving the RAF foreknowledge...They were therefore too optimistic about their prospects in the air and as a result misled the propagandists" (Balfour, 1979, p. 197). Additionally the press had problems expressing the difficulties involved in a cross channel invasion across a distance of a mere thirty-five kilometers. "They therefore failed to see that the campaign against Britain was bound to be very different from that against France" (Balfour, 1979, p. 197). This established a false expectation, promoted by propaganda and policy, that the fall of Britain and subsequent victory of Germany was inevitable. As evidence counter to this outcome failed to materialize the inconsistency between words and deeds increased. "The German public began to divide into those who doubted their leadership and those who took its apparent confidence at face value...The degree of unity which had been achieved after the fall of France was lost" (Balfour, 1979, p. 199).

One solid example from German efforts on the Eastern front where words and deeds were misaligned and not reflective of reality occurred during Operation Typhoon. Hitler in a speech in Berlin made the bold assertion that Russia was virtually defeated and the Soviet Government would have to flee from Moscow. He further had the following

statement made in the German press, “With the smashing of Timoshenko’s army the campaign in the east is decided. With these final mighty blows dealt by us, the Soviet Union is finished as a military power. The English aim of a war on two fronts will never be more than a dream” (Balfour, 1979, p. 239). Balfour points out that “the presumption was naturally created that the war was for all practical purposes over” (Balfour, 1979, p. 239). This, of course, was blatantly not true as would become immediately obvious. Goebbels himself attempted to defend against this type of inconsistency.

The German narrative during the Battle of the Atlantic would prove inconsistent with actual events as well. “German claims were always higher than the reality and one wonders how far this may have misled them in their general appreciation of the relative positions” (Balfour, 1979, p. 272). In this instance the result of inconsistency may have well been not only to discredit themselves to outside audiences but to cause doubt in their own ability to estimate the situation in the Atlantic.

Hitler himself made four open commitments that would be proved false within a year. First, that wherever the Allies chose to land next, following the raid on Dieppe, that they would not remain ashore more than nine hours. Second, that Stalingrad would be captured and that the German army never driven out. Third, that breaking the alliance between Germany and Italy was impossible. Fourth, that the German people had already persevered through the toughest part of the war, it would not get worse. None of these statements would be affirmed by physical reality.

4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?

The Allies were able to claim legitimacy generally by responding to aggression, seeking to liberate occupied peoples, and being on the side of freedom and democracy. Chamberlain’s initial appeasement of Hitler ultimately played into the overall legitimacy of the Allied narrative. “For the people whom the Government needed to carry with it in declaring war were those who would have remained reluctant to face the price of fighting until the price of not fighting had been demonstrated” (Balfour, 1979, p. 153).

The change in policy regarding Germany that accompanied the replacement of Chamberlain by Churchill might be construed as inconsistency over time in the British narrative. However, it may have been absolutely necessary to the legitimacy of the narrative for it to have occurred in that manner. As Balfour notes, “Britain changed horses just soon enough to give the nation in its darkest days a leader in whom they could feel confidence” and “Churchill, by never underrating what lay before the nation, had been building up an ideological ‘fall-back’ position which he consolidated by his reference to blood, toil, tears and sweat” (Balfour, 1979, p. 185).

A document distributed within the MOI as working guidance as to what tone propaganda should take stated ““No peace can be justified which does not secure release for Germany’s victims: the right for men to live, vote, talk and worship as they wish; a new world which is Christian, not satanic, spiritual not material”” (Balfour, 1979, p. 169). This combined with Hitler’s naked aggression and duplicity appears to have resulted in firmly establishing the moral legitimacy of the narrative. Balfour (1979) further concludes that “(British) consensus was never seriously impaired. In June 1941, 46 per cent of those questioned by BIPO (British Institute of Public Opinion) said that they were fighting for freedom, liberty and democracy; 14 per cent to stop Fascism, Hitlerism and aggression; 8 per cent because ‘it’s Britain or Germany, them or us’, 5 per cent for our existence...Acceptance of the war as necessary generally carried with it the belief that the cause was just” (p. 76).

Goebbels provided evidence of the moral confidence the British possessed in their cause through his acknowledgement 1942 that ““The English show fantastic national discipline, especially in war-time. Anything they want to keep to themselves simply doesn’t get out”” and ““A moral breakdown such as we experienced in 1918 can be brought about in England only with great difficulty, if at all”” (Balfour, 1979, p. 252).

The moral legitimacy of the German narrative largely rested on claims to be addressing injustices of WW I such as the Treaty of Versailles as mention previously. “The German people were reminded...of all the scores which had to be settled” (Balfour, 1979, p. 183). Fuller (1949) in his section on the immediate causes of the war notes that

others in Britain and the U.S. were conscious of the injustices of the treaty as well (pp. 17–23). The harshness of the treaty gave some legitimacy in foreign sentiments to Germany's actions.

Germany intentionally staged its aggression against Poland to appear as though it was responding in self-defense. What was actually a clandestine operation conducted by the Head Office for Reich Security is portrayed as a series of raids by the regular Polish Army and used as pretext for invasion. It was portrayed as a matter which should not have concerned Britain therefore her declaration of war was an act of aggression. War had been forced on Germany.

Additional claims of legitimacy were made based on a philosophy of racial and political superiority. Two observations made by Balfour (1979) point out the difficulty this presented to claims of moral legitimacy, first:

democracy on which the Western nations prided themselves was an illusion. The mere right to vote was valueless as long as the rich were in control of the government. The German, by virtue of his ability to participate in the Volk community, had much more genuine freedom...this...created an inherent dilemma for German propaganda, which had as a result to find means of differentiating itself convincingly from both liberal democracy and from Communism. The handiest argument for doing so was anti-Semitism, which became even more important after the 1941 attack on Russia as the common factor linking capitalism and Communism. (p. 163)

Second, "In Germany entry into the war had been the doing of the Government and the Party rather than of the public as a whole. Doubts as to whether it was necessary or wise were never wholly obliterated and became more widespread when the tide of fortune turned" (Balfour, 1979, p. 151).

Handling of Polish prisoners and Jewish citizens presented a major obstacle to appearance of legitimacy to external audience and to lesser degree internal public. Goebbels himself recognized problems with Germany's claims to a just cause. Balfour comments that Goebbels began to have doubts about how conquered populations in the East were treated. "We come as conquerors when we should come as liberators"

(Balfour, 1979, p. 116). “[H]ow the Germans, if allowed to dominate the Continent, could be expected in the light of their record to treat many Europeans” would be a major factor effecting perceived legitimacy for the entire war (Balfour, 1979, p. 132). As more evidence would come to light regarding Nazi mass extermination of prisoners, particularly Jews, the German cause would steadily lose legitimacy while the Allied cause would be bolstered. German brutality against Slavic peoples in the Ukraine and its detrimental effect on the German cause is also noted in Stokesbury’s history of WW II (Stokesbury, 1980, pp. 150–160).

5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?

The general overarching narratives on both the Allied and Axis side can be said to generally derive their legitimacy from philosophy. Each participant sought to cast its effort as a battle for the future of humanity. That future would be defined by the political philosophy of the victor. For Britain and the United States it was a struggle of freedom in the guise of liberal democracy. For Germany it was National Socialism, *Lebensraum*, and the superiority of the German race.

However, each side’s narrative would become much more complex and nuanced once Hitler ordered the invasion of the Soviet Union. Nazism would have to distinguish itself from communist totalitarianism and the West would have to come to terms with allying with a diametrically opposed political philosophy. As mentioned before, Hitler would attempt to accomplish this by linking a Jewish conspiracy involving communism and western plutocracy. The U.S. and U.K. narrative accepted alliance with the Soviet Union on a much more practical and realistic level. If the Soviets could hold out against Germany then Britain’s position would be much improved. If not, resisting the full might of Germany would be difficult (Balfour, 1979).

There is another layer to the source of legitimacy regardless of political philosophy however. Much of Germany’s motivation to build up its military strength and subsequently begin a conquest of Europe was based on the outcome of WW I and the terms of the Treaty of Versailles as mentioned previously. This is very much a narrative

of correcting a historical wrong and restoring the rights of the German nation or German race. While this layer of the narrative goes hand in hand with the goals of National Socialism, it also helps to define the narrative against Soviet Communism. A system with much in common to National Socialism, but which involved a supposedly ‘inferior’ race in the Slavic peoples. The superiority of National Socialism was not alone the motivating narrative. It also required a sense of a historical injustice that needed correcting along with a belief in German exceptionalism.

The underlying layer to the narrative of the U.S. and U.K. was very much one of self-preservation and self-defense in the face of unrelenting aggression. Each Ally was slow to respond to early German aggression until it became clear that they too would be the eventual target of German expansion. Their own political philosophy was not enough to motivate them to act to counter Germany until a personal threat was perceived. This is still tied to philosophy as it is a characteristic of liberal democracy to postpone conflict and seek resolution. However, the justification of spreading that philosophy by force of arms is not established until the U.S. and U.K. conclude that as long as any form of German militarism existed, Europe, and perhaps the world, would not be safe.

6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?

In general German political and military organization was more hierarchical than the allies. Broadly this is the result of the difference between a totalitarian state and states more organized as constitutional, liberal democracies. Militaries reflect the politics from which they garner support. More specifically it is the result of the nature of the alliances on each side.

Coordination and cooperation between Germany and its Axis partners was never as effective or intimate as that between the United States and the United Kingdom. Even before Hitler’s violation of the non-aggression pact, the Soviet Union and Germany did not coordinate common military objectives or what to do together. Rather, they coordinated merely what not to do to each other and where the lines should be drawn. There is little evidence of joint or combined military operations; rather there are

operations by each side that were bounded by political settlements regarding Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe. Japan and Germany shared virtually no common objectives and no political or military cooperation outside of sharing the same enemies although on opposite sides of the globe. Italy embarked on its fateful military ventures with tacit political approval from Hitler, but little to no military support or coordination until German forces were repositioned to rescue Italian blunders.

The compartmentalized way in which political and military cooperation took place between Germany and the other Axis powers illustrates a tendency towards hierarchy. Understanding and decisions reach at the highest levels were translated into policy and action, but there is less communication and coordination at lower levels where action affects reality. Hitler and Mussolini may have shared similar goals with respect to fascism and its place in the world, but those goals were not translated into tangible coordination at lower levels until necessity forced the German military's hand.

The manner in which the German General Staff operated during WW II is illustrative as well. Martin Kitchen's study of the German military provides insight into the design and practice of the German high command. The German military was complicit in the rise of Hitler to power in so much as it wanted a highly structured authoritarian government and Hitler's Nazis held military virtues in high esteem (Kitchen, 1975, p. 281). As Hitler's power increased the German military would increasingly be unable to maintain any sense of being non-political. "An Army can never be divorced from the social milieu in which it is embedded, and this is doubly true under a totalitarian dictatorship" (Kitchen, 1975, p. 285). The German military became more and more the servant of the Nazi political machine as key positions were assigned based on faithfulness to the regime. Members of the Wehrmacht swore an oath to obey Adolf Hitler unconditionally, making him effectively overall commander of the armed forces (Kitchen, 1975, p. 293). This should not be taken lightly by those who are accustomed to civilian control of the military in a constitutional democracy. Hitler was not effectively limited by a constitutional rule of law. The oath sworn to Hitler prevented the Army from formally resisting Hitler's authority on the grounds of serving Germany. The oath

insured that they served him, although some eventually rejected this oath during the latter part of the war when they conspired to kill Hitler.

In 1935 the post of war minister was created and along with other changes in organization placed the military directly under Hitler and with no further responsibility to answer to the Reichstag (Kitchen, 1975, p. 295). In 1936, a successful Gestapo plot removed Blomberg as war minister and resulted in Hitler assuming the duties himself, becoming even more directly in supreme command of Germany's military (Kitchen, 1975, p. 298). In 1938 a final reorganization of the high command would result in the establishment of the OKW (armed forces high command) and the OKH (army high command). The head of each possessed the equivalent status of a Reich minister (Kitchen, 1975, p. 298). Hitler insured that these posts were held by individuals loyal to the regime. This structure remained through WW II and provides some evidence of top down, hierarchical control and is depicted in Figure 5.




Figure 5. German Leadership, 1939–1945 (From Jacobson & Smith, 1970)

Upon Hitler's determination to annex Austria and occupy Czechoslovakia, the general staff chief, Beck, submitted a report warning that such action would have grave consequences for Germany. The OKW and OKH heads deliberately diminished the

impact of the report as it was not in line with Hitler's vision (Kitchen, 1975, p. 300). Beck was forced to resign (Kitchen, 1975, p. 302). "[Beck] believed that the army should participate in decision-making on vital matters of state such as war and peace. This was intolerable to Hitler" (Kitchen, 1975, p. 302). Any further contradiction to Hitler's vision would be muted by Keitel as head of the OKW (Kitchen, 1975, p. 303).

With the formal outbreak of war following the invasion of Poland the Armed Forces Office of the OKW under Jodl became responsible for the conduct of war and providing information to Hitler for decisions. "Jodl had complete faith in Hitler's genius, and rarely took advice from other officers...The result was that there was a serious lack of co-ordination and agreement at the top of the armed forces throughout the war which...allowed Hitler to exercise even more power" (Kitchen, 1975, p. 307). Hitler was additionally able to bully generals concerned that 1939 was too soon for an invasion of Western Europe into compliance (Kitchen, 1975, p. 309). Indeed, "As supreme commander of the Wehrmacht Hitler kept a close watch on the army and frequently interfered in its operational planning" (Kitchen, 1975, p. 310).

Through the invasion of the Soviet Union Hitler's hierarchical control of the military effort increased. Hitler through the OKW overrode the OKH's estimate that the decisive battle of the campaign should be for Moscow. Forces would be diverted from the center axis of advance to the south on Hitler's personal direction (Kitchen, 1975, p. 317). Likewise, as the German offensive was halted and the Soviet counter-offensive proved effective, Hitler again overrode the recommendations of his generals that a withdrawal to establish a defense was required (Kitchen, 1975, p. 319). Hitler again countermanded his general in North Africa, Rommel, by not allowing withdrawal of forces, first from Alamein, later from Tunisia (Kitchen, 1975, p. 322). A final example of the hierarchical control of the military is the ease with which the OKW was able to countermand the orders of the Operation Valkyrie conspirators and the subsequent arrests and executions (Kitchen, 1975, p. 327). This is evidence is provided not to judge the rightness or wrongness of the military decisions, but to illustrate the firm top down hierarchical manner in which decisions were made. The German system was hierarchical

in form with Hitler as the ultimate authority over all arms as well as in function where influence was wielded from the top to the bottom.

Largely as a result of the nature of their political systems, coordination and cooperation on the allied side was not nearly as hierarchical as that of Germany. The United States and the United Kingdom both adhered to some form of constitutional democracy where various branches of government serve to balance the power of others and the rule of law constrains the arbitrary exercise of authority. This in contrast to a totalitarian system such as fascism is inherently less hierarchical and does not require elaboration. Additionally opposing political parties were not actively oppressed or eliminated by the ruling party.

The Allied military organization was less hierarchical than the German military organization. The United States and the United Kingdom combined their military staffs over time in an unprecedented manner to achieve the coordination necessary to prosecute the war against Germany (Pogue, 1996, p. xii). The structure became more hierarchical over time as the U.S. entered the war and the problems of combining their strength with the U.K.'s were overcome, but it never reached the level of hierarchy of the German structure. The following illustration depicts the leadership structure of the British and Americans (Jacobson & Smith, 1970, p. 458).

LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN, 1944




Figure 6. Leadership of U.S. and Great Britain, 1944 (From Jacobson & Smith, 1970)

The manner in which coalition command and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were formed and operated is illustrative of this. Overall the “hierarchy of command...included the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the heads of executive departments which dealt with military matters, and an organization of British and U.S. armed services leaders known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff” (Pogue, 1996, p. 36). “The decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff reflected the views of the heads of the British and United States governments who...determined major national policies and strategy” (Pogue, 1996, p. 36). The President, who attended Allied conferences and made decisions regarding general policy, was generally satisfied with recommending to the Congress and other Allies the military details as determined by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff (Pogue, 1996, p. 36). The Prime Minister, due to his dual position as Minister of Defense, was more directly responsible to the British Parliament regarding the conduct of the war. Thus, was more intimately involved in the workings of the British Chiefs of Staff (Pogue, 1996, p. 37).

The Combined Chiefs of Staff were responsible for “policies and plans relating to the strategic conduct of the war” (Pogue, 1996, p. 37) and consisted of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff. Decisions were typically made in meetings attended by representatives of both staffs where proposals from each group could be presented and discussed. Differences were often worked out ahead of time through more informal means based on personal relationships (Pogue, 1996, p. 39). At times the doctrinal chain was circumvented by the British Chiefs submitting proposals to Eisenhower as Supreme Commander directly believing them more likely to be adopted by the U.S. Chiefs that way (Pogue, 1996, p. 40). Additionally, Eisenhower frequently had lunch with the Prime Minister and attended British staff meetings, thus providing additional influence from the British side (Pogue, 1996, p. 41). This was countered somewhat by the command relationship between the Supreme Commander and the Combined Chiefs of Staff which directly linked Eisenhower to Marshall (Pogue, 1996, p. 40).

This system was in effect one of strategic command by consensus. This is well illustrated by the proposal and counter-proposal battle between the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the scope of the command authority that the Supreme Commander would have over air, land, and sea forces for the invasion of Europe and the subsequent conduct of the effort against Germany. The U.S. largely proposed a system based on unity of command where the Supreme Commander had ultimate authority and responsibility of all forces. The British generally proposed some separation at the operational level between air, land, and sea forces. Ultimately the Supreme Commander would be granted authority over operational forces. Strategic decisions would continue to be made in a less hierarchical manner through consensus seeking on the combined Chiefs of Staff (Pogue, 1996, pp. 53–55).

“The real blame for the blunders [of news and propaganda] lay however not with the OKW, but with Hitler. For it was he who frequently insisted on making his own amendments, sometimes changing whole passages on the ground that they were too uninformative and literal, sometimes refusing to allow admissions of failure” (Balfour, 1979, p. 122).

7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?

The following chart depicts the structure of state and party organizations controlling German propaganda (Welch, 1993):




Figure 7. German propaganda organization in WWII (From Welch, 1993)

The Ministry of People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda (RMVP) was established on 12 March 1933 and headed by Goebbels (Balfour, 1979, p. 12). It consisted of several subordinate bodies the most prominent being the Reich Chamber of Culture (RKK) which was intended to perform the administrative function of keeping a register of persons active within its sphere by referencing ancestry and issuing permits. The RKK consisted of sub-chambers for press, broadcasting, film, writing, theatre, music, and graphic arts (Balfour, 1979, pp. 15–17).

The senior division of the RMVP was the Propaganda Division. This division was charged with managing the Nazi Party’s propaganda campaigns and had the power to coordinate the Ministry’s other divisions for this purpose. In addition it also prepared reports on public opinion. The Broadcasting Division supervised the Reich Broadcasting

Company (RRG) in which the German government had 51% ownership. This body eventually obtained control over the content of all nine regional German broadcasting companies (Balfour, 1979, p. 18).

The Press Division was responsible for managing the daily release of news which functionally made it, rather than the Propaganda Division, the issuer of short-term publicity policy. This Division however did not possess a monopoly on the news press within Germany. The Nazi party's Press Department headed by Otto Dietrich, who also served as Hitler's personal press officer, was responsible for issuing all non-local news about party activities as well as supervising the contents of all party papers. The distinction between the ministry and the party department was established down the bureaucratic chain to the local office level (Balfour, 1979, p. 21). Despite this distinction that did at times result in rivalry, both entities were arms of the Nazi regime. The Nazis controlled, at least indirectly, all of the German press (Zeman, 1964, p. 43).

Control over what was printed was affected in several ways. Negative bans on certain materials were established through emergency decrees under the guise of protecting security and order (Balfour, 1979, p. 23). Control was also exercised through press conferences held by the RMVP where only trusted journalists with official passes would be admitted. Information designed to produce impressions on the public would be issued at a conference and required to be transmitted to editors and others deemed necessary. This information was regarded as secret, was limited in distribution to approved persons only, and was required to be destroyed after an established interval. These controls along with legal measures allowed the government to effectively "regulate their (journalist's) work in accordance with the National Socialist philosophy of life and to keep out of the paper everything calculated to impair the strength of the Reich at home or abroad, the resolution of the community, the national capacity for self-defense or the religious convictions of others, as well as everything 'offensive to the honor or dignity of a German'" (Balfour, 1979, p. 25). The overall effect was to bring nearly all non-Nazi Party papers under the control of party representatives. Hitler's vision of the function of the press was as a body that would indoctrinate the German people to National Socialist

thinking. Goebbels “aimed at making the Press ‘monoform in will but polyform in the trappings of that will’” by allowing local press some freedom in the way local public events (Balfour, 1979, p. 34). This establishment of Nazi influence over the German press is confirmed by Zeman’s account of the state and propaganda (Zeman, 1964, pp. 43–46).

The RMVP Film Division gained de facto control over the German film industry first by taking over that part of the Ministry of Interior previously responsible for censorship. Additionally, RMVP administrators were placed in key positions and the Reich Cinema Law (RLG) introduced as a means to exercise further control. For instance, the RLG required all film scripts to be submitted to the RMVP for approval before filming could begin (Balfour, 1979, pp. 38–39). The film division acquired a monopoly on movie production in Germany and eventually the elimination of foreign competition (Zeman, 1964, p. 49). The RMVP’s Foreign Division was never effectively in central control of German propaganda abroad. Rather, the Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party under the authority of Hess was more influential. As a result foreign journalists in Berlin received information from two sources sometimes at odds with one another (Balfour, 1979, p. 36).

The Division for Wehrmacht Propaganda (WPr) as part of the Supreme Command of the Defense Forces (OKW) was never subject to the control of the RMVP. The WPr was responsible for military censorship, battlefield eye-witness reports and photos, as well as directing propaganda against friendly and enemy troops. The most important function of the WPr, and subsequently the one that most directly contradicted the RMVP’s control of the press, was the collection and issuing of the daily Wehrmacht communiqué to the German national press. This document was forwarded directly to Hitler’s Headquarters for approval and once approved could not be altered before release. This effectively prevented the RMVP from coordinating or controlling much of the military related press (Balfour, 1979, p. 104).

