

## LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: AMERICAN DILEMMA

For over a quarter of a century in these United States, national security policy makers, military professionals of all ranks, and many among the amorphous elite referred to in the media as "defense intellectuals", have puzzled over that genre of political violence known as insurgency or guerrilla warfare. We have come together to discuss what some of us have recently been calling low intensity conflict (often abbreviated as LIC). The term is a not altogether satisfactory synonym denoting contemporary terrorism and other forms of insurgency (or counterinsurgency, depending on one's perspective). Since the framers of this conference have invited us into a semantic morass, let me be sure you understand what I am not talking about:

\* I am not talking only about Special Operations or forces for same (SOF). Regretably there are a number of Department of Defense officials who seem to equate low intensity conflict to the employment of these, but I see situations requiring the use of SOF as a subset of much larger challenges within the LIC rubric.

\* I am not talking about counterinsurgency as that term was understood back in the days when I groaned under the title of Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for same. I sincerely hope that the military hubris and political naivete which then afflicted our policies may never again be associated with U.S. policies for low intensity conflict.

\* I am not just talking about one facet of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions. True, LIC is often just that, for both great powers are usually involved, and on opposite sides of Third World conflicts. But it is important for success of U.S. policy to recognize that such conflicts often arise from causes remote from the influence of either, and it would be both falacious and imprudent to translate all such conflicts involving U.S. interests into East-West confrontations.

\* And I am not focusing exclusively on terrorism, although that phenomenon is surely a form of LIC of particular interest at the moment.

Like most of our military vocabulary, the term low intensity conflict is not indigenous, or at least the British spoke and wrote about it years ago, long before I can remember hearing it used in American parlance --e.g. Frank Kitson's Low Intensity Operations, 1971. When I have used it recently, I hope I have been clear that mine is a peculiarly American referent, fully as particular to our circumstance as small wars was once to that of the British Empire (borrowed, incidentally, by the U.S. Marine Corps for their superb manual by that name published in 1940). Obviously, one would not want to employ the "low intensity" descriptor in talking with an Afghan Freedom Fighter, with Napoleon Duarte,<sup>1</sup> or with Arturo Cruz about the conflict in which each is engaged, the intensity of which may be

<sup>1</sup> At the Conference on 15 January 1986, General Blandon of El Salvador's Army took exception to the term, saying that his war was high intensity indeed.

as high as he wishes to contemplate. Yet today, I submit, consideration of relative intensity is sine qua non for U.S. strategists, defense programmers, and legislators.

There is, after all, a distinction which we Americans ought to continue to make between high intensity conflict involving all weapons and forces at our disposal, war which would affect vast areas and populations, and conflict in which we would seek deliberately to restrain our forces, to limit their weaponry, or to circumscribe their operations geographically, qualitatively, or quantitatively. Our ability to prevail in such limited conflicts has been a key element of our containment strategy vis a vis the Soviet Union since the mid-'40's. But here the dilemma obtrudes: readiness for the more intense forms of possible conflicts is the principal pursuit of U.S. General Purpose Forces. But such readiness does not entail, we have found through painful experience, preparedness for such ambiguous challenges to U.S. interests as might be presented by those who, out of need or out of choice, avoid confronting the United States with forces comparable to our own, and have recourse instead to pursuing their political objectives by means of criminals, terrorists, or guerrillas. The North Vietnamese-Viet Cong coalition, for example, confronted us with a subtle mix of conventional and unconventional forces. In fact, that sort of recourse to violence for political purposes presents a series of difficulties for U.S. defense planners which include the following:

