

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL,
Washington, DC, Thursday, May 12, 1988.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2337, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) presiding.

**STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL**

Mr. SKELTON. Ladies and gentlemen, this morning we continue our hearing on the education of professional military officers. We are fortunate today in having two senior officers with extensive combat and peace-time experience in both service and joint commands. They bring a broad perspective to the panel and will share with us their extraordinary competence in joint and strategic matters.

Gen. Paul F. Gorman retired from the Army in 1985 after more than 34 years of service. He served in both Korea and Vietnam as an infantry commander and was deeply involved in training soldiers throughout his career. He was the Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning and the Deputy Chief of Training of the Army Training and Doctrine Command. From 1980 to 1983, he served on the Joint Staff, first as the J-5 and then as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1983, he assumed command of the United States Southern Command in Panama with responsibility for U.S. strategy and planning in the Southern Hemisphere.

Gen. W.Y. Smith served in both Air Force and joint command and staff positions throughout his 36-year career. From combat in Korea and Wing Command in Germany, General Smith's illustrious career included key assignments to a Presidential committee studying military assistance, Staff Assistant to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Staff of the National Security Council, Military Assistant to the two Secretaries of the Air Force, and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1979 he became Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and in 1981 was appointed Deputy Commander in Chief, United States European Command. General Smith retired from that position in 1983.

We anticipate an interesting morning with these two very distinguished retired four-star generals who have a wealth of experience in joint operations and strategic planning.

Members sometimes float in and out, and unfortunately a full committee hearing begins shortly, so we may be having a three-way discussion here, but at least I want you to know how appreciative I am of both of you, because what you say here becomes part

of the record and part of our report which we hope to wind up in November or December. Thank you very much.

Mr. SKELTON. General Gorman, would you like to lead off, sir?

General GORMAN. In matters of this sort, sir, I would prefer not to. Dr. Smith always takes academic precedence over a mere master's.

Mr. SKELTON. Dr. Smith, you are in.

General SMITH. I think he is going to be more contentious than I am.

Mr. SKELTON. Not General Gorman. Surely not.

STATEMENT OF GEN. W.Y. SMITH, FORMER DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWER EUROPE

General SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here. I have been asked to express my views on professional military education and specifically to comment on the contributions of that education to jointness and developing strategists. I do think I am competent to talk about jointness because I spent more than half of the 35 years of my career in joint assignments. I became good friends with General Gorman when we were both studying at Harvard preparing to go to teach at West Point. In fact, at that time there were a number of Air Force officers teaching at West Point. I found that situation very healthy and very productive, and I would like to see more of it today.

Let me begin by stressing my strong support for professional military education, but before I get through, you will see I don't want to put too big a load on it. I would like to see a strong professional education program, and I would like to see more joint education taught at all the service institutions.

My reasons follow: In the future, even more so than the past, we are going to have to fight our forces as integrated military forces with units from all four services. The first time they get together can't be at the edge of the battle; they have to have worked together before that time and have learned the true sense of jointness. I think that service schools can make a great contribution in that regard.

But let me here define what I mean by jointness, because I think it is important to have clearly in mind what one's thinking of jointness is. What it means to me is to have units from separate military departments in a condition so that they can operate as a fighting team in protecting United States interests. Now the key word there is to operate, to conduct combat operations, and I don't believe that we should lose that focus as we talk about professional military education and its contribution to jointness.

Now, what does it take to achieve jointness? In my view, four things. First of all, and the thing that I always looked for in people who served on joint staffs under me is the person must have in-depth, expert knowledge of his own service. He has to know how his own service forces operate. Second, he must have some knowledge of the capabilities of other services. Third, it helps if he has had some experience in working with the other services; and, final-

ly, there must be mutual respect and trust among the people that are working together.

Now professional military education can contribute to all those four areas. Knowledge of one's own service is learned primarily through study and experience in the individual service schools, but joint education can help because it is always good to see one's self as others see us.

The second, which is knowledge of the capabilities of other services, is developed by exposure to other services and the viewpoints to other services, and those can be facilitated at joint professional military education institutions.

The same is true of the third, which is to get some experience working with other services.

The fourth, and which I think often is under-estimated, is mutual trust and respect. I think you get that from having frequent contact, and serving with fellow professionals, so you can learn their strengths and observe their integrity, because our military forces depend on that integrity. It is important to remember as you think of those four things and the contribution professional military education can make to them, there is no simple, single route to developing strong professional officers. Professional military education can help, but as I said, I don't think we should place the entire burden on that. In fact, in my view, professional military education is very much like discipline. The only kind of discipline that really works in the long run is self discipline, and the only kind of education that works in the long run is self education. That means that professional military education must become a way of life. It is not something, for military officers, it is not something they only get in school; it is something that is instilled in them and becomes a part of their every-day life.

In the same vein, let me say in my view jointness is as much a state of mind as it is the result of specific assignments or attendance at service schools. Assignments in schools can help, but they can't do the whole job. A joint culture has to be created. I must tell you, in my view, in my experience in the service, I have found that a joint culture is emerging. I think we have made a lot of progress in recent years, and I really think it comes from the logic of military operations in today's world that you just have to think in terms that go beyond one's own service. In every operation we have conducted recently we have seen that.

Now you asked me to talk a little bit also about what professional military education can do to develop strategists. Well, my goals are much more modest probably than yours are in that regard, in part because I am not sure what we mean by strategists and, second, to the extent that I do, I am not quite sure how professional military education programs that are designed for what I call the every-man officer are really going to be that much benefit to a true strategist who views matters from the perspective of his own creativity.

But that goes back again to the point that professional military education must take place outside of schools as well as in them. So rather than looking for strategists, I myself would be satisfied to develop sound joint planners and operators because I know what that means, and I can recognize those officers, and we need them

very badly. Again, professional military education can help in developing joint planners and joint operators, and, therefore, I think it has an important role in that regard.

Now let me close with, I would say, a fear that I have. It is that, in our well-intentioned desire to encourage and facilitate jointness, we may impede the development of professionalism in other ways. After Vietnam a lot of attention was placed to what is called ticket punching, and the adverse impact of ticket punching on the development of combat leaders. I would hope that our efforts to foster jointness—and I can tell you I don't believe anyone believes in jointness more than I do—but I would hope in your efforts to facilitate and foster jointness we do not establish the need for a lot of ticket punching and a lot of ticket punching that must be done in any precise order.

I think what we need instead are flexible policies that are implemented in a way that allow the complete professional development of an officer in a way that encourages jointness but does not make jointness become such a criterion that it impedes the development of professionalism in other ways, particularly the development of knowledge of one's own services. I think we are going to need a lot of joint professional military officers for a long time. Joint professional military education could contribute to that very much, and I think we ought to encourage that in a positive way.

Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. General Gorman.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL F. GORMAN, USA (RETIRED) FORMER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
AND FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF**


General GORMAN. Let me begin by strongly endorsing Bill's remarks, sir. I thoroughly associate myself with them.

I was invited the year before last to present the Ira Eaker Lecture at the Air Force Academy on the subject of jointness. I think if your staff could provide you a copy of that, you would discover a remarkable parallel in my remarks at that time with what General Smith has just said.

What I said on that occasion—

Mr. SKELTON. I may interrupt you at this point, General, without objection, we will obtain a copy of that, without objection, and make it a part of our record here today.

[The following information was received for the record:]



JOINT SERVICE: PLANS AND OPERATIONS

GENERAL PAUL F. GORMAN, U.S. ARMY (RET)
FORMER COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
SOUTHERN COMMAND

THE IRA C. EAKER DISTINGUISHED
LECTURE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY

NUMBER EIGHT

USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO

21 APRIL 1986

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The Ira C. Eaker Distinguished Lecture
on National Defense Policy
1985-1986

FOREWORD

In the spring of 1978, Major General and Mrs. Robert J. Smith, USAFR (Retired), established an endowment fund through the Air Force Academy Association of Graduates for the purpose of presenting an annual lecture program in honor of Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, USAF (Retired). Entitled "The Ira C. Eaker Distinguished Lecture on National Defense Policy," the lecture series commemorates the many important and significant contributions to national defense policy and security made by General Eaker, the air power pioneer, columnist and commentator.

The lecture is delivered at the United States Air Force Academy toward the end of the spring semester of each academic year to graduating cadets by an individual distinguished in the field of national defense policy. The lecturer is chosen by a nominating committee of four civilian and four military members, and chaired by the Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, United States Air Force Academy. Based upon original research, the lecture becomes the property of the Air Force Academy for publication and distribution. The endowment fund is administered by the United States Air Force Academy Association of Graduates; the lecture series itself is administered by the Department of Political Science, United States Air Force Academy.

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LIEUTENANT GENERAL IRA C. EAKER

Ira Eaker began active military service at El Paso, Texas, in 1917 as an infantry second lieutenant. He was 21 and a recent graduate of Southeastern Normal School, Durant, Oklahoma. The same year he applied for pilot training. While at Rockwell Field, California, where he was serving early in 1919 with Colonel H.H. "Hap" Arnold and Major Carl Spaatz, Eaker got his first opportunity to organize a unit. He volunteered for an assignment to recruit a squadron of 60 men, to help train it, and to take it to the Philippines as the first increment of the Second Aero Squadron.

For the next few years Ira Eaker acquired flying skills as well as experience in military organization and leadership. After two years in the Philippines and more than a year at Mitchell Field, New York, where he commanded the Fifth Aero Squadron, he was assigned as executive assistant in the Office of Air Service in Washington.