In 1935 the British parliament considered the issues of censorship in war-time, issuing of news, and control of news. The subsequent report recommended a Ministry be

created consisting of five Divisions: Administrative, News, Control, Publicity, and Collecting. The Ministry function would be to collect and distribute information regarding the war and to present the national case at home and abroad (Balfour, 1979, p. 53). The resulting Ministry of Information (MOI), after reorganization due to bureaucratic resistance from existing departments as well as trial and error, consisted of five major sections. These were Administration (finance, personnel), News and Censorship (news, censorship, photos), Home (home audience, home intelligence), Overseas (allied and neutral), and Production (campaigns, publications).

No large effort was made to bring the press in Britain under government ownership as was exercised in Germany. Additionally governmental departments maintained individual responsibility for issuing announcements within their sphere and maintaining their own public relations offices. In effect, with the exception of foreign dispatches, “submission to censorship was voluntary. Any correspondent was free to write, and any editor to print, any story they got hold of” (Balfour, 1979, p. 59). Censorship as well was split between that imposed by the MOI as well as the military service departments. “The censorship system was thus based on bluff, goodwill...and the realization that, if it broke down, a much more vexatious compulsory scheme would have to be substituted” (Balfour, 1979, p. 60). Indeed, “The kind of general publicity which the MOI had at the outset regarded as its task was realized to be misconceived and unnecessary” (Balfour, 1979, p. 80). Films were considered a specialized subject and remained separate. British film production remained under private ownership although the Ministry of Information exercised influence through the control of resources and exemptions from military service.

Broadcasting as well remained a separate section apart from News and Censorship due to the unique relationship that was established between the MOI and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). No formal control was ever established by the MOI over the BBC.

The Government, through the MOI, had complete power but chose not to exercise it...The corollary was that the key people in the BBC...knew what the Government’s aims were, sympathized with them in principle

and could therefore be trusted to see that the Corporation furthered them. The Government for their part were ready to leave considerable scope in the way those aims were realized. (Balfour, 1979, pp. 85–86)

Considerably more censorship authority was wielded with respect to the release of dispatches abroad containing information considered of military value.

“War-time plans...put the control of all forms of propaganda to enemy countries into the charge of a department responsible to the Ministry of Information but distinct from the rest of his realm” (Balfour, 1979, p 89). This department was financed in secret and given the moniker of Electra House. However, the Foreign Office (completely separate from the MOI) also managed some foreign news services and never fully controlled the BBC’s foreign output. Additionally, a Minister of Special Operations (MSO) was established from part of the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) with a branch responsible for black propaganda and leaflet distribution. In order to unify foreign efforts at foreign influence and mitigate problems arising from competition and lack of coordination the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) was eventually established to “conduct all forms of such warfare against enemy, satellite and occupied countries” (Balfour, 1979, p. 91). In effect however the new PWE remained jointly managed by three separate ministers with the result that administration was handled by the MOI, propaganda by MSO, and subversion by MEW.

Much like its formal entry into the war the United States would formally establish its apparatus years later than Germany and Britain. Laurie (1996) states that the initial response to Nazi propaganda was made by the private sector within the United States and largely remained as such from 1939 to 1941. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis took an analytical approach to counter-propaganda and adopted a strategy of educating the public in order to protect it against enemy influence. Academics became involved as well with projects such as the Princeton Listening Center that documented and recorded foreign broadcasts that reached Americans as well as studied American listening habits (Laurie, 1996, p. 32).

Laurie (1996) discusses how two competing philosophies arose regarding the appropriate role for government in relation to propaganda. One was cautious about government control and felt that properly educated and organized citizens could adequately guard against Nazi propaganda. The other determined that a propaganda offensive was necessary to meet the foreign menace and that only the federal government could operate internationally and on a large enough scale to be effective. The latter opinion would become dominant partly because it influenced President Roosevelt and partly because a deliberate effort was made by its proponents to convince Americans that intervention was necessary to counter the Nazi threat. Roosevelt however remained reluctant to establish a propaganda agency based on negative experiences related to the CPI during World War I. The Committee on National Morale, a non-government body, would continue to work domestically on counter-propaganda and promote the idea of a propaganda counter-offensive.

In 1941 the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) were created effectively separating domestic and foreign propaganda (Laurie, 1996, p. 63). It was recognized that “an agency on the Nazi model would not be possible...because it would require government direction of privately owned media” (Laurie, 1996, p. 62). The Foreign Information Service (FIS) was the specific department within the COI responsible for propaganda abroad. It included departments that worked on print, radio, and film media.

From its creation until its dismantling in 1942, the COI under William Donovan would find itself engaged in struggles to define its role and the proper strategy to pursue that role both internally and externally. Internal differences of opinion between the FIS director and the COI chief regarding the nature of effective and ethically legitimate propaganda strategy divided the agency. Externally other departments of the executive branch such as the FBI, Department of State, and the War Department would criticize the overlap in role and function of the COI with some of their own responsibilities. As a result the Office of War Information (OWI) was created in June 1942. The function of the FIS would now be the responsibility of the OWI. The remainder of the COI would

become the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as a supporting agency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for espionage and subversion (Laurie, 1996).

The OWI was responsible for both domestic and foreign information activities and would organize itself between home and overseas branches, with regional offices, with bureaus aligned by media type (film, radio, publications, and news). The OWI was plagued by the scope of its responsibilities as well as by internal divisions regarding policy and practice. The goals of the overseas branch would at times not match the goals of the OWI director (Laurie, 1996, p. 113).

The OSS in its new role would find its way back into propaganda under the guise of the OSS Morale Operations Branch (OSS MO). This branch engaged primarily in black and subversive propaganda aimed attacking the morale and political unity of the enemy. OSS MO worked closely with the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Division as well as the British Political Warfare Executive (Laurie, 1996, p. 141).

Laurie (1996) describes how the U.S. military propaganda apparatus constantly evolved throughout the war. It was organized as the Psychological Warfare Service during action in North Africa, became the Psychological Warfare Branch in 1942, and formed the Psychological Warfare Division for operations in Europe. The military control of psychological operations would increase and become more coordinated with the strategic activities of the OWI and OSS over time. However, flexibility for tactical psychological operations remained under the authority of army group commanders (Laurie, 1996, p. 187).

Overall the United States apparatus for propaganda was less hierarchical than that of the British or the Germans. The creation and re-creation of the various agencies was not driven by top down decision so much as by consensus formed after much debate between different government bodies and policy philosophies originally voiced in the private sector. Even within the agencies, as evidenced by the differences that developed between the OWI overseas branch and the larger OWI, executives didn't exercise the same type of authority as Goebbels over the RMVP.

8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

A means of illustrating the relative number of voices between each side, Axis and Allied is to look at the number of major powers in each coalition as well as their participation over time. Each partner represents a political voice of the coalition. We will see that a transition between the number of voices occurs on both sides. This is intentionally kept separate from any idea of multiple narratives that would indicate internal inconsistency.

The Germans entered the war in a firm alliance with Italy and a non-Aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Three is the highest number of voices, based on partner nations, Germany consolidated on its behalf. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Soviet voice could no longer be considered as contributing to German objectives. With Italy knocked out of the war in 1943, this would become one voice for the remainder of the war in Europe.

The U.S. and U.K. in contrast ultimately gained voices over time. With the onset of aggression against Poland by Germany in 1939, Britain, France, and Poland maintained a mutual defense pact. Canada would quickly declare war on Germany setting the initial number of Allied voices as four. The same aggression against the Soviet Union that removed their voice from any support of German objectives added it to the Allied cause. Italy's invasion of Greece in 1940 would add that nation to the Allies' number. From this point until the entry formal entry of the United States into the war the voices generally supporting Allied objectives is six. The United States even while officially neutral could possibly be added as early as the invasion of Western Europe by Germany. However for this purpose it will not be counted until the formal declaration of war in 1941. Following the Japanese attack on Hawaii the United States officially entered the war raising the number of major powers to seven.

The number of Allied voices was consistently higher than the number of Axis voices based on this perspective. Also of importance is how "in synch" the voices of each side were with one another. The nature of the Axis partnership as noted in the

background section at the beginning of this chapter was based largely on identification of a common enemy rather than recognition of common objectives or philosophy. The Allies, particularly the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada, definitely shared a common enemy but also something more. The political philosophies underlying their systems of government were more in tune with one another. As evidenced by the manner in which the Allied command structure was created in the previous paragraphs under question 6, the allies were committed to coordinating at a level that was not reached by the Axis powers to achieve common objectives.

9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

It is evident from the description of the organizational structures for question 7 that the Allied apparatus responsible for influence included many small voices under a decentralized control. However, based on the manner in which they operated and their tendency to adhere to a single narrative as discussed previously those voices were all generally aligned. That did not mean that opposing views were absent on minor issues of how to proceed towards established objectives. Balfour (1979) states that:

The BBC in war-time had a monopoly and secure finances, but that did not remove the desirability of its representing, within the bounds set by the national will to win, a plurality of views. Had it ever ceased to do so, it would have been giving its listeners inadequate reasons for the things it wished them to believe...Indeed freedom to differ, and the confidence so engendered in the reliability of the publicity media, were important for morale and even impressed the enemy who took it as a sign of strength. (p. 88)

The German apparatus was much less fragmented and became more and more centralized over time. It was always ultimately dominated by Hitler and the Nazi party, and utilizes fewer channels than the allies both at home and abroad. Some of this was due to a similar effect as described in question 8. Just the combination of the British and American propaganda agencies alone established more voices than what remained to Germany as the war progressed.

10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?

Germany, as Hitler came to power and over the conduct of the war became more dense over time to the point of achieving a relatively high density. This is to say that the number of ties between the various branches of the German government and military increased. The nature in which the Nazi party rose to prominence and the manner in which Hitler and other officials maintained control by eliminating opposition and appointing loyal party men to prominent positions lead to increasing density.

Key positions in the German military were given to National Socialists. The military became increasingly intertwined with the party and Nazi symbolism and indoctrination found its way into Wehrmacht schools (Kitchen, 1975, p. 285). Hitler himself presided over decisions regarding the appointment of generals to key positions or the removal of those that were suspect (Kitchen, 1975, p. 286).

Hitler conducted purges of his opposition. In 1934, the SS with the support of the army executed roughly 200 people labeled as subversives (Kitchen, 1975, p. 292). Tactics such as this increased the density of the inner circles of leadership. The imprisonment of millions of German citizens may be said to have generally increased the density (uniformity of political ties) of the populace. This tendency continued throughout the war. As the German military encountered difficulties Hitler continually replaced generals whose opinions did not match his own with those that did (Kitchen, 1975, p. 324). The Operation Valkyrie coup attempt in 1944 was met with yet another purge of the officer corps (Kitchen, 1975, p. 327). In general the need for Nazi party domination of the political/military system lead to cronyism where those closest to Hitler and the party elite gained position and power.

The Allied side poses a similar difficulty to the Axis, in that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the other allied powers was much more attenuated than that between the rest such as the United States and United Kingdom. Additionally all the allied powers would remain on the same side as the war ended. The U.S. and U.K. possessed common ties beyond just a common enemy. The English-speaking nations of the alliance shared common language, history, and culture to a large extent as well as

similar political philosophy. This, despite the disconnected nature of the Soviet Union to the other, places the Allies at firm medium density at the alliance level.

At individual levels the Americans and British were medium dense as well, with the American less dense than the British. Both nations observed multi-party systems of government with government deliberately compartmentalized to balance power and function. There were not purges or removal of opposition conducted as in Germany.

At the propaganda apparatus level, the British again were more dense than the Americans. As described in question 7, the manner in which the British effort was organized around the MOI is less compartmentalized than the system the United States would adopt with the OWI, OSS, and PWD. These organizations as described in question 7 would become more dense over time as the British and American agency's efforts were better coordinated the war in Europe progressed. The allied propaganda apparatus' density in total would begin medium and approach high. In general due to political systems, the total number of member nations, and the organization of their propaganda systems, the Allies are considered of medium density.

11. What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?

The final result for Germany is that it did not achieve its political or military goals. It gained the territory it desired only for a limited time and those gains were largely made through political maneuvering rather than military force. It did not maintain dominance in Europe. In fact it ceased to exist in its previous form. However, it is important to note that for a time it did achieve and come close to maintaining some goals and that goals may change. Hitler was successful in Austria and Czechoslovakia. He largely succeeded in his objectives in Poland although war with Britain was not initially desired. France was defeated quickly. The Battle of Britain and inability to invade the isles marked the end of Germany's ability to achieve its political goals.

The Allies did not achieve an initial goal of appeasement; however they did achieve the goal of unconditional surrender and de-Nazification of Germany. Any other goals were quickly overcome by the friction between the Soviet Union and the western

allies over the future shape of Europe. Arrangements short of armed conflict were determined. The result, much like the manner in which the Treaty of Versailles set the stage for the war, would lay the foundations of the Cold War.

12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?

Important to note is the relative balance of resources and materials available to each side. Germany sought to gain the resources of the Soviet Union partly because they were viewed as necessary to succeed in the effort against Britain. Indeed once the Soviet Union averted defeat and the United States entered the war, the balance of resources and material was firmly in the favor of the Allies. As the war proceeded Germany would be increasingly strangled from its access to the resources necessary to continue. The overwhelming advantage in resources and capacity to mobilize those resources that the Allies attained was critical to the ultimate outcome.

Another important factor is the role that air power played. A role not present in previous conflicts. Germany in the initiation of its campaigns against Poland, France, and the Soviet Union sought to destroy as much as possible of the opponent's air power on the ground as soon as possible in order to give the ground forces the advantages provided by local air superiority. Indeed a connection can be drawn between the success of the German Army and the status of the German Air Force. The Luftwaffe was significantly weakened by the Battle of Britain and then stretched to the point of ineffectiveness during the invasion of the Soviet Union. The German Army began to sustain successive defeats on land as the German Air Force was unable to remain as effective. While this is not strong enough to regard it as an ultimate cause of defeat, it suggests some correlation. Likewise Allied armies in Africa, Italy, and Europe would enjoy almost constant air dominance.

A third factor to consider is the effect of Allied code breaking. At several points in the war crucial information regarding German intentions and their subsequent understanding of Allied intentions allowed the Allies to effectively exploit German plans. As an example, Churchill was able to provide Stalin some warning regarding Operation

Barbarossa as well as to provide continued intelligence based on German transmissions (SparkNotes Editors, p. 21). Signal intercepts played a role in the Battle of Britain and the Battle of the Atlantic as well.

Lastly, the emergence of radar technologies affected the battle in the air and at sea. The Allies were generally able to remain ahead of the Germans in the advancement of radar. This impacted operations from the fight against submarines in the Atlantic, to the Battle of Britain, to the strategic bombing of Germany.

D. RESULTS

Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the influence strategy in WW II based upon our structured questions:

1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? **Germany – mostly yes (however, there was minor inconsistent nuances over the course of the war, especially regarding the “primary enemy”); U.S. /U.K. – no.**

2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? **Germany – no; U.S. /U.K. – no, difficulty in including Russia as an ally, but more consistent as the alliance solidified.**

3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? **Germany – no; U.S. /U.K. – yes, with the exception of black PWE and OSS efforts. The relative balance being that Germany was much less consistent than the U.S. /U.K.**

4) Is the narrative morally legitimate? **Germany – internally yes, externally no. U.S. /U.K. – yes.**

5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other source? **Germany – from Nazi philosophy as well as historical grievance from Treaty of Versailles. U.S. /U.K. – from philosophy associated with constitutional democracy but initially motivated by appeasement and self-defense.**

6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? **Germany – Hierarchy. U.S. /U.K. – Hierarchy but more hybridized due to nature of**

allied governmental systems. Formal hierarchies existed, but top down control not exercised as strongly.

7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, hierarchy, or hybrid? **Germany – Hierarchy; U.S. /U.K. – Hybrid due to the manner in which the efforts of the agencies were coordinated.**

8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **Germany – Single voice, Nazi Party; Allies – many voices.**

9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **Germany – Not a single voice, RMVP distinct from Party Press; U.S. /U.K. – many voices that would become more aligned with time.**

10) Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? **Axis – low, Germany itself – high; Allies – medium.**

11) What was the political goal (end)? Was it achieved? **Germany –achieved initially, but lost by war’s end; Allies – Achieved so far as unconditional surrender.**

12) What other capabilities (means) were used? Relative importance of the other capabilities in achieving the end? **Relative balance of resources – significant importance; Air power – moderate as related to tactical maneuver; Radar – moderate and connected to air power; Code breaking – significant.**

The relationship between the construct consistency of the narratives of the two sides is important. The narratives of both sides shifted over time, but it is the timing of these shifts, their magnitude, and their relationship to legitimacy that is interesting. The overarching German narrative based on Versailles, *Lebensraum*, and German superiority shifted little over the course of the war and when it did the shift was more about strategy than a change in justification. Relative to the change in narratives that the U.S. and U.K. experienced this is minor. The basic legitimacy of the narrative allowed Germany to pursue its objectives to a fault. The U.S. and U.K. on some level recognized the Versailles portion of the narrative, but Germany’s aggressive pursuit of *Lebensraum*

would effectively cross a line that may be said to have caused the shift in the British and American narratives. It appears that the relative consistency of the German narrative over time was counter-productive, indicating that the ability to adapt or respond to the adversaries shifting narrative may be important.

The British and American narratives shifted dramatically from neutrality and appeasement respectively to a shared narrative focused on the defeat of Germany. Of interest here is that the shifts were predicated by Germany's relentless pursuit of its own narrative. The shifts were reactive and the legitimacy of the U.S. and U.K. narratives was dependent upon Germany's actions to a certain degree. The U.S. and U.K. could not have successfully established the narrative they ended the war with without first seeing the neutrality and appeasement narratives fail in the face of aggression.

An additional observation is that legitimacy is a sort of capital that can be earned and spent. The legitimacy of German actions was exhausted over time through its continued aggression with the invasion of France as well as its treatment of Jewish and Slavic peoples. Legitimacy for the U.S. and U.K. was built up over time as seemingly all efforts at appeasing Hitler and restoring peace were exhausted and betrayed.

The relationship between hierarchy and density is interesting as well. Germany started and ended the war relatively more hierarchical and more dense than the U.S. and U.K. However, Germany was initially successful but later defeated. This may illustrate the idea that there is a sweet spot between no hierarchy and strict hierarchy as well as between single channel and all channel density. When conflict began the Germans were at a point of hierarchy and density that facilitated success against adversaries that possessed too little hierarchy and not enough density to compete. As the war progressed, both sides continued to increase hierarchy and density. At some point the balance shifted when the U.S. and U.K. became hierarchical and dense enough to compete with and then overwhelm a German structure that lost effectiveness after becoming too hierarchical and dense.

IX. COMPARATIVE STUDY 4: THE COLD WAR

A. BACKGROUND

The Cold War was the longest major conflict of the twentieth century. It was also the most unique as the primary super-power belligerents, the United States and the Soviet Union, never directly confronted one another militarily. The conflict played out more in the form of political, irregular, and economic warfare. Historians generally concur that the Cold War began in 1946/7 and ended in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The origins of the Cold War rest in a combination of the situation in Europe and Asia following World War II and the dynamics of opposition of the vastly different political/economic systems in the United States and the Soviet Union. The conferences held in Yalta and Potsdam in 1945 placed the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at odds with one another regarding the future of Germany as well as Japan (Gaddis, 1997, p. 56). Both nations were highly suspicious of each other and the future design of Europe. The competition for dominant influence affected nearly every nation on the planet.

The data presented in this study is designed to present a picture of the general trends over the forty plus years of the Cold War. However, exceptions are made to address key pieces of specific detail that illustrate changes in the essential status or character of narrative and organization as related in the structured questions. Exploring every facet of every corner of the Cold War is beyond the scope of this study.

B. DATA

As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused comparison approach to explore the selected case studies. Thus data is structured below as answers to each of our stated focus questions. Despite the global nature of the conflict, the data will focus primarily on the United States and Soviet Union (although other theaters of war and countries will be referenced in key points).

1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?

The overarching American narrative of the Cold War was that Soviet communism was a direct and aggressive threat to capitalism and therefore the western way of life. It originated in a combination of two primary factors, the situation at the end of World War II and the political philosophy that the United States was founded on. The United States had just fought a war to defeat German totalitarianism through an alliance of necessity with another totalitarian nation, the Soviet Union. America was uncertain how post-war relations were to proceed and Soviet behavior caused concern (Whitcomb, 1998, p. 66). The United States still adhered to the political philosophies of individual rights, private property, representative government, the rule of law, and a free press that were at the heart of the American Revolution and the Constitution of the United States. Soviet communism appeared to be counter to these ideals.

By 1947, Soviet behavior convinced the Truman administration that the Soviet Union was a direct threat to stability and peace in Europe. This was reinforced by George Kennan's "long telegram" and *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*. Kennan's description of the nature of the Soviet Union rested on five major assumptions. First, that the Soviet Union perceived itself as being in perpetual conflict with capitalism. Second, that other competing social democratic movements posed threats to Soviet communism. Third, that proponents of Marxism in capitalist states could be used to internally weaken capitalist adversaries. Fourth, that Soviet policy was not necessarily aligned with the reality of the communist economy or the views of its citizens. Fifth, that the structure of the Soviet government is what prevented it from achieving an objective understanding of itself or its adversaries (Jensen, 1993, p. 17). Additionally, the perceived failure of attempts to appease Hitler prior to WWII by many in U.S. policy circles suppressed development of more cooperative strategies (Whitcomb, 1998, p. 73).

These factors converged and prompted the adoption of the Truman Doctrine to support free peoples who resisted attempts at subjugation by militant minorities or outside powers. Kennan's telegram influenced the Truman Doctrine and was the origin of containment, a policy to deny the spread of communism and increase American

influence in the world. National Security Council Report 68 reveals how aggressive the United States perceived the Soviet threat to be and put containment fully into practice (United States, 1950). Containment shaped American policy towards the Soviet Union for the next forty years until the Reagan Administration. (Warren, 1996, p. 46).