- (1) LIC is inherently a form of warfare repugnant to Americans, a conflict which involves innocents, in which non-combatant casualties may be an explicit object. Its perpetrators are secretive, conspiratorial, and usually morally unconstrained. Their operations are the antithesis of respect for human rights. They can succeed if all they undertake is death and destruction, and yet they can impose on a defending government grave imperatives for restraint, heightened regard for human rights, creative reconstruction and societal reform under stress.
- (2) The very lack of comparability between low intensity threats and prospective responses by the U.S. has tended to confound us in devising an appropriate national strategy, and in preparing and defending national security budgets. "Proportionality," one of the tests of just war, is at issue here, but also how to explain why we need money for specific defense expenditures. As defense budgets become more strained in the future, allocations for readiness for low intensity conflict seem even more problematic.
- (3) Low intensity conflict brings into play political forces Americans often find obscure and inaccessible. General Bill DePuy has written a retrospect on Vietnam for the forthcoming issue of ARMY magazine in which he points out that:

...we never quite built a viable Government of South Vietnam. It was a hollow structure girded and propped by a pervasive American presence. An American ignition harness extended to every level. The power generator lay outside the machine itself. When it was withdrawn, the spark plugs no longer fired. It is difficult for this democracy of ours to deal with the political dimensions of insurgency. The kinds of measures and risks that

need to be taken, the arbitrary (and often undemocratic) controls which may be required, do not go down well here at home where the value system is unique and to a large extent non-exportable. Our Congress is in a constant state of dither and shock over the slightest suggestion that we are selecting, installing and supporting strong leaders. Yet when we do not, the other side does. At least, by now we should recognize that we may be reasonably competent in the economic and military fields and even have something to offer on the plane of counter-terror but in the center ring -- the political heart of the matter -- we are self constrained by our own history and political processes and therefore vulnerable to failure.

I agree throughly with General DePuy, and deplore in particular the lack of trust between the Executive and Legislative branches which makes bipartisan policy difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

(4) Because we have difficulty defining the threat to our interests, and because of the political dimensions of the problem, our leaders are frequently impaired in explaining publicly what they are about. Even when they can cogently address domestic audiences, there still remains our friends and our adversaries: with neither is candor a sure rule for public statements. A careless phrase uttered in Washington might undo weeks of careful diplomacy with the former. And concerning the latter, as is the case with prospective foes in higher intensity conflict, incalculability -- to use SACEUR's word -- is a major contributor to deterrence.


(5) Low intensity conflict, experience suggests, makes news. This does make a difference, not only for U.S. officials strapped to find a way to set forth a credible policy line, but also for our friends abroad. Those we help must accomodate to having their social fabric subjected to minute scrutiny by the American media and described in not altogether charitable fashion, fleas, ticks, lice and all. And their enemies invariably learn to play our media better than our friends, to our and their consternation.

(6) There is a propensity among some of our leaders, especially those within the Department of Defense, to define the United States out of low intensity conflict. This is not a new phenomenon; President Eisenhower can fairly be said to have entertained a strong aversion to minor, regional conflict, and to insist that the Department of Defense focus its resources and energies on readiness for a contest with the U.S.S.R. But we live in a more dangerous world than that of the '50's, and it is unfortunate that our Southeast Asia experience has led officials to lay down explicit conditions for the commitment of U.S. forces, stipulations which, however helpful in assuaging doubts in Congress or in the electorate, vitiate incalculability.

I have been using the term low intensity conflict to remind that there is a contemporary need to find a better way of explicating for Congress and the public how we should structure our forces and devise policies to meet the exigencies of such unsymmetric warfare, so remote from our own national principles and predilections. I am disposed to use three relatively simple constructs. The first presents a continuum of possible conflicts

differentiated by both a intensity and risk, the latter concept embracing costs as well:


### SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT



I have suggested that this is a paradigm which might be used in a Soviet staff college to call attention to the strategic advantages for the U.S.S.R. of low intensity conflict (I assure you I have no reason to believe that such has been the case). And I believe that attempts to link the Soviets to all low intensity conflict are founded in misapprehension. But as the diagram suggests, there is ample strategic attraction to low intensity conflict for those of aggressive intent who cannot wage, or cannot risk, more intense conflict.

My second construct is, I submit, the way a U.S. planner should consider the warfare continuum.