Until 1938, when the rumblings of war in Europe moved the United States to begin rearming, the needs of the small Air Corps were accorded a relatively low priority by the War Department. Airpower advocates, foreseeing the great potentials of aviation, were impelled to draw public attention to the capabilities of the aircraft. Ira Eaker was one of the small group that led this effort. Possibly no advocate had greater sustained influence on public understanding of airpower during the 20s, 30s and 40s than Eaker. He worked not only behind the scenes but in the forefront as a commander, an official spokesman, and a noted pilot.

He wrote speeches and prepared reports for General Patrick, Chief of the Air Corps in the mid-twenties, and later was chief pilot for General Fechet and the first Assistant Secretary of War for Air, F. Trubee Davison.

With Mulr S. Fairchild he flew one of the amphibian planes, the San Francisco, that made the 23,000-mile Pan American Good Will Flight to 26 Latin American countries from December 1926 to May 1927. This plane is now in the National Air Museum (Smithsonian).

He was chief pilot for the "Question Mark," which in 1929 set a world endurance record of more than 150 hours, using in-flight refueling.

In 1930 he made the first non-stop transcontinental flight, refueling in the air. In 1936 he made the first blind (instrument) transcontinental flight.

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Ira Eaker was Assistant Chief of the Air Corps Information Division from 1937 to 1939, and during the next year was executive officer to the Chief of the Air Corps, General "Hap" Arnold.

Then, in August 1941, he was ordered to special duty with the Royal Air Force in England to fly new types of fighters, to observe British fighter-control methods, and to report his findings to General Arnold. A few months later, in January, Ira Eaker, then a brigadier general, was assigned to organize the VIII Bomber Command, to understudy the British system of night bomber operations, and to determine the feasibility of the proposed daylight bombing effort. He led the first United States bomber raid to Germany, in August 1942. He was then promoted to brigadier general, was assigned to organize the VIII Bomber Command, to understudy the British system of night bomber operations, and to determine the feasibility of the proposed daylight bombing effort. He led the first United States daylight bombing effort. He led the first United States daylight bombing raid from Italy to German targets, landing in Russia. He piloted a fighter plane in the invasion of southern France in August 1944.

The Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, the counterpart of the Eighth Air Force in Britain, was highly effective in bombing German-held targets from the south. But there may have been no daylight bombing at all—and undoubtedly there would have been a less effective use of airpower—if it were not for General Eaker. It was he who persuaded Prime Minister Winston Churchill to withdraw British objection to American daylight bombing in favor of the less hazardous night bombing. When General Arnold learned early in 1943 that President Roosevelt had agreed with Churchill that the Americans should discontinue daylight bombing, he arranged for Eaker to discuss the matter with Churchill.

Churchill said later that General Eaker "pleaded his cause with skill and tenacity." He said Eaker "stated the case for the daylight Fortress bomber with powerful earnestness and pointed out what immense preparations had already been made in England—the transfer of many squadrons from America, the piling up of men, materials, spare parts, and so forth, and also the preparation of airfields now at length ready.... Considering how much had been staked on this venture by the United States and all they felt about it, I decided to back Eaker and his theme, and I turned around completely and withdrew all my opposition to the daylight bombing by the Fortresses."

From April 1945 until August 1947, when he retired, General Eaker served with Generals "Hap" Arnold and Carl Spaatz as Deputy Commander of the Army Air Forces and Chief of the Air Staff.

Born on April 13, 1896 in Llano County, Texas, Ira Eaker's education in journalism and three years of law served him and the Air Force well. He prepared policy directives and Congressional testimony, proposed legislation, and served on many boards which selected fighter aircraft. He was an informed and articulate spokesman for the Air Arm. With General Arnold as co-author he wrote and published three books on flying and aerial warfare.

General Eaker continued to serve the nation by explaining with rare insight the effect of aerospace power on world affairs. His weekly column was published by more than 30 newspapers, including *Air Force Times*, which is read widely in the armed forces. As always, he spoke from first-hand knowledge, having observed combat in the battlefields of Vietnam in 1967.

For contributing immeasurably to the development of aviation and to the security of his country, the President of the United States—in the name of the Congress—presented General Ira C. Eaker with a Special Congressional Gold Medal on December 17, 1979, at the Pentagon. This medal, which is shown on the covers of this pamphlet, was authorized by an Act of Congress on October 10, 1978.

INTRODUCTION OF GENERAL PAUL F. GORMAN

**BY LIEUTENANT GENERAL WINFIELD W. SCOTT, JR.
SUPERINTENDENT, U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY**

Good evening, and welcome to the Eighth Ira C. Eaker Distinguished Lecture on National Defense Policy. This lecture established in 1978 by Major General and Mrs. Robert J. Smith, long and dear friends of the Academy, is our only endowed lecture series. I would like to pay tribute to General Smith, a patriot who has served his nation in three wars. He is a truly great American. Please join me in saluting General Smith.

This lecture honors the air power pioneer, wartime commander, and postwar columnist, Lt General Ira C. Eaker. Eleven years ago I had the personal honor of working closely with General Eaker. He is one of our greats and bears substantial responsibility for the fact that we have a United States Air Force today.

Our Eaker Lecturer this evening has served his nation with great distinction in a variety of crucial posts over a 35 year career.

Graduating from West Point in 1950, General Paul F. Gorman subsequently received a master's degree in Public Administration from Harvard University. He is a veteran of both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, having served two tours in Vietnam—one as the Commander, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, 1st Division; and the other as the Commander of 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne. Later he served as a member of the United States delegation peace talks in Paris. General Gorman's decorations include the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of Merit, the Purple Heart and the Silver Star. Most recently he held positions as Director of Plans and Policy for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as Commander in Chief, Southern Command. In the latter capacity he was instrumental in stemming the spread of insurgency in Central America. He is eminently qualified to address the challenges of Joint Service Combat Operations because of his remarkable success in this capacity.

It is a great honor for me to present to you the Eighth Ira C. Eaker Distinguished Lecturer on National Defense Policy, General Paul F. Gorman.

JOINT SERVICE: PLANS AND OPERATIONS

PAUL F. GORMAN, GENERAL, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)

**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY
IRA C. EAKER DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
ON NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY
21 APRIL 1986**

During the past three years, a great deal of controversy has surrounded proposals to revamp the way the Department of Defense is organized and managed. The Military Reform Caucus in the Congress did much to promote the debate, but my good friend and mentor, your fifth Eaker Lecturer, General David Jones probably deserves first mention among those who brought about this latest attempt to concert more surely the contributions of the top leaders of our military profession, and of their civilian masters. Changes there will surely be this year, but it remains to be seen whether President Reagan will be more successful in bringing about new clarity and breadth of vision, and more unity and coherence in formulating national military strategy than were Presidents Eisenhower, Truman, or Theodore Roosevelt.

I do not wish to discuss tonight the range of issues which caused the latest of the periodic attempts to reorder organization charts and procedures for the Department of Defense. I believe we could all agree that, whatever the outcome of the current reorganization, America's defense establishment will continue to evolve, and that probably another Blue Ribbon Commission, and certainly another President and another Congress will have to deal with those issues once more.

Rather, I want to comment on a directly related subject which is, unless I miss my guess, of much more immediate interest to this audience: joint operations, the planning and executing of military undertakings involving elements of more than one service. Amid the furor over defense organization, much has been said and written about such operations, the flaws in which, it is said, argue for drastic change. There is in some quarters a presumption that we military professionals have lost that ability, manifest among such predecessors as Ira Eaker

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during World War II, to conceive artfully and to carry out successfully invasions, campaigns, battles, or even raids. Most defense reformers these days have a repertoire of anecdotes on joint operations to illustrate how the services have subordinated the Quest for the Grail of Victory to intramural bickering. Interservice relationships, once means to the end of winning, have become, so the charge goes, ends in themselves. The "joint system," as it has come to be known, proliferates rank and staff, and otherwise fosters careerists and military bureaucrats, rather than warriors, as in the good old days. The "joint system," some believe, lies at the root of all the military disappointments and failures the U.S. has known since the *Pueblo* was seized in 1968. *Mayaguez*, *Desert One*, Beirut, even Grenada have become code-words for a malaise of command which breeds ineptitude at the top, and doubt and confusion in the ranks.

Of course, most of these judgements are based on bunkum, on erroneous information, partial facts, and egregious exaggeration. Yet they must be taken seriously, for some who hold them occupy high positions, and believe that they should be an issue in the next presidential election. For example, one prominent reformer considers the defects of the joint system so serious that he would scrap one or more of the regional unified commands and reassign their responsibilities for plans and operations among the several services. Another, a presidential aspirant, is persuaded that more, not less jointness is the answer, and would create a new super-service, a National Defense Staff, composed of officers who, unburdened with fealty to one of the traditional armed services, would man the headquarters of the Department of Defense and its combatant commands with unprecedented pride and professionalism. To quote Senator Hart:

Officers would be chosen while young, probably at the rank of major/lieutenant commander. The intent would be to choose people before they developed a parochial mind-set. Selection would put especially strong emphasis on strength of character; candidates would have to have shown such character in their previous service careers. Then they would have to pass an extensive test. Passing would gain them entry into the National Defense Staff education system. This could be either a special school, probably of three years duration, or a compendia of the curricula

offered by the reformed command and staff colleges and war colleges, including the second-year courses in at least some of these. The candidates would have to demonstrate that they were the outstanding students in these courses in order finally to be selected as National Defense Staff officers....

As part of their continuing education and training, all National Defense Staff officers would periodically return to troop duties as unit commanders or staff officers. There would not be an "ivory tower" atmosphere in the National Staff. However, even when assigned to troop units, the National Staff officer's promotion would be controlled by the National Staff.¹

The last statement is footnoted as follows:

They would probably, though not necessarily, return to the service from whence they came. But their fitness report during their tour of field duty would be written by the National Defense Staff, not the service.²

Fellow professionals: given the gravity of the charges leveled at us by the Military Reformers, we have a right to expect more serious diagnosis and prescription.