Historians point out that U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union varied by administration between *détente* and roll-back. The United States engaged communist aggression North Korea and pursued the defeat (roll-back) of communism through the unification of Korea but failed due to Chinese intervention. The Korean War ended as a success for containment (Ball, 1998, p. 80). Eisenhower pursued containment during the Hungarian uprising in 1956 choosing not to support the insurgents (Warren, 1996, p. 123–125). Kennedy with respect to Cuba engaged in both an attempt at containment with the support of Batista and roll-back in the failed Bay of Pigs landings (Crockatt, 1995, p. 194–197). Johnson pursued containment during the Vietnam War, not seeking to unify the country, but to firmly establish a non-communist government in the South (Ball, 1998, p. 130). Nixon implemented a policy known as *détente* based more on political realism but still with the intent to contain communism when national interest demanded it. The Vietnam War ended as a victory for communism. Nixon normalized relations with communist China as a balance to Soviet influence (Ball, 1998, p. 135). Carter pursued containment following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Crockatt, 1995, p. 288). Reagan promoted roll-back through policies in South America, Africa, and Afghanistan. He also issued National Security Decision Directives 45 and 77, both aimed at reducing Soviet influence via information activities.

The shifts in policy from 1947 to 1991 described in the preceding paragraph were not shifts in the fundamental narrative. They were shifts based on internal debate as regards to what strategy to pursue to protect the interests of the free world while defeating communism either actively or passively. American policy adapted to reflect what was realistically possible at given points of time, but never accepted communism.

The overarching Soviet narrative of the Cold War was that American capitalism was a direct and aggressive threat to communism and therefore the Soviet way of life.

This is almost a mirror image of the U.S. narrative. The Soviet narrative, not unlike that of the United States, originated from a combination of the situation at the end of World War II and the political philosophy that the Soviet Union was founded on. The Soviets had just fought a war to defeat German imperialism through an alliance of necessity with an imperialist nation, Great Britain. Soviet ideology was firmly rooted in the political philosophy of Marx and Engel's *Communist Manifesto* of class struggle, the exploitative nature of the bourgeois (capitalists), and state control (in the name of the proletariat) of property, communications, and transportation that were at the heart of the revolution and the founding of the Soviet Union. American capitalism/imperialism appeared in direct opposition to these ideals.

In the years following World War II, the Soviets saw both threat and opportunity in the behavior of the United States. Stalin perceived an inevitable struggle with capitalism and believed it important to solidify Soviet strength in Eastern Europe and take measures to prevent Western Europe from doing the same (Ball, 1998, p. 12). This was reinforced by a communication from Nikolai Novikov known as "The Novikov Telegram". The telegram described an ambitious, imperialist United States that abandoned the cooperation of World War II, was building up its military power to expand its influence across the world, and could not be reasoned with (Jensen, 1993, p. 3). American policies such as the Marshall Plan further intensified the perception that the United States sought imperial expansion through capitalism in Europe (Ball, 1993, p. 14).

Soviet policy towards the United States varied with the tenure of different Soviet leaders much as U.S. policy had. Khrushchev implemented de-Stalinization aimed at denouncing Stalin's terror, ending the "cult of personality", shifting the economy towards consumer rather than industrial goods, rehabilitating former opponents of Stalinism, and allowing more autonomy for Eastern Bloc nations (Crockatt, p. 188). He did not perceive military confrontation as inevitable and recognized other means could promote communism in the West (Ball, 1998, p.70). Brezhnev instituted the "Brezhnev doctrine", a policy to prevent weakening of socialist governments by capitalist interventions, intervening in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and engaged in a complicated balance of

accepting Nixon's *détente* while suppressing dissidence in Eastern Europe and building the Soviet military (Dunbabin, 1994, p. 20). The Soviet *détente* faltered during the Ford presidency and ended with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Andropov continued the Afghan war, and by 1983 allowed arms negotiations with the United States to end. Chernenko, like Andropov, did not stray significantly from the legacy of Breshnev's policies. The Soviet narrative was consistent up to this point. It fluctuated with respect to about how best to serve the interests of the Soviet Union, but those interests remained the advancement of communism and resistance of western imperialism.

The policies of Mikhail Gorbachev resulted in a shift in the fundamental Soviet narrative. He recognized that the single minded dominance of the communist party and the structure of the Soviet government were significantly flawed and could not continue to compete with western capitalism (Warren, 1996, p. 225). A series of policy foreign policy disasters (Afghanistan, mismanagement of Poland, Israeli success against the Soviet-backed Palestinian Liberation Organization) as well as economic stagnation likely contributed to Gorbachev's view (Gaddis, 1990, p. 321). He introduced *perestroika* (literally restructuring) as a concept for reorganizing the Soviet political and economic systems to become competitive. He also introduced *glasnost* (openness) a policy designed to bring improved accountability and transparency into the Soviet system that he believed would serve to eliminate corruption.

It is important to note that *glasnost* and *perestroika* were not intended to be fundamental shifts away from the traditional Soviet narrative. Gorbachev viewed them as a means to save communist socialism. Any opening of information or restructuring of the system was not an admission of communism's failure. It was recognition that the system had not adequately provided feedback regarding the reality of the Soviet situation and that freeing up information was the cure (Shane, 1994, p. 66). While a narrative shift was not the intent, it was the result. The loosening of information and societal controls developed a momentum of its own and shifted the perceptions of the Soviets about their own system and world view.

2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?

The rigid enforcement of communist party doctrine by the KGB revealed a sort of logical inconsistency in the dilemmas of conscience that it forced on people in positions of responsibility within Soviet society. Shane (1994) relates the account of Andrei Mironov who was brought before psychiatrists to evaluate his mental health in light of his habitual association with foreign students. Diagnosis of “sluggish schizophrenia” was often used by the KGB as a means to persecute dissidents. The enforcement of the communist system, a system presented as the inevitable and proper future for humanity pressured the psychiatrists to make evaluations counter to the truth (Shane, 1994, p. 24).

Another example of logical inconsistency is Shane’s account of the ideas of Vaclav Havel in describing Soviet thought. Havel is quoted as saying ““conventionalized, pseudo-ideological thinking...without our noticing it, separated thought from its immediate contact with reality...a ritualization of language. From being a means of signifying reality, and of enabling us to come to an understanding of it, language seems to have become an end in itself...has gained a kind of occult power to transform one reality into another”” (Shane, 1994, p. 53).

Glasnost contained an element of logical inconsistency as well. Shane quotes Gorbachev as saying ““Publish everything. There must be plurality of opinions. But plurality aimed at defending and strengthening the line of perestroika and the cause of socialism...We are not talking about any kind of limits on glasnost or democracy. What limits? Glasnost in the interest of the people and of socialism should be without limits. I repeat—in the interests of the people and of socialism”” (Shane, 1994, p. 66). So *glasnost* is not limited yet is constrained to the goal of strengthening socialism.

Glasnost was logically inconsistent in another respect. The Soviet system and freedom of information could not coexist. The system was maintained by controlling perceptions of reality through the control of information. Removing the controls on information undermined the foundations of the Soviet illusion. *Glasnost* and Soviet communism were logical contradictions (Shane, 1994, p. 72).

Some logical inconsistency in the U.S. narrative is found in American support for anti-communist authoritarian regimes. In Cuba the United States tolerated the dictatorship of the Batista regime based on commercial interests. In Iran the United States installed and supported Shah Pahlavi, another anti-communist autocratic ruler. Enthusiasm for countering communism was at times at odds with the political philosophies of individual rights, private property, representative government, the rule of law, and a free press.

3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?

Official Soviet history was riddled with myths, lies, and omissions. As Gorbachev's reforms allowed for more freedom in publication, Soviet citizens came to understand how big the lie had been. "By mid-1988 so much had been published that contradicted the textbooks, that school history exams for the year had to be canceled" (Shane, 1994, p. 123). The media industry sprang to life with articles, books, poems, films, and plays revealing the truth about the Soviet Union's past. The deeds of Stalin and others had been covered in words. Many people had no understanding of the Stalin years, and those that did by virtue of experience saw it varnished over by Soviet propaganda. The Soviets were exceptionally good at distorting the reality of for its citizens, convincing them that they lived in a land of freedom and prosperity when the reality was much more dismal (Snyder, 1995, p. 96).

Soviet dealings with the west contained inconsistency as well. Hook, Bukovsky, and Hollander make the case that the Soviet Union repeatedly used peace as a political weapon. The Soviets chastised the United States with respect to the treatment of communist movements within America while at the same time suppressing any independent, non-government movements within their own borders even when agitating for similar reforms (Hook, Bukovsky, & Hollander, 1987, p. 6).

The Soviet conception of democratic elections is also an example of a mismatch between words and deeds. The communist party held a monopoly and no opposition

parties were tolerated. Only one candidate per position was nominated, and the nomination was determined by the party. This was claimed as democracy.

Another example of inconsistency between words and deeds is Gorbachev's declaration to the USIA Director Charles Z. Wick that there would be no more disinformation. Despite this promise, Soviet active measures continued. The Soviets engaged in an information campaign claiming that U.S. scientists had developed the AIDS virus as a weapon to weaken societies in Africa. In Latin America the Soviets engaged in the "baby parts" campaign alleging that children in South America were kidnapped in order to use their body parts in transplants for rich Americans. A campaign of document forgery also occurred to attribute questionable activities to the Central Intelligence Agency (United States, 1989, p. viii). The Soviets also published several books containing false information designed to discredit the United States (Radvanyi, 1990, p. 53).

Inconsistency in the words and deeds of the U.S. narrative existed in the form of disinformation, denial, and deception campaigns. The American information campaign surrounding the destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by Soviet air defenses is an example of disinformation by omission of information where the portrayal of what occurred by the United States did not match what actually happened (Snyder, 1995, ch. 4). The information campaign around the Strategic Defense Initiative promoted by President Reagan is an example of disinformation through exaggeration of capability by the United States. Reagan sought to convince the Soviets that the United States was pursuing technology that could protect the West from ballistic missile attack. By exaggerating the true extent of the development of this capability, the United States hoped to force the Soviets into expending additional economic resources (Snyder, 1995, p. 120).

The Vietnam War and the division it caused at home presented a picture of America that was at times at odds with the presentation of the United States as a promoter and role model of the free world (Snyder, 1995, p. 19). The North Vietnamese combined nationalism with communism in order to expel French colonialism. American desire to

confront the spread of communism put it at odds with the self-determination of Vietnam. The protest against the war that emerged inside the United States also portrayed a picture of America at odds with its own values prompting Vice President Humphrey to comment that the image of America was of “bombs dropping, riots taking place, crime and corruption” (Snyder, 1995, p. 19).

4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?

Soviet treatment of its own citizens accused of subverting the system is a primary obstacle to the moral legitimacy of the communist narrative. Shane’s (1994) account of the arrest and trial of Andrei Mironov illustrates this on a personal level. Mironov’s friends and family were threatened with arrest and personal violence if they failed to cooperate. Through terror, Mironov’s associates were pressured to denounce his actions. The inhumane conditions of his confinement, including physical torture, were designed to incapacitate him and prevent him from defending himself in the trial. Cellmates were pressured to provide testimony against Andrei as well. This occurred in 1986, a year after Gorbachev came to power (Shane, 1994, p. 34).

The conduct of the KGB in general does not contribute to the legitimacy of the Soviet narrative. Soviet citizens lived in perpetual fear of the KGB. Countless individuals disappeared at the hands of the KGB or at a minimum were hostilely detained and intimidated without legitimate cause. The accounts of writers such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s *The Gulag Archipelago* and *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* firmly established the inhumane treatment of Soviet citizens, particularly during Stalin’s rule. The KGB also suppressed religion through the monitoring, harassment, and infiltration of religious groups (Shane, 1994, ch. 4).

To outsiders the employment of information control by the Soviet Union served to foster perceptions of a lack of moral legitimacy. The banning of books, monitoring of communications, travel restrictions, and treatment of Soviet prisoners provided direct evidence. Indirectly the lag in the fruits of information technology available to Soviet citizen called into question the efficacy of the communist system relative to the west.

Gorbachev recognized this as well as he eased controls on the access to information in an attempt make the Soviet economy competitive in an information economy as well as shore up the legitimacy the communist façade. Gorbachev's reforms aimed at rescuing the Soviet system place it in an irrecoverable dilemma. The Soviet system experienced legitimacy issues based in its internal brutality and strict control of information. "Opening" Soviet society through *glasnost* was a means to recover legitimacy, but it also revealed just how illegitimate the system had been by revealing previous suppressed information regarding brutality (Shane, 1994, p. 45–46).

Economic corruption was another problem for Soviet moral legitimacy. The account of an investigation into bribery and corruption in Uzbekistan provided by Shane suggests that corruption was an integral part of the Soviet system. Bureaucratic control of prices was at the root of the corruption. "Bureaucrats who are given the ability to control prices exercise so much economic power that their own offices become a desirable market commodity, and they themselves end up being bought and sold" (Shane, 1994, p. 95).

5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?

The Soviet narrative derived its legitimacy from philosophy and historical tradition. A key piece of the Soviet narrative was of Marxist-Leninist thought as a science. It was a science that brought rationality to human social behavior and predicted the future of social progress. A required course at Soviet universities was titled Scientific Communism (Shane, 1994, p. 54). Additionally, the Soviet system suppressed religion. Despite the revolution Soviet thought was not free of the influence of Russian history. Russia was historically threatened by armies from Western Europe and this history played a significant role in the legitimacy of Soviet suspicion and aggression towards its neighbors. The framing of WW II as The Great Patriotic War also provided legitimacy to the Soviet narrative.

The American narrative derived its legitimacy from philosophy and history as well. However, religion played a part too. Many American leaders viewed America's

role as that of defending Western Civilization, a civilization rooted deeply in Christian tradition (Kurth, 2003, p. 5). Political philosophy rooted in self-determination and liberty *was* the history of the United States since its independence from Great Britain. Americans had engaged in a civil war where both sides fought for their interpretation of that philosophy. For the Confederacy it was the rights of states to determine their own future. For the Union it was the freedom of the individual. Religion played an integral role in that history and philosophy as well. Many who immigrated from Europe had sought religious freedom. American law protected that freedom and much of the philosophy of individual rights referenced divine origins.

6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?

Russia, even before the Soviet Union, had a long tradition of centralized hierarchic rule involving strict information control. Even the Russian tsars had strictly controlled publishing. Russian society did not parallel the Western erosion of censorship. The Soviet regime shared the tsarist regime's fear of the threat posed by information and the technologies that spread it. However, it can be argued that the Soviets took information control to a higher level. The Soviets, in addition to censoring and banning certain items, developed a system for engaging the sources that produced information to produce what the state wants (Shane, 1994, p. 49). The United States in contrast had a distinct separation between the press and the government. The government did not tightly control the sources of information gathering, reproduction, and dissemination in the same hierarchic manner as the Soviets.

The hierarchic nature of the Soviet government is seen in the account by Shane of Gorbachev as young member of the Politburo seeking information regarding defense spending and the Soviet economy. He, the Chief of the Central Committees economic department, and the Politburo's head of heavy industry, who were all members of the Kremlin's inner circle, were refused budget information by the General Secretary Andropov. Information was tightly controlled in a hierarchic manner from the top down (Shane, 1994, p. 44). Again in contrast the United States government observed strict

separation of powers between different functions of government designed to prevent too much centralized control. Through a distinct separation of powers between three branches of government that were required by statute to provide information to each other. Additionally, the existence of a multi-party political system is less hierarchical than the Soviet one-party system.

The Soviet economic system in general gave ample evidence of an overall hierarchical system. The manner in which supply and demand were met is illustrated by Shane (1994). Pricing and production were not determined by demand from below, but by mandate from above. Production was not connected to consumption via pricing information (feedback). Therefore items such as shoes might be produced in overabundance, but the sizes were wrong and the styles not desired. Production of everything was set in the Economic Plan by the State Planning Committee. Prices were established by the State Price Committee. Distribution was handled by the State Supply Committee. There was not interconnection between pricing, supply, and demand as found in the west (Shane, p. 1994, p. 78). “It was an economy designed not to generate the stream of information necessary for self-regulation but to respond to orders from the regime” (Shane, 1994, p. 90). Again in contrast the economic system of the United States was not centrally controlled. Individual entities were relatively free to associate and conduct business in whatever manner was most conducive to economic success. This is distinctly less hierarchical.

7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?

The Chief Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in Print provided strict guidance regarding what was allowed to be published. Nothing could be published without an index number provided by this agency (Shane, 1994, p. 58). This is evidence of top down, hierarchical control of print media.

The KGB possessed enormous control over information within the Soviet Union and its satellite countries as well. The KGB’s access allowed it to influence all other institutions of the Soviet system. It was able to a high degree to influence what parts of

the government had access to what pieces of information. It provided information to local as well as national leaders. It could determine what to omit or emphasize. The KGB was self-aware regarding the influence it wielded based on the information control systems it administered. It was able to compare the information it collected domestically to the information it collected abroad. The seeds of the need for the reforms of the 1980s originated in the KGB likely because of their unique position of understanding (Shane, 1994, p. 104). The KGB also played a significant role in the appointment and removal of Soviet leadership (p. 119).




Figure 8. Soviet Organization for Active Measures (From United States, 1989)




Figure 9. U.S. Information Agency in Relation to the Executive Branch (From Henderson, 1969).

Figures 8 and 9 depict the formal information apparatus of both the Soviet Union and the United States. Both are typical bureaucratic hierarchies. The figures do not depict either side's state diplomatic service. However, both sides engaged in traditional official state diplomacy. The role of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in relation to the Information Agency is of note. It is a distinct and separate agency without formal authority over the Information agency. The KGB in the Soviet system is of note as it played a central role, through the exercise of internal policing powers, in the oversight of Soviet "active measures." The Soviet apparatus was more hierarchical in the sense of firm centralized control, while the American apparatus exhibited its hierarchy in the compartmentalization of functions and authorities between state diplomacy, public diplomacy, and the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The nature of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the function of the KGB decreased the compartmentalization of function and authority in the Soviet Union. Another illustration of the central control versus compartmentalization difference between the Soviet Union and the United States is the strict separation between internal and external information activities in the American System. This separation was established by the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948.

The implementation of information technologies made the U. S. system distinctly more networked than the Soviet System. The United States Information Agency implemented a system known as Worldnet. Worldnet was a world-wide television and information system that established a near instantaneous global network through which U.S. information activities could be synchronized. It was one of the chief weapons of the Reagan presidency's public diplomacy (Snyder, 1995, p. 91).

8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

Through the control of the CPSU Politburo, the Soviet Union maintained a single monolithic voice to the outside world. Contact between non-government voices and the West was suppressed. The Soviets engaged in immense radio broadcast and print media campaigns to the outside world through multiple state controlled broadcast stations and press outlets. There were many channels, but one voice (Snyder, 1995, p. 101).

The Soviet government sought to maintain tight control over voices within the U.S.S.R. as well. It exercised a virtual monopoly on "truth", and went to great lengths to insure that it, not the people, decided what could be read, written, or said. One example of this exercise of control is the distribution by the state publishing house of instructions to cut out pages of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and replace them with a provided insert. The changes removed the history of Stalin's secret police chief Lavrenty Beria. A Second is the suppression of information regarding an explosion involving nuclear waste in 1957. Soviet citizens were largely unaware of in incident at all until reforms under Gorbachev permitted the press the freedom to write about it (Shane, 1994, pp. 11–20). A

third example is the implementation of Soviet cable television where signals were tightly controlled by government receiving stations (Snyder, 1995, p. 91).

With the relaxation of control over information sources that occurred under Gorbachev new internal voices arose to compete with the previously tightly controlled monolithic voices of the CPSU (Shane, 1994, p. 11). The Soviet human rights movement of the 1980s is an example of this phenomenon. As the pressure of the movement forced some relaxation of information controls it opened up more voices not necessarily in line with the official one. These voices in turn placed more pressure for the freedom of information allowing for more voices to be heard (Shane, 1994, p. 25).

The increasing education and urbanization in the 1960s of the Soviet population also contributed to the increase in dissenting voices within the Soviet Union. As people became more literate, the audience for *samizdat* (underground publishing) grew and increased its demand. Likewise urbanization of the population allowed for wider circulation of the underground documents also increasing demand. Increased demand led to increased supply effectively increasing the number of voices, in the form of samizdat (Shane, 1994, 26). That Soviet officials recognized the threat posed by the additional voices and resulting loss of information control is evidenced by the KGB's focus on arresting producers and consumers of samizdat rather than arresting known public dissidents (Shane, 1994, p. 29).

Economic black-marketeers also added internal voices of dissent. They were dissidents. They challenged the states monopoly on the economy in the same way samizdat publisher challenged the monopoly on ideology. Soviet communist ideology so tightly tied politics to economics that engaging in the underground free market was synonymous to engaging in free speech (Shane, 1994, p. 92).

In contrast, the United States voice to the outside world was always fragmented and pluralistic. The government never controlled the domestic institutions that created, reproduced, and disseminated information such as universities and media outlets. These constituted numerous voices that distributed information both at home and abroad.

9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

In 1987, the Soviet Union employed no fewer than 2.5 million propagandists. These propagandists were credited by Gorbachev with conquering the hearts and minds of the people for the communist party. In this respect the Soviet apparatus had many voices, but they all focused on the same overarching objective (Shane, 1994, p. 54). As described in the organizational structure of the influence apparatus the Soviets maintained tight central control. While there were many voices, they were all singly focused and orchestrated. The lack of separation between domestic and foreign information campaigns allowed the internal and external information activities to overlap and blur.

The reforms of Gorbachev had a similar effect on the Soviet influence apparatus as was experienced by the Soviet system as a whole. State media outlets were less controlled and therefore became competing voices over time. These voices became less unified over the last decade of the Cold War.

The United States influence apparatus was not as tightly coupled as the Soviet. The United States Information Agency maintained close ties to the Department of State for policy guidance but was not controlled by it. The Central Intelligence Agency's information activities were often completely obscured from either the Department of State or U.S. Information Agency as a whole. This limited the United States' ability to achieve as monolithic a voice as the Soviet Union.

Under the Reagan administration the voice became more singular. Reagan made the U.S. Information Agency a key player in national security affairs and promoted an increase of capability based heavily on satellite television and increased radio broadcast stations. The net effect of implementing new information technologies was to network the information campaigns of the United States in an unprecedented manner. This unified the voice of the American influence apparatus to a greater degree than any other time in the Cold War.

10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?