## PROBABILITY vs INTENSITY



We ought to weigh the probability of the several possible forms of conflict, if we are to formulate cogent defense policy. There is virtual certainty that U.S. interests are going to continue to be engaged with political terrorism. In some areas of the world, notably in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean Basin, terrorists, subversives, and insurgents have found common cause with narcotics traffickers smuggling cocaine, marijuana, and heroin into the United States -- a particularly dangerous coalition of wealth, arms, and utter unscrupulousness. It also seems quite likely that governments which we support are going to have to contend with more pervasive and destructive forms of insurgency. Challenges which might precipitate mid- or high intensity conflict involving the U.S. are less

probable, although bearing in mind their grave risks and costs, we cannot for a moment stint on measures for deterring these. The question remains, are we doing enough to ready our defenses against the more probable, less intense, conflicts? To answer, I have used a third construct, which arrays upon the probability function just presented those capabilities or type forces most likely to be used were the U.S. called upon to cope with a range of increasingly intense conflicts:

## FORCE FUNCTIONS



I have here put distance between myself and those who tend to think of force structure in terms of the major components of our General Purpose Forces --Air Force Wings, Army Divisions, Marine Amphibious Forces, Navy Carrier Battle Groups-- for I maintain that these elements are largely irrelevant to the most probable tasks U.S. forces are likely to be called upon to perform in low intensity conflict. For instance, at a recent meeting here at NDU, the Australian attache asked me whether I thought that the Army's new light infantry division would raise readiness for low intensity conflict. I responded that the main reasons for restructuring the division --intercontinental mobility-- had little to do with low intensity conflict, and that employment of any division therein I thought

less possible than using other type Army units not similarly tailored for their strategic and tactical tasks. Similarly, my former colleague, Brigadier General Doc Bahnsen, writing in the November Armed Forces Journal, held that the Light Infantry Division (LID) is:

...essentially a division designed for a single role --low intensity conflict (LIC). Given agreement that LIC is an appropriate role for conventional forces, although our Vietnam experience strongly established just the opposite, few would argue that the LID with its high rifle strength is not properly designed.


Doc will not be surprised to hear that I am among the few who would argue that the design of the LID in the '80s was as little prompted by concern for LIC as was the design of the Airmobile Division for "counterinsurgency" in the '60s.

But back to the diagram. Allow me two important stipulations concerning this paradigm:

First, national intelligence must be envisaged as a necessary backdrop to any conceivable U.S. response to a LIC threat. Indeed, accurate perception of the threat, coupled with adequate warning of its actualization, are necessary conditions for assessing political, economic and military goals, for keeping U.S. risks and costs as low as possible, and for deterring effectively similar future challenges. When I discuss intelligence further, I will be referring to developments beyond national means, to theater as opposed to strategic intelligence, to tactical or operational intelligence.

Second, another contextual imperative is the presence of U.S. military forces which make evident both a willingness and a capacity to employ conventional fire and maneuver should our interests so require. I endorse Admiral James Watkins construct, presented in his essay on "The Maritime Strategy", distributed with the latest Naval Institute Proceedings, as follows:

### ***The Spectrum of Conflict***



In LIC, so long as maritime forces remain "over the horizon", in international waters or aerospace, and outside the interdicts of the War Powers Resolution, such deployments seem to be readily accepted by both Congress and the public. In a number of recent situations, presence of our forces seems to have been essential for deterring overt military adventurism by a would-be aggressor. In the instance of the PLO and Libya, U.S. Navy F-14s have proven to be a trump card. But in terms of enheartening beleaguered friends, I point out that there have been times when the deployment of a humble engineer company or a handful of unarmed aircraft have constituted a more effective "show of force" than a display by large naval or air forces.