The obvious consequence of abolishing unified commands is retrogression to the military department "executive agents" which were the major target of President Eisenhower's 1958 reform. I see no need to recycle that experience, for I agree with what the President said in his message to Congress in April 1958:

...separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it with all elements, with all services, in one single concerted effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient

¹Hart, Gary, with Lind, William S., *America Can Win: The Case For Military Reform*, Adler & Adler, Bethesda, Md., 1986, p. 217.

²*Ibid.*, p. 282.

weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one regardless of service....

I recognize that there will be occasions when it makes sense to use units of one service for a particular operation, and that the Navy and Marine Corps have a special relationship and admirable readiness upon which any CINC should capitalize for projecting force ashore from the sea. But in this year of 1986, unification has evolved to the point that all such operations would be planned and executed within the "joint system," under one of the unified commands. The evident ability of the United States to muster all the depth and flexibility of the several services assure any operation of back-up power and sustainability, and enhances deterrence, especially *vis-a-vis* the U.S.S.R. Joint operations can leverage the power of participating service components, and a joint command, properly led and staffed, is a force-multiplier. In a dangerous world, with adversaries who outnumber our forces, and who are in many instances as well armed, our warriors, our country, need such advantages.

As for establishing a new service named National Defense Staff, that seems to me a dubious way to bring about the "one single concerted effort" which Eisenhower sought. I am quite sure that most officers who have served as commander-in-chief of a unified command would much prefer to be advised, and to have directives acted upon, by a staff composed of service practitioners rather than staff specialists.

There are quite contrary views. Last Friday morning I watched Senator Hart on television agree with Brian Gumble that the failure of seven F-111 crews to pickle their bombs over downtown Tripoli was symptomatic of irresolute leadership and incompetence throughout the services, not just in the Air Force units from Lakenheath. You and I understand, of course, the collateral damage strictures bearing on those crews. But evidently the Senator has been led to believe that operational performance would have been materially improved had the squadron been led by a lieutenant colonel from the National Defense Staff, perhaps an infantry officer of admirable character, wearing on his coveralls a camrine stripe denoting his complete mastery, during three rigorous academic years at Leavenworth and Maxwell, of Sun Tzu, Frederick the Great, Clausewitz, and the gospels according to Steve Canby, Chuck Spinney, Pierre Sprey and John Boyd. But note that, in any event, Senator Hart would have the National Defense Staff

determine whether his performance was adequate or otherwise, not Colonel Sam Westbrook at Lakenheath, or any other USAFE commander, or even USCINCEUR. Ladies and gentlemen, I do not purport to understand whether such notions add up to good politics. I can only report that I consider them military nonsense.

However, let me be quick to add that I agree with Senator Hart's objectives: he wants more defense for the dollar, and I am convinced that we can and should provide for same. Moreover, I strongly concur with his proposal that the individual service staffs should be forbidden to involve themselves in most war-fighting issues, and that force employment should be guided, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, by the Chairman and the JCS, their Staff, and the Commanders-in-Chief of the combatant commands.³ Surely what is needed now is to strengthen the "joint system"—the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the unified and specified commanders—at the expense of the military departments, to evolve further toward the "truly unified commands" sought by President Eisenhower. Obviously, I support the recommendations of the Packard Commission to that end, and I admire the provisions of the bills now before Congress which have that effect.

Let me see if I can direct your own analyses of these issues by posing two questions:

First, should you consider loyalty to a service an outmoded idea?

Second, if being a "service practitioner" is what is important, should you seek joint service outside the Air Force?

Of course, I now will give you my own answers, but to do so, I will have to go back to my beginnings.

The year 1950 witnessed one of those events in the cosmos of the American military profession which caused a shower of stars decades afterward. Just as the USMA Class of 1915 produced an unusual number of the generals of World War II, the USMA Class of 1950, I am told, went on to earn more stars than any class since 1915. Its contributions to the "joint system" were significant, including Charley Gabriel, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, John Wickham, Chief of Staff of the Army, Generals Volney Warner and Wally Nutting who served as Commanders-in-Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command, Benny

³*Ibid.*, p.218.

Davis as CINC of the Strategic Air Command, and myself as USCINCSO.

What we were then taught about the value we should attach to our chosen service is, it seems to me, what you should be taught today. I still have among my books one of our texts on that subject, a slim blue hardback entitled *The Armed Forces Officer*, a manual on leadership first published in November, 1950, under the signature of George Marshall, then Secretary of Defense. *The Armed Forces Officer* had as its principal author Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall, the Army's combat historian of World War II, Korea, and Viet Nam. SLAM Marshall figured in a number of updates and rewrites of the book until he died. As far as I know, there have been no editions since the late '70's. That's regrettable, especially in the context of this lecture, for SLAM Marshall held up Ira Eaker to his readers as an example of the sort of searching intellect which he calculated that modern professionalism demands. Listen to this description of the commander of the 8th Air Force:

...a strikingly soft-spoken, sober, compact man who has the mild manner and the judicial outlook of a member of the Supreme Court. But he is always about two steps ahead of everybody ...there is a quiet, inexorable logic about everything he does....

I have no doubt that General Ira Eaker would have been as successful as a modern CINC as he was planning and directing the operations of 8th Air Force against Germany during World War II. His upbringing as an airman would no more have handicapped him for command of elements of another service than would his training in civil law. Indeed, from all I have read, he provides an excellent role-model for any young professional of today who may be interested in preparing for the highest levels of joint command: an inquiring mind, anticipation, rational calm.

Incidentally, *The Armed Forces Officer* was reissued in 1956 as Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-2, when Maxwell D. Taylor was Chief of Staff of the Army, and Dwight David Eisenhower was in the White House. General Eisenhower, you know, told the cadets at West Point in 1945 that there should be but one service. Nonetheless, as President, he signed into law the bill authorizing establishment of this Academy in April, 1954, and in his memoir, he wrote in 1965 that:

I have always believed that a nation's defense would be most efficiently conducted by a single administrative service, comprising elements of land, sea, and air. I did not (and do not) join those who insist that a system of "checks and balances" among services contributes to the nation's security. Successful defense cannot be conducted under a debating society....

¹ However, I well recognized that the feeling of the individual soldier, sailor, marine, or airman for his own service was very real, that much of his morale was based on service loyalty. Therefore, a complete amalgamation of the services in 1958, I felt, would be unwise and extreme....⁴

David Packard, Chairman of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, has interpreted the mission of our panel as fulfilling Ike's objectives. Several weeks ago, General Paul Xavier Kelly, United States Marine Corps—year-group 1950, by the way—appeared before the Commission to provide his advice on what it should aim to achieve. Dave Packard told him that we wanted to bring about what Eisenhower could not in 1958. P.X. was ready: he had brought his copy of the little blue book with him, and, by way of reply to Mr. Packard, read the following passage from the *Armed Forces Officer*:

Toward services other than his own, any officer is expected to have both a comradely feeling and an imaginative interest. Any Army officer is a better man for having studied the works of Admiral Mahan and familiarized himself with the modern Navy from first-hand experience. Those who lead sea-going forces can enlarge upon their own capacities by knowing more, rather than less, about the nature of the air and ground establishments. The submariner can always learn something useful to his own work by mingling with airmen; the airman becomes a better officer as he grows in qualified knowledge of ground and sea fighting.

But the fact remains that the services are not alike,

⁴Eisenhower, Dwight D., *Waging Peace*, Doubleday, New York, 1965, pp. 248-249.

that no wit of man can make them alike, and that the retention by each of its separate character, customs and confidence is essential to the conserving of our national military power. Unification has not altered this basic proposition. The first requirement of a unified establishment is moral soundness in each of the Integral parts, without which there can be no soundness at all. And on the question of fundamental loyalty, the officer who loves every other service just as much as his own will have just as much active virtue as the man who loves other women as much as his own wife.

The beginning of wisdom for understanding joint operations, then, is an appreciation of the profound differences among the services of which Marshall wrote, distinguishing characteristics which are often functional and benign, and cannot and should not be dismissed. I have commented before that these hallmarks are so ingrained as to warrant the appellation culture—a corpus of ideas, suppositions, traditions, customs, prejudices, and obstacles, as well as language and costume.⁵ The frequently mentioned "purple suiter" exists as surely as the unicorn, and I, for one, find the descriptor offensive.

The differences among the services may be plainly perceived by comparing four three-star commanders: a Vice Admiral, USN, commanding a numbered fleet; a Lieutenant General, USAF, commanding a numbered air force; a Lieutenant General, USMC, commanding an amphibious force; and a Lieutenant General, USA, commanding a corps. There is an order of magnitude difference among the numbers of independent elements subordinate to each: the admiral would have within his command something like one hundred entities maneuvering under a single intelligence—submarines, ships, flights, single aircraft. The Air Force commander would have something like one thousand such entities. The Marine three-star would have perhaps ten thousand, and the Army corps commander, upwards of one hundred thousand. Both the fleet and the Air Force commander would dispose of fighting elements under command of officers; their Marine and Army counterparts would perforce rely on more junior, less

⁵E.g., "Genuine Jointness: Cross-cultural Aspects of Airspace Management," MITRE Corporation, *Proceedings of the Battlefield Airspace Symposium*, September 1982.

well educated and trained leaders in the small detachments of their forces. The commanders of the fleet and of the Air Force would know with some precision where their elements were from moment to moment, and would be able to talk directly to them, or otherwise alter their orders at will. The Marine and his Army counterpart would probably neither know where all their elements were with certainty, nor possess the means to order them about except through a hierarchy of subordinates.