One way of evaluating the density of the Soviet Union relative to the United States is to look at its economic system with respect to information technology. Soviet control of information required suppression of technologies designed to facilitate the free flow of information. Something as simple as a Xerox machine was tightly controlled by the KGB. The various parts of the Soviet economy could not become nearly as dense (interconnected) as the American economy simply due to the failure to implement technologies that speed up the exchange and duplication of information (Shane, p. 64). This same effect based on information technologies that connect various parts of society had similar effects upon the organization of each side's societal institutions. The net result is that the United States as a whole, both publicly and privately, was more dense than the Soviet Union.

11. What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?

In the early years of the Cold War the Soviet Union succeeded in solidifying the Eastern Bloc under communist control. However, it did not succeed in denying Berlin to the West or in preventing the unification of the occupied zones into West Germany. It was also unable to prevent the industrial and economic rehabilitation of free Europe under the Marshall Plan.

The United States was able to stem the rise of communism in Western Europe by revitalizing the economy, but it was unable to ensure the self-determination of those nations it had earlier sought to free from Nazi domination as they fell to communist domination. West Germany was combined and established as a strong point against Soviet expansion.

The Korean conflict ended in stalemate. The domain of communism was not expanded, but this was not necessarily a Soviet goal. It may be viewed as a success for the United States' objective of containment, but the attempt to roll back communism and unify Korea failed.

The Vietnam War ended in failure for the United States and was an indirect, but significant, victory for the Soviet Union. Other indirect conflicts across the third world ended in mixed results for both sides. The Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, an indirect victory for the United States.

In 1991 the Soviet Union ceased to exist. This was a clear Cold War victory for the United States. The original U.S. objectives of the Cold War were formed in National Security Council Report 20/4 and were re-affirmed in National Security Council Report 68. Through the forty plus years of the Cold War these objectives were obtained with varying degrees of success. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union all were achieved or made unnecessary.

12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?

Nuclear deterrence played a defining role in the Cold War. Through the adoption of a doctrine of mutually assured destruction the United States and Soviet Union locked the Cold War into almost perpetual stalemate. This theory of deterrence prevented either side from initiating direct armed conflict, but it also ensured that neither side could pursue unilateral disarmament. It also pushed each side towards pursuing irregular warfare. These irregular wars were played out through the major crisis of the Cold War and characterize the “hot” portion of the Cold War. The Vietnam and Afghanistan wars caused internal dissent in the United States and Soviet Union respectively causing internal publics to question the basic narratives of each nation.

The rapid advance of technology also played an integral role in the Cold War. This is most evident in the space race and arms race that the United States and Soviet Union engaged in. The early lead of the Soviet Union in the space race with the launch of Sputnik prompted the United States to fast forward its own space program. This yielded additional advances in technology for the United States that were applied across society. It also yielded technology integral to the pursuit of anti-ballistic missile capability. The Soviet Union would spend disproportionate resources attempting to compensate for this perceived technology gap. The net result was that the Soviet Union in

the 1980's found itself distinctly behind in the adaptation of technology and particularly information technology that was increasing the productivity and quality of life of the United States.

C. RESULTS

Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the influence strategy in the Cold War based upon our structured questions:

1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? **Soviet Union – yes (although they lost control of the narrative with Gorbachev's reforms); United States – yes (however, the element of plurality and liberalism in the narrative allowed it to be more inclusive than the Soviet).**

2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? **Soviet Union – no; United States – yes (support for totalitarian regimes does not completely override validity of anti-communism).**

3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? **Soviet Union – no; United States – qualified yes (there was some inconsistency due to U.S. support of authoritarian leaders, this was required to maintain consistency in our messaging and support of anti-communist regimes).**

4) Is the narrative morally legitimate? **Soviet Union – no (legitimacy with internal public was maintained by coercion until Gorbachev reforms); United States – yes (Vietnam was low-point of legitimacy, but did not override overall legitimacy).**

5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other source? **Soviet Union – philosophy, history; United States – philosophy, history (with religious undertone).**

6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? **Soviet Union – hybrid leaning towards hierarchy based on authoritarian control; United States – hybrid with hierarchical political institutions but network like private institutions.**

7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, hierarchy, or hybrid? **Soviet Union – hierarchy under CPSU control; United States – hierarchy in form, but more networked in practice due to the use of information technologies.**

8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **Soviet Union – single voice until Gorbachev reforms; United States – many voices due to nature of open society.**

9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **Soviet Union – single voice; United States – more than one voice whose message became more unified under the Reagan administration.**

10) Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? **Soviet Union less dense than the United States based on character of economic and social systems and implementation of information technology.**

11) What was the political goal (end)? Was it achieved? **Soviet Union – no; United States – yes.**

12) What other capabilities (means) were used? Relative importance of the other capabilities in achieving the end? **Nuclear deterrence – significant; Information technology – significant.**

The internal and external inconsistency of the Soviet narrative was overcome during most of the Cold War by the tight central control placed on information inside the country. Construct consistency was necessary to suppress the negative effect on legitimacy of the mismatch between Soviet words and reality as well as the logical absurdity of the Soviet system. The same consistency over time that maintained control of Soviet internal legitimacy was also integral to the rapid decentralization of information that occurred under Gorbachev and the subsequent loss of control of the narrative by the Soviets. So much had been disguised for so long that when the cracks in the construct

were revealed there was no space left for minor adjustments that could maintain the legitimacy of the narrative.

In contrast, the relative internal and external consistency of the United States narrative played a part in maintaining construct consistency. As a more open and decentralized organization the United States allowed critical voices to be heard and become a reinforcing part of the overall narrative rather than a destructive force. The pressure of inconsistencies was vented and the fact that venting was allowed turned into evidence of the legitimacy of the overall narrative.

Each side dealt with low points in their legitimacy. For the United States it was the Vietnam War. For the Soviets it was the war in Afghanistan. The timing of these with respect to information technology is of interest. During the Vietnam War video recording technology had a significant impact on perceptions of the war and therefore legitimacy, although the nature of the content was also important. The Soviets experienced a similar effect in their war in Afghanistan. However, by the 1980s the portability and reproducibility of video was greatly advanced and capitalized on by the United States in its information campaigns.

X. CASE STUDY 5: U.S. VERSUS TRANS-NATIONAL JIHADI TERRORISTS

A. BACKGROUND

Transitioning from the Cold War to the war against trans-national jihadi terrorists, we should note immediately that one of the lasting legacies of the Cold War was the development of nuclear weapons. The technology of nuclear weapons had a major impact upon the political end-state of the Cold War, but not because of the technology itself. The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons did not allow either side to use them militarily to achieve their desired end-states; thus, nuclear deterrence forced the conflict to be fought primarily through the other elements of national power, especially the information component and the competing narratives. This is significant for future analyses as the continued existence of nuclear weapons will serve primarily to constrain all future conflicts below a certain technological level indicating that the narrative will continue to gain in importance during the information age. This factor is apparent in the current case study. As cited earlier, the “QDR acknowledges that victory...depends on information, perception, and how and what we communicate as much as application of kinetic effects” (United States, 2006b, p. 230). This realization is key in the strategy by trans-national jihadis as exemplified in the oft used quote by Ayman al-Zawahiri: “We are in the midst of war, and more than half of that struggle takes place on an information battlefield; we are in an information war for the hearts and minds of all Muslims” (as quoted by Robinson, 2007, p. 86). Robinson (2007) continues to state that the “austere and puritanical ideal society, ruled by authoritarian means has no appeal for the vast majority of Muslims...The relative success they have enjoyed despite the unpopularity of their view...can be attributed largely to their innovative and nimble information strategy” (p. 86).

First, we must define what we mean by the term ‘trans-national jihadi terrorists’. As discussed by Hegghammer (2009), ‘jihadism’ or ‘jihadi’ are the most widely-used words used today to describe radical Islamism and are used primarily to distinguish

violent actors from nonviolent, democratic, or progressive Islamists. However, Hegghammer also acknowledges the problem with associating the word Jihad with violence and terrorist action, namely: the widespread belief within the Muslim community that Jihad represents a noble religious struggle, not illegitimate violence. ¹For this reason, Muslims refer to militant Islamists as either terrorists, *irhabiyyun*; *Kharijites*, *khawarij*; deviants, *munharifun*; or the Mised Sect, *al-fi'a al-dhalla* (Hegghammer, 2009). Additionally, different and opposing trends in modern Islamic thought, Islamism, fundamentalism, Salafism, neo-Salafism, Wahhabism, jihadism, political Islam, Islamic radicalism and others, are often mistakenly lumped together (Moussalli, 2009). However, there are several strands of Islamic thought which differentiate groups in their connotations, discourses, and actions. The discontented either look to reform Islam or look to revert back to the way things were with the 1st generation of Muslims (al-salaf) including stricter interpretations of religious law and how it fits with society. Even so, only a small proportion of these individuals from either the reformers/islamists or the Salafi/Wahhabi are “jihadi.” (See Figure 10, note: the figure is a notional construct based upon our own interpretation of Moussalli (2009)).



Figure 10. Strands of Islamic thought

¹ Note, we will always capitalize the authentic, religious interpretation of Jihad to differentiate it from the use of religion by either the broader jihadi current or the trans-national jihadi terrorists who use religion to justify their actions.

For the purposes of this chapter, we will follow the precedent set by Lia (2009) who adopts the definition provided by Abu Mus'ab al-Suri (a key, outspoken, and articulate writer within jihadi thought, as well as an al-Qaeda theorist and strategist), namely:

It comprises organisations, groups assemblies, scholars, intellectuals, symbolic figures, and the individuals who have adopted the ideology of armed *jihad* against the existing regimes in the Arab-Islamic world on the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling not by what Allah said..., by legislating without Allah, and by giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel enemies of the Islamic Nation. The Jihadi current has also adopted the program of armed *jihad* against the colonialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Muslims. (pp. 281–282)

By doing so, we avoid conflating the jihadi current with specific categories, sects of Islam, and other arbitrary categorizations such as Sunni, Shi'a, Wahhabi, Salafi, moderates, radicals, takfirs, etc. We also avoid conflating the jihadi current with specific terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda who have expanded the jihadi concept into a trans-national phenomenon. Of the jihadis, an even smaller proportion are trans-national jihadi terrorists like al-Qaeda. Robinson (2007) categorizes jihadis into four distinct categories based upon two variables; first, if the focus of ideology is national or trans-national in scope and second, whether the locus of violence is national or trans-national in scope. Based upon this, he differentiates between four categories: traditional jihadi groups (e.g. GIA, Syrian Muslim Brethren); nationalist jihadi groups (e.g. Hamas, Chechnya, Iraq); transnational groups (e.g., al-Qaeda); and al-Qaeda franchise groups, which have a transnational focus of ideology, but who focus the locus of their violence nationally. For the purposes of our analysis we focus primarily on al-Qaeda, which is trans-national in both focus of ideology and locus of violence, but do not exclude al-Qaeda franchise groups, which share the same trans-national focus of ideology, but are constrained in their locus of violence.

B. DATA

As stated in the methodology section, we are using a structured/focused comparison approach to explore the selected case studies. Thus data is structured below as answers to each of our stated focus questions.

1. Is the Narrative Consistent Over Time (Construct)?

Some academics have explored the inconsistencies between the narratives of the past versus the present, for instance, Bonner explores the central theme of Jihad as it has evolved or morphed throughout time focusing on the origins prior to Muhammad through to modern history. In his examination, it is clear that the evolution or morphing is not consistent. “Most of the jihad’s basic elements are already present in the Quran, including the doctrine on martyrdom, the divine reward, and exhortations to take up arms for the sake of religion and God” (Bonner, 2006, p. 104). However, we “now see that there was disagreement among the major intellectual centers of the early Islamic world over the jihad” (p.106). The “doctrine of jihad, including the distinction between individual and collective obligation; the insistence on religiously correct intention on the part of the person performing jihad; the insistence on the supervision of the imam or his representative, especially in offensive warfare...many of the underlying tensions were never completely resolved” (p. 169). “Are these jihadists of today the direct heirs of the raiders and ghazis of the Abbasid, Ottoman, and other premodern Islamic empires and states? For a number of reason, the answer seems to be ‘no’” (p. 171). “Yet the most urgent question for the radical jihadists and, beyond them, for fundamentalists of all kinds...is how to create a link with an authentic Islamic past and recover an authentic Islamic practice” (p. 172). Based upon Bonner, the construct consistency has morphed and evolved over time partly to suit the needs of the community, justify political/military action, or in response to intellectual and theological discourse.

While the concept of Jihad has evolved over time, the “formulation of jihadi ideology is of recent origin” with the ideological founder of Sunni Arab jihadism, Sayyid Qutb (Robinson, 2007, p. 87). Robinson notes that Qutb started a process of ideological

innovation where instead “of creating new vocabularies, jihadists radically reinterpret existing, and culturally authentic, concepts and institutions” (p. 88). There are many such examples, but two that we will highlight, from Robinson (2007), is Jihad and *Jahiliyya*. *Jahiliyya* traditional refers to the historical time prior the prophet Muhammad which is viewed as a period of ignorance and barbarism prior to the revelation by God’s final prophet. This was reinterpreted by Qutb to refer, not only to the chronological period, but also to any modern states or institutions that are characterized by immoral and licentious behavior or governments based upon secular governments vice *sharia* law. Similarly Jihad, which primarily refers to either a personal, religious struggle to resist temptation, “greater Jihad”, or a defensive “holy war”, lesser Jihad”, has been transformed to raise the status of Jihad “to that of the five traditional pillars of Islam (the testament of faith, prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage)...situated at the center of Islam” (Robinson, 2007, p. 89). The ideological innovation also rejects the strict interpretation of Jihad as a defensive struggle and states that it is obligatory for every individual Muslim (highlighted by bin Laden’s *fatwa* for every Muslim to kill Americans and Jews). This process of ideological innovation amplifies the changing construct of the narrative over time in an attempt to justify, and legitimize, the jihadi narrative.

There have been multiple reasons given as to why the U.S. is involved in the fight against trans-national jihadi terrorists, specifically in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, many of which have shifted over time. The initial narrative is that Afghanistan was a safe haven for the terrorist organization that had perpetuated the September 11 terrorist attack against the U.S. However, in 2003, the narrative shifted with the U.S. invasion in Iraq. Although some interpreted the underlying narrative as U.S. desire for control over oil or as unfinished business for the Bush family after the Gulf War, Deputy of Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz described the U.S. narrative against trans-national jihadi terrorism, specifically the decision to invade Iraq by stating:

The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but [...] there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction, the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal

treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the first two. (U.S. Department of Defense: News Transcript, 2003)

But UN inspections revealed no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and no clear ties between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda. At that point the narrative shifted again to one of democracy and freeing the people of Iraq and Afghanistan from oppressive regimes. The narrative specifically in Afghanistan shifted from destruction of the al Qaeda network and bin Laden to a narrative of democracy and freedom for the oppressed Afghans (including women) from the authoritarian regime of the Taliban who had regained control of much of Afghanistan. So the U.S. construct consistency has shifted over time. Although the latter shift appears to hold greater moral authority at face value, it has actually created problems with internal and external consistency in the U.S. narrative, thereby undermining the force of moral legitimacy as will be explored in the following sections. Ultimately, the U.S. needs to understand and rely on staying “on a path most consistent with American grand strategy since the dawn of the republic... ‘not a crusade for democracy...[but rather]...the fundamental liberties which the world has established’” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 58).

2. Is the Narrative Logically Consistent (Internal)?

Qutb articulated the essential characteristics of the Islamic vision in his writings. One of these essential characteristics is constancy (thabat) which serves as a bulwark against Westernization and “both guarantees the integration and harmony of Muslim life with that of the order of the universe” (Haddad, 1983, p. 75). Needless to say, for Qutb, God is the only true source of constancy. In conjunction with this is the principle of comprehensiveness (shumul). Since the Islamic vision is comprehensive, it “rejects every foreign element” which may corrupt it (p. 76). This is the other side of the consistency coin. Brooke (2008) explores how Islamists and jihadis were “fractured” based upon how they defined and applied the concepts of Takfir, or the importance of focusing on the “near” enemy versus the “far” enemy. These debates show that there

were “serious and sustained conflicts over strategy inside the jihadist movement...[which]...illustrates the diversity of the movement” (p. 219).

Additionally, the decision by bin Laden and Zawahiri to focus on and attack the US created new divisions and amplified existing ones. “Not all jihadis thought alike and acted in unison...jihadis were deeply splintered and segmented along charismatic personalities and regional affiliations. There existed considerable competition and rivalry among various jihadi factions, whereby each set up its own shop and guest houses and tried to recruit more men and expand further” (Gerges, 2009, p. 99). “Differences and divisions existed not only among jihadis but also between the jihadis and mainstream traditional Islamists” (p. 109) “Bin Laden reportedly argued that internal strife alienated the *ummah*, whose support was urgently needed...On this score, bin Laden was more consistent than Zawahiri and other religious nationalists who subsequently changed camps” (p. 144). Hani al-Sibai criticizes al-Jama’a for vacillating like a pendulum from one extreme to the other and states “How do we trust a group that overnight changes its color from black to white and then white to black? How are we to take its revisions seriously” (p. 214)? Another critic claims that this collective repentance by the al-Jama’a group undermines the credibility of the historical leadership. “Like other jihadis’ critiques of Al Qaeda, Zayat’s reinforces the existence of deep fault lines among their ranks...The critical question is...whether [Zayat’s]...narrative is credible and consistent...his critique tallies with those of other jihadis and is historically consistent” (p. 223).

Lia (2009) observes that broadly “speaking one may identify two tendencies within the Jihadi current...This divide...is...better described as a spectrum, or a continuum, of positions, defined by two extreme positions. On the one extreme were the Salafi purists for whom doctrinal purity was of quintessential importance, even if it meant fighting side-battles, alienating allies, and shattering any semblance of a common front...At the other extreme were semi-independent thinkers and strategists like al Suri, whose main preoccupation was strategy, i.e. the ways in which [the] Jihadi current can fight its enemy most effectively” (p. 282). Here we have a basic example of

inconsistency within the jihadi narrative in the form of disagreement between pure religious fundamentalists and more practical “fighting” jihadis. Lia presents two cases where friction between jihadis in the form of ideological dispute causes more division than unity which “suggest that the spread of purist Salafi doctrines in the jihadi current, rather than being a source of strength and renewal, has instead constituted a considerable obstacle to jihadi mobilization, and has more often than not served to handicap and cripple Jihadi groups by embroiling them in schisms and internal conflicts” (p. 283).

Additionally, “the Jihadi movement did not have a well-established and unified ideological foundation, separate from the Salafi school; its ideological character was multifaceted, evolving, and open for new influences.” (Lia, 2009, p. 285). A quote from al-Suri reveals the schisms in the internal narrative: “one of the most intractable contentious issues...because at the end of the day, it will constitute an entry point for divisiveness, partyism, and intolerant jurisprudence, which in turn breeds fanaticism in the domain of political ideology as well as in organisational terms within the Jihadi movement itself” (Lia, 2009, p. 288). Al-Suri’s opposition to the ideological rhetoric of Abu Qutada further points to inconsistency within the jihadi narrative as he accuses the Salafi cleric of alienating virtually all other schools of Islamic thought. Lia’s illustration of the controversy over the Taliban’s legitimacy as experienced by al-Suri is likely one of the most damning examples of the physically negative effects that result from internal disputes over ideology (narrative). “There were significant differences in religious observance and practices between the Arab volunteer fighters...and the Afghan resistance...[jihadis] soon became embroiled in tense ideological disputes over whether the Taliban regime should be considered an Islamic Emirate for which it was worth fighting and to which emigration was obligatory.” (p. 294). “Despite their rhetorical pronouncements of solidarity and unity...Arabs looked with contempt and shock at the localized ‘primitive’ and ‘diluted’ religious practices of the Afghans...At the heart of these differences lay a bigger moral clash between Afghans’ homegrown, nuanced traditions...and fundamentalist interpretation” (Gerges, 2009, p. 83).

Finally, the “Salafi problem was not simply a disturbing factor in the Arab-Afghan community’s relationship with the Taliban. It also threatened al-Qaeda’s legitimacy as bin Laden moved to solidify his alliance with Mullah ‘Umar.” (Lia, 2009, p. 297). “Al-Suri and those Arab-Afghans who wished to make the Taliban a pillar of their jihadi project had clearly failed, not only because they fought an uphill battle against the Taliban’s external enemies, but perhaps even more so because of the sizeable anti-Taliban opposition *within* the Jihadi currents themselves, let alone the general condescending Arab attitude towards the Islamic Emirate.” (p. 298). “Interestingly, jihad is supposed to remedy the problems of discord and chaos, or *fitna*, both at the individual and societal levels. Yet, jihadists have used the concept of jihad in a way that has enhanced internal discord within the Muslim community” (Robinson, 2007, p. 90)

The U.S. narrative also suffered heavily from an inconsistency in its internal logic. One such example in Afghanistan was “our close association with the Northern Alliance—seen by many as brutal Russian proxies in the Afghan civil war [which] made it hard to portray the campaign as a straight liberation. This point was only reinforced when some members of the Northern Alliance...were perceived to behave in corrupt ways and to resort to violence to consolidate their positions” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 23). Our “association with leaders long perceived to be corrupt in their wielding of power has made democracy a hard ‘brand’ to sell to the Afghan people” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 25). This logical inconsistency exists throughout our narrative to the Muslim world as the U.S. continues to proclaim democracy while ostensibly supporting autocratic regimes (a point which falls both within internal inconsistency and external inconsistency, and will be expounded upon further in the following section).

3. Is the Narrative Consistent Between Words and Deeds (External)?

“According to the Gallup Poll, 7% of respondents think that the 9/11 attacks were ‘completely’ justified and view the United States unfavorably. Among those who believe that the 9/11 attacks were not justified, whom we’ll call ‘moderates,’ 40% are pro-United States, but 60% view the United States unfavorably” which suggests that even those who may generally agree with jihadi extremism’s antagonism to the United States view the

attack on civilians perpetrated on 9/11 to be unacceptable and inconsistent with the mainstream view of Jihad and justice in war (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 69). Additionally, only 13% of the politically radicalized 7% above considered the attacks as “completely justified” again indicating that even among those that agree to the notion of violent jihad they don’t view the deed of attacking civilians as consistent with their ideology (p. 70).

