

## IMPERATIVES FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

In the current climate, there is broad agreement among operators and researchers that many, if not most, of the challenges we face in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted from our failure early on to understand the cultures in which coalition forces were working. In other words, failing to heed the lessons of Vietnam and CORDS, we did not take the steps necessary to deal appropriately with the insurgencies within the context of their unique cultural environments. Moreover, there appears to be general agreement that whatever notable successes we have had in specific localities closely correlate with proactive efforts by coalition units to understand and respect the culture. By conducting operations that took indigenous cultural norms into account, those units garnered support for coalition objectives.<sup>1</sup>

Evidently present leaders of the armed services of the United State now understand what their predecessors once were taught: military success against a determined enemy embedded within a foreign population can be achieved neither by applications of advanced technology, however adroit, nor by indiscriminate coercion, however violent. Rather, during operations that population has to be regarded as an invaluable source of information on adversaries, and treated humanely in a manner that minimally avoids overt hostility, and optimally obtains cooperation, thereby the better to serve the traditional American object beyond the war: to convert our most bitter enemies into friends and allies.

All the services have undertaken to imbue cultural awareness among American forces, but none have been altogether successful in overcoming early setbacks, adherence to accustomed methods and means, time urgencies of CENTCOM operations, and the constraints imposed by authorized force structure and domestic fiscal and political realities. In May 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was impelled to warn against succumbing to “next-war-itis” -- the propensity of much of the defense establishment —internally among the services, and externally within what President Eisenhower termed the “military-industrial complex”— to favor programs aimed at what might be needed in a future conflict, as though to wish away the pressures that OIF and OEF now exert upon the ground forces, especially the Army:<sup>2</sup>

"The risk of over-extending the Army is real. But I believe the risk is far greater -- to that institution, as well as to our country -- if we were to fail in Iraq... That is the war we are in. That is the war we must win."

To win the “war were are in,” there are three imperatives, two for the services, and one for OSD

### Service Imperative: Inculcate Discipline With the Use of Force

In February 2008 General Casey, Chief of Staff of the Army, presented to his generals a revision of Field Manual 3-0, Operations, the Foreword of which states:<sup>3</sup>

This edition of FM 3-0, the first update since September 11, 2001, is a revolutionary departure from past doctrine. It describes an operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.

“Doctrine” is best understood as an operative term: what is persistently taught in training to assure the consensus that in combat facilitates cooperation among components of a force. For example, U.S. doctrine has consistently fostered recognition that killing prisoners of war is dysfunctional, inciting an adversary to

<sup>1</sup> Kipp, J. Grau, L., Prinslow, K. Smith, D. “The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century.” Military Review, Sep-Oct 2006. <[http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/december\\_2006/12\\_06\\_2\\_pf.html](http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/december_2006/12_06_2_pf.html)>

<sup>2</sup> Reuters, 13 May 2008. “U.S. Must Focus On Iraq, Less On Future Wars: Gates”

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.army.mil/fm3-0.pdf>

## DRAFT Chapter 8

do likewise, and negating a useful source of intelligence. The previous edition of FM3-0, dated June 2001—written in an era of preoccupation with “overwhelming force” and “shock and awe”—emphasized domination, characterizing land combat as “contact with the enemy throughout the depth of an operational area...maneuver, fires, and other elements of combat power to defeat or destroy enemy forces.” It did note, however, “land combat normally entails close and continuous contact with noncombatants. Rules of engagement reflect this.” Use of the word “contact” to equate on the one hand to “defeat or destroy,” and on the other hand to rules tempering actions re people of the locale, failed to address the usual circumstance: to defeat or destroy an adversary he must first be found, and rules for engagement once we find him (or he finds us) scarcely address the importance of the role the populace could play in the “finding.”

In contrast, the current FM 3-0 enjoins commanders to go beyond defining “rules of engagement” to integrating their objectives for the populace into their plans and operations for achieving and sustaining stability:

1-11. In essence, the operational environment of the future will still be an arena in which bloodshed is the immediate result of hostilities between antagonists. It will also be an arena in which operational goals are attained or lost not only by the use of highly lethal force but also by how quickly a state of stability can be established and maintained. The operational environment will remain a dirty, frightening, physically and emotionally draining one in which death and destruction result from environmental conditions creating humanitarian crisis as well as conflict itself. Due to the extremely high lethality and range of advanced weapons systems, and the tendency of adversaries to operate among the population, the risk to combatants and noncombatants will be much greater. All adversaries, state or nonstate, regardless of technological or military capability, can be expected to use the full range of options, including every political, economic, informational, and military measure at their disposal. In addition, the operational environment will expand to areas historically immune to battle, including the continental United States and the territory of multinational partners, especially urban areas. In fact, the operational environment will probably include areas not defined by geography, such as cyberspace. Computer network attacks will span borders and will be able to hit anywhere, anytime. With the exception of cyberspace, all operations will be conducted “among the people” and outcomes will be measured in terms of effects on populations.