These distinctions are, of course, a function of the environment within which each command must operate: the naval and air forces within the homogenous and extensive hydrosphere and atmosphere, the Marines and soldiers amid the disparate, confining and confusing clutter of the surface of the earth. Together with the numbers I have cited, these dictate very different attitudes toward planning and operations among the commanders concerned.

By and large the air and naval commanders would be alike in that they would be relatively unconcerned about *employment*, that is, how or where battles might occur, in that their forces would be practiced to deal with an adversary in one part of their domains as readily as another. Both can afford to plan without much regard for tactics, which are a make-it-up-as-you-go-along matter safely left to subordinates. To be sure, the naval commander would have to be concerned with the status of his elements, but generally speaking, of the four, he would have the greatest strategic independence and tactical flexibility. The Air Force commander would have a higher concern than the admiral for *deployment*—with all that connotes for enroute sustainment and protection of the force, overflight rights, and access to key facilities—and for bed-down, or basing for the force during operations.

In contrast, both the Marine and his Army colleague would have to plan in detail all aspects of *deployment* and *employment*, to calculate carefully how to deal not only with the enemy, but also with the terrain, the weather, the civil population, and the logistic infrastructure of the area in which they intended to operate. They would be less able, once committed, to improvise a major deviation from these plans. The Marine, were he to execute an amphibious landing, would have to see to it that his ships were loaded so that men and materiel were available for landing in the proper sequence. Were the corps the senior Army headquarters involved, its commander would have to shoulder most of the burden of planning and providing for seaport throughput and overland

logistic support for forces of all services within the theater of operations.

Concerning logistics, both naval and air forces prefer to operate from secure bases remote from combat, and to employ factory-like techniques for replenishment and maintenance. The forces on land must plan to resupply and repair within easy reach of their foe, and to do so with a much more decentralized, cottage-industry organizations.

Even service doctrine or fighting concepts tend to have different meanings to each commander. For the admiral and the commander of the Air Force, these center on how to exploit the capabilities of their several weapon systems. For the Marine and the soldier, doctrine has to encompass materiel, but then go beyond to provide within their dispersed forces and decentralized command and control apparatus an effective consensus on how to operate together to defeat the enemy, and to cope with terrain, weather, and other uncertainties.

But it is important to remember that these pairings I have identified fly in the face of history: despite the fact that the Navy and Air Force commanders have a great deal in common, as do the Marine and Army commanders, the maritime services, both in the Department of the Navy, have a long tradition of cooperation, and they practice continuously at making it work despite adversity. By the same token, there are strong bonds between the Army and the Air Force rooted in their common heritage, and in their common need to prepare for joint air-land battles of the future.

In recent years there has been a striking growth in the amount of interdependence among the services, reflected in critical dependencies of one unified or specified command upon others. In any joint operation, the more demanding the mission, the more important these dependencies become. Think of a deployment to Southwest Asia: neither the Marines or the Army could get there without MAC, and forces from all services would have to count heavily upon a sea line of communications. Or think of Tripoli. You were probably as disturbed as was I with the continuous coverage in the visual media of the position of our aircraft carriers, and the repetitive speculation on the time of strike. In the event, CINCEUR achieved the requisite operational surprize by using entirely unanticipated forces, and by striking in the dead of night. These dependencies can be strength.

I find, however, that there is a canard which even those of us who should know better often repeat: the charge that the "joint

system" causes the services to vie one with another to participate in any contingency operation, so that everyone has a "piece of the action." I had lunch last week with two retired Army generals, both of whom asserted that F-111s were superfluous to the Tripoli operation, their participation an attempt to attract for the Air Force a bit of the favorable publicity accorded naval air for its earlier forays against the Libyans. I tell you what I told them: certainly the carriers could have struck unaided, but they could not have attacked so swiftly, widely, precisely, and devastatingly, and the hazards for all involved would have risen proportionate to the amount of time available for the Libyans to react. In this case, I think a joint operation was solidly indicated, and that far from carping and nit-picking criticism, I think USCINCEUR, USNAVEUR and USAFE deserve high praise for a difficult assignment well executed.

Of course, joint operations are more difficult than single-service operations. They are therefore often more risky, and potentially more costly. They may violate the principle of *Simplicity* to achieve *Surprise*, exert *Mass*, exploit *Maneuver*, or insure achievement of *Objective*. But they will assuredly be more efficacious if well planned, and if the forces involved are well trained. Incidentally, it is not enough for participants to be ready or proficient in a general sense: most joint contingency plans address operations which are highly situational, and which demand rehearsal of the specific cooperative interactions among the service components of the joint task force. A long-standing contingency plan requires frequent update and re-rehearsal, especially if it involves maritime units, which often rotate. One hears a lot these days about "C²": the commander of a joint operation must plan for "C²": command, control, communications, and culture. Intelligence—relevant, timely, frequently refreshed and re-analyzed information—is crucial for joint planning. The authority who can plan the C² most cogently and train most appropriately for such joint operations is a regional CINC.

It is the hubris of Washington, and it afflicts civilian leaders as powerfully as military men, that our capital is the repository of available wisdom on all problems on the national agenda. It is fostered by the concentration in Washington of technical and analytical centers for the several intelligence agencies, and the nodes for the stovepipe communications from our Embassies abroad. It leads to attempts to plan and conduct joint operations from the Pentagon, and it leads to ignoring and bypassing the combatant commands and their CINCs. But I know from

experience how mistaken it is, for while there may be in the Washington area much information, that information is all too rarely transformed into intelligence, that is, sifted and situated between the ears of decision makers.

The regional CINCs and the other combatant commanders within the "joint system" serve their nation by concentrating talented minds on their joint staffs full time on in-depth oversight of a narrower span of problems than Washington can afford to consider, by developing estimates thereon informed by physical presence and a transregional perspective, and by raising these with proposals for decision in Washington. It is a grievous, if common error among civilians to suppose that the unified and specified commands are in place only to deter war and to provide against its outbreak, and that they are extraneous for the day-to-day formulating and conducting of foreign policy. The exercise of national power is by no means coextensive with the use of force, and an Assistant Secretary of State or U.S. Ambassador who exploits adroitly the resources of a CINC substantially amplifies his decisional information and his ability to influence events.

But let's talk for a moment about the sort of planners a regional CINC might require for some prospective joint operation. There is a misapprehension that a CINC must have contingency plans for any eventuality, a patent impossibility. There is another, equally untrue, that a joint planner must be prophetic, able to foresee distant events with unerring accuracy; the fact is that a CINC plans for those missions which higher authority directs, or which he himself anticipates. Even were the Air Force Academy to recruit annually one or two genuine clairvoyants, I doubt that they would have much of a professional future as prophets, even in Washington on the National Defense Staff, for much that is future is better unknown.

A senior officer of the German *Bundeswehr* once told me this story about a particularly brilliant young officer of the *Generalstab*—nameless, as General von Seeckt thought of staff officers. In 1928 the staff officer was directed to prepare an estimate of the strategic position of Germany five, fifteen, twenty and forty years in the future to serve as the basis for contingency plans. The staff officer promptly prepared a briefing which began with the assertion that in 1933 Germany would be in the grips of a world-wide depression, and would be ruled by a certifiable maniac intent on eradicating the Jewish people. Stunned, his superiors asked whether this portended

military disaster for the country. Not so, said the staff officer, because in fifteen years, in 1943, a Third German Empire would extend from the Volga to the French coast, from the Norwegian Arctic to the African desert. Would Germany then go on to dominate the world? No, replied the staffer, because in 1948 Germany would have been divided among the Bolsheviks and the western democracies, its cities in ruins, and its industrial production only 10 percent of 1928's. Would this mean the end of German military power? No, replied the staffer, because he estimated that in forty years time, in 1968, Germans would provide the bulk of the armed forces in Central Europe, and would have a robust war industry in the Rhineland, where workers of unprecedented affluence would divide their time between automated machine tools and little black boxes where they would watch a man on the moon. That staff officer's carmine stripes were promptly ripped from his uniform, and he was quietly spirited off to a padded cell.

There is another, older story about military staffers, concerning the two British balloon observers of World War I who had a brush with a German fighter, were cut loose from their mooring, and before they could parachute, were blown into a fog bank. They drifted in the murk for about an hour, panic rising the while over concern that they might cross the front into German-occupied Belgium. Then the fog parted a bit, and they saw on the ground, to their immense relief, two British officers in a formal garden. "Where are we," they shouted down. "You're in a balloon," came the answer from below. Whereupon one balloonist said to the other, "I know exactly where we are. We must be over GHQ. I know because those must be general staff officers. Their answer was instantaneously fast, exceedingly precise, and utterly useless."

Joint planning requires neither prescience, nor omniscience, nor instantaneous precision. It does require some art in selecting circumstances which might call for military response, that anticipation for which Ira Eaker was known. A joint staff's energies must be focused, and that is the purview of the CINC, which he discharges with the exercise of logic, prudence, his years of experience and perhaps hunch. The CINC's planning guidance is crucial for staff efficiency: he must set forth a concept of operations, describing what he wants to accomplish, and generally how he would like to operate, so that the staff can bring in the service components to test his concept and devise supporting plans. The joint staff officer, whatever his service of origin, must understand that the inputs from a naval or air

component are likely to differ from those from a Marine or Army component and why—as I have described. The joint staff officer becomes the CINC's surrogate in probing to ascertain the cogency of those responses, and in relating them one to another. It is within the joint staff that the force-multiplier effect of joint operations takes shape, and acquires substance. The joint staff officer thereby performs services which are properly understood as the quintessence of military professionalism.

This is especially the case with respect to low intensity conflict, the political uses of violence in the form of sabotage, terrorism, and insurgency. These will, in all probability, constitute the most urgent threats to our national interests and to our citizens for the foreseeable future. For example, I can tell you that there exists today only three places where the future of Central America is being planned comprehensively and intensively: Havana, Managua, and Quarry Heights, Panama, the headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command.