Not “a single respondent in Indonesia who condones the attacks of 9/11 cites the Quran for justification. Instead this group’s responses are markedly secular and worldly” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 73). Those who do believe that jihadi extremist acts are justified must rely on political rather than religious support for the act which seems peculiar in light of the jihadist’s need for solid religious cover for jihadi ideology and suggest that they themselves recognize the precarious footing of such deeds with respect to their own words.

Clearly mainstream Islamic jurisprudence does not accept attacks on civilian targets as legitimate acts of Jihad. Esposito and Mogahed (2007) deliberately state that the “Islamic war ethic prohibits attacking civilians” (p. 28). Al Qaeda in particular has received much criticism for targeting of “innocents.” Initially, bin Laden was willing to support al Qaeda affiliate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his attempt to start a civil war in Iraq between the Sunni and Shi’a in 2004. However, even the radical jihadist Ayman al-Zawahiri (2005) recognized the negative effect that would occur due to the inconsistency of Zarqawi’s brutally violent attacks on Muslim civilians with a jihadi ideology that claims the status of defending the *Ummah* (community/nation). Zawahiri rightly recognized the difficulties that Zarqawi’s strategy of attempting to incite a civil war would cause in Muslim public opinion with regard to Al Qaeda’s goals stating that “the strongest weapon which the mujahedeen enjoy ... is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries” (p. 4). Additionally, he comments “[t]herefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve ... lest the people should say that Muhammad used to kill his Companions” (p. 5).

Suicide operations, sometimes known as martyrdom operations, also appear to be inconsistent with jihadi adherence to Islamic law. In *The Middle East Quarterly*, Malka (2003) cites Sheikh Muhammad Sa'id Tantawi, head of Egypt's Al-Azhar mosque, who declared that "shari'a (Islamic law) 'rejects all attempts on human life, and in the name of the shari'a, we condemn all attacks on civilians, whatever their community or state responsible for such an attack'" (p. 1). Providing further evidence, Malka points out that "Islamic legal arguments against the operations relied upon three principles of Islamic law: the prohibition against killing civilians, the prohibition against suicide, and the protected status of Jews and Christians" (p. 1).

By "the mid-1990s, jihadis had fallen into a trap set for them by the regime by waging a tribal vendetta against officials, police officers, and intellectuals, thus further alienating the public" (Gerges, 2009, p. 153). There are multiple examples that the tactics used by jihadis back-fired: in 1993, during an attempt to kill the Egyptian prime minister, a 12-year-old school girl was unintentionally killed which "led to a precipitous drop in already poor levels of public support" (Brooke, 2008, p. 212). Subsequently, the public outcry after the 1999 Luxor massacre in Egypt forced jihadis in Egypt to declare a ceasefire. "Egyptian and Algerian jihadis had lost the battle for Muslims' hearts and minds long before they lost the military fight against local authorities" (Gerges, 2009, p. 153). The jihadis "have isolated themselves from society, have contempt for its laws, and consider themselves morally superior to other Muslims...[but]...jihadis' violent actions speak much louder than any public relations campaign...as long as jihadis kill in the name of Islam, Muslims will suffer" (Gerges, 2009, pp. 242–243). Most of the casualties in Riyadh from an al Qaeda 2003 triple suicide bombing "and the subsequent bombings in Turkey, Morocco, and Egypt were Muslims, not foreigners. Far from endearing al Qaeda and its affiliates to Arabs and Muslims, these attacks on soft targets were universally condemned by opinion makers and Islamists" (p. 249). Arquilla (2009) highlights that a major shift occurred in Iraq which "was made possible by al Qaeda's missteps at the narrative level. Their 'brand' had changed from freedom fighters against the American occupation forces to oppressors of the indigenous insurgents" (p. 18).

Surveys indicate that Muslims view the U.S. as highly inconsistent (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007) with our hypocrisy regarding democracy as well as other inconsistencies between words and deeds. Ties between Islamist insurgents “were reinforced by a common narrative based on resistance to American occupation, a story that grew in strength with the outing of abuses such as those at Abu Ghraib, and the increasing toll of collateral damage on the Iraqi people” (Arquilla, 2009, p.13). “‘Collateral damage’ may be a convenient euphemism, but the real-world effect of killing the wrong people is to spark blood feuds, energize enemy recruitment and...raise the risk of setting off a social revolution in Pakistan” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 25). The “democracy project overall is pursued in highly inconsistent ways...The United States strives to spread democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is content to deal with authoritarian rulers in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere throughout the 44 Muslim countries of the world. Such contradictory behavior is poison for the narrative aspect of netwar” (Arquilla, 2009, pp. 25–26). In the end,

the United States...has a record of actions taken over the past eight years that leaves much room for enemy exploitation. For example, the divisive debates about the invasion of Iraq, disputes that rocked the world, the scandals arising from maltreatment of detainees, and the collateral damage that accompanied American applications of air power have all conspired to undermine the counter-terror narrative. (Arquilla, 2009, p. 36)

4. Is the Narrative Morally Legitimate?

“For the most part, the Muslim jurists do not make the ‘justice’ of any instance of jihad the term of their discussion...for them any authentic instance of jihad was necessarily both holy and just” (Bonner, 2006, p. 5). Sayyid Qutb’s life, death and writings is a “perfect illustration of...[how]...the human being becomes part of the revolutionary movement aimed at changing the world and bringing in a new ethical, moral order based on freedom, brotherhood, and justice for all” (Haddad, 1983, p. 67). For Qutb, in “order to have a moral society, the ideology must be grounded in the Qur’an and follow the design of God for humanity” (Haddad, 1983, p. 71). “Reform was no longer sufficient since it did not deal with the root of the evil that permeates society” (p. 78). As discussed with the concept of ideological innovation, the “concept of *jahiliyyah*

as developed by Qutb projects a Manichaeian view of the world...a constant struggle...between faith and disbelief...an ideological conflict” between essential good versus evil, the morally just and the unjust (p. 86). Therefore, those “who seek to propagate Islam in the world must aspire to purity and constancy” (p. 94). Similarly, Khomeini was convinced that “the Muslim world is confronted with a crisis of fundamental identity, a pervasive alienation in which is rooted...[among other things]...moral debilitation” (Rose, 1985, p. 167). “These young militants sought the freedom to engage in open religious discussion...over questions of ethics and morals” (p. 21). For jihadis, at the moral root of the conflict, a central theme is idolatry, “the principle of moral orientation that competes with God” (Goldberg, 1991, p. 12). Yet, the near enemy, the “apostate” regimes, are “nominal Muslims who manifestly betray the community...[and]...commit the most heinous ethical and moral delinquency imaginable” (p. 23). Unlike “Islamism, the salafists argue that politics is a manifestation of polytheism” (Moussalli, 2009, p. 15). Similarly the far enemy, the west, may best be seen “as a metaphor for antagonism to the ‘world’...in which believers are tempted...and duped by error and idolatry...a symbol for the place in which idolatry has reached its logical extreme” (Goldberg, 1991, p. 25).

It is not just the society as a whole who uses this worldview to justify the jihad as a Manichaeian struggle; some individuals may be more predisposed to view life through a lens of good versus evil as well. Gambetta and Hertog (1970) found that engineers are overrepresented among violent Islamic radicals by two to four times the size normally expected by chance. One part of the explanation that they propose for this phenomenon is that engineers have a specific mindset that attracts them more to Islamism. One feature of this specific mindset is the tendency to see history “as shaped by the clash between good and evil, and conspiratorially ascribing the forces of evil to one identifiable foe” (p. 49). Additionally, engineers turn out to be the most religious group of all academics. “Individuals with above-average skills selected on merit are...particularly exposed to the frustration and sense of injustice that comes from finding their professional future hampered by lack of opportunities” (p. 61). Confronted by corrupt, state-driven job allocation, and an erosion of the link between merit and reward, “graduates tried to

restore their dignity by declaring their adherence to anti-materialistic Islamic morality” (Hoffman 1995, p. 208, as cited by Gambetta & Hertog, 1970, p. 64). This collective frustration and deprivation leads to cognitive dissonance. The envy, resentment, anger and hatred “are more likely to trigger action-responses...a desire to destroy the object of hatred, the West and its impure social mores, and a passionate embrace of traditional religious values” (Gambetta & Hertog, 1970, p. 69). In the above, we can see that the Jihad itself is morally legitimate; however is the trans-national jihadi current authentic Jihad? “Bin Laden and Zawahiri faced a difficult battle in their efforts to incite a large pool of recruits to come to their defense because they lacked legitimacy and a credible religious cover” (Gerges, 2009, p. 189). If the current strand of trans-national jihadis are having trouble justifying their actions from a religious standpoint, then what source are they using to justify their cause?

The U.S. narrative is a little more difficult to code only because of the changing narrative over time and problems of external consistency. The theme of retribution for the September 11 terrorist attacks against unarmed civilians was generally viewed as morally legitimate throughout much of the world. (Although there is unofficial anecdotal evidence that many people in Afghanistan were unaware of the terrorist attacks and the link to al Qaeda and the Taliban even ten years after the attacks, which could serve to undermine the U.S. narrative). However, the U.S. had some moral legitimacy (much like capital) that it could spend in its efforts in Afghanistan. However, much like our analysis of Germany in WWII; the U.S. quickly outran any stock of moral legitimacy it may have had when the decision was made to invade Iraq under dubious analysis that there was a connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (with the inherent dangers that Iraq could provide al Qaeda with WMD material). This lack of moral legitimacy was clearly apparent from the beginning when the U.S. was unable to establish a coalition of nations with support from other Muslim countries. Any remaining shred of perceived moral legitimacy was wiped out by the failure to establish any link between Saddam and al Qaeda, the lack of WMD material, and problems of external inconsistency (i.e., abuses of detainees, collateral damage, etc.).

5. Is the Narrative Deriving Legitimacy from Religion, Philosophy, or Some Other Source?

“Al-Qaeda’s struggle against the United States and its European and Arab allies, Saudi-Arabia in particular, has always depended on a minimum of political-religious legitimation, which explains why there is far more literature on Jihadi websites dealing with the question “why jihad?” rather than “how jihad?” (Lia, 2009, p. 283). According to “Gallup Polls in 2001 and 2005–2007, of countries with substantial or predominantly Muslim populations, majorities in many countries (several in the 90% range) say that religion is an important part of their daily lives” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 5). However, what is the mainstream Islamic stance on the moral legitimacy of jihadi extremist acts? “Many mainstream Muslim theologians have asserted that radicals who encourage a “jihad against the infidels” employ a faulty reading of the Quran, and they point to verses that teach that an all-powerful God could certainly eliminate disbelief if he wanted. Therefore, it is not up to any Muslim to eliminate it for him by force” (p. 20). “The multiple meanings of jihad were captured in a 2001 Gallup Poll in which...the most frequent descriptions of jihad were ‘duty toward God’, a ‘divine duty’, or a ‘worship of God’—with no reference to warfare. However, in three non-Arab countries (Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey), significant minorities mentioned ‘sacrificing one’s life for the sake of Islam/God/a just cause’ or ‘fighting against the opponents of Islam.’ An outright majority mentioned these in non-Arab Indonesia” (p. 20). This highlights the effect of the resultant shift in the construct of Jihad via the process of ideological innovation as presented by Robinson (2007), Esposito and Mogahed conclude that most Muslims therefore reject the acts and rhetoric of jihadi extremists. They point out that it is important to note that for Muslims, whether Jihad means a struggle of the soul or one of the sword, it is in both cases a just and ethical struggle. The authors imply that what the jihadi extremists are doing would not actually be considered true Jihad by most mainstream Muslims until others in the West label it as such. As we have seen earlier, the word Jihad has only positive connotations and is inherently morally legitimate. Yet, many Muslims don’t view the “jihad” espoused by trans-national jihadis as legitimate. So how do trans-national jihadis derive their legitimacy?

Here we must elaborate on the common attitude of Muslims toward perceived Western policy. “Muslim attitudes toward the United States have been affected by what is perceived as America’s—and to a great extent Europe’s—‘double standard’ in promoting democracy: its long track record of supporting authoritarian regimes and failure to promote democracy in the Muslim world as it did in other areas and countries after the fall of the Soviet Union” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 58). The authors quote Salameh Nematt, a Jordanian analyst and writer for the Arabic newspaper *al-Hayat*: “It’s a success story for al-Qaeda, a success story for autocratic Arab regimes that made democracy look ugly in their people’s eyes. They can say to their people: ‘Look at the democracy that the American’s want to bring to you. Democracy is trouble. You may as well forget about what the American’s promise you. They promise you death’” (p. 59). Some of the most common answers from Muslims to the question of what could be done by the United States to improve the conditions of Muslims were “stop interfering in the internal affairs of Arab/Islamic states,” “stop imposing your beliefs and policies,” “respect our political rights and stop controlling us,” and “give us our own freedom.” While the inconsistent and aggressive policies of the West may not be a direct or root cause of jihadi extremism, it is not a far stretch to conclude how the general dissatisfaction of the majority of Muslims with the perceived treatment of Islam by the west may contribute to the passive approval of some jihadi extremist acts. Esposito & Mogahed note that only small percentages (5% to 10%) “believe that the United States is trustworthy, friendly, or treats other countries respectfully” (p. 62).

As we can see, trans-national jihadis use Western policies against the U.S. to re-frame the struggle as a legitimate Jihad. “Across the Muslim world from Morocco to Mindanao, the ‘war against Islam and Muslims’ has become a popular belief and slogan. Substantial majorities in a 2007 WorldPublicOpinion.org survey of residents in Morocco, Indonesia, Egypt, and Pakistan said the goal of the United States is to ‘weaken and divide the Islamic world’” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 87). While not condoning extremist acts or choosing to participate themselves, the average Muslim grants a sort of passive approval to jihadi extremism in so much as it does not affect them personally. Ultimately, the “heightened sense of the West’s threat to political freedom and to Islamic

identity has likely reinforced the desire for Sharia. Recourse to Sharia, the blueprint for an Islamic society, provides a centuries-old paradigm. Thus, however different and diverse Muslim populations may be, for many, Sharia is central to faith and identity” (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007, p. 92). As the majority of the Muslim world perceives things, “[f]or you, America, to go against your own values and how you would treat your own people and to abuse Muslims in this way means you must *really* despise us and our faith” (p. 165). Added to this problem, the U.S. is viewed as either non-religious, polytheistic, or simply morally corrupt. The perceived lack of moral legitimacy is an aspect the U.S. must fix quickly and maintain as “it is the perceived justice of our cause that will determine ‘whose story wins’” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 58).

6. Is the Organization (Overall) a Network, Hierarchy, or a Hybrid of the Two?

Originally, many authors and scholars argued that al Qaeda was a hierarchy with bin Laden and a central staff as the head of the organization and training camps spread throughout Afghanistan (although several scholars identified al Qaeda as a network even prior to September 11, 2001; c.f. Arquilla). However, the hierarchical organization was largely dismantled by U.S. and Coalition attacks following September 11. Consequently, al Qaeda and several loosely associated militant Islamist groups started to be conceived as “more important as an ideology than an organization, network than a hierarchy, and a movement than a group. It is increasingly amorphous, though initially it seemed tightly formed” (Ronfeldt, 2005, p. 1 as cited by Milward & Raab, 2006). However, Milward and Raab (2006) contend that it may not even make sense to talk about al Qaeda (much less all jihadi trans-national terrorist groups as “one unified dark network...it may make more sense to talk about it as a network of networks” (Milward & Raab, 2006). The authors continue to cite the differing organizational definitions and characterizations present in the literature including: a foundation that funds terror, project teams, more like a social movement than a network, only an inspiration, a franchise, or four separate clumps consisting of a network hub, two scale-free networks, and a hierarchical network that are all loosely connected. The authors describe the organization more as “a very

decentralized network...[where]...integration is quite low...a strategy of decentralizing to the maximum...cells should be self-supporting with doctrinal guidance from above...Hence, the global jihadist movement should discourage any direct organizational bonds between the leadership and the operative units...[In summary] Al Qaeda seems to have become a metaphor for a very decentralized network of cells operating independently” (Milward & Raab, 2006, pp. 11–13).

Al Qaeda as an example of the jihadi trans-national movement had evolved from a hierarchy to a network, but then devolved under continued pressure to a very decentralized cluster of cells that are integrated only ideologically via cognitive-cultural mechanisms which can be achieved only through shared beliefs and the orientation to a common goal (Milward & Raab, 2006). The authors conclude that if we can sever these cognitive-cultural mechanisms, then the lack of any existing structural organization based upon actors’ linkages will result in complete fragmentation. In the final analysis, we would conclude that the trans-national jihadi movement began as a hierarchy, transitioned to a network, then became even more decentralized where it is neither a hierarchy, a network, or a hybrid of either; but rather a very-loosely connected group of cells whose only connection is an ideology, which may call for a new classification level (network-minus).

The U.S. organization is, again, much more difficult to code on this dimension due to the multiple approaches the U.S. has taken towards fighting terrorism in different theaters of conflict. In Iraq, the U.S. began as a hierarchical structure, but “after years of floundering against...networks, American-led forces built networks of their own—a physical infrastructure of distributed small nodes (i.e., platoon-sized combat outposts)” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 6). These outposts “improved response time and enabled us to swarm better at the doctrinal level, but it was the social networking phenomenon...that improved intelligence coming into our system” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 15). Another example of this shift to networking was seen in the “widespread lateral sharing of information about best practices at light speed” through “‘Companycommand.com’, where U.S. Army

commanders could share tactics that worked against the terrorists” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 13).

By contrast, the U.S. began operations in Afghanistan as a networked organization: “just 11 Special Forces A-teams—about 200 soldiers...Since then...the international security assistance force (ISAF) has become more and more hierarchical in its approach” (Arquilla, 2009, p.6). “The nimble network of A-teams and other light forces gave way to a much larger, heavier footprint. Instead of emphasizing the creation of a large number of small outposts, a few bases became quite large...[which] made us slower to respond to fleeting targets and much less able to achieve surprise” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 23). Although we have focused primarily on the U.S. military in this chapter, it is important to remember that we are just one nation among “allied forces in Afghanistan—long hampered in their ability to cooperate by balky, hierarchical, too-separate organizational structures—to coordinate their campaign efforts far better, and to seize the initiative from the enemy” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 27). To add to the hierarchy and too-separateness, “within nations the ability of their various departments of government—military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic—to engage in the broad sharing of information...is generally impeded by a social ethos that defines individuals’ identities in terms of their parent organizations” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 5). For this reason, we would classify the U.S. efforts overall as hierarchy.

7. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Achieving Influence a Network, Hierarchy, or Hybrid?

“[T]errorist networks, are relatively open systems...they are comprised of myriad independent, or at least semi-autonomous nodes and cells...a multitude of actors who can speak with some authority for their part of the network” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 55). In a report by the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental affairs (2008), the influence of Islamist extremism is best characterized as a hybrid between hierarchical and networked. The 2008 Report states that the internet is a key medium for the distribution of propaganda to legitimize terrorist actions and recruiting followers. “Some material is produced by organized groups...while other material is produced by

self-starting individuals” (p. 5). For instance, “al-Qaeda manages a multi-tiered online media operation...This sophisticated structure” includes: a number of production units, a media committee, and product clearinghouses to “ensure a message’s authenticity...and helps maintain message discipline” (pp. 5–6). The resulting messages are posted to thousands of well-known websites, some of which are simply mirrors or bulletin boards to provide a built-in redundancy and resilience from attack. Meanwhile, Awan (2010) notes that “much of this ‘official’ jihadist media activity had been hierarchically organized and strictly regulated. Yet the advent of Web 2.0 platforms...have facilitated a far more diffuse dissemination of autonomous user-generated media content outside the ‘official’ jihadist spaces” (p. 10).

Once again we find that the U.S. is difficult to code on this question. In the fight against trans-national jihadi terrorism, the U.S. appears to be hierarchical, but fragmented losing any benefits that typically may be gained from hierarchical structure. As an example of the hierarchical nature, any broad, over-arching MISO (PSYOP) themes or messages must be approved at the highest levels in the government: “Prior to conducting PSYOP...CCDRs must have their PSYOP program or plan approved...coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff and interagency, and then forwarded for USD(P) review and approval” (FM 3-05.301, August 2007, p. 1–2). Then any specific products (leaflets, radio ads, posters) generated from these over-arching themes must be passed back up the chain for approval all the way to the USD(P) unless these authorities are specifically granted to a lower echelon of authority: “USD(P) is the primary PSYOP approval authority for PSYOP products, but, ordinarily, this authority is subdelegated to levels that are situation dependent” (p. 1–3). “The SecDef normally delegates PSYOP approval authority to the supported GCC...[who] retains PSYOP approval authority following the approval of the PSYOP plan by the president and/or SecDef” (FM 3-05.301, August 2007, p. 1–3). At face value, the U.S. policy and practice is, again, pretty hierarchical; however, there are multiple hierarchies and organizations involved in the strategic influence business. Although a CCDR (presumably CENTCOM in this case) may have specific authorities for operations (including influence) within a region, any strategic influence against trans-national jihadi terrorism falls under the

authority of SOCOM. Both COCOMs are within the military hierarchy which is separate from any DoS attempts at influence and messaging whether by the Secretary of State or the Ambassador and his/her staff. Finally, there is strategic messaging by prominent public figures (i.e., the President, Senators, and other political figures). So although the official organizations responsible for influence in the U.S. are hierarchical with all the inherent bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies, there is no benefit from overarching unity of effort, since as noted above: “the ability of their various departments of government—military, law enforcement, intelligence, and diplomatic—to engage in the broad sharing of information...is generally impeded by a social ethos that defines individuals’ identities in terms of their parent organizations” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 5). For this reason, we would actually modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. as a hierarchy-minus (indicating that it operates hierarchically, but with multiple hierarchies diluting the potential benefits of a hierarchical organization).

8. Is the Organization (Overall) Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

Although the question states “speaking”, the question is primarily designed to understand the doctrinal position of the organization, which is critical for understanding how members of an organization are enabled to operate both strategically and tactically. For the trans-national jihadi terrorists, “In terms of doctrine, the swarm characterized both the tactical level—e.g., in coordinated attacks on truck convoys—and the operational level, with the orchestration of a drumbeat of simultaneous strikes all over Anbar province, and even reaching out elsewhere in Iraq” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 13). Since they operate as a network, each part of the organization is enabled and empowered to ‘speak’ for itself on many matters of operations from the tactical level all the way to the strategic level. Often there is no higher coordination or need for approval as each separate cluster plans its own actions and the core of al Qaeda is left in a position of being able to accept or deny affiliation with certain clusters.