1-12. The operational environment will be extremely fluid, with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and actors. Interagency and joint operations will be required to deal with this wide and intricate range of players occupying the environment. International news organizations, using new information and communications technologies, will no longer have to depend on states to gain access to the area of operations and will greatly influence how operations are viewed. They will have satellites or their own unmanned aerial reconnaissance platforms from which to monitor the scene. Secrecy will be difficult to maintain, making operations security more vital than ever. Finally, complex cultural, demographic, and physical environmental factors will be present, adding to the fog of war. Such factors include humanitarian crises, ethnic and religious differences, and complex and urban terrain, which often become major centers of gravity and a haven for potential threats. The operational environment will be interconnected, dynamic, and extremely volatile.

U.S land forces have not always done well in such complicated circumstances, particularly when the national mood was vengeful, as it has been since 9/11 in the Global War on Terrorism. Many thoughtful military critics have long been warning the armed forces against any expectation that modern technology enabled pursuing operations to control land and people by relegating close combat with adversaries to elite, specialized units:<sup>4</sup> They are right, and the Gulf Wars must be regarded as aberrational in that the population did not play an important role in American operations that were designed to destroy the Iraqi Army. But efforts at reconstruction, and restoration of stability altogether too often, have been disfigured by instances of military oppression: undisciplined violence, and even barbarism such as that at My Lai in 1968. In 2008, forty years after My Lai, Secretary Gates commented ruefully on more recent dysfunctional behavior of some American troops: “In Iraq and Afghanistan, the heroic efforts and best intentions of our men and women in uniform have at times been undercut by a lack of knowledge of the culture and people they are

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<sup>4</sup> E.g. Sir Michael Howard (1994) “How Much Can Technology Change War?” and H.R. McMaster (2008).

“<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=354>. “On War: Lessons to be Learned”, *Survival*, 50:1, 19 – 30. [Howard warned against military lessons drawn from history: usually “bad history and worse logic.”]

## DRAFT Chapter 8

dealing with everyday - societies organized by networks of kin and tribe, where ancient codes of shame and honor often mean a good deal more than 'hearts and minds...' " <sup>5</sup>

Cultural vacuity among U.S. forces is neither peculiar to the present conflict, nor has it always been caused by unexpected encounters with esoteric foreign cultures. In 1863 President Lincoln ordered promulgation of General Order Number 100 to temper the propensity of some of his commanders to tolerate the very sort of disorders that Secretary Gates deplored. <sup>6</sup> In the context of this DSB study, it is worthwhile reviewing certain of the provisions of G.O. No. 100:

Art. 4. Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usages of war. Military oppression is not Martial Law: it is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor, and humanity - virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed....

Art. 14. Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.

Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult....

Art. 44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense. A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior....

Art. 47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall be preferred....

Art. 68. Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of the belligerent which lies beyond the war. Unnecessary or revengeful destruction of life is not lawful.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1228>

<sup>6</sup> < <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lieber.htm> > **INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD.** Prepared by Francis Lieber, LLD. Promulgated by President Lincoln, 24 April 1863. That General order constituted a landmark in establishing what is now termed the Laws of War. The belligerents during the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 adopted its tenets, and the United States republished G.O. 100 during the Spanish-American War; it figured prominently in American jurisprudence during the Philippine Insurgency. *Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose.*

## DRAFT Chapter 8

Despite the blots on the American escutcheon, however, our forces have shown that, properly led, acting in concert with other agencies of the U.S., and amply resourced, they can successfully conduct low intensity conflict (stability operations). Secretary Gates himself, in a previous office, participated in one such success, cited approvingly in 1988 by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy:<sup>7</sup>

Low intensity conflict [is] a form of conflict that is not a problem just for the Department of Defense. In many situations, the United States will need not just DoD personnel and material, but diplomats and information specialists, agricultural chemists, bankers and economists, hydrologists, criminologists, meteorologists, and scores of other professionals. Because so many Americans are predisposed to pessimism about our role in the Third World, it is worth pointing to one recent example of a U.S. intervention that, against high odds, did very well: the saving of democracy in El Salvador. In 1980 it seemed quite possible that the country would fall to guerillas supported from Nicaragua by the Sandinistas and Cubans. Many Americans assumed that the [Salvadoran] government would soon be toppled by the Communist insurgents. Congress severely limited the security assistance our government could make available to it. And yet by 1985 there was a democratic government in place in El Salvador, and Congress became committed to supporting it.

