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1988



National Defense University Press
Washington, DC

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NDU Press publications are sold by the US Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 783-3238 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

First printing, August 1988.

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Frank E. Jordan III

FOREWORD

To meet the constitutional objective of providing for the common defense requires strategic thinking. Strategists must ponder how the nation can use its capabilities, especially its military power, to meet its political objectives. To do so, they must see beyond the present, anticipating how the nation can remain secure amid changing and sometimes turbulent international conditions. Strategic thinking must, therefore, be innovative. The eight essays in this collection exemplify that kind of thinking.

Four of these essays—written by students at our Senior Service Colleges—won recognition in the 1987 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition. They address the national security implications of strategic defense; Soviet capabilities for operating in the Arctic seas; ways for the military services to meet future personnel needs; and the debate over continental versus maritime strategies for the United States. A second quartet of essays—written by the former Commander of the US Southern Command, a State Department historian, two military officers with experience on the National Security Council staff, and a senior Australian Naval officer—discuss how the United States should deal with what has come to be called “low-intensity conflict”; the normalization of US-Vietnamese relations; the capabilities that might determine national power as we move toward the twenty-first century; and how the United States ought to modify its policy toward the increasingly important island nations of the Pacific.

The considered judgments and wise advice offered by these writers have a common objective: to help us raise the correct questions and consider the best options *before* the necessity of action is forced upon us by the inexorable march of events.



Bradley C. Hosmer
Lieutenant General, US Air Force
President, National Defense
University

**Essays
on
Strategy**

1

**PREPARING FOR LOW-
INTENSITY CONFLICT:
FOUR FUNDAMENTALS**

Paul F. Gorman

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT presents the United States with some of its more difficult national security problems. The issues begin with concerns about the various definitions of low-intensity conflict, the assumptions behind those definitions, and inherent implications; they also include questions about organization and the allocation of resources. Late in 1986, the US Congress passed a law creating a new apparatus for addressing strategy for Special Operations Forces and low-intensity conflict. But I believe the law fails to address these crucial issues.

Senator William C. Cohen, one of the sponsors of the legislation, asked me what I thought of the legislation. I said I wished he had asked me before the bill was passed, because I would have said the last thing this country needs in its present duress is yet one more Assistant Secretary of Defense. And I would accord the next lowest priority to yet one more Unified Command. Senator Cohen responded that the Congress, in effect, had passed that law to get the attention of the Department of Defense, having failed to bring Caspar Weinberger out of his budget book by any other means.

Paul F. Gorman, retired US Army General, is former Commander of the US Southern Command. This essay, presented at a workshop on Lebanon held at the National Defense University, is based on ideas General Gorman presented in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Now that the law is on the books, let me suggest that there are four fundamental notions about low-intensity conflict which I think must be addressed by any group concerned with it, whether the focus of the group happens to be the instability in the Middle East or in one of the other areas where low-intensity conflict is now central to American policy. In the Philippines, for example, the truce has broken down. South Africa is aflame, and, as we know, the war in Central America goes apace. Pick up the newspaper any morning and you can find threaded through it a range of issues which fit under the rubric of low-intensity conflict; all of these issues present the Congress—and the President—with deep difficulties.

The first concept that I think we all need to consider is that the traditional dichotomy of war versus peace, with which this Republic was formed and under which it has lived for so many years, may have to be set aside in order to deal adequately with the problems of the present. The United States may indeed not consider itself at war, but many in the Third World see themselves at war with the United States. Certainly, the drug kingpin, Carlos Lehder Rivas, now in custody in Miami after being extradited from Colombia, considers himself at war with the United States. Indeed, he has said as much on television. While having himself photographed with M-19 guerrillas in the mountain fastness beyond Medellin, he told the world that he was at war with the United States. Moreover, he called upon all loyal Colombians to join him in a struggle against the country that was drenching Colombian crops with noxious chemicals, poisons whose use the United States, which was demanding the extradition of Colombians, would not even permit within its own borders. He also had some colorful words for American justice toward Colombians who, in his view, were simply pursuing their only means of livelihood.

Now, that kind of appeal has caused major difficulties for the government of Colombia. After the television appearance, the M-19 guerrillas attacked the Supreme Court of Colombia, killing 12 justices and some

60-odd other people in order to secure records that might be used in extradition proceedings against the members of the drug cartel. (The drug operation, incidentally, is supported by the government of Nicaragua with arms, communications, etc.) The narcotraficantes of Colombia are but one of numerous groups who mean to inflict violence upon Americans, and upon the United States of America, in any way that lies within their power. Indeed, as the present events in the Middle East demonstrate, where there are Americans—under whatever aegis—the United States is vulnerable.

So the United States must find a way to deal with this new form of conflict. At the outset, the United States must articulate a policy, formulate a national strategy, and set objectives. Moreover, it must develop ideas relevant to the achievement of those objectives and devise ways of allocating resources under a rubric different from the traditional one of cutting diplomatic relations, declaring war, and going on to victory. There is no way that we can deal with this form of violence for political purposes through such mechanisms.

During recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, I answered many questions that tended to dwell upon whether it was a good idea to shut down the US Embassy in Managua. Although doing so seems to be very important to senators, historical precedence would advise against such a move. During the American Revolution, for example, the British and the French maintained diplomatic relations despite France's assistance to American revolutionaries. Shutting down an embassy is not the answer; we need a set of different ideas for dealing with revolutions in the modern world.

The second point that I think needs clarification is the mistaken notion that Special Operations and Special Operations Forces are *the* answer to low-intensity conflict. To be sure, Special Operations Forces are very useful in some cases of low-intensity conflict. But it is not the case, as some senators believe, that the United States conducted its effort in El Salvador, for example, fundamentally with Special Operations Forces. Nor is it the

case that future low-intensity conflict in any one of the trouble spots around the world should be handled mainly by people with funny hats and the appellation "Special," whether they be Navy SEALs, airmen with curious airplanes, or folks with Green Berets.

I bow to no one in my admiration for those soldiers, sailors, and airmen in the Special Operations Forces—who do extraordinary service for their country. But low-intensity conflict requires a much broader range of policy options than sending in shooters, or indeed sending in Special Operations Forces as trainers, communicators, advisers. The latter is an expensive use of a scarce strategic resource.

The third idea, about which one seldom finds disagreement but for which one rarely finds support, is that intelligence has to be the touchstone for low-intensity conflict policy. I am confident there are very few people trying to deal with low-intensity conflict who would disagree. But there is a presumption, particularly on Capitol Hill, that all of the work that has been done to forearm the United States against the wiles of the Soviets prepares us for dealing with difficulties such as we face in the Middle East, Central America, the Horn of Africa, or a hundred other places around the world. That presumption, of course, is sheer nonsense. For example, we have not prepared the cadres of analysts and operatives that would enable us to come to grips with a phenomenon like that represented by Abu Nidal. Moreover, we have not yet prepared ourselves adequately for addressing the situation in Central America, despite the rather extensive resources of Hispanic talent in this country. And as some of us look for Tagalog linguists, we discover that we have a long, long way to go.

I genuinely believe, as I told the Senate Armed Services Committee, that the strategic commodity for dealing with low-intensity conflict is intelligence, and that providing that requirement means years of patient preparation. One of my interrogators referred to the "success" in El Salvador. I corrected him, because one cannot point

to that situation as a success. In relative terms, however, I think some major affirmative differences exist between what has been happening in recent months and what was occurring in 1983 when I first visited El Salvador. The main difference, I would attribute fundamentally to intelligence—better intelligence by and for the Salvadoran Army and better intelligence for the United States. The intelligence is backed by a depth of understanding (the current term of this art is “data base,” although I hesitate to use the phrase), and it has permitted Salvadorans in recent months to target the real rebel leaders and their supporting infrastructure with a great deal of precision and, in some instances, with remarkable success.

In any event, I would tell the policymaker who is concerned about the US ability to come to grips with the sort of situation presented by sabotage, terrorism, paramilitary narcotrafficking, and insurgencies—that is, all of the difficulties of low-intensity conflict—that we ought to look to intelligence resources. The most important resources are human, the development of which takes years of care, training, and education. We simply haven't done that, nor do I see any signs that we are aware of the need for much broader resources of that kind in order to prepare ourselves for the next century.

Thinking about the future brings me to **my final point**. There is a presumption in many quarters that the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provides ample authority for an adequate US response to low-intensity conflict. That presumption is wrong. For example, the best piece of work that the government has published on Central America is the report of the National Bipartisan Commission, the so-called “Kissinger Report.” That report advocates expenditures above \$5 billion per year to provide economic stability, permit political growth, and furnish a security shield against the depredations of Marxist-Leninist insurgents, terrorists, and subversives operating in the area. Yet Congress has not seen fit to allocate that level of resources; indeed, in these days of budgetary austerity, there is every prospect that foreign assistance outlays,

whether for economic aid, economic support, or security assistance, may be lower rather than higher. Moreover, the history of US security assistance budgets indicates that 80 percent is provided to non-Third World countries, such as Egypt, Israel, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal.

The amounts of money that the United States actually expends, particularly in places where it might help arm democracies to defend themselves against low-intensity conflict, are relatively insignificant, given the size of the overall foreign aid program and the US defense budget. I think this is very shortsighted parsimony, and I would say that one of the pieces of legislation that the Congress should have addressed is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, rather than initiating the SOF-LIC legislation. For a variety of reasons, the former needs dramatic revision.

Let me provide an example of current limitations in the legislation. A conference planned to address a particular Latin American country, with indigenous representation, has been forestalled because to invite a group from that country would be an action, a billable service, addressable only as a foreign military sale. In other words, we would have to charge them for the privilege of attending a US government-sponsored workshop.

But perhaps the gravest misunderstanding in the land has to do with the notion that low-intensity conflict is a matter for the Department of Defense. Indeed, the very format of the new law, setting up an Assistant Secretary of Defense, underscores that view. But in reality, low-intensity conflict is first and foremost the province of the US Ambassador to the country concerned, and next, the Secretary of State. Unfortunately, I see no indication in the SOF-LIC legislation that the drafters had any notion that low-intensity conflict was a matter for the Department of State.

The newly created apparatus, which includes, incidentally, a Deputy to the National Security Adviser and a committee at the National Security Council, does not

seem to have taken the Secretary of State's primacy into account. Nor is there anything in the law that would suggest that the drafters understood the centrality of intelligence. Therefore, I think that the Congress still has a long way to go before it exhibits understanding of the sort of phenomena that make up low-intensity conflict.

Those concerns notwithstanding, the legislation is the law of the land, and we need to find ways to make it work. In that regard, several issues require reexamination. For example, a review of the Unified and Specified Commands is long overdue. Back when we were in the early part of the "get well" years of the Reagan administration, it became fashionable to form large, well-heeled—yea, bloated—headquarters down in Tampa, Florida. I think we should go through and pull out some of the fat.

Another issue is the location of SOUTHCOM, the US Southern Command. I have openly advocated moving SOUTHCOM out of Panama; it's time to do that and consolidate it with one or more of the several Commands in Florida. A candidate for that consolidation would be US Forces, Caribbean, established in 1979 by President Carter to reassure the Congress that we were, in fact, worried about the Russian troops that Senator Frank Church discovered in Cuba. The Commander of that organization, who had been diligently practicing for contingencies on the Caribbean islands, sat there idle while the airplanes went to and came from Grenada; he wasn't even on the message address when the execute order was given. That headquarters, therefore, is one that could be eliminated. Another conceivable candidate for reduction or consolidation is the US Readiness Command, with its curious hodgepodge of responsibilities.

But I would offer as a final observation that what we need for Special Operations Forces is not a very large, lavishly generated headquarters like some people in the Pentagon have been discussing. That kind of thinking assumes there is some kind of magic associated with the number of flag officers assigned to a headquarters. While

I was there, I was the only general officer assigned to the US Southern Command. I had a deputy, an Air Force general, but his proper position was Commander of US Air Forces in the region; as such he served only part-time at my headquarters. My view is that a lean headquarters, with access to Washington, probably is going to do Special Operations Forces more good than a lot of stars on the Christmas tree of the newly mandated US Special Operations Command.

As far as the newly created Assistant Secretary of Defense is concerned, there is every prospect that he can do Special Operations Forces a lot of good as an advocate in the budget process and as a spokesman before the Congress. But I doubt that he is going to do much for low-intensity conflict. In the first place, as I remarked earlier, low-intensity conflict is primarily the province not of the Department of Defense but of the Department of State. The new Assistant Secretary of Defense will discover that low-intensity conflict, in one sense or another, involves responsibilities of virtually every other Assistant Secretary in town, and as a consequence, massive turf problems will abound.

If the United States intends to organize for low-intensity conflict, it must address a much broader range of issues than those intrinsic to Special Operations Forces. I'm confident that we can make the SOF part work; I'm not at all confident that doing that much will help us resolve the larger issues inherent in low-intensity conflict. But we must try.

NORMALIZING US- VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Allen H. Kitchens

DURING THE YEARS since the North Vietnamese occupied Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) and the Americans departed, the United States and Vietnam have gradually resumed official contacts, at one point coming close to normalizing diplomatic relations. The United States has a national security interest in establishing a relationship with Vietnam that works to the benefit of the United States and other nations of Southeast Asia, especially those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹ The United States also seeks to reduce Hanoi's dependency on Moscow and the Soviet military presence in the region. Current US policy holds that Washington will not entertain the establishment of relations with Vietnam, however, until after Vietnamese forces have been withdrawn from Cambodia, where they have been deployed since the Vietnamese invasion in December 1978.

This essay reviews US-Vietnamese relations since 1975, particularly discussing the progress in resolving the issue of US servicemen missing in action. In the essay, I also analyze the various options Washington might pursue in eventually normalizing relations with Hanoi, and I assess the short- and long-term benefits and risks to the United States of establishing diplomatic relations with

Allen H. Kitchens is a historian and officer of the US Department of State. He wrote this essay while studying at the National War College, from which he graduated in 1987.

Vietnam—or at least considering and taking some partial steps short of normalization which would improve relations between the two countries. To put the issues in better perspective, I address how Hanoi views prospective relations with the United States, and whether, from Vietnam's viewpoint, normalization of relations would be possible and productive. One central question I discuss is whether the United States should become more actively involved in working toward a Cambodian settlement that would make possible normalization of US-Vietnamese relations and an end of Vietnam's political and economic isolation.

IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD, 1975–78

AFTER THE WAR ENDED in Indochina in April 1975, the Ford administration adopted a "wait and see" policy toward Vietnam, relating US actions to Vietnam's relations with its neighbors and stressing the US desire to obtain an accounting of its soldiers missing in action, called the MIAs. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made clear that US relations with Vietnam would not be determined by the past, and that the United States was prepared to respond to gestures of goodwill. If the Indochinese regimes acted responsibly toward other Southeast Asian states, particularly Thailand, and were cooperative in resolving the MIA issue, the United States was prepared to reciprocate. Kissinger stressed that the issue of whether the United States would establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam would be determined when there had been a full accounting of the MIAs.²

The bitter emotions of the time, however, combined with Vietnam's indifference toward the United States and unresponsiveness on MIAs, led to sharp US actions. The United States imposed a trade embargo against Vietnam, froze \$150 million in Vietnamese assets in the United States, and blocked Vietnam's membership in the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary

Monetary Fund (IMF). At the time, Hanoi linked progress on the MIA issue to fulfillment of President Nixon's 1973 promise of reconstruction aid to Vietnam. The Ford administration dismissed Hanoi's demand for aid, however, on the grounds that Vietnam had violated the Paris Peace Agreement of 1973.

But the Ford administration came under pressure to establish contacts with Vietnam. Two of the main sources of pressure were the petroleum industry, which had invested millions in purchasing offshore oil leases and drilling exploratory wells, and the Congress, concerned with resolution of the MIA issue. Late in President Ford's term, Secretary Kissinger, acting under pressure from Congress, invited discussions with the Vietnamese, looking toward an eventual normalization of relations. The immediate results, though, were undramatic. The Deputy Chiefs of Mission of the US and Vietnamese Embassies in Paris merely held a few unproductive meetings in 1976.³

Carter's Moves Toward Normalization

The Carter administration took a new, much less vindictive view toward Vietnam, approaching the issue from the standpoint of healing the scars of the war. The new administration reconfirmed the US desire to account for the MIAs, but indicated that the United States was prepared to move forward toward normalizing relations. President Carter wanted to reduce the number of countries with which the United States did not have diplomatic relations. In addition, the President, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke believed that relations with Vietnam would help reduce Hanoi's dependence on Moscow and Beijing and encourage Vietnam to concentrate on internal reconstruction and to work with ASEAN. The administration was able to soften the US stand on the MIA accounting issue as a result of a late 1976 report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, which concluded, "no

Americans are still being held alive as prisoners in Indochina," and "a total accounting by the Indochinese governments is not possible and should not be expected."⁴ But the issue did not disappear.

President Carter initiated the process by sending Ambassador Leonard Woodcock on a special presidential mission to Hanoi in late March 1977 in an effort to get the Vietnamese to begin some movement in resolving the MIA issue. Under Article 8 of the 1973 Paris Agreement, all parties were obligated to cooperate in developing information on MIAs and exhuming remains. Carter's decision to send the mission followed several quiet steps designed to improve the atmosphere between Washington and Hanoi, including only perfunctory US opposition (compared to previous outright resistance by the Ford administration) to an IMF loan to Vietnam, the relaxation of trade restrictions by allowing foreign ships and planes bound for Vietnam to refuel in the United States, and the lifting of restrictions on travel to Vietnam.⁵

In Hanoi, Ambassador Woodcock told the Vietnamese that the Carter administration was prepared to recommend to the Congress a program of humanitarian assistance (housing, health, food, etc.) once there was an accounting on the MIAs. Woodcock made no reference to a precondition of a full MIA accounting before the provision of US assistance. The Vietnamese appeared to be forthcoming on MIAs—stating that they would turn over twelve sets of remains, had set up an office to seek information on MIAs, and would return remains to the United States as they were recovered—and indicated that they wanted to establish relations with the United States. Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien asked that in return for Vietnam's actions on MIAs the United States act humanely to repair some of the war damage, commenting that aid was an obligation that had to be fulfilled. Although Phan Hien suggested that the Vietnamese were flexible as to the form of the aid, he made it clear that normalization of relations was linked to reconstruction aid.⁶

The friendly atmosphere in Hanoi prompted the Vietnamese to propose talks in Paris without any preconditions. The Vietnamese apparently believed, however, that the United States was prepared to provide assistance to Vietnam in return for Hanoi's cooperation on MIAs. There was no doubt in Hanoi's mind that MIAs, aid, and normalization were all linked. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review's* Washington Bureau Chief, Nayan Chanda, the nationalistic Vietnamese also wanted to have balanced relations with the superpowers rather than be wholly dependent on the Soviet Union, and they expected to have US aid and the establishment of a small American mission in Hanoi by the end of 1977.⁷

The United States and Vietnam held three formal rounds of talks in Paris that year. During the first session, May 3–4, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke proposed mutual recognition without preconditions, indicated that there had to be a satisfactory accounting of the MIAs (but did not make this a precondition to normalization), and said that the United States would no longer veto Vietnam's admission to the United Nations. (The United Nations Security Council approved Vietnam's admission to the United Nations in July 1977.) Holbrooke made no commitment on aid, but indicated that assistance might be possible after the establishment of relations. Phan Hien, referring to Article 21 of the 1973 agreement, stated that the United States had a responsibility to assist in the postwar reconstruction of Vietnam.⁸

News of the Paris meeting and Vietnam's insistence on reconstruction aid led the Congress, in May and June, to pass legislation which formally banned aid to Vietnam and renounced President Nixon's February 1, 1973, letter to Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong—kept secret until released by the Vietnamese in mid-May 1977—which spelled out procedures for implementing Article 21 and referred to reconstruction and commodity assistance totaling \$4.75 billion.⁹

The second and third rounds of talks in Paris, in June and December, ended without progress on normalization. Following the second round, Phan Hien reiterated that Vietnam was flexible on the form that the reconstruction assistance could take and said Vietnam would even accept a private, oral pledge. But the United States refused to make a commitment on aid. By the end of the year, events surrounding the Vietnamese spy affair involving US Information Agency employee Ronald Humphrey and the expelling from the United States of the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United Nations had cast a pall over the negotiations. Further talks set for February were cancelled.¹⁰

Vietnamese Interest in Normalization

Normalization talks languished until the summer of 1978, when Washington received several signals from Hanoi that Vietnam was interested in resuming talks. In July, Vietnam indicated directly to the United States that it would no longer insist on assistance as a precondition to the establishment of relations; Vietnam would treat the issues of normalization and aid separately. Other indications of Vietnam's interest included the release of several Vietnamese holding US passports to a congressional delegation visiting Vietnam, the first visit by a Vietnamese delegation to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) in Hawaii, and the handing over of fifteen sets of MIA remains.¹¹

Vietnam's leadership, concerned over its serious economic problems and its growing conflicts with China and Cambodia, probably had decided at the June 1978 Communist Party of Vietnam plenum meeting to drop its demand for US assistance and attempt to normalize relations. Vietnam's leaders may have calculated that a US presence in Hanoi eventually would lead to much-needed US and Western assistance and technology, would help improve Vietnam's image among the ASEAN states, and would balance Vietnam's relations with the Soviet Union. In addition, normalization would reduce

the perceived trend in US policy to identify more closely with China in Beijing's growing confrontational attitude toward Hanoi, help minimize international opposition to Vietnamese moves against Cambodia, and forestall Chinese military action against Vietnam.¹²

Washington, deciding to test the seriousness of Vietnam's intentions, arranged secret talks in New York City on September 22 and 27 between Richard Holbrooke and Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. During the initial session, Thach, probably doing some testing of his own (apparently based on advice to Vietnam from American leftists who believed the United States would give in on the aid issue), reiterated the demand for reconstruction assistance. In the second session, Thach dropped the aid demand and said Vietnam wanted to normalize relations. The two sides agreed to set up a working group to finalize the details of an agreement.¹³

At this point, the fate of an agreement with Vietnam became caught up in a sharp debate within the Carter administration between Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Department of State. The debate concerned whether normalization with Vietnam would harm chances for a formal normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Brzezinski argued that disagreements between Washington and Beijing over US links with Taiwan already were causing serious problems for US-PRC normalization, and that establishment of relations with Vietnam would be too much for the Chinese. On the other side, Secretary of State Vance argued that formal US-Vietnamese ties would facilitate the MIA accounting, provide for a closer monitoring of Soviet activities and influence in Vietnam, and give Vietnam a clear option to alignment solely with the Soviet Union.

President Carter, deciding that establishment of diplomatic relations with China was of paramount importance, postponed normalization with Vietnam until after an agreement with the PRC had been concluded.¹⁴ Carter also had become increasingly occupied with the Iranian

situation and the US economy, making it more difficult for him to give Vietnam high priority. In addition, the President and the National Democratic Party leadership had become concerned about the prospects for the Democrats in the upcoming mid-term congressional elections. For many Americans, the establishment of relations with Vietnam still would be a bitter pill to swallow, no matter what the arguments were for doing so.¹⁵

Thach waited in New York City until the end of October for an answer from Washington. He then left to join a Vietnamese delegation in Moscow for the signing on November 3 of a 25-year friendship agreement. Vietnam's late December 1978 invasion and eventual occupation of Cambodia, ousting the Democratic Kampuchean (DK) regime of Pol Pot and threatening Thailand, made any further discussions on normalization of relations unlikely during the Carter years.

It is questionable whether relations with Vietnam and the PRC were mutually exclusive. Perhaps by not establishing ties with Vietnam the United States lost an opportunity to broaden Western influence there and prevent closer relations between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Given the long, bitter history of Sino-Vietnamese suspicion and animosity, though, as well as growing hostility between Vietnam and the PRC-backed Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the establishment of US-Vietnamese relations at this juncture probably would have had little effect in preventing either the invasion of Cambodia or Vietnam's closer reliance on the Soviet Union.

THE MIA ISSUE, 1982-86

THERE WAS VERY LITTLE DIALOGUE between the United States and Vietnam from 1979 to 1982. The few interchanges that took place were primarily related to the MIA issue, although some substantive discussions were held on refugees, family reunification and the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), and the fate of the Amerasian children.

ODP was set up in 1980 by agreements between Vietnam and other nations at the UN-sponsored 1979 Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees. The program facilitates the legal emigration, under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), of Vietnamese who have special ties to the United States, France, Canada, and other countries. ODP grew out of the US family reunification program, an effort that began after the war to obtain Hanoi's approval for the emigration of relatives of Vietnamese who had resettled in other countries, particularly in the United States. The Amerasians, children of US citizens left behind in Vietnam, are being handled bilaterally between the United States and Vietnam. Currently, the Vietnamese have suspended action on all of these programs on "technical procedural" grounds.¹⁶

Beginning in 1979, while the Vietnamese occasionally continued to profess interest in normalization, the rhetoric on both sides hardened. The United States has supported ASEAN in the economic and political isolation of Vietnam. In the United Nations, the United States strongly sided with ASEAN on the Cambodia question by voting for the UN resolutions condemning the invasion, demanding the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, and calling for the establishment of an independent, neutral Cambodia. The United States also supported the retention of the Democratic Kampuchean regime's seat in the UN General Assembly instead of the seating of the new People's Republic of Kampuchea regime. Hanoi accused the United States of being an accomplice of China by approving and supporting the PRC's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979; Hanoi also increased its criticism of the presence of US bases in the Philippines and of military assistance to Thailand.¹⁷ However, representatives from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and Vietnamese officials continued to meet in Hawaii and Vietnam for discussions on technical aspects of the accounting process. In 1981, Vietnam resumed the return of remains, providing only a trickle (seven) until June 1983, when nine sets were given to the United States.¹⁸

The Reagan Administration— New Impetus to the MIA Issue

When the Reagan administration came into office, Washington raised the MIA issue to high national priority and significantly increased the resources—funds and personnel—devoted to it. The President had a strong personal belief in this issue, formed well before his taking of office, and he wanted to obtain as full an accounting as possible of Americans still captive, missing, or unaccounted for in Indochina. By this time, the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia had developed real political clout with the White House, primarily because of the President's support, and was pushing hard for action.¹⁹

The first major step toward gaining Vietnamese cooperation came in February 1982. A US delegation headed by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage—the highest-level US official to visit Vietnam since the end of the war—went to Hanoi. Armitage attempted to impress on the Vietnamese the US Government's commitment to resolving the issue, and to stress that Washington wanted as full an accounting as possible. The Vietnamese made it clear that further contacts on the MIAs would be abandoned if Hanoi believed the United States was using the issue politically against Vietnam. Thach said that Washington had to change its attitude toward Vietnam if the United States wanted Vietnamese cooperation.

Despite the chilly reception and Vietnam's rhetoric, the Vietnamese soon afterward accepted a US invitation to visit the Casualty Resolution Center and US Army Central Identification Laboratory facilities in Hawaii. This visit took place in August 1982. In September, the Vietnamese replied to a US proposal that technical experts from both sides meet on a regular basis to discuss the MIA question by agreeing to four technical meetings a year.²⁰

There have been a few setbacks. The only significant one, though, was the suspension of the quarterly technical meetings for a year because Hanoi was displeased by

remarks made in Bangkok in July 1983 by Secretary of State George Shultz, accusing Vietnam of withholding the remains of a large number of servicemen. In general, there has been considerable progress. High-level meetings between US and Vietnamese officials have continued, technical talks (resumed in August 1984) have been kept fairly well on schedule, and a large number of remains (over 70 sets) have been turned over to the United States.²¹

When the Vietnamese offered in February 1984 to resume the quarterly technical meetings, they also offered to accelerate cooperation. In March 1985, Vietnam agreed to increase the resumed technical meetings to a minimum of six per year. In July and August 1985, Vietnam announced its intention to resolve the MIA issue within a two-year timeframe and presented an implementation plan that would increase efforts to locate remains, investigate sighting reports of possible former US servicemen living in Vietnam, and conduct joint crash-site excavations (the first and only of which was carried out in November 1985).²²

Following another high-level US visit to Hanoi, this time by Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz in January 1986, Vietnam formally agreed, in a July follow-up meeting with US officials in Hanoi, to hold the six technical meetings annually plus forensic specialist consultations, to provide the United States with investigations of live sightings, to permit US experts to accompany Vietnamese officials on investigations, and to discuss specific crash sites for excavation.²³ The technical talks have been delayed, however, since October 1985.

Hanoi's Policy Shift

This progress has to be viewed with cautious optimism because high US officials believe that Vietnam has to accelerate the pace in order to fulfill its promised two-year program. The progress apparently is a result primarily of Hanoi's realization that its security could only

be ensured through an international settlement of the Cambodian situation including formal guarantees from China, and that the United States would have to play a key role in achieving that goal. Hanoi's formal moves to improve relations with the United States began with a decision by the seventh plenum meeting of the Vietnamese Communist Party, in December 1984, that Vietnam should attempt to resolve the MIA issue. In January 1985, the Indochinese foreign ministers appealed for the United States to "assume a responsible role in contributing to long-term peace and stability in Southeast Asia."²⁴

Vietnam may have been further suggesting an apparent interest in creating a more favorable atmosphere between itself and the United States when, in March 1986, Foreign Minister Thach told Nayan Chanda in Hanoi that the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay was negotiable with the United States. But Thach said any such change could come about only after a Cambodian settlement which included the installation of a friendly, neutral government in Phnom Penh, and after Vietnam had been assured of its security vis-a-vis China. Washington has treated such an "enticement" from Hanoi, however, with great skepticism, wanting to avoid being maneuvered by Vietnam into US-Vietnam negotiations on Cambodia that would undermine ASEAN's position.²⁵

The Vietnamese may have decided that serious efforts to cooperate on this issue eventually would lead to a climate of goodwill within which relations could be improved and other issues could be resolved. Vietnam may also have believed that this process would lay the groundwork for a possible normalization of relations with the United States and receipt of US assistance.

For its part, the United States has lowered the level of its rhetoric (including a reduction of Vietnam-bashing in the Congress) and has sought to convince Vietnam of US seriousness about resolving the MIA issue. In this regard, the Armitage-Wolfowitz visit was an important signal to Hanoi; the manner in which Vietnam handled the visit and the results flowing from it was a message to

Washington that Hanoi understood. Washington remains wary, however, of Vietnam's intentions. The United States is still waiting to see whether Hanoi's initiatives over the past couple of years constitute a real departure in policy toward the United States and altered objectives in Cambodia.²⁶

In view of the expected resurfacing of the normalization issue, high-level US officials repeatedly have told the Vietnamese that discussions on MIAs are not to be linked with any other issue, and that resolution of the MIA issue is not a formal precondition for normalization—it is, pure and simple, a humanitarian issue. But Washington has also told Hanoi that the question of normalization is still tied directly to the Cambodian issue, and that normalization could be pursued within the context of a Cambodian settlement. In an effort to prompt Vietnam to speed up its efforts on MIAs, though, Washington has indicated to Hanoi that resolution of the MIA issue in advance of a Cambodian settlement could facilitate discussions toward normalization.²⁷

Washington's determined, highly visible efforts to get an MIA accounting have had an unfortunate side effect: they have provided Vietnam with an important bargaining chip and given it more of a role in setting the pace of relations with the United States than is warranted. Although Hanoi publicly acknowledges that the MIA issue is a humanitarian one, Vietnam has made it a political question that is now subject to formal negotiations in order to maintain momentum and achieve progress. This situation, combined with the diminishing of polemics between Hanoi and Washington, has led, despite US disclaimers, to speculation by China and within ASEAN (particularly hardliners Singapore and Thailand) that the United States may have weakened the US-PRC-ASEAN position on Cambodia. It may also have fueled unwarranted optimism by Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar that the United States is on a track toward establishing relations with Vietnam and taking a key role in finding a Cambodian solution.²⁸

Hanoi implicitly has used the MIA card to suggest that in return for its support in resolving this issue the United States could help ease Vietnam's isolation. Vietnam has softened its rhetoric, limiting claims that it is hard to motivate its people on MIAs in view of Washington's "collusion" with China against Vietnamese interests in Cambodia and of "hostile" US policies toward Vietnam. (The claim of "hostile" policies probably meant, among other US actions, the trade embargo.) Hanoi apparently dropped this approach when it realized that linkage of MIAs to other issues was not working and when it became convinced that the United States would not shift on its Cambodia policy.²⁹

Progress on Other Issues

Since 1978, progress in resolving issues other than MIAs and Cambodia has been spotty at best. Vietnam has attempted to use these other issues to draw the United States into additional bilateral talks, which in turn would give the impression that relations between Washington and Hanoi were continuing to improve and that normalization was only around the corner—an approach no doubt designed to worry Beijing and Bangkok. Such speculation is unwarranted, however, given the lack of substantive results on these issues.

There has been some progress on the Orderly Departure Program, but efforts to continue the program are currently stalled over differences in procedures. As for the Amerasian children, Hanoi offered to allow them to leave Vietnam in 1982. The United States wanted them to come out under the auspices of the ODP, thus making this issue a multilateral one. Hanoi believed this was a direct bilateral issue, subject to direct negotiations between the United States and Vietnam. The Vietnamese argued that the children were those of US citizens and not refugees subject to the jurisdiction of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees. Although some children were allowed to depart under ODP, in the fall of 1986 the United States proposed a bilateral handling of this issue

through the use of US consular officials working temporarily in Vietnam,⁹ and Amerasians are now treated on a bilateral basis.

There has been no progress to date, however, in gaining the release of an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 Vietnamese prisoners in the political reeducation camps. In 1982 and 1984, the Vietnamese announced that they would release inmates. But after Secretary of State Shultz said in September 1984 that the United States was willing to grant entry permits into the United States for all of the prisoners, Hanoi said in December 1984 that it would go ahead with the releases only if Washington guaranteed that those released would not engage in anti-Vietnamese activities. Hanoi's concern over its inability to gain political loyalty in southern Vietnam and over the increasing anti-Vietnamese activity of the emigre community in Western Europe and North America probably played a key role in Hanoi's decision to backtrack on release of the prisoners to the United States.¹⁰

VIETNAM'S PERSPECTIVE

VIETNAM NOT ONLY WANTS to achieve normalization of its relations with the United States, but also wants to break out of its isolation in order to enhance its international political position, ensure its security, and improve its economy. Vietnam's isolation is clearly hampering foreign investment, which Hanoi needs, in drilling for offshore oil, extracting minerals, setting up plants to process agricultural products and seafood, and building a consumer goods industry.¹¹

Because of Vietnam's determination to ensure the security of its northern and western borders, as well as to maintain the level of its political relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations, normalization per se with the United States is, in reality, probably a relatively low item on Hanoi's agenda. The Soviet Union will continue to be Vietnam's preferred partner for the

present. Hanoi will also have to continue to rely on Moscow for the bulk of its economic needs. Vietnam's already troubled and worsening economic situation probably is a key factor motivating Hanoi's desire to develop better relations with the United States, and consequently with Japan and Western Europe. Hanoi's leadership has publicly made clear its recognition of Vietnam's economic problems, and probably has concluded that many of these problems cannot be solved without internal reforms and assistance, trade, and technology from non-Soviet bloc sources.³³

Vietnam is ranked as one of the world's twenty poorest countries, with an annual per capita income of about \$160, soaring inflation of around 500 percent, and a foreign debt of \$6.7 billion. The currency system has collapsed. Factories are running at 25 percent or less of capacity because of the lack of spare parts, raw materials, and fuel. Economic reforms introduced since 1979 have led to some improvements, with a narrowing of the food deficit and an apparent improvement in the people's standard of living. But citizens, even party cadres, reportedly are grumbling about their condition and voicing the need for drastic change. Pressure has been building for a rejuvenation of the political apparatus. Partly in response to this situation, the recent leadership changes and official government and party pronouncements indicate that the government may be serious about implementing reforms. But Vietnam has a long way to go and is in great need of help.³⁴

Despite its current strong reliance on the Soviet bloc, Vietnam apparently desires to reduce its economic and technological dependence on the Soviets and to fully normalize its relations with China—or at least to substantially improve the atmosphere between Hanoi and Beijing. The strongly nationalistic Vietnamese are beginning to chafe over their reliance on trade with the Eastern bloc, which represents an estimated 75 percent of Vietnam's export market, and over Soviet efforts to tell Vietnam how to manage its economy.³⁵

The Vietnamese are also becoming increasingly upset with Moscow's lecturing about the need to improve relations with Beijing, a step which Vietnam wishes to pursue on its own without coaching from the Soviets.²⁰ The latest Soviet effort in this regard was contained in a speech delivered by Soviet Politburo member and Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee Yegor Ligachev in Hanoi on December 15, 1986, at the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Congress. Ligachev, following up on CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev's speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, stated,

An important positive influence on improving the situation in Asia and the international climate as a whole would be exerted by the normalization of Vietnam's relations with China. . . . We confirm our support for the holding of a Vietnam-China dialogue with the aim of removing unnecessary suspicions and mistrusts.²¹

Vietnam's own diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with China have been going on for some time but have met with virtually no response from China. Hanoi will not establish ties with Beijing, in any case, without Chinese assurances respecting Vietnam's security. The Vietnamese are also likely to be concerned over the improving state-to-state relations between the Soviet Union and China and what this trend might portend for Vietnam.

In recent years, moves within the Vietnamese government to take a more pragmatic approach to state economic planning and international affairs, especially toward Cambodia and China and to a certain extent toward the United States, have been undercut by resistance from hardline ideologues in the top leadership. The unusually high number of official statements during 1985 and 1986 concerning the need for bureaucratic and economic reforms, followed by the death in July 1986 of

CPV General Secretary Le Duan and the widespread shakeup in Vietnam's party leadership by the Sixth Party Congress in December, may set the stage for future consideration of significant change in its domestic and international policies.³⁸

The Party Congress retired several members of the conservative old guard, such as Pham Van Dong, Truong Chinh, To Huu, and Le Duc Tho, but retained and promoted to the number two position Pham Hung, the Minister of Interior and one of the more conservative members. It selected as new Party General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh, the outgoing Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) Party chief who presided over gradual and apparently somewhat successful economic liberalization there. It also elevated to full Politburo membership several younger, more moderate leaders, such as Foreign Minister Thach and former mayor of Ho Chi Minh City Mai Chi Tho. The Congress made a major shakeup in the Party Secretariat, which implements Politburo decisions and manages the country, and ousted almost one-third of the Party Central Committee.³⁹

In the near term, until Linh, who is 73 years old and possibly only a caretaker Party leader, has had time to begin building a power base, the new leadership is more likely to remain an unknown quantity and move cautiously in introducing radically new policies. But it could make some positive linkages. The most important of these would be Hanoi's clear understanding that Vietnam will not have access to Western assistance, markets, and technology unless other outstanding problems are resolved first. Important signals in this regard would be increased efforts to resolve as soon as possible the MIA, ODP, and Amerasian issues. The question of normalizing relations with the United States, however, may remain a secondary and controversial issue for some time within the leadership, which historically has been concerned primarily about internal security and somewhat dubious about the benefits to be derived from such ties.⁴⁰

US POLICY OPTIONS

THE OBJECTIVES of US policy in Southeast Asia are regional political stability, and economic development and growth for all Southeast Asian nations. Toward achieving these objectives, the United States seeks to prevent regional dominance by any single power, to reduce Soviet influence and presence in the area, and to achieve and maintain good relations with all nations in the region. The United States wants a cohesive ASEAN that remains friendly to the West and strong enough to withstand attempts at domination or manipulation. It also wants a peaceful relationship between ASEAN and a Vietnam that is subordinate to neither the Soviet Union nor China. Finally, the United States wants a peaceful settlement in Cambodia that will provide for self-determination by the Cambodian people and a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. As for Vietnam, the United States remains interested in relations with a Vietnam that is not hostile and threatening to its neighbors. Washington will not even consider establishing relations with Vietnam, however, until after a settlement of the Cambodian issue – a settlement that is, in particular, acceptable to ASEAN.