There is a potential downfall or risk to this approach in that the overall organization risks splintering due to the internal inconsistencies of the narrative as each

sub-group attempts to take the organization in different directions. Again, as stated earlier, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) propose that the key to the performance of networks depends “on the existence of shared principles and practices that span all nodes and to which the members subscribe in a deep way” (p. 333). It is the strength of the narrative that keeps individuals bound and committed to the organization. Thus far, al Qaeda is able to speak with many, small voices because all members are bound together with a strong narrative that provides for unity of focus and action without excessive, overarching control. By contrast, the U.S. is extremely hierarchical (as is best typified through the example of the influence organization in the preceding section above). All operations must be approved through higher echelons of command, but there are multiple echelons of command competing against each other. Although hierarchical, there is not one big, overarching voice, but few, competing, big overarching voices often heading in different directions. Consistent with the coding above, we would modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. as a hierarchy-minus.

9. Is the Part of the Organization Responsible for Influence Speaking with a Single, Overarching Voice or with Many Small Voices?

As seen above, the influence network for trans-national jihadism is a hybrid of hierarchy and network. But the key lies in the dissemination of the message: “Instead of relying on a few large conduits, [al Qaeda’s] leadership relied on the power of the narrative...to guide others...[and] has ended up with thousands of conduits of its message—few that are controlled, but almost all ‘on message’” (Arquilla, 2009, pp. 54–55). In fact, it may be the small voices of the masses that may be of greater concern to the U.S. in its attempts to combat the spread of terrorist ideology. Marc Sageman (2008) “observed that while websites have been instrumental for distributing documents and other materials, it is through the interactive forums that relationships are built, bonding takes place, and beliefs are hardened...‘People change their minds through discussions with friends, not simply reading impersonal stories’” (p. 116, as cited by Denning, 2009, p. 13). This results in a group of “self-appointed amplifiers of the violent Islamist message [who] may not be part of a known terrorist organization, but they choose to

advance the cause, not necessarily with guns but with propaganda” (Senate Committee Staff Report, 2008, p. 5). Ultimately, “at this level of...analysis, our terrorist enemies appear far more willing to allow the message to be crafted and spread by the masses” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 54).

Again, in the example provided earlier, we see that the organizations responsible for influence in the U.S. are speaking with a few, big voices as opposed to one, big voice or many, small voices. The U.S. influence efforts are constrained by all the pitfalls of hierarchy without deriving the one presumed benefit of hierarchy, namely: unity of direction and focus. One potential solution would be the “creation of an organizational network designed to create the kind of information edge that the Allies in World War II had against the Axis powers...Today, no analog to this information advantage exists; but it should be a high priority to seek to recreate such a winning capability” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 47). Such a solution would not require a concentration of resources, but rather a concentration of effort; thus no need to create additional institutional hierarchies, but rather moving to become more networked (Arquilla, 2009). “In the United States...there is a great reluctance to allow for anything other than very tight central control over the development and dissemination of our message” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 54). The U.S. has “relied upon building radio and television broadcasting capabilities of our own. This belief in the primacy of a few-to-many approach in a networked era of many-to-many communications has hopelessly slowed our efforts. And...cast doubt on the credibility of our content...[what is required is] a willingness to relinquish much control over those who would spread our story” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 64).

One may think that an influence organization that is less hierarchical and more networked may have an issue with maintaining a consistency of narrative. This may be a potential risk; however, it can be greatly offset by selecting a single compelling narrative at the core, which is universal in its moral legitimacy and truthful (which would indicate that themes like democracy and economic free-trade need to be abandoned in favor of more universal themes based on basic human needs and desires such as basic human

rights and security). The ultimate goal is not to control and guide the message, but to let the message guide and control our actions.

10. Is the Overall Density of the Organization High, Low, or Medium?

The preceding arguments might bias the reader into assuming the trans-national jihadi terrorists are high or medium in their density; however, trans-national jihadis have been shown to be a loosely connected network, thus low density, as “a large number of small affiliates, distributed worldwide, is perforce going to be less connected socially than support networks comprised, say, of Iraqi Sunnis or Afghan Pashtuns—both of which feature dense webs of kinship-based social interconnection. Widely distributed small cells will no doubt have strong local ties, but these will be a far cry from the interlinked masses in the terror network’s core areas of operations” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 32).

Similarly, we would classify the overall density of the U.S. as low as there are multiple bureaucratic institutions operating in hierarchy, each with its own goals. Individuals rarely work with individuals within other organizations and are constrained with who they can work with in their own organizations due to the hierarchical nature. Therefore, we would classify both sides as low in overall density.

11. What was the Political Goal (End)? Was it Achieved?

Fishman and Moghadam (2010) assert that al-Qaeda (and by inference the larger trans-national jihadi movement) is on the decline and has not accomplished any of its goals due to internal debates and division. Their report examines the internal causes that have sped up the decline of the jihadi movement. First, al-Qaeda shows clear signs of decline as many key leaders have been lost to arrest or assassination and many al-Qaeda franchises have been substantially weakened or defeated (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Algeria). Although networks have an inherent ability to self-heal given the loss of key leaders in networks, it still has minor impacts on organizational efficiency and may lead to even greater internal divide as the new leaders vie for influence and control over the direction of the network. Additionally, Fishman and Moghadam (2010) state that al-

Qaeda has not achieved any of its goals, since the U.S. remains entrenched in the Middle East politically, economically, militarily; the Taliban-led Islamic State was ousted from power; Iraq is a weakly-functioning democracy; Israel remains in firm existence; and al-Qaeda has been unable to inspire mass support from Muslims any country (although these assumptions will have to be revisited and carefully analyzed in the context of our projected withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan). As stated by the authors, given al-Qaeda's operational capability, why can't it achieve its policy goals? The answer is that internal divisions limit the group's ability to design or implement a coherent strategy to achieve core goals (problems with internal consistency); al-Qaeda's operational successes since 9/11 have come at the expense of Muslims (problems with external consistency); and efforts to counter western narratives have been haphazard and rely on denigrating the enemy (smear campaigns) rather than solidifying a unified narrative for the future (vision). This latest point highlights the problem with a morally legitimate narrative in the absence of perceived western aggression.

However, has the U.S. achieved its goals? As this is a current conflict, the obvious answer is no, but the bigger question becomes: "What is/was the U.S. objective?" This question ties directly to the question of the narrative and its consistency over time. If the goal is to deny safe havens for terrorists, then the U.S. has made some gains as there has not been a major terrorist attack in the U.S. since September 11, 2001. However, the trans-national jihadi terrorists are still operating at a high enough level to warrant continued U.S. military involvement as al-Qaeda and its affiliates accounted "for most of the nearly forty-fold increase in the number of significant terrorist incidents around the world from 2001–2008" (Arquilla, 2009, p. 31). Is the overall U.S. goal to spread democracy in the Middle East. Iraq and Afghanistan are no longer under oppressive rule, the U.S. has made some headway; but many political experts question whether it is feasible or even desirable to continue to push for democracy in Iraq or Afghanistan over other forms of government and neither government is a full-fledged, transparent democracy running with the consent of its people. Is the overall goal to provide basic human rights and security? Again, the U.S. has made some headway; however, not enough headway to consider the conflict as over. So it would appear as if

the U.S. objective (however it is defined) has not been achieved yet, but this section raises a bigger issue for the U.S influence strategy and grand strategy. What is our overall objective, how does this fit with our narrative, can we stay consistent, is it morally legitimate, and will we still be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan?

12. What Other Capabilities (Means) Were Used? Relative Importance of the Other Capabilities in Achieving the End?

The trans-national jihadi terrorists have made excellent use of the “tremendous capacity of cyberspace to act as a spreading device for narrative... ‘story’ lies at the heart of a network’s ability to attract and sustain members, and to impel...them to action...difficulties with our own ability to craft a consistent, compelling narrative...have left the field of cyberspace relatively open to terrorists” (Arquilla, 2009, pp. 41–42). Almost all experts are willing to concede that the trans-national jihadis have, thus far, out-maneuvered us in cyberspace, which is a critical technological capability for them. However, it is interesting to note that unlike the prior case studies where other capabilities (means) of warfare were analyzed and noted to see how these other capabilities competed against influence (as a mean) to see which, if any, had a greater impact upon the overall ends of the conflict; in this instance the other means being used by the trans-national jihadis are not in competition with influence, but are designed specifically to enhance the effects of the narrative and secondarily to use this narrative to keep the network “glued” together.

Of the three major uses of cyberspace, al Qaeda and its affiliates have...created their own ‘realm of the mind’, a kind of ‘virtual caliphate’ from which to spread their narrative, build social connections and call others to the cause...[as well as]...become dependent on the many instrumental uses of cyberspace that greatly assist in the daily functioning of their networks. (Arquilla, 2009, p. 44)

C. RESULTS

Based upon above evaluations, below is a short response as to how we code the jihadi influence strategy based upon our structured questions:

- 1) Is the narrative consistent over time (construct)? **jihadi – No; U.S. – No**
- 2) Is the narrative logically consistent (internal)? **jihadi – No; U.S. – No**
- 3) Is the narrative consistent between words and deeds (external)? **jihadi – No; U.S. – No**
- 4) Is the narrative morally legitimate? **jihadi – Qualified, yes; U.S. – Qualified, yes (Democracy, no; basic human rights and security, yes)**
- 5) Is the narrative deriving legitimacy from religion, philosophy, or some other source? **jihadi – Religion (But, unsuccessful unless reaction to Western policy creates appearance of U.S. versus Islam); U.S. – Philosophy**
- 6) Is the organization (overall) a network, hierarchy, or a hybrid of the two? **jihadi – Network-minus; U.S. – Hierarchy**
- 7) Is the part of the organization responsible for achieving influence a network, hierarchy, or hybrid? **jihadi – Hybrid; U.S. – Hierarchy-minus**
- 8) Is the organization (overall) speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **jihadi – Many small voices; U.S. – Few, big voices**
- 9) Is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices? **jihadi – Many small voices; U.S. – Few, big voices**
- 10) Is the overall density of the organization high, low, or medium? **jihadi – Low; U.S. – Low**
- 11) What was the political goal (end)? Was it achieved? **jihadi – End apostate regimes and remove Western influence: politically, economically, and militarily; U.S. – Unclear (as seen by problems with construct consistency of narrative) Was it achieved? jihadi – No (subject to revision upon U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan) ; U.S. – No; additionally the analysis indicates that the U.S. needs to consider what is our overall objective, how does this fit with our narrative, can we**

stay consistent, is it morally legitimate, and will we still be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan?

12) What other capabilities (means) were used? Relative importance of the other capabilities in achieving the end? **jihadi – Cyberspace, extremely important as a tool to promulgate the narrative and maintain the network (works synergistically with influence strategy)**

As shown in this case study, the jihadi movement's narrative has suffered from a lack of consistency in all three categories (internal, external, and construct). Although there is a high moral legitimacy for conducting Jihad; there is, nonetheless, a disconnect between the concept of the authentic Jihad versus the "jihad" that the trans-national jihadi terrorist groups espouse. On the surface, it would seem as if the overall influence strategy of jihadism is doomed to failure (as seen in response to question 11 above, "Have they achieved their ends?"), since polls "indicate that many of al-Qaida's potential constituents have been deeply repulsed by recent attacks..., publics in many predominantly Muslim states increasingly see Islamic extremism as a threat to their own countries, express less support for terrorism, have less confidence in bin Laden, and reflect a declining belief in the usefulness of suicide attacks" (Cronin, 2006, p. 45). If this is the case, then why has it been an issue for over a decade? Because, for many Muslims dissatisfied with the state of affairs, there is no other viable alternative. Repressive and corrupt regimes fail to live up to their developmental promises leaving frustrated elites no alternatives for managing their opposition. "Other than acquiescence, joining radical movements became the only option" (Gambetta & Hertog, 1970, p. 75).

There no legitimate contender from within the state apparatus and the current U.S. strategy has done more to alienate and push Muslims away rather than convince them that we are on the same side. So although the jihadi influence strategy has flaws, the U.S. is not providing a viable alternative narrative in either our vision of the future or the morality of our cause. In terms of organizational structure, the U.S. is hierarchical with all the inherent bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies; however, the U.S. is not deriving any benefit from the hierarchy regarding overarching unity of effort.

For this reason, we would actually modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. as a hierarchy-minus indicating a need to change organizationally. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the U.S. is still unclear regarding our overall objective, how this fits with our narrative, whether it is consistent or morally legitimate, and whether we will be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

XI. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

In our analysis of findings, we begin by highlighting some of the key concepts that arose from our individual case studies as they apply to each of our hypotheses. We will then continue to discuss the evidence as it relates to each hypothesis. So, how do these preliminary results match up to our original six hypotheses developed in Chapter 5 (and re-stated below)? We will begin with each sub-hypothesis before analyzing the main hypothesis, namely: that the most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient).

1. Narrative

After our review of the literature, we hypothesized that to be most effective, the narrative must be both consistent and morally legitimate. (A narrative may be modestly effective if it is either consistent or morally legitimate, but will not be effective if it is neither consistent nor morally legitimate).

In the Boer War, we found that the Boers were consistent over time, particularly with respect to nationalism (although we would consider both sides as morally questionable today). British atrocities in the concentration camps and the resulting public outrage from press reports resulted in undermining perceived British legitimacy. Therefore, the post-war settlement was decidedly pro-Boer, leading to continued white supremacy over the native African population throughout the majority of the 20th century. Despite being rated as nearly equal on all measures on narrative, the loss of legitimacy by the internal British audience resulted in a relative Boer advantage in this category. Thus in the review of the Boer War, we immediately see that the absolute value of the narrative (in terms of consistency and legitimacy) does not appear to be as valuable as evaluating the relative value of the narratives of the competitors. However, this does not immediately invalidate the hypothesis (as the more consistent and legitimate the narrative; the greater the chance of achieving an advantage over the competitor); yet,

it is also important to analyze the relative position of each narrative. We will keep this modification in mind when reviewing the subsequent case studies.

In WWI, we found that negative deeds (such as unrestricted submarine warfare and violations of neutrality) had a major impact on the perceived legitimacy, regardless of whether or not the deeds directly conflicted with the stated narrative. Any action that served to undermine the perceived legitimacy of the belligerent had a major impact on the course and outcome of the war. Specifically, in this case study, Germany's willingness to flaunt the neutrality of Belgium was the key factor in the British declaration of war and popular public support. The perceived German atrocities and intent (the execution of Nurse Cavell, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the Zimmerman telegram) dragged the U.S. into the war despite the struggle by President Wilson to remain neutral. Additionally, we found that Germany was confronted with multiple decisions between the moral high ground versus an immediate operational or tactical military advantage. In their decisions to violate Belgium neutrality and resume unrestricted submarine warfare, Germany chose the military advantage to the detriment of their own narrative. By doing so, Germany knowingly sacrificed its informational advantage for material gain when the analysis of the narrative seems to imply that more weight should have been given to the moral effects over operational military advantage in these calculations. This case study further supports the hypothesis regarding the need for consistency and legitimacy while also providing support for our main hypothesis regarding the overarching importance of the narrative vice the other levels of organizational analysis.

In WWII, the relationship between the construct consistency of the narratives of the two sides is important. The narratives of both sides shifted over time, but it is the timing of these shifts, their magnitude, and their relationship to legitimacy that is interesting. The overarching German narrative based on Versailles, *Lebensraum*, and German superiority shifted little over the course of the war. When it did, the shift was more about strategy than a change in justification. This shift was minor relative to the change in narratives that the U.S. and U.K. experienced. The basic legitimacy of the narrative allowed Germany to pursue its objectives to a fault. The U.S. and U.K., on

some level, recognized the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles' portion of the narrative, but Germany's aggressive pursuit of *Lebensraum* crossed a line that caused the shift in the British and American narratives. It appears that the relative consistency of the German narrative over time was counter-productive, indicating that the ability to adapt or respond to the adversaries shifting narrative may be important. Meanwhile, the U.S. and U.K. narratives shifted dramatically from neutrality and appeasement to a shared narrative to defeat Germany. Of interest here is that the shifts were predicated by Germany's relentless pursuit of its own narrative. The shifts of the U.S. and U.K. narratives were reactive and their legitimacy was dependent upon Germany's actions to a certain degree. The U.S. and U.K. could not have successfully established the narrative they ended the war with without first seeing the neutrality and appeasement narratives fail in the face of aggression. A final observation is that legitimacy is a sort of capital that can be earned and spent. The legitimacy of the German narrative was exhausted over time through its continued aggression with the invasion of France as well as its treatment of Jewish and Slavic peoples while legitimacy for the U.S. and U.K. was built up over time as efforts at appeasing Hitler and restoring peace were exhausted and betrayed. Overall, the analysis of WWII still supports the hypothesis that the consistency and legitimacy of the narrative is important, while again raising the issue of a comparative relevancy between the two competitors vice an absolute coding. Germany began with higher relative narrative strength to begin the war; but the legitimacy was eventually spent; thereby, decreasing its comparative advantage over the Allies' narrative. Of additional interest is the fact that when the German legitimacy began to decrease, their continued consistency of narrative actually became a hindrance. So although relative consistency between the two competitors is important, the narrative also must be evaluated in regards to the legitimacy.

The internal and external inconsistency of the Soviet narrative was overcome during the majority of the Cold War by the tight central control placed on information inside the country. Construct consistency was necessary to suppress the negative effect on legitimacy of the mismatch between Soviet words and reality as well as the logical absurdity of the Soviet system. The same consistency over time that maintained control

of Soviet internal legitimacy was also integral to the rapid decentralization of information that occurred under Gorbachev and the subsequent loss of control of the narrative by the Soviets. So much had been disguised for so long that when the cracks in the construct were revealed, there was no space left for minor adjustments that could maintain the legitimacy of the narrative. In contrast, the relative internal and external consistency of the United States narrative played a part in maintaining construct consistency. As a more open and decentralized organization, the United States allowed critical voices to be heard and become a reinforcing part of the overall narrative rather than a destructive force. The pressure of inconsistencies was vented and turned into evidence of the legitimacy of the overall narrative. The Soviet narrative was relatively less strong than that of the United States because it was less legitimate. The Soviet Union was only able to maintain its narrative over the Cold War era because they were able to completely control the information environment, fabricating legitimacy through consistency and a lack of a competing narrative inside the country. However, under *glasnost*, the presence of a competing narrative and the inability to maintain consistency with the opening of the information flow undermined the perceived legitimacy and ultimately the narrative itself. This again supports both the original hypothesis as well as the modification regarding the comparative relevance of the narrative as opposed to the competing narratives. When the Soviet Union was able to control the information environment, there was, virtually, no competing narrative; therefore, their narrative won (within country). However, anywhere where a competition occurred in an information-free environment, the U.S. narrative had the comparative advantage. One final note is that although one can fabricate legitimacy by controlling the message, it appears that the most effective strategy is to always maintain the legitimacy advantage which only serves to strengthen the consistency and is less disadvantaged to exposure to competing narratives than a closed society.

Finally, in the case study of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, the jihadi movement's narrative has suffered from a lack of consistency in all three categories (internal, external, and construct). Although there is a high moral legitimacy for conducting Jihad, there is, nonetheless, a disconnect between the concept of the authentic Jihad versus the "jihad" that the trans-national jihadi terrorist groups espouse.

On the surface, it would seem as if the overall influence strategy of jihadism is doomed to failure since many Muslims increasingly see Islamic extremism as a threat to their own countries, express less support for terrorism, and reflect a declining belief in the usefulness of suicide attacks. However, the jihadi narrative has often “won” the battle of the narratives since, for many Muslims dissatisfied with the state of affairs, there is often no other viable alternative. Repressive and corrupt regimes fail to live up to their developmental promises leaving frustrated elites no alternatives for managing their opposition so there no legitimate contender from within the state apparatus. Additionally, the current U.S. strategy has done more to alienate and push Muslims away rather than convince them that we are on the same side. So although the jihadi influence strategy has flaws, the U.S. is not providing a viable alternative narrative in either our vision of the future or the morality of our cause.

Overall, the above examples from the case studies support the hypothesis that a narrative should be both consistent and legitimate (although this may be evaluated by comparing the narrative’s strength relative to the competing narratives. Yet, although a particular narrative may be more consistent or legitimate relative to the opponent’s narrative, one should still strive to increase or maintain the highest level of consistency and legitimacy (ensuring both factors work with each other) since any changes to the information environment can change the relative strength of the narratives. This conclusion also appears to be supported by the overall coding in Table 4. During each conflict, the side which has more “yes” than “no” (either in the three measures of consistency or in legitimacy) may be understood to possess a relative advantage over its competitor. Those actors which appear to have a relative advantage over the competitor achieved their political goals as opposed to their opponent. The only case in which any side was coded as “yes” and enjoyed a significant relative advantage over its competitor was the Cold War (which interestingly is the only case in which the desired political end was achieved without resort to major, direct, military confrontation between the two sides). Meanwhile, the one conflict where neither side has a relative advantage, the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorism, is still in a stalemate perhaps indicating that

whichever side can achieve a relative advantage over its opponent in the narrative will be more likely to achieve its political end-state.

2. Social

Under the social level of organizational analysis, we hypothesized that organizations are more effective when the organizational density (as measured by tight coupling of connections, levels of clustering, and ratio of strong vs. weak ties) is medium (versus low or high) drawing primarily from Everton (2009). We will discuss the combined result in Table 4 after discussing some of the most illustrative examples from each of the case studies.

In our review of the Boer War, it appeared that, despite significant numerical disadvantages, the Boers were more successful militarily when the density of the army was medium based upon their networked structure. The Boer army was set up to operate in Commandos where local Boers could join, leave, or switch Commandos at their own discretion, partially based upon the level of connections they had with other members of the Commando (which were, themselves, often heavily based on familial and friendship ties as Commandos were primarily formed from the local communities). Additionally, each Commando was free to operate on its own initiatives, which included often combining with other Commandos to achieve tactical goals and then disbanding to pursue other objectives. Towards the end of the war, the Boer army became more disjointed when individual soldiers no longer felt strong ties to the groups and each Commando increasingly operated on its own without coordinating and networking with other Commandos. The data in this case appears to support the hypothesis that organizations whose ties are medium density are more effective overall.