By agreement with the Congress, American military on the ground in El Salvador, other than individuals assigned to the Embassy, were limited to 55. These were foreclosed from direct participation in combat, and confined to training the Salvadoran armed forces (1) to limit the ability of the guerillas to move freely through the countryside in their depredations, and (2) to observe in relations with the populace strict rules for respect of human rights. Those Americans so assigned by USCINCSO<sup>8</sup> were largely drawn from units of the Army's Special Forces that were linguistically and culturally prepared to instruct and to motivate Salvadorans, supplemented by Spanish-speaking technicians, such as communicators, medics, and one US Southern Command sociologist. Perhaps more importantly, the corps of cadets of the Salvadoran military academy were transported to Fort Benning, Georgia, there to undergo a version of the U.S. Army's Officer Candidate School (OCS) conducted entirely in Spanish that emphasized the essentiality of observing human rights, of avoiding harm to non-combatants, and of wresting popular support away from the guerrillas. This American OCS created for the Salvadoran Army a cadre of junior officers significantly more effective in field operations, and more responsive to American advice. Equally as important, the government of Honduras allowed entire units of the Salvadoran Army to enter their territory for the purpose of conducting counter-guerrilla field exercises under the tutelage of American Special Forces; moreover, units of the U.S. National Guard were invited to conduct training exercises with Honduran troops, building roads and bridges, rectifying water supplies, and practicing medicine.<sup>9</sup> These drills in Honduras set new operational standards for Salvadoran and Honduran commanders.

The COCOM's plans for military operations were implemented only after meetings with the appropriate U.S. Ambassador and head of state, and approval from the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. Habitually USCINCSO and the Ambassador met often with local defense officials and military commanders. USCINCSO's standing order to U.S. forces was that only he could deny a request from the U.S. Ambassador, head of the Country Team.<sup>10</sup> Teamwork among U.S. agencies, in the words of the

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<sup>7</sup> DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE. Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988, 15-16. Group was convened toward the end of President Reagan's second term, and was co-chaired by Fred Ikle' and Albert Wohlstetter.

<sup>8</sup> Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, as the responsible COCOM commander was then entitled.

<sup>9</sup> A turning-point in the war, for there were many in Washington who believed that anti-Americanism in Honduras was so strong that Roberto Suazo Cordoba, President of the fledging democracy in Honduras, would be overturned; moreover, El Salvador and Honduras were long-time antagonists, at war with each other as recently as 1969. The president made a courageously bold decision in inviting foreign troops into his country. N.B. he agreed to an American presence only on the proviso that the first unit deployed would be a U.S. Army field hospital.

<sup>10</sup> Fortuitously, Ambassadors Thomas Pickering in San Salvador and John Negroponte in Tegucigalpa, like USCINCSO, were veterans of the war in Southeast Asia; the latter and Negroponte had both assisted Henry Kissinger during the negotiations with the Vietnamese communists. USSOUTHCOM's headquarters in Panama was small — 120 officers, half of them ranked below O-4— but it well informed. USCINCSO spent much of his time traveling in Latin America or coordinating with Washington agencies and departments. There was seldom tension among the several U.S. governmental entities active in his AOR.

**DRAFT Chapter 8**

Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, worked a transformation in relations between Americans and the peoples of Central America:<sup>11</sup>

The transformation in large measure reflects ideas that are applicable elsewhere. American technology gave the Salvadoran government a new tactical intelligence capability, which became a prod to action for the [Salvadoran] military (while also giving it constant feedback on the effectiveness of its operations). The war also became a model of sorts for cooperative efforts: under American leadership, other Latin American countries proved willing to offer military training and some economic aid of their own to El Salvador. Our security assistance program helped the Salvadoran military to acquire weapons systems that made possible more discriminate attacks on enemy troops and reduced civilian casualties. We also did a lot for the morale of our allies by introducing medical programs that drastically reduced death rate among wounded Salvadoran troops (from around 45% to around 5%). ...

The Commission set forth these concepts:

- **Conflicts in the Third World were less threatening than any Soviet-American war would be, yet they can undermine our ability to defend our most vital interests.**
- **Low intensity conflict is not a problem just for the Department of Defense**
- **U.S. forces will not in general be combatants.**
- **The United State should support anti-Communist insurgencies**
- **Security assistance requires new legislation and more resources**

Further, the Commission concluded that implementing costs would be tolerable:

The strategic concepts laid out here to deal with low intensity conflict could be funded with about 4 percent of the defense budget, requiring annual outlays of perhaps \$12 billion. This amount could be provided under current Defense Department budget levels without significantly impairing our ability to prosecute higher-intensity wars...