To return to my own paradigm, the first, most probable "force function" I have listed is Special Operations, referring to U.S. military forces equipped and trained to defend key personnel and sensitive installations, to provide surveillance, and to conduct raids and ambushes. Obviously, such Special Operations Forces (SOF) are useful across the whole spectrum of warfare, and in that sense one should interpret their citation not as a point, but as a band extending across the entire range of intensity. I emphasize again that the nomenclature "Special Operations" is not coextensive with "low intensity operations". But we all need to appreciate that to be ready for low intensity conflict, the U.S. needs a few highly trained, well equipped, strategically and tactically mobile units --air, land, and sea capable-- which can be committed outside our national domain to foil terrorist plots, and to deal discriminately with hostage incidents. We have had an understandable propensity to form such units around mobile, capable elements in the force structure originally designed for other purposes--Army Special Forces and Rangers, Navy SEALs, and Air Force Special Operations Wings. This practice presents two difficulties: our armed forces abhor elites, which these units properly ought to be, and our service planners allocate resources with priority to utility in mid- and high intensity conflict. Naturally enough, then, even within the SOF elites there is a yearning to identify with the "main force", manifested in preoccupation with readiness for Unconventional Warfare missions associated with the resource-generating major plans for mid- or high intensity war, rather than for unsung roles in low intensity conflict of bodyguard or overseas SWAT team.

I agree that we need to endow our Special Operations Forces with higher attention within the military profession, and within DoD resourcing. But I am not in sympathy with the proposal to place SOF under a DoD agency. Their difficulty with service identity would be compounded, and their relationships with the unified and specified commands would be even more troubled than they are under the present arrangement. No, these are matters that the Secretary should instruct the JCS to work out, for only the Chiefs and the CINCs can set it all right.

Fixing the SOF, however important, is not tantamount to fixing our unreadiness for LIC. We must not allow ourselves to forget that even very efficient Special Operations Forces could deal with only a small part of the threats we face from subversion, international criminality, and terrorism abroad. As a national strategy for coping with such threats, I believe that we must look for ways to help other countries to deal with the perpetrators within the framework of their own laws and culture. Hence

the importance I ascribe to "Security Assistance" as a relevant function of the Armed Forces.

It is true that Security Assistance policies and budgets are under the purview of the Department of State, and proceed through Congress under Committees concerned with international relations. It is also true that the Defense Security Assistance Agency is a civilianized bureaucracy which in my experience maintains closer working relationships with the service materiel commands than with the operational commands. But where there is a friendly government abroad struggling against internal political violence, there is also likely to be a claimant for U.S. Security Assistance. And in such a country, almost invariably Security Assistance will be personified by members of the U.S. armed services, either stationed there with our Country Team, or deployed there on temporary duty. In the final analysis, the efficacy of aid from the United States is determined by the professionalism, communicative skills, and diligence of these officers and noncommissioned officers. But if military professionals have difficulty with their services on SOF assignments, those on Security Assistance duty abroad are up against two or three times as hard a problem in obtaining recognition for their contributions. In fact, there is a significant, largely overlooked congruence between our key cadres for Security Assistance and those for SOF, or at least such was my experience. And I can assure you that rotating among SOF and Security Assistance jobs is not a pathway to recognition and rapid promotion, although both entail stress on family and continuing personal risks much greater than do conventional line and staff careers. Here again, it seems to me, is a problem which the Secretary of Defense and the JCS need to redress.

Security Assistance presents much more of a problem than personnel policy. Most of the funds allocated go toward sweetening basing arrangements (e.g., Spain, the Philippines, Korea) or to Cain/Abel pairings --bribing one of a fraternal pair of friends abroad not to cut the throat of the other (e.g., Egypt/Israel, Greece/Turkey). Very little is left to give away to Third World nations struggling with LIC. And the extension of credit to nations unable to service current debts is an empty gesture.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE\* ALLOCATION

<u>Region</u>	<u>Nation</u>	<u>% Region</u>	<u>% World</u>
East Asia and Pacific.....			5.8
	Korea	50	2.9
	Philippines	15	0.9
Near East and S. Asia.....			61.0
	Egypt	36	22.0
	Isreal	49	33.0
Europe.....			27.1
	Greece	28	7.6
	Turkey	40	10.8
	Portugal	10	2.7
	Spain	25	6.7
Africa.....			1.9
American Republics.....			4.3
	El Salvador	52	0.9
	Honduras	25	0.4
			<u>100</u>

\*Security Assistance includes Military Assistance, Foreign Military Sales Financing, and Training, but excludes Economic Support Funds.