Some analysts have suggested that the United States should take the bit by the teeth, accept a Vietnamese *fait accompli* in Cambodia (and in Laos), and normalize relations with Vietnam. Otherwise, they argue, the United States will continue to lose significant opportunities to work with Vietnam to achieve a reasonable Cambodian solution, to make progress on bilateral and multilateral issues, to have some positive effect on human rights in Indochina, and to reduce Soviet influence and military presence in the region.¹¹

Such a move might produce some marginal benefits for the United States, particularly concerning MIAs and the Orderly Departure Program. But given the limited US involvement with Indochina and with the Cambodian situation, and considering the complexities of the Hanoi-Beijing-Moscow relationship, normalization now would

have little effect on Vietnam's ties with the Soviet Union or the prospects for a Cambodian settlement. Since the issue of normalization is, in fact, firmly linked to the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia, normalization might serve to make a settlement more difficult to achieve.

A US accommodation of Vietnam would undermine US credibility, seriously damage US relations with ASEAN, weaken ASEAN itself, and create an additional difficulty for US-PRC relations. Vietnam would be receiving a major political victory, while giving up almost nothing in return. Moreover, Hanoi would see such a shift in US policy as a sign that the strong international opposition to its policies had begun to unravel. And on the US domestic front, normalization at the present time would receive a negative reaction from the Congress and the public.

The question of normalization thus appears to be moot. Hanoi shows no serious intention of withdrawing its forces from Cambodia and will not do so as long as Vietnam feels threatened by the Chinese. In this circumstance, the United States should not consider tendering to Vietnam the ultimate carrots: normalizing relations, lifting the aid ban and trade embargo, and dropping opposition to Japanese and West European assistance to Vietnam. There are some policy considerations the United States could pursue, however, that might give some momentum to the process, leading to an eventual establishment of relations. These possibilities include some interim, half-way measures that could be taken in an effort to improve relations between Washington and Hanoi.

Continued Efforts on the Missing in Action

Washington should strive to maintain the momentum on MIAs and press Hanoi for continued progress on both this and Orderly Departure issues. The United States should take great care not to make Vietnam feel any more than it already does that resolution of the MIA issue is in fact a precondition to normalization talks, or to

encourage Hanoi to see the issue as a bargaining chip. Moreover, Washington should not offer Vietnam any material incentives to be more forthcoming on this issue. Doing so would only be giving Vietnam what it wants and suggesting to Hanoi that Washington no longer sees the MIA issue as a humanitarian matter. In the course of discussions with Vietnam on MIAs, the United States should continue, as it has in the past, to use opportunities during informal contacts and social occasions to talk with Hanoi about other matters such as ODP, Amerasians, political detainees, the Soviets, and Cambodia.

A More Active Role on Cambodia

Through informal exchanges on Cambodia, the United States gradually—and cautiously—could become involved in diplomatic efforts to begin substantive talks on a settlement between ASEAN, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK—a coalition of anti-Vietnamese-PRK groups), and possibly the Chinese. On Cambodia, US policy consistently has been to follow ASEAN's lead, believing that the Cambodian problem should be settled in a regional framework. Because ASEAN prefers this approach, any shift from a passive US role in the settlement process to a more active one would have to follow a direct request to, and take place in full concert with, ASEAN.

Currently, efforts to begin talks that might eventually lead to a settlement have reached an impasse. There is little indication that the two sides—ASEAN and the CGDK on one, Vietnam and the PRK on the other—will make any progress toward talks in the near future. Hanoi continues to take an uncompromising line on its fundamental objectives—permanent political control of Cambodia and security from the Chinese—and rejects any discussions of terms that would undermine them.

Even though faced with this set of circumstances, the United States should take a hard look at whether its passive policy on Cambodia is contributing to its own interests and objectives concerning Southeast Asia.

So far, the ASEAN members have kept strains over Cambodia submerged in the interests of maintaining a solid unified front against Vietnamese occupation. But unless some movement toward a solution appears likely in the next year or so, differences, especially between Thailand and Indonesia, could begin to undermine ASEAN unity. Although public perceptions are what continue to count and ASEAN unity remains a preeminent concern among the six states, according to Nayan Chanda, there are significant differences between what ASEAN officials say in public and what they say in private.¹² Divisiveness within ASEAN would serve Vietnamese and Soviet interests, as well as those of the Chinese, who benefit from the Cambodian situation because of the pressure it places on Vietnam.

As part of a policy review on the US role vis-a-vis Cambodia, the United States might consider approaching the Soviets and the Chinese. Although Moscow has significant strategic interests in maintaining its influence and presence in Indochina and will do nothing to compromise them, the United States could continue to pursue with the Soviets the process begun in 1985 at the Geneva Summit on regional conflicts. The Soviets, with their long-term objective of improving their image in the Third World, are likely to see in a Cambodian settlement an opportunity to expand Soviet diplomatic presence and trade with ASEAN. Moscow has been persistently trying to achieve that goal for over a decade (most recently with demarches from Moscow to each ASEAN state, indicating a desire for expanded relations).

The Chinese, too, probably would be reluctant to become more active in the diplomatic process on Cambodia any time soon. But a couple of important factors might lead Beijing to shift its stance. First, state-to-state relations between China and the Soviet Union have improved significantly in the past few years. There has been a substantial reduction in polemics, an increase in trade, a settlement of some border questions, and an expansion of cultural ties and scholar exchanges. Beijing

has reacted skeptically to Moscow's recent "signals" (such as Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech), however, and continues to stand by its three conditions for normalization of relations: withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and a further reduction of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet borders. Of the three, Beijing plays Cambodia as the principal obstacle.

A second factor may be more significant in terms of a Cambodian settlement. China sees Cambodian leader Prince Sihanouk as a key figure in an eventual solution; apparently he is acceptable to all the parties, especially to China and Vietnam. The Prince, though, recently hospitalized again in France with a kidney ailment, may not live for more than a few years. Nayan Chanda believes that Sihanouk's condition might prompt China to begin to move on Cambodia while there is still time to negotiate a settlement that would involve Sihanouk again assuming a leadership role in his own country.¹³ For now, China is probably not interested in rushing into a settlement, even one involving Sihanouk. In any case, China would not agree to any settlement which would result in the Prince becoming a pawn of Vietnam and the PRK.¹⁴

Despite Vietnam's hard line, Hanoi may also be in the process of rethinking its position on Cambodia, along with its relationships with the United States and China. Vietnam's poor economic condition and its international isolation, as already indicated, would be important motivating factors. But possibly the most pressing motivators are that Vietnam apparently is losing political ground in Cambodia to strong Cambodian nationalism and increasing anti-Vietnamese sentiment, and that Vietnam continues to face rising costs of maintaining its troops there and on the Chinese border.¹⁵

None of these factors suggests that Vietnam is anywhere near ready to compromise on its objectives or that its military position in Cambodia is deteriorating. But Vietnam's situation in Cambodia and the improving governmental relations between Beijing and Moscow may

lead Hanoi to be more receptive to the possibility of talks. It is a situation in which the United States should be alert to any possible shift in Hanoi's policy. The continuing contacts between US and Vietnamese officials could be an important way in which to look for such a shift.

Half-Way Measures To Improve Relations

With the dim prospect of a Cambodian settlement in the near term, the United States should consider several options it could take now to pre-position itself for probable normalization following a Cambodian settlement. In pursuing all but one of these ideas, the United States should be able to manage the evolving US-Vietnamese relationship without creating problems for the United States with ASEAN and China.

Some scholars and political analysts have suggested that the United States should explore the possibility of opening an interests section or liaison office in Hanoi, patterned after the interests section that Washington has maintained in Havana for several years and one it had in China in the mid-1970s. This office, they argue, would facilitate efforts on MIAs, ODP, and the Amerasians, and would give the United States a foothold from which it could explore with Hanoi other issues such as Cambodia.⁴⁶

The establishment in Hanoi of such an official US presence—in effect, a diplomatic post—would, however, be perceived internationally as *de facto* US recognition of the Vietnamese government, thus giving Hanoi a major victory and sending the wrong signal to ASEAN and China.

The current level of US efforts directly with Vietnam on MIAs probably is sufficient, but the number of interchanges and personnel involved would need to be increased should Vietnam become more cooperative on joint crash site surveys and excavations. As for ODP and the Amerasians, in order to get increased movement on these programs, Vietnam is considering a US proposal for two groups of US consular officers to be detailed

temporarily to Vietnam. One group would work on ODP in tandem with UN officials; the other would work alone handling the Amerasians.⁴⁷

If Hanoi approves and there is real progress on these two issues, as well as on MIAs, the United States might consider opening up some kind of office in Hanoi, and possibly in Ho Chi Minh City, to coordinate its Vietnam efforts. Whatever might be opened, however, would have to have no diplomatic name, flags, or other official US symbols. This option would still run the risk, however, of creating the perception of *de facto* US recognition of Vietnam, and run the further risk of causing worry among ASEAN and the Chinese. It is an option, however, that the United States should be prepared to choose if the payoff seemed sufficient.

Other possible actions the United States might pursue include an expansion of privately arranged cultural and scientific exchanges, and of private, voluntary organizations that provide limited humanitarian aid to Cambodia and Vietnam. The United States might also relax restrictions barring Vietnamese assigned to their UN mission from traveling outside New York City, and continue softening US rhetoric on Vietnam.

These latter gestures to Vietnam should present no problems with ASEAN and China. But they should reinforce Foreign Minister Thach in his efforts to improve relations with the United States, and should be seen by the Vietnamese as tangible benefits of their cooperation on MIAs.

THE UNITED STATES will not achieve its objectives of peace and stability in Southeast Asia, maintenance of close relations with ASEAN, and a reduction of Soviet influence and presence in the region through a unilateral accommodation with Hanoi before an acceptable Cambodian settlement. Because of the complicated nature of the Indochina tangle, normalization of relations with

Vietnam thus will be a long-term US objective. But there are things the United States can do to achieve progress with Vietnam and eventually to attain US objectives. Washington will have to move cautiously, however, in picking and choosing how it will deal with Hanoi, whose tendency for erratic behavior could create unexpected problems and setbacks for the United States.

The United States should continue to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the MIA issue to pursue with Vietnam the possible resolution of other questions. Because of the slowly evolving US-Vietnamese relationship, Hanoi could become more forthcoming on several issues in order to be in a position to establish relations once Cambodia is satisfactorily settled.

In its handling of the MIA issue, however, Washington must take great care to keep the issue within realistic bounds—that is, Washington must continue to hold down the rhetoric at home, use an estimated number of MIAs related just to Vietnam (about 800 to 1,000) rather than the total estimated figure for all of Indochina, and avoid having Vietnam make an unhelpful linkage between MIAs and other issues. An even-handed yet firm handling of this issue should continue to show positive results, maintain the good atmosphere between Hanoi and Washington, and lead to progress on other issues.

Instrumental in this respect are the informal contacts with Vietnamese foreign ministry officials. In the informal environment of unofficial contacts at cocktail receptions, in hallways, and on the streets away from the government watchdogs, substantive discussions can take place without the need of setting positions and testing possible scenarios.⁴⁸ The Vietnamese are comfortable with this process, and the United States should make as full use of it as possible, but remain cautious in believing all that we hear.

Finally, on Cambodia, the sticking point on normalization of relations with Vietnam, the United States should continue to fully support ASEAN in its handling

of this question. Washington should also remain alert to any signs that Hanoi might be moving toward a solution, or at least showing some interest in preliminary talks. If such signs appear, the United States could take the opportunity to carefully begin a more active role in the settlement process.

After consulting with ASEAN to allay likely concerns over possible US impulsiveness in being too ready to become involved, and after informing the Chinese, the United States could use the MIA channel or possibly some reliable but unofficial American fact-finding mission to see if the Vietnamese wish to engage in talks on Cambodia and to determine what common ground on the issue exists between Vietnam and ASEAN. If Hanoi agreed to talk with ASEAN, the United States could make clear its willingness to be of help. In the words of former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Evelyn Colbert,

Along with ASEAN, Washington could then encourage a settlement focusing on three major objectives: allaying Chinese and Vietnamese fears of each other, both directly and through their association or influence with third countries; providing a basis for cooperative relations between ASEAN and an Indochina that is subordinate to neither Moscow nor Beijing; and giving the Kampuchean people the voice in their own destiny that has been too long denied to them. For now, America's preferred policy should be one of patience.¹²

Notes

1. Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand make up ASEAN.

2. Interview with Frederick Brown, member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee professional staff and former Department of State Country Director for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and for Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 12 December 1986; interview with Evelyn Colbert, Professor at Johns Hopkins School of International Studies and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 3 December 1986; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Vietnam's Future Policies and Role in Southeast Asia*, Committee Print (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 64; Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown, *Communist Indochina and U.S. Foreign Policy: Postwar Realities* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), p. 4.

3. Interview with Colbert; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, p. 64; Zasloff and Brown, p. 13.

4. Interview with Brown; Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War—A History of Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), p. 146; interview with Jean Sauvageot, Northrop Corporation, former Vietnamese specialist with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, and interpreter/adviser with US delegations to Vietnam, 17 December 1986; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, p. 64.

5. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, p. 150; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, p. 64; Zasloff and Brown, pp. 13, 18.

6. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 136–137, 140–141, 147; Zasloff and Brown, pp. 14–15.

7. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 150–151.

8. Interview with Brown; interview with Nayan Chanda, *Far Eastern Economic Review* Washington bureau chief, 18 December 1986; Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, p. 152; Zasloff and Brown, pp. 15, 19.

9. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 153, 155; Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 39–40.

10. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 155–156, 267; Murray Hiebert, "Vietnam's Policy Toward the United States Since

Reunification." unpublished paper, annual conference of the Mid-Atlantic Region Association for Asian Studies, October 1985, p. 5; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, p. 65.

11. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 270-271; Hiebert, "Vietnam's Policy," p. 6; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, pp. 65-66; interview with Dorothy Avery, senior intelligence analyst on Vietnam, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 13 January 1987.

12. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 268-269; Hiebert, "Vietnam's Policy," p. 7; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, p. 46-47, 65-66; interview with Avery.

13. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 264-265; interviews with Colbert and Sauvageot; Hiebert, "Vietnam's Policy," pp. 7-8.

14. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), pp. 224, 228, 404; Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 288-290.

15. Interview with Colbert.

16. Interview with Avery.

17. Interview with Chanda; Hiebert, "Vietnam's Policy," pp. 8-9; *Vietnam's Future Policies*, p. 67.

18. US Department of Defense, *POW/MIA Fact Book* (Washington, DC: August 1986), pp. 5-6; National League of Families, "Chronology of US SRV POW/MIA Activities, May 1981-October 1986," (Washington, DC: 28 October 1986).

19. Interview with Richard Childress, Director, Asian Affairs and coordinator for POW/MIA affairs, National Security Council, 4 December 1986; interview with Colbert; *POW/MIA Fact Book*, p. 1.

20. Interviews with Childress and Sauvageot; *POW/MIA Fact Book*, p. 6; "Chronology of US SRV POW/MIA Activities;" "Talks in Hanoi About Missing Called 'Frank,'" *The Washington Post*, 25 February 1982, p. A20.

21. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 401-403; interviews with Childress and Sauvageot; *POW/MIA Fact Book*, pp. 6-10; "Chronology of US SRV POW/MIA Activities."

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*

24. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 401-403; Nayan Chanda, "Hanoi Drops A Hint," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 January 1985, pp. 12-13; "Conference of Foreign Ministers of Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam," Hanoi Domestic Service, 21 January 1985, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily*

Report: Asia and Pacific, 23 January 1985, pp. K3-K8; Hiebert, "Vietnam's Policy," pp. 12-13; interview with Childress.

25. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, p. 403; interviews with Chanda and Childress.

26. Chanda, "Hanoi Drops A Hint;" interviews with Chanda and Childress.

27. Chanda, *Brother Enemy*, pp. 403-404; Chanda, "Hanoi Drops A Hint;" interviews with Chanda, Childress, and Sauvageot.

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3

IMPENDING CRISIS IN THE PACIFIC

C. A. Barrie

ATOMIC WEAPONS WERE FIRST USED in August 1945 to bring a speedy end to the war in the Pacific. Since then, both friend and foe have generally considered the United States the most powerful nation on earth. As a result, most postwar political leaders in the Pacific have looked to the United States for leadership and support as they have tried to deal with the pressing problems of obtaining independence and organizing their new states so they could survive in the world's political and economic environment. In the early postwar period, the emergence of a powerful, militarized Soviet Union destroyed hopes for a free and peaceful world. Rather, the Soviet Union seemed intent on spreading its influence worldwide and countering US foreign policy objectives wherever possible. The Soviets' acquisition of an atomic weapons capability transformed international relations: the future of the world seemed to depend primarily on avoiding war between the major nuclear powers.

To try to maintain world peace, the United States and other responsible nations pressed vigorously for the establishment of a new international forum for discussion of issues and resolution of conflict. Thus, the United

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Nations came into being in 1945, founded on a basic principle of the right to self-determination and the concept that the five major powers in the Security Council could resolve conflict by their concerted action. Despite the preponderance of power represented in the Security Council, the United Nations has not proved as effective in preventing the outbreak of conflict as originally expected. Once conflict has broken out, however, UN involvement has often succeeded in managing it and establishing peacekeeping operations.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have shown considerable restraint in the exercise of their nuclear capabilities over the years. But though they have avoided coming into direct conflict, they have constantly engaged in an intense "competition" to extend their influence wherever possible.

With few exceptions, European and Middle East matters have dominated international affairs. The Pacific area has been a relatively peaceful and uncontested sphere of American influence. In the immediate postwar decade, a US policy of containing communism resulted in a concerted effort to organize a suitable system of alliances throughout the free world. The purpose of the system in the Pacific region was to support an American presence, exclude the Soviet Union, and maintain peace. US interests were served by the creation of bilateral alliances with Japan (1951) and the Philippines (1951); the instrument to safeguard Australian and New Zealand interests was the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) Treaty (1951). Later, after the Korean War had exposed additional vulnerabilities, the alliance system was expanded to include a separate bilateral treaty with South Korea (1953) and the Manila Pact (1954), the SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) umbrella arrangement. In efforts to create stability, friends such as Australia and New Zealand assisted the United States. In general, the containment policy has been successful; US leadership in the Pacific has ensured peace and limited opportunities for Soviet expansion in the area.

Against this background, many of the island groups in the oceanic area between Australia and the United States have made the transition from territorial or colonial status to independence. On the whole, new island nations, on taking their places in the United Nations, have pursued independent but mostly Western oriented policies designed to assert their new status in the world. But this political independence has not brought them economic freedom. Obtaining enough resources to manage their own affairs free from outside interference is a perennial problem for the region's statesmen.

Currently, stated US objectives in the South Pacific region seem to flow from these developments and the policy of containment of the Soviet Union. The objectives were outlined in recent testimony by Mr. Edward J. Derwinski of the Department of State before the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs:

Our interests and objectives in the South Pacific are in the first instance strategic and political and, in the second, economic. Our principal policy objectives are to work with the region's governments to maintain a positive US presence in the South Pacific, to limit the influence in the region of hostile third powers, to foster the stability of the region's democratic institutions, and cooperate in the continuing economic development of the independent island states.¹

Regrettably, regional events of the last ten to fifteen years do not support this projection of regional peacefulness and tranquility that is accepted in Washington. The United States has handled certain key issues badly and insensitively, despite continuing rhetoric about its traditional policy objectives. In some of the new states, leaders are questioning the value of alliances and friendships based on the leadership of one major power, and questioning their assumptions about international affairs. They have growing suspicions about US motives and are

beginning to look elsewhere for support and assistance. The gradually increasing level of sophistication in the conduct of international relations in the region could result in significant, unsettling changes to Western Hemisphere security.

We need to arrest this unfortunate trend toward destabilization in time to prevent the undermining of regional US and Western security interests. To achieve this objective, we need a redirection of US policy. The new policy must restore confidence in the United States as a friend of the region and prevent a repetition of past mistakes. Three broad sets of issues impel adjustments to US Pacific policy and prompt implementation of appropriate measures.

NUCLEAR ISSUES

DISCUSSIONS OF EVENTS in the Pacific almost always include some consideration of nuclear issues. At present, many people in the United States think about nuclear issues and the region solely in terms of the argument with New Zealand over its anti-nuclear policy and the formal withdrawal of US security guarantees provided for under the ANZUS Treaty. To take such an approach, however, is to fail to comprehend the depth of feeling over nuclear issues that exists in the majority of the Pacific islands. There is a growing perception that some nuclear powers cannot, and do not want to, resolve or control important nuclear matters in the region.

Nuclear issues have been a priority in the Pacific area since 1966 when France transferred its nuclear testing facilities from Algeria to Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia, rather than to anyplace within metropolitan France. Almost immediately, countries in the Pacific region, particularly those with memories of the tests of the postwar decade, began to pay special attention to French activities in Polynesia. This attention had little to do with the Soviet Union or Soviet propaganda; it arose

because, apart from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Pacific islands and Australia have been the only locations in the Western world where nuclear tests have had a direct negative impact on indigenous peoples.

For example, US atmospheric testing at Bikini Atoll and Rongelap totally displaced the inhabitants of those islands, and not in a manner of which the United States can be proud. In Australia, the effects of British tests at Woomera and the Monte Bello Islands have only recently been the subject of a Royal Commission of Inquiry to find out if mistakes were made and to look at compensation matters.² None of these locations is yet fit for human habitation. This fact highlights the possible adverse consequences of an accident at any test site, apart from possible inferences based on the Soviet experience at Chernobyl.

Most countries involved with nuclear technology gain some economic benefits from the industry, commensurate with the risks involved. Except for Australia, however, none of the Pacific island states is capable of participating in any way in the nuclear fuel cycle. There is also concern that the Pacific region could become a dumping ground for nuclear waste materials. Thus, the islands perceive exposure to risks without possible economic benefits. Rather, they must focus their concerns on how to obtain revenues from their marine resources and the encouragement of tourism and investment if they are to survive. So, coupled with opposition in principle to French tests in Polynesia has been a secondary concern that nuclear tests or wastes dumped in the area could contaminate marine resources important to the food chain and to tourism.

The main point of contention surrounds French insistence on using Mururoa Atoll as a test site, especially since we know there are geological structures equally suitable for nuclear testing in metropolitan France. Countries of the Pacific assert that France should follow the lead of the United States in this matter. If continuation of nuclear tests is so vital to French national interests, then

tests should take place within the confines of metropolitan France. In this case, the people who gain the benefit of the technology would also accept the inherent risks. Only the end of nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll could relegate nuclear issues to a lower priority on the international relations agenda in the region.

Uncertainty and apprehension about nuclear issues have not been confined to the small Pacific island states. In New Zealand and Australia, similar attitudes are a matter of public record. In the late 1960s the NZ government rejected the proposed location of a US Omega VLF antenna in New Zealand unless it controlled antenna transmissions—a proposition to which the US government could not agree. In 1973 new Labor governments in both Australia and New Zealand sent one naval vessel each to Mururoa Atoll in an attempt to force France to stop nuclear testing. In the United Nations, the NZ government proposed a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Pacific, condemned French tests at Mururoa Atoll, and demanded their cessation. As a result of these initiatives, French tests were moved underground and UNGA Resolution 3477 sought to establish the Pacific weapons-free zone. In December 1975, both countries initiated action in the International Court of Justice to further restrain French nuclear testing.

After the electoral swing against Labor in Australia and New Zealand, in 1975 the traditionally conservative parties regained office. In opposition, the Labor parties of both countries began to develop new policies, more independent of other powers. They began to focus on the Pacific as the region of greatest importance to their countries. This tendency was greater in New Zealand than in Australia. Specifically, in New Zealand, as Dora Alves, a Pacific analyst at the US National Defense University, has noted, "Labour party members stressed independence in foreign affairs and, for the first time, pushed through at the annual conference, a motion that no foreign warships or aircraft that normally carried, or could be carrying, nuclear weapons would be permitted to visit New Zealand or use its facilities."³ The majority of Australians, on

the other hand, continued to believe that their country was still significant in world contexts. As a medium power, Australia had a responsibility to work toward conciliation between the developed and the underdeveloped world—a responsibility that would not permit unilateralist actions.

In New Zealand, issues of nuclear involvement were a much discussed centerpiece of the proposed independence in foreign policy because the ramifications for the ANZUS alliance were well recognized.¹ Before the 1984 election, Labour Party efforts to explain to the electorate the implications for ANZUS of the proposed policy change resulted in production of special materials designed to promote “informed” debate on the consequences of continued membership in the alliance. At the root of the anti-ANZUS argument is the assumption that ANZUS constitutes a “nuclear” alliance and that “unless nuclear warships and power stations are banned, the NZLP will have no credibility in its endeavors to support the Pacific peoples’ wish to end French testing, Japanese dumping, and superpower confrontation in the region.”²

The rest of the New Zealand story is quite well known. An NZLP government headed by David Lange came to power in July 1984. It decided to approve visits to New Zealand ports only by those vessels which in the NZ government’s opinion were “neither nuclear-powered nor nuclear-armed.”³ The purpose of this procedure was to overcome the nuclear powers’ policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons in their vessels. Shortly afterward, the United States sought approval for a visit to a New Zealand port for the USS *Buchanan*, a DDG2-class ship similar to some destroyers operated by Australia. The request tested the resolve of the NZ government. According to Lange, it was denied “because the government was unable to satisfy itself that the *Buchanan* was not carrying nuclear weapons.”⁴ A full scale row then erupted within the alliance. It resulted in the United States publicly withdrawing its guarantees to New Zealand under ANZUS⁵

and dropping other special arrangements set up under the Treaty.

Regarding these outcomes, the NZ Prime Minister has said that he regrets "the position of the US remains ... that the restoration of a fully operative ANZUS required New Zealand visits by its nuclear-armed ships." On the other hand the United States "said it could not be expected ... to carry out its obligations to New Zealand ... and it is ending its security obligations to New Zealand ... pending adequate corrective measures."⁹ The present positions of the two governments appear intractable.

This argument between once very close allies has increased tensions in the Pacific region. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, Lange made a number of points which deserve consideration, especially in light of how the row has affected perceptions in the Pacific area. First, ANZUS has been a very cost-effective alliance for the United States to date because it has provided the benefits of extending Western influence at little financial cost, since neither Australia nor New Zealand has sought or received American aid, economic or military. Second, New Zealand has given strong support in the South Pacific Forum¹⁰ to moves seeking to establish a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone as a means of enhancing regional security. Third, New Zealand has been militarily involved in Korea, Vietnam, and the Sinai Multinational Peacekeeping Force because the United States requested support and because New Zealand assumed a responsibility for trying to maintain world peace and stability. Finally, the fact that two solid treaty partners could possibly have taken such differing views of the character of an alliance should raise serious questions as to how the alliance would be managed and the security of the South Pacific maintained in the future.¹¹

The root of the problem lies in different perceptions about the nature of ANZUS and the Western alliance, according to Lange. In his view the United States has a global perspective which encourages a "unitary and

indivisible approach to foreign policy matters." Thus, US relations with smaller powers, friends or foes, are taken in the context of the East-West balance. Such a policy fails to differentiate between different parts of the world.

The strategic circumstances of the South Pacific are not like those in Europe or even in Northeast Asia. The South Pacific is not an area of superpower rivalry or confrontation, at present. The small island states see their security in economic as much as in military terms. In addition, to these states the Western alliance often appears monolithic—a fact which contradicts the very idea of a democracy embracing pluralistic values. This image is wrong, Lange says, because it is the Soviet bloc which establishes a total uniformity of views and allows no dissent, not the West. In Lange's estimate, US reactions are having two main effects. First, they are preventing others in the Western alliance from acting as New Zealand has. This denies the very pluralism which should be at the heart of the West's ideals. Second, they make it much harder for New Zealand, an important influence in the Pacific, to go on working toward the stability and prosperity of the South Pacific as it affects US interests.

Responses in the Pacific to the argument between these alliance partners are mixed. Fiji, for example, considers that its own security is threatened by a reduction of US activity in the region and holds New Zealand responsible. This attitude assumes that the ANZUS Treaty performs a role of guaranteeing the security of the entire South Pacific area. On the other hand, Vanuatu admires the New Zealand initiative. It is using the example to strengthen pressure for the adoption of nonaligned policies for the region. Regardless of their particular attitude, all countries have experienced some uncertainty over the issue. They now know that, in the past, differences existed between their perceptions of security and those of the United States and New Zealand. They also know that little effort was made to resolve these differences until it was too late.

Regional countries have believed for some time that the United States takes them for granted and does not consider them very important. In past months the special effort of important US commentators, such as the Secretary for Defense, to include NATO issues in the forthcoming election campaign in Britain has featured prominently in the media.¹² Its purpose is to confound the electoral chances of the British Labour Party, which has a stated policy of withdrawing approval for US bases and dismantling the British nuclear deterrent. In stark contrast, in 1984 when similar policies were on the political agenda in New Zealand, the US Embassy in Wellington merely issued some election-related tracts. Pacific leaders may ask where US leaders were when similar issues were on the agenda in New Zealand. Perhaps New Zealand's political agenda was not important enough. Maybe the United States has learned from the argument with New Zealand.

The new sophistication that has been developing in the region over the past decade is apparent in the politicization of the nuclear issue by Pacific island leaders in the South Pacific Forum. Some nations thought it was essential to obtain an international treaty on nuclear issues within the region to neutralize political activists trying to destabilize the region. They expect the United States, like all the nuclear powers, to stand up and be counted on its attitude to these important South Pacific issues through the mechanism of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty. The Treaty was adopted at Rarotonga on 6 August 1985 and ratified into international law when Australia, the eighth signatory, lodged its instrument in Suva on 11 December 1986.

In negotiations which produced the final form of SPNFZ, it was clear that some countries wished to adopt a Treaty which banned all nuclear activities. These countries argued that leading nations like Australia were acting as surrogates for US interest in seeking the means to enable the United States to agree to the protocols. The opposing view, which prevailed, was that a Treaty which

could offer no prospect of US agreement would be terminally weak, if not worthless, from the start.

To be fair, the primary intention of SPNFZ is to apply international pressure on France to stop nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll. Nonetheless, the Treaty also contains measures designed to determine the present attitudes of all the major nuclear powers to regional issues. Each nuclear power is asked to sign protocols which have the effect of recognizing certain principles of the Treaty and the desires of the South Pacific countries in their part of the world. Moreover, the Treaty is cleverly crafted to make the signing of the protocols acceptable to the United States. As stated by Derwinski,

Pacific island leaders also are aware that we do not and have no intention to dump nuclear wastes in the region. Our position on the regional nuclear free zone is equally well known in the South Pacific. We respect the concerns that prompted the region's leadership to support the creation of the Zone at the 1985 South Pacific Forum meeting. We likewise appreciate the effort Forum leaders made to accommodate our strategic needs in drafting the Treaty and its protocols. We have consulted with island leaders and our allies on this matter and are giving serious and high level attention to the Treaty and its protocols. It is our hope that the Administration will have reached an agreed upon position on the matter in the near future.

Prospects for the signing of the protocols by the United States, however, have never been high. US displeasure with New Zealand over the anti-nuclear issue, risks attached to creating a precedent, and potentially restricted options for relocating key strategic bases from the Philippines, together have worked against US acceptance of SPNFZ. An item in *The Washington Post* on 28 October 1986, for example, reported that the United States cast the only negative vote against a South Atlantic

"zone of peace" resolution, approved by the UN General Assembly 124 to 1, which called on members of the United Nations to respect the zone "especially through reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, nonintroduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction." In the opinion of the US delegate, the resolution implied "restrictions should be placed on naval access to and activity in the South Atlantic Ocean" which would be "inconsistent" with international law principles of freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage.¹⁴

As a precedent, SPNFZ is different. The protocols have three distinct aims. The first protocol seeks to ensure that the principles contained in the Treaty regarding the manufacture, stationing, and testing of any nuclear explosive device in the designated area would also apply within territories under the external jurisdiction of France, Great Britain, and the United States. The second protocol seeks guarantees from all the nuclear powers that they will not use or threaten to use any nuclear device against Treaty parties or within the designated area. The third protocol seeks guarantees from all the nuclear powers that they will not test any nuclear device anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. These objectives may not be as widely cast as those contained in the South Atlantic proposals, but nonetheless, they are difficult for the present administration to accept because of precedence and the possible limits they place on future actions.

The US administration's announcement on 3 February 1987 that the United States would not sign the protocols is in line with its previous policies. In response, apart from airing its general disappointment over the announcement, Australia expressed the hope that this decision would not be final. The Australian Foreign Minister has put forward the view that the "Treaty did not compromise Western strategic interests nor cut across the maintenance of stable nuclear deterrence . . . the Treaty was an arrangement which reinforced the favourable

security environment in the South Pacific and was fully consistent with Australia's support of the ANZUS alliance.⁷¹ Importantly, the Soviet Union was the first of the five nuclear powers to sign the protocols, on 15 December 1986, within a week of the Treaty coming into effect. China followed the Soviet example by signing the protocols in January 1987.

Nuclear issues have long been a cause for concern in the Pacific region. The main focus is to persuade France to stop testing at Mururoa Atoll and be sure that dumping of nuclear wastes at sea would not threaten the Pacific island economies. The row between the United States and New Zealand over anti-nuclear policies has created tension within the region and provided a focus for anti-US sentiments, particularly in the South Pacific Forum. Not all island states agree with the stand taken by New Zealand because of the security issues it raises.

The Forum has adopted SPNFZ, by which it hopes to obtain the agreement of the nuclear powers to maintaining the nuclear free status of the South Pacific within certain constraints. The Soviet Union and China have demonstrated their willingness to accommodate the wishes of the region. At present the island states do not expect France to sign the protocols. By also refusing to sign the protocols, the United States could seriously damage the level of pro-Western consensus within the South Pacific Forum, especially following the special effort made to accommodate US interests. Trust could also be destroyed, leaving each state more free to pursue its own independent policy.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

AS MANY OF THE ISLAND NATIONS came into being during the 1970s, one of their first administrative acts was to take up seats in the UN General Assembly. This action was an important status symbol. Membership in the United Nations provided an opportunity to participate in

discussion and decisionmaking in the world forum on a footing supposedly equal with every other nation. Moreover, participation in the work of the United Nations was a symbolic objective of the various independence movements because the organization itself is founded on the principle of self-determination.

Growth in membership of the world body was unprecedented during the 1970s, leading to a significant diffusion of power away from traditional power blocs. For example, the previous UN Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim, has observed that from an initial membership of 51 states in 1955 the membership grew rapidly with 16 countries joining in that year, some 17 countries joining in 1960 and thereafter new member states joining every year until 1984 when total membership reached 158 nation-states.¹⁶

On joining the United Nations in the 1970s, many of these countries became involved almost immediately in a significant undertaking of the international forum—the Third UN Conference on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS III). The Conference originated from a call made in 1968 by Ambassador Pardo of Malta for the creation of an international regime to govern the uses made of the seabed beyond national jurisdictions. Existing continental shelf agreements were based on the limits of an earlier technology of feasible exploitation. By 1968, such international agreements were quickly becoming obsolete. Improved technology which had been used, at least experimentally, to pick up manganese nodules and sweep for crustaceans not only on continental shelves but also on the deep seabed itself prompted Pardo's action. The following year, the United Nations responded by declaring a moratorium on seabed exploitation beyond the limits of national jurisdictions pending the establishment of an international regime. In 1970, it passed the "Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction."¹⁷ The United Nations made these areas, together with their resources, the common

heritage of mankind. Thereafter, increased pressure from many nations to sort out these, and other important issues in international law of the sea, resulted in the establishment of a Law of the Sea Conference under UN auspices in 1973.¹⁸

When signed on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was the culmination of nearly fourteen years of effort and compromise by all nations involved. For underdeveloped countries, this work was particularly significant because it presented an unsurpassed opportunity for them to gain access to economic resources previously the domain of only technologically advanced countries. The establishment of an International Seabed Authority to control exploitation of non-living resources outside all 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and administer the resources available inside EEZs, even if these had to be exploited by other countries, was an important part of the Convention.

The Convention is of particular interest to the Pacific island states because their economies have changed very little over the years. The problems addressed by an international conference held in Hawaii in 1981 illustrate this point:

Throughout the central and eastern Pacific from the northern Marianas to the southern Cook Islands, from Tonga to French Polynesia, local exports are still basically the same as eighty years ago: coconut products, mainly copra and coconut oil, supplemented here and there by relatively small quantities of fruit juices, bananas, vegetables, pearl shell, or handicrafts. . . . There have, of course, been changes; in the field of fisheries, for instance, tuna are now widely exploited, but this development is largely balanced by the fact that the tuna industry remains firmly in nonindigenous hands. . . . No Micronesian or Polynesian state or territory is . . . self supporting, and economic dependence is in most cases increasing.¹⁹

The maintenance of these basic economies is vitally important to the island states, overshadowing almost all other considerations. If they cannot survive economically it is certain they cannot survive politically. So in these important matters, and in the United Nations generally, they look for US leadership. Countries outside the region expect the Pacific island states to be strongly influenced in their attitudes to key issues by the dominating presence of the United States in the region.

For many of these small states, the track record of the United States in the United Nations has been disappointing. For example, in a recent edition of *World Policy Journal*, Robert C. Johansen takes issue with this poor record. He observes, "From the United Nations' founding until 1970, Washington never lacked a majority on important issues and never exercised its veto in the Security Council . . . [but] in the 1980-86 period, the United States vetoed 27 resolutions, while the Soviet Union vetoed only 4." Further, he argues that the administration has tied US foreign aid to a pro-US voting record in the United Nations and notes, "UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick recommended 'penalties for opposing our views' and 'rewards for cooperating' Her successor, Vernon Walters, has reaffirmed that aid will be reduced for countries who do not vote with the United States. . . . Any concern about the merits of particular issues or any acknowledgment of UN accomplishments is lost amid the administration's widespread criticisms."²⁰

After leaving the post of Secretary General to the United Nations after a long period of stewardship, in which many of the problems of growth in membership had surfaced, Kurt Waldheim observes that those who created the United Nations, and particularly Americans, expect too much of it. He says they have experienced great disappointment possibly because the words of the Charter enshrine much of the terminology of American political idealism.²¹ In efforts to reform the world body, the United States has restricted its commitment to the UN system by withdrawing from UNESCO, slashing its

funding of the institution, and promoting a weighted voting system which would give the United States a much greater say in deliberations.²² Johansen notes that when the United Nations was founded, the United States paid 40 percent of the total budget. Now, contributing nations pay between 0.1 percent and 25 percent of the UN budget depending on their capacity to do so. This results in the United States contributing less than the 28 percent it would if assessments were based on national income. On a per capita basis, US contributions are worth about \$0.85 annually. This means that people in 18 other countries, including nine Third World countries, pay more for the world body than US citizens. Yet none of these other countries enjoys the local economic benefits of having about half the UN budget spent there—benefits equal to about double the US contribution.

The reasons behind US policies are often poorly understood, especially by Third World countries. They think the real level of US support for their views is manifested in the record of votes taken in the General Assembly. In considering that record, Johansen makes a strong case that blatant self-interest in pursuing objectives associated with the East-West balance has substantially reduced the moral position of the United States as the leader of a cohesive Western alliance.

The rights and wrongs of the particular issues, or Johansen's interpretation of them, are not important here. It is important, however, to point out that key aspects of the US performance in the world forum can be interpreted in ways which could be inimical to its long-term objective of leading an alliance of like minded nations against the forces of totalitarianism represented by the Soviet Union.

For example, in his analysis of policy failures, Johansen notes one that is particularly relevant to the Pacific islands:

After eight years of negotiations among 133 countries, the United States rejected the comprehensive

treaty governing the use of the seas and seabed minerals, the limits of territorial waters, freedom of navigation on the high seas, fishing rights, and conservation of the marine environment. The international consensus was clear. Washington again stood outside it. The United States did not reject the treaty for security reasons. Rather, US officials undermined this effort to rationalize governance over large portions of the planet—areas where national sovereignty cannot fulfill necessary governmental functions anyway—in deference to the interests of US mining companies.²³

For many Pacific countries, the failure of the United States to accept the final UNCLOS III Convention is particularly serious, because it appears that their opportunities for economic advancement were deliberately undermined. It was not long before Pacific islands' disappointment over the US position turned to frustration and anger in disputes concerning fisheries.