I have had occasion recently to remind members of Congress that in April 1983, three years ago, Honduras was threatened with war by Nicaragua, El Salvador had all but succumbed to Marxist guerrillas, and Congress was divided over whether to attempt to aid in defending either. Today Congress is seized with an issue of offense vice defense: whether to help anti-Marxist rebels fighting in Nicaragua. I do not claim credit for this turn-about, credit which belongs largely to the Central Americans and to the skilled U.S. diplomats we have had on the scene. But I will state that USSOUTHCOM has played an important role in advancing our national policies, an unspectacular role very different from the sort our forces would play in other forms of conflict. In USSOUTHCOM's joint operations, for instance, its first-line aircraft, the mainstay of its airpower, has been the C-130. And most of those C-130s have been manned by reservists. To be sure, there was not much television fare in those operations, but they nonetheless have served to reassure friends and to dismay and deter adversaries. As Sun Tzu put it, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."

I earlier raised the question whether you should seek joint service. I cannot testify that it is a pathway to stars, if that is any criterion, but we should note that joint duty is *sine qua non* for promotion to general officer. I can attest that joint duty can be stimulating, exciting, challenging, and rewarding exactly in the sense that SLAM Marshall meant when he urged his readers to learn about the other services. In my own view, an Air Force

officer who has served as a valuable member of a joint command, either on a joint staff, or as commander of a joint task force or air component, has increased his or her professional worth to the Air Force and to the nation, value-added that deserves recognition by promotion boards. Needless to say I commend joint service to you without hesitation.

Let me conclude with a possibly apocryphal description of the last hours of General Tasker Bliss, one of your unsung aviation pioneers; who was Chief of Staff of the United States Army during World War I, from September 1917 until May 1918. My informant has it that when the old soldier's military family was summoned to his bedside for their final farewells, one junior aide had the temerity to ask the general whether, looking back on his long and successful career, he had any regrets. At the question the pale face flushed, the grey brows bent in frown, the gnarled fingers crumpled the counterpane, and with forcefulness which evoked the commander of yesteryear, he rasped: "Damn right! I should never have let the bastards out of the Signal Corps."


Ladies and gentlemen: the decision that there should be a separate air service is no more recallable for us than it was for Tasker Bliss, or for Dwight D. Eisenhower. Our task, our good fortune, is to take advantage of the strengths of this service which Bliss aided in its infancy, and to grow within it officers capable of commanding, planning, and conducting joint operations with all the professionalism to which this institution is dedicated.

I am deeply honored for this opportunity to share ideas with you, under so prestigious an aegis. My best wishes attend you all in your future service. Thank you.

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PREVIOUS LAKER LECTURES

- (1979) The Present State of the World, by Dr. Jean
M. H. Jung, Secretary General, NATO
- (1980) Choices for the 1980s, by Sir Cecil
Aulmann, Professor of Political Science, M.I.A.
- (1981) The Strategic Balance and Strategic Realities in
the 1980s, by Mr. Richard R. Burg, Director,
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department
of State (Delivered by Mr. Robert Blackwill)
- (1982) Vietnam Revisited, by General Ross Milton,
USAF (Ret.), former U.S. Representative to the
NATO Military Committee
- (1983) Defense Challenges of the 1980s, by General
David C. Jones, USAF (Ret.), former Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
- (1984) Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Defense
Management, by Lieutenant General Brent C.
Acorncroft, USAF (Ret.), Chairman, President's
Commission on Strategic Forces
- (1985) Reflections on U.S.-Soviet Relations, by
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs



General GORMAN. Thank you. What I said on that occasion was no unified commander that I know of would want to have a staff peopled by gentlemen and ladies who had no experience other than service on other joint staffs, even the great Joint Staff in Washington. Rather, what he would like to have is a pool of officers competent in their own services who understand how their service operates, the doctrine, the training, the customs, the whole heritage and culture of that service.

It is probably true that most of us would prefer to have former commanders on those staffs rather than professional staffers.

As a second sort of elaboration on Bill's remarks, I want to disagree somewhat with the unwise extolling of the capacity of professional military education. I think I am in a position to talk to you from the basis of considerable experience with that. I would tell you that professional military education has not in the past done all that is claimed for it.

For example, as you noted at the outset, I served as the Assistant Commandant at the Infantry School, as did George Marshall, back in the late 1920s. Now, George Marshall, I believe, is correctly recognized as a great strategist, but George Marshall did not acquire his strategic prowess from professional military education. To the contrary, George Marshall acted on and within the military education system as a severe critic and as a reformer. He came to Fort Benning as an individual who was deeply concerned about the formation of officers for responsibilities and staff and command and was dismayed to discover that we had, in being there, a school dedicated primarily to the production of staff officers capable of producing long written orders of the style that had committed droves of infantrymen to attacks across the barbed wire reaches in front of the trenches in France in 1917 and 1918.

There is a remarkable book that I would commend to you that was produced by the faculty of the Infantry School back in that era called, "Infantry in Battle", in which he made repeatedly the point that war eludes rules and formats, and war rewards the inventive mind, war rewards the adaptive commander, war rewards ingenuity and the ability to perceive reality and react to it soundly. War is not a matter that can be left to rules.

Now, I think that it is germane to these proceedings that George Marshall was the Assistant Commandant at the Infantry School at a time in which the services were burdened by the National Defense Act of 1920, an act which prescribed in significant amount of detail, Mr. Chairman, just exactly how the services would organize and fight. That is a bit of legislation that prescribed, for example, that tanks should be assigned to the infantry, and the derivative wisdom of that was, since the infantry traveled at 2½ miles an hour, the United States should not buy any tank that traveled faster than that speed.

There were a variety of other prescriptions in there which narrowed the thinking of the services and constrained doctrinal development.

Mr. SKELTON. They accuse us of micromanaging today. We can't even come close.

General GORMAN. Well, I tell you it is an ancient disease of the body politic of the United States, and to the degree that you folks

go a little ways you can bet there are a whole bunch of fellows out there in green, blue and white who are going to be prepared and take and extend that micromanagement on down so that you get the antithesis of the force that General Marshall—or then Colonel Marshall—wanted to see in the United States.

If you don't want to take that book as the documentary evidence, take the letter that General Marshall wrote to the Commandant at Fort Leavenworth.

Mr. SKELTON. We have that.

General GORMAN. Yes. The point there, of course, was exactly that he was aware, as were many other thinking members of the profession, that the Germans were moving out rapidly, committing Army Corps to action on the basis of oral orders, and Heintzleman and company out of Leavenworth were still doing the paper drill.

Now, one aspect of the business that disturbs me the most is that we are very likely, if we are not careful, to think that professional military education is solely the product of what occurs at those schools. Marshall didn't believe that. Marshall's faculty certainly were a collection of individuals, most of whom brought to the school sets of ideas that were derived from their own experience and their own study. A lot of the professional military education that took place back in that period, as is the case still today, was acquired out in the serving units.

Here again I am echoing Bill Smith. There are, after all, four places at which, or four systems by which, military education and training is communicated effectively. There is training in institutions, sir, but most of the training in institutions is individual. Yes, we do have some group or collective training, the National Training Center, or Red Flag, in the Air Force, some of the Navy instrumented ranges where groups are trained, but those are not the place to teach joint operations. You have to get out in the serving forces.

So I would put a considerable degree of importance on the training undertakings of the unified and specified commands, and that goes to the provisions in their resource allocations for training for readiness. It also goes to arrangements which take advantage of the occasions for joint operations to extract from them the maximum in educational opportunities for the participating officers, and I don't think we do that wisely and well.

I can assure you that attention to the latter would produce far more than worrying about a corps of professional educators for institutions, concerning ourselves with so-called Capstone courses. The problem is, of course, that real strategists never stop growing, never stop learning, they get smarter year by year, step by step, and if we put together our educational institutions properly, they would be supportive of that growth throughout a professional's service.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. General Gorman, thank you so much. The book, the "Infantry in Battle", that was written by Marshall and his staff, do you have a date on that, sir?

General GORMAN. I think my copy is 1939. I would be glad to loan it to you.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

From the standpoint of men who have been in the position of unified commanders, do you think that perhaps we are putting too much emphasis on this joint training when, in fact, only a very small number of people in the system are going to be called on to make that kind of decision? I don't know if I made myself clear.

General SMITH. No, you did. I understand what you are saying. I have thought about that, and I really do think there should be more emphasis on joint training. Like in the European Command, we had exercises, a lot of joint exercises, and, as you say, it is true that a lot of people were out in the field, and they didn't necessarily see that directly, but they did see it in ways that were very important, like in terms of close air support. The Army needed close air support, and we needed a good system, and the Army forces needed to know that close air support was going to be there. The only way they could know it would be there or not be there, as the circumstances warrant, was that they had some joint training where Air Force participated in exercises with Army forces.

So I am satisfied, even though in a lot of cases the things individuals did were not greatly affected by joint exercise, in my view, when the chips were down, those people were going to have to operate together, and, therefore, there ought to be more joint training than there was, and that meant there had to be more training because the individual service training is important also.

General GORMAN. On the lofty plane of some of your previous discussions of strategy, et cetera, I think you may be right. There are relatively few people who are going to be involved in the prosecution of issues of national policy over on the Joint Staff here in Washington or in one of the unified or specified command headquarters. But many services, or most of the services, have the need for joint training that goes right down to grass level soldiering. No Army unit can deploy without getting on an Air Force airplane or using sea transportation in some sense, so the Army, right at the very basic level of soldiering, has to communicate to its individuals how to interact with load masters on C-5s or otherwise, as Bill says, take advantage of Air Force capabilities to fight their battle.

