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HEARINGS

Before the

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY

FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

TO BE RETURNED TO THE SENATE
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FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY
FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS

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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 28, 1987

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U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in Room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Sam Nunn [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Senators Sam Nunn [presiding], John C. Stennis, J. James Exon, Edward M. Kennedy, Jeff Bingaman, Alan J. Dixon, Timothy E. Wirth, John W. Warner, Strom Thurmond, Gordon J. Humphrey, William S. Cohen, Pete Wilson, Steven D. Symms, and John McCain.

Also Present: Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director; Carl M. Smith, Staff Director for the Minority; Romie L. Brownlee, Deputy Minority Staff Director; Patrick A. Tucker, Minority Counsel; Professional Staff Members: Judith A. Freedman, George K. Johnsen, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, Gordon G. Riggle, and Mark B. Robinson; Kathleen L. McGuire, Staff Assistant; Committee Members' Assistants: Jeffrey B. Subko, Asst. to Sen. Exon; Gregory B. Craig, Asst. to Sen.

1 Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, Asst. to Sen. Dixon; Milton D.
2 Beach, Asst. to Sen. Glenn; Jeffrey Hyche, Asst. to Sen.
3 Shelby; James M. Bodner, Asst. to Sen. Cohen; Haney D.
4 Sokolski, Asst. to Sen. Quayle; Samuel J. Routson, Asst. to
5 Sen. Symms; Lorren Kramer, Asst. to Sen. McCain; and Bill
6 White, Asst. to Sen. Warner.

7 The Chairman: The Committee will come to order.

8 The Committee meets this morning for the eleventh hearing
9 on U.S. national security strategy and its military strategy
10 component. The focus of this hearing is U.S. strategy for
11 low intensity conflicts.

12 The Committee is fortunate to have General Paul F.
13 Gorman, United States Army (Retired), as the witness this
14 morning. General Gorman is well known to this Committee. He
15 has had a very distinguished military career, serving in his
16 final assignment as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern
17 Command.

18 Since his retirement, General Gorman has served as a key
19 member of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
20 Management, known as the Packard Commission. At present,
21 General Gorman chairs the Regional Conflict Working Group of
22 the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. I might add
23 that he was also very helpful to our Committee last year in
24 our deliberations on the Defense Reorganization bill.

25 On behalf of the Committee, I extend a warm welcome to

1 General Gorman this morning. We know you have come a long
2 way, and we have tread over a very difficult battlefield out
3 there the last two-and-a-half hours, I am sure, from
4 Charlottesville. We appreciate your appearance today, and we
5 look forward to your testimony.

6 It is instructive that in the ten preceding strategy
7 hearings low intensity conflict has not been mentioned very
8 prominently. The testimony has focused almost exclusively on
9 nuclear deterrence or fighting the Soviets in a big war.
10 This raises the question of whether the U.S. places, whether
11 our military establishment, and whether any of us place
12 sufficient emphasis on the training, the organization,
13 planning, and preparing for low intensity conflicts.

14 Congress has been giving this subject a great deal of
15 attention in the last year, year-and-a-half, two years, and I
16 think our interest in it is going to continue. Senator Cohen
17 has been particularly a leader in this on this Committee, and
18 I know that he is looking forward to this this morning and
19 will be back in a few minutes.

20 The U.S. military appears to view low intensity conflicts
21 as a lesser included case of major conventional warfare.
22 This orientation may be based on the belief that if we can
23 fight the Soviets we can handle any less demanding scenario.
24 This point of view needs to be rigorously examined during
25 this hearing.

1 Is that the correct point of view? Beyond this issue,
2 there are numerous other fundamental questions concerning low
3 intensity conflict. There are questions of terminology.
4 What do we mean by "low intensity conflict"? There are
5 questions about Vietnam. What did we learn from that
6 conflict? Are those lessons accurately reflected in the six
7 conditions that Secretary Weinberger has prescribed for
8 future U.S. involvement in low intensity conflict?

9 There are questions about vital U.S. interests. Do low
10 intensity conflicts threaten the United States? Is American
11 involvement in such conflicts essential? These are only a
12 few of the questions we will be exploring this morning.

13 Beyond low intensity conflict subjects, the Committee
14 would also like to hear General Gorman's view on the quality
15 of strategy making in the Department of Defense. The Packard
16 Commission was critical of U.S. strategic planning. The
17 Committee would appreciate a fuller explanation from General
18 Gorman of the Commission's concerns:

19 Senator Warner.

20 Senator Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

21 I would join in welcoming our witness, and am prompt to
22 say that whatever delay he incurred this morning was as a
23 consequence of after he crossed the line into the District of
24 Columbia, not the roads in Virginia.

25 [Laughter]

1 The Chairman: I heard him say "inside the Beltway." I
2 probably misunderstood.

3 [Laughter]

4 [The opening statement of Senator Dixon follows:]

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The Chairman: General Gorman, why do you not lead off.
We will hear your testimony, and then go to questions.

1 STATEMENT OF GENERAL PAUL F. GORMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY
2 (RETIRED), CHAIRMAN, REGIONAL CONFLICT WORKING GROUP,
3 COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY.

4 General Gorman: I have provided the Committee, Senator
5 Nunn, a fairly extensive statement, so I am not going to take
6 up much time at the outset. I apologize for the length of
7 that statement. That is what comes from being snowed in in
8 Nelson County, Senator Warner.

9 [Laughter]

10 [General Gorman: I would like to make four--]

11 The Chairman: You take whatever time you need this
12 morning, because you are our witness. You are our main
13 witness.

14 General Gorman: I would like to make four points by way
15 of beginning.

16 First of all, in answer to your query of whether this is
17 a lesser included case of dealing with the Soviets, it is
18 important to realize that many of the difficulties that the
19 government today considers under the rubric of low intensity
20 conflict proceed from causes and sources that the Kremlin
21 does not control, and of which the Kremlin may in fact be
22 from time to time as unaware of and as surprised as we.

23 The fact of the matter is that the United States faces a
24 range of difficulties over the years to come for generations
25 arising out of local and regional causes, economic causes,

1 demographic causes, social mutations of one kind or another
2 that may present opportunities for the Kremlin, may offer
3 them chances that they would otherwise be denied but which
4 are in no sense their doing or under their control.

5 Having said that, I need to add the point that while ^{it is true} the
6 Soviets are very much a one-note society, as some of your
7 earlier commentators have pointed out, (they are very good at
8 producing large military machines), ^{the} bad news is that they
9 are getting better in their approaches to the third world.
10 They have made many mistakes there, particularly in the
11 Middle East, but of late their policy is showing an
12 adroitness that has surprised many commentators.

13 The Soviets do in fact learn from their mistakes. One
14 thing that they do much better than the United States of
15 America is mobilize their allies. Call them proxies, call
16 them fraternal nations, call them ^{clients} allies, but the fact of the
17 matter is that all over the third world there are East
18 Germans, Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, and others doing the
19 bidding of the Kremlin, and doing so fairly effectively.

20 With respect to your question on definition, what I mean
21 by "low intensity conflict," which may not be what the
22 government means, is that genre of problem which sweeps
23 across the range of violence from sabotage for political
24 purposes, to terrorism--the use of violence for political
25 purposes directed against persons ⁻⁻ to the sort of

1 paramilitary narco trafficking that you see ^{among} [in] the cocaine
2 traders of this hemisphere, to include guerilla warfare,
3 insurgency, the sort of phenomena that afflicts most of the
4 nations in the third world today and will inflict them
5 increasingly in the future.

6 Part and parcel of this entire skein of problems is the
7 systematic training and equipping that the individuals who,
8 for whatever reasons, want to associate themselves with this
9 violence receive from the proponents of such violence. That
10 includes the Soviet Union. It includes the radical Arabs in
11 the Middle East. It includes the Cubans. Suffice to say
12 that anyone who for whatever reasons, for whatever ambitions,
13 for whatever misguided reasons may wish to perpetrate
14 violence for political purposes, [he] can receive a high degree
15 of professional training. And indeed it is clear that in most
16 cases where governments have attempted to come to grips with
17 this sort of violence, the opposition is better trained,
18 better equipped, more resourceful, more maneuverable than the
19 government forces.

20 Well, this then brings us to the fundamental issue: What
21 should the United States do about this? Now every President
22 since President Nixon has espoused an approach to the third
23 world which says fundamentally, we will help those who are
24 willing to help themselves. We will help those who are
25 prepared to defend themselves. The problem before us today,

1 and the problem I submit that will be before this country for
2 the foreseeable future is how to be useful to countries that
3 are attempting to come to grips with this sort of violence.

4 Now the instruments that are available to the President
5 of the United States, or indeed to the Congress, are not very
6 well suited for the ^{sort} [skein] of problems that I have just
7 described. Certainly the traditional military establishment
8 of the United States is maladroit in coming to grips with any
9 of the sorts of difficulties ^{of} [to] which I have made mention.
10 And albeit exceptionally well equipped, very well trained,
11 and very well motivated, our forces frequently cannot
12 position themselves where they can be put to good effect, for
13 lack of intelligence, for lack of political access, or for
14 simple inability to get there in time to be of use.

15 So we go back to the fundamental premise of the strategy
16 that the United States embarked on now 17 years ago. How can
17 we help others better to face this sort of threat? The
18 security assistance program of the United States, I submit,
19 is no better answer than our traditional military
20 establishment. In fact, this country is becoming
21 increasingly irrelevant to the countries of the third world.
22 I suggest to you on this Committee and your colleagues in the
23 Congress as a whole, one of the problems to which you should
24 turn your attention most urgently, as you think through
25 American responses to this sort of ^{challenge,} [business] is how to make

1 the security assistance program of the United States more
2 relevant.

3 Finally, I want to make the point that in dealing with
4 these problems, the critical commodity is intelligence. We
5 cannot devise an adequate strategy, we cannot use our
6 resources in time and with good effect, unless we have a much
7 better understanding of what the opposition is up to, and how
8 best to come to grips with it.

9 We have been caught out time and again by the
10 perpetrators of violence in the third world for the simple
11 reason that most of our intelligence community is directed
12 against the Soviet Union. We are very good Soviet watchers.
13 We are very poor watchers of Colombians, or Iranians, or
14 anyone else, for that matter, in the third world. We have
15 got to get a lot better if we are to be forearmed and are
16 able to take effective preemptive action, or better to assist
17 an ally to take such action.

18 Intelligence is a strategic commodity in a sense. It is
19 probably the sort of assistance that the United States can be
20 most useful with--not military equipment, not helicopters,
21 not guns, not ordnance, but intelligence. We are very good
22 at that. If we could but direct our resources to the
23 problem, I am convinced that we could get much better, and we
24 could become much better in a hurry.

25 With that, sir, I would invite your questions.

1 The Chairman: You know, your testimony is so good, I am
2 just trying to think of how we can get it here for all of
3 us--all of us will of course read it, but I just wonder if
4 you could not start about page 10 where you address the
5 changes in law and at least go through that.

6 General Gorman: All right, sir. I would be glad to.

7 The basis for this paper is really the lesson I learned
8 from one of my mentors, General Andy Goodpast^{er}ure] who taught
9 me that ^{lesson} long ago when we were sitting in Paris trying to
10 puzzle through the next moves of the North Vietnamese during
11 the Peace Talks of 1968. General Goodpast^{er}ure] taught me that
12 the national strategy is really the answer to three
13 questions:

14 What is it that you want to have happen?

15 How do you go about doing it?

16 And what are you going to do it with?

17 If you can answer those three questions in terms that the
18 ordinary American can understand, you have got a national
19 strategy. If you cannot, you do not.

20 Now this paper attempts to talk to this issue of low
21 intensity conflict in those terms. There was passed in the
22 last session of Congress, thanks to the leadership of this
23 Committee in no small part, a law which addressed itself to
24 low intensity conflict. It was a bill that dealt with
25 Special Operations Forces and low intensity conflict.

1 I think that the bill gave a much-needed boost to Special
2 Operations Forces. There is no questions about that. But if
3 you had asked me before that bill was passed what I thought
4 of it, I would have said something to the effect that the
5 last thing the United States needs at this juncture is
6 another Assistant Secretary of Defense. Maybe the next
7 lowest priority is yet one more unified command. I think we
8 could do with fewer of both. ^{The issues addressed are} And [that is a] problems, Senator
9 Nunn, that I would have put to the Chairman of the Joint
10 Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense and said, fix
11 it. Then if they did not, hold them accountable.

12 I think that the sorts of discussions that we had back
13 during the consideration of the ~~Nichols~~^{Goldwater} bill bears
14 directly on this [sort of a] proposition. The Secretary of
15 Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, certainly under
16 that legislation, have all the authority they need to deal
17 with a problem like readiness of Special Operations Forces,
18 and it ought to have been very possible to address this
19 without the legislation.