The Convention deals at length with the rights and duties of coastal states in the respective zones it establishes, including EEZs. Article 56, for example, gives the coastal state "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living." Further, in Article 61, the coastal state "shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in its EEZ," but under Article 62, "where the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch it shall ... give other states access to the surplus."

In addition, the coastal state has the ability to make laws and regulations to govern licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels, and equipment, including the payment of fees and other forms of remuneration, including appropriate enforcement measures permitted under Article 62. As far as highly migratory species of fish are concerned, under Article 64, the Convention requires the coastal state and other states whose nationals fish in the region

for highly migratory species to cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations to conserve the species within and beyond the respective EEZs.

Most Pacific island nations were quick to establish and proclaim their 200 mile zones of national control over resources. The specific nature of the jurisdictions varies, but nearly all of them include exclusive authority "to regulate foreign-flag fishing activities within their zones."²⁴

Understandably, these claims are important to the islands since they could provide substantial benefits from the exploitation of apparently abundant tuna fish. There was an estimate in 1981 that the total tuna fishery in the Pacific had an annual value of US\$300 million. If a reasonable proportion of this value could be realized by the island states, they might get some US\$15 million to help them balance their budgets.²⁵ This would be a significant benefit by their standards. Although the islanders hope to participate in tuna fishing, as well as to collect fees for access to the fishery, the technology and investment necessary to exploit the resource properly has not been readily available to them. This has made their leverage weak in negotiating for economic advantages.

Shortly after the signing of the Convention, and its acceptance by the Pacific island states, clashes of interest over tuna fishing began, involving members of the American Tuna Boat Association and the authorities in these small states. For their part, US officials argued initially that since the United States had not accepted the Convention, it did not recognize any legitimate rights of a coastal state over tuna fisheries. Tuna fish were deemed a highly migratory species exclusive of state controls. Yet while officials argued that this policy should apply in the Pacific islands situation, the United States was trying to apply a different policy in respect to another type of highly migratory species, salmon, to prevent Canadian fishermen catching them inside some kind of "coastal state" regime surrounding the continental United States and Alaska. Tuna do not exist in great numbers in US waters, but salmon do.

The effects of this conflicting interpretation of international law, which the islanders viewed as grossly unfair, were made worse by the effects of the Magnussen Act,²⁶ which imposes embargoes on fish exports to the United States coming from any country which has arrested any US fishing vessel and confiscated it, for whatever reason. US fishermen thus were protected by economic sanctions provided for by domestic US laws.

An early arrest occurred in Papua New Guinea. Later, a US vessel was arrested and held for some months in the Solomon Islands. Bitter negotiations between the United States and the Solomon Islands took place before resolution of this matter. Other clashes have taken place. There are cases on record of US fishing vessels deliberately flouting island fishing laws, apparently safe in the knowledge that, if caught, Uncle Sam would protect them. Within the region, Australia supported the actions taken by the Solomon Islands in arresting the *Jeanette Diana* and then confiscating it. Threatened US embargoes forced the Solomon Islands leadership to make a politically unpopular decision on this matter to avoid serious damage to the economy.

People in the region became very angry over such issues. In the Solomon Islands, the response was to suggest publicly that they allow the Soviet Union, already proved willing to pay fishing fees, access to Solomon Islands waters for fisheries purposes. Indeed, after this incident the government of Kiribati entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union directly after the breakdown of negotiations with the American Tuna Boat Association. Under that agreement, the Soviet Union paid about US\$1.6 million to Kiribati for fishing rights. This sum constituted some 13 percent of the government's annual budget, and it enabled budgetary outlays in Kiribati to be independent of aid for the first time.

Once the serious consequences to US and Western security of a breakdown in relations were appreciated, the US State Department began negotiations to attempt to conclude a multilateral fishing deal with the countries

of the South Pacific. This deal is to be completely separate from the Convention. In Kiribati, renegotiations with the Soviet Union have not been as productive as the islanders had hoped; perhaps the catch for the Soviets in the first year did not seem worth the investment. Kiribati seeks a long-term commitment. Meanwhile we await the final outcome of the State Department effort.

The failure of US policymakers to be sensitive and even responsive to issues, such as the one on tuna fishing, has clearly resulted in opportunities for the Soviet Union in the South Pacific region. Following its agreement with Kiribati the Soviet Union was able to position about 16 fishing vessels south of Hawaii, directly on a principal trade route between the United States and Australia.

Soviet activity has not been restricted to Kiribati. In June 1986, Fiji announced that it would consider granting fishing rights to the Soviet Union, and in August, Papua New Guinea made a similar announcement. In time, the need to generate cash may overcome the islanders' fear of the Soviet Union in many other parts of the region.

In Vanuatu, however, other developments suggest that it might already be too late for the United States to recover lost ground and prestige. These developments concern negotiations with the Soviet Union, initially over fishing, but with even more sinister potentials. Indeed, in the last week of January 1987, an agreement for fisheries access to waters around Vanuatu was concluded. Future agreements may allow deep water ports to be used by the Soviets and also permit them to use shore facilities and airfields, nominally for crew exchanges. In return for fishing rights, Vanuatu expects to receive about US\$6 million. This sum may significantly exceed the cash available to Vanuatu when the State Department deal, currently expected to be worth US\$2.5 million annually, is concluded.

Consequences such as these were predicted. They followed from the initial failure to accept the UNCLOS III Convention. In summer 1982, for example, Leigh Ratiner, a former US negotiator at UNCLOS III, made the following observations in an attempt to alert responsible policymakers to the potential problems:

On April 30, the United States was the only Western industrialized country to vote against the final treaty adopted in New York ... if the United States stays out of the sea law treaty, and most major nations join it, we risk conflict over American assertions that we are entitled ... to rights embodied in the treaty related to navigational freedoms, exclusive economic zones, jurisdiction over our continental shelf, fisheries, pollution control and the conduct of marine scientific research.... Should all this come to pass—and it seems likely it will—we will suffer a significant, long-term foreign policy setback with grave implications for U.S. influence in global economic and political affairs.²⁷

The failure of the United States to provide leadership and support for emergent Pacific Island states by not acceding to a properly negotiated agreement on the Law of the Sea and by its record in the United Nations has resulted in rising suspicions that US policies disregard the interests of smaller states when commercial or super-power advantage is involved.

After initial disappointment over the US refusal to sign the UNCLOS III Convention, tuna fishing disputes between US nationals and the authorities in the islands have provided opportunities for Soviet expansion into the area. Island leaders are slowly becoming convinced that Soviet fishing agreements are harmless ways in which to raise enough income to survive, despite protestations from Australia and the United States over the strategic implications.

SELF-DETERMINATION ISSUES

IN THE IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PERIOD the United States staunchly advocated and actively supported the granting of independence to many Pacific colonies and territories, particularly those governed by European powers. Today most island groups are self-governing with only a few colonial regimes remaining. At present, the most prominent independence issues in the region directly involve

the United States and France, the only two colonial powers left. The attention of the other nations in the region is focused on them and the prospects for achieving independence for all island people in the Pacific.

US Trust Territories

Currently, actions associated with the United States' relinquishing the UN trusteeship over Micronesia are well underway, although some unexpected problems have arisen. One report observes, "after 17 years of difficult negotiation, the islands of Micronesia are scheduled to leave behind the ... trust that has governed them since World War II ... [but] the Soviet Union has said it will veto present dissolution plans, which call for the islands' defense to remain in US hands and Washington to retain rights of 'strategic denial' of access to Micronesia by other military powers."²⁸

To foster a continuing association, the United States plans to provide US\$3 billion in development assistance over the next 15 years for the three new states of Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau, recently renamed the Republic of Belau. This assistance is conditional on these countries continuing to be bound by provisions contained in the "Compact of Free Association" as approved in plebiscites held in the territories in 1983. A fourth trust territory, the Northern Mariana Islands, has voted to join the United States as a commonwealth similar in status to Puerto Rico.

The Compact requires the United States to defend the islands. It gives power to Washington to establish military bases and conduct military operations as desired and to block access to the islands by any third nation. While it appears to give the United States almost complete freedom in managing island foreign and security policies, the Compact arrangement is not necessarily permanent. As with most international agreements, any of the parties can end the Compact with six months' notice, and renegotiation of the terms is required after 15 years.

Soviet Intentions The Soviet Union has stated already its position on the Compact arrangement. When

the Security Council debates the dissolution proposals, as legally it must, the Soviet Union intends to veto them. If this occurs, the United States could consider the option of unilaterally declaring the trusteeship at an end and carrying out its program anyway. Though such an action might not be welcome because it is unilateralist, its intent would probably not find much criticism in the Pacific, were it not for a serious problem which has cropped up in one of the islands.

Anti-Nuclearism in Belau The problem centers on the passage of a constitution by Belau that would prohibit the use, testing, and storage of nuclear weapons in the Republic. This restriction is contrary to the terms of the Compact proposed by the United States, which has been repeatedly approved by plebiscite. Now the US administration is insisting that the new constitution must not include anti-nuclear provisions if the Republic is to gain the benefits of the Compact arrangement. One main strategic problem for the United States could be that Babelthuap, the main island, is a viable alternative position if the US bases in the Philippines have to be relocated following a breakdown of negotiations in 1991. In a challenge in the High Court of Belau in September 1986, however, the nuclear transit provisions in the Compact were declared unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid. At present, US officials are considering holding another plebiscite to try to obtain the necessary 75 percent of votes to overcome the anti-nuclear provisions of the constitution. On both sides, patience on this issue is wearing thin.²⁹

Delays Originally, 30 September 1986 was the deadline for dissolution of the trusteeship arrangement, but difficulties have prevented its achievement. More time is required to resolve these matters. Despite these difficulties with the United States, many of the other states in the region will be envious of these new states when they become independent, because of US support given to them over the past forty years. Even so, many important leaders in the region believe that past aid to these island groups has prevented the development of independent attitudes appropriate for today's world.

French Possessions

While members of the South Pacific Forum will be watching developments in Micronesia, the real focus of their attention will be on the policies being adopted by the French concerning independence for its territories. Much of the emotion generated against the French presence relates directly to continued French use of the South Pacific as a nuclear test site despite strong objections from all other independent states in the region. The United States needs to understand that its responses to these issues are being closely watched for any hint of duplicity and collusion with France. The two large powers cannot continue to disregard regional attitudes without inviting appropriate responses. If the United States fails to respond to this issue with vigor and by providing leadership, then it risks being considered in the same "league" as France—the pariah of the Pacific.

New Caledonia At present, New Caledonia is the main point of interest for most of the independence activities taking place within the region. The island is populated by a mixture of French settlers (36 percent), Kanaks or Melanesians (43 percent), and non-indigenous islanders (13 percent), with the remaining people being mainly from Indonesia and Vietnam. The Kanak community, in particular, is seeking an independent Kanak state so it can share similar rights and privileges to those enjoyed in the other Pacific islands.

In recognition of the potential problem posed by Kanak attitudes, the French government took a number of steps aimed at slow evolution toward the eventual granting of independence. In considering Kanak claims, President Francois Mitterrand was also mindful that the rights of the French settlers and others would have to be guaranteed, especially in terms of their land, citizenship, and economic interests. In July 1983, in a conference held at Nainville-les-Roches, Kanak claims were clearly acknowledged, but efforts were also made to explain the French government position that Kanak rights were only supportable as they fitted in with the rights of all the

other ethnic groups on the island.³⁰ To lend credibility to the seriousness of its intentions, the French government fixed elections for 14 November 1984 in which all persons resident for three years or more on the island could vote for a new Territorial Assembly. It promised also that a referendum on New Caledonia's future would be held before the end of the Assembly's term of office in 1989. Full independence was to be a clear option in the referendum.

Despite these good intentions, the Front National pour la Liberation Kanake et Socialiste (FLKNS), the Kanak-based independence front, decided to boycott the elections and do its best to disrupt them. This decision followed an assessment by the Kanaks that they could not obtain a majority of the electoral vote in a franchise based strictly on time of residency rather than ethnic background. According to projections, the FLKNS worked out that Kanaks would not be assured a racial majority until sometime in 1995.³¹ A franchise based on ethnicity alone would have been contrary to French constitutional guarantees. As a result of the Kanak plan, there was unrest and limited violence at the time of the elections and ever since, because, as Alan Ward states, "many of the settlers have for years been openly spoiling for an excuse to take up their own guns" in response to Kanak violence.³² To stabilize the situation, a skilled French negotiator arrived in New Caledonia in December 1984 with instructions to find a solution. He announced on 7 January 1985 that a referendum would be held that July to decide on independence, in association with France, effective from 1 January 1986. However, even this tactic failed to diffuse the low levels of violence that were occurring. Peace was eventually restored only after a state of emergency had been declared and curfews imposed.

In July 1985, President Mitterrand announced plans to build a new strategic base in New Caledonia. Although the planned construction is to be modest, the base is part of an upgrade of the *force de frappe*. The announcement is a clear indication that the French plan

to continue testing at Mururoa Atoll until well into the 1990s, and possibly also a sign that effective French control over the island will not be surrendered easily.²⁷

A new government gained office in France in March 1986 amidst apprehension that initiatives achieved by the socialists in New Caledonia would be lost. Indeed, on 29 August 1986 the Chirac government stated its preference to retain possession of the island as part of France. The new government also made it clear that it would do its best to ensure a majority votes against independence. As bait, Chirac offered US\$125 million in aid and establishment of 10,000 new jobs to help stimulate the economy. In response to these announcements and plans, FLKNS activists threatened to use increasing levels of violence to destabilize the island.

South Pacific Forum Interest—The issue of New Caledonia attracted much attention at the meeting of the South Pacific Forum in August 1986. Member states agreed that recent developments had reversed the progress made under Mitterrand. They also agreed to request the reinscription of New Caledonia on the UN list of non-self-governing territories through the Committee on Decolonization (the Committee of 24). This action is intended to ensure regular UN review of the territory's progress toward self-government and independence, which is to be achieved by peaceful means. The Forum also warned that a plebiscite which resulted in a majority opposing independence could serve only to exacerbate the territory's problems. Shortly afterwards, the FLKNS congress reaffirmed its position that only Kanaks should vote in the plebiscite and that its members would boycott any referendum which included non-Kanaks.

The Forum's interest has angered French authorities, who have reacted with a particularly bitter attack on Australia's Prime Minister because of Australian support of UN involvement in the issue. In fact, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution reinscribing New Caledonia as a French dependent territory on 2 December 1986, with 89 votes in favor, 24 votes not in favor, and 34 abstentions. Among

votes supporting the resolution were those cast by China, Japan, and all member countries of ASEAN.

Libyan Connection Connections with Libya already have produced unfortunate side effects for regional security. In October 1984, 17 Kanak militants accepted paramilitary training provided by Libya, with the leader of that group eventually being killed in a shoot-out with French authorities in New Caledonia. In January 1986, Libya appeared to be sponsoring another 20 Kanak militants to attend a "summit of liberation movements" which includes elements of the PLO; these militants might have received further military training. Australia has been especially vocal in condemning these developments, even to the extent of trying to divide FLKNS leadership over this matter. Most of these contacts between FLKNS representatives and Libya are apparently organized through contacts in Vanuatu.

Vanuatan Policies Vanuatu has a record of developing relationships with some very undesirable regimes. By the end of last year, for example, Vanuatu had established diplomatic relations with Cuba, Libya, the Soviet Union, and Nicaragua. This situation is causing concern in nearly all the other countries of the region. As an example of the effect of this unfortunate trend, one analyst has reported, "Vanuaaku members [from Vanuatu] together with Kanak activists and OPM guerrillas attended a March 1986 terrorist summit held in Tripoli where the South Pacific was high on the agenda and reports indicate a decision to establish a fighting force, or revolutionary committee, to cover the area."³⁴

Uncertain Future How this issue of self-determination will be decided is very difficult to predict. Little doubt exists, however, that eventually independence will come to New Caledonia. At present, the prospects for a peaceful solution to this problem do not look promising. It would be better for the region and for US interests in the area if independence could be achieved without any more bloodshed.

Current Difficulties The situation is delicately balanced at present. Kanaks are determined to secure independence for themselves, even at some cost, over time. There is also considerable potential for further communist penetration of the region under the guise of "assisting the FLKNS" to secure its goals. This development would create a real difficulty for moderate pro-Western forces in the region, represented by countries such as Australia and Fiji. Moreover, dealings with a prominent European power over this issue have turned out like a game of double jeopardy, mainly because that power does not seem interested in listening.

For the United States, there are added difficulties. If the United States does nothing to advance the cause of New Caledonian independence, it will be regarded as having little interest in supporting legitimate groups to obtain their freedom. Accusations of betraying fundamental ideals on the grounds of "realpolitik" due to US-French alliance interests in Europe, even though France is not a military member of NATO, will be possible. On the other hand, we can expect France to react strongly to any hint of US interference in this matter, as it has done already over Australian involvement. Nonetheless, current "wait and see" policies being adopted by the United States seem destined to result in further alienations in the region and unfavorable shifts in the strategic balance. Hard policy choices may have to be made soon.

US INVOLVEMENT IS IMPORTANT

I HAVE BROADLY ANALYZED three issues which have reduced the level of US standing within the South Pacific region. On balance, the record shows a paucity of comprehensive and active policies to deal with key problems and an indefinable lack of interest in the area. The overall strategy for dealing with the region over the past decade or so might be described as one of "benign neglect." Regrettably, regional discontent over US insensitivity to one issue has already led to Soviet encroachments into the area.

An Alerted United States US strategic analysts tell us they are well aware of the potential problems the current situation poses for Western security. A recent commentary by Paul Dibb, a Washington analyst, concerning the administration's position on a recent review of Australian defense interests included such a reference:

Armitage also contests the idea that the Soviets pose no threat to Australia. The Soviets are expanding in the Pacific and, with a permanent presence in Cam Ranh Bay, already have a strategy to make political inroads among new Pacific nations, and to diminish Western influence as much as they can. Further, he says: 'We are uncertain how long it will be before they make physical inroads.' Over time, they could pose a threat—militarily—to Australia.³⁵

Further, Armitage implied that the United States is now alert and responding to these potential security problems. He also said, "Australian leaders have made us aware that we should take an active interest in the developments in the South Pacific."³⁶ Despite this assurance that the United States is taking a positive interest in the region, the record of US performance there over the past five years is still a cause for serious concern. Moreover, Australian attempts to generate interest in the region in Washington have been going on for some time without much success.

Earlier Warnings To illustrate the importance which Australia has, in the past, placed on alerting US policy-makers to key issues in the region, a previous effort bears examination. In a speech presented in Washington, DC, on 24 September 1985, His Excellency the Ambassador of Australia, Mr. F. Rawdon Dalrymple, recounted a previous visit he made to Washington in 1976, exactly nine years before, to carry out just such a task with a representative of the New Zealand government. Two main issues prompted the visit. First, proposals for 200 nautical mile EEZs in the UNCLOS III negotiations had made

Australian and New Zealand authorities acutely aware that the new zones, if implemented, would produce a substantial change to the resources and sovereignty map of the South Pacific. Resultant changes to the political framework of the area would be of strategic importance to the Western allies. Second, the Soviet Union had just begun to take an interest in the area through discussions with Tonga over developmental issues. US policymakers were thus alerted to the possibilities.

According to the Ambassador, the US position on management of the area was quite clear:

But it was and continued to be the United States position, and it is a position which I think is a respectable and understandable one, that the South Pacific within the alliance context should remain primarily a responsibility of Australia and New Zealand.... It was never expected or hoped that you would develop large aid programs for the South Pacific. In any case large aid programs are neither appropriate nor required for states which have such small populations and indeed such relatively simple economies. But attention is required, interest is required, and above all it is important to show respect and to avoid actions which are counterproductive to alliance interests in that part of the world.⁵

Lost Opportunities—Given the special effort made over ten years ago to alert US policymakers to the potential problems of the region, the record of performance in paying special attention to the South Pacific region is quite poor, in spite of the rhetoric. In fact, our position was much better in those days to deal with potential problems than it is now. New Zealand was still very much a partner in the ANZUS alliance and a mainstay for promoting US interests. Political unrest in the South Pacific and subversive leanings to highly undesirable Third World countries were unknown. US leadership was still highly valued and respected.

Not Yet Too Late I do not intend to analyze why US interest in the region appears to have lacked a sense of purpose and direction. I do, however, want to drive home two very important messages for the future. First, the presence of the alliance has been effectively reduced to one country in terms of promoting the interests of the West on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, the track record of the immediate past few years suggests that the interests of the West are being slowly eroded despite a concerted effort by Australia, assisted as possible by New Zealand, to provide good leadership and advice, especially in the South Pacific Forum. From the analysis of issues in this essay, one significant conclusion might be that maintenance of the status quo is beyond current Australian capabilities alone. If the situation is to be altered to the good, the United States will have to do more than simply show the "active interest" that Armitage has suggested is enough.

Second, it should be apparent from the foregoing analysis that the situation, in terms of the strategic balance, is deteriorating daily with diminishing prospects of corrective action being taken. The change is not dramatic, but nonetheless, it exists. There does not seem to be much time left in which the United States can afford to regard matters in the South Pacific with indifference in the hope that the problems will go away.

Proposed Policy Options

A positive US commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the South Pacific region is necessary. A coordinated and cohesive policy to deal with important regional questions could assist the United States in restoring its prestige and credibility in the South Pacific region. At present, little direct investment in the area is practical, and most islanders would not welcome it. They are looking for workable economic benefits, not hand-outs. New measures should imply an acceptance of the importance of the island states, encourage their economic growth, and maintain their political stability. The following specific measures deserve consideration:

- The provision to France of underground nuclear testing facilities in the United States on an equitable basis, along the lines of the programs undertaken already with the United Kingdom. The offer should be made public with emphasis given to abandonment of the Mururoa Atoll site and to safeguarding of French rights to their independent nuclear deterrent.
- The speedy conclusion of the fishing agreement with the island states, even if costs to the United States of licensing are somewhat higher than expected. Encouragement of the growth of the Pacific island tuna fishing industry would provide, over time, indirect economic assistance to countries in the region through licensing or direct fishing assistance.
- Reconsideration of signing the protocols to SPNFZ as a matter of respect for the political activities of the region while, at the same time, acknowledging that US nuclear ships will continue to visit those countries which permit them.
- Application of diplomatic pressure on France to obtain assurances that a plan for the granting of independence to New Caledonia will be resurrected with a realistic timetable attached.
- Establishment of diplomatic ties, at sensible levels, with all the countries in the South Pacific, together with consideration of appropriate methods for coordinating limited and equitable aid programs throughout the region.

Consequences of a Failure to Act

These policy initiatives seek to align US expressions of interest with those of the Pacific Island states. The proposals are based on the concept that the United States is

a Pacific power. The United States is going to have to establish a priority between safeguarding its own interests and ignoring French activities in the Pacific. Even though this is a tough choice to have to make, it is sensible to suggest that US interests in the South Pacific are vital and far more important than avoiding the issue of the French presence in the Pacific. After all, France is a European power, not a Pacific one.

Soviet Presence If the United States is incapable of changing its policies to support the island countries and therefore unable to become more directly involved in the important issues of the area, then the prospects for the future strategic balance in the region look bleak. It is too facile to suggest that Soviet penetration of the area has been solely of Soviet design when a regional perspective suggests that the United States has, even inadvertently, played a significant role in encouraging regional states to foster that particular relationship.

There should be no doubt that the Soviet Union is watching developments in the South Pacific and preparing to exploit any opportunities presented. On 28 July 1986 in Vladivostok, Secretary General Gorbachev outlined an ambitious new policy that included extensive diplomatic ties and economic interests throughout the Pacific region and the establishment of a new Pacific Ocean Department within the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Mr. Gorbachev made the special point that the "Soviet Union is also an Asian and Pacific country" in his explanation of heightened Soviet interest in the area. Recent developments in Vanuatu demonstrate the seriousness with which the Soviets are pursuing this policy.

Statement of US Policy There are some Americans who are taking an active interest in these important security issues. In his testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Derwinski of the State Department explained that a basic concern of the United States was that the Pacific region should not be transformed "into yet another area of superpower confrontation." Further, he said,

We should keep in mind when examining Moscow's new found interest in the Pacific islands that we have been an active force in the political, economic and social development of the region since the early 19th century. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has never been an important or particularly interested participant in the development of relations between Pacific islanders and their neighbors on the Pacific rim. Should the region become a new stage for East-West confrontation, island leaders will understand that the responsibility lies with the Soviet Union.³⁸

Soviet Advantages If my analysis in this essay is correct, then island leaders probably do not share Derwinski's assumption that the United States has been an active political, economic, and social development force within the region. Indeed, the Soviets could well be exploiting a position of being economically helpful and understanding of regional issues as they seek to extend their influence. Their readiness to agree to fishery licensing arrangements and to sign the protocols to SPNFZ exemplifies their perception of important current Pacific issues.

The proposition that Soviet influence could gain a foothold in the region without support being provided by some of the island states is not credible. Rather, limited regional support for Soviet opportunism must be an essential condition for any significant expansion in the area. Island leaders are beginning to question whether there is much to choose from between the United States and the Soviet Union as friends when it comes to pursuing their national interests.

An Island Decision To be sure, the decision about the spread of Soviet influence in the area over the next decade or so will be made in island capitals. It will be a decision over which the United States and Australia will be able to exercise little direct control, apart from relying on the past and present record as perceived by respective

national leaders. If we fail in the task of keeping the island states inside the Western strategic alliance, Australia and the United States will have to face up to the security implications of further Soviet expansion.

Security Implications

Observing the proximity of parts of the Pacific region to the United States, if the Soviet Union is able to enter the area in significant force, the United States will not be able to disregard such developments. They would be inimical to US national security interests. The United States would have to respond directly by substantially increasing its own military commitment and presence in a part of the world that was previously considered secure.

In a similar fashion, Australian security interests would also be threatened. This outcome would be regrettable for Australia given the substantial effort expended on behalf of the Western alliance. In this case, however, Australian security interests are inextricably linked up with the success of US policies within the South Pacific region, especially since the two countries are so closely aligned under the ANZUS Treaty.

Cheaper Alternative The cost of acting now to implement new policies and accommodate the economic consequences of providing realistic support for the Pacific region would be quite small by the normal standards of foreign aid. Even the consequences of opposing French Pacific policy might also be acceptable because, in the longer term, if nothing is done the United States must be prepared to face competition from the Soviet Union throughout the Pacific region as well as in the rest of the world. Without associated increases in force levels to compensate for this eventuality, the current US global strategy would be weakened substantially with little prospect of a change for the better. The added cost of providing increased force levels in the long term to counter Soviet expansion in the South Pacific region would inevitably be much more expensive than funding the limited proposals in this paper.

Lesson from History The examples I have analyzed in this essay are drawn from Pacific island activities over the past fifteen years. Although the most recent times have produced the greatest number of incidents, the policy of "benign neglect" has been in existence for at least the same fifteen years.

In 1984, American historian Barbara Tuchman wrote *The March of Folly*, in which she related some classic examples of governments pursuing policies which were contrary to their self-interest. For her rules to apply, folly could only take place if three criteria are fulfilled: first, the policy must be perceived as counterproductive in its own time; second, a feasible course of alternative action must be available; and third, the policy should extend beyond one political lifetime.³⁹

Her treatise includes an account of "the series of dramatic events by which, over fifteen years, Britain's George III and his government mindlessly and repeatedly injured their relations with the American colonies, made rebels where there had been none, played deaf to the rising discontent that rang in their ears ... and as a result forfeited control of [the] ... continent."⁴⁰ She particularly identifies the following British attitude:

The ... ministries went through a full decade of mounting conflict with the colonies without any of them sending a representative, much less a minister, across the Atlantic to make acquaintance, to discuss, to find out what was spoiling, even endangering, the relationship and how it might be better managed. They were not interested in the Americans because they considered them rabble or at best children whom it was inconceivable to treat—or even fight—as equals.⁴¹

Students of early American history may see many parallels between the current situation in the South Pacific and the neglect that brought about the American revolution. British attitudes to the American colonists, as

Tuchman identifies them, seem remarkably similar to current US attitudes to the South Pacific region. The South Pacific region, however, is not yet lost. If new US policies can be implemented soon, Soviet penetration of the region can be limited and perhaps even reversed. We might be able to avoid committing our own modern day "folly" in alienating countries in this part of the globe.

NOTES

1. Testimony given by Edward J. Derwinski from Department of State before Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 10 September 1986. Derwinski's statement before the House Subcommittee, 10 September 1986.
 2. Justice James R. McClelland, *The Report of the Royal Commission into British Nuclear Testing in Australia. Vols. 1, 2 and 3*, Canberra: AGPS, 1986.
 3. Lora Alves, *Anti-Nuclear Attitudes in New Zealand and Australia*, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1985, p. 21.
 4. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26. Alves discusses in detail the development of policies during the period out of government and gives credence to the idea that NZLP knew full well the risks of the policy on which it would embark if it came into government.
 5. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
 6. David Lange, "New Zealand's Security Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1985, p. 1011.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 1011.
 8. *Washington Post*, 12 August 1986, "US Severs Defense Alliance With New Zealand".
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. A consultative group comprising Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. The Federated States of Micronesia has observer status.
 11. Lange, pp. 1011-1015.
 12. An example of the type of interest that could have been shown is reported in *Time*, 13 October 1986. Secretary Weinberger and Assistant Secretary Perle have appeared on British television over the issue.
 13. Derwinski's statement before the House Subcommittee, 10 September 1986.
 14. *Washington Post*, 28 October 1986, "S. Atlantic Peace Zone" in "Around the World."
 15. Statement recorded in Commonwealth Record, 2-8 February 1987, p. 118.
 16. Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations: The Tarnished Image," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1984, p. 96.
 17. Resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970.
 18. Ivan A. Shearer "International Legal Aspects of Australia's Maritime Environment," *Australia's Maritime Horizons in*
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the 1980s. Australian Centre of Maritime Studies, Canberra, 1982, p. 5.

19. Arvid Pardo, "The Emerging Marine Economy of Micronesia and Polynesia: A Possible Scenario", Conference on *The Emerging Marine Economy of the Pacific*, Stoneham, MA: Butterworths Press, p. 5.

20. Robert C. Johansen, "The Reagan Administration and the UN," *World Policy Journal*, Fall 1986, p. 604.

21. Waldheim, p. 94.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 106. The Kassebaum amendment limits the annual US contribution to 20 percent of any UN agency budget unless that organization adopts a system of weighted voting on budgetary matters.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 611-612.

24. Dean H. Robb, "Foreign Fishing Access Regimes in the Pacific Basin," Conference on *The Emerging Marine Economy of the Pacific*, p. 107.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112. These estimates may be quite conservative, according to Robb.

26. US Code.

27. Leigh S. Ratiner, "The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1006-7. Ratiner notes also that up to the accession of the Reagan administration the United States was committed to the Convention, but even then efforts were made to water down the seabed mining implications. In its final negotiating session, he states, the United States adopted a tough uncompromising position which convinced the developing countries that the United States had no real interest in a comprehensive treaty. Further, he observes that there was a "volte face" in the Defense Department which had earlier been "a strong unyielding supporter of the successful conclusion of the treaty" because of the stability that would accrue especially with many provisions favorable to the mobility of US forces. With the new administration the Department changed its view substantially arguing that the navigation rights would become customary law anyway and that unfettered access to "strategic" raw minerals was a national security interest—pushed mainly by the civilians.

28. Tom Ashbrook, "Challenge to US in Pacific," *Boston Globe*, 28 September 1986.

29. Tom Ashbrook, "A Prized Bull's-Eye," *Boston Globe*, 29 September 1986.

30. Alan Ward, "New Caledonia: Trouble in Paradise," *Current Affairs Bulletin*, University of Sydney, March 1985, p. 28.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

33. Denis Warner, "The Pacific isn't Pacific," in *Pacific Defence Reporter*, February 1986, p. 29. Warner outlines the plans to upgrade port and airfield facilities but notes that the key is maintaining a chain of communications between France and the Pacific testing ground. His article quotes ALPACI as stating, "If France believes that it should maintain a presence in the Pacific, then the geographical situation of New Caledonia and of Polynesia assumes a strategic importance." Warner says that since "France has made the political decision to upgrade its nuclear forces, and Mururoa is the only apparently feasible weapon testing site, then ipso facto, both Polynesia and New Caledonia are strategically important."

34. Colin L. Rubenstein, "Trouble Makers in the Turbulent South Pacific," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, October 1986, p. 9.

35. Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*. Canberra: AGPS, 1986.

36. Howard Handleman, "Whither Australia? US has Major Reservations about Dibb Report," *Pacific Defence Reporter*, August 1986, p. 45.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Address to Asia Society/Washington Center on Partners, Friends and Allies: Australia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, 24 September 1985.

39. Barbara W. Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*, Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1984, p. 5.

40. *Ibid.*, publisher's notes.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

4

**SPACE CAPABILITIES:
EMERGING DETERMINANTS
OF NATIONAL POWER**

**Simon P. Worden
and
Bruce Pitcairn Jackson**

*Control of space will be decided in the next decade,
and the nation which controls space can control the
Earth.*

*—John F. Kennedy
October 24, 1960*

ALL NATIONS have national security objectives, even if they are as nebulous as ensuring security, preserving the balance of power, or maintaining strategic stability. In order to realize these objectives, those charged with executive responsibility use national power. The concept of a nation's *power*, difficult to quantify, is generally understood as a complex function of military, economic, and political attributes. The way we configure these attributes to support our national security objectives is our *strategy*. In this essay, we consider how the nature of military power changes with technological progress and is determined by key technical capabilities. Given what we now know of our likely technological capabilities in

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the 1990s, we can begin to discuss the key national power determinants of the next century.

Historically, formal calculations of military power involved both the medium of conflict—the physical environment, sea, land, or air, in which or through which a physical effect might be exerted—and the force which could be brought to bear in that medium. The second consideration involved the determinants of that physical effect—those things which translated directly into striking power, such as the size and armament of land armies. For example, the medium in World War I was the continental landmass of Europe. The determinants were both the quantity of armament which could be produced and the speed with which armament could be delivered to the front and engaged in the battle.

In 1945, the development of nuclear weapons produced a new determinant of military power. And when the destructive force of nuclear explosions was projected by ballistic missiles through a new medium—outer space—national strategies altered drastically. The United States and the Soviet Union have since developed strategies centered upon nuclear weapons delivered by ballistic missiles. Nuclear weapons also have mass destruction “side effects,” which these strategies have incorporated. To some it appears that strategy has developed more around the side effect of collateral damage than around the military potential of nuclear weapons, particularly with the “Mutual Assured Destruction” approach to strategic analysis. The United States and its allies calculate the ability of their forces to sustain their strategy from “post exchange ratios”—a comparison of expected damage done to each side after a nuclear exchange. Similarly, Soviet strategy revolves around nuclear weapon determinants. The core of the Soviets’ approach, however, is the result not so much of a calculation of damage expectancy, but of a calculation of relative levels of opposing sides’ military power—a “Correlation of Forces” analysis.

Technology has recently allowed us to take fuller advantage of the medium of space than the 10-30 minute

passage to which the relatively inefficient ballistic missile limited our systems. The first effect of this change, realized in the March 1983 beginnings of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), was the possibility of ballistic missiles themselves becoming obsolete. It may well be, however, that this effect is the first of many changes in our strategy, and that new capabilities coupled with a growing capability to operate in space will emerge as determinants of national power. The determinants of national power in space may well cast as long a shadow on political events and strategy as that cast by nuclear weapons.¹

Military power bears many similarities to political power. The key to both is action at a distance—the ability to work one's will without being nearby. The more forceful the action, the more timely, the greater precision with which it is applied, and the greater distance over which it is effective, the greater utility military or political instruments possess. We believe that the emerging space capabilities of the world's leading nations will soon overtake nuclear power as the prime determinant of national power. This essay discusses the technical and strategic implications of these technological advances.

TECHNICAL FACTORS

BEFORE THE INVENTION of nuclear weapons, military experts regarded the introduction of new technologies into the inventory and then into national strategy as a slow, evolutionary process. New technologies increased absolute military power and shifted relative political power, but at a leisurely pace. Military strategists carefully studied the influences of a weapon's power in order to understand when and how those new weapons would affect military affairs. Nuclear weapons, however, burst upon the scene so suddenly and so impressed civilian strategists that these studied approaches were lost in the strategic shuffle. Assessing the potential effects of new

technological factors today, though, strategists often rediscover the older work.

Airpower's emergence in World War I provides an excellent example of how a new capability was analyzed and then integrated into military thinking. Because aircraft operated in a new medium and had easily definable characteristics—speed, armament, range—air warfare was relatively easy to model mathematically. F. W. Lanchester's 1916 book, *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm*,² was the hallmark work of those years. Lanchester is now best known for his "state equations"—mathematical relationships showing the relative power of two opposing forces. The state equations demonstrated that a military force's power relative to opposing forces varies as a square of its firepower, meaning a small difference in two forces' firepower can translate into a decisive battlefield advantage. For example, if a side has 70 percent of the firepower of its opponent, it will be only half as powerful as the adversary. Although efforts to apply these relationships to more general military engagements have failed, the equations remain valid in cases, like air warfare, where most features of the battle are quantifiable.

In the 1920s an obscure Italian General, Giulio Douhet, recognizing air warfare's potential to dominate the European land battle, developed a strategy based on air technology and air warfare. His strategy—in his book *The Command of the Air*—advocated crushing air attacks against the enemy homeland and war-making potential.³ Douhet's ideas provided the strategic rationale for Allied and German bombing campaigns during World War II. At least in the West, Douhet's assertion of the dominant influence of offensive air attack against unprotected urban-industrial targets and war-supporting industry has persisted through the nuclear era and continues to underlie US nuclear strategy.

Recently, few people have paid attention to the influence of technological innovation in developing national strategy. We tend to forget that what we wish to do strategically depends almost entirely upon what technology

allows us to do. Perhaps the best work in this area was J. F. C. Fuller's 1945 *Armament and History*.⁴ Fuller, a proponent of another technological innovation, mechanized tank warfare, listed five qualitative parameters determining a weapon's overall power:

- Range of Action
- Striking Power
- Accuracy of Aim
- Volume of Fire
- Portability

Of these parameters, Fuller gave priority to the first, Range of Action. In the modern nuclear era, accuracy has become a key parameter.⁵ Nuclear weapons release a huge amount of energy—but it is not directed. In a nuclear explosion the energy density—how much destructive energy is deposited per unit of volume in a target—falls off as the third power of distance from the nuclear explosion. A nuclear weapon which is twice as accurate is eight times as powerful as the less accurate weapon of the same explosive yield.

Fuller's first three parameters can be combined into a late twentieth century parameter known as "brightness." Laser weapon engineers use brightness to measure a laser's capability, but it can be adapted to a more general military purpose. Brightness combines range, striking power, and accuracy into a single measure of the energy a weapon puts into a conic volume of space. Physicists measure brightness in Joules (a unit of energy, about what it takes to tap your finger on the table) per Steradian (a unit of conic volume, about the size of a megaphone, determined by relating accuracy and range).

Brightness alone is not a complete measure of military effectiveness. Firing rate—represented by Fuller as Volume of Fire—is also important. To determine the firing rate, we must consider two factors: how many "rounds" the weapon fires during a battle and how much time it takes the weapon to get into position to fire. For

example, an army might have 10,000 artillery rounds, but if it takes between one and two weeks to get into position (10^6 seconds), the total firing rate averaged over both the time it takes to get into position and the time of the battle could be quite low. In the example here the firing rate would be only 0.01 per second.