But even beyond that, in the most routine tasks in my command, when I was a CINC, it was common to see groups put together for missions that came from different services. The ability to inter-operate, whether you are talking about a communications team or whether you are talking about a mobile training team, or whether you are talking about an intelligence analysis group, just was part of the business, sir.

So I would submit that, while you know it may be true that relatively few people are going to be dealing with national strategy or theater level strategy, relatively few, there is a heck of a lot of need for joint training that goes right down to how you fight.

Mr. PICKETT. Drawing on your experiences as commanders and thinking back on some of the better or best officers that you had working with you, how do you feel these men were developed? What role did professional military education play, do you believe, in their development? If none, what did cause these people to be of the quality that you perceive them to be?

General SMITH. In my case, it was hard to see the direct influence of professional military education. Although I did perceive that people who had been to a service school or to the National War College and associated with people in other services, as well as people in the State Department and other civilian agencies of Government, I could see there occasionally a better understanding of the problems of other people.

I had a lot of experience with people in the Navy and particularly the European Command within the Mediterranean, which is always, particularly at that time, 1981 to 1983, a very active part of the world. The thing I really expected most from them was the fact that they knew a lot about how the Navy operated and they had a lot of confidence on people in the Navy so we could get something done. But in terms of their professional military education, that was a secondary factor to their professionalism in naval matters.

General GORMAN. I think that any commander will tell you that people who performed well for him were individuals who brought to their job attitudes and skills and knowledge which are very hard to attribute to professional military education.

I would tell you that in every command that I have held, I have gone through my rosters and removed from the job descriptors those caveats that said, "This position can only be filled by a graduate of this or that or the other thing". I did so precisely because I would prefer to appoint to staff positions individuals with energy and enthusiasm, initiative and the ability to learn on the job, as opposed to an individual whose primary selection criterion rested on some sort of completed schooling. That is not to say that I, like Bill, don't admire graduates of the War College or that, like Bill, I don't treasure the advantages of an experience like the National War College makes available. But, I would hold that the differences among officers are certainly not predictable on the basis of their having completed any kind of a school.

I have found, for example, in the Southern Command, that very young officers were fully—with virtually no schooling—were fully capable of handling very large responsibilities. I would cite, for example, the case of a young Navy lieutenant who turned out to be the foremost analyst on the Salvadoran guerrilla force. That kid, no professional military education beyond his initial entry training, was a superb officer. He was selected by the Director of Central Intelligence as sort of the—for the Analyst of the Year program—they take them off for special training within the intelligence community, give them special assignments, kind of a Rhodes Scholar of the intelligence business. There is a lad who learned on the job, and is still doing it that way.

To take another swipe at your question, sir, I suspect that, as was the case with General Marshall, most of us would prefer to have elites that are in effect sort of self-identifying and self-electing. Marshall's notebook, in which he kept the names of officers that he had recognized over the years had those qualities and attributes, I submit, would not match up with years of professional military education. The guys he picked were doers and thinkers.

Mr. SKELTON. May I interrupt right there, sir. I think you will also find those same people, however, going through the schools

that were then in existence, a good number of them were instructors at various schools at different times.

General GORMAN. Back in those days, sir, they didn't have much else to do. Of course, they were instructors. If you were a commandant, you would damn well go get the best guys, but you look at, General Stilwell—not an academician, but a great instructor, a great commander.

Mr. PICKETT. One other thing, I suppose what we are struggling with is trying to make sure that we do the best possible job with the resources there as far as military education is concerned. What I am sort of detecting from the comments that you are making is that you think the present structure might not be doing the job, and maybe an entirely different approach toward encouraging some sort of career-long development might be more appropriate. I don't know if you had a chance to develop your thoughts along this line.

One of the themes that we have heard frequently in our talking with people at the schools, and students who have gone through the schools, is that their experience changes their way of thinking about what they are doing. It sort of broadens their perspective and sometimes, while I realize it is not always true, people in the military get accused of getting so focused they can't see options and alternatives other than those that they are accustomed to. From that standpoint, maybe putting an officer in an environment where he is tested on these ideas might be healthy.

What I am focusing on is: Have you conceptualized some better way to train officers than the way we are going at it now? If not—the resources we are putting into the program, is the program paying for itself?

General SMITH. You see I probably expect a lot less from formal education than most people because, I go back again, it is self-education, and, therefore, I think an environment that you put people in that gives them a chance to expand and learn, to look at alternatives, that is the important thing. A lot of the professional schools have been criticized—I read some questions here I think about not testing people. As you know, there are some people who know how to take tests and some people who don't, and some of the smartest people I know don't know how to take tests. I am not big on testing; I am big on putting people in environments and giving them the opportunity to learn and stimulating them and evaluating them some way other than solely by testing. Peer evaluation is probably the best evaluation that you have at service schools.

So I don't find that much fault with the training and with the educational system that we have, although I wouldn't expect too much of it. When you say try something entirely different, I must tell you I flinch at that, because I say to myself I don't know what that would be. But I think that what you want to do is give officers a chance to grow and put them in an environment and encourage them to grow. A lot aren't going to do it. A few will. What you are trying to do is to let them.

Now again, I go back to the service schools. The National War College, I understand, today has a lot more electives and courses being graded than we did when I was there, and people say, isn't that good? I said I am not so sure it is good. When I was at the

National War College, I got to talk to a lot of people who understood more about certain issues than I did, and the course gave me time for individual development. The only change that I would say in our current system is that we ought to allow time for people to develop as individuals and not think that we are going to cram into them everything they should know, because we are going to be gravely disappointed.

General GORMAN. You had, I think, two parts to your question. One goes to the question of effective use of resources.

I ran the Army schools for 4 years, and I would tell you that that was not an effective use of resources, sir, because \$6 out of every \$10 that you appropriate for Army schools goes into base operations: light, heat, snow removal, blue-collar folks out there, in addition to the faculty and the library and the other learning stuff, and it turns out, of course, that the latter was the relatively minor part of the total operation.

You want to rationalize Army school systems? Support base closures or at least let us consolidate the schools, because it is inefficient the way we are doing business out there. I have been up here for 20 years trying to get that message home. Tinkering around with the faculty and the curriculum will do a lot, sure, but the big money is out there in the base operations.

The second point I would make, though, goes to the kind of substantive issue of how do you approach schools? There are a lot of schools of thought on that, just as there are differences in the Nation's law schools. In the business administration business, you are going to find different schools of thought on how to proceed. When I was Director of Training in TRADOC, I had an Army contingent at the Naval War College when Stan Turner was up there, and it was the beginning of a long relationship with Admiral Turner. I served with him subsequently. He and I had a continuing debate over whether his approach or another was the right way to go. Succinctly, of course, Stan advocates a demanding, stressful, rigorous academic approach.

Interestingly, the guy I would set up as the proponent for the opposite school is George Marshall, and George Marshall used to say to his faculty at Benning, and I was reminded of this very frequently by my officers when I was the Assistant Commandant, George Marshall used to advocate to officers at Benning that every officer ought to take at least an hour a day, put his feet up on the desk, and do nothing but think about who he was, what the profession was all about, and where he thought that he ought to be going within it and how he could change it for the good of the country.

A reflective approach with a lot of emphasis on reading is very different from the kind of performance oriented approach that Stan took at the Naval War College. I think there are strengths in both approaches, and I frankly don't know which is right. I can't see the difference among the graduates of institutions that are run by individuals of very different persuasions in these regards. I think that both of them are viable approaches.

To sum it up, I wouldn't change much in the existing professional military education system except to make it more efficient from the resource point of view, and I think, as I say, the big operation there would be to operate on base costs. But I do believe that it is

certainly not sufficient for the purposes of your inquiry, you are not going to get strategists necessarily out of the PME.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. You have both stressed the role of the individual and all of us seek—or we reach conclusions as a result of our past experience or experiences, you through the military, and I through being a country trial lawyer, lo many years ago, and I realize that it is a combination, I think, of two things. I hope in your testimony you are not understating the role of education, because in looking back, and I suppose in the trial work that I did a good part of it was tort work, you needed to know evidence, the procedures of trial practice and the like, and you had to have a good, good foundation, which I felt I got in the University of Missouri School of Law. I didn't mean I was a trial lawyer when I walked out with my diploma. The people who were outstanding trial lawyers were those that spent Saturday afternoons, Sundays, reading closing arguments, reading from the archives the excellent cross-examinations and the like.

But that is all based on having a very good evidentiary knowledge, knowledge obtained only in a rigorous school of law. So I hope we don't have the wrong impression that someone on his own—the bright young lieutenant on his own evolves as this outstanding—

General GORMAN. Excuse me, sir. I wasn't trying to make that point. I just said he didn't do it out of professional military education. He got educated like you did at those trials.

Mr. SKELTON. The question before us: How do we take advantage of these schools to promote jointness, to promote those handful of Smiths and Gormans and Marshalls to give them the basic knowledge that they need and then to inspire them to achieve that ultimate, whatever it is, that indefinable thing known as a leading strategist? How do we do that? That is really what we are searching for. Comments?

General SMITH. If I gave you the impression I don't value education, I certainly didn't mean to convey that. I value professional military education very highly, and as I said at the beginning, I think there ought to be more of it. I myself would have more joint training earlier than most people. The fact that I went to West Point and served in the Air Force and the fact that we have a lot of naval officers from Annapolis that have served in the Air Force—we have seen the benefits of people going to one academy and serving in another service. That jointness is good, in the field and in the educational system. You asked what we need to do to put people in the right environment and give them rigorous training, but I think that development comes from the self discipline I talked about rather than from something forced on them.

