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## *Military Instruments of Containment*

*Paul F. Gorman*

**I**N THE ORIGINAL 'X' ESSAY, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," George Kennan postulated containment as a means of affecting the Soviet mentality, and in particular Soviet *diplomacy*:

On the one hand . . . [Soviet diplomacy] is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies . . . no

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less steady in their purpose, no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.<sup>1</sup>

But X also held out the hope that, in the long run, the willingness and ability of the United States to muster the moral and physical resources thus "to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point at which they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world" would exert an even more powerful influence over the Russian psyche, one which might finally lead to permanently ameliorated relations between the United States and the USSR:

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.<sup>2</sup>

Four decades have elapsed since X's views were published. Kennan's more recent writings have expressed disenchantment with containment on the grounds that the West, "honeycombed with bewilderment and a profound sense of internal decay," patently lacks the moral wherewithal for persevering with such a policy, and that there are now larger, more urgent demands upon all nations than military confrontation—such as "an absolutely certain ecological and demographic disaster which is going to overtake this planet in the next, I would say, 60–70 years. . . ." Concerning the military instruments with which the United States might pursue a policy of containment, especially nuclear weapons, Kennan has written, in his *Nuclear Delusion*,

We have been putting emphasis in the wrong places. We talk of saving Western civilization when we talk of a military confrontation with the Russians—but saving it for what? In order that 20 or 30 years hence we may run out of oil and minerals and food and invite upon humanity a devastating conflict between the overpopulated and undernourished two-thirds of the world and ourselves?<sup>3</sup>

And in February of this year, *The New Yorker* published a literate reminiscence of Kennan's in which he recalled that what he wanted of US policy in the aftermath of World War II was to pursue "containment"

in the sense of restoring economic health and political self confidence to the peoples of Western Europe and Japan in order that they may be resistant to local Communist pressures . . . and then, when a political balance has been created, to go on to the negotiation with Moscow of a general political settlement.<sup>4</sup>

But my purpose here is not to enter the debate between the contemporary Kennan and X, but rather to inquire into present and future military requirements for counterforce as originally commended by the latter.

#### *Containment and Present US Strategy*

*Containment* is not a word prominent in the lexicon of modern US strategists, but the concept seems implicit in their formulations of *deterrence*. For some, Kennan's term may seem too passive, too much of a surrender of initiative; for others, possibly too aggressive, too intervention-prone. For example, a recent report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled *Toward a More Effective Defense*, states,

At the broadest level, U.S. military forces have three major missions: to deter nuclear attacks on the United States and its allies, to deter and, if necessary, defend against an attack on Western Europe, and to project U.S. military power where necessary to defend vital interests and support U.S. foreign policy in other parts of the globe.<sup>5</sup>

In the recently released study by the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, *containment* is not listed among the functions of the Department of Defense:

In fulfilling U.S. national security objectives and in implementing U.S. defense strategies, the Department of Defense has six major missions, three of which are worldwide in nature and three of which are regional. The major worldwide missions are:

*nuclear deterrence*—essential equivalence with the strategic and theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union;

*maritime superiority*—controlling the seas when and where needed.

*power projection superiority*—deploying superior military forces in times of crisis to distant world areas which are primarily outside the traditional system of Western alliances.

The major regional missions are:

*defense of NATO Europe*, including both the northern and southern flanks;

*defense of East Asia*, particularly Northeast Asia; and  
*defense of Southwest Asia*, especially the region's oil resources.

While DoD has other regional missions (e.g., Western Hemisphere and Africa), these relatively smaller, while important, missions are included in the mission of power projection superiority.<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in a 9 October 1985 address to the National Press Club on the topic "What is our Defense Strategy?" never used the word *containment*, but talked *in extenso* of *deterrence*. Secretary Weinberger described the "pillars of our defense policy for the 1990's" as—

- SDI and nuclear deterrence.
- Conventional deterrence and uses of force.
- A strategy for reducing and controlling arms.