So the basic measure of military effectiveness for a given weapons system is⁶

$$\text{Effectiveness} = \text{Brightness} \times \text{Firing Rate.}$$

With this equation it is possible to evaluate a range of weapons over the past millenia in terms of their overall effectiveness. In this way we can see how new space capabilities, such as kinetic energy or directed energy weapons, might stack up against earlier weapons. Table 1 lists brightness per unit of time calculated for various weapons systems. Brightness has been totaled for all weapons involved in a battle and averaged over both the time of battle and the time it takes to get into position for the battle. Figure 1 plots these results in graphic form.

Kinetic energy weapons kill a target by striking it. At the relative velocities involved in space operations (tens of kilometers per second), kinetic energy is much more significant than any conventional explosive, approaching nuclear energy levels. A ten-ton projectile dropped from a distance as far from the earth's surface as the moon would strike the earth with almost a kiloton of kinetic energy. More important than the level of energy is the fact that, unlike nuclear weapons, this energy is "directed" in a precise way. A kinetic energy space weapon need be no more complex than an air-to-air missile mounted on a satellite. Directed energy weapons, by comparison, fire energy in the form of light (lasers) or atomic particles (particle beams). These beams travel at or near the speed of light (300,000 kilometers per second).

Table 1 shows some interesting comparisons. Both kinetic energy and directed energy space weapons are at least as powerful as nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. Directed energy weapons, the

Table 1. Weapon effectiveness

<i>Era</i>	<i>Weapon</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Brightness</i>	<i>Firing Rate</i>	<i>Effectiveness</i>
1000 AD	Arrows	6 months	10^8 J/Sr	10^{-2} /Sec	10^6 J/Sr/Sec
1500 AD	Bullets	3 months	10^9 J/Sr	10^{-1} /Sec	10^8 J/Sr/Sec
1800 AD	Artillery	1 month	10^{12} J/Sr	10^{-1} /Sec	10^{11} J/Sr/Sec
1900 AD	Artillery	1 week	10^{14} J/Sr	10^0 /Sec	10^{14} J/Sr/Sec
1930 AD	Aircraft	1 day	10^{16} J/Sr	10^{-1} /Sec	10^{18} J/Sr/Sec
1950 AD	Aircraft	1 day	10^{23} J/Sr	10^{-2} /Sec	10^{21} J/Sr/Sec
1970 AD	ICBM	1 hour	10^{23} J/Sr	10^{-1} /Sec	10^{22} J/Sr/Sec
2000 AD	SBKKV	1 hour	10^{23} J/Sr	10^0 /Sec	10^{23} J/Sr/Sec
2020 AD	Laser	5 minutes	10^{22} J/Sr	10^2 /Sec	10^{24} J/Sr/Sec

J = Joules; Sr = Steradians; Sec = Seconds

ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

SBKKV = Space-Based Kinetic Kill Vehicle

more advanced technology, have the long-term edge because they can get into position rapidly and fire at extremely high rates. A special kind of weapon, the nuclear directed energy weapon, is not addressed here. These devices are hybrids of nuclear and directed energy weapons which use a nuclear explosion to power the directed energy beam. Because these are single shot devices, however, their firing rate will be very low. The low firing rate makes them less effective than non-nuclear directed energy weapons, even though the brightness of each shot can be extremely high. The conclusion is significant. Non-nuclear weapons, combined with space-basing, are potentially more militarily effective than nuclear weapons.

What, then, are the capabilities that will interact with this clear potential to form the determinants of national power in space? What are the space capabilities that really matter to great nations? The key to these questions is provided by the concept known to space scientists as




Figure 1. Evolution of military effectiveness. Calculations of military effectiveness for the principal weapons systems of the past 1,000 years. The measure is "brightness" per unit time, where time includes both the time it takes to get into position to engage the enemy and the time of the actual battle. Brightness is a technical term used by laser engineers to characterize laser performance. However, it also embodies most of the historical determinants of a weapon's power. Note that weapons over the past 1,000 years show a smooth increase in brightness. Nuclear weapons are not wildly outside this curve—nor are they the last word. The final two points of this curve are space-based kinetic energy and directed energy weapons.

the gravity well, illustrated in Figure 2.⁷ To take an object from the surface of the earth to some very great distance, a large amount of energy would be required. To place the object in an orbit near the earth would still take substantial energy, but less than that required to get into deep space.

For an object dropped from space, on the other hand, gravity accelerates the object down toward the earth. The farther from earth the object starts, the faster it will be going when it strikes the earth. Gravitational "potential" energy gets turned into kinetic energy of motion. An object dropped from lunar orbit would hit the earth at about 20 kilometers per second, with kinetic energy that could be many kilotons if the object was large.⁸ Since the earth is the source of the gravity which accelerates the object—and the farther from the earth the object is taken, the more potential energy it possesses—the earth is said to sit at the bottom of the gravity well. (See figure 2.)

The gravity well diagram is an easy way to measure space capabilities. By considering how much mass a nation can put into space, and how far a nation can place it up the gravity well, we have an excellent measure of a nation's space capabilities. It takes energy to climb out of a gravity well. For mass on the earth's surface, this energy is now supplied by rocket motors which boost the mass up the well.

There are, in fact, two gravity wells to consider. The first, of course, is the earth's. But the earth also sits in a much deeper gravity well—that of the sun. To truly measure the potential energy of an object in space we must consider, once out of the earth's well, where it sits in the sun's gravity well. The farther from the sun an object is, the more potential energy it has.

There are two ways to position a nation's assets within these gravity wells. Currently, the only means we have to move mass into and around in space is to launch it from the earth's surface on top of large chemically-powered rockets. The more mass we wish to put




Figure 2. Inner solar system gravity wells. To lift payloads from the earth and place them into orbit in space takes energy. We now generate this energy as a rocket's energy of motion. As the rocket coasts upward after firing, the expended energy of motion (kinetic energy) converts to the potential energy of height (gravitational potential energy). To lift a payload free from earth's gravitation we must expend as much energy as if we were to haul that payload against the full force of gravity we feel on the earth's surface to a height of 4,000 miles. To reach the nearer goal of low earth orbit (LEO), where rockets and their payloads orbit just above the atmosphere, only requires half as much energy—still equivalent to climbing to 2,000 miles. All large objects in space—the sun, moon, and planets such as Mars—have these gravity wells. Smaller objects, such as the Moon and Mars, have wells much less deep. The sun's gravity well is far deeper.

up, or the farther up these wells we want to go, the more powerful our launching rocket must be. In the future, however, we may be able to make use of material already in space, far up the gravity wells of the earth and sun.

As an illustration of how, decades from now, access to material already in space could become more important than the ability to launch material from earth, consider a few long-term possibilities. For example, we might get material from the moon—almost completely out of the earth's gravity well. We would need first to get it out of the moon's own gravity well, but it is very small (see figure 2). Or we might use some of the numerous small "islands" in space, known as asteroids. Most of these are only a kilometer or so across, and many come within easy range of the earth. Some asteroids are made of water ice, others of almost pure iron; some scientists think certain asteroids are made of nearly pure platinum group metals. These are all the ingredients needed by future space systems, and they are ready for our use far up the gravity well.⁹

In addition to an object's general position in the gravity well diagram, there are some special locations in space of particular interest to national strategists. These locations are analogous to Admiral Mahan's nineteenth century sea lines of communication and naval choke points. Like their naval counterparts, these positions in space possess special attributes of military significance and can dominate space operations.

The first such space "line of communication" is the polar low earth orbit. Normally, it is cheapest and easiest to launch payloads into an equatorial orbit. The satellite then orbits over a narrow band of latitudes centered on the equator, missing areas in the far north and south—the Soviet Union and Western Europe are beyond the field of view. If, instead, satellites are launched due north or south, such that their orbits pass over the poles, they will pass over nearly every point on the globe several times in the course of a day.

The second critical space location is geostationary earth orbit, or GEO. Satellites in orbit about 40,000 kilometers above the equator take exactly 24 hours to orbit the globe. Thus, a satellite in GEO is always directly over a single point on the ground. This orbit is ideal for communications systems and early warning sensors because the satellite is always available at the same point in the sky to relay data to points on the earth up to a hemisphere away. Ground-based relay antennas, once pointed at the satellite, do not need to move to remain locked on the satellite.

The third important location in space is a set of positions where the gravitational attractions of two large celestial bodies—the earth and moon are of primary interest here—exactly balance. For each set of two celestial bodies of gravitational significance, these equilibrium positions are known as the system's Lagrange points. There are five points in each system. Lagrange points are important since it takes minimum energy to move from them to any other point in the system. In a sense they represent the equivalent of high ground. By "taking and holding" the Lagrange points, an anti-satellite or other military system would have done the equivalent of gaining the high ground. As we move out into space beyond the earth-moon system, the Lagrange points defined by the sun and earth become similarly important for dominating operations within the inner solar system.

Currently, the basic space-capability measure is the ability to place mass just outside the atmosphere into low earth orbit, or LEO. This position is about halfway up the earth's gravity well. The Soviet Union has recently tested a heavy-lift launch vehicle that can place over 100 metric tons at a time into LEO. By comparison, the US space shuttle is capable of carrying less than 20 tons. With an expected launch rate of at least ten of these giant "Energia" rockets per year, the Soviet Union will soon be able to place several million kilograms—the equivalent of a small naval destroyer—into LEO each year. By comparison, the United States will, with the shuttle back on

line, be limited to a few hundred thousand kilograms per year—about the size of a modest pleasure yacht. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan would take a dim view of the resultant imbalance in the "fleet."

SPACE AND SOVIET STRATEGY

AS NOTED ALREADY, Soviet strategic analyses differ from the Western exchange calculations. The Soviets measure the quality of their strategic posture not so much by what they can do in a nuclear exchange, but rather by their capabilities relative to the capabilities of potential adversaries. The Soviet measure of this relationship between their military power and that of their adversaries is known as the Correlation of Forces.

In Soviet doctrinal writings, the Correlation of Forces analysis is a precise calculation of relative military power. The Soviets take great pains to ensure a true quantitative measure of each side's military potential. Overall military strength, force vulnerability, and strength of enemy defenses all enter the calculation. From these numerical measures of power, the Soviet strategist can calculate when and where to strike, and when to hold fast or retreat.

One other Soviet concept—the concept of stability—differs significantly from its Western counterpart. Stability for the Soviets is not the Western concept of a balanced international system. Rather, stability is a situation where military variables are known and predictable. The Soviet objective is to completely quantify a situation through a Correlation of Forces analysis, wherein, by eliminating uncertainty, the Soviets can maximize the advantage their "scientific" approach affords, whether in military or political affairs.

In the 1960s, Soviet strategists developed Correlation of Forces analyses for nuclear weapons, the preeminent weapons of the day. These equations, to the best of our knowledge, were first set forward in the classified Soviet

general staff journal by Major General Anureyev in 1967.¹⁰ This basic analysis, with some modifications, appears to have been the basis of Soviet strategic analyses since that time. By the 1980s, the Soviets had built a large Correlation of Forces advantage over the United States in nuclear forces.¹¹ This advantage gives the Soviets formidable bargaining capital in arms control talks, as demonstrated by their newfound ability to make marginal "concessions" in order to lock in long-term advantage.

The Soviets have long been aware of space capabilities' effects on the power balance. The classic 1960s book, *Soviet Military Strategy*, attributed to Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Sokolovskiy, emphasized the preeminent role of nuclear weapons in Soviet strategy.¹² However, in its first edition (1962) the book incorrectly quoted President Kennedy as saying that the nation that controlled space would control the earth, and that space supremacy was the US aim.¹³ By the late 1960s, as it became clear to the Soviets as a result of the US Apollo program that Soviet space efforts were falling behind, the Soviets began to use arms control as an obstacle to US space activities. This tactical adjustment, however, did not banish discussions of space capabilities from Soviet writings. By the time Marshal Sokolovskiy's third edition of *Soviet Military Strategy* appeared in 1968, military space discussions had been moved totally into the realm of "foreign" and "Western" efforts.

In the 1980s, strident Soviet demands for banning all weapons in space have been the order of the day. Although much of the Soviet political effort has been directed against the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), it is by no means clear that effective missile defenses are the sole or even top Soviet concern.

The military potential of the US space shuttle as an effective "space truck" frightened the Soviets. The 1979 anti-satellite talks broke down over Soviet insistence that the space shuttle was a military weapon that should be banned. The effect of the shuttle on Soviet thinking is

shown most clearly in the degree to which their own shuttle, soon to be launched, resembles the US version.¹¹

Recent Soviet writings provide several important clues about the importance the Soviet Union ascribes to space capabilities. The Soviets understand well the potentially dominant position of space capabilities, as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, they regard space systems as the most destabilizing of military systems, because they inject the greatest uncertainty into the Soviets' strategic plans. Recent writings by senior Soviet officials, such as Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy, equate space weapons with nuclear weapons in their effect on the strategic balance.¹² This emphasis is reflected in Soviet propaganda concerning SDI, which concentrates on the danger of an arms race in space rather than on the virtues or failings of missile defense.¹³

Soviet propaganda attacks US military space efforts on several grounds. Public statements usually focus on the possibility that new space weapons will mean even more terrible mass destruction capabilities than nuclear weapons. However, these charges are usually backed up with only the writings of putative US experts such as those who, in 1985, made the technically dubious suggestion that a space-based laser system could start firestorms in cities.¹⁴ The Soviets have also professed to see yet another military "spinoff" from the SDI. They have gone on to point out that space-based systems could hit key air, ground, sea, and military command and control installations in an effective surprise military attack.¹⁵

A brief glance at long-term Soviet strategy shows why the Soviets find space weapons so threatening. Soviet strategic thinking in the 1980s has increasingly emphasized non-nuclear capabilities. The Soviet ground forces seem to be regaining their traditional role in Russian history as the preeminent military instrument.¹⁶ Even in the heyday of Soviet nuclear strategy, the 1960s, the Soviets placed their army only slightly below their nuclear forces in importance. As they move away from reliance on nuclear instruments to sustain their strategy,

their ground forces return to center stage. Western space capabilities, however, can threaten both pillars of Soviet military strength—their nuclear forces and conventional land power.

Space-based strategic defenses will negate and make obsolete Soviet nuclear offensive forces. To understand this notion, consider once again the lessons of history. Whenever the side planning an offensive had free reign to use the battle space between himself and the defender, it was easy for the offense to dominate defenses. The failure of the French Maginot line provides an example of such offensive dominance. With ample uncontested maneuver space, the German offensive merely had to punch through the single line of defense at points and times of their own choosing. Even simpler, the German army could go around the unfinished defenses—as it did in its 1940 attack on France.

However, in cases where the defense operated throughout the battle space separating the defender from the aggressor, the defense often dominated. In the Allied North Atlantic defense in World War II, such a multi-layered defense proved highly effective. Even though individual defensive layers might be weak, they can combine to wear down an offensive strike so badly that an aggressor is usually deterred from launching such a strike.

In the case of missile defenses, 1960s systems such as the US Safeguard had two layers operating in only the final minutes of an offensive nuclear warhead's flight. As the late 1960s anti-ballistic missile (ABM) debate proved, these systems could do little to alter the dominance of offensive nuclear missiles. However, future defenses would have many layers, some operating soon after an offensive missile lifts off, in what is known as its boost phase. The combination of layers based on differing technical approaches makes effective offensive countermeasures difficult if not impossible. The key to this effective defense is the presence of defensive layers in space, operating through nearly the entire flight path of an attacker.

But more significantly, other space capabilities could provide an even more potent and decisive counter to Soviet ground forces than did Western nuclear weapons in the decades past. The reason for this space-dominance is clear. At any point on the globe where the Soviets contemplate a conventional attack, Western space systems would be ready to respond almost instantly.

An example of such space-dominance is provided by US concern over Soviet ocean surveillance systems. The US Navy relies on its surface forces remaining undetected. Soviet ocean surveillance sensors—their Radar Ocean Surveillance Satellite (RORSAT) and Electronic Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (EORSAT)—may be able to find US naval forces and direct Soviet munitions against them. This threat is one vital reason why the United States urgently needs and is developing anti-satellite systems—we simply cannot allow the Soviets to have an effective gunsight in space during a conventional conflict. The vital shock element of a conventional offensive would be lost due to these space capabilities. This is only one example of how space capabilities can dominate terrestrial operations; there are many others. Taken together, these emerging space possibilities will have an effect on ground forces similar to their effect on nuclear offensive missiles. Simply put, space capabilities will make massive conventional force attacks obsolete.

Soviet responses to the putative threat of space weapons have focused on an aggressive public relations campaign. The Soviets' effective campaign to link US space activities to an arms race in space has almost arrested US military use of space. The US Miniature Vehicle Anti-Satellite Program was an early casualty of this effort. More to the point, however, the Soviets are themselves rapidly developing a coercive advantage in the key measure of national power—the ability to place large masses into LEO. They are accomplishing this under the context of manned Mars missions, manned space stations, and scientific exploration of the universe.²⁰ In the extreme, the Soviet strategy could keep

the West out of space except for some modest scientific programs.

The Soviet position is that space programs other than their own should be multinational efforts. They have proposed to supply space launch assets so that Western nations would be spared the expense of developing independent capabilities. This condominium in space exploration would allow the Soviets to amass an enormous Correlation of Forces advantage in the parameter that really matters in the decades ahead. The effect of this advantage would be analogous to the situation which would have existed in the 1950s had the Soviets, and not the United States, had a massive aircraft industry and a large capacity to produce fissionable material.

US STRATEGIC ANALYSES

IN CONTRAST TO the Soviet correlative calculations, US strategy is firmly fixed in nuclear exchange calculations.²¹ For the United States, deterrence is served as long as we can retaliate effectively against the Soviet Union. The basic US analysis proceeds from a Soviet first strike on US retaliatory capability, calculating the damage done in the US counterattack. Although there is much public discussion on whether the retaliatory targets are Soviet cities (countervalue) or the Soviet military (counterforce), actual US targets have always been the Soviet military. The US objective in a retaliatory strike is to destroy the Soviet Union's capability to continue the war. If US strategic forces can credibly threaten to accomplish this objective, we believe we have an effective deterrent.

Across a standardized Red target base composed of Soviet nuclear systems, command and control facilities, other military targets, and critical leadership and war-supporting industry, the United States measures the effectiveness of its deterrent forces in terms of the damage expected to be done by a retaliatory strike to a set of Soviet targets. This "damage expectancy" is

expressed as a percentage, derived from a complex calculation of accuracy (circular error of probability, or CEP), multiple targeting, target hardness, launch failure rates, and other considerations. Today, according to open source Soviet literature, our damage expectancy in a US retaliatory strike is about 60 percent averaged over all target sets.²²

As the Soviet Union increases its passive and active defenses and increases its ability to effectively strike US retaliatory forces, that damage expectancy drops. To preserve the US deterrent, US strategists must confront the alternatives: increase the survivability of US retaliatory forces or increase this force's effectiveness against Soviet targets. The great debate of the early 1980s was over this choice. The Scowcroft Commission argued for more survivable mobile systems, such as the small mobile ICBM; others, including Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle, pressed for more accurate, thus more effective systems such as the MX ICBM and D-5 SLBM.

In the context of these exchange calculations, the addition of more militarily effective non-nuclear technologies and systems is destabilizing. As these powerful new capabilities emerge, they will invariably make it more difficult to accomplish damage expectancy objectives using the ballistic nuclear systems. This obsolescence can readily be seen in the effect that increasing strategic defense effectiveness has on exchange calculations. As defenses grow in effectiveness on *both* sides, it could be increasingly hard to maintain a high damage expectancy in a US retaliatory strike.²³

A SNAPSHOT OF Soviet and US strategic programs in 1987 suggests that the United States is resolutely clinging to obsolete determinants of power, while the Soviet Union is moving confidently into the 1990s and beyond. The Soviet Union has moved beyond the alternatives which nonplus US strategists. The Soviets have elected to build both mobile systems, such as the SS-X-24, and other

increasingly capable ballistic systems, such as the SS-25. But this investment is marginal compared to their pursuit of space and space-related programs. An incomplete list of some examples includes the following:

- (1) The Soviets have established the territorial base for an ABM system in which the Krasnoyarsk radar figures prominently. They have argued that the Krasnoyarsk facility is a deep-space radar while the United States has argued that it is for ABM purposes. Our point in this essay is that it is necessarily both.
- (2) They have established a near-permanent, manned military presence in space with their Soyuz and Mir space stations.
- (3) They have deployed a heavy-lift launch vehicle, the Energia, which will soon support a space shuttle system.
- (4) They have deployed a second generation system of a two-layer ABM defense around Moscow which also has significant anti-satellite potential.
- (5) They have an operational anti-satellite system.
- (6) They have made substantial progress in high-powered lasers to support space-denial or ABM missions.

By contrast, the United States has had few successful space launches since 1985 and has had no manned missions longer than 7 days since the early 1970s.

Given this situation, a cynic might conclude that Soviet intentions in the arms control talks in Geneva are little related to the neutralization of Western Europe and still less informed by altruism regarding nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, Soviet intransigence in the

Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva is a positive function of the degree to which the Soviet Union would benefit from perpetuating the space asymmetries we have described.

The Soviets recognize that the primary measure of national power in the decades ahead will be the ability to place large amounts of mass up and out of the gravity well. With their new heavy-lift launch vehicle, they are building this ability as rapidly as possible. Their arms control and political efforts are also bearing fruit by stalling most US space launch efforts. For example, Congress has slashed Defense Department proposals to construct heavy-lift launch vehicles on the pretense that these funds will be used to launch a premature strategic defense system into space. Congress is also making every effort to block military use and support of space systems like the space station. If these roadblocks persist, the United States will wake up some day in the not too distant future to find that its nuclear power is irrelevant and that its adversaries have built a dominating lead in what really matters. The fact that the Soviets achieved their advantage under the guise of a peaceful exploration of space will provide little comfort.

If we in the United States are to execute our responsibilities in the world and protect our national security, we must recognize the criteria under which national power will be determined. The United States must build and keep a comfortable margin in space capabilities over potential adversaries. After the year 2000, the amount of material the nation can place in space will be far more important than any nuclear or conventional force measure. If the United States does not at least match the Soviet ability to place a few million kilograms a year into LEO, it will find itself very much a second-rate power.

The United States has the technologies in hand to build and maintain a solid lead. The first step is to immediately construct a heavy-lift vehicle capable of placing 100 metric tons per launch at LEO. Improvements to this system should eventually lower launch costs by up to a

factor of ten from what they are today (thousands of dollars per kilogram for the space shuttle). We must then be prepared to follow with systems such as the "spaceplane"—capable of "flying" into orbit at costs at least a factor of ten lower than today's.

Once the United States recognizes that military power will be dominated by new determinants, it must develop new strategies based on them and new military systems to support those strategies. We therefore have two tasks. First, as described above we must at least match our potential adversary in the emerging power determinants. Second, and more important, we must consider a new strategy based on non-nuclear space systems.

The Strategic Defense Initiative is clearly one element of that new strategy, but it is insufficient without an overarching National Space Policy. The United States must also develop space capabilities which can deny adversaries benefits from their massive conventional investments. The first of these developments can take the form of improved sensors that act as force multipliers: the faster and better we locate opposing forces, the more effective our own ground forces can be. But eventually, we must use our emerging space power to directly counter conventional attacks, as nuclear weapons currently do. As space-based systems exceed the capabilities of those nuclear weapons, there is no reason that the new systems cannot be even more effective in deterring conventional aggression.

In the context of future power relationships, nuclear power—and conversely nuclear disarmament schemes—will be largely irrelevant. National use of space is what will matter.

NOTES

1. Although there is general acceptance of the proposition that technology influences strategy, there have been few careful studies of these influences. Since the advent of nuclear weapons, strategists have tended to follow Bernard Brodie's view, expressed in his articles (see *The Absolute Weapon*, edited by Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1946)), that nuclear weapons simply made obsolete all previous military strategy. The most reasoned views on this subject are, therefore, pre-nuclear. One of the best is J. E. C. Fuller, *Armament and History* (New York: Scribners, 1945).

2. The first modern quantitative "analysis" concerned World War I aircraft. It was F. W. Lanchester's *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm* (London: Constable and Company, 1916). Unfortunately, only Lanchester's state equations, developed in chapters 5 and 6, are remembered now. The rest of the book should also be read as an example of how technology can fundamentally change strategic doctrine, while building on what has gone before. Lanchester's square law has been roundly criticized by late twentieth century analysts. It appears applicable only in cases where the sides are forced to conduct a battle without interruptions or retreat, a rare occurrence in conventional warfare. Interestingly, a space-to-space exchange may best model Lanchester's scenarios.

3. Giulio Douhet was an Italian general and World War I aviator. His works, written during the 1920s, suggested that airpower could restore Italy to its historical position of greatness. Needless to say, Douhet's ideas appealed to Mussolini's Fascists. An English translation of Douhet is *The Command of the Air*, translated by Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1942). For more information of these effects, see Brent Scowcroft, "Understanding the U.S. Strategic Arsenal," in *Nuclear Arms, Ethics, Strategy, Politics*, edited by R. James Woolsey (San Francisco: ISC Press, 1984).

4. J. E. C. Fuller, *Armament and History*.

5. Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," *Commentary*, June 1983, pp. 15-35.

6. For the purpose of this analysis, we calculate the collective "brightness" of all the weapons involved in a military campaign.

7. The illustration and discussion of the "gravity well" concept have been drawn from the space exploration community. See *Report of the National Commission on Space: Pioneering the Space Frontier* (New York: Bantam, 1987) pp. 59-73.

8. The Arizona meteor crater is a result of a collision with a meteor weighing thousands of tons. Its impact released megatons of kinetic energy. For an interesting view of military applications of this phenomenon, see Daniel Dudney, "Unlocking Space," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1983-84, pp. 91-113.

9. The most useful materials in space are not metals--not even precious ones. Simple water ice may be most valuable. Solar power can be used to "crack" water into its constituent hydrogen and oxygen. These are the basic fuels for moving around in space and are used today in the Space Shuttle's main engines. Ice is probably absent on the moon, but may exist on asteroids in large quantities.

10. Major General I. Anureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," *Voyennaya Mysl* ("Military Thought"), No. 6, 1967.

11. See, for example, Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Strategic Programs and the U.S. SDI," *Survival*, November-December 1985, pp. 274-292.

12. Marshall V. D. Sokolovskiy's *Soviet Military Strategy*, 3rd Edition, translated by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1980). This seminal book on Soviet strategy by the Soviet military leadership was originally published in 1968 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968). Earlier editions appeared in 1962 and 1963.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 456. President Kennedy did point out in 1960 that the nation controlling space could control the earth. He did not, as Sokolovskiy asserted, state that such space dominance was the US goal. The correct quotation begins this essay.

14. *Soviet Military Power* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 6th Edition, March 1987) pp. 53-58.

15. Recent Soviet writings refer to the present strategic situation as the "nuclear space era." Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy, *Security in the Nuclear Space Era* (Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, November 1985) stresses the equivalent danger from nuclear and space arms.

16. The titles of Soviet writings on SDI focus on space rather than missile defense. These books, written by "The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, Against the Nuclear Threat," include *Space Strike Arms and International Security*

(Moscow: October 1985, handed out to the press before the November 1985 Geneva summit conference), *Weaponry in Space: The Dilemma of Security* (Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1986), and *'Star Wars': Delusions and Dangers* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1985).

17. Recent Soviet writings are moving away from the view expressed in Marshall Sokolovskiy's *Soviet Military Strategy* that war will inevitably start with massive nuclear exchanges. The Soviets now emphasize that conflict could, and should be kept conventional. A recent work pressing this line is Colonel General M.A. Gareyev, *M.V. Frunze—Military Theoretician: The Views of M.V. Frunze and Contemporary Military Theory* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985).

18. Albert L. Latter and Ernest A. Martinelli, *SDI: Defense or Retaliation* (Marina del Rey: RDA/Logicon, May 28, 1985).

19. Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, *Against the Nuclear Threat, Space Strike Arms and International Security* (Abridged), p.49.

20. The mass to LEO requirements for a vigorous NASA program in the decades ahead, including a lunar base and a manned mission to Mars, are very similar to that needed for a space-based defensive missile system deployment—several million kilograms per year. This is about what Soviet capabilities will be in the 1990s. Clearly, under the guise of "peaceful" space exploration the Soviets will have available sufficient launch capability for massive military use of space in a short time. Data from the SDI Organization, Department of Defense, Office of Survivability, Lethality and Key Technologies, July, 1987.

21. Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1959, pp. 211-234.

22. The 60 percent US damage expectancy against Soviet military targets is an oft-quoted number. It has even been used by the Soviets themselves. See, for example, Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace, *Against the Nuclear Threat, Strategic Stability Under the Conditions of Radical Nuclear Arms Reductions* (Moscow: April 1987), p. 18.

23. For an example of the negative effect mutual strategic defenses have on an exchange calculation, see US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, OTA-ISC-254, September 1985), pp. 93-116.

STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND SECURITY

David P. Kirby

ON 23 MARCH 1983, President Reagan announced his intention to launch "an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history."¹ The effort he referred to is the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also referred to as "star wars" by the news media and those who generally oppose the program. SDI is a research program designed to examine the possibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles based on the emerging technology of directed energy weapons. In outlining the necessity for SDI, the President made the following points:

[My] predecessors in the Oval Office have appeared before [the American public] on other occasions to describe the threat posed by Soviet power and have proposed steps to address that threat. But since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps have been increasingly directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation. . . .

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter Soviet attack, that

David P. Kirby, a Colonel in the US Army, wrote this essay while studying at the US Army War College, from which he graduated in 1987. The essay won recognition in the 1987 Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition.

we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?²

Response to the President's SDI proposal has run the full spectrum from unquestioned endorsement to outright rejection. Few subjects have stirred more debate during the Reagan presidency, and the attention is clearly deserved. The technical, political, and strategic implications are immense. If SDI were to meet President Reagan's vision, the course of human history could indeed be changed; the nuclear superpowers could deal with each other based on mutual security, rather than based on the ominous fear of nuclear confrontation.

Technical experts, politicians, strategists, and academicians of all persuasions have written extensively about SDI. My intent in this essay is not to summarize or compete with the technical assessments, political arguments, or learned opinions offered by the experts. Rather, by using the "Prisoner's Dilemma" model of game theory to examine the complex strategic issues involved in SDI, I address the questions raised by possession of nuclear weapons, assess the alternatives and implications associated with deployment of SDI, and draw conclusions about the prospects for SDI deployment.

THE "PRISONER'S DILEMMA" MODEL

THE "PRISONER'S DILEMMA" is a model used by game theorists and psychologists to assess certain situations that require individuals or competitors to make choices, the possible payoff combinations of those choices conforming to a characteristic pattern. The following illustrates the theory of the model.

Two prisoners, held incommunicado, are charged with the same crime. They can be convicted only if either confesses. Designate by -1 the payoff associated with conviction on the basis of confessions by

both prisoners and by +1 the payoff associated with acquittal. Further, if only one confesses, he is set free for having turned state's evidence and is given a reward to boot. Call his payoff under these circumstances +2. The prisoner who has held out is convicted on the strength of the other's testimony and is given a more severe sentence than if he had also confessed. Call his payoff -2.³

Using the described scoring system, the set of possible outcomes looks like this:

	<i>Prisoner B Does Not Confess</i>	<i>Prisoner B Confesses</i>
<i>Prisoner A Does Not Confess</i>	A,1; B,1	A, -2; B,2
<i>Prisoner A Confesses</i>	A,2; B, -2	A, -1; B, -1

Obviously, the outcome if neither prisoner confesses—both go free—is preferable to the outcome if both confess—both go to jail. But from a single prisoner's viewpoint, confession is the preferable strategy because it produces a higher-value outcome against either confession or non-confession by the other prisoner. But if both prisoners make the strategically sound choice of confession, both go to jail, which is worse for both prisoners than the result if they both choose not to confess. So there is the dilemma: a prisoner's strategically sound choice produces a result preferable to that prisoner, no matter what the other prisoner does, but cannot produce the ideal result for both prisoners.

Today, nuclear weapons place the superpowers in what amounts to a Prisoner's Dilemma, but the issues, instead of being confessions and time in jail, are nuclear arsenals and national survival. Following the illustration of the two prisoners, the most desirable situation would be if both superpowers eliminated their nuclear arsenals and adopted strategies which did not rely on nuclear

weapons. Both superpowers survive (very positive from an individual superpower's perspective), or at least neither has to fear nuclear annihilation. But neither can use the threat of nuclear weapons as leverage in seeking to pursue national interests (negative, because each superpower has lost a means for protecting its national interests). Thus, this option has a medium payoff for both superpowers, for illustrative purposes, say 1.

Another option would be for the United States to eliminate its nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union retained its nuclear arsenal. The Soviet Union would, of course, prefer this option (payoff value of 2) to option one because the Soviets could coerce the United States through the threat of nuclear attack without fear of retaliation. The United States, being subject to nuclear coercion or even to nuclear attack (a threat to national survival) with no capability to respond in kind, would strongly reject this option (payoff value of -2). The option which had the United States with and the Soviet Union without a nuclear arsenal would yield similar but reversed preferences and payoffs.

In the fourth option, both superpowers have nuclear arsenals. Assuming relative balance or symmetry of weapons, neither is subject to nuclear blackmail or coercion (that is positive), but both are subject to the possibility of massive nuclear strikes which threaten national survival (that is very negative). Consequently, the payoff for both superpowers is negative, although not as negative as when one or the other of the superpowers is subject to both nuclear coercion and nuclear attack without a means for nuclear retaliation. Relative to the other possibilities, this alternative would have a -1 value for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The payoffs of the four options are summarized below:

	<i>USSR has no nuclear arsenal</i>	<i>USSR has nuclear arsenal</i>
<i>US has no nuclear arsenal</i>	US, 1; USSR, 1	US, -2; USSR, 2
<i>US has nuclear arsenal</i>	US, 2; USSR, -2	US, -1; USSR, -1

Weighing the possible results, the most desirable option (positive payoff for both superpowers) is the first, which would have both superpowers without nuclear weapons. Achieving this option, however, would require both superpowers to trust each other to eliminate their nuclear weapons. For the past forty years, rather than pursue an option that was dependent on the other side, both the United States and the Soviet Union have followed the "dominant strategy," that is, a course which calls for possession of a nuclear arsenal to ensure against a unilateral threat to national survival. Possession of nuclear weapons is the dominant strategy because it has the better payoff whether the other side pursues a similar course (has nuclear weapons) or a different course (does not have nuclear weapons).

For the United States—and for the Soviet Union, too—the great challenge is to escape the dilemma of the nuclear arsenals and move to a military strategy which allows each of the superpowers to guard its national interests without threatening to use nuclear weapons, thus without the potentially catastrophic results of nuclear war. The question that I intend to examine more completely is whether SDI offers an escape from the Prisoner's Dilemma of nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction. But before looking for a way out of the problem, we should understand how the United States got into the nuclear dilemma.

THE DILEMMA OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DURING THE SUMMER of 1945, the United States led the world into the age of nuclear weapons with the detonation of three atomic weapons. Four decades later, there is still no consensus as to the military necessity of dropping the bombs that virtually destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the time, however, those making the decision had little doubt. Sir Winston Churchill recalled the

14 July 1945 Potsdam Conference where he and President Truman discussed use of atomic weapons:

To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance. . . . The final decision now lay in the main with President Truman. . . . but I never doubted what it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was right. . . . There was unanimous agreement around the table.⁴

As long as the Allies insisted on Japan's unconditional surrender, the alternatives to use of the atomic weapons were a land invasion or a naval blockade. Both alternatives were unattractive because they would cost more American lives, prolong the war, and provide time for Stalin's Soviet forces to join the fight against Japan. According to Churchill, President Truman made it clear at Potsdam that the United States was anxious to avoid any Soviet occupation of Japan.⁵ Thus, for a multiplicity of reasons, the atomic weapons were used against Japan, and the United States was left in a preeminent position as a world power, sole possessor of the "ultimate weapon of destruction." From 1945 to 1949, the United States held all the trump; it could pursue its interests knowing that no other nation had such an intimidating weapon.

The situation changed when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb on 29 August 1949.⁶ The United States no longer held all the trump; no longer could an American President rely on the nuclear threat to arbitrate a disagreement with his country's foremost adversary. Instead, the world entered a period in which the ultimate purpose of nuclear weapons would be to prevent their very use—that is, nuclear deterrence. Churchill characterized the situation as "a process of sublime irony where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."⁷ In

American parlance, Churchill's characterization translates to the "balance of terror."

The two world powers acquiring nuclear weapons was, however, just the first of many steps leading to the dilemma of nuclear weapons. In the early 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed few nuclear weapons, which could only be delivered by aircraft. In the aftermath of the Korean War, with the objective of greatly reducing standing military forces, the Eisenhower administration adopted a military strategy of massive retaliation, articulated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in January 1954. The United States had no intention of matching the military strength of the Soviet Union, but instead depended upon the threat of massive nuclear retaliation to deter Soviet actions counter to US national interests. By 1957 the United States had slightly more than 2,000 nuclear weapons, while the Soviet Union had no more than a few hundred.⁵ Nuclear superiority provided the United States with tremendous leverage if ever the Soviet Union were to push an issue to the point of threatening US national survival.

The mid-1950s saw the development of thermonuclear (fusion) weapons, with destructive capabilities hundreds of times greater than the weapons dropped on Japan in 1945, and a new weapon delivery system, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The inaccuracy of the ICBM meant that nuclear weapons were still most suitable for area targets (as opposed to very precise targets), so nuclear targeting continued to rely on a "city busting" philosophy. But the speed of delivery for the ICBM—less than thirty minutes from launch to target—required a revolution in thinking about war. In the span of thirty minutes, a single nuclear-tipped ICBM could nearly eliminate the population of the world's largest city. The 1950s ended with the United States relying on a strategy of massive retaliation against Soviet cities using technologically and numerically superior nuclear forces.⁶

The Kennedy administration of the early 1960s saw the quandary presented by the strategy of massive retaliation.

Namely, was it reasonable to rely on a strategy that offered only the option of massive retaliation against Soviet cities and which would have the Soviet Union mounting counterstrikes against American cities? Would it be possible to deter Soviet actions by nuclear strikes against targets other than cities? Secretary of Defense McNamara and others in the administration, rejecting the single option offered in the massive retaliation strategy, convinced President Kennedy to adopt a strategy of "flexible response" coupled with a "no cities" targeting philosophy. The primary motivation for this shift in strategy was to provide the president with multiple options for the use of nuclear weapons, thus making nuclear weapons a more credible element of the deterrent strategy.¹⁰

The early 1960s also brought the most serious confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the nuclear era. In 1962, the United States had irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union was installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. Ultimately, the Soviet missiles were withdrawn, but not before the United States put its forces, including nuclear-armed aircraft, on alert. Describing the situation, Kennedy's secretary of defense said,

Khrushchev knew without any question whatsoever that he faced the full military power of the United States, including its nuclear weapons . . . and that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons.¹¹

Realizing that they had come so dangerously close to nuclear war, both Kennedy and Khrushchev sought to change the basic character of their nuclear forces. Kennedy, as already pointed out, sought to institute a nuclear policy of flexible response and to increase conventional force capabilities. Based on the experience of the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy recognized the unacceptability of a national military strategy overdependent upon nuclear weapons. He also realized that extending a credible nuclear deterrent to NATO allies required something other than a massive retaliation strategy.

Khrushchev, for his part, reversed efforts to hold down Soviet military spending, and set out to match the United States in nuclear might. He and other Soviet leaders, knowing that US nuclear superiority had carried the day in the Cuban missile crisis, were determined never to suffer such a humiliation again.¹² The nuclear arms race was in full gear: the United States strengthened its strategic nuclear triad of ICBMs, strategic bombers, and sea-launched ballistic missiles while the Soviet Union tried to match the United States, but with greater reliance on ICBMs.

Before the sixties ended, both the United States and the Soviet Union recognized the danger in the continuing nuclear arms race. Pressure to reduce the defense budget in the United States was threatening the weapon system programs necessary to support flexible response and a nuclear warfighting strategy.¹³ The first step toward controlling the arms race was the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which banned all nuclear weapons tests except those conducted underground. And by 1969, both of the superpowers, each with several thousand nuclear warheads, sought to slow the arms race through negotiations concerning actual weapons. The buildup of nuclear weapons stockpiles in the sixties only made the nuclear dilemma worse—both the Soviet Union and the United States had every reason to believe a nuclear exchange would prove catastrophic to both nations.