I think that—there is a role for professional military education. The only point I was trying to make is it doesn't all come from schools, that you have to instill people and show the rewards in terms of important assignments from the education they get and give them an opportunity to demonstrate in assignments what they have learned.

I go back again to the term "creating." You were talking about strategists—I think all you can do is to set up a professional mili-

tary education system that exposes people to issues and makes them read into those issues. Of course, I rely more on history than a lot of people in that regard. I would give them an opportunity to think and to express their views and to say what they would do in certain situations. I don't think you can do much more than that, because I don't think strategists are necessarily taught to become strategists, I think they are exposed to issues and ideas, their mind develops, and they make use of the facts that they have.

General GORMAN. The question was: What can we do? I presume "we" was—

Mr. SKELTON. Was on this side of the table.

General GORMAN. Yes, sir. Title X U.S. Code charges the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff *inter alia* with responsibility for training. It seems to me training and education of officers is one of the more serious responsibilities that the Chiefs and the Chairman have on their plate, and my first bit of advice would be to demand of them an accounting of their stewardship in this respect.

The second point is that I would hope that we would not attempt from here to legislate curricula or procedures within the schools because of the aforementioned uncertainty as to which is the wisest path. Is George Marshall right or is Stan Turner right? I don't think we know for certain, but I think that one could ask, regardless of the particular curricular philosophy or approach, how many officers have been advantaged by these experiences, and what do you do with them after—are they putting their education to use? I think those are all proper questions for congressional oversight.

I think it is also extremely useful for you to lay down policy guidance on such issues as approaches to developing individuals capable of coping with notions of national strategy. But I submit that there still will be an important element in the education of officers that exists and will continue, has existed in the past and will continue to exist quite independent of the professional military education schooling system, and the Chiefs should be as accountable for that as they are for the former.

In short, what I am suggesting to you is that in addition to the particular subject of your inquiry, which goes right to the heart of the profession, there is another area which looks at "how well do we use joint operations for the purposes of training and educating the would-be strategists therein?" Do we really take advantage of those? I submit in many cases we do not. That is to say, operations occur, but after operations, critiques or learning exercises based on them are not as thorough as they might be. There may be a field of policy or inquiry to which you could devote yourselves there. I think that learning on the job in the military is as important a route to the development of strategists as is learning in schools. Both are important, both have their place.

I would further submit that since most of us, most of the time, are serving in units, training in units, education in units ought to be very much a concern for the chairman and the chiefs and, sir, this committee.

General SMITH. The interest in strategists—if you look at history and you look at military people in history, there have not been very many great strategists. Military people are primarily operators. They are given a task and they do that task.

Quite honestly, you can only stand so many strategists also.

Mr. SKELTON. All you need is one good one. We want to make him as good as we can.

General SMITH. I share that. That points out the complexities and difficulties of what we are trying to do. To develop an educational system that is designed to get the best for the most is quite different than trying to design a system that gets the best for the one.

I think the military education system ought to be designed to get the best out of most of officers and also create an environment in which a few will have a chance to grow and become strategists.

I think one has to draw the line carefully and not set the goals so high that we cannot achieve them.

Mr. SKELTON. We have had the opportunity to have folks such as you, retired gentlemen of four-star-rank, and we were wondering if, in the scheme of things, we might be better off in some of our war colleges to have an outstanding four-star person rather than pick someone who may or may not be an interested party or an educator.

Sometimes we are fearful of there being a mishap between a felon charge and the institutional institution. Of course, I have relied on advice from you and gentlemen such as you. It seems to me that somewhere along the line some retired people would make excellent commandants of such war colleges or schools.

I realize there are some problems with that which involve the law, et cetera.

Do you have any ideas along this line? It is a matter the committee has been wrestling with on an informal basis.

I know it is a tough question. I am not enlisting either one of you to be a commandant of a school tomorrow, but I think there is a serious question and I see some tremendous resources in a handful of people.

General SMITH. I would like to make two comments.

First, I do think that there are retired military people who have certain expertise and knowledge in an area that could be of assistance at some of the war colleges, both because they combine experience with knowledge, and because their experience makes it relevant to the audience. So I can see some role for that.

I must be consistent with my own thinking, however. When I was in the service and I was hoping that I would get promoted, the one thing I didn't like was senior officers who stayed on too long, or retired people taking jobs that should go to active duty officers who are more in touch with the world than are we retired officers.

So when you talk about being commandant or something like that, I am not sure that is the proper place for them. But to have some role in those institutions for a few people in certain subjects in certain areas, I think there is a lot of experience and knowledge that could be gained from that.

I think that part of it is a good idea.

General GORMAN. Mr. Chairman, when I was serving out at CIA, I had been propelled into an environment for which I had no previous training or education.

The way I learned about how that place worked and what my role in it ought to be, was by seeking out some of the older hands out there.

At the time, there was, in fact, a mechanism whereby Admiral Turner could bring back and maintain a kind of cadre of very senior people, retired military officers, former ambassadors, individuals who had been in positions to use the product of the intelligence community or who had dealt with the operations of the intelligence arms of the United States in overseas positions of significance.

The operations of the laws of the United States pertaining to compensation for retired officers have all but eliminated that resource out there. I worry about that.

I am giving this as an example of an analogous problem. I worry about that institution because you have a state of affairs now where individuals with military experience or operational experience are vanishing from the ranks out there and there is no mechanism in place to flavor the thought of the rising corps of managers.

Now, that state of affairs, it seems to me, is probably true throughout the Government. It would be a super idea in my view, to take better advantage of certain retired officers, not all, but some who would be particularly adept at holding down a chair of "whatever" at a military school.

They could make a real contribution. Not all retired four-stars would have the frame of mind that would lend itself readily to such a position, but many would. Many of them could be very, very helpful.

I think that experience of the National Defense University in bringing in senior officers as mentors for the so-called "Capstone" course over there is to the point.

But those are very brief encounters and the individuals on both sides are involved in an evanescent experience somewhat different from what you are proposing. I think it is an idea well worth pursuing.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Statistics tell us that people who attain a flag rank will spend the last third of their careers as a flag officer.

You mentioned Capstone a moment ago. Would they benefit more during that 10-plus-year period from more education than they are getting now? Do you have a Capstone course which is not long enough, doesn't teach the right things?

Should we have a continuation of the Capstone idea—so many weeks, a couple of weeks or 3 weeks in the school for these flag officers as they advance through the ranks until they reach their last year?

General SMITH. Capstone course? I am sure if Harry Train talked to you, he extolled it, and Russ Dougherty would have it go for a year.

I think it is too short. If you think you are going to educate people at that stage, if you hope to make big changes in them, I don't think that reflects a proper understanding of human nature.

Mr. SKELTON. Once they reach flag rank, does that mean they are uneducatable?

General SMITH. Well, they have had a lot of education up to that point. I think the advantage of the Capstone course is to meet contemporaries from other services and that gives them an idea of what they are dealing with and the issues they will be exposed to as flag officers. It gives them some contact with individuals who help in making national decisions when they come as speakers before the group.

All that is rather inspiring to new flag officers. They think, "I am going to be part of this." Some will and some won't be.

I think the 8 weeks or longer idea is useful. In terms of going beyond that, I am not sure what the value is.

I think you said should they come back periodically?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, for a couple of weeks every year or so?

General SMITH. I must say, I have not thought it through, but I am not sure I can see what the benefits would be from that.

Mr. SKELTON. One thing is just what you mentioned, an update on world situations as to how strategic thinking might or might not apply to what is happening in another area in which they are not now serving, but next year they may be in the heart of.

General SMITH. That is a good argument for it, if you did something like that and said this is an opportunity. Each of the services has some way of doing that.

You can do that from a joint perspective, assuming you can afford it.

I would think it might be useful if it were done correctly, the way you described, to give them insight into some issues and know what might affect their positions.

Mr. SKELTON. General Gorman?

General GORMAN. I have been doing more thinking about that than Bill has because I was in on the present Capstone program since its birth and have been following it and teaching in it since.

I have a very different perspective.

First, you are quite right. Most of the time in flag rank, one is operating well out beyond the parameters of the formal education system.

I went to the National War College, as Bill did, I think about midway in career, just about 16 or 17 years service or so, 16 or 17 in a 30-year career.

I would say every assignment I received as a general officer I was pushed into positions that were very different from what I thought I was going to be doing in the profession, and I am confident, very different from what the curricula designers back in those schools I went to thought I was going to be doing.

In fact, I can think of no position that I held as a general officer that I could specifically attribute curricular preparation any credit. The position the services find themselves in is no different than any other profession.

The profession is changing and changing dramatically. When General Eisenhower set up the Armed Forces Staff College he had in mind training offices for staff duty. But I think it is true that, valuable as that program is, the requirements of joint staff duty have changed so rapidly, referring to the technical procedures and referring to the circumstances of joint staff duty, and the demands upon officers in the several joint staffs have changed so dramati-

ly over time that the relevance of that program 10 years after graduation is virtually nil.

I am lead, therefore, to advocate, and I did at the time the original Capstone Program was considered, first of all, scrapping the name.

The name is an affront. It says that education has come to a stop. The name is a misnomer. It is not true in the first instance, and it should not be true in the second instance.

We should not have a capstone on training and education.

In the second place, there is value, as Bill says, in socialization, but not much.

There might be some value in training and current events, but I suspect you could probably do as well with a subscription to *Time* magazine or any other publication—I don't want to endorse that particular one.

Therefore, I would turn to a different model than schoolhouse training on a one-time shot. I would be looking for a program of continuing education.

Mr. SKELTON. All through their years?

General GORMAN. All through the years.

I would be looking for three things out of it.

First, I believe that flag officers are frequently put into positions where they need access to a store of information, whether that information pertains to laws or regulations over which they now are exercising responsibilities, which laws and regulations are changing constantly as you know.