The Administration proposal for FY 1986 Security Assistance amounted about \$6 billions. But as may be seen from the table, just 8 nations received over 80%: half was allocated to Egypt/Isreal; Greece/Turkey and basing quid pro quo added to that (including Korea, Philippines, Portugal and Spain) comprise 83.6% of the program. The much-publicized Salvadoran program amounted to less that 1% of the total, and the Hondurans, gravely exposed by U.S. policies in Central America, received less that one-half of one percent.

But even if there were more funds available for such LIC-prone regions as Central America, to put it bluntly the U.S. can no longer be of much material help to a Third World country wrestling with insurgency because we do not have the sort of inexpensive, simple, rugged military equipment they require. Even more cripplingly, we charge too much for the training we can provide.

I believe that the dangers of contemporary low intensity conflict are sufficiently grave to warrant another major, government-wide reexamination of the purposes and modalities of aid tendered under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The armed services no longer have huge quantities of equipment being rendered surplus by modernization, and, in any event, U.S. military equipment is now too complicated and too expensive for most Third World friends. But there is much that the American military professionals and American technologists could do to help them if the price were made right, and if we could find a way to undertake modest research and development projects aimed at foreign forces rather than our own, and to transfer low-order technology to increase the self-sufficiency and economic productivity of countries we support. Permit me to offer three examples of what might be done under more flexible laws and policies:

1. We could build, alone or with Brazil or our NATO allies, a Third World airlifter. We would be seeking to manufacture a transport which was low in cost both to buy and to operate, and easily crewed and maintained. We would want it to have short takeoff and land characteristics, and a capability to operate from rough fields. We would want it to be adaptable, through kits and pallet loads, for medical evacuation, reconnaissance and fire support. And we would want its avionics compatible with our own. How desperately such an aircraft is needed, in so many countries! I would have it in our own forces to insure a training and logistic base, manned perhaps by Reserve Component crews. And I would propose loaning or leasing the aircraft as Security Assistance, with right of recall or CRAF-like "call-up" in the event of a major contingency operation by U.S. forces (mid or high intensity conflict).
  
2. We could manufacture here in the U.S. a robot unmanned aircraft capable of close-up, silent reconnaissance, both day and night. This robot could be controlled either from the ground, from a manned aircraft, or even via satellite. It could be launched and recovered from the deck of any ship, or from any soccer field. And it could stay aloft twenty-four hours. This is no R&D pipe dream. Such an aircraft could be flying this year if there were but a way to fund it. And it could aid our own forces, or be loaned to friends as Security Assistance.
  
3. We could transform the mobility of many foreign armies with two simple technology transfers: durable boot soles and canned field rations. Showing a government how to make boots so that its soldiers might be shod for extended patrols across rough terrain, and how to prepare food so that they could be fed without confiscating the meals of peasants, could literally double or triple the usefulness of its forces.

I suggest that now is the time for a new chapter in the saga of American foreign aid, in which it will be recorded that the United States finally turned its talents --military personnel, engineers, industrialists-- to helping others defend themselves against subversives, criminals, and terrorists.