Possibly by the late sixties, and certainly by the early seventies, the United States had lost nuclear superiority; nuclear parity more accurately described any comparison of US and Soviet nuclear arsenals. But a new race was on the horizon, the race to produce ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Both countries had spent many years developing BMD systems; deployment of such systems was imminent. However, through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), begun in 1969, the two countries agreed to limit development, testing, and deployment of such systems. The United States had superior technology, but reached a judgment that defense against nuclear missiles

was impossible with the best technology of the sixties and seventies. The United States also lacked domestic support for the massive expenditure deployment of a BMD system would require.¹⁴

The Soviet Union had several reasons for not wanting to proceed with BMD. First, the Soviets could ill afford to compete in such an expensive undertaking when the United States had a technological lead. Second, the Soviets were worried about China and the improving Sino-US relations. Reaching an accord with the United States on nuclear weapons and BMD would allow the Soviet Union to devote more resources to the growing problem of a less-than-friendly China. And third, the Soviets were frustrated at having spent vast sums on nuclear weapons without achieving the expected payoff. Nuclear weapons meant superpower status, but they did little to guarantee the spread of world communism or Soviet world domination, and the drain on the Soviet economy was considerable. The opening statement by the Soviets at SALT I, as summarized by Gerard Smith, the chief American negotiator, captures the Soviets' frustration:

Mountains of weapons were growing, yet security was not improving but diminishing as a result. A situation of mutual deterrence existed. Even in the event that one of the sides was the first to be subjected to attack, it would undoubtedly retain the ability to inflict a retaliatory blow of destructive force. It would be tantamount to suicide for the ones who decide to start war.¹⁵

In 1972, after nearly three years of negotiating, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The major provisions of the treaty limited the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and established ceilings on intercontinental and sea-launched ballistic missiles. The treaty was hailed as a monumental first step in ending the nuclear

arms race between the two superpowers, as it codified deterrence based on mutual vulnerability. Both nations would leave their military forces and populations vulnerable to attack as a guarantee that neither could find advantage in initiating nuclear war.¹⁷

During the seventies and early eighties, both superpowers worked within the ABM Treaty and the unratified SALT II agreement, which further restricted offensive nuclear weapons, in modernizing nuclear arsenals and in pursuing basic research with possible application to ABM systems. New technologies incorporated into ICBMs changed the conceivable military utility of the weapon system. The ICBM still got to its target in approximately thirty minutes, but improved guidance and multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or MIRVs, put land-based ICBMs, even in hardened silos, at risk. In other words, technology had made the land-based ICBM more vulnerable to a pre-emptive first strike.¹⁸ Thus, the nuclear weapons dilemma was compounded because the deterrence based on mutual vulnerability had been altered. Conceivably, a pre-emptive first strike could destroy a major portion of the other side's retaliatory forces, particularly the ICBM component.

The situation has not really changed since. Technology has changed some of the basic assumptions upon which the ABM Treaty was negotiated. Meanwhile, both countries have undertaken strategic force modernization programs, and both have been pursuing ABM research and development. The confluence of these and other factors has brought the United States to a crossroads in its military strategy of nuclear deterrence. The United States can continue straight ahead, relying on deterrence based on offensive nuclear weapons while remaining vulnerable to nuclear attack. Alternatively, it can take a new route, attempting to shift the basis of deterrence to reliance upon a combination of offensive nuclear weapons and defensive capabilities such as those being pursued under SDI. The question is, would deployment

of defenses against ballistic missiles provide a solution to the dilemma caused by possession of massive nuclear arsenals?

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SDI ALTERNATIVES

FOLLOWING THE BASIC Prisoner's Dilemma model, there are four alternatives with respect to deployment of SDI or the Soviet equivalent: neither side has a ballistic missile defense (BMD) or shield, one has BMD while the other does not (two possibilities), or both have BMD. The first possibility, where neither the United States nor the Soviet Union deploys an SDI-type system, amounts to continuation of the situation that exists today under the provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Admittedly, the Soviet Union has an operational ABM system around Moscow, but no one truly believes the system could counter a concerted attack which was intended to destroy the Soviet capital.

Obviously, this alternative maintains the precarious position of the two superpowers as they contemplate the destructive potential of each other's nuclear ballistic missiles, the status quo which the world has lived with for the past decade. It also allows both superpowers to avoid the expense of a BMD systems arms race. But it is the status quo that President Reagan does not want to leave as a legacy for future generations. Who could fault him or any national leader for seeking a military strategy of deterrence that served national interests and was based on mutual security instead of mutual vulnerability? As former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has observed, "a strategic posture that safeguards peace by the threat of annihilation, one that bases national defense on the threat of killing scores of millions of people, is ethically troubling, morally corrosive, and dehumanizing."¹⁸

A second possibility is for the United States to deploy a BMD system while the Soviet Union has no such system. This alternative, on the surface, might have,

tremendous appeal for Americans: the United States would return to a preeminent position. But this situation, together with its symmetric twin (in which only the Soviet Union has a BMD system) is probably the most dangerous of the four possibilities.

Although the United States might see the mix of an offensive and defensive posture as a means of preventing a disabling Soviet first strike, the Soviets are likely to see that mixture as a US first strike capability. The United States could launch a massive nuclear strike to destroy Soviet nuclear capability, knowing that the deployed SDI system could counter what Soviet ballistic missiles were not destroyed and were used in a retaliatory strike. Pronouncements by the United States that it would never undertake such an attack would have little influence. There is no incentive for the Soviets to entrust their security to the goodwill of the United States. The Soviet Union learned a painful lesson in World War II when it sought security by signing a peace treaty with Germany, only to be invaded by Germany. Soviet General Nikolay A. Talensky summarizes Soviet perceptions as follows:

History has taught the Soviet Union to depend mainly on itself in ensuring its security and that of its friends. . . . After all, when the security of a state is based on mutual deterrence with the aid of powerful nuclear rockets it is directly dependent on the goodwill and designs of the other side, which is a highly subjective and indefinite factor.¹⁹

The alternative that would have the United States with a BMD capability and none for the Soviet Union ignores the reality of Soviet military doctrine, deployment of defensive systems, and research and development over the past four decades. Soviet military doctrine has consistently stressed the importance of the balance between offense and defense, even in the nuclear age. In his treatise on military strategy, written in 1962, Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy stated, "one of the cardinal problems

for Soviet military strategy is the reliable defense of the rear from nuclear strikes.²⁰

Soviet deployment of defensive systems proves Sokolovskiy's words have been taken seriously. The Soviet Union has spent more than \$50 billion over the past twenty-five years to develop relocation sites (passive defense) for political leaders. The Soviet Union has the most extensive, most sophisticated air defense system in the world, and has an extensive civil defense program to protect a large segment of its population. Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has spent more on strategic defense than on strategic offense. While the United States has viewed deterrence as being based on mutual vulnerability, the Soviet Union has sought to reduce its vulnerability by developing and deploying defensive systems. In essence, the Soviets have been pursuing a strategy to put themselves, if deterrence should fail, in a superior position for engaging in nuclear war.²¹

In addition, the Soviets have a long history of efforts to develop a BMD capability. Evidence is available that they started developing ballistic missile defenses almost concurrently with development of ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has been conducting research in lasers, other directed energy weapons, tracking systems, and other technologies applicable to BMD for nearly two decades. Some of this research has led to the upgrading of the existing ABM system around Moscow.²² Given this history, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would leave itself undefended while the United States planned or actually deployed a defensive capability such as that being studied under SDI. Soviet actions during and after the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit between President Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev give even stronger indications that the Soviet Union will not tolerate a BMD asymmetry which favors the United States.

Alternative three, in which only the Soviet Union is defended, would be as untenable for the United States as alternative two was for the Soviet Union. Such a situation would clearly invalidate or seriously undermine the

pre-Reagan US military strategy of deterrence which assumes mutual vulnerability. This alternative could even be perceived as destabilizing from a Soviet perspective. Andrei Sakharov, the well-known Soviet dissident and nuclear weapons expert, saw the danger as early as 1967. He warned that a unilateral defensive shield could create the illusion of invulnerability and thus increase the propensity for more aggressive foreign policy and increase the risk of nuclear blackmail.²³ Alternative three might have advantages (give a higher payoff) for the Soviet Union, but the United States would be unlikely to accept an invulnerable Soviet Union while it had no defense against ballistic missiles.

If alternative one does little to alter the current conundrum of nuclear arms, and alternatives two and three would be unacceptable or unrealistic to one or both of the superpowers, how about the fourth alternative, both superpowers deploying ballistic missile defense? On close inspection, even this alternative has serious shortcomings. First, the concept of a strategic defensive system that could protect military targets and population centers from all ballistic missiles is utopian. The Fletcher Panel, appointed by President Reagan to investigate the feasibility of ballistic missile defense, concluded chances were slim that a defensive system could be built to protect the US population without constraints on Soviet forces. A study by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment reached the same conclusion.²⁴ This is not to say that a less-than-perfect BMD system is without value. Deterrence would be strengthened to the extent that a BMD system increased the uncertainty of the adversary achieving his objectives in a nuclear strike. Nonetheless, the less-than-perfect BMD system would not make ballistic missiles impotent, nor would it free the United States from the fear of a ballistic missile attack.

A second major concern for the United States would be the possible effect on the NATO alliance should the United States and Soviet Union deploy BMD systems. The NATO doctrine of flexible response, which assumes

the ability to initiate limited nuclear attacks on the Warsaw Pact, would lose credibility if the Soviet Union could minimize the ballistic missile portion of such attacks. Mutual BMD deployment conceivably leaves Europe vulnerable to the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact. In addition, the British and French would see the usefulness of their nuclear forces decrease if one or both of them confronted the Soviet Union. The British and French would be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union was defended.

For many European allies, a shift to strategic defense systems would substantially undermine the arms control process.²⁵ Allies also voice concern that a safely defended United States would decouple US security from the defense of NATO. West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has warned that a "defended America could become a fortress America."²⁶ French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson expressed the same thought when he said an SDI-defended United States could "lead to an isolationist America unconcerned about European security."²⁷ In sum, the NATO alliance would suffer great strain were the Soviet Union and United States to have mutual BMD capabilities.

A third major obstacle to mutual defense is achieving that circumstance without creating the instability that would result from an asymmetry in capability. Even the most optimistic proponents of SDI acknowledge that deployment of an effective BMD would take a minimum of ten years. But a technological breakthrough by one side which would allow it to achieve an early BMD capability would create the same circumstance as alternatives two and three. The side that perceived it was falling behind would likely take steps to strengthen its offensive capability as a hedge against the BMD. As a result, it is conceivable that there would be two arms races, one offensive and one defensive.

Given the distrust between the two superpowers, the propensity to hedge against a technological breakthrough by the other side, and uncertainty about the

other side's offensive and defensive capabilities, the transition to mutual BMD capabilities would be fraught with uncertainty, instability, and possible peril. Consequently, alternative four yields a payoff that is less than optimum for both superpowers, but it is also more desirable than alternatives two and three, which have one of the superpowers at a distinct disadvantage. In essence, the nuclear dilemma remains.

THE DEBATE ON SDI and the desirability of deploying a BMD capability will undoubtedly continue for many years. The issues are numerous and complex. They include the possibility of changing national military strategy, the question of affordability, competition with other federal programs, changes in alliance relationships, and perhaps even dramatic change in the concept of world power. If SDI met the goals that President Reagan outlined in March 1983, resolution of these many issues would be less problematic. But until the technologies of SDI have emerged from the laboratories and been demonstrated, much of the debate will be based on assumptions, conjectures, and positions that have little to do with the merits of BMD.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, the facts of the matter are that each of the superpowers is driven to pursue a strategy that is in its best interests, independent of the action taken by the other side. Just as it is strategically sensible for each of the prisoners to pursue a dominant strategy, even though both will then end up in jail, so the United States and the Soviet Union will pursue strategic defense. The objective will not be a utopian solution to the dilemma of massive nuclear arsenals, nor will it be a repudiation of a strategy of deterrence. Rather, both sides will see strategic defense as a means of achieving security that depends more upon its own military capabilities than upon the goodwill of the adversary.

Achieving mutual ballistic missile defense would not solve the Prisoner's Dilemma posed by nuclear missiles.

But it could change the nature of the dilemma and provide incentives for decreasing the dependence on ballistic missiles for ensuring deterrence. For example, as ballistic missiles lose their utility in a BMD environment, elimination of the ballistic missile becomes more reasonable, thus more possible.

One of the great challenges of the coming decades for both the United States and the Soviet Union will be to achieve mutual security based on strategic defense in such a way that overall world security is increased. This undertaking will not be easy. The many issues involved include the effects on alliances, the imbalance of conventional forces between the superpowers, and the nuclear arsenals of nations other than the superpowers. The complex issues only increase the importance of the United States and the Soviet Union moving mutually and cooperatively toward a world more reliant on strategic defense, thus less threatened by nuclear ballistic missiles.

NOTES

1. Speech made by President Reagan 23 March 1983, and partially reproduced by Daniel O. Graham, LTG, USA (Ret), and Gregory A. Fossedal, *A Defense that Defends*, p. 145. See also Sidney D. Drell, et. al., *The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative*, pp. 101-103.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 143-145.
3. Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, *Prisoner's Dilemma*, pp. 24-25.
4. B. H. Liddell Hart, *History of the Second World War*, p. 692.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 697.
6. Albert Carnesale, et. al., *Living with Nuclear Weapons*, p. 79.
7. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, p. 377. Note 1. See also Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., *American National Security*, p. 253.
8. Carnesale, pp. 79-80.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-85. See also Jordan, p. 36.
10. Brodie, pp. 124-126. See also Carnesale, pp. 89 and 92, and Jordan, pp. 70-73.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 425.
12. Carnesale, pp. 83 and 88. See also Jordan pp. 339-340.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-84. See also James E. Dougherty in *National Security and American Security*, pp. 407-423, for additional background information related to SALT I.
15. Drell, et. al., p. 15.
16. Scott Armstrong and Peter Grier, *Strategic Defense Initiative: Splendid Defense or Pipe Dream?* p. 7. See also Payne, p. 29.
17. Michael Nacht, *The Age of Vulnerability: Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate*, pp. 67-74.
18. Zbigniew Brzezinski, et. al., *Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative*, p. x.
19. Carnesale, p. 37.
20. Drell, et. al., p. 13.
21. Keith B. Payne, *Strategic Defense: Star Wars in Perspective*, pp. 46-50.
22. Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1987*, pp. 74-76. See also Payne, pp. 52-57.

23. Drell, et al., p. 17.
24. Alex Glikzman, *Strategic Defense in the 21st Century*, pp. 15–16.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 85–101. See also *Alternative Military Strategies for the Future*, pp. 33–34 and p. 37.
26. Payne, p. 194.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 201. See also Gary L. Guertner and Donald M. Snow, *The Last Frontier*, p. 93.

SEA CONTROL IN THE ARCTIC: A SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

Dennis M. Egan
and
David W. Orr

VERY FEW NAVAL ANALYSTS have looked recently at the cumulative military lift capacity of the Warsaw Pact nations' fleets. A review of *Lloyd's Register of Shipping*, though, shows that most Warsaw Pact ships built in the last 15 years have been designed and constructed to operate in the ice. Those ice-strengthened ships could add a new strategic dimension to future NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontations. Soviet ability to operate large surface ships in the Arctic Ocean and gain a substantial degree of Arctic sea control could threaten US, Canadian, and NATO vital interests.

In the ancient Punic Wars, Hannibal surprised and strategically dislocated the Roman legions by attacking them with his war elephants over what had been considered an insurmountable geographic barrier, the Alps. In a similar fashion, recent developments in Soviet Arctic mobility and logistics give the Soviets the capability to use surprise against the West. The icy Arctic barriers may no longer shield North America from Soviet sea-borne power projection. Unless this threat is countered, the Soviets will be able to outflank the US Maritime Strategy.

Dennis M. Egan, a Lieutenant Commander in the US Coast Guard, and David W. Orr, a Major in the US Marine Corps Reserve, wrote this essay while studying at the US Naval War College. The essay won recognition in the 1987 JCS Essay Competition.

*It is the winter of 1987. Voroshilov Academy has recently been tasked to examine Soviet maritime capabilities and doctrine. Comrade Mikhail Sorokin, Professor of Military Economics at the Academy and Candidate Member of the Politburo, is meeting in his office with General Ivan Yermak, an assistant to the First Deputy Minister of Defense (Chief of the General Staff). General Yermak has, among other responsibilities, an administrative support function for the Soviet Northern Fleet. He has been instructed to brief Professor Sorokin and answer his questions. The Academy's work may ultimately facilitate the economic planning necessary for enhancing the military posture of the Soviet state.**

Comrade Sorokin: Welcome, General Yermak. Thank you for visiting me on such a cold winter morning. Your son is doing well, I hope? He was an honor graduate from our Academy just three years ago. Where is he now?

General Yermak: Thank you for your hospitality, Comrade Sorokin. It's always a pleasure to visit the Academy. It has been some time since I heard from my son. He's still in Afghanistan, though. He recently received a medal for valor in combat.

Comrade Sorokin: I wish him well. I expect he hopes that the efforts of Party Secretary Gorbachev will bring the war to a successful conclusion?

General Yermak: Yes, a satisfactory solution to that war would be very beneficial.

*Related information and sources of factual information in this fictitious conversation are provided in the endnotes. Other information is simply conjecture or speculation. Fictitious political events and names are used.


Comrade Sorokin: Well, I would like to hear more about your son's observations and experiences in Afghanistan. Perhaps we can discuss this over dinner. I know you have a very busy schedule today, so I will get to the point of why I asked you to visit today.

General Yermak: Thank you, Comrade. I have been given a very busy schedule for today. I believe I will be ready for a leisurely dinner once this day is finished.


Comrade Sorokin: As you may know, the Voroshilov Academy recently has been tasked to critically examine our Soviet maritime strategy and capabilities. My old friend Admiral Gorshkov told me that you and Captain Chubakov¹ of the Defense Ministry have been working on some strategic concepts which he thought you and I should discuss further. He also indicated that the two of you made some interesting observations about the recently published American novel, *Red Storm Rising*, by Tom Clancy.² Although the book is filled with disinformation and deliberately outdated strategic doctrine, and includes slanderous misrepresentations of the peaceful motivations of the Communist party, I believe Mr. Clancy has revealed some valuable insights. I've heard that he gleaned much of his information from conversations on the Washington cocktail circuit after the acclaim for his first novel, *The Hunt for Red October*.³ What do you think of the book?

General Yermak: As I discussed with Captain Chubakov, it amazes me that an American writer would have so much insight into his country's war plans and defensive capabilities. I understand that the book has even received the acclaim of the American President and many of his top military advisers. Personally, I was troubled by Clancy's novel, and not just because the capitalistic nations stalemated our intentions. Mr. Clancy made some gross simplifications concerning the capabilities of our northern forces which might be misinterpreted by

THE ARCTIC



● Ports and airports



our leaders. I believe our military and political leaders should be reminded of our true capabilities.

Comrade Sorokin: Still, the novel recognized the essence of some of our strategic maritime potential, which I wish it hadn't stressed. Even though Admiral Gorshkov was pleased that Mr. Clancy had used some ideas from his book, *Seapower of the State*.³ I felt that Clancy's use of the MV *Julius Tuchik* as an amphibious force transport ship capable of moving an entire regiment to Iceland in order to capture NATO military facilities was just too close to some of the highly classified scenarios we've played in various war games at this school.

General Yermak: I don't think that Clancy's observations concerning a minor portion of our maritime sealift capability should be viewed with much concern. *Jane's Fighting Ships*⁴ already emphasizes the possible military significance of some of our merchant fleet. Fortunately, the Americans seem naive, believing that if a ship isn't painted grey, it cannot have military application. For example, they are still trying to determine if the MV *Ivan Skuridan* was used to support our amphibious operation in the Volkovoya Fjord during April 1986.⁵ Of course we would never consider using our merchant fleet for anything other than peaceful maritime purposes, but as Captain Chubakov pointed out, we have true capabilities for sealifting considerably more divisions to Iceland than Clancy might envision!

Comrade Sorokin: Having the strategic lift capability is not sufficient in itself, General. Mounting a successful amphibious operation in open water entails controlling the air, the sea, and even the regions under the sea. As Admiral Gorshkov said, a fleet must create the conditions that allow it to control shipping, protect itself, and deploy forces. He also said that air combat to secure dominance at sea may either precede or accompany the fleet's actions.⁶

General Yermak: You're absolutely right, Comrade. This is one of many errors apparent in Clancy's book. At the start of a war with the United States, it would be far too risky to attempt to seize and hold Iceland. It's just too far forward for us to reliably maintain safe air and sea lines of communication and control over the island without the use of a very large force. The plan simply isn't feasible.

Comrade Sorokin: Yet undoubtedly there are other amphibious operations on the northern maritime front that would make strategic sense during the initial stages of a conflict.

General Yermak: Yes, Comrade, but only on islands in water which can be struck by our land based aircraft. For example, because it's on the direct path of air attack from North America to Moscow, Svalbard is the group of islands that are of immediate concern.⁶ Several thousand Soviet miners live and work there, and they outnumber the native Norwegians two to one. Svalbard has an adequate airport which could provide us with an advanced base for staging tactical fighter aircraft. By initially controlling Svalbard rather than Iceland, we're far better situated to attack enemy forces trying to enter the Arctic Ocean from the Norwegian and Greenland Sea approaches. Other strategic islands such as Bear and Jan Mayen could be seized simultaneously and quickly developed to provide radar sites and forward tactical aircraft recovery air strips. All of these islands are located along the approximate maximum limits for pack ice during April. What this means is that most of our surface navy and merchant ships can then operate near or inside the perimeter of the ice. Our sea lines of communication will be relatively safe from enemy submarines and surface ships. As long as we can also maintain air superiority, it will be nearly impossible for anyone to strike at our fleet. This will ensure the availability of our fleet for combat on our terms, rather than on the enemy's terms.

Comrade Sorokin: But Admiral Gorshkov emphasized using surface ships in a more active and aggressive anti-submarine role. He said, "Surface ships remain the basic and often sole combat means of ensuring deployment of the main strike forces of the fleet - our submarines." The current declaratory version of the US maritime strategy,² which we take more seriously than Mr. Clancy's out-moded GI-UK Gap barrier strategy, suggests that the United States will try to penetrate deep into our bastions in order to seek out and destroy our SSBN forces. We know that their attack submarines have under-ice capability. How can your idea of seizing air bases at Svalbard and Jan Mayen islands, installing radar on Bear Island, plus keeping our surface fleet in the marginal ice zone, by themselves ensure the protection of our SSBNs and deny the Norwegian Sea approaches to the US carrier battle groups?

General Yermak: Individually, they won't. But by capturing Svalbard, Jan Mayen, and Bear Island, we will greatly increase the effective coverage by our tactical fighter forces—another 600 miles north of the homeland and substantially over the Greenland and Norwegian Sea approaches. With improvements to the air runway at Svalbard, we can also launch bomber forces from outside the Norwegian territorial defense zone. These bombers can fly undetected by land based radar and can strike any US battle forces operating in the area. And our anti-submarine aircraft, such as the Il-38 and Bear E, can have continuous fighter protection between the Kola Peninsula and the edge of the permanent polar ice cap. This is the zone where we intend to locate, trap, and destroy enemy submarines and ASW aircraft.

Our massive fleet of fishing and research vessels will help our anti-submarine aircraft and our submarines hunt and kill the American submarines. I envision this fleet operating as picket ships throughout the ocean area between Greenland and Norway, wherever they fall under the umbrella of our air forces. It would be a

defense in depth, with increasingly dense numbers of these ships the closer we get to our homeland. Many of these ships have highly accurate sonars, good radio transmitters, and radar. Some are even equipped with satellite communications. Because they're relatively small vessels, no American submarine would risk exposure to attack them, much less expend valuable ordnance. The ships which stay inside the ice zone are also relatively immune to attack by US surface forces, because their ships are not ice strengthened so they can't pursue us into our sanctuary.

The trawlers can employ towed tactical sonar arrays and fish-finding sonars to help locate American submarines and ensnare them with fishing nets. We can also equip the trawlers with depth charges so they'll be able to engage any submarines they can locate. The larger factory and research ships which are equipped with helicopters may be able to support anti-submarine helicopters.¹¹ We need to explore this concept further, and perhaps some of the ships will need additional modifications. The anti-submarine helicopters have dipping sonars and torpedoes for searching out and destroying enemy submarine contacts. They should be especially successful at attacking targets identified by the smaller trawlers. The helicopters can be armed with air-to-air missiles for attacking any enemy P-3s or other slow moving aircraft which might attempt to damage our fleet of picket ships.¹² We also have plans to arm this fleet with surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns for self defense. Deck space has been allocated for these weapon systems and it's a relatively simple task for the crew to perform this modification.¹³ As you said, Comrade, it takes a combination of air and sea supremacy to ensure the survival of our SSBNs and protect our northern defensive zone. This combination of land and sea based forces will ensure our initial survivability and provide the basis for future options.

Comrade Sorokin: Yes, General, Admiral Gorshkov said that our experience in the two World Wars showed the

value of fishing fleets used as part of the Navy, mainly in defenses.¹³ Is your scheme feasible, though? How big is our fishing fleet? Is it strengthened to operate in ice-strewn waters? What threat can the enemy pose to such small targets? And how do you envision they can defend and sustain themselves?

General Yermak: The scheme is highly feasible. In 1975, we owned 3,833 fishing vessels, grossing three million tons. A study completed in 1976 indicated that we had an additional 547 factory ships, grossing another three million tons.¹⁴ Not all of these ships were designed for frozen seas, though. Recently, I identified over 1,700 ice strengthened fishing vessels listed in the 1985 edition of Lloyds Registry. Even though I didn't have time to record the sizes of the various vessel classes, I can assure you that many are as large as a medium freighter and can stay at sea continuously for over six months at a time. For example, we have 175 trawlers of the *Atlantik* class, in excess of 2,100 registered tons, and 178 trawlers of the *Super Atlantik* class, which are in excess of 3,000 registered tons.¹⁵ Perhaps a more complete inventory and analysis of the capabilities of our small boat fleet could be conducted. We shouldn't have to learn the lessons of World War II all over again.

The enemy will have little interest in attacking our fishing fleet from the air. He probably will be operating at the limits of his combat radius in a hostile environment. He won't be able to expend his valuable ordnance on anything but our larger merchant ships and naval combatants. On the other hand, if he does attack our fishing fleet, his main striking force is diluted.

Did I tell you about the *Odyssey* class research ships, which carry small submarines? The submarines descend from their holds covertly to provide ideal vehicles for Spetsnaz [Special Operations Forces] missions such as cutting deep sea surveillance and communication cables and sabotaging enemy installations. These ships look just the same as 187 other *Mayakovskiy* class trawlers. It's very difficult to detect which of these ships is carrying submarines when viewed from outside.

In summary, Comrade, we have a very sizeable fleet of self-sustained fishing vessels which can be armed for self-defense, and which can be very useful in a role as picket ships to assist in the detection, targeting, and interdiction of the enemy.

Comrade Sorokin: I believe Admiral Gorshkov was aware of this when he said that the fishing fleet is an important part of the civil fleet and of the State's sea power. Until now, I had failed to fully understand the military significance of the complex equipment these vessels apparently carry. Your ideas sound promising.

Admiral Gorshkov emphasizes the importance of keeping the SSBN force inviolate, not only for their nuclear warfighting capability but also for intimidation, deterrence, and their potential to serve as a strategic reserve to exact war termination on favorable terms. Since we now can keep our *Delta* and *Typhoon* submarines at home in ice strewn waters,¹⁸ and by exploiting our surveillance systems, including our fishing fleet, can quickly detect and cue our air and sea anti-submarine resources to intercept and kill NATO submarines, do you see any strong arguments for keeping the majority of our diesel and nuclear attack submarines bottled up in our own waters?

General Yermak. No. I've demonstrated that we already have the capability to protect our SSBNs. By 1995, our new aircraft carriers with their modified Su-27 jets¹⁹ and our greatly expanded Arctic fleet will ensure that the role of the attack submarine can be changed from defending SSBNs to forward deployment. I believe our diesel submarines will have the greatest potential against forward-deployed NATO submarines and aircraft carriers, especially in choke points and coastal waters, as the Americans still haven't gained the ability to reliably detect these boats when they operate on batteries.²⁰ Our new superconductor technology promises to greatly extend the silent operation of these submarines—significantly enhancing their threat potential.

Comrade Sorokin: Just one minute, General. Are you proposing that we assign our most powerful nuclear attack submarines to a peripheral role against NATO merchant shipping while tasking our less sustainable diesel submarines to take on the entire American battle fleet? My friend, think of what you're saying. Interdiction of sea lines of communication at such an early stage of the war employs a protracted war strategy which doesn't address the enemy's immediate threat of striking the motherland, particularly with cruise missiles. To restrict our multi-mission nuclear attack submarines to an SLOC interdiction role is preposterous and a complete waste of assets.

General Yermak: Professor, you have completely failed to comprehend what I'm saying. I didn't propose that we should initially conduct SLOC interdiction with our nuclear submarines. It's true that our diesel submarines might be highly successful against forward-deployed carrier battle groups. Had you let me finish though, you would have realized that I propose a far more important initial role for our SSNs. They will carry submarine-launched cruise missiles, such as the SS-N-21, directly to the waters off the United States.²⁷ By having this capability, we can threaten the Americans with retaliation in kind should they decide upon a first use policy for their own sea-launched cruise missile strikes against our forces on the Kola Peninsula or elsewhere in the motherland.

Comrade Sorokin: You're suggesting that our SSNs can deter cruise missile attacks on our motherland, but our SSNs are used in a pro-SSBN role. Our SSBNs are currently using the ice to their advantage, and only the SSNs can protect them in their icy bastions. You've expanded upon some of Admiral Gorshkov's recommendations to integrate the fishing fleet into our defensive maritime strategy, even in the ice. You infer that SSNs will thereby be released for your new mission of cruise missile strike deterrence. But the fishing fleet may not provide an

adequate substitute for SSBN protection. Perhaps our naval combatants and auxiliary ships could make up the difference if they were able to operate in a similar environment. Admiral Gorshkov has used the pro-SSBN mission as justification for building expensive surface combat ships such as the *Kiev*, *Kara*, and *Krivak* classes.²² Can these vessels operate in the ice?

General Yermak: Comrade Sorokin, I realize your position does not regularly lend itself to mixing with the operational side of the military. Your background is, of course, in economics and long-term strategies for industrialization. Because I've been told to answer all your questions concerning operational concepts for our armed forces in northern areas, let me put things into perspective for you. Suppose I told you that a large percentage of our naval combatants might be capable of negotiating heavy ice-strewn waters. *Jane's Fighting Ships*²³ is finally suggesting that some of our naval auxiliary ships might be ice strengthened. However, as early as June 1969, a Washington research center recognized the importance to us of the Northern Sea Route. Their study emphasized that most ordinary merchantmen on this route are specially reinforced in the hulls using ice-strengthening techniques developed in modern Finnish shipyards. It also alluded to suspicions about similar ice strengthening designs of our warships.²⁴ Perhaps they drew their conclusions from the fact that we currently have *Kiev* class Surface Action Groups assigned to the ice-strewn waters of our Baltic, Northern, and Pacific Fleets.²⁵

The real clue, though, is the 1985 edition of *Lloyd's Register of Shipping*, which shows that over 95 percent of our entire merchant marine is ice strengthened. Comrade, do you really think that the senior defense and political strategists who envisioned our rise as a maritime power would have been so foolish as to build the world's largest ice strengthened merchant marine and submarine fleet without having a surface navy capable of protecting that fleet? Western observers know that we operate our

combat ships in ice as an operational requirement driven by our environment.⁷

Comrade Sorokin: General, you've made your point, but you would be well advised not to assume such an insulting, condescending manner toward a member of the Central Committee. I need not remind you, Clausewitz said that major military developments shouldn't be matters for just the military. I tire of your word games. Let's return to the basics.

Since the mid 1960s, our foreign policy has stressed (1) strategic deterrence, (2) defense of the homeland, (3) preservation of political alliances, and (4) support of national liberation movements.⁷ Obviously, this foreign policy is one of peace. With the exception of our problematical experience in Afghanistan, we've been careful not to commit ground forces to combat.

Meanwhile, the West, led by the US, continues to escalate their weapons buildup at a frightening pace, developing new weapons of mass destruction, and leaving us no alternative but to follow suit. The weapons we are forced to mass at the inter-German border serve as a constant reminder of the nuclear sword the US and its NATO allies have hung over our heads. But now they've gone too far. They've introduced hundreds of ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles into the German theater which have the capability to hit Moscow. What's more, after foolishly allowing West Germany to re-arm over the last 30 years, our intelligence has recently suggested that a US general may have offered West Germany access to the top secret Permissive Action Link codes which would allow them to unilaterally activate the nuclear weapons within their zone.

There has also been a dangerous resurgence of German neo-Nazi nationalism in the West, along with substantial pressures to ease the US burden of the NATO expenses.⁷ The US and its allies have conveniently forgotten who unleashed the two most catastrophic wars of destruction in this century and are abandoning their

responsibility to keep the German "evil genie" in the bottle. Why couldn't they have allowed West Germany to develop into a peace-loving industrial and trading power like Japan? Instead, to gain defense "on the cheap," they fostered the inherent beast-like instincts of the German people, placed the nuclear lances virtually in their hand, and pointed them at the peace-loving people of the USSR.

At the same time, there's a growing atmosphere of distrust and unrest among NATO European member nations who deeply resent US hegemony. Pacifist and anti-nuclear movements are growing in strength. The US is finding it increasingly difficult to gain consensus among NATO members. The basing rights for US forces are a frequently discussed thorn in the sides of the European nations.³⁰ The US has reacted in a characteristically disjointed, irrational, and warlike manner. They persist in building a large naval fleet and proliferating tactical nuclear weapons throughout their forces. They've increased the number of fleet exercises in geographic areas very close to the maritime approaches to our homeland in an obvious attempt to intimidate our forces and demonstrate that offensive maritime power projection is a key element in their war plans. Recent weapon developments allow the US an extremely long-range, stand-off offensive strike potential. We must develop an effective counter strategy. We see Germany as the primary land threat, NATO as a brittle alliance, and the US as a potent aggressor who must be neutralized in the event of a major European conflict. Consequently, we are developing the following war aims:

First, to disarm Germany. Despite our forebodings of a united Germany, we feel that a West Germany in control of its own nuclear destiny is far more dangerous. Since the US and its allies have abrogated their responsibility to keep Germany from ever rising to make war on the world again, we must act swiftly to exercise control over all Germany. Our aim is to disarm West Germany, reunite the German people, and guarantee a peaceful

German government under Soviet protection and supervision, highly consistent with our declaratory policy to promote a nuclear-free Europe.

Second, to eliminate US hegemony on the European continent by destroying the cohesion of NATO. We can achieve this if the European NATO members see the nuclear threat of Germany in its proper perspective and relate it to the US unilateral defense interests. Why should Europe risk becoming a nuclear graveyard just to promote US prestige abroad? Clearly the interests of European member nations are becoming increasingly parochial. We must make our war aims clear as to their objectives *and* limitations. We must also stress that we do not want nuclear war. Rather, we seek a disarmed Germany and a nuclear-free world where all can live in peace.

Third, to neutralize the United States. The principal threat to the Soviet homeland is the United States. As long as they haven't yet achieved an effective strategic defense, history has shown that our ICBM and SLBM forces can keep them in a conventional response mode. But their Navy is increasing their offensive posture, particularly in the maritime approaches to the Kola Peninsula. We would prefer to achieve a strategy in which the US stays at home. If they've launched a massive resupply of military force to the inter-German theatre, we would like to achieve a strategy which turns their ships around. Keeping the US in North America will neutralize them.

And fourth, to improve access to the sea and defense of the maritime approaches to the homeland. In part, this becomes resolved with the reunification of East and West Germany under Soviet control. We thereby get access to the North Sea through the Rhine River and internal canal systems, in addition to gaining a virtual monopoly on all significant inland waterway river transportation north of France on the European continent. In addition, we'll introduce a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly changing Svalberg from a Norwegian trust territory to a Soviet trust territory. Since we outnumber

the local populace with our Soviet mining community on the island, we should make the territorial redistribution a question to be self-determined by a "local" plebiscite. We also feel that by giving Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway guarantees that we won't attack their territory on the mainland, we can fracture the public support they must rally to actively participate against us if we fight a war with Germany. The neutrality of Sweden and Finland will be respected. However, we might have to intimidate or cajole our Norwegian neighbors to abide by our temporary occupation of Jan Mayen Island as a forward air base for our defensive tactical airpower. Other war aims can follow in time—such as better access to the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. But, these are secondary concerns which may ultimately develop through political means as a result of our support for Third World liberation movements and our increasing stature as a world maritime trading partner.

To be concise, General, our war aims would be (1) disarm Germany to achieve a nuclear free Europe, (2) eliminate US military hegemony over Western Europe by destroying the cohesion of NATO, and (3) defend our homeland by neutralizing the United States.

Until now, I have had difficulty in reconciling the very expensive naval fleet building programs promoted by Admiral Gorshkov with a coherent Soviet maritime strategy which substantially contributes to our potential war aims. Do you have such a maritime strategy, General?

General Yermak: I must differ with your observation that there is no coherent maritime strategy component in the Army's overall defense plan. Let me point out the five major objectives which have been the foundation of our naval planning and strategy for over 20 years: (1) protect our SSBNs; (2) protect the maritime avenues of approach to our homeland; (3) destroy American carrier battle groups before they are capable of striking our homeland, (4) interdict enemy sea lines of communication; and

(5) seize the initiative and take the fight to the enemy's shores.¹⁷

I've already discussed some concepts for accomplishing the first two elements of this strategy. By freeing our attack submarines from the role of defending our SSBNs, we'll have the ability to put severe pressure on the enemy's SLOCs. By combining long-range bombers and our new generation of cruise missile carrying, wing in ground effect aircraft¹⁸ with simultaneous submarine attacks, we will soon make the high seas untenable for enemy convoys and carrier battle groups. We might even force the surviving portions of the American carrier battle groups to pull back from their forward-deployed positions to try to escort convoys across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Before proceeding further with my explanation of a proposed Soviet maritime strategy, I'd like to ask if you're beginning to see how all our assets interrelate?

Comrade Sorokin: Not entirely, General. You've presented a reasonably clear description of how you might accomplish your first four objectives. But your fifth objective, seizing the initiative and taking the fight to the enemy's shore, is most troublesome.

General Yermak: What do you mean, Comrade?

Comrade Sorokin: Our ability to take the fight to North America seems to be limited to a nuclear option, because we still don't have the conventional capability to establish air and sea superiority in either the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean. You've suggested that attack submarines can be used as platforms for launching cruise missiles against targets ashore. I have no problem with this concept because it provides a powerful deterrent. But the use of these missiles to accomplish your fifth objective will be extremely destabilizing and might escalate into a full nuclear exchange. It's common knowledge that these cruise missiles have nuclear warheads.¹⁹ The US may

launch strategic nuclear weapons on detection of incoming cruise missiles simply because they don't have the capability to differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear warheads.

General Yermak: But neither do we.

Comrade Sorokin: Very perceptive of you, General. As I was saying, I don't see any politically acceptable way that submarines would be decisive in taking the fight to North American shores unless the conflict had already become nuclear. I need not remind you that Clausewitz said, "war is an instrument of policy,"³⁴ and Secretary Gorbachev has publicly stated our policy that the Soviet Union will not initiate a nuclear war.³⁵ If the war stays conventional, the use of submarines as the only means to take the fight to North America will not be decisive.