Just look at what has been happening with the acquisition law and procedure in the material acquisition realm in the last several years.

Anybody who went to school, however good the school was 10 years ago, is not prepared to be a senior officer or managing officer in the DOD today.

He could get his training out of his own staff apparatus. But it would be useful in the interest of standardization, and the interest of providing the best available material to him, to have a central resource available for those purposes.

So I would like to see the National Defense University or some competent institution tasked to service the needs of these flag officers.

I could also see some real advantage in a regular mechanism for informing officers of important issues or significant changes, sort of putting them on notice that they need to keep updated against future assignments in a field in which they might be required to exercise responsibility.

Bill mentioned reading. Just keeping up with reading in one's profession these days is a tough job. Time is crucial. Reading lists and those kinds of things would be helpful.

The way I characterized an education program, it would go something like this: You bring in officers. You socialize them. You identify them as peer groups, or whatever. Then you equip them with a communication means, and I would use today telephone-connected computers, and give them access to learn a resource of the sort that I sort of sketched in my previous remarks.

I would then send them forth to their job, but I would keep in communication with them and permit them to keep in communication with each other.

I would bring them back periodically for resocialization or reinvigoration or reacquainting with the resources of the central institution.

I think you could make the National Defense University the Armed Forces Staff College, if you will, or any other adjunct of the school system, far more relevant in the officer's career by using modern communication means.

We are rapidly coming to an area where the use of computers for such purposes will be very familiar to the officers.

They will be very comfortable with it. That is not the way now, but it will be in the future and we ought to take advantage of it.

General SMITH. When we taught at West Point, I spent months of my time trying to learn the subject matter and General Gorman said we have to provide visual aids to the officers. This debate continues. He believes much more in gadgets than I do.

General GORMAN. Communications are not gadgets. We are in an area where American business is learning more and more that the preparation of executives for senior responsibilities requires the use of techniques such as I described.

My old-fashioned general friend to the right is probably ineducatable in such matters.

Mr. SKELTON. I am not going to get involved.

General Gorman, do you want to discuss what consolidations you would make in the schools? You referred to this a few moments ago.

General GORMAN. There ought to be a lot of value in collating schools with other forms of military activities. For example, if one were to take advantage of the location of the infantry school for the purpose of training the folks who are there, it is helpful to have the infantry school on the same post as a basic training undertaking.

Mr. SKELTON. I mentioned that concept on June 4, when we raised the engineering flag at Fort Leonard Wood in my district. The engineering school is leaving Fort Belvoir, VA and will be with the rest of the engineering training at Fort Leonard Wood, MO.

General GORMAN. I have been after that since 1973.

Mr. SKELTON. Bless your heart. It is going to happen on June 1. I will be there to say, hurrah.

General GORMAN. That is right. I don't know why it is not a good idea to put the young engineer out there, cheek-by-jowl, with the young privates who are going through basic training.

Mr. SKELTON. Exactly.

Please proceed, I did not mean to interrupt it.

General GORMAN. That is the point I was driving at. I would argue that that kind of architecture would be something we ought to be looking for throughout the Army.

I don't understand, moreover, why we have to have bits and pieces of comparable undertakings, like the intelligence school, strewn around the United States.

Why didn't we bring them together? Why does one branch have to be off by itself?

I think the reasons for that have to do with Army parochialism, and, to put it bluntly, pork barreling outside the Army. Over the years we have gotten ourselves into a lot of unnecessary expense from bad habits.

I think the model of the Air Force in bringing together at Maxwell Air Force Base several echelons of military training—

Mr. SKELTON. Three, to be exact.

General GORMAN. That is one the Army might usefully have leapt upon. Fort Leavenworth was selected because it was a convenient place to bring together elements of the Indian fighting army.

Today it doesn't have much relevant sense. It gets bigger and bigger. I wish they had some soldiers to look at out there.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Pickett?

Mr. PICKETT. No questions.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Barrett?

Mr. BARRETT. I would ask that you respond to a few comments I would like to make.

As you were testifying, General Smith, you indicated how schools might help in developing officers and knowledge of their own services and then of other services. You indicated they might be helpful in those respects.

As you testified I jotted down a question.

Are the schools irrelevant to what you gentlemen use the school's output for?

I think in your testimony you undervalued, or it seems to me you undervalued the possible contributions of education, because it seems to me you said, in effect, it was irrelevant to joint assignments.

You were both CINC's, or at that level. If not irrelevant, it had slight relevance to the educational growth of most officers. It was almost like you read two different philosophies of education.

Some businesses like to take liberal arts majors and train them, but most businesses would not do that. If you talk to a chief of staff at a hospital, I would not say it didn't matter whether his doctors had been to medical school.

I would ask you to comment on that, and also on a second point.

If education is irrelevant the way it is, would it not help if you as CINC's took an evaluation of what you needed of the education system so it could become more relevant of the officers who finally become your staff officers.

I would also like to comment on the tenor of your remarks on, "Don't have this panel change professional military education."

We have found real problems out there. We have found difficulties in faculty quality in different schools. Difficulties in the quality of the students. Differences in the way military personnel systems in the various services handle the students as they come out of the schools.

Now, if we trust the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or the Chairman, that is fine. But we need to know what they are doing and how some judgments as to what they should be doing are made, and we must have some oversight.

I don't think you have given me any feeling that the problems we have found will be corrected.

General SMITH. I don't think you understand. I think you expect too much of what you are going to do in schools. If I were trying to get something across, it was to disabuse you of what would occur in formal schools.

As much schooling as I have had, I certainly have great faith in it. But I don't believe it is the single factor that makes successful officers.

Mr. BARRETT. I don't know anybody in this panel, or in this room, who would think that.

General SMITH. What you want is a cause and effect. You want us to say because somebody has been to this school, I can see this result. I don't think things are quite that simple in this life. Things are more complicated than that. It is not that I am opposed to education. I just don't think that this committee trying to restructure what the military is doing in terms of education, that you are going to deal with the problems that you want to deal with as satisfactorily as you think you will.

Do you think you are not going to find differences after all the legislation that you pass? People are different. They operate under different circumstances.

I think you ought to accept there will be differences. I think you are right in trying to make good use of the people.

You ought to talk to the Chairman and tell him what you think should be done and let him do it. I think your view is that you are going to have an uniform set of officers after they go through professional military education. I don't think you can do it. If you did, I think it would be a mistake.

I favor very much military education. I would like to see more of it sooner. The fact that I cannot say as a CINC I can tell just by the way someone walked in the door whether he had been to the Army War College or the Naval War College—no.

We expect the senior people have had a lot of military professional education. We take that for granted. We don't look for those distinctions.

I see the individual characteristics of people and not necessarily where their military professional education shows through.

I think you are advocating standards that are too high. I think you should strive for policies which see that officers are given education and are exposed to matters they will have to deal with later in their career, but I don't think you can set up standards by which you can deal with them later. I think that is much too difficult a task to take on.

General GORMAN. The question of "undervaluing" should not arise with either of us. I have spent many years up here in my career arguing for resources for the Army school system.

I am a strong believer in professional military education. I will take second place to no one for my support of professional military education.

I would say, don't overvalue. I am taking the same point as Bill. We have a good system, but we should not expect it to do everything.

There is another sphere out there. It goes to the Chairman's question to me, "what should we do about it?" Well, one of the things we, you guys on that side, need to do is recognize there is a

lot going on in terms of education that is not encompassed within PME.

As Bill says, the Chairman ought to be held responsible for both.

Second, it certainly is true that officers need a grounding in their professional fundamentals. I am not sure, though, that I know of any group or individuals who can surely characterize what those fundamentals are.

The military professions are not analogous to the profession of medicine. One cannot start with Gray's Anatomy and go on and describe other specific disciplines relating to how the human body operates.

We are talking about an amorphous and artful undertaking. In our profession we are deprived of the value of precedent, which is such a sound basis for proceeding in the legal professional.

As you know better than most, we are dealing with, as Bill points out, history, and yes, history is important.

But you and I know that most military history is bosh. The record of past battle is very poor, dubiously relevant to modern battle, and deserves very critical application in the guiding of young for future undertakings.

Like most senior officers, I tend to put a lot of emphasis in my own thinking about training and education on what is called, in other spheres of education, the case method. But in our profession, just understanding what happens in a given case is very difficult at best.

Perhaps the greatest value is the notion advanced by the Chairman of bringing to bear on curricula undertakings by well-experienced officers is precisely that it could lend verisimilitude to the case under discussion.

The examples most moving seem to occur in the operational force, and taking advantage of those for instructional purposes is not well down now. Rather than spending a lot of time and energy on worrying about quality of faculty from one school to another, which is a legitimate concern, believe me, I endorse your views on the problems out there. I am confident that they are there.

They have been there for many years. They certainly deserve to be solved.

But if the end purpose of all of this is to equip the Nation with leaders who are capable of dealing with strategic level thinking, whether they be staff or commanders or whether they be the George Marshalls of the future, that takes a broader attack on the institution than just operating on only the schools.

General SMITH. I was asked to talk about the contributions of professional military education to jointness and developing strategies. The key word is contributions, one contribution out of many.

Paul and I are saying that it is an important contribution, and one we should do better at. We applaud your efforts to establish policy to do that, but it is only a contribution.

I am always wary of single-factor analyses. If we had the best education system in the world, that would not guarantee we have the best officer corps in the world.

There are other things involved. We are trying to put these things in perspective.

Mr. SKELTON. Gentlemen, I am most appreciative. We apologize for the conflict with the other committee to which I must rush now.

You have been extremely helpful. Needless to say, your past careers have been an inspiration to so many.

We are thankful that you shared your thoughts with us today. With that we will adjourn.

[Whereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the hearing adjourned.]