Nonetheless, Weinberger stressed the continuity of the present administration's approach with our strategy since 1945, and in

so doing, echoed X's aspirations for exerting a fundamental and benign influence over the thinking of Soviet leaders:

What is our strategy? Deterrence for the 1990's: the safest, strongest possible deterrent.

What is our aim? Freedom and peace, the protection of our vital interests and those of our allies at the lowest possible risk of nuclear war, indeed of any war.

What is our hope? That over time, our determination to deny the Soviet Union any significant exploitable military advantage against our vital interests will persuade them to consider more attractive alternative uses of their resources and their energy. We have no illusions that Soviet leaders will be persuaded by our words, or by any short-term demonstration of our commitment. But we do believe that over time, if we have and use our firm long-term resolve to maintain a vigorous and effective deterrent, we can not only keep the peace, but move the Soviet Union toward *peaceful competition*...

Although our modern strategists do not use the word *containment*, their strategies and goals seem to embody the concept. What is defense of the Asian rimlands if not containment? We seek to deter, an essentially psychological objective. The modern parallels with X's thinking are plain.

As a matter of fact, despite some rather tense interludes, war has *not* broken out between the United States and the USSR in the years since X wrote. It is significant that only in Afghanistan have Soviet ground forces extended their control over people and territory where they had no troops in 1947; even in Afghanistan, it is possible to argue that their control is only temporary. But if US containment policies have worked in that sense, they have by no means influenced the Soviets to move away from their reliance on a massive military establishment supported by a top-priority defense industry. As Secretary Weinberger noted, the Soviets continue to allocate proportionally three times more from their Gross National Product than the

US government does for defense: they have been regularly spending upwards of 16–20 percent of GNP, we 6–7 percent. And in the meantime, the Soviets, through aggressive (and skillful) diplomacy, independently or through surrogates, and backed by impressively growing sea and air power, have established their presence and influence far beyond their position at the end of World War II. To use Secretary Weinberger's construct, the Soviets have resorted to not-so-peaceful competition with some modest success, notably in Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru, Syria, Ethiopia, and Angola. And although these successes have been accompanied by occasional setbacks, Soviet leaders have transformed Stalin's beleaguered communist homeland into a world power. The prospect seems to be for more, not less, of this behavior, and Weinberger's hope for a less militarized USSR seems no closer to fulfillment than X's.

#### *Future Requirements for Counterforce*

But what of future containment? As X reminded us repeatedly, containment is a function of *counterforce*. How should one think of the notion of counterforce in the waning 1980s and the 1990s? The answer lies in considering the sort of international behavior which might call for forceful counters from the United States or its allies, and then in anticipating the kinds of instruments we should have on hand to deter such behavior, or to react to it.

As recent public debates make evident, no aspect of defense policy is fixed or assured. But it seems likely that any future confrontation with the Soviets will take place in an era of essential nuclear parity between the United States and the USSR. This relationship forms the strategic backdrop, a setting we ought to be careful to preserve because it has reduced Soviet interest in armed action against the United States, just as Kennan predicted. In the second place, it was not the American militarism Kennan so deplures (if indeed such an influence were operative) which led to NATO, but the insecurity and historic anxieties of European allies. Hence, we shall have to maintain

some forces in Europe so long as the Europeans perceive a need for our presence. In this respect, the relentless military buildup in Eastern Europe scarcely reassures the Western allies. It calls for continued efforts on our part to maintain a credible defensive posture, both to deter intimidating uses of such force and to maintain confidence within the Western coalition.

But neither an exchange of nuclear weapons nor a westward march by the Warsaw Pact seems very probable. What sorts of military confrontations, then, are US forces more likely to face? Both the United States and the USSR will probably continue to go to some lengths to avoid a direct clash. But neither power can expect to act militarily without engaging to some degree the interests of the other, and in that sense all uses of military force heighten the risk of superpower war.

The record since X wrote supports the contention that *low intensity conflict* is more probable than *high intensity conflict*. By *conflict* I mean the use of violence for political purposes. *Intensity* refers to the means of violence, and to the nature and extent of consequent casualties and destruction.