General Yermak: You misunderstood me, Comrade Sorokin. Having cruise missile submarines stationed off either coast of the United States does not in itself escalate the war, especially since the enemy has the same capability. Until those missiles are launched, they are merely deterrents. But while our submarines are forward-deployed, they can be used to close harbors by mining or they can sink ships with their torpedoes. This is what I consider taking the war to the enemy's shores, short of crossing the nuclear threshold. But this is only part of the effort we need to employ in a war of global consequences.

Consider our war aims, and then consider what we must accomplish to achieve those aims. Clausewitz says that in order to succeed in war, we must strike at the enemy's center of gravity.³⁶ Comrade, I suggest that the center of gravity for the Americans is the cohesion of their alliance with NATO. If we can divide NATO from the United States, we will win.

This lesson is as old as history itself. The great Chinese General Sun Tzu observed that alliances make an enemy strong, but if the enemy has no alliances, he is in a weak position.³⁷

Before we could even consider attacking Western Europe, we must first examine the purpose of the NATO alliance. As you know, NATO was created as an American and British effort to establish a permanent foothold on the continent. More importantly, it was created for the defense of Western Europe and portions of Eurasia, not to protect North America. It appears that the alliance serves only for keeping a war in Europe rather than ensuring that the United States will have allies to come to its aid if the American continent were invaded. If you're following me so far, Comrade, let me emphasize something else our naval strategists have recognized for some time: To destroy and occupy territory of a maritime opponent requires amphibious operations.⁷ To take that one step further, I'm suggesting that we may need to transport our army to North America to successfully terminate a war.

Comrade Sorokin: General, I've heard arguments before that amphibious landings and subsequent operations ashore are necessary to defeat a maritime opponent. Yet launching an amphibious operation into the teeth of US blue water naval and air superiority is an act only a madman would consider.

General Yermak: Yes, I agree. Only a madman or a fool would sail into the arms of a waiting American fleet. What I've been contemplating, though, is a great white fleet operating in an area where we anticipate having sea control—the Arctic Ocean theater.⁸ Do you think the Americans can sail their blue water fleet into the ice to do battle with us?

Comrade Sorokin: Of course not, General. We know their few icebreakers are unarmed, and their surface ships are thin-skinned. And advanced concepts of arctic warfare using air-cushion amphibious vessels suffer from lack of interest on the part of US war planners and lack of funds. Their Marines are finally deploying air-cushion vehicle

landing craft, but their craft are not designed for Arctic duty.⁴⁰ Our air cushion vehicles are designed for Arctic duty, and even though they have limited endurance, Admiral Gorshkov told me that a squadron of these can, conceptually, operate out of our Arctic class RO-RO ships, barge carriers, and LASH carriers recently developed for our Northern Sea Route.⁴¹ Did I understand Captain Chubakov to say that the two of you have discovered a new strategic military use for our ice capable merchant fleet as well?

General Yermak: Remember, I said it was fortunate that Mr. Clancy missed the essence of our maritime strength by suggesting that one large RO-RO ship, the *Julius Fuchik*, would carry portions of an airborne division to Iceland to secure that island. Clancy leaves his readers with the impression that this is just about the extent of our amphibious capability. This is good, Comrade. If our enemies continue to think this way, we'll catch them by surprise. Let me show you some tables of data my staff has compiled concerning our ice-strengthened merchant fleet. You see we have more than 600 ice-strengthened merchant ships that each have 10,000 horsepower, which we think is the minimum necessary to safely negotiate Arctic ice at a reasonable convoy speed; and we have over 2,000 more ships, with less than 10,000 horsepower, that could operate in the Arctic in certain seasons but would mainly keep supplies moving northward.⁴²

Comrade Sorokin: Your staff has done considerable homework, General. But I notice that you've included Romanian, Polish, and GDR vessels in this report—in addition to ships of the Soviet Union. Were you trying to inflate the numbers?

General Yermak: No, but we did think it was necessary to include all of these ships because our records show these vessels are capable of flying any flag of opportunity as the political situation requires. You might remember that

in October 1983 our Romanian allies had many of their ships, along with ours, caught in the ice of the East Siberian and Chukchi Seas. Of that fleet of 50 resupply vessels, only one was sunk, despite one of the worst ice seasons on record. Captain Chubakov has insisted that many critical lessons were learned during that winter. In a recent article he wrote that the nuclear powered icebreakers successfully saved the merchant fleet from disaster, and that ice forecasting and air surveillance is now conducted on a 24-hour basis, as this proved to be invaluable during the 1983 ice rescue missions.¹³

Comrade Sorokin: General, I'm aware of all this. The 26th CPSU Congress directed the fitting of nuclear power plants on our new fleet of transport vessels.¹⁴ The 27th CPSU Congress reaffirmed Captain Chubakov's optimistic forecasts and allotted billions of rubles for the building of a huge icebreaking cargo fleet capable of year-round navigation across the Northern Sea Route.¹⁵ Many nuclear powered icebreaking ships have been launched or are now being constructed. Once all of these new ships are in service, we'll have a year-round navigational capability across the entire Northern Sea Route. Convoys will be able to achieve an average transit speed of 12 knots by the 1990s.¹⁶ The State Research and Project Development Institute of Merchant Marine Affairs has played an important part in developing rapid cargo transfer capabilities at our most northern Arctic seaports.¹⁷

The result has been the development of an ability to unload tons of containerized cargo from RO-RO type ships directly onto the ice, and then onto intermodal advanced river transport systems such as air cushion assist barge trains and shallow water hydrofoil transports.¹⁸ No doubt, this has given us substantial experience in establishing a beach-head in Arctic terrain. We also have the necessary mobility for rapid transit over ice, snow, tundra, swamps or rivers. Our ability to open the huge gas fields in Western Siberia required us to develop the ability to carry heavy loads of gas pipeline equipment

by timber carrier ships to northern Siberian seaports such as Navy Port in the Bay of Ob, and to develop modularized transport systems to offload and rapidly move the cargo overland. This capability was necessary in order to build the huge gas pipeline which increasingly supplies Western Europe's natural gas requirements from our fields in Siberia. I fully understand the economics and political aspects of this surge in our Arctic mobility capabilities. But I also find the military perspective intriguing because I recognize Lenin's imperative that economic development and the interests of defense must proceed hand in hand.⁴⁹

General Yermak: Actually, the decision to navigate the northern route was made many years ago. You might remember that near the end of World War II, Marshal Stalin emphasized the strategic importance of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. He said that if the Japanese had been able to cut this line of communication, we would have been forced to withdraw from the war.⁵⁰ After the war, Stalin began making plans to eliminate our strategic "Achilles heel." Unfortunately, this process wasn't expedited because the Japanese were no longer a threat and the Chinese became our allies. So there was little immediate priority for building a new fleet of ice-strengthened vessels capable of negotiating our northern sea lanes.

When our relations with China deteriorated in the early 1960s, we again focused upon our strategic West-East communications vulnerability. We drastically upgraded the defense of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, built tactical bypass trackage, and began building our Northern Fleet in earnest. Plans were completed to begin construction of the world's mightiest fleet of icebreakers, both nuclear and conventionally powered. In the early 1970s, an unexpected thaw in Sino-US relations further intensified our need for Arctic class ship construction. The threat to our vital interior railroad lines was never clearer. This was the period when our concepts for highly specialized barge carriers, RO-RO ships, tankers, ferries,

and air cushion vehicles became a reality. Using Finnish shipyards, we were able to trade for dozens of these types of ships which had the hull strength and horsepower necessary for operations in polar ice, without icebreaker assistance.

We've come a long way since the end of World War II and are now able to keep the Northern Sea Route completely open for 10 months each year. During the 12th five-year plan, our goal is to achieve year-round operations. By 1990, our fleet of icebreakers, ice-strengthened cargo vessels, and ships of all kinds will provide us with the capability to fully develop our entire Siberian region.¹⁰ We'll then be able to tie our Atlantic and Pacific naval forces together by a common sea route completely within our territorial waters. In time of war or hostilities, we can completely protect these SLOC's using our land-based air forces and fleets of ice-strengthened naval auxiliaries and combatants, and indeed have sea control in the Arctic Ocean.

Comrade Sorokin: If I understand your thinking, General, the normal peacetime operating areas of our blue water combat and merchant fleets may radically change in times of a major conflict with the US and NATO powers?

General Yermak: That's exactly what I'm suggesting, Comrade. While some of our less capable ships may stay in neutral ports in warm water countries, there's a good chance we'll recall most of our ice capable ships back into our sphere of protection before hostilities start. The largest of the merchantmen and capital ships will reassemble in the Arctic IVD. We must preserve as much of our fleet as possible until our submarines and aircraft can roll back those NATO forces which would prevent our fleet from sailing. The fleet will not move forward any faster than we can expand our defensive perimeter by establishing air and sea control outward from the homeland. Because of our virtually uncontested capabilities to operate in the Arctic, we can swiftly

expand our defensive perimeter across the Arctic Ocean to the northern shores of Alaska and the Northwest Territories of Canada.

With the majority of our large ships attached to the Arctic TVD before hostilities begin, we may be able to project a very large force onto the North American continent at the start of the war. The purpose of such a campaign would be to strike a decisive surprise counterattack which would eliminate vital North American energy supplies and strategically dislocate forces and materiel needed to feed the NATO war machine. The element of surprise and methods for employing advance forces would be similar to that which Mr. Clancy alludes to,⁵² but the magnitude would be greatly increased. Many of our RO-RO ships, barge carriers, and other highly specialized ships are already making port calls and conducting trade with the US and the Canadians. In a few more years, carefully negotiated bilateral economic development agreements will allow us to use our ice-strengthened fleet to assist the US and Canada in developing their Arctic resources.

Comrade Sorokin: General, please be more precise in your use of terms. "Bilateral economic development agreements" are used only with Third World countries to extend our political influence, win their people's hearts and minds, and provide them with ships which allow them to transport their raw materials to our world markets. I think you mean "bilateral trade agreements."

General Yermak: No, Professor, I mean we should treat the people of Alaska and northern Canada exactly the same as we treat developing nations of the Third World. Use of our ships to carry North American Arctic raw materials would be similar to our earlier grain agreements, when our ships were consigned to carry a great percentage of US grain. Once we establish a routine presence, we'll be better able to swiftly land large forces at important points along Alaska's northern coastline and the Mackenzie River delta in Canada's Northwest Territories.

Comrade Sorokin: But General, what if the American surveillance system detects such a large movement of ships and aircraft?

General Yermak: Surveillance systems must be focused along anticipated axes of advance. It's not their system we will defeat as much as their interpretation and conventional thinking as to what they see. Most of the US forces will already be forward-deployed in Europe and in the Pacific. Even Canada will have only 2,000 troops to defend its homeland after fulfilling its commitment to NATO.¹² Even if surveillance systems alert the enemy, they lack the logistic capability to stop us before it is too late. On D-day, we would begin flying in reinforcements to rendezvous with equipment and supplies being shuttled in by our ships.¹³ Although in theory we currently have an ice-strengthened lift capacity for over 40 armored divisions,¹⁴ we certainly wouldn't want to sail such a force in one gigantic armada. What I envision is the initial projection of five to ten motorized rifle divisions in Alaska and the Mackenzie River delta concurrent with the start of war in Europe. Where we expect to encounter lightly opposed landings, such as at Barrow and Prudhoe Bay, we would plan to use our naval combatant and amphibious assault ships to conduct forcible entry onto the coast.¹⁵ Our naval infantry would probably be the logical force for securing the beach-heads, with regular army units providing rapid reinforcement either from the air or by sea. If the naval infantry was not available for this operation, we still have many army divisions trained in amphibious operations.¹⁶

The main penetration would be rapidly directed south up the Mackenzie River drainage and along all the roads which have opened up this territory. The extensive transport technology we've developed for mobility in Siberian regions would be ideal for negotiating the terrain of northern Canada and Alaska. This penetration would continue south into the oil and gas fields of central Canada which supply the industrial heartland of the US. All

land lines of communication from the continental US to Alaska would be severed. All North Slope oil would cease to flow south because we would seize control of the giant oil production center at Prudhoe Bay.⁵⁸ We would secure our flanks by seizing other key Alaskan objectives such as Little Diomedes Island, Point Barrow, Deadhorse, and Barter Island. We would also neutralize as much of the Alaskan air defense system as possible, including key installations on the Aleutian Islands, just before our landings. This would be tasked to our long-range bomber fleets equipped with conventional cruise missiles, and also to our airborne and Spetsnaz forces. By creating enough confusion among the Americans over the uncertainty of the situation in Europe, I believe there is a good chance that we could initially overwhelm the North American commands long enough for our first landings to become firmly established ashore.

There's one more important factor in our favor, Comrade. We're much closer to Alaska and Northern Canada than is the rest of the US. Their SLOCs to Europe are over twice as long as our SLOCs to North America. In terms of distance, we have considerable advantage over the Americans.

Comrade Sorokin: General Yermak, I gather that you are exploiting the Western strategists' mindset, the Mercator Global Projection, which results in a much less meaningful presentation of strategic geo-proximities than the polar projection our planners prefer.

General Yermak: Precisely. As Sun Tzu said, "Make it appear that you are far off. . . . He who wishes to snatch an advantage from his enemy takes a devious and distant route and makes it the short way."⁵⁹ If we could effectively invade the North American continent by way of the Arctic, it could drive a wedge into the NATO alliance. Consider these thoughts:

(1) Will the political powers in the US allow for the bulk of critical US follow-on forces and war material to be

sent to resupply Europe when Soviet troops have successfully landed on the North American continent?

(2) If hostilities are essentially confined to the Federal Republic of Germany, which NATO nations will cling to the alliance when the US cannot abide by its treaty obligations? If we make a case that our war is only with West Germany, because of their dangerous rearmament, and further that the United States is the true cause of instability on the continent and is practicing nuclear brinksmanship, perhaps Western European nations will be more sympathetic to our goals.

(3) When the US has been politically severed from its NATO responsibilities because of greater priorities on the North American continent, what will deter us from success in Europe?

Comrade Sorokin: General, I can just imagine the chaos such a situation could throw the US into. All the US mobilization time schedules and transport vectors are directed toward the European resupply scenario. Diverting such gigantic logistic momentum would not only be disruptive, but it could buy us the necessary time to win our objectives and favorably terminate the war in the European theatre. This scheme of yours has a certain insane logic to it, but where would such a strategy lead? You surely don't propose to invade and conquer the US, especially with such a small force.

General Yermak: Initially, I envision a landing on the North American continent to be an effort designed to break the United States free of an alliance with NATO. If our current estimates for war in Europe are in any way reasonable, we should be able to complete such a war in about 30 days.¹⁰ We could ensure that the world clearly understood that our war aims were limited. Once again, as Comrade Gorbachev has so pointedly stated, we won't be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons in a global war. Because an unlimited war with the United States can only be concluded through the use of weapons

of mass destruction, I believe what our party secretary is saying is that he does not envision a war with the Americans, except to accomplish limited objectives. As such, this proposed strategy we've been discussing hinges on the presumption that the war to this point has remained conventional. So an attack on the North American continent can only be for limited objectives, not for the overthrow of the American system.

What I'm suggesting is that the Canadians and Americans may find it in their best interests to terminate the war by acknowledging our historical interests in stabilizing Europe in exchange for a release of any territory we may occupy as a result of invading North America. As Clausewitz points out, "If the enemy is to be coerced, you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice you call on him to make."⁶¹

Let's say we've reached the point where this strategy is on the verge of accomplishing our war aims. The United States will finally have to decide whether Western Europe is more important than the defense of the North American continent. If the United States decides that North America is more important, and so stops its reinforcement of Western Europe and perhaps even recalls some of the forces it has already sent, then the NATO alliance will be fractured—the United States will be perceived as no longer capable of fulfilling the terms of its treaty alliance. If the US military establishment ignores our Arctic campaign and treats it as a diversion, we can continue to build our effort in North America until the US is politically forced to take notice and respond. We have no doubt that the Canadians will take immediate notice and will valiantly defend their homeland, but what can they do alone?

I want to reiterate a point from Clausewitz, that we shouldn't even consider going to war without first knowing our final goal.⁶² Our long-term goal has always been to create long-term stability on the European continent. So the only purpose in quarreling with the Americans is to neutralize their support for the NATO alliance.

Comrade Sorokin: Our Arctic capabilities may make your strategy feasible. Depending upon our political sophistication, your strategy may be suitable in fracturing the cohesion of the NATO alliance. But what of the risks? Are they acceptable? I see the following problems: (1) You propose diverting critical forces to a secondary theater. (2) Your lines of supply and communications are particularly susceptible to air and submarine interdiction. And (3) the US and Canada may choose to escalate the war by using nuclear weapons in such a remote area.

General Yermak: As you know, Professor, the use of nuclear weapons is a political issue. Since there are many civilians living in northern Canada and Alaska, I doubt that the US has the political will to use such weapons on its own citizens while other options exist, and I'm certain that the Canadians will have strong reservations about using such weapons to poison their own soil. Canadian winds are born in their Northwest Territories and will carry the seeds of their own destruction. Regardless, if nuclear weapons were employed, our fleet of warships, merchant ships, and ground forces are well equipped for operating in a nuclear battle zone.⁶³

Concerning your other points, it's true that valuable resources would be diverted to a secondary front. But our scheme of mobilization can provide these forces without severe impact on our other IVDs.⁶⁴ One can also argue that the potential gains from preventing or detaining US follow-on forces from being sent to Europe, and the resultant fracturing of the NATO alliance, are more than commensurate with the losses we might incur if this secondary effort isn't successful. Even though we have the lift capability for transporting more than 40 divisions over the ice,⁶⁵ perhaps only 10 to 15 divisions are all that are initially required. The establishment of a sizeable beach-head on the North American continent could require as many as 30 to 40 US and Canadian divisions to dislodge our force. To accomplish this they would need to use more than all of their existing active and reserve

divisions. So where do they get their divisions? They obviously must use divisions which otherwise were designated for the timely reinforcement of Europe. Inadequate logistics to meet our new threat axis and required mobilization time will delay our enemies' being able to dislodge our North American expeditionary forces. It's this delay time that's critical to ensuring the success of our main effort in Europe. In addition, the North Americans will suffer greatly from inadequate cold weather training and lack of Arctic materiel. What little cold weather materiel they do have isn't easily accessible because it's stored at pre-positioned sites in Europe and Korea.

You're correct that our flanks might be exposed to air and submarine attack. But our Arctic SLOC can be reasonably well protected by land-based air and in-depth cordons of anti-air batteries. Icebreaking vessels, such as our *Norilsk* class RO-ROs, could be modified to carry both helicopters and jump jets in a manner similar to concepts successfully used by the British in the Falklands War. Our new aircraft carriers, and even our smaller *Kiev* class carriers, might be assigned protective roles. The same may be true for some of our cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. We are also evaluating new integrated warfare concepts with our growing fleet of Arctic Sea control air cushioned vessels operating in both anti-air and anti-submarine screens.⁶⁶ The logistic support would be facilitated by our helicopter-equipped nuclear powered ice-breaking barge carriers and other ice-strengthened vessels.

One of the biggest problems we have in taking the war to North America is establishing air control over our convoy routes and amphibious objective areas. American B-52, F-111, F-15, and F-18 aircraft pose a constant and serious all-weather, night attack air threat. If we were to invade North America today, we would be at a serious disadvantage due to our lack of training and limited inventory of fully capable air attack/air defense all-weather, day/night tactical aircraft. Fortunately, we've

finally developed and are producing fighter attack aircraft which may be as good as anything currently in the US inventory — or maybe even better. Our new Su-27 all-weather, counterair fighter has large pulse-Doppler radar and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles. It gives us lockdown/shutdown capabilities against low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles. It's even more effective in conjunction with our H-76 airborne electronic warfare and countermeasures aircraft. We're currently testing a navalized version of the Su-27 fighter for service with our new 65,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the first of which has been launched for over a year.¹⁰ If these new aircraft carriers and Su-27 fighters are allowed to join our Arctic forces, we will indeed have a vastly improved capability in the regions of the Arctic Ocean.

Regardless, our MiG-29 fighter and MiG-31 interceptor are both excellent land-based aircraft.¹¹ Both these aircraft have large pulse-Doppler lockdown/shutdown radars and beyond-visual-range missile capabilities. The MiG-31 has a combat radius without refueling that would give us good initial protection of our SLOC from several of the air bases in our Far Eastern theatre. Once airfields are seized and secured along Alaska's northern coast, we can shuttle both of these aircraft onto the North American continent for air defensive use in conjunction with our long-range picket ships and electronic warfare and countermeasures aircraft. This will allow us to have an early warning capability and the means to engage enemy aircraft within our maximum effective combat radius, before they can close with and target our convoys and installations ashore. If we can also be effective in damaging or destroying runways and support facilities at key airbases in Alaska and northern Canada, we will have seriously degraded the enemy's capability to conduct effective, sustained air attacks against our forces.

One method we could use to get our land-based tactical aircraft into position before D-day would be to upgrade well camouflaged and protected airfields on some of the large ice islands within the polar ice pack.¹²

Our nuclear-powered icebreakers could escort an ice-strengthened tanker, a RO-RO support ship, and long-range air-search radar equipped research vessels right to the edge of the ice island, giving us the rapid potential to activate the airfields for self-sustained air operations. As you know, we've had considerable experience in operating our aircraft off of marginal Arctic runways, and our aircraft are designed for these types of conditions. Whether operating off of ice islands or from bases ashore in Alaska and northern Canada, there will be an urgency to develop aircraft revetments, protected surface-to-air missile sites, and hardened logistic support facilities. Fortunately, we already have large, highly trained engineer forces that are adept at using snow and water to construct massive fortifications or repair damaged runways. As usual, the engineers will accomplish the critical support tasks.

Old concepts are being merged with new. We're evaluating the use of lighter than air dirigibles as surveillance, targeting, and communication devices towed by ice-strengthened timber carrier ships or other surface platforms.⁷⁰ These dirigibles, used with our over-the-horizon targeting, video data link equipped helicopters,⁷¹ could have considerable potential if equipped with a combination of look-down sensors and tightly linked communication relays, enhancing our detection of incoming threats and allowing for a coordinated anti-air defense in depth.

To help counter submarine threats to our convoys, the Bering Straits approach to the Chukchi Sea could be mined, making enemy submarine passage extremely hazardous. Finally, US carrier battle groups operating in the Bering Sea will find their own flanks vulnerable to missile, air, and sea attack by our forces operating from air and naval bases in the vicinity of the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Comrade Sorokin: General, I found this discussion quite enlightening and helpful in terms of directing future

economic programs and understanding new technologies for exploiting Arctic sea control. You've made considerable progress in analyzing the military application of technologies initially designed to economically develop our northern regions. You've also reinforced my appreciation of looking at our world from a polar perspective. Your scheme of attack is very appropriate to contemplate in the context of our response to the US Maritime Strategy. It offers a feasible, acceptable, and suitable means to protect our SSBN bastions, to strategically dislocate North Americans away from Europe, to deter or respond in kind to US attacks on the Kola Peninsula, the Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Kurile islands, and to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. I like it. Please keep me informed of any significant new developments, for who can say with certainty what opportunities future world events will bring? I would appreciate a written summary of your recommendations for bases and facility requirements, research and development projects, capital equipment procurement schedules, and general support requirements to round out our existing capabilities for supporting such a concept of operations. We may be able to address some of these shortages in the next five year plan. Unfortunately, our time is up. Shall we discuss dinner for this evening?

THE SOVIETS ARE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING an Arctic Ocean warfighting and strategic lift capability, couched in massive, ice-strengthened naval, fishing, commercial, and icebreaking fleets; ice-strengthened Soviet war vessels are also likely, including aircraft carriers of the *Kiev* class and new, larger carriers. This fleet, combined with new generations of all-weather, day-night tactical aircraft (Su-27, MiG-29, and Mig 31), gives the Soviets a potential for projecting military force across ice-strewn seas and defending it under cover of the long Arctic night.

The inability of US forces to operate in the ice makes Soviet sea power appear even more dangerous. The Soviets' massive ice-strengthened fleet of fishing, research, and merchant ships may greatly complicate US efforts against Soviet submarines in their Arctic bastions. This Soviet fleet might also perform picket duty for intelligence gathering, covert operations, general surveillance, and targeting of US forces. With its ice-strengthened merchant fleet and strategic airlift, the Soviet Union *is now capable of landing on the North American Arctic shore with a force as large as 40 US armored divisions*. Soviet icebreaking tankers and cargo vessels are more than sufficient, in deadweight capacity, to support such an effort over a sustained period of land combat.

Technology has increased Soviet mobility in the Arctic Ocean to such an extent that the protective polar ice barriers have come down. Long, exposed Arctic coastlines have become vulnerable to exploitation by economic enterprises or by military forces possessing the necessary platforms. A new Soviet axis of advance has evolved which combines internal lines of supply with Soviet sea control in the Arctic Ocean. In combination, these factors open the gate for Soviet power projection into the North American continent.

North American defense plans therefore need to address the growing Soviet threat of sea control and surface power projection in their Arctic Ocean TVD. The requirements of the United States and Canada to defend their maritime zones out to the 200 mile limit and to deny amphibious landings on North America's Arctic coasts need to be considered as carefully as other NATO defense commitments. Future shipbuilding and conversions for the US strategic lift fleet should encourage ice-strengthened hull designs and sufficient horsepower ratings to be effective in Arctic marginal ice zone conditions. If such upgrading of privately owned strategic lift shipping is not economically attractive, the federal government needs to provide necessary incentives to the private sector to facilitate the conversions. At the same

time, the US Navy should begin an experimental conversion program to retro-fit selected categories of combatants with ice-strengthened hulls and then conduct routine operations in the Arctic Ocean areas with these ships. Because of the massive number of potential surface targets in the Soviet Arctic Ocean IVD, the US Navy should give priority to naval gunfire platforms in the conversion process. US icebreakers should be armed accordingly.

The US Navy should prepare for forward defense in the Arctic Ocean, with overall concepts of operation developed from the US Maritime Strategy. New Arctic warfare concepts, including the use of properly armed and Arctic equipped landing craft air cushion (LCAC) squadrons as anti-air warfare (AAW) defense screens and as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) screens, need to be evaluated in concert with the use of armed icebreaker surface raiders as logistics (POL) motherships. Icebreakers are critical for extending the range and projecting the power of such a task force. They could be equipped with naval guns, Harpoon missiles, Tomahawk missiles such as TASM-C or TLAM-C, anti-aircraft missiles, and ASW weapons, including the LAMPS-III helicopter. For amphibious strike power projection, new classes of ice-breaking LASH or barge carrying ships need to be built and configured for helicopters, vertical launched jets (Harrier), and air-cushion landing craft. They need to be able to carry the air cushion craft, launch and retrieve them, refuel them directly or use helo-delivered fuel bladders, and serve as integrated battle management platforms. These ships could be configured similar to the US Marine LHA type ships, but would also have icebreaking capability and, preferably, nuclear propulsion.

But the US Navy cannot do the whole job alone. As Canada completes a major review of its defense plans in relationship to NATO commitments, the US Coast Guard contemplates warfighting missions for new icebreakers, and the US Army and Marine Corps, as well as the Navy,

develop concepts and capabilities to conduct Arctic warfare, all need to better focus defense resources so that control of the Arctic Ocean is not ceded to the Soviets.

NOTES

1. Captain Chubakov was head of the Northern Sea Route Administration. See *Soviet Shipping Journal*, Vol. 482, p. 26.
2. Tom Clancy, *Red Storm Rising* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1986).
3. Tom Clancy, *The Hunt for Red October* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1985).
4. Admiral Gorshkov has consistently stressed the essential prerequisite for cross-compatibility between merchant vessel cargo configurations and military sea lift requirements. See Gorshkov, *Seapower of the State* (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Co., 1983).
5. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-1987* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1986).
6. David D. Isby, "Soviet Amphibious Warfare, 1986," *Amphibious Warfare Review*, Fall/Winter 1986, pp. 42-44.5, indicates that the United States is still uncertain as to the use of Soviet RO-RO ships.
7. Gorshkov, pp. 229, 233.
8. Wilbur E. Garrett, "Arctic Ocean" (Azimuthal Equidistant Projection), *National Geographic*, February 1983.
9. Gorshkov, pp. 196-97.
10. Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy" (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, January 1986); "The Northern Front Maritime Campaign: A Recommended Approach," NWC 2178, an advanced amphibious study group concept paper, US Naval War College (OPS Dept.); D. B. Rivkin, "No Bastions for the Bear" (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, April 1984) V. 110-4974, pp. 37-43.
11. The Soviets' anti-submarine helicopters are the Hormone A and the Helix KA-32S. Norman Polmar, *Guide to the Soviet Navy*, 4th ed. (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1986), p. 404.
12. Additionally, *Kiev* class and *Brezhnev* class aircraft carriers with Yak-38 (Forger) jump jets and the new navalized version of the Su-27 (Flanker) aircraft, all equipped with air-to-air missiles, can be very effective against P-3 aircraft that venture into weapon ranges. W. R. Taylor, "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1987, pp. 89-90.

13. For instance, on the *Artika* class civilian icebreakers, a complete suite of anti-air and anti-submarine weapons was fitted but taken off immediately after acceptance trials, leaving only the attachment platforms. Polmar, *Soviet Navy*, p. 370.

14. Gorshkov, p. 44.

15. Bruno Bock and Klaus Bock, *Soviet Bloc Merchant Ships* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 68.

16. *Lloyds Register of Shipping* (1984/85) (London).

17. Gorshkov, p. 43.

18. Hamlin Caldwell, "Arctic Submarine Warfare," *Submarine Review*, July 1983, pp. 5-13. See also Polmar, *Soviet Navy*, p. 117.

19. Taylor, p. 89.

20. Caldwell, p. 9.

21. Polmar, *Soviet Navy*, pp. 4, 431.

22. Ken McGruther, *The Evolving Soviet Navy* (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1978), p. 55.

23. *Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-1987*.

24. Center for Strategic and International Studies, *Soviet Sea Power* (Georgetown University, Washington, June 1969), p. 85.

25. Polmar, *Soviet Navy*, pp. 5, 460.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Howard and Paret, trans., 8th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 607.

28. McGruther, p. 33.

29. For a discussion of PAL code nuclear weapon safeguards, see Jonathan B. Tucker, "Strategic Command and Control: America's Achilles Heel?" US Naval War College paper NWC 2155. Although the political scenario of this essay is fictitious, defense analyst Melvyn Krauss recommended in "Let Europe Negotiate With Gorbachev," in the 6 March 1987 *Wall Street Journal*, p. 30, that West Germany and other US allies be allowed to control their own nuclear weapons and claimed support of this position by several highly influential US defense analysts and politicians. Regarding neo-Nazi nationalism, see Martin Suskind, "History Cannot be Shrugged Off," *New York Times*, 2 November 1986, sec. 4.

30. For further discussion of these issues, see John Cushman, "U.S. To Cut Arms Aid to Allies—Includes Some Hosts of Bases," *New York Times*, 13 November 1986; and Edward

Schumacher, "U.S., Spanish Discord over Bases is Growing," *New York Times*, 14 December 1986, p. 6.

31. This last objective is the authors' conjecture. Destruction or neutralization of NATO strategic nuclear forces could be included in the category "seize the initiative and take the fight to the enemy."

32. NATO has code named this wing in ground effect aircraft the Orlan. It has been observed in performance trials armed with the air launched version of the SS-N-22 cruise missile. Stand off attack radius of this WIG aircraft is therefore in excess of 60 nautical miles. Maximum speed is estimated to be 300 knots at cruising altitude. The SS-N-22 cruise missile can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead at an estimated speed of Mach 2.5. Polmar, *Secret Navies*, pp. 101, 108, 431.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 431.

34. Clausewitz, p. 610.

35. This policy was not originated by Gorbachev. It was articulated in 1982 by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov when he said, "Only extraordinary circumstances—a direct nuclear aggression against the Soviet State or its allies—can compel us to resort to a retaliatory nuclear strike as a last means of self-defense." D. E. Ustinov, "We Serve the Homeland and the Cause of Communism," *Levstat*, 27 May 1982.

36. Clausewitz, pp. 595-96.

37. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 78.

38. *Soviet Sea Power* (Center for Strategic and International Studies), pp. 45-46.

39. The Arctic Ocean Teatrn Voennykh Deystviy (Theater of Operations), or TVD, is one of four maritime theaters of operation established by the Soviets for unified direction of operations. The other maritime TVDs are the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Polmar, *Secret Navies*, p. 13.

40. Norman Polmar, *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*, 13th ed. (Annapolis, US Naval Institute Press, 1986); and William Mathews, "Soviets May Be Building giant LCACs for the Arctic," *Naval News*, 23 March 1987, p. 33.

41. RO-RO and LASH refer to roll on/roll off and lighter container aboard ship handling carriers.

42. *Global Register of Shipping: Jane's Merchant Ships 1985-1986* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1985); *Jane's Fighting Ships 1986-1987*, Brock and Brock, p. 67, state, "Most new

Soviet freighters are completely equipped for ice conditions." The Soviet Union's internal transportation system connects the west-east corridor Trans-Siberian Railroad to intermodal cargo-handling river ports on the Irtysh, Ob, Yenisey, Angara, and Lena Rivers which move cargo north to Arctic port facilities. The Trans-Siberian Railroad also connects to port facilities on the Volga River which, in turn, are linked by a river and canal network from the Danube River, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Baltic Sea to the White Sea on the northern Arctic coast. By the early 1990s, the Danube River will also be connected to the Rhine River in a joint FRG-Soviet project. The Rhine River has access to the North Sea through outlets in the Netherlands and through the Rhine-Weser canal in West Germany. Most of the Soviet Union's naval combatants can be shuttled from one fleet operating area to another completely within Soviet territorial waters and internal waterways. See D. M. Egan, "The Triumph of Technology Over Geography—Unlocking the Siberian Maritime Icebox," available from the US Naval War College Library, Newport, Rhode Island.

43. "The Arctic Autumn '83," *Soviet Shipping*, 1/84, pp. 32-35. See also Captain Chubakov's historical review of the Northern Sea Route in "The Northern Sea Route—Past and Present," *Soviet Shipping*, 4/82, pp. 26-29.

44. Timofel Guzhenko, "U.S.S.R. Marine Transport in the Period of Developed Socialism" (Moscow: Transport Publishers, 1981), as summarized in *Soviet Shipping*, 2/82, p. 13.

45. "Forward to New Frontiers, 27th C.P.S.U. Congress," *Soviet Shipping*, 3/86, p. 1. See also T. Guzhenko, "Programme for Long Term Action," *Soviet Shipping*, 3/86, pp. 2-6.

46. As a demonstration of things to come, in 1978 the Soviet nuclear icebreaker *Sibir* accompanied an ice-strengthened containerized cargo ship through multi-year polar pack ice at an average speed in excess of 11 knots. Lawrence Brigham, "Future Developments in the Soviet Arctic Maritime Transportation System," Proceedings of the First Spilhaus Conference, Williamsburg, Virginia, 14-17 October 1984, p. 213.

47. "Morflot Ports: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow," *Soviet Shipping*, 4/84, pp. 2-4.

48. *Jane's Surface Skimmers 1985* (London: Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1985), pp. 59-90.

49. Lenin, "Better Fewer, But Better," *Pravda*, 4 March 1923, as translated by Robert C. Tucker in *The Lenin Anthology* (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1975), p. 745.

50. Robert A. Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1979), p. 44.

51. In a recent newspaper article, Captain Anatoly Kozanov, master of the SR-15 class Arctic freighter *Kapitan Mar*, was quoted as saying, "off season voyages to end next year or the year after . . . when the Soviets plan to open the eastern Arctic to year-round shipping." "Soviet Ice-Breaking Freighter Offers All Creature Comforts," *Journal of Commerce*, 21 January 1987.

52. Clancy, *Red Storm Rising*.

53. David R. Francis, "Canada Ponders Major Shift in Defense Policy," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 February 1987, p. 9.

54. To air deliver personnel, approximately 125 Candid aircraft sorties will move personnel equal to one US mechanized division, approximately 17,500 men. For example, using a distance of 2,000 nautical miles and 55 percent of available Soviet Candid aircraft, 125 sorties could be completed each day. The Candid aircraft requires a minimum runway length of 1,600 feet and can operate on dirt airstrips, allowing for the use of many alternative North American austere landing sites. See John E. Scherer, *USSR Facts and Figures Annual 1985*, Vol. 9 (Academic International Press, 1985), p. 90. Use of much larger Soviet logistics aircraft joining their air fleet, such as the Condor or Casp BAWG, will substantially decrease their sortie requirements.

55. Calculations based on data from *Logistics Handbook for Strategic Mobility Planning*, Military Traffic Management Command, PAM 700-1, January 1986, pp. 5-8; and from Charles D. Odorizzi, "Can Army Support Keep Those Caissons Rolling Along?" *Army Forces Journal*, October 1986. (We used a figure slightly higher than Odorizzi's for fuel consumption per day by one US armored division—460,000 gallons instead of 450,000.)

56. Ships of the *Ivan Rogov* class (EPD) can carry over 550 troops, 30 armored personnel carriers, 10 tanks, and 3 air cushion landing craft. *Aligator* class ships (LSD) can carry 375 troops and up to 26 tanks. The Soviets have a large fleet of air cushion vehicles of various sizes, all of which are highly capable of negotiating shore ice. They also have the *Pobinon* A class landing craft (LST), capable of carrying 200 troops and 6 tanks, and the *Pobinon* C class landing craft can carry an additional 30 tons of cargo.

57. Captain John Moore, Royal Navy, *Jane's Naval Review* (London: Jane's Publishing Ltd., 1985), p. 170.

58. Seizing the Prudhoe Bay facility and cutting off North Slope oil would immediately stop about 20 percent of US domestic oil production.

59. Sun Tzu, p. 102.

60. Merely speculation on the part of the authors, and perhaps overly optimistic.

61. Clausewitz, p. 77.

62. "No one should go to war or even contemplate doing so without knowing in advance what final goals they intend to accomplish." Clausewitz, p. 579.

63. For more information about radiological, chemical, and biological warfare defensive systems on Soviet merchant ships, see Moore, p. 168.

64. This is a conservative estimate based upon a worst case lift requirement for 40 US armored divisions. Soviet armored divisions are believed to require considerably less lift weight capacity. Our detailed calculations supporting this estimate are included in a longer version of this essay, at the US Naval War College Library, on pp. C-2, D-3.

65. The initial Soviet divisions could come from Mongolia in the Far Eastern TVD and from the Central Strategic Reserve. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1984-1985* (Oxford: Alden Press, 1984), pp. 18, 19, 22, 105. Soviet forces in Mongolia would be replaced by highly trained and loyal forces of the Mongolian People's Republic regular and reserve army as part of a regularly practiced routine. See David W. Orr, "The Geo-Political Significance of Outer Mongolia and its Relationship to China and the Soviet Union," 3 March 1987, US Naval War College Library, Newport, p. 8. The Soviets can mobilize 4-6 million reserves within 48 hours, all of whom have had active military service within the past two years. See William F. Scott and Harriet F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 322-26. These reserves will more than replace initial divisions sent to North America. Also the Soviets have a highly efficient system for rapid absorption of reserves. Each division has a duplication of officers. When a division moves out, the division commander and half of the officers (a full complement) go with the unit. Meanwhile, the division commander's deputy and a second full complement of officers stay behind and immediately form a new division once the reserve complement of enlisted soldiers arrive. It is strongly suspected that there are enough officers in the original division so that the

Chief of Staff can form a third division. The first division uses Category 1 equipment (brand new), the second division uses Category 2 equipment (almost new), and the third division uses older war stocks or equipment with which the parent division trains on a daily basis. Mobilization in this context is practiced by all units. See Viktor Sugurov, *The Liberators* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1983); and Sugurov, *Inside the Soviet Army* (New York: Berkley Books, 1982), p. 164.