20 Nonetheless, as I say, ^{the} legislation did do a good deal for
21 Special Operations Forces. It gave them a prominence, a
22 visibility, a budget structure, a way of addressing resources
23 that they have never had before, and I suspect that the
24 Nation will be well served. But the responsibilities of this
25 Assistant Secretary for Low Intensity Conflict are quite a

1 different sort of consideration.

2 In the first place, that Assistant Secretary is going to
 3 discover that his responsibilities for low intensity conflict
 4 overlap virtually every one of the responsibilities of his
 5 colleagues on the Secretary of Defense's staff. Moreover, he
 6 is going to discover that there is virtually nothing that can
 7 be done under the rubric of low intensity conflict without
 8 involving the Department of State. And if the sort of
 9 business that we are talking about bridges, as they usually
 10 do, international borders into the United States, ^{involved also are} the
 11 Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration,
 12 ^{The Customs Service, The Coast Guard} and a range of other governmental agencies well outside of
 13 the traditional national security community.

14 So this Assistant Secretary in his role as the proponent
 15 for low intensity conflict in the Department of Defense has a
 16 very tough row to hoe. Now I applaud the provision of the
 17 law which directs that there be designated someone in the
 18 White House in the National Security Council staff to concern
 19 himself with the phenomena full-time, and I think that the
 20 establishment of a board or a committee at the National
 21 Security Council to overwatch these matters is also sound.

22 Clearly this is not a matter that can be addressed by the
 23 Department of Defense exclusively, or indeed optimally. This
 24 is a governmental problem. In the foreign country of
 25 interest, it is the ambassador's charge, and the ambassador

1 does or should report to the Secretary of State on all of his
2 various undertakings.

3 The military is definitely in a supporting role, and that
4 makes it very difficult for the Department of Defense to
5 address itself to the range of difficulties that emerge under
6 the rubric of low intensity conflict.

7 One other point on this issue: The law has confused
8 some, I know from my conversations with them, to believe from
9 its title that Special Operations Forces are the answer to
10 low intensity conflict. They are not. In many respects,
11 they are the most useful kind of force for dealing with some
12 kinds of low intensity conflict. But ^{Special Operations Forces} [they] have missions
13 across the spectrum of war, and most of the force structure
14 and most of the equipment that we have purchased for Special
15 Operations Forces were [bought] for the sorts of contingencies
16 for which the rest of the force structure was brought into
17 being--that is to say, a major war against the Soviet Union.

18 Special Operations Forces in fact are not the answer to
19 the intelligence problem to which I earlier alluded, and they
20 are only a partial answer to the security assistance
21 difficulties to which I made reference. They can be
22 extraordinarily useful in both respects, but telling off
23 large numbers of our Special Operations Forces for the
24 purposes of training foreign forces, assisting
25 communications, or gathering intelligence is not a good use

1 of a rare strategic resource.

2 It is interesting to me to note that although the Soviets
3 in their single-minded devotion to building a massive
4 military machine has put a lot of emphasis on this sort of
5 force, the ^{Speznaz} SPNAS, or Special Operations Forces, ^{one} [You] rarely
6 see^s or hear^s of their being employed in third world nations.
7 Afghanistan, of course, ^{is} the specific exception.

8 I think a way of dramatizing that point is to note that
9 most of the Soviets [most of the Russians] in Nicaragua are in
10 the military hospital at Chinandega. One of the first things
11 the Soviet Union did when it moved into Nicaragua after the
12 revolution was to put up a military hospital.

13 When a Sandanista soldier falls in battle wounded, he is
14 evacuated to ^{that} a Soviet ^{Field} hospital, and if the treatment there
15 cannot solve his problem, he is evacuated to East Europe by
16 air through an evacuation chain that in every case puts him
17 under the care of the best medical authorities that the
18 Soviet Eastern Bloc nations can command.

19 The Soviets, you see, are sensitive to the Nicaraguan
20 antipathy to foreigners, and to the notions of ^{threatening} some sort of
21 new imperialism, and have ^{therefore} presented themselves to the
22 Nicaraguan people as benefactors. This political use of
23 military medicine I believe that the United States should
24 look at very carefully as one of the ways that we could make
25 ourselves very relevant and very useful in the third world,

1 and ^{as} a form of competition with the Soviets in which we
 2 clearly would have the upper hand.

3 The paper here goes into the questions of definitions at
 4 some length, Senator. The fundamental point on definitions,
 5 however, is that whatever you call it, whether you want to
 6 avoid the definition all together and just use terms like
 7 "terrorism," "sabotage," "insurgency," or whether you need a
 8 more embracive ^S term for the purposes of devising a national
 9 policy, it is important to understand that when the United
 10 States commits its armed forces to combat anywhere, you have
 11 transformed the war or the event. [and] I doubt if there were
 12 any large-scale commitment of ^{US} forces we would be in what
 13 anybody would regard as low intensity operations for very
 14 long.

15 I can see, ^{in low intensity conflict} [obviously] as we have discussed here before,
 16 the commitment of a team from the Joint Special Operations
 17 Command for the express purposes of a surgical strike to
 18 rescue a hostage, or some similar raid. But if we are talking
 19 about the commitment of American infantry or American marines
 20 anywhere in the world, I submit we are outside of what I
 21 would refer to as low intensity conflict.

22 If we are not at the time we go in, we shortly will be
 23 because of the propensity of our commanders to use whatever
 24 means are at their disposal to ^{provide security for their troops, and to} deal with the situation in
 25 front of them. Thus, Vietnam, ^{the war in Southeast Asia,} ^{was} [is]

1 not, as I would define it, low intensity conflict. I was
2 using B-52s for fire support out there, and that sure as hell
3 is not very low intensity conflict when you are out in the
4 jungle under those MARK-82s raining down.

5 In any event, whether I am right or those who would sweep
6 into ^{low intensity conflict} [it with] the use of U.S. forces are right, it is crucial
7 to grasp that you cannot advertise every new force structure
8 fad as an answer to low intensity conflict. I am
9 specifically critical of the propensity among my Army
10 colleagues to refer to the Light Infantry Division as the
11 answer to low intensity conflict. It is not. The Light
12 Infantry Division was designed to fit in an express number of
13 C-141s for strategic mobility purposes, and it is in fact a
14 division that is very poorly structured to deal with a
15 situation such as another, God forbid, Southeast Asia kind of
16 contingency. It does not have the mobility, the staying
17 power to cope with that kind of a situation. We have better
18 force structure answers, for example in the 101st Air Mobile
19 Division.

20 In any event, I go back to my point that committing
21 American infantry is not, in my view, the way to deal with
22 low intensity conflict. You start with intelligence. You
23 start with your security assistance program. You do that
24 right, you will not have to use your forces ^{in combat} except, as I say,
25 for the occasional Special Operations Forces team.

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Over to you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Gorman follows:]

1 The Chairman: Thank you very much, General Gorman.

2 I am going to yield my time, or maybe I will take his
3 place when it comes, to Senator Cohen since he has been a
4 real leader in this area, and I know he would like to get
5 right into some of the questions regarding the Gorman
6 testimony, so I yield my time. We will go by the six-minute
7 rule.

8 Senator Cohen: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

9 I appreciate, General, your testimony. I am glad I did
10 not call upon you to give reasons for not creating the new
11 legislation that we adopted last year, because we had a tough
12 enough time in dealing with the Pentagon to even discuss the
13 matter I think in a rational way.

14 General Gorman: You may have been in one of those
15 situations where your sole recourse was just to hit them
16 alongside the ear and see what happened.

17 Senator Cohen: Well, frankly, I must tell you that it
18 was my intention, and I believe Senator Nunn's at that time,
19 to simply use the proposed legislation as a prod to see if
20 the Department of Defense would not undertake to do the kind
21 of reforms, or take the initiatives that we thought were
22 necessary. And what was a turning point, at least in my
23 judgment, was it came to the revelations about some of the
24 things that took place during the Granada operation and the
25 kind of conflicts, and rivalries, and planning and

1 misplanning that took place that contributed to some of our
2 losses during that particular operation which persuaded me
3 that, rather than simply being advisory, we ought to make it
4 mandatory.

5 So we started out as a prod with that in mind, but it
6 quickly evolved into something that was much more important
7 in terms of seeing some action. I bring this up, because I
8 think you used the words, "The traditional military
9 establishment's reluctance to come to grips with low
10 intensity conflict." That is what we ran into, and we had a
11 DOD report last year which essentially concluded the same
12 thing.

13 "Our current defense posture reflects our inability to
14 understand the form and substance of the direct challenge to
15 our interests. Our lack of understanding is manifested in a
16 lack of unity of effort by doctrine, training, organization,
17 or material to execute operations, and a lack of a sustaining
18 support system. Short of war, we have no strategy or
19 comprehensive plan to address the challenge of political
20 violence."

21 So we kept coming into contact with statements coming
22 out, fairly authoritative, that we are ill prepared to cope
23 with the most likely types of challenges that we face in the
24 coming decade, and nothing we seem to say or do was going to
25 move the bureaucracy as such to come to grips with it. I had

1 asked you, for example, what do you suggest are the reasons
 2 for the inability to deal with low intensity conflict which
 3 everybody from Secretary Shultz, Kissinger, Kirkpatrick, on
 4 down recognizes that this is the type of conflict that is
 5 most likely that we are ill prepared to deal with?

6 General Gorman: ^{e @} Granada is a poor example, in my view,
 7 of low intensity conflict, but it gets sort of into that
 8 definitional area that we were talking about.

9 Let us stand back for a moment and take a look at where
 10 we were with that operation. First of all, I was a
 11 supporting commander. I happened to be in Washington while
 12 the planning was underway, so I was able to follow it fairly
 13 closely. My contributions were to send a couple of AC-130s
 14 over to help the Atlantic Command. Now you may recall that
 15 in one of ^{their} [those] rare bursts of strategic clarity the JCS
 16 removed the Caribbean ^{Islands} from the purview of my predecessor,
 17 ^{USCINCSO,} [USCINC-SOUTH] and, but for that stroke of genius, I would have
 18 been in command of ^{Grenada} [it] and far more responsible for the
 19 outcome. Irresponsible onlooker that I am, I would comment
 20 that here was a case that we clearly should have foreseen.

21 I mean, this damn pot had been boiling for years--months,
 22 certainly.

23 The Chairman: The President of the United States had
 24 been on television--we will not take this out of Senator
 25 Cohen's time--identifying that air field on national

1 television as a threat.

2 General Gorman: Sure. And we had a command established,
3 a joint headquarters established in Key West Florida in 1979,
4 you will recall when Senator Church discovered the presence
5 of the Soviets in Cuba, We ended up with yet one more unified
6 command headquarters down there with express responsibility
7 for commanding and controlling contingency operations on the
8 Caribbean Islands. Yet, when we came to the point of having
9 to commit forces, we were foundering, looking for maps,
10 trying to get together some kind of a command structure that
11 made sense, and ultimately ended up using the Second Fleet
12 Commander.

13 Now given the time deadlines under which everything was
14 moving, that may have been the best we ^{could} [can] do, but it does
15 seem to me that you can fault the whole mechanism for lack of
16 presⁱence. You should have seen that problem coming. In my
17 view, for example, having dealt with a number of comparable
18 sorts of contingencies while I was commander, the United
19 States should have ^{put} [had] at the disposal of the President not
20 only a plan and all of the supporting intelligence for a
21 plan, but a rehearsed force.

22 I cannot emphasize enough the criticality of actually
23 going out and running rehearsals. You do not need to do this
24 in any kind of showy way. Senator Thurmond may know that
25 there were some curious maneuvers on some of the military

1 posts in his jurisdiction some years ago. Those were
2 rehearsals for contingency plans in my command. I ^{also} believe
3 that a unified commander worried about an upcoming problem in
4 low intensity conflict has got to start with the intelligence
5 base, build that, and keep building it; focus a lot of
6 tactical intelligence on the whole area, so that when
7 somebody up here decides, as they will from time to time,
8 usually when the CINC is out of theater and in Vermont skiing
9 ^{at Christmas time} [in the wintertime], or something like that, [and that is an
10 actual case], they will decide that [hey,] we want to implement
11 that plan.

12 You ^{then} do not need to do the sort of scrambling that took
13 place here in town on the eve of ^{e.g.} Granada.

14 Senator Cohen: ^{e.g.} Granada may be a poor example of low
15 intensity conflict, but I think the use of the Special Forces
16 in that case was also a poor use of the Special Forces that
17 we had, subjecting them to a risk that they need not have
18 been exposed to.

19 General Gorman: Granted.

20 Senator Cohen: May I just switch for a minute. My time
21 is running out. We talked about the deficiencies and how the
22 Soviets do in fact learn from mistakes and how they approach
23 it in terms of getting assistance that is significant, not
24 only symbolic but significant, to their allies in the
25 countries that they support.