From the perspective of the United States, high intensity conflict describes the relatively unconstrained use of available military forces and weapons, including nuclear, chemical, biological, or other weapons capable of affecting large numbers of people or broad expanses of territory. Mid intensity conflict implies limitation on the use of weapons of mass destruction but assumes employment of conventional military forces and weapons in a given region with extensive destruction and heavy casualties among participants. Low intensity conflict, in contrast, refers to situations in which the perpetrators of violence resort to coercive crime, sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare and the United States limits its military response either to direct action by its Special Operations Forces to advising or supporting a threatened ally, or to positioning US forces to deter escalation of the conflict by third nations.

From the perspective of the assisted ally, this latter kind of conflict (for example, an invasion by neighbors or an extensive counterinsurgency campaign) may require the commitment of all its available military resources and involve extensive destruction and casualties; from its point of view, in other words, the conflict may be of mid or high intensity. Nonetheless, the terminology is useful for those charged with planning and programming the US forces which must implement containment worldwide. This is so because—

(1) Low intensity conflict is the form of political violence most likely anywhere in the world, and the roles which the USSR and the United States are likely to play, or to have thrust upon them, will probably pit them against each other on opposite sides of violent confrontations.

(2) US industry has moved over the past forty years from a position of substantial industrial independence to far-reaching dependencies on Third World suppliers of semi-conductors, castings, vacuum tubes, fasteners, and fossil fuels. During the same two score years, we have developed a new societal relationship with the Third World, especially with Latin America, as important to our future as was the importation of slaves centuries earlier. Therefore, low intensity conflict can engage US strategic interests in ways which Kennan and his generation did not have to contemplate.

(3) Congressional and public attention, and DOD expenditures, tend to be directed toward preparation for less probable, albeit more dangerous, higher intensity conflict. In short, we spend more seriously to deter mid and high intensity conflict.

(4) Low intensity conflict often requires distinctive material, or forces structured and trained differently from those for higher intensity conflict. We have not raised and trained such forces in sufficient strength, or maintained what we have in a state of adequate readiness, to constitute an effective deterrent against Soviet adventurism in the Third World.

(5) Although the United States has a consensus, or doctrine, for reacting to threats of high intensity and mid intensity conflict, we are sorely confused and divided over how to handle low intensity conflict, especially in the Third World. This lack of national policy probably constitutes our gravest weakness and is a principal invitation to our adversaries.

It is useful to graph the spectrum of conflicts, comparing their relative risks or costs with intensity (as done in figure 1).




Figure 1  
Spectrum of Conflict

For a Soviet, Cuban, or Bulgarian strategist, this portrayal should convey the message that if political objectives can be achieved by recourse to low intensity conflict, that is the lower-risk, lower-cost course of action. And in fact, their clear preference for low intensity conflict can easily be inferred from their past behavior.

The US strategist might more usefully plot conflict *probability* versus intensity, as in figure 2. Were the US national security community seriously interested in applying the notion of containment to low intensity conflict, it would have to deal




Figure 2  
Probability versus Intensity  
of Conflict

promptly with the problem posed by the fact that we have structured our general purpose forces for mid and high intensity conflict, assuming that forces so structured also have utility in conflict at the low end of the spectrum. In my judgment, this assumption is incorrect and can lead to tragic miscalculations, even to strategic vulnerability—to flawed judgments of the sort that the United States made in Southeast Asia and the Soviet Union made in Afghanistan.

*Capabilities for Third World Combat*

To illustrate this last point, figure 3 lists military force functions in low intensity conflict, arranged on the Probability-Intensity




Figure 3  
Force Functions

graph roughly in the order in which they might be called into play as the intensity of conflict increases. These force functions describe many of the military tools of national policy; the capability adroitly to perform them is *sine qua non* for future containment. Moreover, all the functions cited depend upon additional capabilities to project and to support forces abroad, and therefore assume intercontinental airlift and maritime power.