But, of course, the recommendations of the Commission were not adopted. The Soviet Union, the *bête noire* of the U.S., fractionated, and “peace-dividends” depleted budgets for the military services and for foreign aid. Little has been done by the U.S. government over the ensuing two decades to improve the American posture *vis-à-vis* low intensity conflict (stability operations). As a result the Army and the Marine Corps, however well they were prepared for missions of mid-intensity warfare, were largely unready for their post 9/11 missions, or for the exigencies of OIF and OEF. The services and the Department of Defense have already done much to overcome this neglect, but much remains to be done.

**FINDINGS:**

- **Cultural insensitivity is militarily dysfunctional, especially when coupled with indiscriminate violence directed at noncombatants.**
- **Military training should persistently stress discretion in the use of force**
- **Stability operations can succeed only with close collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense and among related government agencies.**
- **Preferably U.S. forces should not be combatants.**

**Service Imperative: Train for Cultural Awareness**

Following the failure of measures for reestablishing stability following the “regime change” in Iraq<sup>12</sup>, the services have undertaken to train forces in cultural awareness, thereby improving the abilities of rank and

<sup>11</sup> DISCRIMINATE DETERRENCE. Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with LtG Jay Garner. His plan was predicated on expected use by Saddam Hussein of WMD, and on employing the Iraqi Army for reconstruction. < <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html>

## **DRAFT Chapter 8**

file to plan for and to conduct stability operations. These range from establishing appropriate doctrine — the Army and the Marine Corps collaborated on a joint manual on counterinsurgency — through laudable initiatives by unit commanders,<sup>13</sup> to reconfiguration of such large training facilities as those of the Army at Forts Irwin and Polk, and that of the Marine Corps at 29 Palms, to create a cultural simulacrum suitable for pre-deployment Mission readiness Exercises (MRE). Some detail concerning broader efforts follows:

### **U.S. Marine Corps**

The USMC has instituted, at Quantico, VA, the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) with the following mission:<sup>14</sup>

Ensure Marine and Marine units are equipped with requisite regional, culture, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint expeditionary environment in any region of the world in current and potential operating conditions, targeting persistent and emerging irregular, traditional, catastrophic and disruptive threats.

Priority of effort CAOCL effort will be as follows:

1. Persistent Home Station and Pre-Deployment Training for Operational Forces and MSOAG
2. Support to the Schoolhouses and Distance Learning
3. Scenario Performance-based “elementary” language learning
  - Support for the operating forces/MSOAG/Advisors
  - Support sustainment language training
4. Career Marine Regional Studies (CMRS) Program

To execute its mission, CAOCL, with the approval of the Commandant, has launched the Career Marine Regional Studies Program (CMRS), courses of instruction in 17 “micro-regions” of the world — e.g. Transcaucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans. Priorities among these regions will reflect strategic requirements, and will determine numbers trained for each — a work in progress. CAOCL will use learning centers at Marine bases, plus texts and multi-media CD’s, together with commercial self-taught language lessons. Meeting specific learning objectives concerning at least one of these micro-regions is mandatory for each Marine after a second enlistment, and for all Marine officers. CAOCL has proposed making that achievement a criterion for promotion. CAOCL intends to execute CMRS as follows:

Provide militarily significant culture studies to Marines and Marine units. Using an efficient mix of distance learning, schoolhouse courses, directed reading, and commercial/other service/joint instructional materials, provide every Marine operational culture and language learning in order to better prepare them for military operations in every corner of the world in current and projected operational environments. Provide targeted persistent and pre-deployment support to Marine operational forces. Track every career Marine’s progress toward defined learning goals in order to provide on-call expertise.

### **U.S. Air Force**

At the Air University (Maxwell-Gunter AFB, Montgomery, AL) the USAF has established a broad program of education, research and development on culture and language, directed from the following “centers”:<sup>15</sup>

Cultural and Language Center. Formed in 2006, the Center supports the Expeditionary Air Force by providing Airmen at all ranks with the best available understanding of foreign cultures and the competencies to communicate and collaborate effectively with members of foreign societies. The Center conducts and sponsors research into the development of cross-cultural competencies by USAF personnel, as well as research addressing the requirement for specific skills (and level of skill) needed by individuals in particular assignments and roles. In order to keep abreast of the most up-to-date knowledge of

<sup>13</sup> E.g. techniques reported above by the 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR under Col. H.R. McMaster to exploit operationally the expertise of a historian, one of the U.S. Army’s few Arabist Foreign Area Officers. See also McMaster’s 2008 article. Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> CAOCL Brief to DSB panel 29 April 2008.