1 What about El Salvador? We have had a measure of success
2 in how we have dealt with El Salvador, and as no small result
3 of your own actions in advising in that regard, but there as
4 I understand it you have special forces people who have
5 really agreed with the Congressional limitation of no more
6 than 50. Congress was concerned for a different reason, of
7 committing a large number of troops, letting the Army perhaps
8 do what it likes to do best, and that is to build up an
9 infrastructure and really gear up for some type of war, but
10 Congress said, no, you have 50 and that is all you are going
11 to deal with, and the special forces people I think at that
12 point thanked us for doing the right thing. This is their
13 war, not ours. If we want to lend assistance, advice, some
14 training, but basically not to become involved.

15 The biggest problem I saw when I was there back in 1983,
16 to contrast that to the Soviet experience, they did not have,
17 the Salvadorans did not have any helicopters to get their
18 wounded out of the jungle. They would die almost within a
19 few hours. They needed helicopters. They needed that kind
20 of military assistance. So the fact is that Congress was a
21 little bit ahead, I think, of the military establishment in
22 terms of limiting our involvement.

23 Would you just comment on the seeming success of El
24 Salvador so far?

25 General Gorman: Well, on the issue of 55, it is an

1 irrational number. It did not make any sense at the time
2 that it was whomped up--

3 Senator Cohen: It was political.

4 General Gorman: It was a political number. And [I would
5 have much preferred] as the Commander in Chief--I took over
6 in May of 1983, as you will recall--I would have much
7 preferred simply to have gotten some guidance to do it with
8 minimum force. Sometimes the answer might have been 32. The
9 next Thursday it might have been 74. I have absolutely no
10 problem at all with the idea that we had to do it with
11 minimum presence.

12 That gets right directly to what is it that you are
13 trying to do? We certainly did not want the Salvadorans to
14 assume, as they were prone to, that if they screwed it up
15 enough we would come in and rescue them. One of the first
16 things that I got across to my colleagues in the Salvadoran
17 armed forces was that there was not going to be any rescue
18 operation. They were going to sink or swim on their own.

19 And I must say that it was helpful to me in that respect
20 to have a Congressional set of positions expressed in various
21 laws and budgetary allocations which made it very evident. ^{that I spoke for you}
22 You could point to any number of statements on any given week
23 which made it quite clear to the Salvadorans that whatever
24 else happened down there, they were the architects of the
25 future, not the United States.

① Now you mentioned [↑]special [↑]forces. There was one
 ② battallion of [↑]special [↑]forces in Panama that was a prime source
 3 for trainers, but you should appreciate that most of the
 4 people of the 55 who were in-country at any given time under
 ⑤ the security assistance program were not from [↑]special
 ⑥ [↑]operations [↑]forces, not special forces, army, or other [↑]special
 ⑦ [↑]operations [↑]forces like SEALs.

8 A number of the key players throughout the period, many
 ⑨ of them NCOs, were [↑]special [↑]forces people. They are great for
 10 specific roles when you are, for example, trying to get the
 ⑪ Salvadorans to understand something about public relations,
 ⑫ You do not tap somebody in ^a[the] ^cGreen ^eBerets and send ^{him}[them] in
 ⑬ to do that. Or if you are trying to teach them how to re^bplace
 ⑭ their ^{old}[own] rifles ^{here}] they were continually showing up at my
 ⑮ doorstep saying we need more rifles; [Hell,] the country was
 16 practically sinking under the weight of the ordnance that had
 ⑰ been shipped [in] there in previous years.

⑱ There were about three weapons per capita in the country,
 19 most of them unuseable. In San Salvador, there were whole
 ⑳ warehouses of ^{old}[unuse], largely German-made, rifles. Well, we
 21 tried to show them how to get into the business of
 22 reconditioning weapons. Or, to take another humble example,
 23 you mentioned helicopters. Yes, I agree completely on the
 ⑳ point of medical ev^{ac}uation. [Those were--] that was a good
 25 investment. We reduced the mortality in the Salvadoran army

1 from about 50 percent wounded to dead, to around 10 or 11
 2 percent in two years, and that is a pretty dramatic kind of
 3 change, and the Army's Medical Service Corps and Medical
 4 Corps, the ^{US} doctors we put in there, deserve a lot of credit
 5 for teaching them ^{how to build} that kind of capability.

6 It is the sort of service that we ought to perform. ^{But that was not Special Forces} [But]

7 Looking at the larger issue of the mobility of that army,
 8 what they needed ^{more} [less] than helicopters was just good boots.
 9 They were operating up in the volcanic parts of the country
 10 where the soil and the rocks are very tough on boot soles.
 11 They had a [manufactured] locally manufactured boot that
 12 resembled our jungle boot, but the sole of which was about
 13 like an ordinary sneaker.

14 Senator Cohen: We tried to tell you to buy from L.L.
 15 Bean, but you would not do it.

16 [Laughter]

17 General Gorman: Senator L.L. Bean and the United States
 18 Army are just too expensive for the Salvadcrans. They cannot
 19 afford ^{either} [it]. They could make those boots themselves, if we
 20 showed them how to do the sole part of it. ^{needs technicians for} That [is] a
 21 technology transfer, not Special Forces.

22 To take another point, the Salvadoran army's mobility was
 23 impaired by the lack of a field ration. The usual way of
 24 operating when I got there was to issue a bag of gold to a
 25 commander. He would pocket some of it. He would go down

1 into the village and buy the food for the operation, and [the]
 2 ^{agents} enemy down there could determine on the basis of what he
 3 purchased how many soldiers were going out in the field, and
 4 generally speaking from talking to the shopkeepers ascertain
 5 virtually every detail of the operation.

6 The idea of putting ^{the Salvadorans} [them] onto some sort of a storeable
 7 portable field ration was a kind of a revolutionary idea, and
 8 we brought some people down from ⁺ Natick, Massachusetts, to
 9 show them how to do that kind of thing, [and] they can put up
 10 their own beans ^q and chili, and that sort of business. They
 11 are perfectly capable of doing that, [kind of thing] It had
 12 just never occurred, in the kind of professional scope of
 13 those people, that that is the kind of business they ought to
 14 be in.

15 Now I must tell you that helicopters are faddish. You
 16 present any ambassador, political appointee or foreign
 17 service officer, with a low intensity conflict situation and
 18 his first recourse is to fire off a message to the State
 19 Department asking for helicopters. We are shipping these
 20 damn things with gay abandon all over the world.

21 We do a major disservice to many countries in burdening
 22 them with that maintenance nightmare. ^{Now} [Here] we have got El
 23 ^{60 helicopter} Salvador struggling to its feet with [16] millstones around its
 24 neck--too many. Too many, by far.

25 I think the Security Assistant Act ought to be amended to

1 permit us to loan, just so that we could have not only a
 2 mobilization plan to get ^{an attacked country} [the thing] moving, but a
 3 demobilization plan to pull ^{our equipment} [it] away when we ^{no longer} [do not] need it.
 4 Above all, ^{we} [it] must not breed into ^{such} [these] armies the notion
 5 that there is always going to be that kind of transportation
 6 available to them.

7 The Chairman: Senator Warner.

8 Senator Warner: Mr. Chairman, I would defer to the
 9 Chairman.

10 The Chairman: No, I waived my time. You go ahead. You
 11 go ahead. I will come back on mine later on. Go ahead.

12 Senator Warner: Several members of the Senate
 13 Intelligence Committee are here, and we have a varied
 14 interest in your response. You are quite pointed in your
 15 observations. What sort of intelligence collection are you
 16 proposing we engage in?

17 General Gorman: I want to direct your attention to at
 18 least three areas where we need dramatic improvement.

19 I was, as you know, at one time a ^{national} intelligence
 20 officer. I saw in the councils of the intelligence community
 21 at the top late in the Carter Administration, and heard at
 22 that point in time, numerous assertions that, boy, this
 23 terrorism thing is really going to be important, and we
 24 therefore have got to get ready, and we need people.

25 We need to set aside some bright people, trained [ed]

① educated, direct their attention, get them the lingual skills
 2 and the sort of background they need to be either good
 3 collectors in the field, or shrewd analysts here in
 4 Washington.

5 That apparently did not take place, and I know from
 6 having been associated with those in charge of the
 7 counterterrorism business here in the United States over the
 8 years that they are still saying, gee, we really need to set
 9 up a professional cadre of people that are steeped in ^{terrorist threats,} [this],
 10 and stay with it for years. Only by that way are we going to
 11 be able to get ahead of Abu Nidal or any of these other
 12 international terrorist groups that are well funded,
 13 organized, and have a scope that is not only
 14 transcultural, ^{and} transnational, but intercontinental in reach.

15 So we need to build the ^{intelligence} cadres. We need to take a hard
 16 look at our manpower. Going back to your question on El
 17 Salvador, the roots of success in El Salvador, if there can
 18 be such a label applied to an ongoing war the outcome of
 19 which is still uncertain, [but] the change ^{for the better} really began here in
 20 a decision taken in 1981 to establish a special oversight
 21 committee [in the intelligence community over there] at the
 22 Intelligence Community Staff, an interagency group, that
 23 would ask the hard questions of the several intelligence
 24 agencies of who is ^{analyzing} on the problem of Cuba, Nicaragua, El
 25 Salvador? Who is there? How many? How well trained are

1 they? What are we going to do to fix the shortages that are
2 identified?

3 That committee under Admiral Al Burk^{alter}h[older] did yeoman
4 service for the United States very quietly by prodding the
5 intelligence community to put people in place where they
6 could do some good. In that respect, the Defense
7 Intelligence Agency in a very exceptionally perceptive move
8 agreed to establish over in the basement of the Pentagon
9 something called the Central American Joint Intelligence
10 Team. All in the world that was, Senator Warner, was just a
11 collection of people who had their head in El Salvador. They
12 lived El Salvador, breathed El Salvador, read every bit of
13 stuff out of El Salvador, talked with us in Panama and with
14 ^{my folks} San Salvador day in and day out. ^{assembled,} [and] they [had] after a couple
15 of years very, very detailed kinds of information on the
16 guerilla movement down there.

17 Let me tell you one anecdote.

18 Senator Warner: And it is positive, a good one.

19 General Gorman: Yes, sir.

20 One anecdote. I was visited by an East European
21 Ambassador in Panama, a courtesy call. I ^{wanted to ask my visitor} [asked Pierre] what we
22 knew about the activities of his ^{countrymen} [folks] in Nicaragua and in El
23 Salvador. I ^{had} received a batch of documents written in the
24 language of his country, along with translations taken from a
25 prisoner in El Salvador which had names, places, dates, a

1 sort of a laying out of the network that ran from his capital
2 to a squad of his countrymen who were carrying guns in El
3 Salvador. And ^{the documents talked} [they were talking] about recruiting more and
4 getting money, and all the usual sorts of things.

5 This ^{Ambassador} [guy] came in, and we sat down and talked. [and] he
6 deplored the violence in the region, and I let him do that
7 for a bit, and then I said, well, you know, if that is the
8 position of your government, Mr. Ambassador, why is it that
9 you allow your nationals to operate in Central America with
10 guns? Why are they out there killing the innocent. And he
11 denied that that was the case.

12 Whereupon, I laid the documents out. Now that kind of a
13 play in 1983 when we started, Senator Cohen, would have been
14 simply beyond the capability of the American intelligence
15 establishment.

16 So the first point, Senator Warner, build your cadres.
17 That goes to the ^{eg} Granada point. We should not have been
18 caught up by that one. That was signaled too far in
19 advance. It is inexcusable that we let it happen.

20 The second point, we have a great deal of capability
21 under the aegis of our national collection systems, but you
22 will discover that as there is an iron rule of war that says
23 that infantry battles always take place on the edge of the
24 map where the maps but together, there is another rule in the
25 intelligence racket that says that the crisis is going to

1 come up in a place with 90 percent cloud cover, and you are
2 just not going to be able to rely on those national means all
3 the time.

4 More importantly, the national means are primarily
5 dedicated to watching the larger issues of national security,
6 and they do not pay enough attention to the kind of detail
7 that you need to come to grips with a terrorist group. What
8 house might they have the hostage in? How do you maintain
9 24-hour-a-day surveillance over that house?

10 You need tactical intelligence, and much of the work that
11 was done vis-a-vis Central America--

12 Senator Cohen: Human intelligence? Do you mean human
13 intelligence?

14 General Gorman: Human intelligence, and technical
15 intelligence, but at the tactical level producing detailed
16 order of battle [stuff], the kind of routine military business
17 that leads to your understanding of what your opposition is
18 up to on an hourly basis--I mean it, literally hourly--and we
19 got very, very good at it.

20 I think we are getting better all the time. We have
21 certainly demonstrated to ourselves that with the Central
22 American Joint Intelligence Teams, Senator Warner, and the
23 Tactical Intelligence ^{means} that we put in place in Central
24 America, that we could track in some fine-grain detail
25 specific guerilla groups, and use that information for

① whatever tactical advantage ^{we} [you] wanted, or whatever leverage
 ② ^{we} [you] wanted to ^{exercise} [acquire] over the Salvadoran armed forces.