The broader strategic context in which these force functions are employed usually includes a "show of force" by our extensive and far-reaching maritime power, a demonstration—designed to deter escalation—that we can meet any challenge at whatever scale or intensity the situation may demand. A show of force is effective only when it is clear that the United States could, and might, resort to firepower. But we should be clear that air and land forces can also "show" our determination, and that in certain circumstances a humble engineer company is more effective than a carrier battle group off the coast.

Significant progress has been made in setting up special operations forces, and in training them for specific missions in low intensity conflict. The United States has been slower to establish such forces than the British, Israelis, or West Germans. Aside from the Ranger assault on the airfield at Grenada, US Special Operations Forces have fortunately received little publicity; but they have already proved to be useful to the Commander-in-Chief in a number of other instances, and they have therefore no doubt come to figure in the calculus of the Soviets. If we can resist our propensity to equip and train these forces for unconventional warfare missions in mid and high intensity conflict, and can focus them instead on antiterrorism and Third World contingencies, we will enhance our ability to deter the latter.

In most situations involving low intensity conflict, the US response will include security assistance. By strengthening our allies and friends, security assistance programs serve as an

economy-of-force measure which allows the United States better to husband its deployed military forces and to avoid direct involvement in hostilities. In that sense, a cogent security assistance program could narrow opportunities for the Soviet Union or its surrogates and lessen the prospects for direct US-USSR confrontation. Unfortunately, the priority recently accorded to the Middle East has left few funds for dealing with the rest of the Third World. For example, the apportionment of security assistance funds to the American republics has, in the past several years, been about three percent of the worldwide total. The administration's FY 86 budget seeks to raise this amount to five percent, barely sufficient for our closest neighbors given the wholesale penetration by the Soviet Union into Peru, the bold Cuban-Soviet endeavor in Nicaragua, and the revelations of Cuban-Soviet complicity in Grenada.

The mention of Grenada raises the critical importance of accurate intelligence for low intensity conflict. If we are to gauge where to allocate our security assistance and how to support other US actions, we need timely and accurate intelligence. Such intelligence—evaluations of the reliable, timely information available to our several intelligence organizations—provides access and influence for US ambassadors and military officers. Overseas, knowledge literally is power. In addition to permitting sound US management, intelligence can be used for strategic or tactical support of an ally. Our superior means of collection will often be the sole recourse of a foreign government seeking to acquire an advantage in intelligence over an adversary, especially if the latter employs the clandestine methods taught by the Soviets or Cubans.

Unfortunately, the best as well as the majority of US intelligence units are manned and equipped to collect against Soviet targets, and are often inept in dealing with cultural and linguistic peculiarities of Third World targets. Designed to operate as part of a larger force in mid intensity wars, these units are often awkwardly robust and expensive to support, politically as well

as logistically. Moreover, intelligence units with missions in the Third World are often issued older, less capable, more manpower-intensive equipment, which creates problems for host countries and US commanders who wish to minimize their visibility and maximize the security of the intelligence collectors. Insufficient DOD research and development funding has been directed at this problem, with the result that military intelligence which could be a decisive response to low intensity conflict remains only marginally efficient. Some recent research efforts with robotic collection and electronic transmission of intelligence, however, show great promise.

Communications are *sine qua non* for collecting and disseminating intelligence and otherwise dealing with low intensity conflicts. For democratic governments under attack, access to modern communications technology can be a force multiplier. For the United States, it is essential if the plethora of US government agencies in oversea country teams are to be assisted by intelligence and helped to act in concert with authorities in Washington and with each other. The drawback is that our better military communications equipment is often reserved for the "major contingencies" of mid and high intensity conflict, and readiness for these is cited in denying requests to support low intensity contingencies. The solution to this problem lies in making broader use of commercial communications, suitably protected.

Units capable of providing civil affairs support or conducting psychological operations have all but disappeared from the active forces. The Army, which possesses most of these, now has 98 percent of its civil affairs and 61 percent of its PSYOPS personnel in its reserve components. Active or reserve, these forces are conceptually and technologically obsolescent, bypassed by the age of television. Nonetheless, the skills called for in such units are useful in prosecuting low intensity conflict and could contribute to containment.