<sup>15</sup> <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/viewNews.asp?storyid=101>>

## DRAFT Chapter 8

cross-cultural communications issues, the Center will be sponsoring future conferences and colloquia. Its personnel attend such events hosted elsewhere as well. The vision for the Center is that it will become a premier Department of Defense institution for the definition of cross-cultural competencies, for the development of conceptual tools to facilitate analysis of culturally distinct behavior, and for the sponsorship and application of cutting-edge research into cross-cultural communications.

**Behavioral Influences Analysis Center.** Established in 2006, the BIAC provides responsive, authoritative, reliable support to professional military education, operational level warfighters, and policy makers to enable understanding, holistic planning, and exploitation of the perceptual and behavioral dimensions of the “human terrain” of any military or military-supported mission. Its principal missions are these:



- Curriculum design and delivery support, and a BIA elective offering, to AWC and ACSC, CADRE and related military educational institutions
- Adversary/other behavioral modeling drawing from the computational and social sciences, operations research, organizational dynamics, and network analysis
- Selective direct support to AEF and other deploying personnel in adversary/other profiles, field assessment techniques, and through reachback analysis support
- Establish procedural basis, participant preparation, and support for a USAF level “Adversary Behavioral Assessment Group” that performs RED TEAM and alternative/competitive analysis on motivations, intentions, and likely behaviors

The BIAC is professionally and procedurally advised, and evaluated, by a network of subject matter experts and practitioners in the social, behavioral, cognitive, decision, and computational sciences. Similarly, specialists from the liberal arts, humanities, linguistics, and analysis disciplines are part of this BIA Center “National Advisory Network.” These experts and practitioners work and contribute within the national security, academic, intelligence, research, and science and technology domains. They offer their views and critiques of BIA work in progress, assessment, Adversary Behavioral Red Team activities, customer support, publications, educational, and outreach projects. They act in appropriate circumstances as interlocutors with customers, sponsors, and collaborators of the BIA Center to facilitate the delivery of high quality support, methodological effectiveness, and educational excellence. As they have the specific expertise and time, members of this Network review Center mission activities, analyses, assessments, methodological developments, modeling and simulation efforts, and education and research projects. They participate as desired and available on Red team development, training, and execution; comment on written products; review candidates for Center positions, fellowships, and exchanges; and offer constructive criticism of the direction, appropriateness, and utility of activities in progress or proposed. They are in no way responsible for the decisions, activities, or results of the Center staff, activities, or products

The BIAC is expected to evolve into the center of excellence, and advisory activity of choice, for operational level warfighters, in their student and practitioner roles, and the national security policy community on:

- Comprehension of the “*human terrain*” of foreign battlespaces, military mission areas, and coalition interoperability
- Key foreign audience, and adversary actor, *perceptual* and *behavioral* aspects of USAF and Joint planning, shaping, engagement, analysis, and assessment
- Methodology and modeling leading to actionable cultural, organizational, and psychological insights into adversary/other motivations, intentions and likely behaviors

### Macro-Context for Behavioral Influences Analysis



**Negotiation Center of Excellence.** The USAF resource for preparing participants in negotiations of wide range of types: international, crisis, hostage, labor and job-related, acquisition and contracts, environmental, alternative dispute resolution, consensus building, mediation, and facilitation.

## U.S. Army

The Army has adopted procedures at its Combat Training Centers —activities that it regards as its “seed corn”, *sine qua non* for its future— for revising training apace with changes in adversary behaviors in OIF and OEF. For example, the sequence of events for a BCT engaged in a pre-deployment Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) at Fort Irwin can be modified to portray a new IED technique within a matter of hours of its being identified and reported from Iraq. Participating in such exercises are the Joint IED Detection and Defeat Office (JIEDDO), DARPA, the Defense Language Institute, and hundreds of role players who portray the populace and the covert adversaries. CTC training includes instruction and practical exercises in negotiation and interface with the local judicial system, but prominent by absence are U.S. non-military actors in stability operations.<sup>16</sup>