66. The Soviets are now operating an impressive fleet of more than 70 air cushion, Arctic capable landing craft (each having an unrefueled range of more than 200 nautical miles) including the *Pomornik* class, a 360-ton, 59-meter craft which operates at a speed in excess of 50 knots and carries over 200 troops, three medium tanks, SA-N-5 anti-air missiles, 30 mm/65 cal. Gatling guns; the *Aist* class, a 250-ton, 47.3-meter craft which operates at a speed in excess of 60 knots and carries 220 troops, two medium tanks, 2 quad AS-N-5 Grail anti-aircraft missiles, 4 30 mm/65 cal. Gatling guns; and the *Gus* class, a 27-ton, 21.3-meter craft which operates at a speed in excess of 50 knots and carries 25 troops and a 30 mm Gatling gun. These craft can sortie out of a barge carrier or LASH ship for logistics and control, refuel from helicopter delivered fuel bladders, or replenish from ice-breaking tankers in the convoy. Given this logistic support to extend their range, air suction vehicles can be deployed in conjunction with helicopters and vertically launched aircraft to establish dispersed AAW and ASW formations. See Polmar, *Soviet Navy*, pp. 266-70.

67. "Jane's All the World Aircraft Supplement," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1986, p. 129.

68. In 1985, US Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald Latham hinted that the MiG-31 might be better than any existing US fighter. Taylor, p. 86.

69. Lowell Thomas Jr. said, "Between 1937 and 1958 Russia airlifted the astonishing total of 565 temporary scientific stations onto Arctic ice pack islands." Lowell Thomas Jr., "Scientists Ride Ice Islands on Arctic Odysseys," *National Geographic* 128 (1965), p. 675.

70. *Soviet Shipping Journal* (Morskoi Flot) 9/86, p. 6.

71. Polmar, *Soviet Navy*, pp. 406-07.

MANNING THE VOLUNTEER FORCE: COMPETING IN THE MARKETPLACE

Ronald G. Porter

PLANNING THE ARMED FORCES to maintain national security requires decisions on some crucial issues: the nature and extent of the military threat to US national security, what is needed to maintain deterrence, what is affordable, what the risks are, and a course of action if deterrence fails. Consensus on these issues leads to decisions about the levels of "combat capability" the United States maintains and relies on to ensure national survival. Combat capability is the force structure, technical sophistication, readiness, and sustainability of military forces, units, weapons systems, and equipment.¹ But combat capability also depends on the people who make up the forces, man the units, and operate the systems and equipment. As former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger has pointed out, "A military force is only as good as its members."²

Of course, recognition that the military requires talented people is hardly new. Patton said, "Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men."³ Or, as former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird put it,

We had better make sure we understand where the essence of our national defense lies. It is the quality

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of our combat and combat-support personnel ... which undergirds our entire defense effort. Attracting and retaining persons of quality in sufficient numbers should be our number one priority.⁴

In other words, the problem isn't just convincing someone that the services need good people; it's getting and keeping those people. Attention to "getting and keeping" logically begins with a look at the demographics of the national population, the first concern being sufficient availability of American youth—prospective military manpower—to meet military requirements. Of course, several dynamic influences affect a prospective recruit's decision to join a service, and then whether to stay or leave. But demographics, though it doesn't provide a total picture, does provide insight about future accession potential.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC INFLUENCE

IN THE LATE 1970s, both the military and civil communities became increasingly concerned about the United States' ability to maintain needed military manpower strength. As the Soviets continued to build up their military forces, the United States experienced rising military expenses, alleged deterioration in volunteer quality, and concern that the military was becoming just another occupation. By 1980, the situation reached a critical point. The realities of Iran and Afghanistan, and the fact that in 1979, for the first time, no service had met its recruiting goals, contributed to the developing consensus that the military was in trouble.⁵ Furthermore, a decline in the available youth population made prospects of reversing the perceived trend appear unlikely.⁶

By 1981, some were claiming the 1973 All-Volunteer Force (AVF) was a failure and were calling for a return to the draft. Supporting such a move, Senator Lloyd M. Bentsen Jr said the AVF "will have increasing problems

attracting the requisite number of qualified recruits ... and has, in some respects, become an employer of last resort."⁷

But the fact of the matter is that, despite the rhetoric and warnings, the Volunteer Force has not failed to bring in an adequate number of willing recruits. In the years since 1979, accession quantity requirements have been met, even while the pool of available recruits has declined. Now, at a point about half-way through the period during which male youth availability will decrease annually, service manning has actually shown improvement.⁸ A smaller youth pool doesn't necessarily mean a reduction in accessions. If not, then what does it mean?

Fewer candidates to choose from can't be a positive recruiting influence, and there must be a limit to how small the pool can get before the military can no longer meet its requirements. But the relationship between the number of qualified male youth and volunteer enlistment rates is by no means well understood. To begin with, in examining the effect of demographics on military manning, we lack a clear definition of recruit demand (quantity and quality) and supply (the size of the potential recruit pool). Consequently, analysts have used different baselines, assumptions, and limitations. Results have varied accordingly.

Quantity Demand

In Europe, Soviet troops outnumber ours two to one.⁹ In a guerrilla conflict, estimates of conventional to insurgent force ratios required to maintain a standoff run as high as ten to one.¹⁰ Given that the quality of any force can only overcome a certain degree of an opponent's numerical superiority, it follows that the size of our forces is an important part of deterrence strategy. With the prospects for a come-as-you-are war in Europe or elsewhere, respectable force structures are critical for both deterrence and actual combat.¹¹ And reducing the requirement is not a prudent alternative to overcoming a manpower shortage. We must establish requirements based on strategy and then act to fill shortfalls before they occur. Making do with smaller or less capable forces than required is the same as operating at increased risk.

So what is the projected manpower demand? Table 1 provides data on military manpower demands. The table shows all non-prior service (NPS) enlistment requirements for all services, including Reserve and National

Table 1. Total Non-Prior Service Accession Requirement

<i>Year</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>
1974	46,000	446,000
1975	51,000	460,000
1976	46,000	451,000
1977	45,000	434,000
1978	53,000	357,000
1979	56,000	357,000
1980	64,000	395,000
1981	56,000	370,000
1982	48,000	353,000
1983	50,000	352,000
1984	51,000	362,000
1985	53,000	415,000
1986	55,000	431,000
1987	54,000	421,000
1988	53,000	411,000
1989	53,000	416,000
1990	52,000	408,000
1991-2000	52,000	408,000

Note: The reserve/guard component requirement is a constant 15,000 per year for females and 88,000 per year for males.

Source: US Department of the Air Force, *Personnel Force Composition Study: An Analysis of the Effects of Varying Male and Female Force Levels*, Annex 2 (Washington: Headquarters, US Air Force, March 1985), pp. 4-23.

Guard accessions. It does not include officers or prior service (PS) accessions; but there is no recent indication of difficulty in accessing officers, and PS accessions are windfall experience gains. Therefore, planning to man enlisted requirements with NPS personnel is a reasonable approach so long as the manpower pool disqualifies college graduates (officer candidates) from accession eligibility consideration.

To help put demand in perspective, it is useful to look at a breakdown of actual accessions, including PS accessions, for recent years, as shown in table 2. In light of the fact that all DOD and virtually all Guard and Reserve forces met or exceeded end-strength objectives for fiscal years 1983-85,¹² we can view the actual enlistments shown in table 2 as equal to the demand in those fiscal years. Clearly, then, youth accession is only one of the many factors that, along with reenlistments, retention rates, and other mechanisms, ultimately figure into end-strength totals for a service or agency. But accession remains critical. A service can only keep members so long, so a flow of "new blood" must continue from the bottom.

An important observation we can make based on table 2 concerns the effect of prior service entrants on total accessions. Those personnel reentering or cross-flowing from active to non-active status make up a significant portion of Guard and Reserve accessions. Moreover, prior service people are generally older than 18, so their enlistments offset part of the demand for younger NPS entrants across the total force spectrum. This effect, which appears in the difference between 1985 estimated and actual NPS figures in tables 1 and 2 (i.e., the difference between the demand for NPS males projected in table 1—415,000—and the actual number of enlistments shown in table 2—348,100), makes another case for considering accessions as a total force problem and working it from a total force perspective rather than from a NPS-PS perspective.

Table 2. Actual Accessions, FY 1983–85

	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985
Active Duty Accessions			
Non-Prior Service			
(NPS) Male	269,200	273,700	263,300
NPS Female	35,900	36,100	38,500
Prior Service (PS) Male			
PS Male	23,800	17,500	14,100
PS Female	1,800	1,100	1,100
Reserve and Guard Accessions			
NPS Male	86,200	88,700	84,800
NPS Female	13,200	12,400	13,000
PS Male	120,800	107,300	120,000
PS Female	12,300	13,300	14,600
Total Accessions—Active, Reserve, and Guard			
NPS Male	355,400	362,400	348,000
NPS Female	49,100	48,500	51,500
PS Male	144,600	124,800	134,100
PS Female	14,100	14,400	15,700
Total Force Male	500,000	487,200	482,200
Total Force Female	63,200	62,900	67,200
Grand Total	563,200	550,100	549,400

Source: US Department of Defense, *Military Manpower Strength Assessment, Recruiting and Reenlistment Results for the Active Force—End Fiscal Year 1984* (Washington: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release No. 561–84, 31 October 1984), p. 2; . . . *for the Active Force and Preliminary Selected Reserve Results—Fiscal Year 1985* (News Release No. 704–85, 10 December 1985), p. 2; *Selected Reserve Manpower Strength Assessment and Recruiting Results for Fiscal Year 1984* (News Release No. 90–85, 20 February 1985), pp. 2, 6; and . . . *Results for Fiscal Year 1985* (News Release No. 59–86, 3 February 1986), pp. 2, 6.

One of the most significant lessons of the early Volunteer Force years was the difficulty of "attracting a sufficient quantity and quality of enlisted personnel to man the reserve forces."¹¹ Without the motivation of the draft, selected reserve and individual ready reserve force levels declined.¹² Meanwhile, the trend toward greater size and use of reserve units to round out and support active duty functions increased.¹³ It appears that reserve and active forces' recruiting interests are being drawn ever closer together.¹⁴ If the Guard or Reserve can do a support function at up to 70 percent cost saving,¹⁵ it seems best that it be done with a prior service person—the more experienced, the better.

Quality Demand

A case for desiring quality in recruits can be made based on common sense alone. That is, the smarter the recruit, the more capable he is. The problem comes, first, in defining quality by measurable standards and then applying those standards to persons in the population being considered, and second, in deciding on the minimum level of quality acceptable for military service.¹⁶ To complicate the matter, the minimum level of acceptable quality is consistently rising.

Several things drive this ever increasing trend toward higher quality requirements, not the least of which is the complexity of modern military hardware. Equipment that is complex and, therefore, difficult to maintain places demands on the accession process that need to be carefully considered to ensure a continued match between equipment and personnel. More generally, restricting entry of those who don't meet the minimum standards is justified given their potential trainability, disciplinary, and motivational problems.¹⁷ But quantifying quality is no simple task.

In the final analysis, quality is measured by demonstrated performance. But since the military relies largely on young, untrained individuals, quality has come to be interpreted in terms of measurable attributes of aptitude and education.²⁰

Aptitude The services administer the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to all applicants. Its ten subset areas, four of which make up the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), form the primary tool to measure aptitude for trainability and to assess vocational aptitude for specific job categories.²¹ Applicants tested are grouped into categories, based on their test scores, as shown in table 3.

Table 3. Armed Forces Qualifications Test (AFQT) Categories

AFQT Category	AFQT Percentile Score	Reading Grade Level
I	93-99	12.7-12.9
II	65-92	10.6-12.6
III	31-64	8.1-10.5
IV	10-30	6.6-8.0
V	9 and below	3.4-6.5

Source: Martin Binkin, *Military Technology and Defense Manpower* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 15.

Categories I and II are considered above average. Category III, average, is sometimes divided into two groups: IIIA, with scores in the 50th to 64th percentiles, and IIIB, with scores in the 31st to 49th percentiles. Scores in the 30th percentile and below are considered below average. Category IV recruits require more training and have more disciplinary problems than those in higher groups. Those in the 9th percentile and below are ineligible by law for service.²²

AFQT and other test results have proven to be helpful in predicting the probability of success in training for each military occupation. But the Military Manpower Task Force observes, "The link between test scores and actual performance on the job is more tenuous, although available evidence indicates that, in the aggregate, most

high scorers do better on the job than most low scorers."²² To ensure the services don't load their forces with lower quality enlistees, and in response to AWT testing and recruiting problems between 1976 and 1980, Congress set a ceiling of 20 percent on Category IV personnel in each service.²³

Education. "A high school diploma ... is the best single measure of a person's potential for adapting to life in the military," states military analyst Martin Binkin. In the years 1977-79, male recruits with high school diplomas were twice as likely to successfully complete thirty-six months of service as non-high school graduates or general equivalency diploma recipients.²⁴ Because of the strong correlation between high school graduation and completion of enlistment, Congress requires at least a 65 percent high school completion rate for Army enlistees.²⁵

The larger truth remains, that the better, more qualified recruits the services can attract, the more capability they will individually and collectively have. Adjustments made by the services to the tests and standards they use to measure aptitude, establish minimum cutoff scores, and accommodate those without high school diplomas may help meet numerical goals, but at a cost in capability.²⁶

Ideally, we build force structures to carry out military strategy. Given superior Soviet numbers, the quality of our equipment and personnel has long been held as a positive offset. This fact is apparently overlooked by those who criticize the services for following a "quality maximizing" policy as measured by mental category. They would promote a "quality matching" policy, to match individual aptitudes with job requirements.²⁷ But it is not currently possible to determine accurately either the minimum or the optimum quality requirements. Nevertheless, the quality of our force is, and will remain, a crucial element in the total effectiveness equation. Quality standards should not be lowered to expand the available supply pool without first making changes in

equipment or strategy that would allow the new force mix to provide the required capability. Otherwise, we run the risk of increasing personnel quantity but getting a decrease in equipment effectiveness—exactly what we don't want.

Supply

One approach to looking at the military labor supply and "individuals' propensities to seek employment in the military" is to group factors that influence decisions to join and stay. Major factors cited in a 1977 RAND report included the following:³⁰

- tangible aspects of military employment
- effective recruiting
- conditions of the civil economy
- size of the population base
- individual "taste" for military service

This study did not include Reserve and Guard accession requirements in its demand estimates, but it still concluded, "enlistment supply will probably not be sufficient to meet the Services' stated accession requirements unless unemployment remains at high levels or unless the Services reduce their quality standards."³¹

Another RAND study in 1986 forecast enlistment supply under four scenarios:³²

- business recession
- business expansion
- the economy remaining on an "even keel"
- a "most realistic scenario [which] assumes that the economy will gradually improve over time"

The study used data for 1974 through 1981 as a control for the model. The model output is an equation for each of the active services that "relate[s] the enlistment rate to military/civilian pay, the number of recruiters per potential enlistee, a business cycle variable, and other control

variables reflecting changes in enlistment policy, including the end of the GI Bill." The resulting equations were used against scenarios to forecast "high quality" NPS male enlistments. High quality was defined as an AFQT Category I through IIIA high school graduate.³³ The report results for each of the scenarios are shown in table 4.

Table 4. Forecasts of DOD Enlistments of High School Graduate Males in AFQT Categories I-III A, Under Four Economic Scenarios

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>Recessionary</i>	<i>Expansionary</i>	<i>"Leen Keel"</i>	<i>Realistic</i>
1982	128,694	99,493	108,706	128,694
1983	135,615	99,184	108,175	123,631
1984	134,104	98,754	107,478	116,539
1985	132,476	98,233	106,684	113,735
1986	130,953	97,699	105,906	111,491
1987	130,001	97,347	105,406	110,099
1988	129,847	97,293	105,328	109,287
1989	129,532	97,168	105,156	108,408
1990	128,806	96,879	104,759	107,608

Source: Robert Cotterman, *Forecasting Enlisted Supply* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1986), pp. 41-44.

The study, not surprisingly, found the following variables to significantly influence results: business cycles (extremely important), the ratio of military pay to civilian pay, recruiter intensity, level of post-service educational benefits, and the size of the young male cohort.³⁴ Another observable feature generated by the model is the relatively consistent number of male high school graduates, basically between 100,000 and 130,000, that would

enlist each year from 1982 to 1990. If the authors are correct in their belief that the "realistic" scenario offers the best indication of how the supply of the military youth market will behave, there will be remarkably small reductions in available males through the end of the 1980s.

Another analyst, looking at the supply issue in a steady demand environment, showed the relative effect of the smaller youth pool for the period 1985-88 as compared to 1991-95. While holding quality and end strength requirements constant, the study decreased the size of the 18-year-old pool by 200,000 a year. The results indicated that the services must increase their recruiting rate from 50 to 55 percent of the qualified and available annual candidates.³⁵ Stated another way, everything else being equal, we need only increase the 1984-88 accession rate by 5 percent to man the services in 1990-95. The hard part is two-fold: validating the accuracy of numbers, given the reality that everything else *is not* equal, and determining what will be necessary to achieve the 5 percent rate increase.

In March 1985, the Air Force released *An Analysis of the Effects of Varying Male and Female Force Levels*.³⁶ Annex 2 of that report included a dynamic model estimating available, qualified American youth, ages 18 to 23, through the year 2000. Table 5 shows the results of the study in youth accession requirements as a percentage of available youth, historically, currently, and with projections through the year 2000.

The model used to obtain the data in table 5 considered immigration at between "middle and high" rates. This assumption is appropriate, as the low rate is by definition a rate associated with sustained depressed economic conditions in the United States. Aptitude, education, and other criteria are based on meeting minimums, by service and occupational areas.³⁷ This model indicates that the supply of male youth, 18 to 23 years old, relative to demand cited in table 1, will vary by less than 2 percent through the year 2000. Other earlier analysts tended to agree.

Table 5. Non-Prior Service Male Accession Requirement as a Percentage of Qualified and Available Males, Ages 18–23 (Active Duty and Reserve Requirements Combined)

Year	Age						Total, 18–23
	18	19	20	21	22	23	
1974	9.3	12.5	7.6	5.0	3.2	2.1	7.1
1976	8.8	11.9	8.3	5.1	2.8	2.1	7.0
1978	6.8	9.0	6.2	3.8	2.5	1.7	5.4
1980	7.3	9.4	6.4	3.8	2.5	1.7	5.6
1982	6.5	8.5	5.7	3.3	2.1	1.4	4.8
1984	6.8	8.9	6.0	3.5	2.2	1.5	5.0
1986	8.6	11.3	7.7	4.5	2.8	1.9	6.2
1988	8.5	11.3	7.8	4.6	2.9	1.9	6.4
1990	8.6	11.5	7.9	4.7	3.0	2.0	6.7
1992	8.9	11.9	8.2	4.9	3.1	2.1	6.7
1994	9.3	12.4	8.6	5.1	3.3	2.2	7.1
1996	9.5	12.7	8.9	5.3	3.4	2.3	7.5
1998	9.2	12.3	8.6	5.2	3.3	2.2	7.4
2000	8.7	11.7	8.1	4.9	3.2	2.1	7.0

Source: US Department of the Air Force, *Personnel Force Composition Study: An Analysis of the Effects of Varying Male and Female Force Levels*, Annex Two (Washington: Headquarters, US Air Force, March 1985), pp. 5–6.

Demographic Assessment

Two basic issues have combined to cause wide concern and debate over the future quality and size of the US military. These two issues are the change to the Volunteer Force and the declining youth population. For years, there has been speculation that, in combination, these factors would force drastic action to maintain the required force structure. Yet after 13 years of the

Volunteer Force, and nearly half-way through the well publicized decline in the size of the available manpower pool, the military is meeting recruiting objectives and getting quality recruits. In FY 1985, each of the services achieved its recruiting objective, and DOD tied its FY 1984 record with 93 percent of all NPS accessions possessing a high school diploma.³⁸ The percent of NPS accessions who scored in Categories I to III on the AFQT also continues a favorable upward trend since 1980.³⁹

In summary, demographics have not, in themselves, caused a reduction in quality or quantity of service accessions. The services have overcome demographic declines through the offsetting influences of supportive management actions and pro-service environmental factors. We need to consider several of the most important of these dynamic influences in order to view more realistically the total manpower accession and retention issue.

DYNAMIC INFLUENCES

DESPITE ALL THE REASONS why the Volunteer Force shouldn't, couldn't, and wouldn't survive, it is surviving. The services' efforts to determine what needed to be done and then do it has paid off. It's been shown that a declining male population base doesn't necessarily mean a reduction in quantity or quality of accessions. But to deal with what a declining population base does mean for the long run requires progress toward a more complete and accurate understanding of accession variables in the Volunteer Force system. Only after the variables are identified and quantified can we implement the most effective policies. Because retention directly affects accession requirements, it is a logical influence to consider first.

Retention

Retention isn't something we do; it's a result and a measure of effectiveness. But we need to look at it because, from a military point of view, retention rates

provide a basis for considering the overall "goodness" of what has happened in service manning.

Table 6 shows reenlistment rates for all of DOD from fiscal year 1977 through 1985. Though it is difficult to draw conclusions about specific aspects of what was done to keep reenlistment rates going up, we can say that, in total, what was done must have worked.

Table 6. Reenlistment Rates (Percentages)

<i>Fiscal Year</i>	<i>First Term</i>	<i>Career</i>
1977	35	75
1978	37	72
1979	37	68
1980	39	71
1981	43	76
1982	53	85
1983	52	86
1984	51	86
1985	48	84

Source: US Department of Defense, "Almanac," *Defense 86*, September-October (Washington: GPO, 1986), p. 31.

Retention is valuable for offsetting accession requirements. For instance, between fiscal years 1980 and 1984, the services' strength was up by 88,000. However, total accessions required were down by over 61,000 because of improved retention.¹⁰ Furthermore, it's cheaper and better for services to keep trained, qualified personnel than to replace them through recruitment. The difference between replacement cost and current cost should be identified and recognized as no-cost retention initiative funds.¹¹

Recruiting

As already shown, the services have been meeting end strength goals. Thus recruiting, in combination with

retention, has been successful. DOD met or exceeded its recruiting objectives for fiscal years 1982 through 1985.⁴² But how were they successful? Some maintain that recruiting for the Volunteer Force is not so much an economic or a supply problem as it is a management problem; the services develop recruiting programs, then train, assign, manage, and allocate resources in terms of service objectives.⁴³ But as I see it, to suggest that the services can just "manage" their accession difficulty is a gross oversimplification.

In the five-component RAND model mentioned earlier, each of the components has both positive and negative potential. So if the model is correct and the components are not mutually exclusive, there are at least 10 major influences on potential recruits. Further complicating the issue is the reality that components 3, 4, and 5—conditions of the civil economy, size of the population base, and individual "taste" for military service—are beyond the immediate influence of the services. This model provides a structure for appreciating the magnitude of the military services' manning problem and shows that recruiting itself is an important influence on accession.

The validity of this statement is confirmed by data on recruiting outcomes which show that the quality of recruits isn't just a matter of efficiency or of changes in selection criteria. Rather, recruiting success might be more appropriately defined by the number of high quality recruits who are more likely to reenlist. In effect, the flow of high quality recruits is critical, and the recruiters have primary responsibility for maintaining the flow. The Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff indicated just how important recruiting is when asked what he considered the best tool for recruiting and retaining quality Marines. In reply, he stated, "the one that makes the critical difference . . . is the recruiter in the field."⁴⁴ Once the recruit has enlisted, other factors, which we turn to next, will determine if, and how long, he will stay.

Proactive Management

Everything that the services have done to improve morale, welfare, and well-being among their members has had a positive influence on accession and retention. The challenge will continue in deciding between alternative people programs and determining the point of marginal return for those programs as they compete for limited resources. In the process, the services must do everything possible to maintain the confidence of their members. In fact and perception, service members need to know that military and national leaders are committed to protecting incentives and programs viewed as part of their "implied contract" with the government. Three critical support areas are education assistance, financial incentives, and quality of life support.

The merits of an education incentive are considerable; it is popular and helps enlistment.⁴⁵ But the services need quality people to begin with and need to keep them. As a consequence, the post-Vietnam education benefits program evolved into the Veterans' Educational Assistance Program (VEAP), and VEAP "Kickers," both to offer educational assistance and to channel recruits into hard-to-fill skills.⁴⁶ Evidence continues to indicate that education assistance induces accessions, if not retention. Likewise, it remains an area which could be expanded should recruiting need additional help.⁴⁷

Financial incentives provide an even stronger effect on accession and retention. "With the exception of conscription," concludes the Defense Manpower Commission, "raises in military compensation offer the most direct means of increasing the numbers of young men who apply for enlistment."⁴⁸ The "elasticity" of pay to retention has been shown to be consistent with draft-era data. "First term" elasticity of about 2.5 means a 10 percent increase in pay would raise reenlistment rates by an average of 25 percent. Lump-sum bonuses, limited by law to \$16,000 for non-nuclear trained personnel, "have a larger retention impact than equivalent installment bonuses, and they induce personnel to reenlistment for longer periods."⁴⁹

In whatever form, putting money in the service member's pocket is important. Financial incentives increase recruiting and subsequent retention.⁵⁰ Recognition of this fact is in large measure why total manpower cost (including civilian and retired pay) has gone from \$23.9 billion in FY 1964 to over \$111 billion in FY 1985.⁵¹

But like everything else, pay is a relative issue. It must be viewed in the context of the existing environment. For accessions, a critical competing reality is the wage level for youths in the private sector. For any particular situation, a certain level of pay will equate to a certain level of enlistment and retention. The 1980-84 Youth Attitude Tracking Study results indicated that "level of pay" was only the fifth most important reason young males decided *not* to enlist. The first four reasons for both males and females were continuation in school, plans for a civilian career, lack of personal freedom, and separation from family and friends.⁵² The key here is that pay matters, but it's not all that matters. As pay can offset other negative factors in the environment, so too can it be offset by positive factors.

Quality of life considerations have an important influence on career decisions and have received recent emphasis. The Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to the Congress* for fiscal year 1986 states, "It appears that a significant correlation exists among quality of life programs, spouse satisfaction, and recruitment and retention of qualified people on the one hand, and the discipline, morale, and readiness of our forces on the other."⁵³ Correspondingly, the DOD Family Policy Coordinating Committee, created in FY 1984, has set about to make, coordinate, and implement improvement in such areas as medical care, child care, legal assistance, religious programs, assignment policies, housing, recreation services, family services, commissaries, and exchanges.⁵⁴

Proactive management actions taken on a wide range of issues and problems have resulted in improvements and success. But there are other dynamics at work which have the potential to influence enlistment and retention.

Some of the factors are well documented while others are not. Most are beyond the immediate control of the DOD leadership, yet they exist and should be dealt with, where feasible, to minimize their potential adverse effect. Some of these factors are the economy, opportunities for women, immigration, and technology.

The Economy

We'll deal with the economy first because it is probably the most recognized influence on the Volunteer Force. Virtually all comprehensive personnel models consider it a major variable in determining accession and retention outcomes. The problem, then, isn't whether to consider it, but rather how to and how much.

While unemployment has tended to rise since 1957, the total labor force has also grown significantly, from 71.5 million in 1960 to 117.2 million in 1985.⁵⁵ One recent analysis stated that unemployment could well be "the most critical economic variable for the success of the AVF. Yet the effects of unemployment on enlistment supply is our area of greatest ignorance."⁵⁶ Estimates on the elasticity of unemployment in relation to enlistment and retention are highly variable—ranging from 0.25 to 1.3. The significance of refining the elasticity is realization that if elasticity is 1.0, reducing unemployment from 10 percent to 5 percent cuts the enlistment supply in half.⁵⁷

In effect, the government's goal of manning the publicly funded services conflicts with the goal of reducing unemployment in the private sector economy. It's unrealistic to expect full employment and, at the same time, an armed force that is unlimited in its talent, size, and professionalism. There must be a degree of pragmatism and consistency in dealing with ups and downs in the economy. The fact of the matter is that the military is in competition with the private sector for "good" people. Allowing relative levels of service manning to be unduly affected by cycles in the economy and unemployment causes considerable disruption, turmoil, and effort within the services.

One of the tenets of the Volunteer Force was that competition for manpower would require compensation competitive with the civil sector's. The services need to make competitive compensation a reality to build the confidence and stability required for the long term.

Are we there yet? That hasn't been clearly demonstrated one way or the other. Even if the military were doing everything perfectly, there is always the danger that domestic considerations might take disproportionate and unrealistic precedence over strategic military needs.⁵⁸ Furthermore, ours is a labor force changing "with respect to employment of older workers and women . . . family employment patterns, educational and monetary incentives, and integration of reserve and regular forces service."⁵⁹ We need to get ahead and stay ahead of these changes with understanding and proactive measures that will avoid return to the concern and doubt of the late 1970s

Women in the Work Force

The increased participation of women in the work force has been another relatively well recognized influence that has altered the character of the force. Women joining the work force is affecting the relative supply of youth who compete in the job market and for military service. As a 1985 Air Force study observes, "This means that as women continue to enter the labor market, youth wages and unemployment will be adversely affected, both of which benefit military recruiting."⁶⁰ However, rising relative wages for women may make their recruitment more difficult, and thus reduce prospects for them to significantly expand the enlistment supply. Furthermore, the same Air Force study shows that, primarily for medical reasons, women in general are less able to perform their duties than men. It also reported that a significantly increased use of women "would require incremental reevaluation for individual specialties and in the aggregate."⁶¹

Another factor arguing against a substantial increase in the number of women in the services is the lower

propensity of women to join the military. A DOD report to Congress indicated that men were from 2.5 to 5 times more likely than women to express interest in military service or intent to enlist.⁶²

On balance, the growth in work participation rates of women will continue to be a positive influence on numbers of enlistments. Even more significantly, the indirect influence of women has caused overall wages and employment of youth to decline. Youth wages are reduced by about 1.5 percent for each 10 percent increase in the number of women in the work force. As a result, military service is economically more attractive.⁶³

Immigration

Although somewhat less well recognized as a major factor in shaping the work force, immigration, both legal and illegal, has an effect somewhat like that of women joining the work force. An estimated 470,000 *legal* immigrants enters the United States annually in the 1980s, and about half of them go to work. These new workers will represent from 10 to 15 percent of labor force growth. Legal immigrants tend to "resemble" the US labor force, with an apparently even distribution within the labor market.⁶⁴

But what of the illegal immigrants? The US Census Bureau estimated a total of between 4 million and 6 million illegal immigrants in the country in 1985. "If there is an immigrant-induced effect on youth labor markets," said the Air Force in 1985, "it is more likely to come from illegal aliens." Lack of data on illegal immigrants makes conclusions difficult, but the March 1985 Air Force Personnel Force Composition Study used isolated statistics from the Department of Labor and compelling logic to arrive at conclusions. In essence, the study suggests that some 500,000 illegal immigrants function in jobs so that they displace youth employment. "This, in turn, causes military service to become relatively more desirable as an employment option."⁶⁵

The forces and influences that cause people to immigrate are continuing relatively unabated. Political

oppression, economic deprivation, and hunger are strong pressures on both skilled and unskilled workers with access to US borders. Whether recent legislation to penalize employers who hire illegal aliens will slow the flow remains to be seen. But we can conclude that immigration, particularly illegal immigration, is an influence on jobs, wages, and, as a result, military manning.⁶⁶

Technology

Technology is a fourth factor which may have a significant impact on the future of services' manning. It seems that it is not possible to predict the effect of technological change on a particular labor demand. It is possible, however, that a technological improvement may result in lower price and increased demand, which in turn requires an increase in manpower.⁶⁷ Thus, increases in automation may reduce labor intensity without reducing the requirement for labor. On the other hand, because industry tends to hire workers with experience, youth unemployment is projected to be about double the overall rate, and youth jobs in industry will tend to be low skill with low pay.⁶⁸

Another potential effect of technology is the actual export of jobs. If there is more labor involved in the production industries than there is in the service industries that are replacing them, then there may be a net decrease in the employed labor force. However, I found no data that substantiates this seemingly logical conclusion. More work is needed to determine what and how much effect technology has on the youth market and subsequent accessions for the military services.

An Overall Perspective

Changing demographics are forcing a change in the makeup of the employment market. They are also causing growing differences between the military and civilian sectors. As the "baby boom" group is aging, the civilian market is shifting with it; the military, however, though getting somewhat older, necessarily remains essentially a

youth market. Over half of the military population is between 17 and 24 years old, as compared to about 15 percent of the general population. The 25-34 age group comprises about one-third of the military, as opposed to less than one-fifth in the civil sector.²⁷

Meanwhile, youth wages and employment rates have declined. So there must have been a reduction in the demand for young workers in the civilian economy. Whether or not the reduction in youth labor demand in the civil sector is a result of fewer youth jobs, immigrant substitution, more older, retired, or part-time workers, or women in the work force, the effect is the same for military enlistment--helpful. During the period FY 1980-84, both the number and experience level of NCOs increased, with the experience level rising at a rate greater than the NCO growth rate.²⁸ Therefore, the record indicates that the services have sustained an excellent enlistment record over that period. And they have been able to do so from a declining youth source while concurrently increasing the experience level of the enlisted force.

KEYS TO CONTINUED SUCCESS

THE SERVICES HAVE DONE WELL in meeting their manning demands. In light of their experiences, the current manning environment, and projections of that environment through the end of the twentieth century, I believe the services will be able to continue their success. However, there are a number of actions which the services should take to enhance the prospects for that happening.

Getting and keeping the best possible people in the complex accessions environment will require continuing attention. Better understanding of the relationships and relative effects of all the controllable and uncontrollable variables is one key to future confidence. In order to achieve that understanding, the data used in the service-sponsored manpower models must be standardized so that results are consistent and comparable. Toward this

end, the analysts concerned should specify inclusive variables, with exceptions, additions, and deviations noted and justified.

But projecting needs and potential recruits isn't enough. So long as the United States has volunteer armed forces, the services must continue to support competitive pay and benefits required to maintain the necessary quantity and quality of military personnel. We can justify the cost of staying competitive with the civil sector, because the manpower expenses associated with the Volunteer Force are lower than the cost of the alternatives, that is, a selective draft, universal military training, or national service.⁷¹

At the same time that the services provide an economic appeal for potential recruits, they must also keep in mind that patriotism and public support are important elements in meeting manpower needs.⁷² Service members can help ensure understanding among our youth that "The privilege of democracy includes the obligation to serve."⁷³ To foster public support, the services should establish procedures for making informative, patriotic, factual presentations available for individual service members to use voluntarily, in the local communities.

Despite recent success and the prospects for continued success in meeting accession needs, the situation might deteriorate in coming years. If the services should begin to fail in meeting their requirements, a response should be orchestrated at the DOD level to ensure consistency, equity, and continuity of purpose among the services intended to benefit. In such a case—and, in fact, even if the services do continue to meet accession needs—quality standards should not be adjusted below the required minimum just to meet quantity requirements. Quality and quantity are both real, independently justifiable requirements.

If quality levels should present problems, prior service accessions are significant, providing experience and training at relatively low cost. All the services should

establish, or continue, procedures to contact appropriately qualified separated members and invite their consideration of further military service, even if manning requirements are still being met.

Two factors that affect military manning pose questions that haven't yet been answered: illegal immigration and technological change. How these factors will affect youth employment, thus the supply of available youth for military recruitment, is unclear. So that we can more accurately project the future and plan to meet our needs, the Department of Defense should sponsor studies to determine how both these issues will affect the ability of the United States to meet its military requirements.

Thus far, the military services have met the challenges of recruitment and retention for the Volunteer Force. Projections for the rest of the twentieth century encourage confidence that we can continue to meet manning needs. But past success does not assure future goals. The US military must learn from its recent experiences and continue to work just as diligently to meet its manning objectives in the coming years.

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**MARITIME-CONTINENTAL
DEBATE:
A STRATEGIC APPROACH**

Frank E. Jordan III

WITH CHARACTERISTIC ELOQUENCE, Winston Churchill, reflecting on the strategic tragedy of the First World War, articulated the modern maritime-continental strategy debate:

And why should the view be limited to the theater in which the best and largest armies happen to face each other? Sea power, railway communications, foreign policy, present the means of finding new flanks outside the area of deadlock. Mechanical science offers on the ground, in the air, on every coast, from the forge or from the laboratory, boundless possibilities of novelty and surprise.¹

The pervasive conflict between the two seemingly exclusive strategic approaches which permeated the development of national strategy in Britain before 1918 must now be resolved by the United States with respect to the Soviet Union.

THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

AS WITH THE GERMAN CHALLENGE to Britain prior to 1914, once more a dominant heartland power is challenging the

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world's preeminent maritime power. The Soviet Union not only poses a continental threat to the Eurasian rimlands, but also possesses a potent blue water maritime capability which holds at risk many of the areas and interests vital to US national survival. The Soviet drive for dependable access to the world's oceans, which would make possible Soviet domination of the rimlands and their narrow seas, threatens decisive global military and political leverage against the United States.² An inappropriate strategic response could, as Britain nearly discovered, be irreversible.

To diminish the chances of an inappropriate US response, this essay provides an uncommon perspective on the maritime-continental strategy debate. I assess the strategic validity of the contending arguments in terms of several basic categories of strategic structure and dynamics, and apply my conclusions to propose a resolution. The framework I employ has been openly influenced, first, by the revival of classic geopolitical thought and, second, by Clausewitzian theory's relevance to maritime strategy, insufficiently appreciated since Sir Julian Corbett's 1911 work, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*.

I believe the current maritime-continental strategy debate artificially fractures the problem of a comprehensive defense policy. For in fact, the two strategies are not mutually exclusive but, properly modified, comprise the elements of an integrated global strategy. In the broad context of geopolitics, and given the dynamic relationship between the political object and military means, a US global strategy is unavoidably a maritime strategy, but one in which traditionally continental forces play a crucial and clearly defined role.

Historically, the systematic contrast between maritime and continental strategies as two fundamentally different *styles* of warfare was first illuminated by Sir Julian Corbett before World War I. He distinguished between the German or continental school of strategy and the British or maritime school.³ But the most vigorous explication of the qualitative difference between

the styles was offered by Liddell Hart, who argued that willful misapplication of the theories of Clausewitz, producing the continental strategy of World War I, had perverted the notion of war as an instrument of policy. Thus Britain, at profound strategic costs, departed from its traditional maritime strategy—control of the oceans and “narrow seas,” support of continental allies, and decisive, but surgical, land campaigns—which, in the main, had attained the carefully crafted ends of national strategy. Instead, Britain focused on the continental war, thus incurring devastating losses on Flanders fields though, arguably, the British fleet proved the decisive instrument in German capitulation. In so doing, Britain provided history’s most horrific example of the failure to match military design with political purpose.⁴

But Churchill’s observations between the World Wars went virtually unheeded in the United States, where geographic isolation and virtually unlimited resources precluded the necessity of a strategic choice.⁵ World War II, in fact, witnessed simultaneously the conduct of a classic continental war of annihilation on the one hand and the “Mahanian triumph of sea power” on the other.⁶ In the ensuing years, however, the expansionist threat of the Soviet Union, the relative decline of American military and economic power, the questionable reliability of the NATO alliance, and a significantly more ambitious US global defense policy have generated the often cited force-strategy mismatch—and highlighted the maritime-continental strategy debate such that it can no longer be ignored.⁷ The resulting imbalance between US strategic ends and means has confounded US strategists trying to develop a strategy which not only deters the Soviet Union but provides for successfully waging war as well.⁸

Debate over the relationship of global seapower to expansionist landpower is conceptually similar. On the one hand, the continentalists emphasize the preeminent threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg conquest of Western Europe during which US naval power, with its slowly developing

leverage, would be inconsequential if not fundamentally irrelevant. On the other, a maritime approach emphasizes surprise, mobility, and selective land campaigns to challenge the Soviets on strategically advantageous terms.⁹

Unfortunately, a "Mahan versus Mackinder" framework often obscures the complexities of the argument.¹⁰ That framework juxtaposes domination of the sea by large battlefleets as the foundation of economic and strategic power¹¹ against the superior industrial base and organizational strength of the heartland, supported by lines of railway communication and highly efficient, massive land armies.¹² These conflicting models have driven equally simplistic policy alternatives: either the Soviet heartland's perceived invulnerability to seapower necessitating a continental strategy, or the USSR's perceived vulnerability to both direct and indirect naval power, especially the potential for destruction of the Soviet fleet and its means of support, necessitating a maritime strategy.¹³

A strategic approach to the maritime-continental strategy debate will guide us away from "resource agendas" that tend to dominate strategy considerations and will allow us to focus on the most enduring issues. The origins of the debate, and of distortions of conventional defense policy that have accompanied and resulted from it, lie in the imprecision and confusion surrounding the most fundamental, first-order strategic concepts. Because only in terms of such concepts can the efficacy of the two strategies (or any strategies) be judged, we must define them as a basis for pursuing this approach.