Meanwhile in WWI, the CPI is a great example of the impact of density on influence operations. The CPI operated in a unique manner wherein members of the organization were recruited and organized in a fluid basis based upon prior pre-existing relationships among the members; but it never became formally rigid based only upon pre-existing ties. Members were also recruited based upon their accomplishments within

their area of expertise (print, radio, etc.). This fluidity, based upon the medium density of the organizational ties, also allowed members to coordinate their work more effectively moving projects and ideas from group to group within the organization.

In WWII, Germany started and ended the war relatively more dense than the U.S. and U.K. However, Germany was initially successful but later defeated. This illustrates the idea that there is a sweet spot between single channel and all channel density. When conflict began, the Germans were at a point of density that facilitated success against adversaries that possessed too little density to compete. As the war progressed, both sides continued to increase their density. At some point, the balance of influence shifted when the U.S. and U.K. became dense enough, based on the combination of their joint military staffs, to compete with and then overwhelm a German structure that lost effectiveness after becoming too dense due to Hitler's purging of his generals following the 1944 coup attempt. This supports the hypothesis that medium density is preferable to extreme low or extreme high density. This also supports the idea that density may not be an absolute value, but (like the narrative) is relative to the position of the opponent. However, unlike the narrative, a fluid organization, in terms of density, could be considered a benefit whereas a shifting narrative over time would be detrimental.

The contrast between the Soviet and American economic systems during the Cold War supports the hypothesis that medium density is more effective than low density. The state-controlled and compartmentalized Soviet system prevented the formation of ties between different parts of the economy. This resulted in a lack of feedback between the entities responsible for production, distribution, and pricing. The relatively unregulated American economy was more dense than the Soviet economy in this respect. The excessive central control prevented the formation of ties between different functions of the economy which would have allowed for proper feedback and exchange of information. The net result over the course of the Cold War was that the Soviet economic organization could not compete with that of the United States. This was particularly significant with the rapid advance of information technologies, as well as

with respect to how the functioning of the economies intertwined with the narratives of both sides in the later years of the Cold War.

Finally, in the struggle of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, we have seen that one of the greatest strengths of the terrorist organizations are their ties to one another (based on familial relationships, local communities, school or religious ties, or joint experience in previous struggles such as the Soviet war in Afghanistan). However, this strength dissipates as the ties become less dense with the spread of the ideology between various franchise organizations, each of which operating as separate clusters without increasing the ties between these often disparate clusters. The U.S. is also seen as low density with multiple stove-piped organizations often operating based upon their own organizational ethos without increasing the ties between the organizations. This problem is compounded with the lack of ties between U.S. forces and the local populace. So although both sides are low density in this struggle, the relative advantage often goes to local terrorist groups based upon their density of ties to the local population, but the strength dissipates when the terrorist groups are operating in foreign areas and do not have the ties with the local population (especially in those areas where a concerted effort has been made by U.S. forces to form deeper ties with the local population and security forces).

The coding of case studies provided in Table 4 further supports the hypothesis that medium density organizations are more effective than either low or high density organizations in achieving the desired political end-state.

3. Organization

Sub-hypothesis 3 dealt primarily with the organizational structure of either side. As mentioned in the literature review, there is some overlap between the organization and the social level of analysis; however the specific hypothesis for this level of analysis states that organizations that are hybrids of networks and hierarchies are more effective overall and more effective at influencing others than either pure networks or pure hierarchies.

During the Boer War, the British army began the conflict as hierarchical. However, despite their significant numerical advantage, the British Army was generally unsuccessful at the operational and tactical level until they incorporated more network-like tendencies (to shift closer to a hybrid) by adopting the blockhouse strategy. Meanwhile the Boer army began the conflict as a hybrid organizational with multiple interconnected Commandos (based on deep social ties). However, as the war progressed the Boer army shifted to become less hybrid and more heterarchical in nature as Boers frequently deserted the Commandos in higher numbers and Commandos began operating completely independently. There were several attempts to regain a more networked structure by holding *krygsraads*, or strategy meeting between the leaders of the various Commandos to coordinate operational and tactical goals; however, these often increased the rift between Commandos resulting in even less coordination. As in the previous two levels of analysis, we found that coding the two sides can often involve a shift, with the relative comparison between the two sides often changing due to these shifts, thereby affecting the achievement of the political outcome. Despite these minor shifts in the Boer War, the overall organization of the Boers remained more hybrid-like while the British were always hierarchical (despite the minor tactical network-like tendencies). Thus politically, the Boers maintained the relative advantage in this category although they lost the military advantage.

In WWI, both sides (as a whole) were coded as hierarchical and remained hierarchical throughout the conflict with neither side achieving a relative advantage over the other side. However the U.S. influence organization, the CPI, was set up in a unique fashion which was structured as a hierarchy, but often operated and shifted more as network. There was an undisputed chain of command and a strong leader in Creel, but the organization became more fluid in its operational practices resulting in a coding of hierarchy/hybrid. The German influence efforts, by contrast, were much more hierarchical (and dysfunctional). The U.S. influence organization had a relative comparative advantage over the Germans and, as can be seen in the case study, were much more adept at garnering not only internal support from the population (including the ultimate decision by President Wilson to enter the war) but also international support.

Germany started and ended WWII as a hierarchy and increased in hierarchy as the war progressed. This was the case for both Hitler and the OKW as well as Goebbels and the RMVP, particularly with respect to the top down centralization of authority and information. The U.S. and U.K. began the war as two separate hierarchies that merged to form a single hybrid. When the conflict began, the Germans were at a point of hierarchy that facilitated success against adversaries that were hierarchies within themselves, but not networked as a whole. Yet, as the war progressed, the balance shifted when the U.S. and U.K. became more networked, even though they retained a basically hierarchical structure. This supports the hypothesis that a hybrid organization is more effective than a pure hierarchy.

In the Cold War, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were largely hierarchical, with little evidence of networks or hybrid-like structures. However, again we find that sometimes it is not the strict absolute value of the coding that is important, but rather the relative comparison between the two sides. Although both sides were hierarchies, the U.S.S.R. was relatively more hierarchical than the U.S. (as best seen in the lack of separation in the powers of government). Although not directly supportive of the hypothesis as stated, in this case study, the side that is comparatively closer to the stated hypothesis on this measure seemed to enjoy a relative advantage over its competitor. This may also indicate that one should wish to strive to be closer to the ideal, hybrid, vice the ends, network or hierarchy, in order to maximize the comparative advantage while minimizing the chance of losing that advantage if the opponent changes his own organizational form.

Finally, in the case of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, we found that in terms of organizational structure, the U.S. is hierarchical with all the inherent bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies; however, the U.S. is not deriving any benefit from the hierarchy regarding overarching unity of effort. For this reason, we would actually modify the original descriptors to classify the U.S. as a hierarchy-minus indicating a need to change organizationally. By comparison, the trans-national jihadis began organizationally as a semi-hierarchy, but changed over time to

become less hierarchical and more networked over time in response to U.S. actions. However, the case study indicates that they may have shifted too far to the left and become even less networked and more heterarchical in nature hindering the organizational efforts. The question is: which side will move back towards the center of the spectrum to gain the comparative advantage over the other side. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the U.S. is still unclear regarding our overall objective, how this fits with our narrative, whether it is consistent or morally legitimate, and whether we will be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan.

4. Doctrinal

In our literature review, we developed two hypotheses under the doctrinal level of analysis. First, that organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command; and second, that swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak.

In terms of influence during the Boer War, pro-British sentiment was centrally directed by a few key proponents while at the same time spontaneously supported and disseminated by the public at-large. Pro-Boer influence was not very effective when it was centrally managed for although they gained many supporters, none of the supporters provided any physical assistance. This supports the hypothesis that participants who are able to self-mobilize into small groups (British) to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that have a central control (Boer diplomatic efforts). Despite the advantage in this category, British influence was undermined by the loss of legitimacy due to concentration camps) affecting the final achievement of the political goal. Similarly, we found that the Boer army was more effective when it operated as a hybrid organization and coordinated between Commandos to swarm the enemy and then dissipate rather than fighting mass on mass. Again, this advantage was lost as the organization became more heterarchical (completely leaderless). By contrast, the British began as a centralized command (although

operations in Ladysmith and Mafeking were not coordinated). Once the British army shifted to add more swarm-like capabilities into the operations (attacking from multiple angles and coordinated in different theaters) vice direct frontal assaults, then their military operations increased in effectiveness. Finally, despite the overwhelming numerical advantage by the British, the Boer army was able to operate more effectively as a swarm because each individual Boer was deeply committed to the narrative of self-governance which sustained those individuals most deeply committed to the cause. The commitment to the narrative remained, despite the military defeat to arise again politically; thus, allowing the Boers to eventually achieve their political end-state despite the military loss. By contrast, the British public was deeply committed to the narrative during the initial military stages, which allowed for increased military build-up; but the lack of a strong narrative (and subsequent undermining of its legitimacy) during the guerilla phase of the war eventually undermined the British public support for the war.

In WWI, the question became more convoluted when analyzing the question “is the part of the organization responsible for influence speaking with a single, overarching voice or with many small voices?” This was already discussed above, but is important enough to bear repetition here. The question as formulated is vague which is useful in allowing the exploration of all the relevant content here, but the analysis above shows that the choice between a single, overarching voice versus many, small voices should not be viewed solely as a simple dichotomy and in reality the answer has many different layers. A single, overarching voice has been shown to be beneficial in establishing and maintaining the overall direction and coherency of the message (i.e., work of the CPI); but not beneficial if interpreted as having the message run and constrained by the government (i.e., German government stigma on the propaganda or even more narrowly defined as only in one’s own native language). Similarly, many small voices can be construed as negative (i.e., the multiple agencies in Germany that were not coordinated in their message) or as positive (i.e., the amplification of the message through multiple dissemination channels and multiple voices within each channel as exemplified by the Four-Minute Men). The most effective organization appears to be one that has a strong, central, well-defined narrative that is broadcast and amplified on multiple channels.

In WWII, both sides employed various media in order to wield influence through propaganda. The Allied structure, however, employed more voices in the form of the number of separate organizations devoted to propaganda. The Germans utilized one large interconnected propaganda apparatus whereas the U.S. and U.K. each built their own independent apparatus. Additionally, the U.S. apparatus contained entities that operated relatively independently at times. Also important is the change over time that occurred. The German apparatus became more unified as Goebbels gained more control and authority, thus reducing the number of separate voices. The number of entities involved in propaganda for the U.S. and U.K. increased over time and remained relatively autonomous. Although none of these entities were necessarily self-mobilizing, this example does support the hypothesis that many small groups under the guidance of a strong overarching narrative have advantage of a single group under a dominating central authority.

In the Cold War, we coded the Soviet Union as one single, overarching voice as opposed to the many, smaller voices of dissent to the communist system that arose from the internal populace and black-market system (as well as from the influence efforts of the U.S. which provided additional information to the many voices of dissent). The amount of dissent increased with *glasnost* and the access to even more channels of information against the communist system. Interestingly, although the Soviet Union's narrative was coded as one big overarching voice, the case study also showed that the propaganda apparatus was set up to have multiple channels of dissemination. From previous case studies (primarily WWI) we found that the question of big, overarching versus many small was a little too ambiguous and that the most effective organization seemed to be one that had a strong central narrative that was then picked up by the many voices and disseminated by the many voices. In this respect, the Soviet Union would seem to have had the advantage except for the glaring illegitimacy of its narrative which was magnified by the many small voices of the dissenters. This supports the second part of the second sub-hypothesis for this section, that centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak. Additionally, the initiatives of the Reagan administration served to unify the many voices of the U.S. propaganda apparatus

providing centralized focus without excessive control. This appears to support both aspects of the hypothesis that many small voices possess an advantage over one overarching voice primarily because of the strength of a single focusing narrative to unify the populace.

In the case study of trans-national jihadi terrorists, the jihadis began with, and maintained, a comparative advantage to the U.S. efforts both militarily, since each part of the organization is enabled and empowered to ‘speak’ for itself on many matters of operations from the tactical level all the way to the strategic level; as well as in influence, since the power of the narrative enables thousands of conduits of its message—few controlled, but all retaining the same narrative. As discussed above, the power of the narrative results in many, small voices of the masses who are all self-appointed amplifiers of the violent Islamist message without having to be part of a known terrorist organization. They choose to advance the cause, not necessarily with guns but with propaganda. Meanwhile, we found that the U.S. influence efforts are constrained by all the pitfalls of hierarchy without deriving the one presumed benefit of hierarchy, namely: unity of direction and focus. Again, this case study supports both hypotheses that organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command; and second, that swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak.

Overall, the data in the case studies as displayed in Table 4 tends to support both hypotheses; however, we found that the answers to the question of many, small versus big, overarching tend to be much more nuanced than previous hypotheses which would indicate that this hypothesis may need to be refined in future studies or further broken down into smaller components (one single narrative versus many, many voices (populace) versus one (government), and number of channels or mediums available to each for dissemination of the message.

5. Technological

Finally, for the technological level of analysis, we hypothesized that technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organizational effectiveness. Again, even a preliminary skimming of the case studies would suggest that this hypothesis may need to be re-evaluated. Technology, in and of itself, may indeed be the least determining factor; but, it is interesting to note the interaction of technology on the overall influence strategy within the various case studies.

First, in evaluating the impact of technology on the Boer War, both sides were similarly equipped and technologically symmetrical forces. However, the British were actually negatively affected by either a reliance on technology (being tied to the rail lines), or a failure to modify anachronistic tactics ill-suited to recent developments in small arms. Therefore, technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organization effectiveness and can often have a negative impact rather than a positive impact. However, the impact of technology on the dissemination of the narrative actually had a greater impact on the war. Inventions such as cable and Penny Mail had a tremendous impact on the ability of the British populace to maintain cognizance of what was happening during the war requiring an even greater effort by the British to maintain internal support for the war. Externally, the British relied on technology to garner support, which was aided by the fact that they controlled most of the cable lines out of the Transvaal and were therefore able to minimize the ability of the Boers to propagate their message to the world (although this was partially mitigated by the Boer diplomatic efforts). Interestingly, it was the widespread dissemination of the tragedies of the concentration camps via British technology (and dissenting voices) which helped to undermine their own legitimacy.

In WWI, we again found that both sides were similarly equipped throughout the war. Despite several technological innovations (i.e., submarines, aircraft, gas, etc.), both sides remained stale-mated in trench warfare throughout much of the war with technology having no real impact upon the ending of the conflict (with the exception of the tank). This again supports the hypothesis that technology was the least determining

factor in achieving the political end-state. However, technology did impact the influence efforts, namely: the negative impact of the German submarine technology and its use on their narrative. This ultimately resulted in a naval blockade, an economic factor, which did have a considerable effect on the outcome of the war. Also, the German use of American diplomatic channels to communicate with Mexico in the Zimmerman Telegram (along with British efforts to intercept and break the code) had another huge impact of the narrative of both sides and the course of the war. So the two elements of national power which were most critical in WWI were economic and informational vice the technology of the military.

The allies enjoyed two particular technological advantages in WWII in the form of radar and code-breaking capabilities. Both contributed significantly at decisive points in the conflict. Radar provided the RAF an advantage during the Battle of Britain and, therefore, affected the German decision not to attempt an amphibious invasion of Great Britain. This in turn allowed the British Isles to be the major staging point of U.S. and U.K. war-fighting capability for the rest of the war. Code-breaking capability allowed the U.S. and U.K. to understand German strategy and operations in a manner that the Germans did not achieve in contrast. This allowed the U.S. and U.K. to maintain strategic surprise at key moments and prepare for German moves. This does not directly support the hypothesis that technology is the least determining factor, but it also does not refute it because the Germans were coded as least effective on the other four measures of organizational effectiveness relative to the Allies. Had the Germans achieved their political end-state because of technology despite being rated as relatively less effective in the other four levels of organizational analysis, then the hypothesis would have been refuted. Additionally, the two sides generally fielded successive series of similarly designed equipment in the form of armor and aircraft in a typical development/counter-development manner. It is not clear that a lack of radar or code-breaking on the part of the U.S. and U.K. or possession of radar or code-breaking by the Germans would change the outcome.

In the Cold War, information technology appears to play a more significant role. Each side dealt with low points in their legitimacy. For the United States, it was the Vietnam War. For the Soviets, it was the war in Afghanistan. The timing of these with respect to information technology is of interest. During the Vietnam War, video recording technology had a significant impact on perceptions of the war and therefore legitimacy. The Soviets experienced a similar effect in their war in Afghanistan. However by the 1980s, the portability and reproducibility of video was greatly advanced and capitalized on by the United States in its information campaigns. Here we see that technology played a part in shaping and amplifying the narratives. Information technology inhibits information control and, therefore, inhibits the ability to tightly control a narrative. This supports an increased importance for the role of technology as it interacts with the narrative, while also supporting the hypothesis that technology is less important in the factors of organizational analysis as compared to a relatively strong narrative. A weak narrative does not survive the scrutiny of a loss of information control (which is why weak narratives are more effective in strong, centralized organizations). This is further evidenced by the use of satellite and cable television technologies by the United States in the 1980's as part of government information campaigns. The victory of the U.S. narrative over the Soviet narrative was greatly enhanced by implementation of technology as it forced the Soviet narrative to compete internally. The Soviet narrative was too weak to hold up to this competition.

Finally, we need to discuss the most salient technological factor during the Cold War: nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly the technology of nuclear weapons had a major impact upon the political end-state of the Cold War, but not because of the technology itself. Nuclear weapons did not allow either side to use the technology militarily to achieve its desired end-state, but rather was significant because it forced the conflict to be fought primarily through the other elements of national power, especially the information component and the competing narratives. This is significant for future analyses as the continued existence of nuclear weapons will serve primarily to constrain all future conflicts below a certain technological level indicating that the narrative will continue to gain in importance during the information age as exemplified in the final case study.

In the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorists, we again see that technology is the least determining variable in organizational effectiveness. Despite the significant, technological advantage the U.S. has over its enemies, the jihadi terrorists have still managed to exist and even flourish despite our technology (even using our technology against us as so aptly and tragically demonstrated by the attacks of 9/11). Where we do see the impact of technology is in the interaction of technology with the other levels or organizational analysis, primarily with the narrative and organizational levels. Unlike the prior case studies where other capabilities (means) of warfare were analyzed and noted to see how these other capabilities competed against influence (as a mean) to see which, if any, had a greater impact upon the overall ends of the conflict; in this instance the other means being used by the trans-national jihadis are not in competition with influence, but are designed specifically to enhance the effects of the narrative and secondarily to use this narrative to keep the network “glued” together. Cyberspace has become a tool to spread their narrative, build social connections, call others to the cause, and assist in the daily functioning of their networks.

The hardest hypothesis to evaluate was our primary hypothesis that the most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient). In all the case studies, the narrative was an essential factor, but so were the other levels of organizational analysis. However, the narrative was shown to be critical in maintaining the Boer resistance despite the overwhelming disproportion of force ratios and it was the undermining of the British narrative which resulted in the Boers achieving their ultimate political end-state despite losing the war. In WWI, the narrative was crucial in compelling England and the U.S. to join militarily in the fight against Germany. In WWII, the Allies were not competitive against Germany until their narrative was strengthened and until Germany outspent its legitimacy. The Cold War appears most supportive of this hypothesis since technology constrained the battle to one of ideology and information versus military confrontation. There were two strong narratives, the Soviet Union was strong in construct consistency, but the U.S. was relatively stronger in all other aspects, primarily legitimacy. Finally, we see that the continued fight by the

trans-national jihadi terrorists could be attributed primarily to the fact that they still have a strong central narrative that glues them together; and despite all other aspects, the U.S. has not yet been able to win the war because we have not presented a compelling enough narrative to counter that of the jihadis. Thus, we believe that this hypothesis is strongly supported by all the case studies.

Findings from Case Studies

Case Study	Competitor	Narrative					Social/Organization			Doctrine		Measures of DV	
		Construct Consistent?	Logically Consistent?	Words/deeds Consistent?	Morally Legitimate?	Source?	Overall Organization Topography	Influence Organization Topography	Overall Density	Overall Organization	Influence Organization	Political Goal Achieved?	Other Means used?
	Adversaries	Yes or no	Yes or no	Yes or no	Yes or no		Network/hierarchy/hybrid/other	Network/hierarchy/hybrid/other	High, Medium, or Low	Single, overarching voice or Many small voices	Single, overarching voice or Many small voices	Yes or No	Potential Confounding Variables (DIME)
Boer War 1899–1902	Britain Boers	No Yes	No No	No No	No No	Phil. Religion	Hierarchical Heterarchical	Network Hierarchical	High Medium	Many, small Many, small	Many, small Many, small	Yes (initially) Yes (later)	Military – Disparate Force Ratios
WWI 1914–1918	Entente (only) U.S. Central Powers	No Yes No	No No No	No No No	Yes Yes No	Phil Phil Phil	Hierarchical Hierarchical Hierarchical	Hierarchical Hybrid Heterarchical	Medium Medium Low	Many, small Many, small Many, small	Hybrid Hybrid Many, small	Yes (partially) Yes (partially) No	Economic – Naval blockade
WWII 1942–1944	U.S./U.K. Germany	No Yes	No No	Yes No	Yes No	Phil Phil	Hierarchy/ hybrid Hierarchical	Hybrid Hierarchy	Medium High	Many, small Single, overarching	Many, small Many, small	Yes Yes (initially), then No	Airpower, Radar, code-breaking
Cold War	U.S. U.S.S.R.	Yes Yes	Yes No	Yes No	Yes No	Phil Phil	Hybrid Hybrid	Hierarchy Hierarchy	Medium Low	Many Single	Many Single	Yes No	Nuclear Deterrence, Information Technology
Trans-national Terrorism	U.S. jihadis	No No	No No	No No	Yes Yes	Phil Religion	Hierarchy- minus Network/ Heterarchical	Hierarchy- minus Hybrid	Low Low	Few, overarching Many, small	Few, overarching Many, small	Not yet Not yet	Military Cyberspace

Table 4. Summary of findings from case studies

XII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this thesis was to explore influence theory and strategy to identify what the key components of an effective influence strategy are and how to modify these components, when necessary, to increase strategic effectiveness. The U.S. strategy in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as with al-Qaeda globally has focused predominantly on heavy U.S. military involvement (with a high proportion of kinetic operations), while using influence components (media, public diplomacy, CA, MISO, and PA), for the most part, in a reactive manner. There seems to be no grand influence strategy by the U.S. to inform U.S. policy and current military operations.