Recently, a team of Observer-Controllers from the CTC at Fort Polk was sent to OIF to assist in training a unit of the Afghan Army.<sup>17</sup> The Army has also dedicated a prime unit of its active force structure, a line brigade combat team — 1st BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division, at Fort Riley, Kansas— to instilling in members of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), both military and civilian, that cultural awareness requisite for subsequent service in OIF and OEF. Each PRT is structured and trained to assist a particular Iraqi or Afghan local government in providing basic services to its citizens —important progress toward capability to conduct stability operations. PRTs have been welcomed in the field, but the undertaking is nascent, and first teams have been judged by some as undermanned and less than cohesive.<sup>18</sup>

But the main Army effort is the Human Terrain System (HTS). Since 2005, the Army’s thrust toward cultural awareness has been led by the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at its Combined Arms Center in Fort Leavenworth, KS. The FMSO assists in curricular modification of Professional Military Education (PME) courses, and furnishes RED TEAM support to Army and joint exercises of stability operations. But mainly it trains and oversees the Army’s HTS.<sup>19</sup> “Human terrain” is defined as the human population and society in the operational environment (area of operations) as characterized by socio-cultural, anthropologic, and ethnographic data and other information about that population and society. Human terrain information is open-source derived, unclassified, referenced (geospatially, relationally, and temporally); it includes the situational roles, goals, relationships, and typical behavior of an operationally relevant group or individual.

So that U.S. forces can operate more effectively in the human terrain in which insurgents live and function, HTS provides deployed BCT commanders and their staffs direct support in the form of a five-person Human Terrain Team (HTT) composed of experienced officers, NCOs, and civilian social scientists —the military members providing a cultural interface for the scientists with the BCT, a critical relationship. HTT have reach-back connectivity to a network of subject matter experts assembled from throughout the DoD, the interagency domain, and academia, managed by a FMSO centralized information-clearinghouse unit. At the same time, to overcome the kinds of problems now typically encountered when in-place units attempt to transfer to a successor unit detailed knowledge about its area of operation; upon transfer of authority HTS will provide for the complete transfer of the HTT and the HTT database to the incoming commander. This will give the incoming commander and unit immediate “institutional memory” about the people and culture

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<sup>16</sup> Panel conference with NTC 29 April using DISA’s Defense Connect Online (DCO).

<sup>17</sup> *Army*. May 2008. 43ff.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. <http://www.washingtonindependent.com/view/civilians-missing>

<sup>19</sup> Proposed originally in 2005 by Montgomery McFate Ph.D., J.D., and Andrea Jackson in an article, “an Organizational Solution for DoD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs,” *Military Review* (Jul-Aug 2005): 1821. Most of the practical work to implement the Human Terrain System was that of FMSO’s Captain Don Smith, U.S.A.R., between July 2005 and August 2006.

There are presently 2 HTT deployed in Afghanistan, and 9 HTT in Iraq. However, there are 121 trainees at Fort Leavenworth, undergoing 4 months of preparation, so that by October the Army expects to have 21 HTT deployed in Iraq, the number called for by the original Multinational Corps Operational Needs Statement. Reportedly, recruitment of civilian social sciences for HTS is exceeding all expectations.

#### FINDINGS:

- The armed services —Navy excepted— have programs underway to build cultural awareness for stability operations, to acquire germane data, and to use communication for training and consultation. These programs are disparate, evidencing few attempts at coordination, either among the services, with a COCOM, or with OSD.
- The USMC's program (CMRS) appears to be the most ambitious, requiring all officers and NCOs to demonstrate learning from material on the culture(s) of one of 17 regions worldwide. Its distance learning technology is mundane, and, in that CMRS probably will have little impact on current conflicts, it may invite criticism from OSD as "next-war-itis."
- The USAF has positioned at the Air University a set of "centers" that could become useful in developing insights into foreign cultures for stability operations, but at present these appear to lack the tactical focus ground forces evidently require.
- The Army's programs do not appear to be closely coupled:
  - MRE's at CTC surely assist in developing cultural awareness, but being of short duration, are dubiously useful for particular missions in a specific place overseas.
  - Similarly, modification of PME courses to shoehorn into curricula time for generic cultural awareness can make only a modest contribution to any particular operation.
  - Use of a combat force unit such as 1<sup>st</sup> BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> ID, to prepare PRTs must be viewed as an expedient, and should be replaced soon by other means and methods.
  - FMSO's HTS-HTT thrust seems likely to provide useful support to BCTs engaged in stability operations, but given the focus of each HTT on a particular AOR, it is not clear how to institutionalize HTS: whether it can be sized to match a COCOM's force requirements, and integrated into ARFORGEN, the Army's plan for force generation and pre-deployment training.
- Both Air Force and Army maintain reportedly extensive networks of consultants among social scientists.

