C ^{3} for Joint Land Forces

The following array compares typical service-components of a JTF, each under command of an officer of three-star rank. These are likely to be quantitatively different by orders of magnitude among numbers of *subordinate movable elements* (referring to groupings or personnel and materiel responsive to a single human intelligence: ships, planes, tank crews, infantry squads, supply detachments, survey parties, and the like):

FOUR COMPONENT COMMANDERS

	☆☆ USN	☆☆☆ USAF	☆☆ USMC	☆☆☆ USA
Number of subordinate movable elements	**10^1-10^2**	**10^2-10^3**	**10^3-10^4**	**10^4-10^5**
• **Deployment independence**	maximum ----------minimum			
• **Dependence on allies**	minimum ----------maximum			
• **Operational latitude**	greatest ----------least			
• **Operational mobility**	highest ----------lowest			
• **Tactical command control**	centralized----------decentralized			
• **Communications**	assured ----------tenuous			
• **Tactical mobility**	ease----------difficulty			
• **Subordinate leaders' ranks**	senior ----------junior			
• **Information:**				
-on own forces	precise, real-time ----------vague, lagging			
-on enemy	strategic - ----------strategic +			
	tactical+ ----------tactical -			
• **Doctrine**	f(materiel) ----------f(behaviors)			
• **Basing:**				
-locus	rearward ----------forward			
-functioning	factory complex ----------cottage industry			
• **Planning:**				
-preparation	+++	+	++	++
-deployment	+	+++	+++	++
-employment	+	+	++	+++

However, more militarily significant than the order-of-magnitude shift in quantity within the array from left to right is the quality among the depicted differences: speed, range of operations, flexibility and maneuverability decline, and difficulties of command, control, and intelligence increase. Forming a Joint Task Force involves artful exploitation of complementing capabilities of each component, and commanding and controlling service components to that end is the prime purpose of joint doctrine, tactics, procedures and techniques. Land forces —USMC and Army elements —are inherently more difficult to plan for, to project abroad, and to coordinate once deployed.

It is reasonable to ask why employ land forces, given their disadvantages relative to naval or air forces. The answer lies in the difficulty of exerting control over land and people from the sea or from the air alone. When the mission of a Joint Task Force entails such control, then it must be provided with appropriate means. Land forces are essential when the objective includes any of the following:

—To deter the use of violence for political purposes

- Evidence U.S. determination
- Enhearten allies
- Inhibit the manufacture or use of weapons of mass destruction

—To affect the governing of territory and population

- Provide humanitarian aid
- Replace a dangerous regime
- Enable propsperity
- Forestall or redress aggression
- Destroy or neutralize usurping armed forces
- Separate combatants

— To secure bases for air or sea components

— To assure precise, discriminate use of firepower

—To terminate conflict on terms favorable to the U.S.

- Delay, disrupt, or deceive hostile armed forces
- Enable decisive fires and dominant maneuver
- Support civic order in the aftermath of war

However appropriate and efficient centralized command and control may be for the JTF itself, or for its naval and air components, its land component functions best with decentralized command structures. Indeed, Command Centers or large Tactical Operations Centers constitute a vulnerability for land forces, exposed as these would be to threats ranging from terrorist or guerrilla attacks, through direct or indirect fire, to actual capture.

Hence, C41SR nodes for land forces should not resemble those of sea or air forces, but should be, rather, highly mobile, dispersed or distributed.