③ But, you know, that effort ^{in Central America}, pretty well exhausted the
 4 capability of the United States' intelligence community. If
 5 you asked them to do another one just like that for Granada,
 6 Senator Cohen, the answer would have been, can't do it.
 7 We've got everything committed; we are turned on full time,
 8 full up, we are going all out.

9 Now, you know, you can think of four or five places
 10 around the world where there ought to be a comparable effort
 11 underway. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the answer
 12 is still "we can do one; any more than that, we cannot," and
 13 you have got to fix that.

14 Senator Warner: Thank you very much, General. My time
 15 has expired.

16 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Warner.

17 Senator Exon.

18 Senator Exon: Mr. Chairman, if I might I would yield to
 19 my colleague from Massachusetts, who by his earlier presence
 20 here this morning indicates he has had more experience
 21 driving in snow than I have in Nebraska.

22 [Laughter]

23 The Chairman: Senator Kennedy.

24 Senator Kennedy: Thank you very much.

25 General, do we not have a number of agreements with

1 countries not to use intelligence operatives? Has not that
2 number, did it not grow in the period--

3 General Gorman: I do not know the answer to that
4 question. I think the agreements with the countries that I
5 am familiar with were fairly specific on what we could or
6 could not do in-country. In all cases, however, when I
7 increased intelligence collection in a given country, I did
8 so with (a) the approval of the Secretary of Defense; (b) the
9 approval of the ambassador, and presumably therefore the
10 Secretary of State; and (c) almost invariably the head of
11 state. And I personally briefed the head of state in most
12 countries where those operations were ^{undertaken} [done].

13 Senator Kennedy: Do you suppose it would be worthwhile
14 for us to find out about them, if there are strictures? As I
15 understand, there were a number that were placed in the
16 period of the 1970s, a few in the 1960s, but a good deal more
17 in the period of the 1970s. Obviously it ought to be treated
18 sensitively.

19 Let me ask you what is the nature of our training program
20 for intelligence operatives that can work with the military
21 personnel? How well are we doing in that? Perhaps you could
22 tell us a little bit about the past, the present, and I would
23 be interested in what you think we ought to be doing now more
24 than we are doing, if we should.

25 General Gorman: There are at least three general

1 disciplines that are worth citing here. There is first the
2 sort of general area familiarization, cultural affinity,
3 lingual skills that you see best exemplified in the Army's
4 foreign area specialist training program. Now that is not an
5 intelligence collection program. It is a way of developing
6 individuals usually with long periods of residence in a given
7 country who have a good feeling for the people, the culture,
8 how it all goes down, and those individuals, when they emerge
9 from their training, then can become first-class intelligence
10 officers.

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1 There is of course a second category of individuals who
2 are the manipulators of technical intelligence, and we are
3 much better at training them than the former.

4 It is a rare service who will countenance taking quality
5 people and setting them aside for years for the purposes of
6 teaching them about a foreign culture.

7 Army does it more willingly than the others. On
8 technical training, we get a lot of help from the services,
9 as far as the manipulation of the equipment is concerned, but
10 ^{not} as much help as we ought to on lingual skills.

11 And there, of course, again and again we get caught out.
12 We just don't have enough ^{lingually} trained, ^{culturally sensitive} people to interpret the
13 take from the technical business. [And] ^{we} could do a lot
14 better in that respect.

15 Finally, there is the training which should be given to
16 any military person who is in a Third World country, under
17 whatever rubric, that sensitizes him to the collection of
18 information that subsequently can become intelligence.

19 That doesn't make him an intelligence collector; it
20 simply makes him a better observer and leads to better
21 debriefings when you get him in hand. Again, we're not doing
22 all that we could in that respect.

23 But the kinds of problems to which I allude when I appeal
24 for better intelligence go ^{also} to research and development of
25 better technical capabilities and better ways of dealing with

1 the human problems.

2 Let me see if I can dramatize this a little bit for you.

3 One of the things we discovered in 1983, ^{anent} [and at] the El
4 Salvadoran problem, was that there were no less than four
5 different map scales in use down there. [and] trying to get
6 everybody literally on the same sheet of music was one of the
7 first undertakings to which I directed my attention.

8 Then I discovered that even having everybody using the
9 same sort of grid reference ^{system} for referring to places didn't
10 help much, because most of the Salvadorans couldn't read maps
11 in any event.

12 And the abstraction that is a map is not very relevant to
13 their way of doing business, ^{or that of most third world people}

14 What we needed were more graphic^s, more ^{actorial} [pictures, more]
15 ways of communicating with them in the way they ^{in turn could} [would try to]
16 communicate with us.

17 There are technical ways of helping a great deal in this
18 respect; kinds of ^{graphic} projects that the Defense Advance Research
19 Project's agency has had underway for years, which have never
20 come out of R&D because there has never been any service
21 stand up and say, there is something that we need.

22 And Senator Kennedy, I would tell you that that is but
23 one example of 20 or 30 that I could name right offhand, but
24 in an open hearing, would prefer not to.

25 Senator Kennedy: Risking the antagonism of my Chairman,

1 and realizing that my time is up, let me just ask one final
2 question, and that is, could you define for us sort of when
3 and where we ought to be using those military advisers, and
4 for what?

5 General Gorman: Well, first of all, I would agree with
6 the earlier suggestion that we should do that very
7 selectively, very charily, with a great deal of care.

8 I suspect that my friend and West Point classmate Eddie
9 ^{in The Philippines} Ramos [^] could be better served by the U.S. Security Assistance
10 program out there. I don't know the facts of the matter.
11 Obviously, I'm just an external observer.

12 But it seems to me that if we want democracy to succeed
13 in the Philippines, there is a prima facie case where some
14 [^] ^{better} help could be well placed.

15 [And I think,] For example, I wouldn't be surprised to
16 discover that there isn't a problem in the Philippine ^{military} medical
17 service something analogous to what ^{there} was in El Salvador. But
18 that's a good case in point.

19 The Saudis and others who are facing the aftermath, the
20 potential problems of the aftermath of the Iraq-Iran war,
21 they too are going to need help.

22 As you go around the world, you can ask yourself where
23 are the strategic zones or areas where the United States is
24 strategically in difficulty, and certainly Southwest Asia and
25 Central America are the places that come readily to mind.

1 The Chairman: Senator Thurmond?

2 Senator Thurmond: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 General Gorman, I want to thank you for your long and
4 faithful service to your country.

5 You mentioned recruitment of individuals for intelligence
6 purposes. Are you aware that the Department of Defense has
7 consistently opposed bringing back the large foreign
8 nationals for that purpose? I introduced a bill in 1983
9 along that line.

10 Do you have any comment on that?

11 General Gorman: That's one of the cases in point that I
12 was alluding to in my response to Senator Warner's question.
13 You're exactly right.

14 Senator Thurmond: Without elaborating, do you think this
15 ought to be done?

16 General Gorman: Yes.

17 Senator Thurmond: Now, I have a number of other
18 questions here that I may submit for the record. But I would
19 like to ask you this practical question.

20 I think most people would like to see the government of
21 Nicaragua that's now dominated by the communists changed and
22 relieved of the orbit of the Soviets in which they now find
23 themselves.

24 If you were Commander in Chief, what would you do to
25 accomplish that? Now the President has advocated aid to the

1 contras. That's fine, if we can give them enough aid, but
2 should we go all out to give them enough aid to do it? Is
3 that the best way to do it?

4 They are a cancer, in my opinion, in the Carribbean
5 today. And if you had the power, what would you do?

6 General Gorman: In the first place, the response of
7 Senator Byrd last night in my view is a better
8 characterization of what the United States ^{ought to do} than the President
9 gave.

10 I think that to see the problem in Central America as one
11 of aiding the contras is to undershoot your strategic mark;
12 that what we require is a regional approach in which the
13 United States uses its total power, its economic, its moral,
14 its political, its social power, which is very extensive in
15 that region, closely affiliated as we are with most of those
16 peoples.

17 The problem presented by the Nicaraguan Marxist-Leninist
18 garrison state, Senator Thurmond, which is abhorrent to me,
19 is a regional one. And our first concern ought to be for
20 those neighbors of Nicaragua who are most threatened by that
21 phenomenon.

22 We had our eye on El Salvador in the years 1983, 1984 and
23 1985. I had any number of you come down to Central America
24 and visit me, or travel up through the region. And some of
25 you will recall, when you told me that you had to get into

1 San Salvador so you could get a good feel for the situation,
 2 ^{That} ^{was} ^{also} my advice to go to San Jose in Costa Rica, because I felt
 3 that ^{the latter} ~~that~~ was a better place to come to grips with the
 4 strategic realities of Central America. And that advice is
 5 still sound.

6 Costa Rica represents, far better than El Salvador, the
 7 problem occasioned by the implantation on the American
 8 mainland of a communist Cuban-style Marxist state.

9 It is the fate of Costa Rica and the fate of Honduras,
 10 and the fate of El Salvador and Guatemala that the United
 11 States should turn its ^{first} attention to. And I do not see, (and I
 12 must say parenthetically I have not been briefed and I am not
 13 privy to any of the current intelligence; I haven't had any
 14 information later than February of 1985 when I left command.)
 15 But it seems to me that what is missing in all of this ^{rhetoric} is a
 16 way of dealing with the harsh realities that these friendly
 17 democratic states are facing.

18 Costa Ricans ^{have} 200,000 Nicaraguan refugees on their soil.
 19 Costa Ricans with a democracy par excellence, which is now
 20 facing the prospect of internal turmoil, unrest, in addition
 21 to all of the human problems associated with services for
 22 these ^{refugees} ~~people~~ ^{Costa Ricans are} ~~and~~ cataclysmically unprepared to deal with
 23 this.

24 They need a lot of help. They need economic help.
 25 They're all groaning -- all of the nations named are groaning

1 under heavy debt. Some kind of systematic bailout for them
2 would help a great deal.

3 On the question of what the Commander in Chief ought to
4 do about the contras --

5 Senator Thurmond: Or about the whole problem of Central
6 America. What should we do?

7 General Gorman: Well, you're not going to knock off the
8 Sandinistas with conventional armed force. And that, I'm
9 afraid, is what the contras have been in my ken. That is to
10 say, as far as I know, they were organized, trained and
11 equipped for conventional military operations; not
12 unconventional warfare.

13 And unless and until we are able to launch a genuine
14 unconventional warfare campaign, the use of that kind of a
15 military instrument is not an option that the President of
16 the United States has.

17 We do not have the intelligence apparatus in place inside
18 of Nicaragua. We do not have the political infrastructure to
19 wage that kind of war.

20 And I, therefore, wouldn't put a great deal of hope that
21 the Contra operation is going to succeed.

22 Senator Thurmond: I believe my time is up, Mr.
23 Chairman. Thank you.

24 The Chairman: General, could I follow that just with one
25 interjected question here? Does that mean you think that

1 what we have set up with our own military training and CIA is
2 a force that's not prepared to fight the kind of war down
3 there, that is, the contra force, the kind of war that's
4 necessary to win, or to ever prevail? Is that what you're
5 saying?

6 General Gorman: I do not see -- from where I sit, I do
7 not see such a force. And again, I have no information later
8 than 1985. There was no military training for that force up
9 to that time. It was a CIA operation. And ^{CIA built} [it was] largely a
10 cross-border raiding force, ^{is what} that I was observing with my
11 intelligence apparatus, not a UW force.

12 The Chairman: Senator Wirth?

13 Senator Wirth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 General Gorman, I hear you saying in response to the last
15 questions and the earlier questioning that we have to do a
16 much better job of developing trained personnel in the areas
17 of intelligence, and language, and foreign language, and
18 training in unconventional warfare and so on, than we're
19 doing today.

20 Is that -- was that historically something that the CIA
21 was supposed to be doing?

22 General Gorman: Well, the history of these operations,
23 as many of you here will recall, is that CIA would launch
24 operations, and then ultimately, the military, the United
25 States Armed Forces would go in and take them over once they

1 became too big or too complicated for the Agency to run.

2 The CIA has redoubtable capabilities in the field of
3 human intelligence. And my view is that we ought to keep
4 them doing what they're good at.

5 I believe that we have within our own armed forces
6 individuals, teams, capabilities, to plan and conduct
7 unconventional warfare. We haven't used them ^{in Central America,} and that, in
8 my view, is a mistake.

9 Senator Wirth: If you were trying to plan the
10 development and training of the groups of people necessary,
11 would you be doing this predominantly within the Pentagon, or
12 would you be putting greater emphasis than we have, for
13 example, on foreign language and area training?

14 I cite that as one area that has been discussed a great
15 deal as we talk about competitiveness; we note the decline of
16 foreign language and area training centers in the country,
17 which have declined by about I think at least a third in the
18 last six years.

19 General Gorman: Two separable issues. One is the
20 strategic asset, which is the group of individuals that have
21 got a capability that you can put into a country and have
22 them operate effectively.