### **OSD Imperative: Enable DoD Collaboration, Intramural and Interdepartmental**

Several proposals have been advanced for one or more new DoD institutions charged with overseeing all those education, training, and operations within the Department that entail cultural expertise, or social science in its numerous disciplines.<sup>20</sup> In one sense, this enthusiasm for the betterment of soldier pre-combat knowledge and discernment is encouraging to those familiar with the sketchy pamphlets provided soldiers prior to World War II invasions. These new proposals are bad ideas, but at the right time. The armed services share the perception that there is a need to improve their cultural awareness, but as Secretary Gates points out, they are at war. They have little time to engage in bureaucratic or legalistic battles to defend ameliorating concepts and existing organizations, however imperfect, for these responded to express requirements from the COCOM, and were brought into being thoroughly consistent with the intent of

<sup>20</sup> E.g. Dr. John Chin's proposal for required pre-deployment training: "phased synchronized quality controlled cultural intelligence education" (CIE) for all DoD personnel, and targeted and tailored add-on for specialists such as PRT and HTT members, all under a Single Cultural Intelligence Education Center and a Standing Cultural Education Advisory Group.

Congress. Concerning the latter, here is its law re the Army:<sup>21</sup>

**TITLE 10--ARMED FORCES Subtitle B--Army PART I--ORGANIZATION CHAPTER 307--THE ARMY**

**Sec. 3062. Policy; composition; organized peace establishment**

**It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;(2) supporting the national policies;(3) implementing the national objectives; and (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.**

It is possible, however, that OSD could obtain interagency agreement and Congressional support for a training center focused of developing teams of government and non-government representatives as Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or any future equivalent. The present gap in capabilities for stability operations is government-wide, extending well beyond DoD: lack of teamwork by members of other departments and agencies with units of the armed services engaged in operations overseas. That gap can be fairly characterized as generated by time-distance: non-DoD entities are reluctant to devote personnel to participation in pre-deployment training with a military unit, and feel unable to deploy them as a military sub-unit into a conflicted area overseas. Establishing an Institute for Public Administration, with a faculty of military experts, skilled engineers, public safety advisers, medics, and social scientists under an interagency aegis may catalyze better understanding and support in the government outside DoD, and among NGO.

Bridging the gap also appears to be amenable to adroit use of DoD information technology: cooperative development of an appropriate database and exploitation of advanced tools of collaboration. It is fortuitous that the Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) is now approaching maturity. DCGS could organize, store, and distribute "human terrain information" requisite to teach cultural awareness, keep that data current, and continuously provide cultural insights from competent social scientists to analysts and operators alike. But there are countless issues of security classification and semantics to be resolved, among them means to communicate information to Americans without security clearances, or to their foreign counterparts.

Fortunately, however, last November the Defense Information System Agency commenced early user testing (EUT) with Defense Connect Online (DCO),<sup>22</sup> a new component of its Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES), providing capabilities for interactive audio-visual multicasting across either its Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), or its Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet). DCO embodies two commercial software applications — Adobe Connect web conferencing, and Jabber instant messaging— and permits archiving and transmittal of graphics such as PowerPoint presentations to convey graphs, maps, diagrams, and photographs as well as text.

It is germane that a survey last autumn of software actually in use in U.S. ground force command posts in Iraq reported that Adobe Connect was in all CPs visited as a favored means of communicating over NIPRNet with Iraqi military and police.<sup>23</sup> Reportedly, Connect has proved to be an important means for information exchange between a PRT and U.S. military command posts because the PRT itself is denied use of SIPRNet. DCO is scheduled to enter a phase of Limited Operational Capability (LOA) in spring 2008. DISA officials believe that it will be able to link transoceanic as well as transcontinental users.

During its EUT, DCO has functioned reliably well over transcontinental networks, and shown it has

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<sup>21</sup> <[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse\\_usc&docid=Cite:+10USC3062](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+10USC3062)>

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.dco.dod.mil>

<sup>23</sup> Conducted by MITRE (Mr. Pitsko); unclassified charts re CPs at Arifjan, VBC, Speicher, Taji, Ballad, and Bagram.