I have also assigned "intelligence" an early and important role in low intensity conflict. Again, I am speaking here about the sort of detailed intelligence that Washington rarely requires, but that a Country Team, a CINC, or a friendly nation might need urgently for plans and operations. In the usual case, national intelligence must be supplemented with fine-grain, local collectors, both human and technological. The United States has among its armed forces considerable resources which might be focused on such missions. But these were brought into being for other purposes, chiefly readiness for higher intensity conflict, and diversion to "lesser" threats entails acceptance of risk by other CINCs, or programming dedicated assets for low intensity conflict, a step excruciatingly difficult for services in the throes of modernization. Moreover, non-military intelligence services, and many Ambassadors, are reluctant to ask for military intelligence assets, often out of simple prejudice. But it is a fact that military intelligence units are often awkward to host abroad, equipped and manned as most of them are for

missions in a different form of warfare. I believe that DoD ought to require the services to reexamine the entire military intelligence structure to determine how it might be turned to better advantage against LIC threats. I am convinced by experience that any serious incidence of low intensity conflict requires at least three very significant modifications in existing intelligence structure and technique:

- \* Stationing in the Washington, D.C., area of a substantial analytical detachment from the involved unified command, capable of extracting and melding information from all of the several collection systems which "stovepipe" into the Capitol.
- \* Stripping out of military intelligence units prior to deployment abroad as much personnel and equipment as possible, leaving a rear echelon in operation within CONUS, linked by satellite communications with the forward echelon. This echelonment may be difficult or impossible to maintain in other forms of conflict, but it is very relevant for LIC. This "LIC posture" should be rehearsed, and any necessary modifications in personnel or equipment undertaken as a matter of urgency for readiness.
- \* Drawing the Country Team and the Theater Commander into coherent management of intelligence collection and dissemination. It is now technologically feasible for key decision-makers simultaneously to participate, in several sites in Washington, in a Theater CINC's CP, and in any one or several U.S. Embassy's abroad, in the same intelligence briefings, or to evaluate collectively a changed situation. The President ought to make such procedures mandatory.

Intelligence is information that has been evaluated and situated between the ears of a decider or operator. Intelligence therefore requires communications. I continue to be dismayed at the seeming inability of the U.S. government to provide for reliable, flexible communications among the formulators and practitioners of its policies. The communications of the Department of State have seldom been adequate, in my experience, for dealing with Third World crises. The communications of the Department of Defense are much more facile, but suffer three deficiencies for dealing with low intensity conflict:

1. DoD assets are reserved for the contingencies of mid- or high intensity conflict, and are only reluctantly and sparingly made available for LIC situations.
2. DoD assets are expensive, complicated and manpower-intensive, buttressed as they are against electromagnetic pulse and the energetic high technology countermeasures of a world-power adversary.
3. DoD assets are not welcomed in most Embassies, for the usual Deputy Chief of Mission will vigorously oppose installation of any communications over which he does not exercise direct, continuous control.

And so, in most LIC situations, the broadcast media have had better communications with their headquarters than representatives of the U.S. government on the scene. Surely the President can remedy this as well.

Civic Action, the provision of aid to the populace from military forces, is a contentious undertaking. Most Ambassadors and AID Country Directors look upon it with suspicion because the military may thereby usurp projects which should properly be performed by civilian agencies or the private sector. When it comes to U.S. forces in such roles, such concerns multiply. But if civic action projects are carefully selected, they will assign tasks to military forces only when and where civilians could not perform them. And as far as U.S. forces are concerned, civic action projects often provide opportunities for training unavailable in the U.S., given our Environmental Protection Act, and our other constraints on what military units, such as well-drilling detachments, can do at home station.

I have listed four other "force functions" --possible DoD contributions to coping with low intensity conflict:

**Construction  
Mobility**

**Logistic Support  
Medicine**

For each of these I could cite objections and deficiencies analogous to those listed above. Such attention as we have paid to capabilities in these disciplines has been focused on problems of grander scale and expense than those likely to present themselves in all but a few LIC circumstances. Yet I am persuaded that were the Executive so to order, and the Congress to support, the U.S. could:

- \* Acquire and maintain capabilities to communicate broadly and effectively with peoples anywhere on the surface of the globe.
- \* Greatly increase our own capacity, and that of foreign governments, to develop intelligence about terrorists, guerrillas, and international criminals.
- \* Develop and teach pioneering techniques which could alter fundamentally the orientation and purposes of foreign armed forces.
- \* Create similarly useful medical cadres and medical service organizations within foreign armed forces.
- \* Modernize and rationalize logistics within foreign forces, to the betterment of their military efficiency and their national economy.