23 You don't need many of those, Senator Wirth. A few men,
24 a few women, can make a great deal of difference. And the
25 problem is always when one of these emergencies confronts the

1 United States to find the right people and get them in the
2 right positions.

3 We do not do, in my view, anywhere near an adequate job
4 of identifying them, fostering them, protecting them,
5 promoting them, keeping them on hand so when the time comes
6 they can be put in the right place.

7 All kinds of artificial barriers are raised against
8 this. And to go to a point that Senator Kennedy alluded to,
9 I got myself into a situation in Honduras where I wanted to
10 make the army attache the commander of my military group
11 there. Now, that means the position to which he was moving
12 came under the security assistanceⁿ program, it was funded by
13 th security assistance program.

14 And the people back here in the Pentagon^{responsible for Security Assistance} cited an
15 agreement with the Hondurans that we would not use
16 intelligence personnel in such assignments, to foreclose^o my
17 moving this lad in the right place.

18 And that was a case where literally I had to go to the
19 Chairman, to the Secretary of Defense, and then to the Chief
20 of State, and say look, we're going to do this with your
21 approval, but he is the right man for the job; knows the
22 language; knows the people; been there for years; understood
23 the background; and was willing to serve.

24 That kind of exceptional management at the top if the way
25 we have to operate in these circumstances, and I just think

1 it ought to be a hell of a lot easier.

2 Senator Wirth: Finally, could I ask you if you would be
3 willing to expand on a quote that was in the New York Times
4 attributed to you, which said, quote: I do not believe the
5 Central Intelligence Agency is capable of mounting a
6 successful insurgency, or supporting one, for that matter. I
7 don't see the Nicaraguan rebels as a likely alternative to
8 the present Sandanista regime.

9 What does that suggest to you -- or were you suggesting
10 that we ought to be doing in Nicaragua?

11 General Gorman: We're a day late and dollar short trying
12 to get an unconventional warfare campaign launched there.
13 And throwing money at the problem at this point in time isn't
14 going to produce, in my view, the kind of results that are
15 required.

16 Where ^{are} [is] the intelligence networks inside Nicaragua?
17 Where do we have the kind of networks that would permit us to
18 infiltrate the cities of Nicaragua, which are the places that
19 count. The Sandinistas understand that. Not the mountains.
20 Not the jungles of the eastern portions of the country.

21 We haven't taken the steps that would make it possible
22 for us to view such a campaign as having a reasonable
23 prospect of succeeding.

24 But again, I underscore, I don't know when that quote was
25 taken from or what the ^{context} [source] of it was. It's certainly the

1 kinds of things I've been saying. But I urge on you the
2 notion that I'm two years out of date. My judgments were
3 based on what I saw in 1985.

4 Nothing I've seen in the press would lead me to believe
5 it's different.

6 Senator Wirth: Therefore, what steps ought we to be
7 taking?

8 General Gorman: Either change the modus operandi and ^{gear} [ger]
9 yourselves for the long haul, or cut it off.

10 Senator Wirth: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Wirth.

12 Senator Humphrey?

13 Senator Humphrey: Sorry I haven't been able to be here.
14 I had a conference in the adjoining room with a constituent
15 of mine.

16 Am I going out of turn?

17 The Chairman: No.

18 Senator Humphrey: I suppose the question has been
19 asked: Given your expertise in Central America, what is your
20 prognosis for Nicaragua?

21 Much is made of the shortcomings of the contras, and yet
22 the Sandinistas are not that classy an outfit either.

23 General Gorman: That's right. But they are very well
24 backed, and very well advised.

25 Senator Humphrey: Now, you're speaking of the

1 Sandinistas?

2 General Gorman: Yes, and they're a tough nut to crack.
3 So my prognosis would be that unless there is some kind of
4 dramatic change along the lines that we were just discussing,
5 you're going to be living with that problem for a long time,
6 and you better start looking to the ^{security of our friends} [guys] who are going to be
7 most threatened by their continued existence, the Hondurans
8 and the Costa Ricans.

9 Senator Humphrey: Do you see as evidence of the
10 Administration ambivalence, on the one hand arming the
11 ^Acontras, on the other hand maintaining diplomatic relations
12 with the Sandinista government?

13 General Gorman: It doesn't bother me as much as it does
14 some people. It is certainly not in keeping with the
15 traditional ways of doing business among states. But we are
16 dealing here with a very extraordinary set of problems, and
17 they're going to be becoming more and more unusual over the
18 years.

19 None of the traditional mechanisms of diplomacy really
20 fit the kinds of situation that Mr. Waite today finds himself
21 in in Beirut. And I think something like that is going on in
22 Central America.

23 There is always an outside chance, Senator Humphrey, that
24 the Sandinista Directorate could be brought to some kind of
25 terms. And I believe that we ought to keep diplomatic

1 channels open. We ought to keep talking. We ought to give
2 them every opportunity to explore their way out of the
3 difficulty.

4 But it ought to be crystal clear to them that they are
5 embarked on a path which, if it leads to adventurism across
6 the borders of their neighbors, is going to bring them into
7 collision with the United States.

8 Senator Humphrey: Well, can we have it both ways? Is it
9 possible to achieve something? Odds are already long because
10 of the entrenchment of the Sandinista regime, because of the
11 Soviet advisers, military personnel, materiel; odds are very
12 long.

13 Can we approach this thing on a half-hearted basis? Is
14 that not what we are doing?

15 General Gorman: Yes, we've been doing it for years.
16 Nothing is unchangeable in Central America. And that
17 government in Managua could be changed. I wouldn't try to
18 maintain to the contrary.

19 Just as the governments in Tegucigalpa and San Jose and
20 San Salvador could be changed.

21 The question is, in my mind, is whether cutting relations
22 would really do any good. If you had any alternative
23 prospect of bringing about the change, which I don't think
24 you have in the Contras, but if you had such a way -- let's say
25 the Contras did have a capability of bringing severe military

1 pressure against the Sandanistas, if you thought that there
2 was going to be a new flag in Managua next year, you might
3 very well want to cut your relations.

4 But I would maintain that just in order to -- to avoid
5 the bloodshed of fighting in the urban areas, and to make it
6 possible to settle the thing short of a bloodbath, you ought
7 to keep your diplomatic lines open.

8 Senator Humphrey: You mentioned the changes of
9 government in El Salvador. What was the other example you
10 gave?

11 General Gorman: In Honduras and Costa Rica.

12 Senator Humphrey: But those were not communist regimes.

13 General Gorman: No, but they are democracies that we're
14 supporting, and should be supporting. And in the case of
15 Costa Rica, one of the rare instances of a regime over the
16 years has made the American democratic dream a reality.

17 Kids are trained in Costa Rican schools in how to use the
18 voting booth. I mean, those people live democracy. And
19 that's something that ought to be protected.

20 And they have no army. There is no shield there. All
21 they can do is invoke the Rio Pact if they are attacked.

22 But ^a [the] more subtle problem is going to manifest itself
23 there, it seems to me, in the form of sabotage, terrorism,
24 kidnappings, that genre of problems; and they are
25 cataclysmically unprepared to deal with that.

1 Senator Humphrey: What happens if the ~~contras~~ fail and
2 the Sandinistas become ever more entrenched in that region?

3 General Gorman: We're going to be, if we honor our
4 commitments to these friends of ours, we're going to be
5 committed there for a long time, trying to cope with the
6 resultant security problems.

7 There is a distinct prospect in my mind, for example, that
8 in Tegucigalpa you could get one of two manifestations. One
9 is a distinct drift to the left, some sort of accommodation
10 with the communists, some sort of a sellout. And the other,
11 perhaps more real, is a drift to the right, the military
12 reasserting control on the grounds of a threat to national
13 security, and a kind of a rightist nationalist regime coming
14 in there, which is again, antithetical to our hopes and
15 aspirations for the region.

16 Senator Humphrey: No reason to suppose the Sandinistas
17 will be satisfied to be a self-contained revolution? They're
18 going to make trouble one way or the other?

19 General Gorman: That's an open question in my view,
20 Senator.

21 I think the question has always been, what are the
22 alternatives? Right now, I don't think they regard the
23 Nicaraguan rebels, the so-called contras, as a serious
24 threat. I think ^{They believe} they've got ^{that} [the] situation under control.
25 Therefore, why should they even be considering changing their

1 way of doing business.

2 Senator Humphrey: My time is up. Thank you.

3 Senator Exon: [presiding] Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

4 I believe my questions are next.

5 I have been listening with keen interest to your
6 testimony here this morning, and it's very enlightening, and
7 I want to thank you for coming and add my remarks to those
8 who congratulate you once again for the great service you're
9 provided over the years to the United States of America.

10 Let me follow up on the question that's been advanced in
11 one or two ways.

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1 Let me ask the question this way. You feel that the CIA
2 should be limited to intelligence gathering services and
3 dispensing that information to the proper authorities and
4 agencies of government, including the military, but that the
5 CIA should not be involved in military actions on their own.
6 Is that a fair summation?

7 General Gorman: You draw the line a little bit
8 differently than I would, Senator Exon. The way I would put
9 it is that they do the intelligence job best. They have not
10 been particularly successful at the unconventional warfare or
11 paramilitary operations. The more conventional or
12 paramilitary the thing gets the less adept they are. I would
13 not want to say that always and everywhere you are going to
14 rule out CIA operations that involve the use of guns and
15 violence. I think that particularly in dealing with
16 terrorism that may be the only recourse you have in a number
17 of circumstances, but as a general rule I keep them in the
18 intelligence bracket..

19 Senator Exon: Thank you. Let me expand if I can on the
20 answer you gave to a previous question that I think needs
21 further explanation. You said, if I properly interpreted
22 your statement, that we either ought to quit sending money to
23 the Contras given the present situation or prepare for the
24 long haul. What do you mean by the long haul?

25 General Gorman: You are not going to win a campaign

1 against the Sandinistas in one year, two years, or three
2 years. The Sandinistas are an entrenched, organized,
3 Cuban-style state. They have a security apparatus which
4 is -- well, not by any means as effective as some that you
5 might be aware of in the Middle East. It is still effective
6 enough to work in Central America.

7 I just do not see the Contras being in a position to
8 challenge that apparatus for some time to come. The
9 necessary precursors would be a penetration of the urban
10 areas with Contra organizations so that at least they were
11 getting direct intelligence out of those areas. That, to my
12 knowledge, has never been done. That is going to take a long
13 time to get in place, but it ought to be possible. It is not
14 a hopeless cause, but it is not a quick fix.

15 The money you spent last year is not going to do it. The
16 money you might be asked to spend this year is not going to
17 do it. But you will have to go the long haul and I do not
18 see yet, I have not heard anyone describe a plan that would
19 in the long haul say that we are going to have an alternative
20 to the Sandinista regime. I do not see yet a way out of our
21 present difficulty.

22 Senator Exon: Are you saying then, General, so I can get
23 a grasp on this, are you saying that we should be assisting
24 the Contras to do the things that you think are necessary and
25 have just outlined to some degree as opposed to supplying

1 them military weaponry now, or are you saying you think that
2 some other agency, either foreign or internal, in Nicaragua
3 over the long pull is the way to make that present government
4 there more responsible?

5 General Gorman: Again, respectfully, sir, I am two years
6 off the beat. I cannot really tell you what is going down
7 except again what I read in the newspapers, but my answer
8 would be something like this. A sound, unconventional
9 warfare campaign does not involve people with guns up front.
10 It involves a lot of patient preparation of the battlefield.
11 Unless and until you have got the ability to move at will in
12 the society that you want to attack you are not going to be
13 an effective insurgent.

14 The lessons of repeated instances of unconventional
15 warfare would tell you that unless you are able to move
16 around better than the government, you are not going to best
17 government forces. They ^{Centras} do not have that capability. We are
18 talking about a cross-border raiding force. We are talking
19 about people that have received a modest amount of weaponry
20 training and a lot of fancy web gear and that sort of
21 business, some ^{training} [good weapons], but I do not think they have got
22 the apparatus in the country that would enable them to be
23 militarily efficacious. I am confident that they can go out
24 and sit on some remote mountain in North Central Nicaragua.
25 There have been guerrillas up in that part of the world ^{for all} [fall]

1 this century. But ^{their} raising a flag in Managua, I do not see
2 it.

3 Senator Exon: Well, my last question has to do with
4 since we respect you as a well-balanced individual who has a
5 basic grasp of both the military situation in Central America
6 and a grasp of the diplomatic situation so that we can inform
7 ourselves and the American public from your perspective,
8 recognizing that you have been out for 18 months now, but
9 what you knew when you were there on the spot as a commander
10 and what you have read from the newspapers since, do you feel
11 that the majority of the people in Nicaragua today still
12 support the Sandinistas, or putting it another way, if it was
13 possible to conduct a public opinion poll, an honest public
14 opinion poll in Nicaragua today, do you think that the
15 majority of the people there would vote to oust the
16 Sandinista government, or would they likely vote at this time
17 to maintain it?