First, *definition of the strategic problem* contains the structural elements of the issue. Definition requires consideration of geopolitics, the strategic relationship of the antagonists, enemy doctrine, and scenario assumptions.

Second, *strategic purpose and approach* involves the central relationship of ends and means, and consideration of the vital issue of war termination on advantageous terms.¹⁴ The question of the ultimate purpose of war is

defined (in accordance with Clausewitz's most enduring insight) by the political object.¹⁵ Political or strategic purpose in turn shapes the nature of the means employed, or the strategic approach. Possible approaches range from wars of annihilation to mere observation.

The spectrum of options in a nuclear environment, though, is influenced by another of Clausewitz's observations: "The advantage that the destruction of the enemy possesses over all other means is balanced by its cost and danger; and it is only in order to avoid these risks that other policies are employed."¹⁶ In a nuclear environment, limited war could be very useful in directly or indirectly attacking the foundations of enemy military power. Besides, destruction of the enemy, with its attendant risk of unlimited war, is unnecessary when the strategic purpose is maintenance of security—a purpose realized if the threat is removed, i.e., the enemy abandons his purpose.¹⁷

Third, *escalation control*, given the natural tendency of war toward the absolute, demands proportionality between the risks inherent in a given strategic approach and the anticipated results of that approach.¹⁸ As events lead to escalation of a war, driving it toward the absolute, the belligerent states must, more and more, not take the first step without considering the last.¹⁹

Fourth, in many ways unifying the other three concepts, is that of the *strategic center of gravity*, most accurately defined as the "dominant characteristics of both belligerents." Out of these characteristics, a certain center of gravity develops, "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all . . . energies should be directed."²⁰ In the context of the present maritime-continental strategy debate, however, the dominant characteristics of the antagonists may be manifestly dissimilar, creating divergent centers of gravity and posing the central question of the maritime-continental strategy debate: Consistent with the constraints of the political object and the imperative of escalation control, should the United States direct all

its energies toward the enemy's center of gravity, or should it direct its energies toward protecting its own "hub of all power and movement" from potentially decisive enemy action?

ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICTING ARGUMENTS

IN TERMS OF THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK I've constructed, the maritime-continental strategy debate has failed to determine the most appropriate conventional defense policy. In failing to accurately *define the strategic problem* with respect to the Soviet Union, both strategies fail to provide a suitable framework in which to establish a *strategic purpose and approach*. Continental strategy negates the primacy of the political object because the strategy doesn't focus on warfighting at all, but on deterrence; and maritime strategy, though it does emphasize warfighting, fails to clearly define war termination objectives. Continental strategy thus considers merely military ends, while the warfighting character of maritime strategy often lacks precise direction. As a result, both seriously compromise the essential requirement of *escalation control*. And finally, the pivotal influence of the *strategic center of gravity* in shaping the nature of war is diminished in assuming similar centers of gravity for both antagonists. As a result, continental strategy courts disaster, maritime strategy irrelevance.

Definition of the Strategic Problem

The two strategies differ fundamentally concerning the structural dimensions of the problem. The continentalists posit a geostrategic environment in which the central strategic problem confronting the United States is prospective Soviet control of the Western European heartland. Given the enormous Soviet conventional forces and geographic advantages, that construct mandates a strategy in which the threat is to be deterred, or resisted, at the point of greatest concentration pending

negotiation or escalation. Naval power has a supporting mission in continental strategy, a mission derived from two assumptions. The first is that the heartland is invulnerable to seapower, leading to the conclusion that neither naval power projection nor destruction of the Soviet fleet would significantly influence force posture, deterrence, or warfighting. The second is that in the most probable scenario, the Soviets would employ a blitzkrieg strategy in which naval power, with its slowly developing effect, would be inconsequential.²¹

The maritime approach, on the other hand, advances the concept of the United States as an island nation dependent on unfettered access to and control of the world's oceans as the foundations of its economic and military power.²² The strategic ends of this approach vary among classic Mahanian maritime supremacy as a key to national greatness, sea control with limited objectives, and maintenance of strategic geographical presence in response to the permanence of conflict and the dynamic threat of competing US-Soviet global capabilities.²³ Finally, maritime strategy asserts the desirability, if war occurs, of extended conventional war in which naval power will have a major effect. Naval power would not only reinforce and sustain forward deployed forces, but also directly influence the course of the campaign through flank pressure, destruction of the Soviet fleet, and power projection through air or landing operations to attain war termination objectives.²⁴

Certain difficulties, however, are inherent to each strategy. For example, in postulating a static geostrategic structure of fixed point defenses (as in Europe and Korea), continental strategy forfeits strategic mobility and its corollary benefits of concentration, surprise, and flexibility. Its historical analogue resembles on a larger scale the Roman Imperial defense system of linear outposts subject to the vagaries of vulnerable internal lines of communication, unreliable allies, and a potent external threat.²⁵ The maritime approach, on the other hand, emphasizes exploitation of inherent capabilities and a

rational division of strategic labor, with the seas in effect becoming interior lines of communication to the peripheries of the heartland—the frontier outposts of North America. But the significance of these advantages to the strategic problem of containing an expansionist continental power is generally undefined. In addition, the relative importance of sea power against a Soviet drive for Eurasian hegemony has tended to be cast in terms of its effect on the central axis of advance.

Attempts to resolve the strategic debate invariably suggest the “Mahan versus Mackinder” model, which distorts the significance of control of the rimlands to both antagonists, as well as control of the interior position of Eurasia in relation to global lines of communication. The continentalists contend that, in the final analysis, land forces are decisive in combat, and that even traditional maritime powers eventually were forced to attain victory on land.²⁶ Such an argument fails to grasp the difference between a particular *style* of strategy and the character of its component elements—for example, that major land campaigns are often integral to maritime strategies.

On the other hand, the maritime argument relies on three hundred years of British success in blunting Continental hegemony by a single power through a combination of maritime operations against vulnerable extremities and limited, often decisive land campaigns at critical junctures.²⁷ Even with respect to Germany in World War I, it has been persuasively argued that, through sea control and the blockade, naval power and the indirect strategic approach ultimately proved decisive.²⁸ Interestingly, that approach was influenced by the German navy as a fleet in being, intended to deter a Mahanian strategy by inflicting unacceptable losses and foreclosing strategic alternatives, its own destruction being strategically inconsequential.

But Germany, and Britain's more traditional Continental enemies Spain and France, were highly vulnerable to naval power given oversea colonies and significant levels of foreign trade. In critical respects, the Soviet case is

different. The Soviet Union's highly autarkic economic structure, minimizing dependence on imported materials, would reduce the utility of closing the easily blockaded Soviet ports. However, the Soviet blue water fleet, especially as concentrated around the Kola Peninsula, poses the analogous problem of a fleet in being; the fleet's destruction or containment would be strategically insignificant for the Soviets. Nevertheless, the Soviet fleet is capable of deterring a decisive engagement and occupying large elements of the US fleet to the exclusion of other options.

Thus, the impact of US naval power is generally twofold. First, it sustains the land battle, a function essential in both maritime and continental approaches. Second, it eliminates, through destruction or containment, Soviet capabilities which threaten vital geostrategic interests (for example, control of the Eurasian rimlands, trade, raw materials).

Finally, the assumptions of each strategy about a probable scenario remain essentially speculative, more a question of desired outcome than of precise assessment. But the continentalist premise of a blitzkrieg invasion does not appear credible given the dynamics of Soviet military organization and doctrine, and a highly cautious and deliberative Soviet approach to military affairs. At the same time, the maritime concern with the short war—long war argument centers on the divergent needs of the two belligerents. The need for both political control of Europe and conflict escalation dominance requires, from the Soviets' viewpoint, short, limited, and politically decisive conflict. Concomitantly, it is desirable for the United States to retain the ability to negate such a Soviet strategy by imposing an undesired long conventional conflict, ensured in turn by US conflict escalation dominance. The broad range of maritime capabilities would be essential to ensuring such an outcome.²⁰

Strategic Purpose and Approach

Clausewitz noted, "No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear

in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."³⁰ The first part of the prescription is clear war termination objectives. In that regard, continental strategy is broadly shaped by the desire for *deterrence*, both conventional and nuclear. In turn, its definition of the strategic problem—that "the Soviet Army must be countered on an equal footing"³¹ in the major continental theaters—mandates a strategy dependent on the US ability to *deter* a blitzkrieg attack. In the event of failure, it vaguely envisions a short war presenting the Soviets with the prospect of an undesired longer war, forcing negotiation of the *status quo ante*.³² Not surprisingly, therefore, the continentalists advance no meaningful political object, thus neglecting the fundamental purpose of war, as well as the imperative of escalation control, in not having thought through the last step.

By contrast, maritime strategy most often advances an explicitly warfighting approach, though deterrence is a first, and preferred, military objective. Except for a general intent to pursue "acceptable" war termination objectives, however, the maritime school does not develop sufficiently explicit political ends of warfighting. For example, the most aggressive effort seeks "to bring about war termination on favorable terms."³³

Strategic purpose and approach are confused in objectives such as denying the Soviets "their kind of war" by exerting global pressure, influencing the land battle, destroying the Soviet fleet, and threatening direct attack against the homeland or altering the correlation of nuclear forces.³⁴ Only the last two approximate *termination* objectives, the remainder concerning only means.³⁵ For what larger purpose is the Soviet fleet to be destroyed? And what termination objectives are achieved by a shift in the correlation of nuclear forces? Thus, though it goes significantly beyond continental strategy in recognizing the need for meaningful termination objectives, the maritime approach nonetheless labors under not having thought through the last step. And without a final step envisioned, we face the prospect of war assuming its own undirected momentum.

The second component of Clausewitz's synergism of political ends and military means defines the strategic approach, which, in the case of both strategies, is largely a function of their respective strategic purpose. Given their focus on deterrence, and possibly a short and inconclusive war, the continentalists advocate the rapid reinforcement of the Central Front at the point of greatest enemy concentration. The continental strategy concedes primacy in non-European heartland areas to the Soviets, responding only with the lesser deterrent of a "tripwire" strategy, especially in the Persian Gulf region.²⁶ Devoid of a strategically significant political object, the resultant approach accepts a *military* end of warfighting: the thwarting of the enemy army in the field. If successful, and assuming a conventional war, such a strategy would merely revisit the mindless attrition of Verdun and the Somme.

Maritime strategy likewise eschews victory in the conventional sense, as well as accepting an effective land engagement as a precondition of success. But consonant with its warfighting character, it would exploit the inherent flexibility of naval power across a spectrum of options, gradually escalating limited military objectives to create a strategic situation favorable to its elusive war termination goals. At the lower end of the spectrum are the highly constrained objectives of maintaining defensive sea control, simultaneously absorbing a "first salvo," containing Soviet naval forces, and exploiting the advantages of the strategic defense to possibly force war termination at that level. At a higher level of military effort is the approach of *The Maritime Strategy*, which envisions the destruction of the Soviet fleet and its means of support, the alteration of the correlation of nuclear forces, and the seizure of Soviet territory as negotiating leverage.²⁷

The value of the warfighting emphasis of the maritime strategic approach is that it recognizes the need for an alternative other than engaging the enemy from a posture of extreme disadvantage, the significance of a meaningful political object to a coherent strategy, and the importance of strategic geography in shaping both strategic purpose and approach.²⁸ However, the approach has

its shortcomings. First is the lack of precise war termination objectives, as already noted. Moreover, the feasibility of aiming to destroy the Soviet fleet is dubious at best, especially in the early stages of global war. Unless fortuitously worn down by attrition in the outer oceans, or decisively engaged on favorable terms, the Soviet fleet, with a posture and function analogous to that of the German Navy of 1914, could only be destroyed through blockade and gradual attrition.

But perhaps the most questionable feature of the more aggressive maritime approach, again related to war termination objectives, is the enormous risk, inherent in altering the correlation of nuclear forces, of forfeiting control of conflict escalation. It is critical that such a strategy clearly pursue a precisely defined political object and be decidedly "worth the candle."

Escalation Control

To realize the political object in war demands the capacity to modulate and control the course of conflict, countering the inherent tendency toward maximum violence. Both continental and maritime strategies seek to impose such control. For example, a central argument of continental strategists is that the United States relies excessively on an increasingly ineffective nuclear deterrent, hence it needs a robust conventional defense at the point of principal threat to ensure escalation control by raising the risks and costs of Soviet military action.³⁹ The continentalists argue further that an aggressive maritime strategy, with its prospects of horizontal escalation and alteration of the correlation of nuclear forces, would, by attacking vital Soviet capabilities and territory, quickly escalate conflict to strategic nuclear dimensions.⁴⁰

The maritimists essentially reverse the argument. They contend that an aggressive approach in fact imposes escalation control through denying the Soviets their strategic preference, a short, decisive war. Moreover, it narrows strategic options through multifaceted challenges, and induces war termination by reducing second strike

capability. Nuclear parity and a longer and more complex war are sufficient to establish escalation control: on NATO in response to conventional Soviet success, and on the Soviets in response to non-nuclear attacks on strategic capabilities or direct threats to the homeland.¹¹

The validity of both approaches centers on assumptions concerning Soviet doctrine and behavior and the imperatives of a deterrent as opposed to a warfighting strategy. The continentalists correctly recognize that the Soviets' integrated doctrine accommodates the full spectrum of violence. However, the absence of a dynamic warfighting concept with appropriate termination objectives has generated an exaggerated fear of full escalation. Moreover, that deficiency further diminishes escalation control through lack of a coherent framework for assessing ends and means if deterrence fails.

By contrast, the maritimists confront the escalatory problem more forthrightly. But their assumptions concerning Soviet behavior, while plausible, appear to minimize the enormous risks inherent in their approach. This minimizing of risks is especially evident in the final phase of *The Maritime Strategy*, which, in attacking both the Soviet Union and its nuclear reserve, might abdicate escalation control. Moreover, that possibility is increased by the lack of precise termination objectives. It is both reasonable and admirable to resist intimidation by the threat of escalation. But the risks in doing so must be recognized, and be proportional to clearly conceived objectives which are themselves open to modification as appropriate. In this case, the "balance of political probabilities" demands reassessment.

Strategic Center of Gravity

The primacy of the political object, its necessarily limited nature, and the infeasibility of either power becoming dominant in the other's sphere suggest the strategic center of gravity as the pivotal concept.¹² As with the other three strategic elements, however, both continental and maritime strategies have addressed the issue incompletely. This failure is especially evident in

the implicit assumption that the United States and the Soviet Union have similar centers of gravity, each the natural focus of the efforts of the other belligerent.

The continentalists define the Soviet center of gravity as the Soviet Army, which, true to Clausewitz, must be directly and vigorously confronted. For "it is the expansion of the Soviet Army that weighs on the overall balance of military power" and which "must be countered on an equal footing."⁴³ In accepting the similarity of respective centers of gravity, however, the continentalists would confront Soviet power from a posture of extreme disadvantage. But they refuse to accept the implications of their argument. For emphasis on deterrence has led them to advocate concentrating primary effort against the Soviet center of gravity without the necessary corollary goal of its destruction. Additionally, the continental strategy fails either to recognize inherent differences in "hubs" of activity or to posit a more realistic concept.

Two different problems are evident in the maritime approach. The first is the tendency to incorrectly identify the Soviet center of gravity and then direct primary effort toward it. The second is a willingness to recognize divergent centers, but not to relate the ramifications of multiple centers of gravity for the central "seapower-landpower" strategic problem.

The first problem characterizes the aggressive approach reflected in *The Maritime Strategy*. This view recognizes the importance of sea control and Third World interests, but is ultimately informed by the Mahanian imperative of destroying the Soviet fleet and its means of support: "The need for forward movement is obvious. This is where the Soviet fleet will be, and this is where we must be prepared to fight."⁴⁴

But the center of gravity is not the Soviet fleet itself; rather, it is the Soviet regime and its mechanism for activating the military establishment. Thus, containment or destruction of the Soviet fleet, while necessary, must not be thought to diminish vital military capability or influence the real center of gravity. However, the aggressive maritime approach may tangentially threaten the

Soviet center of gravity by successfully disrupting strategic timeliness and altering the correlation of nuclear forces, thus affecting the cohesion of the regime. In either case, though, precise war termination objectives would be central to controlling inherent risks.

The second problem in the maritime approach is that it avoids defining and attacking the Soviet center of gravity. Rather, it concentrates on protecting US maritime capabilities central to the projection of all military power.¹⁵ But lacking a definition of the enemy's center of gravity, this strategy cannot relate the center to a limited political object and a corresponding strategic approach; therefore, it runs the risk of uncontrolled escalation.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

THE FOLLOWING APPROACH attempts to conceptually clarify and expand the maritime-continental debate in terms of the strategic framework. The alternative approach, in brief, is this: Given a strategic problem of preventing Soviet "oversetting" of the geopolitical balance and a political object of containing Soviet strategic breakout, the maritime capabilities of mobility, concentration, and interior lines should be integrated with an effective land campaign to deny the goals of Soviet strategy and attain the US strategic purpose. Seeking to preserve the US strategic center of gravity instead of confronting the Soviets from a posture of extreme disadvantage, we can assess the nature of the conflict more accurately, and thus harmonize political ends with military means. Doing so would improve our overall strategic posture.

Definition of the Strategic Problem

Strategic geography is central to the definition of the strategic problem. As Colin Gray has noted, strategic geography is "the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent."¹⁶ The United States possesses the size and indigenous

resources of a classic heartland power. But strategically it is a maritime nation, without contiguous continental threats, significantly dependent upon foreign trade, and requiring military power to project and sustain itself across the world's oceans. Though not as reliant upon the seas as Britain was, the United States, lacking an empire, faces a more difficult task of protecting global interests. For open access must be maintained; others must be prevented from denying that access.

Neither forward posturing of major land forces nor the necessity of major land campaigns in global war alters in any degree the need for maritime access. The remaining element of the strategic problem, moreover, is the Soviet Union's attempt to alter that strategic geography by "oversetting" the balance of global power through control of the Eurasian rimlands and the narrow seas. Mackinder prophesied the consequences of Soviet success in that attempt:

The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet building, and the empire of the world would be in sight.⁴⁷

The strategic problem, then, is a variant of the historical British goal of preventing Continental hegemony by a single power. It embraces the requirements to project and sustain military power, to control maritime challenges, and to secure the Eurasian rimlands and adjacent seas (that is, Western Europe, the North Flank, the Mediterranean littoral, Japan, and South Korea) in order to prevent the strategic breakout of the Soviet Union into the open oceans. Frederick S. Dunn characterized the problem clearly:

The most important single fact in the American security situation is the question of who controls the rimlands of Europe and Asia. Should these get into

the hands of a single power or combination of powers hostile to the United States, the resulting encirclement would put us in a position of grave peril, regardless of the size of our army and navy.⁴⁷

Strategic Purpose and Approach

The maintenance (or attainment) of an advantageous strategic posture requires the positive control or containment of those areas or Soviet capabilities which mortally threaten US vital interests. This includes containing a Soviet strategic breakout from the heartland into the global seas by controlling the rimlands and containing or destroying relevant capabilities. In short, preventing the Soviet Army from controlling the rimlands, containing or destroying the principal elements of the Soviet fleet, and eliminating Soviet oversea bases and strategic outposts (that is, clients) would return that nation to its historical (and "natural") status as the preeminent Continental power.

It is significant, however, that the above political object is classically "limited." It does not envision the Soviet Union's military defeat, or the destabilization of the regime or its social and economic order. Rather, it seeks to truncate the posture and capabilities that strategically threaten the United States but are only peripheral to the dominant Soviet interests of preserving the regime, controlling Western Europe, and ensuring secure contiguous borders.

The strategic approach to achieve this limited political objective avoids directly confronting the Soviet center of gravity. But successful implementation of the approach demands an integrated naval-land character, best illustrated in the relationship between the Northern Flank (maritime) and the Central Front (continental). For the Northern Flank is arguably the decisive area with respect to the US center of gravity. Its security is central to US global maritime access and security, and it is a key to Soviet attainment of a global strategic breakout and subsequent envelopment of the Central Front.

Soviet envelopment of all of Western Europe would be immediately decisive to the Central Front and would threaten interdiction of sealines of communication (SLOC) and the blockade of North America. Moreover, Soviet success along the Baltic axis (capture of Jutland, for example) would enhance the Soviets' already formidable land and air advantage by providing a supporting naval flank. It is critical to note, however, that the significance of the United States controlling Jutland lies not in Soviet vulnerability to direct seapower projected from that "advanced naval base," or in the extent to which the defense against the main Soviet land attack may be affected, but in the extent to which that control attains the political object of maintaining (or righting) the geopolitical balance.

As with Britain's successful "maritime" wars against Continental adversaries, though, an effective land campaign is essential. The operational purpose of that campaign should not be the quixotic declaratory objective of defending the German border, which in continental strategy is the central end of deterrence and warfighting. Rather, in a broader context, the land campaign's purpose should be a successful strategic holding operation, releasing critical capabilities to concentrate on the basic strategic purpose. Successfully achieving that purpose at the German border is, of course, desirable. But the overriding purpose of the land campaign is to preserve the Western European rimland, especially Jutland and the Low Countries, and to deny the Soviets a decisive short-war victory. In those terms, the warfighting objective of the continental campaign is simply, not to lose.

While land forces conduct their strategic holding operation on the Continent, the naval campaign focuses on a phased sequence of related tasks. These would include, in the broadest perspective, first, reinforcement of the land campaign by moving troops and sustaining support, and second, securing the SLOCs by clearing the outer oceans of Soviet fleet elements, especially submarines.

Fleet elements would move landing forces into such critical rimland areas as north Norway (for ground defense and support of the naval campaign) and Jutland (to support the Central Front battle, supplement theater air defense, and provide an advanced naval base for power projection on the flanks). Submarine and surface forces would begin barrier operations as far forward as feasible, supported by land-based and carrier aviation as well as ground forces. Their objective would be to thwart a Soviet flanking movement and breakout into the open ocean. Carrier battle forces would provide air defense for the naval campaign and support subsequent landing operations. And any campaign against the Soviets' ballistic missile submarines would be carefully weighed at this juncture. Hence, the mobility, concentration, and flexibility of sea and landing operations would combine with a precisely defined land campaign, all directed toward a clearly conceived strategic purpose.

The dynamics of the war could lead to termination at this stage, or to escalation of the level envisioned in the *The Maritime Strategy*. But we need not resolve the issue of the *level* of military effort. In any specific circumstances, the level of military effort will depend upon capabilities and the imperatives of the political object.

Containment is likely to be the dominant approach in the early stages, despite the utility of an aggressive "rollback" tactic to prevent establishment of Soviet advanced bases on the west coast of Norway and projection into the Atlantic and North Sea. But at some point attrition will likely make further advance counterproductive until the strategic situation calls for more aggressive action to achieve the political object. That change in the strategic situation will be a significant alteration in the correlation of conventional forces, most likely through effective submarine and surface campaigns and major landing operations against the power projection infrastructure (such as in Jutland, northern Norway, and the Kola). The US fleet, like the Royal Navy in the Great War, will probably be consigned to the role of jailer, at

least in the early stages of a protracted war. A Mahanian result—rapid destruction of the main Soviet fleet—would be clearly desirable, though, given the flexibility it would allow to subsequent US operations.

Escalation Control

The frictions inherent in a warfighting strategic approach could disrupt the essential element of escalation control. Indeed, US strategic options comprise a Hobson's choice between conceding the geopolitical initiative through isolationism, or following the powder trail to absolute war on the Eurasian rimlands. Risks are unavoidable, though the integrated maritime-continental strategy I have proposed attempts to minimize the more obvious ones by limiting its political object.

But dangers still are evident. On the one hand, too successful a strategy raises the danger of escalation: principally, the Soviets might be inclined to escalate out of the disadvantageous strategic situation of a protracted conventional war. On the other hand, a rapid Soviet "oversetting" of the rimlands might force a similar escalation dilemma on the United States. Thus, central to escalation control is the maintenance of escalation dominance. To that end, altering of the correlation of nuclear forces through attrition of Soviet ballistic missile submarines could prove useful.

Strategic Center of Gravity

The structure of the strategic problem, as well as the strategic purpose and approach, are predicated upon a more workable, comprehensive concept of the strategic center of gravity: the "hub" of capabilities or areas decisive to the protection of basic national interests, and to the attainment of the central political object in war. Denying or destroying the enemy's center of gravity would, in all probability, result in complete defeat of the enemy.

The preceding analysis has clearly suggested, however, that the imperatives of escalation control mandate a classically limited political object attained through

a correspondingly adjusted level of military effort. To limit the political object and level of effort is to depart from the Clausewitzian concept that enemy power should be reduced to a single center of gravity, the destruction of which becomes the focus of all military effort. Rather, in the context of limited objectives and the need to control the level of violence, the significance of the concept of the center of gravity is that protection of our own must become the central focus of all military effort. That conclusion is additionally driven by the difference between the respective centers of gravity of the two belligerents, in turn a function of geography, space, and the resulting strategic relationship.

More specifically, The US center of gravity consists of the critical rimlands and narrow seas of Eurasia, global lines of communication, and the capabilities needed to ensure their security. The latter would include all naval, land, power projection, and strategic mobility capabilities essential to sustaining defense of the rimlands, blunting any attempted Soviet breakout, and maintaining escalation dominance through sufficient nuclear deterrence.

By contrast, the Soviet center of gravity is the Soviet regime and its mechanism for employing the military establishment, primarily the army and strategic nuclear forces. The realities of power, accessibility, respective military capabilities, and a necessarily limited US political object preclude a direct US attack on this Soviet center of gravity. Thus, the United States can heed Corbett's imperative of harmonizing land and sea power only by shaping a strategic purpose and approach to protect the US center of gravity against the "oversetting" of the strategic balance. Only after this realization can the nature of the conflict be correctly assessed, and its conduct adjusted accordingly. As Clausewitz wrote,

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor

trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.⁴⁹

THE APPROPRIATE US STRATEGY, then, is neither purely continental nor purely maritime, but rather one of global (yet strategically limited) integrated naval and land campaigns directed toward preserving the critical US center of gravity. With sufficient staying power on the rimlands and the naval capability to project and sustain power globally, a "continental-maritime" nation such as the United States can fulfill Francis Bacon's prophecy of putting "those that be strongest by land ... in great straits."⁵⁰

NOTES

1. Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis, 1911-1918*, Vol. II (London: Odham Press, 1938), pp. 971-73.

2. Alva M. Bowen, "The Anglo-German and Soviet-American Rivalries—Some Comparisons," Paul J. Murray, ed., *Naval Power in Soviet Policy* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 57-66. Also see Norman Friedman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Central Front," Unpublished paper delivered to the Conference on Maritime Strategy: Issues and Perspectives, Naval War College, Newport, 15-17 May 1985, p. 1.

3. Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longman's Green and Co., 1911. Reprinted by AMS Press, New York, 1972), p. 38.

4. B. H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber & Faber, 1932), p. 41. Also see pp. 17-38 for the development of "traditional" maritime strategy, and pp. 93-114 for the evolution of the "principles" of that strategy, later expanded in *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1954) as the "indirect approach." Also indispensable in this regard is Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), p. 15.

5. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: Free Press, 1984), chapters 10-13.

6. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 311. The contrast is developed in chapters 13 and 14.

7. See Keith Dunn and William Staudenmaier, *The Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Strategy Debate*, Washington Paper #107 (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1984), p. 3; Caspar W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 14, 32-37, 51; Jeffrey Record, "Jousting With Unreality: Reagan's Military Strategy," *International Security*, Winter 1983-84, p. 10; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *United States Military Posture, Fiscal Year 1987*, p. 47; and Jeffrey Record, *Reversing U.S. Military Strategy: Tailoring Means to Ends* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), pp. 52-55.

8. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1976), p. 127. The point relates to the author's distinction between preparations for war and the conduct of war proper. Also see Record, *Revising U.S. Military Strategy*, pp. 2-3.

9. A reasonably objective juxtaposition of the general arguments is difficult to find. However, see Michael Vlahos, "Maritime Strategy versus Continental Commitment?" *Orbis*, Fall 1982, p. 586; Dunn and Staudenmaier, pp. 4-7; and, most recently Roger W. Barnett, "The Maritime-Continental Debate Isn't Over," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1987, pp. 28-34 (hereafter cited as *Proceedings*) for a brief and largely descriptive survey of the contrasting arguments. Also, it is important to note that the term "maritime strategy" is used comprehensively to connote either the broad style, or direction, of national defense policy or the general method of employing maritime forces pursuant to the ends of national strategy. This is inclusive of, but distinct from, *The Maritime Strategy*, which is the preferred strategic concept of the Department of the Navy. While the latter represents the ascendant view within the maritime community, and the most visible to the wider public, it is not universally embraced by either. This distinction with the wider usage is attempted throughout.

10. The "Mahan versus Mackinder" construct has been given currency by Paul M. Kennedy who has argued for the diminished efficacy of sea power against highly organized and industrially advanced continental powers. See especially his *Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (New York: Scribners, 1976), pp. xvi-xvii, and pp. 179-202, as well as "Mahan versus Mackinder: Two Interpretations of British Sea Power," in *Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945* (London: Fontana, 1983), pp. 43-85. The prominent contemporary continentalist, Robert W. Komer, for example, draws considerable sustenance from Kennedy in his *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Books, 1984), pp. 39-50. By contrast, the same corpus of history and theory drives substantially different conclusions in Colin Gray's *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West* (New York: Ramapo Press, 1986).

11. Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957, first published in 1890), pp. 1-76. More useful commentaries are available in Margaret Sprout's essay in Edward Meade Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943; reprinted., 1971) pp. 415-445, and that of Philip Crowl in the 1986

edition of the same title edited by Peter Paret, pp. 444-447. In essence Mahan was a geopolitician, but a less sophisticated one than Mackinder. Mahan's concept of the "geographic unity" of the sea did not comprehend the revolutionary technological developments of his age, the multifaceted fleet operations essential to global naval power, combined operations, Corbett's insight that sea power was significant only to the extent that it influenced results on land, or the qualitatively different challenges posed by highly organized and industrially advanced Continental powers. In all fairness to Mahan, however, certain cautionary limits of the utility of sea power have generally been ignored by his more ardent disciples.

12. Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographic Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal*, XXIII (1904), reprinted in *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (New York: Norton, 1962), pp. 259-64. Mackinder was in many respects the more perceptive observer of strategic trends, recognizing the importance of organization and industrial strength, and the significance of the Eurasian "rimlands" for both heartland and maritime powers. However, he failed to recognize the offsetting advantages of a "heartland-maritime" power such as the United States, and his claim that interior lines of railway communication vitiated the strategic mobility of sea power was simply wrong. The contemporary application of geopolitical thinking is due largely to the efforts of Colin Gray. See note 10 above, as well as his earlier *Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartland, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution* (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Inc., 1977).

13. See Kennedy, "Mahan versus Mackinder," p. 75; Michael Howard, "The British Way of Warfare: A Reappraisal" in his *Causes of Wars and other Essays* (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1983), pp. 189-207, essentially a rebuttal of Liddell Hart and Corbett, and *The Continental Commitment* (London: Temple Smith, 1972); and G.S. Graham, *The Politics of Naval Supremacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 8: "In short, warfare has been and remains ultimately based on land, and primarily directed against an enemy's land forces." Much maritime writing of the early 1980s provides an equally exaggerated perspective.

14. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, pp. 335-6.

15. Clausewitz, pp. 87, 584. However, his "political objective" is dropped in favor of Liddell Hart's "political object," the latter connoting broader policy ends as opposed to tactical implications.

16. Clausewitz, p. 97.

17. Corbett, pp. 54-6, 87ff. One of Corbett's most enduring contributions was assessing the relevance of Clausewitz to maritime strategy.

18. Clausewitz, p. 77.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 584.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 595-6.

21. The general imperviousness of the "heartland" to sea power, the criticality of forward defense, and coalitionism may be followed in Robert W. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1982, pp. 1124-32, 1133-34, and 1144, later expanded in *Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense*. However, the most vigorous and unabashed advocate of the primacy of land power and the strictly secondary and supporting role of naval forces is Edward Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 255-56, and 236: "Thus the role of the Navy in resisting any major Soviet action in any major theater of war is likely to be marginal unless really heroic assumptions are made." Also see John M. Collins, "Comment and Discussion," *Proceedings*, March, 1986, pp. 18-22, as well as by John Mearsheimer, "The Maritime Strategy and Conventional Deterrence," unpublished paper delivered to the Conference on Maritime Strategy: Issues and Perspectives, Naval War College, Newport, 15-17 May 1985, and "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security*, Fall 1986, pp. 3-57, who develops the assumption of the blitzkrieg scenario.

22. See the Secretary of the Navy's testimony: US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Sea Power and Force Projection, *Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations For Fiscal Year 1985*, Hearings (Washington: US Govt. Printing Office, 1984), p. 3852; John F. Lehman, Jr., "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1981, pp. 9-15, as well as Admiral James D. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*, supplement to the *Proceedings*, January, 1986, p. 4. Additionally, an articulate defense of *The Maritime Strategy* is Linton F. Brooks' "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," *International Security*, Fall 1986, pp. 58-88.

23. Especially see Lehman, "Rebirth of a U.S. Naval Strategy," pp. 10-12, and the *Maritime Strategy* for the first; for

the second, Stanfield Turner and George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The Need for a New Military Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1982, pp. 124-27; and for the third, Colin Gray, "Maritime Strategy," *Proceedings*, February, 1986, pp. 36-37.

24. The manifest impact of naval power upon Soviet strategy and operations is central to the ascendant maritime arguments. In addition to Lehman, Gray, and the *Maritime Strategy*, see Francis J. West, "Maritime Strategy and NATO Deterrence," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1985, p. 18; and William V. Kennedy and S. Michael de Gyurky, "An Alternative Strategy for the 80's," *National Defense*, July-August 1983, pp. 51-52 for an extreme statement of a countervailing strategy of Northwest Pacific operations as a means of blunting a Soviet Central Front attack. See Turner and Thibault for a cautionary note regarding the efficacy of naval power projection against the Soviet Union, and, with Robert Wood and John Hanley, "The Maritime Role in the North Atlantic," *Naval War College Review*, November-December 1985, p. 5, the greater utility of sea control. The most explicit statement of a strict "division of labor" approach to allied cooperation is Record, *Revising U.S. Military Strategy*, pp. 57-73. The relative decline in the strategic importance of Europe and the concomitantly greater importance of the maritime flanks is forcefully argued in Eliot Cohen's "Do We Still Need Europe?," *Commentary*, January, 1986, pp. 34-35.

25. See Luttwak's *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 80-126. In many respects this work shapes Luttwak's fundamental views of the current debate.

26. See Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*; Howard, "The British Way of Warfare: A Reappraisal;" and Komer, *Maritime Strategy of Coalition Defense*.

27. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare*, pp. 25-38.

28. Richard Hough, *The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 321; Liddell Hart, *The Real War, 1914-1918* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964; first published in 1930), pp. 471-76; and Lord Hankey, *The Supreme Command*, II (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 850 for the significance of removing German allies. Liddell Hart further argues that in World War II Germany was highly vulnerable to naval power, especially the threat of large scale amphibious operations: "Marines and Strategy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, July, 1960.

29. A convincing discussion of the "bolt from the blue" is Norman Friedman's, "Maritime Strategy and the Central Front." While consideration of Soviet strategy is beyond the scope of this discussion, particularly informative is Philip A. Petersen and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," *Orbis*, Fall 1983, pp. 695-739.

30. Clausewitz, p. 579.

31. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, p. 256.

32. In addition to Luttwak, see Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," pp. 1137-41; Dunn and Staudenmaier, pp. 14-15; and, for an articulate argument for the concept of deterrence, John Mearsheimer, "The Maritime Strategy and Conventional Deterrence," pp. 25-28; and Stephen Van Evera and Barry Posen, "Defense Policy and the Reagan Administration: Departure from Containment," *International Security*, Summer 1983, pp. 3-45.

33. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*, p. 13.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 14. Also see Norman Friedman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," *International Defense Review*, July 1985, p. 1075.

35. Colin Gray's geopolitical perspective has suggested some more explicit war termination objectives in focusing upon mutually threatening capabilities, the problem of "strategic breakout," and preservation of the rimlands in forestalling Mackinder's prophecy. See "Maritime Strategy," pp. 36-38; and *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West*, chapters 2 and 3.

36. See note 32 above.

37. See Friedman, "Maritime Strategy and the Central Front;" the three phases of *The Maritime Strategy*, pp. 9-13, especially Phase III; and Turner and Thibault, pp. 124-33 for an emphasis on sea control, global interests, and their significance for the land battle.

38. Gray, "Maritime Strategy," pp. 39-40 argues the need to sustain NATO as a critical rimland.

39. Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," pp. 1127-28.

40. Mearsheimer, "The Maritime Strategy and Conventional Deterrence," pp. 9-16; Van Evera and Posen, p. 33; and Collins, "Comment and Discussion," *Proceedings*, March 1986, pp. 18-22.

41. See the Secretary of the Navy's Senate testimony; Friedman, "The Maritime Strategy and the Central Front," pp. 6-11; and West, p. 18.

42. Theoretically, the most coherent concept is that of Clausewitz: "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends" and which constitutes the main focus of military effort (pp. 595-96). A more elusive, but promising concept is that implied in Liddell Hart's idea of the center of gravity as enemy cohesion deriving from dislocation as the principal aim of battle (*Strategy*, p. 339). A far more specific notion is that of Mahan, contending that command of the sea is most effectively attained through the primacy of the battlefleet and the destruction of the enemy's (pp. 26-28, 121). That view is balanced in maritime thinking by Corbett's reading of Clausewitz's theory of limited objectives, driving a concept of control *and* denial in a "countervalue" strategy against the economic and social fabric of the enemy (pp. 47-56, and 89-90). But generally the maritime-continental strategy debate has suffered from their inappropriate or incomplete application. For example, Clausewitz's dictum of focusing maximum effort on the enemy center of gravity is both easily uncoupled from its clear connection to an extreme level of violence and, more importantly, assumes a similarity of respective centers of gravity, each capable of being attacked by the other belligerent. As suggested previously, the necessity of limited political object coupled with manifestly different strategic imperatives would render such a proposition situational at best. The same obtains with respect to Mahan: is the enemy's battlefleet *in reality* his center of gravity? As noted, the concept of destruction of cohesion is promising, but, in the current context, could easily diminish the efficacy of the limited political object espoused by its author. And while similar centers of gravity are not as unequivocal in Corbett, at least the vulnerability of the enemy to sea power properly applied is assumed. But Corbett does propose a more limited concept of the center of gravity, suggesting that the preservation of one's own--in this case the vital nexus of sea lines of communication--is a proper application of the principle.

43. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War*, pp. 255-56; and Komer, "Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense," pp. 1133-34.

44. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*, p. 9; and Friedman, "U.S. Maritime Strategy," p. 1075.

45. Gray, *Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West*, chapter 3.

46. Gray, *The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era*, p. 1.

47. Mackinder, p. 262.

48. Nicholas Spykman, *The Geography of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944), p. x, from the introduction by Frederick S. Dunn.

49. Clausewitz, pp. 88-89.

50. Quoted in Corbett, p. 55.

*Essays
on
Strategy*

V

Book and cover design by Thomas Gill
Text composed in Palatino
Cover mechanical prepared by Nancy Glover
and Juan Medrano
Display type in Caslon Openface and Andover

Editorial Reader: Major Ben Hackman,
US Army, US Military Academy
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