We began by examining the relationship of influence strategy with grand strategy, then progressed to examining several key influence theories as proposed by Cialdini, Ellul, Pratkanis and Aronson, Tugwell, McLuhan, and Reilly. From our review, it appeared that there were multiple descriptive formulations of the components of influence, but no specific formulations on how to develop an effective influence strategy using these principles. We expanded the five levels of analysis (or practice) as proposed by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), to assess the design and performance of any organization (whether network, nation-state, or non-state actor) in conflict with another organization. Based upon our review of the literature, we proposed six hypotheses regarding an effective influence strategy most likely to help achieve the desired political end-state, which we tested using comparative studies of five major strategic conflicts of the 20th century: the Boer War, WWI, WWII, the Cold War, and U.S. versus trans-national Jihadi terrorists.

Our primary hypothesis was that the most important level of practice in determining the effectiveness of an organization is the narrative (an effective narrative is necessary, but not sufficient). In all the case studies, the narrative was an essential factor, which served to mobilize and galvanize the opponents. Additionally, in all cases where the opponent possessed the stronger relative narrative, none of the other levels of organizational analysis were sufficient to mitigate this weakness. The continued fight by

the trans-national jihadi terrorists could be attributed primarily to the fact that they still have a relatively stronger central narrative that glues them together, while the U.S. has not presented a compelling enough narrative to counter that of the jihadis. Thus, we believe that this hypothesis is strongly supported by all the case studies.

Overall, the case studies support the hypothesis that a narrative should be both consistent and legitimate (although this may be evaluated by comparing the narrative's strength relative to the competing narratives). Although a particular narrative may be more consistent or legitimate relative to the opponent's narrative, one should still strive to increase or maintain the highest level of consistency and legitimacy (ensuring both factors work with each other) since any changes to the information environment can change the relative strength of the narratives. One of the most powerful examples was the Cold War, which was the only case in which any side was coded as "yes" on all measures of the narrative and enjoyed a significant relative advantage over its competitor. As a result, the desired political end was achieved without resort to major, direct, military confrontation between the two sides. Another important finding was the observation that legitimacy is a sort of capital that can be earned and spent as exemplified in the case study of Germany in WWII and the U.S. in the current conflict versus trans-national jihadi terrorists.

All the case studies tended to support the hypothesis that medium density is preferable to extreme low or extreme high density. However, density may not be an absolute value, but (like the narrative) is relative to the position of the opponent. However, unlike the narrative, a fluid organization, in terms of density, could be considered a benefit whereas a shifting narrative over time would be detrimental.

In terms of organizational structure, all case studies again supported the hypothesis that the hybrid form of network and hierarchy tended to be more effective than either pure hierarchies or pure networks. However, like the prior hypotheses, we see that this is a relative position vice an absolute coding as best exemplified in the Cold War where both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were completely hierarchical with no networks or hybrid-like structures. Although both sides were hierarchies, the U.S.S.R. was relatively

more hierarchical than the U.S. (as best seen in the lack of separation in the powers of government). This may also indicate that one should wish to strive to be closer to the ideal, hybrid, vice the ends, network or hierarchy, in order to maximize the comparative advantage while minimizing the chance of losing that advantage if the opponent changes his own organizational form.

In our literature review, we developed two hypotheses under the doctrinal level of analysis. First, that organizations where participants are able to self-mobilize into small groups to perform actions independently (swarms) are more effective than organizations that are completely leaderless or that have a central command; and second, that swarms are more effective when there is a strong narrative, while centralized organizations are more effective when the narrative is weak. Overall, the data in the case studies as displayed in Table 4 tends to support both hypotheses; however, we found that the answers to the question of many, small versus big, overarching tend to be much more nuanced than previous hypotheses which would indicate that this hypothesis may need to be refined in future studies or further broken down into smaller components (one single narrative versus many, many voices (populace) versus one (government), and number of channels or mediums available to each for dissemination of the message.

Finally, for the technological level of analysis, we hypothesized that technology is important, but is the least determining factor in organization effectiveness. Again, even a preliminary skimming of the case studies would suggest that this hypothesis may need to be re-evaluated. Technology, in and of itself, may indeed be the least determining factor; but, it is interesting to note the interaction of technology on the overall influence strategy within the various case studies. Again, one of the most powerful examples was the impact of technological factors during the Cold War, where nuclear weapons were significant because it forced the conflict to be fought primarily through the other elements of national power, especially the information component and the competing narratives. This is significant for future analyses as the continued existence of nuclear weapons will serve primarily to constrain all future conflicts below a certain

technological level indicating that the narrative will continue to gain in importance during the information age as exemplified in the final case study.

As is common with any research, there are some potential flaws in the current study. The first is our reliance on data which is based on personal, subjective histories of the conflicts, often by authors who may be biased due to their culture and interest. Additionally, these histories are then subjectively coded by the researchers, ourselves. Optimally, future studies should seek to better operationalize the constructs and variables under consideration and attempt to increase the objective evaluation of each variable. A second, closely related problem involved the specific area of doctrine with respect to coding competitors as one, single overarching voice versus many, small voices. As discussed earlier, this question tends to be much more nuanced indicating that this variable may need to be refined in future studies or further broken down into smaller components (one single narrative versus many narratives, many voices (populace) versus one (government), and number of channels or mediums available to each for dissemination of the message). A third problem encountered in the study was the close overlapping of some of the levels of analysis (primarily social and organizational). For the purposes of the study, it was necessary to split the analysis into “distinct levels”, but the interplay between the levels is much more complex than the split would sometime allow. Two final questions involve the applicability of this study to be generalizable to all conflicts, which can only be answered by applying this construct to further case studies. The second question is the constraint of number of variables studied. This study focused primarily of the narrative and organization of the nation-state or other conflicting actors, but did not take into account how these variables and the narrative interacted with the populace (the ultimate center of gravity). For example, how does a consistent, legitimate message change when it is inconsistent with the internal narrative of the target audience and how do changes in the populace or narrative impact the narratives of the organization? These interactions could serve as potential sources of future study.

How can the results of this study impact current and future strategic conflicts? As can be seen in the current conflict of the U.S. versus trans-national jihadi terrorism,

neither side has a relative advantage in the narrative. The results indicate that whichever side can achieve a relative advantage over its opponent in the narrative will be more likely to achieve its political end-state. This can only be achieved by increasing our focus on the primary importance of the narrative and the need to develop a narrative (based on a well-defined end-state) that is consistent in its construct (stays stable over time), and is morally legitimate (by appealing to broad, consistent, and universal values (i.e., human rights) vice subjective, cultural values (i.e., democracy). Additionally, once the narrative is developed all actions must be evaluated to ensure that external consistency remains high. The narrative should be primary over actions both at the strategic level (support for autocratic regimes) as well as tactically (collateral damage). The narrative does not need to constrain all potential actions, but any action should be evaluated to understand the impact upon the narrative and risks judged accordingly.

Second, the density of ties both internally and externally is extremely important. Internally, the density of ties can be achieved organizationally by moving to a structure, both overall and specifically in its influence efforts, to become a hybrid structure of hierarchy and networks (a strong overarching narrative can provide for a centralized focus, without constraining execution). Meanwhile, the U.S. is too hierarchical with all the inherent bureaucratic hindrances often associated with hierarchies; however, the U.S. is not deriving any benefit from the hierarchy regarding overarching unity of effort. By comparison, the trans-national jihadis began organizationally as a semi-hierarchy, but changed over time to become less hierarchical and they may have shifted too far to the left and become even less networked and more heterarchical in nature hindering the organizational efforts. Whichever side takes the initiative to move back towards the center of the spectrum in density will gain a comparative advantage over the other side. Externally, the current conflict shows the relative advantage often goes to local terrorist groups based upon their density of ties to the local population, but the strength dissipates when the terrorist groups are operating in foreign areas and do not have the ties with the local population. This fact should be exploited by making a concerted effort to form deeper ties with the local population and security forces while highlighting the differences between foreign jihadis and the populations that they are impacting.

Doctrinally, the U.S. must strive to craft a strong narrative, but be willing enable and empower lower echelons and the public to ‘speak’ for itself, thereby gaining thousands of conduits of its message all amplifying the message. In terms of technology, we again see that technology is the least determining variable in organizational effectiveness indicating that the U.S. should shift its current focus on technological innovations in the kinetic realm towards understanding how technology, including cyberspace, can be used to enhance the effects of the narrative and secondarily to use this narrative to keep the network “glued” together. Finally, and most importantly, the analysis indicates that the U.S. is still unclear regarding our overall objective, how this fits with our narrative, whether it is consistent or morally legitimate, and whether we will be able to achieve it with the projected force withdrawals in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Overall, the case studies support the hypothesis that a narrative should be both consistent and legitimate (although this may be evaluated by comparing the narratives’ strength relative to the competing narratives. Yet, although a particular narrative may be more consistent or relative to the opponent’s narrative, one should still strive to increase or maintain the highest level of consistency and legitimacy (ensuring both factors work with each other) since the any changes to the information environment can change the relative strength of the narratives. However, all case studies support the hypothesis that selecting a single compelling narrative at the core, which is universal in its moral legitimacy and truthful. The ultimate goal is not to control and guide the message, but to let the message guide and control our actions.

In conclusion, our study supports many important conclusions already suggested by notable experts past and present: “The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander...we had won a province when we had taught the civilians in it to die for our ideal of freedom: the presence or absence of the enemy was a secondary matter” (Lawrence, 1920, p. 267). This “suggests the realization that this war will be decided at the narrative level, with military operations to some extent moving more toward being in a supporting position...the quality of the competing narratives will prove of decisive importance” (Arquilla, 2009, p.54). “The effort to harmonize words

and actions should be seen as a major step forward in integrating the so-called ‘war of ideas’ into the larger context of the conflict...one cannot conduct ideological disputations in a manner that is divorced from operational realities” (Arquilla, 2009, p. 53). Therefore, 1) the quality of the competing narratives will prove of decisive importance and 2) any communication strategy will need to address such inconsistencies to be effective.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Al-Zawahiri, A. (2005). *Translated version of a letter between Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi*. As found on http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=9&ved=0CFEQFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fnews%2F2005%2F10%2Fletter_in_english.pdf&ei=DfJ-Tb7WLY-w0QHh8ICFCQ&usg=AFQjCNFJpbb97jH7luUWdiJfEU46nEDebW as of 14 March 2011.
- Arnold-Forster, M. (1973). *The world at war*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Arquilla, J. (2009). "The Coming Swarm." Op-ed. New York Times, published February 14, 2009. As found on <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html> as of 31 July 2011.
- Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. F. (2001). *Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Awan, A. N. (2010). The virtual jihad: An increasingly legitimate form of warfare, *CTC Sentinel, Vol 3(3)* (May), pp. 10–13.
- Badsey, S. (1999). The Boer War as a media war. Australian Chief of Army's History Conference on *The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire*. As found at: www.army.gov.au/ahu/docs/The_Boer_War_Badsey.pdf
- Ball, S. (1998). *The Cold War: An international history 1947–1991*. New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
- Balfour, M. (1979). *Propaganda in War, 1939–1945: Organisations, policies, and publics in Britain and Germany*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Bonner, M. D. (2006). *Jihad in Islamic history: Doctrines and practice [Jihad.]*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brooke, S. (2008). Jihadist strategic debates before 9/11. *Studies in Conflicts and Terrorism, 31, 3*, 201–226.
- Brown, M. (Ed.) (2005). *T.E. Lawrence in war and peace*. London: Greenhill Books.
- Carlino, M. A. (2002). The moral limits of strategic attack. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 93–106). Maxwell AFB, Air Command and Staff College.
- Cialdini, R. B. (1993). *Influence: The psychology of persuasion* (Rev ed.). New York: Morrow.

- Cone, S. L., Rayfield, W. P., & Stach, J. C. (2006). Integrating social influence tactics into contemporary military operations. Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School.
- Cronin, A. K. (2006). How al-Qaida ends: the decline and demise of terrorist groups. *International Security*, 31 (1), 7–48.
- Crockatt, R. (1995). *The fifty years war*. New York: Routledge.
- Denning, D. E. (2009). Terror's web: How the internet is transforming terrorism. In Jewkes, Y. & Yar, M. (Eds.). *Handbook of internet crime* (pp. XX–XX). Cullompton: Willan Publishing.
- Dunbabin, J. (1994). *The Cold War: The great powers and their allies*. New York: Longman Publishing.
- Dunlap, C. J., Jr. (2006). Neo-strategicon: Modernized principles of war for the 21st Century. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 71–79). Maxwell AFB, Air Command and Staff College.
- Ellul, J. (1965). *Propaganda; the formation of men's attitudes [Propagandes.]* (1 American ed.). New York: Knopf.
- Esposito, J. L., & Mogahed, D. (2007). *Who speaks for Islam? : What a billion Muslims really think*. New York: Gallup Press.
- Everton, S. (2011). Network topography, key players and terrorist networks. *Connections* (forthcoming).
- Farwell, B. (1976). *The Great Anglo-Boer War*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Fishman, B., & Moghadam, A. (2010). *Self-inflicted wounds: Debates and divisions within al-Qa'ida and its periphery*. WestPoint: Combating Terrorism Center.
- FM 3-05.301 (August 2007). Psychological Operations Process Tactics, Techniques, and procedures. Headquarters, Department of the Army.
- Fuller, J. (1949). *The Second World War*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce.
- Gaddis, J. (1990). *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
- Gaddis, J. (1997). *We now know: Rethinking Cold War history*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gambetta, D., & Hertog, S. (1970). *Engineers of Jihad*. Oxford: University of Oxford.

- Gerges, F. A. (2009). *The far enemy: Why jihad went global* (2nd ed.). Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- Goldberg, E. (1991). Smashing idols and the state: The Protestant ethic and Egyptian Sunni radicalism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 33, 1, 3–35.
- Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. *American Journal of Sociology*, 73(6), pp. 1360–1380.
- Granovetter, M. (1974). *Getting a job*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gregg, H. S. (2009). Beyond population engagement: Understanding the goals of counter insurgency. *Parameter*, 39(3), pp. 18–31.
- Haddad, Y. Y. (1983). Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic revival. In J. L. Esposito (Ed.), *Voices of resurgent Islam* (pp. 67–98). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell (1939). *The war in outline*. New York: The Modern Library, Inc.
- Hart, B.H. Liddell (1991). *Strategy* (2nd ed.). New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers.
- Henderson, J. (1969). *The United States Information Agency*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Hegghammer, T. (2009). Jihadi-Salafis or revolutionaries? On religion and politics in the study of militant Islamism. In R. Meijer (Ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement* (pp. 244–266). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Heuer, R. J. (1979). Cognitive factors in deception and counterdeception. In Daniel, D. C. & Herbig, L. (Eds.) *Strategic military deception* (pp. 31–69). New York: Pergamon Press.
- Hook, S., Bukovsky, V., & Hollander, P. (1987). *Soviet hypocrisy and western gullibility*. Maryland: University Press of America, Inc.
- Jackson, L. A. (2009). Narrative paradigm in cultural geography modeling. Monterey : U.S. Army TRADOC Analysis Center.
- Jacobson, H. and Smith, A. (1970). *World War II Policy and Strategy*. Santa Barbara, CA: Clio Books.

- Jensen, M. (1993). *Origins of the Cold War: The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts 'long telegrams' of 1946*. United States Institute of Peace
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 1, Department of Defense dictionary of military and associated terms (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1 June 1987).
- Kitchen, M. (1975). *A military history of Germany*. Indiana: University Press.
- Kurth, J. (2003). Western Civilization, Our Tradition. *The Intercollegiate Review*. Volume 39, (1–2).
- Laurie, C. (1996). *The propaganda warriors: America's crusade against Nazi Germany*. Kansas: University Press.
- Lawrence, T.E. (1918). The destruction of the Fourth Army. In M. Brown (Ed.), *T.E. Lawrence in war and peace* (pp. 167–174). London: Greenhill Books.
- Lawrence, T.E. (1920). The changing east. In M. Brown (Ed.), *T.E. Lawrence in war and peace* (pp. 260–273). London: Greenhill Books.
- Levite, A., Jentleson, B. W., & Berman, L. (1992). *Foreign military intervention: The dynamics of protracted conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lia, B. (2009). 'Destructive doctrinaires': Abu Mus'ab al-Suri's critique of the Salafis in the jihadi current. In R. Meijer (Ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's new religious movement* (pp. 281–300). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lieber, K. A. (2000). "Grasping the technological peace: The offense-defense balance and international security." *International Security*, vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer), 71–104.
- Lykke, A. F., Jr. (1989). Defining military strategy. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 9–13). Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College.
- Majority and Minority Staff Report (2008). Violent Islamist extremism, the internet, and the homegrown terrorist threat. United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. pp. 1–23.
- Malka, H. (2003). Must Innocents Die? The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks. *The Middle East Quarterly*. Spring 2003, pp. 19–28. As found at <http://www.meforum.org/530/must-innocents-die-the-islamic-debate-over>.
- McAdam, D. (1999). The classical model of social movements examined. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*: 5–19. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- McLuhan, M. (1965). *Understanding media; the extensions of man*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Milward, H. B., & Raab, J. (2006). Dark networks as organizational problems: Elements of a theory, *International Public Management Journal* (fall), pp. 1–52.
- Mock, J. R., & Larson, C. (1939). *Words that won the war: The story of the Committee on Public Information 1917–1919*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Montgomery, V. (1968). The 1914/18 War. In *A History of Warfare*. London, World Press.
- Morgan, K. O. (2002). The Boer War and the media (1899–1902), *Twentieth Century British History*, 13 (1), 1–16.
- Moussalli, A. (2009). *Wahhabism, Salafism and Islamism: Who is the enemy*. London : Conflicts Forum.
- O’Connell, R. L. (1989). *Of arms and men: A history of war, weapons, and aggression*. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
- Packard, V. (1957). *The hidden persuaders*. New York: David McKay Company, Inc.
- Pakenham, T. (1979). *The Boer War*. New York: Random House.
- Pogue, F. (1996). *United States Army in World War II: The European theater of operations: The Supreme Command*. Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army.
- Ponting, C. (1993). *1940 myth and reality*. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks.
- Pratkanis, A. R., & Aronson, E. (2001). *Age of propaganda: The everyday use and abuse of persuasion* (Rev. ed.). New York: W.H. Freeman.
- Raab, J. & Milward, H. B. (2003). Dark networks as problems. *Journal of public administration research and theory*, 13(4), pp. 413–439.
- Radvanyi, J. (1990). *Psychological operations and political warfare in long-term strategic planning*. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Reilly, R. R. (2009). No Substitute for Substance. *The Journal of International Security Affairs*, Fall 2009, No. 17, 9–17.
- Robinson, G. E. (2007). Jihadi information strategy: Sources, opportunities, and vulnerabilities. In Arquilla, J. & Borer, D. A. (Eds), *Information strategy and warfare: A guide to theory and practice* (pp. 86–112.) New York: Routledge.

- Roetter, C. (1974). *The art of psychological warfare: 1914–1945*. New York: Stein and Day.
- Rose, G. (1985). Velayat-e faqih and the recovery of Islamic identity in the thought of Ayatollah Khomeini. In N. R. Keddie (Ed.), *Religion and politics in Iran: Shi'ism from quietism to revolution* (pp. 166–188). London: Yale University Press.
- Shane, S. (1994). *Dismantling eutopia: How information ended the Soviet Union*. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks.
- Simon, H. A. (1957). *Models of man*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Snyder, A. (1995). *Warriors of Disinformation*. New York: Arcade Publishing, Inc.
- SparkNotes Editors. (2005). SparkNote on World War II (1939–1945). Retrieved August 22, 2011, from <http://www.sparknotes.com/history/european/ww2/>
- Stokesbury, J. (1980). *A short history of World War II*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Strachan, H. (2003). *The First World War*. Penguin Books.
- Thinkquest. World War I: "The War to End All Wars." As found at: <http://library.thinkquest.org/10927/sumwwi.htm>
- Tuchman, B. W. (1958). *The Zimmerman telegram*. New York, The Viking Press.
- Tugwell, M. (1990). Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy. In J. Radvanyi (Ed.), *Psychological operations and political warfare in long-term strategic planning* (pp. 69–81). New York: Praeger Publishers.
- United States (1948). US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948. As found on <http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/22C18.txt>.
- United States (1950). National Security Council Report 68. As found on <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.
- United States (1982). National Security Decision Directive 45. As found on <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/23-1666t.gif>.
- United States (1983). National Security Decision Directive 77. As found on <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-077.htm>.
- United States (1989). *Soviet influence activities: a report on active measures and propaganda, 1987-1988*. Department of State Publication.

- United States (2003). Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz on the reasons for Iraq War. Excerpts from the news transcript of Sam Tannenhaus' Vanity Fair interview with Paul Wolfowitz. U.S. Department of Defense: News Transcript May 9, 2003 as found at: <http://peacefuljustice.caltech.edu/0630/5.shtml>
- United States (2004). National military strategy of the United States of America 2004: A strategy for today—a vision for tomorrow. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 258–283). Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College.
- United States (2005). The national defense strategy of the United States of America. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 234–257). Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College.
- United States (2006a). National military strategic plan for the war on terrorism. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 284–308). Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College.
- United States (2006b). Quadrennial defense review report. In *Strategy and War* (pp. 215–233). Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College.
- United States (2011). Memo 12401-10: Strategic communication and information operations in the DoD. Washington, DC: Office of Secretary of Defense.
- Warren, J. (1996). *Cold War: The American crusade against world communism 1945–1991*. New York: Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Books.
- Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Welch, D. (1993). *The Third Reich: Politics and propaganda*. New York: Routledge.
- Whitcomb, R. (1998). *The Cold War in retrospect: The formative years*. CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Framing jihad: Intramovement framing contests and al-Qaeda's struggle for sacred authority. *International Review of Social History*, 49, 159–177.
- Zeman, Z. (1964). *Nazi Propaganda*. New York: Oxford University Press.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. HQ USSOCOM Library
MacDill AFB, Florida
4. Joint Special Operations University
Hurlburt Field, Florida
5. SOCOM J-7
MacDill AFB, Florida