18 General Gorman: In 1985, if I could qualify it this
19 way, ^{the} information I was receiving from Nicaragua (and it
20 was extensive and, I believe, reliable) would indicate to me
21 that the Sandinistas had a hold on ^{only} a very small fraction of
22 the Nicaraguan people, and that if they had to face some sort
23 of a ballot box test they probably would have failed. I
24 think the longer they remain in power, the broader the
25 control that they exercise over the people, the block

① committees, the ration cards, the rest of the ^{Cuban} nine yards.

② I think that if [you know, if] you could extract from
 3 them, let us say, a promise of an election at some
 4 hypothetical date in the future like 1995, they could
 5 probably point at that with some assurance that they could
 6 bring it off, but the answer to the question you asked, the
 7 sort of the now question, is, remember that a lot of
 8 Nicaraguans already expressed their views on this with their
 9 feet. They left the country. And nearly a quarter of a
 ⑩ million ^{are} now in neighboring countries, which says something
 11 about the regime and their abhorrence of it.

⑫ Last year [right ^{at} after] the Senate Democratic Caucus
 13 Breakfast last spring, I guess it was, Tony Motley and I came
 ⑭ over and talked to the [↑] caucus. I went ^{from there} across to the House
 15 where they had assembled a group of Nicaraguans who were
 16 still or had just recently come out, were still in Managua or
 ⑰ just recently come out, who represented the opposition, if you
 ⑱ will, people from La ^{Princa} [Princa] from the [↑] church.

19 It was at that session that Bishop Pablo Y Vega, the
 20 Bishop of Managua, was asked why, Bishop, is it that we are
 21 hearing from you up here today what we never hear from all of
 ⑳ ^{us} reporters that are in Managua? You know, we have a large
 23 press corps there. Why do people in Managua not come up and
 24 tell our reporters what you have just told us here about the
 ㉕ oppressive, reprehensible nature of this regime. And the

was ~~that~~ ^{to put his finger over his lips,}

1 Bishop's response, and I think this is what got him exiled.

2 The Bishop's response was to put his fingers over his

3 lips, ^{and} He responded, and I am paraphrasing, when I was a

4 young priest and men came to me from the ²Scmoza prisons they

5 would come to me to plead to make public what had happened to

6 them, to get to the press and the world the story of the

7 infamies, the tortures, et cetera. Now men come to me under

8 the seal of confessional, and they do not want me to tell

9 what happened to them in prison because they know that those

10 revelations are going to bring violence on their family or

11 other retribution. The words used by the Nicaraguans at this

12 meeting last spring were "white torture."

13 They don't beat them up. They just take their mind and

14 surround it with a series of dreadful alternatives, or subject

15 them [to] in [many] instances ^{to} sexual abuse so that they are

16 thoroughly compromised or they feel that their family is

17 compromised by their experience. [and] ^{so} Pablo y Vega said,

18 ^{silence} [that] is the rule in Nicaragua now. Nobody talks. And I

19 think that if you were therefore to put that regime to a fair

20 and democratic test they would have a damn hard time getting

21 the ballots.

22 Senator Exon: Thank you very much, General. I

23 appreciate you being here.

24 The Chairman: [Presiding] Senator Wilson?

25 Senator Wilson: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You

1 know my great and personal admiration and gratitude to you
2 for the long service you have given. Let me pick up with
3 this line of questioning. You have indicated that as long as
4 the Contras are engaged in conventional warfare you do not
5 think they have got a very high prospect of success, and you
6 said that our alternatives are either support for the long
7 haul or cut it off.

8 General Gorman: Change the modus operandi.

9 Senator Wilson: And yet in response to Senator Exon's
10 questions you do not apparently see the Contras as very
11 easily capable of engaging in the kind of unconventional
12 warfare that you think is necessary. We have got in the
13 Sandinistas a Marxist regime, avowedly Marxist, and by public
14 statements made repeatedly over the years one dedicated to
15 expending their violent revolution beyond the borders of
16 Nicaragua. They have been, in my judgment, shrewd enough to
17 recognize that the tremendous arsenal of military might that
18 has been built up there through the years of the Soviets in
19 the eastern bloc nations cannot be used directly, but can be
20 used to intimidate and exploit. They have done that very
21 successfully. They know they should not let the Soviet tanks
22 roll into El Salvador or Honduras because that would, of
23 course, put in both provisions of the Rio Treaty, and that
24 would necessitate, whether we want it or not, our own
25 interjections, so it would appear they are prepared for the

1 long haul as most of them that exist are hoping to wait out a
2 U.S. administration that is hostile to them. It seems to me
3 that they are also clever enough to recognize that by this
4 intimidation and by subversion of the kinds that you have
5 described of the things you fear the Costa Ricans are
6 unprepared, that they can gain the same result through
7 patience and different tactics than they could through some
8 kind of a blitzkreig up the Central American isthmus.

9 So what you are telling us is that in order to prevent
10 that ultimate result from becoming inevitable we have to give
11 these fledgling democracies -- they are fledgling democracies
12 and the others are struggling to achieve that status, I think
13 El Salvador has achieved it, that we have got to prepare them
14 to resist.

15 In your judgment, have we done anything like the job that
16 it requires to give heart to the small democracies
17 surrounding Nicaragua that they will not one day find
18 themselves outlasted, that the Reagan Presidency will have
19 ended, that they do not know what follows, that, in short,
20 they may come when it is simply a matter of time before they
21 are worn down? If that is your opinion, I would be interested
22 in your elaborating and really getting a description as to
23 what we ought to do to avoid that inevitable result.

24 General Gorman: Well, as you know from your travels in
25 the region and the time we have spent together talking about

1 the issues, one of the aspects of this situation which has
 2 redounded very much to the advantage of the United States is
 3 the new expression of interest and understanding here for the
 4 problems of the Salvadorans, the Hondurans, and the Costa
 5 Ricans. They have been genuinely grateful for, despite all
 6 of the difficult circumstances that occasioned it, for the
 7 new attention that they have received. But they are ^{as easily} alarmed
 8 by vacillation.

9 If they sense that the United States is faltering or
 10 uncertain they will begin to look for other alternatives, and
 11 your characterization of them as "losing heart" is, I think,
 12 right on the mark. I do not think they need to fear the
 13 Soviet motorized rifle division equivalent that has been put
 14 in there. ^{One} [You] would almost hope that that is the way the
 15 problem would present itself, because it is so much easier
 16 and so much more dangerous for the Sandinistas to operate ^{abroad}
 17 through the more traditional mechanisms of subversion. [They
 18 have certainly been -- they,] the Cubans have certainly been
 19 training in Cuba over the years enough Costa Ricans,
 20 Hondurans, and Salvadorans to fuel violence in the region ^{for}
 21 the next generation, and guns there are plenty, and money
 22 there is plenty from the eastern bloc. So I think your
 23 long-term visualization is accurate. What I believe is
 24 required, regardless of what Washington decides to do about
 25 the Nicaraguan rebels, is, ^{that the United States has} [you have] got to look to those

1 democracies and do all ^{we} [you] can to keep them on the democratic
2 path, moving ahead economically and socially despite this
3 threat.

4 With respect to the Nicaraguan rebels, I reiterate we
5 have got to change their way of doing business. We have got
6 to train them how to make their force more effective than the
7 kind of clumsy attacks on fixed points and sort of crude
8 ambushing that has characterized their operations to date.

9 [They have got to --] If it is true, and I believe it is, per my
10 response to Senator Exon, that there is a substantial amount
11 of disaffection among the Nicaraguan people. They ought to
12 be operating far more broadly in the country than the
13 uninhabited fringes, which has been their wont to date.

14 Senator Wilson: My time is up, unfortunately. Maybe we
15 will get a second round.

16 The Chairman: Senator Symms?

17 Senator Symms: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 General, thank you for your excellent testimony. I sit
19 here and recall that 20 years ago approximately, 25 years
20 ago, I guess, we went through the same thing, and there were
21 oportunities to liberate Cuba, and those were passed up. Now
22 we have this contingent situation with Cuba. I look at the
23 situation in Nicaragua and we sent the fleet down there. I
24 think you were in command of the Southern Command when it
25 went down, and I said at the time, if the fleet goes down and

1 comes back and the Sandinistas are still in power we weaken
2 the role of the United States because it shows that we are
3 all bluff and no delivery, but is it totally out of the
4 realm, or as commander of the Southern Command, when you had
5 that command did you ever make a recommendation or feel that
6 it should be done or feel that we should break diplomatic
7 relations, recognize a provisional government, use military
8 power, and get it over with in a very quick operation? Is it
9 impossible to do that, or are we just going to sit here and
10 watch a year where they educate these kids to hate Americans
11 and be communists and worship the communist materialism and
12 be against our basic western beliefs so that 20 years from
13 now the young people today are the middle aged people and
14 they despise us, or what is our recourse?

15 General Gorman: I opposed the entire time that I was in
16 office and still do, Senator, the use of military forces in
17 Central America. I believe that our going in there with
18 military force ourselves to resolve the situation would be a
19 strategic setback for the United States that would write fini
20 to what remains of the OAS after the Malvinas War.

21 You talk about cutting diplomatic relations, recognizing
22 the provisional government, and proceeding on that basis. I
23 think that that would have brought us to war in Central
24 America in short order and probably on some disadvantageous
25 grounds. I believed at the time and I still believe that the

1 Sandinista regime is vulnerable but that it had already
2 acquired such strength that we had to deal with it with the
3 full range of our policy instruments including diplomacy, and
4 I am back to the statements I made to Senator Humphrey that I
5 do not see much advantage then or now in cutting diplomatic
6 relations.

7 Senator Symms: How do we express this resolve then that
8 the President spoke of last night, that we have to have the
9 resolve? How do we demonstrate the resolve to the
10 surrounding countries so they do not become fainthearted and
11 either revert to a military, extremely authoritarian regime
12 or go to the left to a hard line authoritarian communist
13 regime to ingratiate themselves to the Sandinistas?

14 General Gorman: That goes to Senator Wilson's
15 questions. One of the reasons we brought the fleet to
16 Central America was not to impress the Sandinistas. I think
17 ^{and the Cubans} they understand we can ^{use naval power.} [do that]. We can take care of them
18 fairly readily. But to demonstrate the proximity of American
19 military help to the Costa Ricans or to the Hondurans or
20 indeed to the Salvadorans, in short, it was our answer to the
21 Soviet mechanized rifle division, the threat of ^{INVASION.} [-]

22 Senator Symms: Of course then that discouraged them from
23 doing what you said would make it easier then, if they would
24 go ahead and take the mechanised rifle division and run it
25 across the border into Costa Rica or Honduras, well, then we

1 would have, as you said, a clearcut situation to invoke the
2 Rio Treaty and --

3 General Gorman: Right, and that is the relevance of the
4 fleet. That is the counter to the mechanized rifle division
5 threat, if you will. A question of their own internal
6 security, which is the more serious problem, is a much more
7 difficult and much longer lasting problem, a much tougher nut
8 to crack for the United States, and it will take a long,
9 patient effort on our part to keep them with us.

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1 Senator Symms: You said you did not think the CIA was
2 equipped to do a proper training role, but you think the U.S.
3 Army is equipped to train to the Contras to do the
4 unconventional warfare and infrastructure to do this mission
5 and be successful?

6 General Gorman: Yes, I think we could do that.

7 Senator Symms: Would that include the necessity, then,
8 for some U.S. Army personnel to be in the country in
9 Nicaragua to do that?

10 General Gorman: I do not know. I do not know enough
11 about what kinds of nets you would have.

12 Senator Symms: The reason I asked these questions is it
13 just seems to me that our goal should very clearly be to rid
14 ourself of another Communist Soviet puppet government in
15 Nicaragua and not end up like we did with the Cuban fiasco.

16 General Gorman: If you were, as President, as Commander
17 in Chief, to tell me that is what you wanted to bring about,
18 I know how to do that, and it does not involve having to put
19 the American Marines in Managua again.

20 Senator Symms: That is what I have been trying to get
21 done ever since I have been in the Senate is to get the
22 President to issue those orders and have somebody that can do
23 it and accomplish it, but we are not giving you the
24 wherewithal or did not when you were there to get it done.
25 Did you ever get those orders?

1 General Gorman: I certainly did not get any orders like
2 that, no sir.

3 Senator Symms: Well, I think that statement that you
4 just made is what is wrong with our foriegn policy.
5 Leadership starts at the top, and we have to tell the troops
6 in the field what their mission is.

7 General Gorman: The guidance I got from the Congress of
8 the United States was all in the opposite direction. They
9 wanted to know how many people I had in El Salvador and how
10 many in Honduras and how many in Costa Rica, et cetera.

11 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Symms.

12 Senator McCain, our most patient member. Senator McCain,
13 you may go right to the head of the list this afternoon if we
14 decide to go for that first in/first question rule. It may
15 be the most important decision we make this year.

16 Senator McCain: I think you may be the only one up at
17 that end that may be with us, Mr. Chairman, but I hope we can
18 prevail. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General,
19 for being here and for providing very important testimony,
20 particularly on this whole aspect of low intensity conflict.