And I am convinced that American ingenuity and technology can do much more than is now possible, through strengthening foreign forces, to avert the necessity to employ American forces, including SOF, in combatant roles.

I have sketched in the foregoing a national agenda both extensive and expensive. But we should not suppose that it can much longer be deferred. The day of reckoning for American interests is at hand in the Phillipines, in Central America, and in the Middle East; it may soon come in Southwest Asia. Surely some sort of rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. could help, but in each region there are inimical forces probably beyond the control of the Soviets.

There is a recognition of these realities in the service schools. Within

the past few months I have been in touch with each of the services, and I can report that each, in its own culturally specific fashion, is striving conceptually to arm its leaders for trials ahead in LIC. I am told that there is now an agreed interservice definition of low intensity conflict, as follows:

low intensity conflict A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives. It is often protracted, and ranges from diplomatic, economic and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a geographic area. And it is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics and the level of violence.

As my opening comments would establish, I consider this definition defective in that it attempts to generalize from what I perceive to be a particularly American viewpoint. I believe that we have to be clear with ourselves that a conflict limited from our perspective may be quite otherwise in the minds of foreign participants, and "constraint" is not a word I can easily attach to suicidal terrorists or anarchists. Nonetheless, the joint definition is a useful point of departure for examining relevant operational concepts, strategies, and plans.

The U.S. Navy in its presentations on "Maritime Strategy" now speaks of **violent peace** in describing the lower range of the scale of conflict intensity. The Navy rightly calls attention to its roles in Central America, in the Middle East, and in Grenada to underscore the relevance of naval power to low intensity conflict. In a recent study for the Center for Naval Analysis, Colin Gray has developed the thesis that "containment", i.e. maintaining U.S. influence over the Eurasian rimland, is essential for pursuit of an effective maritime strategy into the next century. And the Navy is in a position well to understand what the fall of the Shah meant for naval strategy in the Indian Ocean, or what insurgency in the Phillipines portends for its posture in the Southwest Pacific.

The Army probably has the most elaborated organization and doctrine for low intensity conflict, including in that rubric missions related to "Foreign Internal Defense", "Peacekeeping Operations", "Terrorism Counteraction", and "Peacetime Contingency Operations." The latter refers to intelligence gathering, show of force, rescue and recovery, and unconventional warfare as well as strike operations. The Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth (under the Deputy Commander of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, Lt. Gen. Bob Kis Cassi) has proponency for doctrine and material requirements. Most significantly, however, the Army is approaching its work explicitly recognizing that Army units are but bit players in LIC, and that low intensity conflict demands joint (interservice) and national (interagency) responses.

Both the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps have joined the Army in seeking to define requirements for low intensity conflict. The former is in the process of establishing the Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC) at Langley Air Force Base, as I understand it. USMC is developing manuals on LIC jointly with the Army. These are developments which encourage me to hope that some of the deficiencies I have deplored above may be addressed by the services, and the DoD energized accordingly.

But while the services are quite explicit in their understanding that the U.S. response to low intensity conflict must not be over-militarized, and eloquent in their appeals for a comprehensive approach by the nation to the present and prospective challenges of such conflict, I have discerned no impulse toward unity of concept, let alone command, at the national level. We must find that leadership.

I suggest that this institution, the National Defense University, sponsor a historic intervention in the policy process by setting forth new terms of reference for the executive and legislative branches alike in dealing with low intensity conflict. Here on this common intellectual ground for all the several U.S. departments and agencies which bear responsibilities for our national interests overseas, you may very well be able to resolve twenty five years of doubt and confusion --or at least, substantially reduce same. And conceivably, ameliorative action may flow from concepts developed here, laws and executive orders which will enhearten our friends and confound our enemies. If so, the hopes of NDU's founders, and the trust of the American people in its faculties and students, will have been amply rewarded.