## DRAFT Chapter 8

potential to interface gracefully with commercial sites such as *iTunes University* and *Beyond Campus* for disseminating multimedia educational materials to Internet users of laptops and iPods—e.g. chart presentations, videos, podcasts, screencasts. In March 2008 the George C. Marshall Foundation, in conjunction with DISA's Office of GIG Enterprise Services and TRADOC's Army Training Support Center, conducted at Duke University experiments using DCO for guided experiential learning: two virtual staff rides (VSR) of a battlefield remote in time and space (Cantigny, France, May 28 1918). In these trials a professional historian skilled with staff rides, from his home office in Northern Virginia, guided ROTC cadets at Duke (one group of seniors, the other of sophomores) through a PowerPoint-based learning experience using Socratic tutoring and role-playing. Post-VSR evaluations conducted by the Professor of Military Science showed that the cadets (learners):

- Readily accepted the remote mentor, endorsed DCO technology, and interacted well with the mentor and with each other.
- Rated the VSR as better organized and presented than any other history instruction they had received at the university.
- Agreed strongly that the VSR improved their understanding of leadership in mid-intensity combat.

Moreover, the mentor reported that he enjoyed his teaching experience, and urged its proliferation. Information technicians from Duke University and DISA engineers who monitored the events were in agreement that DCO showed unique potential for distance learning.

DCO's interactivity also appears to offer an excellent way to develop lingual proficiency and cultural awareness. The Duke experiments demonstrated the DCO is a distance learning methodology that could enable a qualified expert—historian, anthropologist, sociologist, linguist, etc—to teach officers or NCOs—or representatives of other government agencies or NGOs— aspects of foreign culture, including language skills, in a mode that facilitates discussion between expert and learners, and collaborative learning among all participants. Moreover, for such purposes, DCO could readily exploit current cultural-rich imagery such as that being collected in the Tactical Ground Reporting (TIGR) database.<sup>24</sup>

Additionally, using DCO for web conferencing would enable any governmental official, or any NGO representative, to participate from an office or home computer in military exercises or actual operations without the expense, travel time, and risks entailed in being on the scene.

### FINDINGS:

- The Defense Department's establishing a central social science institute would probably not contribute much to fostering cultural awareness in the armed services, but an interagency training center for preparing teams of government and NGO representatives for stability operations, such as PRTs, might prove to be useful. (E.g. it would enable the Army to return 1st BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> ID to operational use.)
- DCGS should host the cultural data base for all DoD, but standards and means will have to be developed to govern data entry, search, retrieval and dissemination outside DoD.
- DISA's DCO can support training for and conduct of stability operations. DCO can also support participation in training and operations through webconferencing for non-DoD officials and NGO representatives.

<sup>24</sup> A DARPA program being developed in Iraq, TIGR is a multimedia reporting system for soldiers at the patrol level, allowing users to collect and share information to improve situational awareness, and to facilitate collaboration and information analysis among junior officers. With its geo-spatial user interface, TIGR is particularly suited to counterinsurgency operations and enables collection and dissemination of fine-grained intelligence on people, places, and insurgent activity. Being focused on users at Company level and below, TIGR complements existing reporting systems that focus on the needs of users at Battalion or Brigade level and above.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Service Imperative: Inculcate Discipline With the Use of Force**

Introduce into pre-deployment training and exercises situational probes to evaluate propensities for dysfunctional attitudes and behavior.

Obtain for Mission Readiness Exercises the participation of interagency and NGO representatives, at least by tele-consultation during planning and in after action review.

Use operations with African Command to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for stability operations with U.S. forces in non-combatant roles, but cooperating closely with other U.S. agencies and NGO, and exerting strong suasion on indigenous forces to observe restraints on the use of force affecting the populace.

### **Service Imperative: Train for Cultural Awareness**

The Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, should:

Develop a comprehensive strategy that builds upon the programs now underway in the Army and the Marine Corps to assure cultural awareness for future stability operations; that strategy should include (1) developing a pool of cultural/linguistic experts, (2) augmenting PME for officers and NCOs, and (3) equipping military units preparing for deployment with minimal skills and knowledge requisite for their mission.

Cause merger of the several data bases germane to foreign culture into the Distributed Common Ground Station, with appropriate provisions for collection, storage, retrieval, and dissemination at the several levels of security.

Combine and augment the separate pools now maintained among the services of available consultants expert on particular cultures.

### **OSD Imperative: Enable DoD Collaboration, Intramural and Interdepartmental**

The Secretary of Defense should instruct his staff to as follows:

Initiate interdepartmental action to establish, with Congressional support, a United States Public Administration Institute (PAI) with a faculty of military experts, skilled engineers, public safety advisers, medics, social scientists, and NGO representatives, tasked to assist the services with readiness for stability operations, and to form and to train multi-discipline teams for augmentation of any U.S. Country Team.

Direct the Defense Information Systems Agency to bring to bear a comprehensive set of network architectures and collaborative tools to facilitate the cultural awareness efforts of the armed services and of the PAI.