21 I do not mean to sound rude, but I have always shied away
22 of high intensity conflict, the nuclear aspect, because I
23 think you can count missiles with a sufficiently
24 sophisticated computer.

25 I think one of the reasons why we have not focused on the

1 issue that you bring here today is because it is so difficult
2 and complex and very difficult to get a handle on what
3 areas. You mentioned the five areas in the world where you
4 would be concentrating with an intelligence team at this
5 time. I think there would be somebody particularly here in
6 Congress who would see that as a great waste of money because
7 nothing happened.

8 Perhaps this will be repetitious to my previous
9 questioners, but you present us with a set of very, I think,
10 unpleasant choices, General, but I think I paid attention to
11 what you had said. Basically, you are saying in our present
12 configuration, Contras cannot win. I am not questioning that
13 judgment, but at the same time you advocate that we do more
14 to help their neighbors. Yet, the trend that I see is a
15 reduction in the security assistance throughout the world
16 with the exception of Israel and Egypt. I see nothing to
17 reverse that trend, particularly given the pressures of
18 Gramm-Rudman.

19 You mentioned the invocation of the Rio Pact. The
20 invocation of the Rio Pact to most Americans means U.S.
21 troops. You and I both rule out that likelihood if only for
22 political reasons alone, leaving aside the military aspect.

23 You mentioned that we need to do what we can to foster
24 and build up these democracies, and the great CSI in your
25 command which has such great prospects is basically dried

1 up. It is now an issue or a program that has lost its
2 glamour, certainly around here, and yet at the same time the
3 only option you provide us, as I understand your testimony,
4 is that we change the training and methodology of the Contras.

5 At the same time, in response to Senator Exon's
6 questions, you, I think, accurately pointed out that time is
7 not on our side. The revolution will consolidate. The block
8 watchers will become more vigorous, and the disappearances
9 and the concentration camps will grow. We have no reason to
10 suspect this model will be any different than previous
11 Marxist models.

12 So my question to you is is it realistic for this country
13 to, one, change the method of training? If so, how? We
14 ruled out the CIA as implementing this policy to some
15 degree. The example of 55 advisors which my esteemed and
16 good friend mentioned in El Salvador is a dramatic example,
17 in my opinion, of the absolute micromanagement of people like
18 yourselves.

19 We pay a great deal of money to investigate and be able
20 to make these kinds of decisions. How can we accomplish this
21 change in training of the Contras, and how long would it take
22 before they became a viable force? You really view, given
23 all the preceding comments that I have made, that that is
24 also a viable option, it seems to me, unless yours is sooner
25 or later faced with a major confrontation, whether it be in

1 Nicaragua or Guatemala or Mexico.

2 General Gorman: There are a lot of questions in there.
3 Let me see if I can pick out a couple of the salient ones,
4 and you can tell me if I am right.

5 First of all, I disagree with you on the question of the
6 Rio Pact, at least on Costa Rica. It happened once before.
7 They rolled the T-55^{tanks} up to the Customs House on the
8 Interamerican Highway, the border between Costa Rica and
9 Nicaragua, and all of the Costa Rican border guards withdrew
10 in alarm, which is understandable. If, as one Santinista
11 official, one of the Ortegas, told a Costa Rican diplomat
12 about that time if they had just kept going for San Jose, I
13 think you would get a vote from the Congress of the United
14 States for war in a trice.

15 Senator McCain: We have already agreed in your previous
16 statements that that is not the scenario. The scenario is
17 intimidation followed by bombings followed by assassinations
18 followed by --

19 General Gorman: I am just telling you that if Costa Rica
20 invokes the Rio Pact, we are going to be for it, and we would
21 be for it on dramatically disadvantaged grounds, nothing in
22 place.

23 Senator McCain: Okay.

24 General Gorman: The second point, yes, I would agree
25 with your assumption that security assistance budgets will go

1 down but, you know, you give 82 percent of what you have in
 2 the budget to just eight countries in the world, and the
 3 Central American program is somewhere down around two, three,
 4 four percent. I do not know what the current figures
 5 reflect. ^{But} [So] it is peanuts compared with the way you are
 6 allocating the funds otherwise. I am saying that you ought
 7 to take a hard look at that one.

8 Moreover, I believe that you could get a lot more for
 9 your security assistance dollars than you have been getting
 10 and thereby laying off the high dollar glamorous stuff like
 11 jet airplanes to the Hondurans and focusing on the kinds of
 12 things that they need to deal with that mechanized rifle
 13 division threat and by teaching them how to come to grips
 14 with the more likely problem which I think we both agree is
 15 what we are really going to have to deal with, how to cope
 16 with an insipient insurgency or would be terrorist movement
 17 sponsored from Nicaragua.

18 Now, this is the ^{sort} [sword] of an issue that brings
 19 dramatically to the ^{fore} [floor] the difficulties that the Congress
 20 has presented to us all of trying to implement foreign
 21 policy. You have the security assistance pot over here under
 22 one set of committees, one budget ^{category} [committee], and then you
 23 have [security] defense, if you will, over in another pot, a
 24 different group of players in the Congress, a different group
 25 of committees. Yet, when it comes to dealing with a country

1 like Costa Rica, which has no army and therefore is not
 2 addressable through the normal mechanisms of security
 3 assistance, we are really talking about a novel form of aid
 4 to a country that is facing a security threat.

5 I would hope that ^{as a result of} the recent law on low intensity
 6 conflict, the board that has been set up at the National
 7 Security Council and the ^{deputy} [advisor] to the President's National
 8 Security Advisor will turn as a matter of priority to the
 9 question of how in the world are you going to deal with low
 10 intensity conflict in places like Costa Rica and Honduras and
 11 bring Congress some proposals for fixing the problem.

12 Let me give you, at the risk of taking too much of your
 13 time, a couple of ideas that I think would help.

14 Tanks, they need antitank weapons. There are any number
 15 of people over in the Pentagon that are sllobbering to sell
 16 them TOW missiles. I do not think you should put TOWs into
 17 play down there, or at least I think you ought to do so ^{only} as a
 18 last recourse.

19 They have ^{106 millimeter recoilless rifles} [some] effective answers to T-55s, but ^{these} [they] are
 20 not capable of firing at night, and they do not have enough
 21 ^{accuracy} probability of hit. The Swedes recently figured out a way to
 22 take our old 106 recoilless rifle antitank weapon and, by
 23 putting an applique of high tech on the ^{sighting} [sighting] and aiming
 24 devices, gave it a 24-hour a day capability and greatly
 25 increased [the] probability of hit. The round will readily

1 penetrate the T-55.

2 Now, if we could get at a development like that through
3 our security assistance program, we could help the Hondurans
4 to a great deal of self-sufficiency with their existing
5 weapons systems; not new jets, but upgrade their existing
6 weapons systems.

7 In both countries, there is a crying need for air
8 transport. The sinews of government in both Costa Rica and
9 in Honduras are C-47 aircraft. Literally, they are tied
10 together with baling wire, and you have seen them down there,
11 Senator Wilson. They are scarcely believable as a flying
12 machine. It has been 30 years since ^{C-47s} [they] rolled off of the
13 factory, but that is the way the government ^{there} gets around to
14 the people. That is the way the political campaigns are
15 conducted. That is the way you move troops. That takes the
16 place of a road infrastructure which they do not have.

17 We have no aircraft up here that we could give them ^{in their place.} If
18 we give them a C-130, they would consume their entire annual
19 defense budget to fly the thing for a week. It is too
20 complicated for them to own and operate. The same thing is
21 true with our helicopters. We just need to learn how to be
22 relevant to those people on their terms, and ^a [the] modern C-47-like
23 rough-field-capable airlifter would be one of the things I
24 would go for as a way of demonstrating to them that the
25 United States is with them.

1 There are 20 or 30 other things that you could do as a
2 practical matter. It is not that you have no options. It
3 just takes a long time to talk your way through it.

4 The main thing you would gain by all of that is
5 convincing them, to go back to my answer to Senator Wilson,
6 that you are still with them, that you are going to stand
7 with them.

8 Now, the best document in town which lays out a plan for
9 doing all of this, is still the work of the President's
10 Bipartisan Commission on Central America, the so-called
11 Kissinger Report. That was on the ^{mark}[money], and it talks about
12 the allocation of sums of money vastly in excess of what the
13 Congress has thus far elected to appropriate, either economic
14 aid or security assistance. I think you ought to turn back
15 to that report and go after it. That is on the money.

16 Finally, with respect to the rebels, if you are going to
17 back the rebels, let us get serious about them and give them
18 a chance to win. I just do not think we have been that
19 serious about it.

20 Senator McCain: General, I am sorry. My last question
21 was if we went to the unconventional warfare mode, which you
22 stated was the only viable tactic, who would train them and
23 how long would it take?

24 General Gorman: I think you ought to give the job to the
25 Commander in Chief in the region, and the answer is years.

1 Senator McCain: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2 The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. McCain. I have just two or
3 three questions here for the General. Then we have other
4 hearings at 2 o'clock. You have been extremely gracious with
5 your time and very helpful here.

6 We talked about the definition of low intensity combat.
7 Your definition, as you stated it, is a narrow definition.
8 Other people have a broader definition. In terms of the
9 effect of this definitional difference of opinion, how
10 significant is it?

11 General Gorman: It is significant enough, in my view, to
12 threaten to underwrite a lot of dumb force structuring. I
13 can see low intensity conflict being used by people who want
14 to build barracks in Alaska or Fort Drum, New York or all
15 sorts of curious places.

16 The Chairman: I am shocked, General.

17 [Laughter.]

18 General Gorman: That is what I am arguing against on the
19 definitional issue. It seems to me that your work which is
20 attempting to clarify what is it that we set out to do as the
21 United States by way of strategic objectives, is right on ^{target} [the
22 money]. What is the purpose of these forces? When I hear
23 people telling me that we are raising these divisions to deal
24 with the problem in Central America, they leave me in the
25 dust. I think that that is a justification for actions that

1 have a whole range of other reasons for being brought into
 2 play but have nothing to do with the strategic objectives of
 3 the United States^{in Central America.}

4 The Chairman: Are you involved in an effort now, a
 5 strategy effort in the Department of Defense? Could you tell
 6 us generally about that?

7 General Gorman: There is not much to tell because the
 8 commission was just formed. The first meeting was
 9 December 15 over in the Executive Office Building, in the old
 10 Secretary of State Office there. The commission consists of
 11 a group of prestigious Americans: former Chairman Jack
 12 Vessey; the former Chief of Naval Operations, Jim Holloway;
 13 General Shreiver of the Air Force; General Goodpastor^S; some
 14 academics, Joshua^{Lederberg} Letterburn and Sam Huntington; Ann
 15 Armstrong, the Chairman of the President's Foreign
 16 Intelligence Advisory Board^[PFIAB]; three former National
 17 Security Advisors, Judge Clark, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry
 18 Kissinger, and others

19 The Chairman: What is the charge? What is your mandate?

20 General Gorman: The commission has been asked over the
 21 coming year to consider the strategies which the United
 22 States should pursue over the next 20 years, in other words
 23 looking into the next century, and lay out for the President
 24 a series of recommendations for appropriate strategies.
 25 Basically, ^{it has} we have just begun ^{its} our work.

1 The Chairman: Does that mandate include force structures
2 to go with those strategies?

3 General Gorman: The initial discussions established no
4 limitations. They were free to talk to the whole range of
5 problems. I presume that many of the issues that they will
6 address will be those that you, yourself, have dealt with
7 extensively over the past several years. For example,
8 questions came up on force structure, resources for defense,
9 et cetera.

10 You would not be at all surprised to hear that many
11 opined that it is not the amounts of money that ^{Defense} [you] gets from
12 year to year but the funding stream that really in the long
13 sense makes the difference, and that ^{we} [you] could probably do
14 more with less if ^{we} [you] had some sort of assured funding from
15 year to year.

16 So I suspect there is going to be a lot of restating of
17 some of the arguments with which you are probably more
18 familiar than any other American.

19 The Chairman: I am delighted you are on that commission,
20 General Gorman. I think that is enormously important. Do
21 you have a time frame for completion of that?

22 General Gorman: Yes, sir. It was stated to be one
23 year. They met on December 15. Their work will presumably
24 finish in December 198⁷.

25 The Chairman: Now, I am the last one to criticize

1 outside commissions because I think most of them have been
 2 very helpful in the last two or three years that I have been
 3 connected in one way or another, but in an ideal world you
 4 would not need an outside commission to come in and tell us
 5 what our strategy should be.

6 Why do we need a commission? What is wrong with these
 7 thousands of people we have over there in the Pentagon in
 8 terms of their ability, or is it lack of ability, lack of
 9 education, lack of training, lack of strategic thinking, or
 10 is it just the way we are organized? Are we just organized
 11 in a way that we cannot focus on strategy?

12 General Gorman: I think the latter is probably as close
 13 a characterization of it as you need. I would comment that
 14 in all of my years ^{close to} [as sort of] at the top of the military
 15 structure over there, there was relatively little discussion
 16 beyond the kinds of generalities that you would see in the
 17 Chairman's statement, or in the Defense Guidance, of what U.S.
 18 strategic objectives really ought to be.

19 Almost all of the discussions [of those] were related, as
 20 you remarked earlier, to the apocalyptic contingencies of a
 21 major war with the Soviet Union. There were almost never any
 22 connections drawn between the objectives and the resources.

23 [Now,] General Goodpastor's triad of questions were rarely asked
 24 and even more seldomly answered.

25 So in the sense that you are inviting commentary here in

1 these hearings, at least in my experience up through 1985,
 2 there just was not much of that. It was getting better. I
 3 think General Vessey and his colleagues in the JCS deserve
 4 some degree of credit for the steps that they took to bring
 5 about a better dialogue.

6 For example, each of the CINCs, regional CINCs, were
 7 required to come in for show and tell before the JCS on their
 8 plans, but that is hardly the level of debate. ^{you ask for} [This is] ^{It was}
 9 ^{the} operational ^{art} [heart] that we are discussing there at that kind
 10 of a meeting. ^{That} [This] is hardly the kind of high level
 11 discussion that you are inviting.

12 So, to sum it all up, I think you are right, that we have
 13 had a dearth of such discussion here in Washington. It is
 14 high time that we brought it to pass. The Packard Commission
 15 began, as you know, ^{with} [There are] reservations on the
 16 difficulties we were facing with allocating resources for
 17 defense, ^{but} [and] we began our observations to the President in
 18 our initial report with the advice that he should, at the
 19 outset of any budget cycle, enunciate a set of objectives and
 20 provide some resource guidance so that the Chiefs and the
 21 Secretary of Defense could then address such issues ^{as} [of] force
 22 structure within ^{strategic} [some kind of] a framing context. I hope that
 23 that is happening. I do not, of course, have any way of
 24 knowing.

25 The Chairman: I would imagine the average taxpayer out

1 there would have assumed that would have been the starting
2 point for the last 40 years. It is amazing how you get into
3 bureaucratic habits and do not ask essential questions.

4 General Gorman: I think that like most other aspects of
5 American life, we sort of all learn to play the ball where it
6 lies. When a man becomes a member of the JCS or, indeed, the
7 Secretary of Defense, he sort of has to start with the force
8 structure he has got, and he is usually handed along with
9 that a whole set of presumptions about what [that] is in
10 existence and a whole group of bureaucrats whose very
11 existence depends on not only keeping it there, but making it
12 grow.

13 So the institution discourages a kind of fundamental
14 reappraisal of the sort that you are advocating. I think it
15 is a very healthy development, Senator.

16 The Chairman: General Gorman, thank you very much.

17 Senator Wilson.

18 Senator Wilson: General Gorman, let me just ask you a
19 question on your last comment. I think that is an
20 interesting cue.

21 You said that whoever it is has to pay the ball where he
22 finds it. That has been more or less true in a way. You
23 would expect choices that have been available to Congress, so
24 it has largely been self-proposed. I quite agree with you.
25 We have not done the Kissinger Bipartisan initial report

1 which should have been done, and instead the focus has been
2 almost exclusively on whether we support or fail to support
3 aid to the Contras for its so-called nonlethal, which is an
4 amazing euphemism by itself, and second, actual arms
5 assistance.

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1 It seems to me that you are speaking with great good
2 sense, as always, and I think a lot of us who have fervently
3 supported aid to the Contras have never been under any
4 illusion that they were going to roll into Managua, but the
5 symbolism alone seems to me has been an argument in favor of
6 voting for that aid simply to give some reasonable assurance
7 that was otherwise almost totally missing, to the Costa
8 Ricans, to the Salvadorans, to the Hondurans.

9 My concern is that we will now not undertake the kind of
10 good advice that you have given us, and that the comments you
11 have made in all candor this morning will be seized upon by
12 some and simply saying there is no point in supporting the
13 Contras without saying, as you have very clearly, that there
14 is a necessity to take action; that the situation is not
15 unchangeable; and that if we do not take some action of some
16 kind to resist the result, we look forward to a result that
17 ultimately the Managua regime is going to outlast this
18 Administration and, by subversion of its neighbors, prevail
19 in a way that will never invoke the provisions of the Rio
20 Pact.

21 So to be clear, it seems to me that what you have said
22 this morning is that instead of arming the Contras for a
23 conventional attack, we should undertake a conscious strategy
24 decision in the U.S. national security interest, and in the
25 interest of the democracies surrounding Nicaragua, to engage

1 the Contras in a program that will prepare them for a
2 successful unconventional warfare in actual practice.

3 The Chairman: Senator Wilson, I am going to have to
4 leave. I have been held up on this meeting. Why do you not,
5 after this question and answer, if you would, close the
6 meeting.

7 Senator Wilson: Yes, Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman: General Gorman, thank you very much for
9 being here. You have been a great help.

10 General Gorman: Thank you, sir. Thanks for inviting me.

11 Senator Wilson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 General Gorman: Senator Wilson, there are three
13 essentials for U.S. policy, it seems to me, at this
14 juncture. One is some kind of a coherent regional policy,
15 political, economic, military, along the lines of that
16 recommended by the President's Bipartisan Commission, which
17 will reassure our friends, preserve democracy, and do all we
18 can to offset the malevolent influence of the Sandinista
19 Regime.

20 Secondly, we have got to have a coherent strategy for the
21 Nicaraguan rebels. Clearly it is going to take years, and I
22 mean literally years. All of the questions I ^{got} [get] from the
23 Congress in my previous appearances, and some of these quotes
24 that were used ^{here,} were in the context of discussions of can we
25 win this year? You know, when is it going to be over?

1 Well, the answer is that it is not going to be over, not
 2 for the foreseeable future. I cannot tell you when it is.
 3 You are just going to have to face the fact that if you want
 4 to back them, you are going to have to do it right, and you
 5 are going to have to play it for many years to come.

6 But the third component of ^{U.S.} [that] policy ought to be a
 7 systematic approach to the Sandinistas confronting them with
 8 our resolve to remain in the region, and to oppose use of
 9 their position and capabilities to intimidate or actually to
 10 subvert their neighbors. [and] ^{to communicate} certainly, our resolve to oppose
 11 their invading their neighbors, and our long-term intention
 12 to support Nicaraguans who want to oust them to see if we
 13 cannot bring about some settlement [of the difficulty] along
 14 the lines that have already been proposed: a cease fire,
 15 [some kind of] an internationally supervised pleb^Sicite, or
 16 elections, which would put [this government,] the Sandinista
 17 government through some form of test under guarantees that
 18 the opposition parties would be able to bring their message
 19 to the people, and that the polling would be conducted under
 20 [something like] reasonable security.

21 That may still be doable. But if we let the situation go
 22 on as it has been with this half-help, no help, the amateur
 23 night kind of debacle that we have had down there lately, you
 24 simply strengthen the hands of the Sandinistas and you make
 25 coherent policy of the sort that I have ^{described} [preserved] impossible

1 for the next President, whomever he may be, to pursue.

2 Senator Wilson: Based on your long observations both as
 3 CINC of ^{US} SOUTHCOM and also since, could you tell me what level
 4 of confidence you have in the Contadora process to bring this
 5 about? Can they do this, the kinds of things you have been
 6 talking about? Or are they necessarily initiatives that have
 7 to be undertaken by the United States?

8 General Gorman: Well, none of us have had any strong
 9 sensing that the Contadora process, so-called, was going to
 10 get us where we wanted to be, but it has had the useful
 11 effect of obtaining a ^S consensus that was not there before
 12 among the nations most affected by the outcome: ~~The~~ Costa
 13 Ricans, the Hondurans, and the Salvadorans, and the
 14 Guatamalans.

15 These external Contadora group nations, Mexico and
 16 Venezuela and Colombia, Panama, et cetera, should be
 17 applauded for their attempts to intervene diplomatically in
 18 this very difficult issue, but the best thing they did was to
 19 get the ^{Care-Four} [COR-4] together, ^{countries} not part of the original group, and
 20 to develop a ^S consensus among ^{the latter} [them] on what it is that they
 21 would settle for. [Other than of course a violent overthrow]

22 The terms that they have come up with, in my view, are
 23 reasonable and they, if pursued, even open up the prospect of
 24 some kind of a strategic tradeoff of the sort that Mr.
 25 Erzezinski refers to, where as part of the resolution of the

1 difficulties vis-a-vis Afghanistan, there would be some
2 associated formula applied in Central America.

3 The test which one should bring to such a formula--you
4 have already sort of outlined. The test should be, in the
5 aftermath of such a settlement, will Honduras and Costa Rica
6 remain democratic? Will they have the requisite
7 self-confidence, economic viability, and effective internal
8 security to survive as nascent democracies?

9 If the answer is no, then we should reject the
10 proposals. Nonetheless, that kind of idea, that kind of
11 linkage is not all bad, and probably at least ought to be
12 thought through and talked about here in Washington in the
13 months to come.

14 To sum up, you have been asking, as usual, a set of very
15 perceptive questions, and you have correctly pointed to the
16 fact that the issue cannot be understood simply in terms of
17 voting yes or no on are we going to send more money to the
18 Contras. It is a far more set of complex issues.

19 Senator Wilson: I do not want to detain you longer, but
20 having you here is a rare opportunity, so I may abuse it
21 slightly if you are good-humored enough.

22 General Gorman: Certainly, sir.

23 Senator Wilson: Let me just ask you this. You have
24 mentioned something that takes me to another comparison that
25 I would be interested in having you make. I assume that the

1 Sandanistas are not as good, and certainly no better than the
2 red army.

3 Would you compare the performance of the Contras and that
4 of the Mujahedin in Afghanistan against the Russians? Also,
5 I would be interested in a comparison of the effectiveness of
6 the Contras as compared with the insurgents against the
7 government in El Salvador.

8 General Gorman: Let us take the Afghans first. As I
9 understand Afghan tribalism, the first sign of manhood is the
10 presentation of a weapon and the use of a rifle and the
11 skills associated with combat are part and parcel of the
12 upbringing of those young men. There is nothing like that in
13 Central America, where martial skills are largely unknown.

14 The Central American is not sociologically a fighter.
15 Now there are some reservations one can make, particularly in
16 El Salvador, but by and large they are quite different
17 societies ^{from the Afghans} with respect to their attitude toward violence,
18 death, et. cetera.

19 On the other hand, there is a long history, as you know,
20 of revolution, changing governments, particularly in
21 Nicaragua. There have been people in the hills, as I
22 remarked earlier, in arms against whatever government was in
23 Managua since the turn of the Century, and some of those were
24 pretty tough hombres. But they are by and large a different
25 kind of a fighter than what I understand the Afghan to be.

1 Now you asked about the Salvadoran guerillas and their
 2 contrast with the Contras. The difference is the difference
 3 between the amateur and the professional. The Salvadoran
 4 guerilla command^aente^s have been trained for their position.
 5 Many of them have been at war for years. You may recall my
 6 bringing up and showing you one time a map that we had picked
 7 up on a battlefield up near the border. It was a plan drawn
 8 out on a sheet of paper for an attack on a [defended bridge, a]
 9 government-defended bridge.

10 The notations on that plan were right out of the Soviet
 11 Field Manual. Symbol for symbol, [all of the--] this was a plan
 12 drawn by somebody who had been educated to the standards of
 13 the Soviet General Staff College. It was a first-class
 14 professional piece of work. He had the ^{Communications} [COM] plan, the fire
 15 plan, the ^{maneuver} schedules for all of the various elements, the
 16 rendezvous points, the fallback positions--it was as complete
 17 a plan as you could see out at Fort Le^avenworth, and all done
 18 in Soviet symbology.

19 Now in the Contras you are dealing with a force that is
 20 about 90 percent illiterate, ^{and in a military sense largely untrained.} [That is not just that they have
 21 not been educated; they cannot even read.] It is not just
 22 that they did not have any military education, in other
 23 words, they cannot read or write. Maps are incomprehensible
 24 to them. They do not understand fire ^{and} movement. They do not
 25 have a fundamental grasp of how to put together an attack

1 like those guerillas in Salvador, and they just have not had
2 practice.

3 ^{Unlike Salvador's guerrillas, the Contras}
4 [They] are not a force that has been subjected to a great
5 deal of military duress, and the natural leaders have not
6 bubbled up. It is a very different kind of a proposition.

7 Senator Wilson: So it is not simply a question of the
8 level of arms.

9 General Gorman: No, sir, by no means. I think you could
10 double or triple the level of arms, and you would not get an
11 iota more effectiveness.

12 Senator Wilson: General, thank you. You have been more
13 than generous and, as usual, have been provocative and have
14 provided us with valuable testimony, and we are much in your
15 debt. Thank you.

16 General Gorman: Thank you, sir.

17 [Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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