Whenever a Third World government faces an internal or external threat, it faces a choice between extensive mobilization of manpower or enhancement of the tactical mobility of existing forces. One of the first items for which it is likely to ask is helicopters, and helicopters are likely to be among the first items a US ambassador is likely to offer. But like security assistance, US military helicopters are expensive. US military trucks are no bargain, either. Fixed wing intratheater airlift might provide an equally important boost to mobility, but here the options are even fewer and more expensive—the services have no contemporary transport smaller than the C-130 Hercules, which for many countries requires too much runway and is too big, too expensive, and too complicated to fly and maintain. Similarly, we seem to have forgotten that in most Third World countries the population clusters on coasts and rivers, where a “brown water” navy built around small boats and landing craft would be useful. Again, the “brown water” capability of the US navy is at minimal strength and is outdated. Here, too, commercial alternatives, made in the United States or by other allies abroad, would answer the need.

There is a clear recognition in the Third World of the value of military engineer units, with the equipment and discipline to undertake construction tasks in remote areas where security may be questionable, or in a natural disaster zone where operations by commercial contractors are unlikely. And in any less-developed country, military engineers can dig wells, build water distribution and flood control systems, and construct the roads and bridges essential to economic progress. There is a concomitant demand for US expertise in organizing and training such units. Yet in our own force structure, 68 percent of Army engineers are in the reserve components.

There is a comparable demand for US military medics. Like our military intelligence, communications, and engineering, our military medicine is respected, even venerated, for its sophistication. Any Third World country which has a bloody

emergency thrust upon it is likely to find that its medical establishment is unequal to the challenge of providing first-aid treatment to the injured and evacuating them to hospitals fast enough to save their lives. Most countries have never considered seriously the concept of a medical service corps trained and equipped for the field. Here US ideas and techniques can exert powerful leverage on manpower. It is expensive to recruit, train, and season a soldier; his needless loss is an expensive stupidity and a moral violation of the soldier-state compact. But again, when we look for resources with which to help allies, we need to remember that over half of our medics are in the reserves.

If Third World notions of military medicine are outdated, the approaches to logistic support found there are unediluvian. Shortsightedness, limited managerial skills, corruption, and simple lack of organizational know-how often produce such dysfunctional practices as troops foraging on the peasantry or commanding officers being issued operating cash based on unverified muster rolls. Standard field rations, bandages, batteries, boots, uniforms, load-bearing equipment, and rain gear, which often could be manufactured within a given country from indigenously produced materials, usually are not or cannot be purchased locally with US security assistance funds. There are, therefore, few alternatives to buying expensive US products or continuing with traditional makeshift means. Here again, relatively simple production and quality-assurance technology, or such inexpensive upgrades as minicomputers for material or personnel management, usually await a US assist. Using security assistance for locally produced items would also create jobs in troubled economies.

US combat power, fire support and maneuver, would probably be the last force function to be exercised in any low intensity conflict. There are exceptions, of course: recent events show the usefulness of carrier-borne F-14 fighters, for example. But the other measures cited above, if used in a timely and

judicious manner, should preclude the introduction of US shooters. Nonetheless, an American ability quickly to employ fire or maneuver should help to deter adventurism by the Soviets or a surrogate. US combat forces have, however, like the other force functions, been poorly designed for low intensity conflict. We need more light land and air forces, more "brown water" naval forces—all more strategically mobile and better fitted to support other nations in defending themselves.

#### *Capabilities for Mid and High Intensity Conflict*

One of the burdens imposed by a strategy of containment—or its contemporary equivalent, the broad spectrum deterrence described by Secretary Weinberger—is geographic. To use the Senate Armed Services Committee staff formulation, five of the six major missions of the Department of Defense involve either maintaining military forces overseas or moving forces abroad in an emergency. We are likely to deter only to the extent that we have the ability to generate force to meet threatening situations. Maritime forces can fill the bill in many of these situations, but there are others where we will have to put forces on foreign soil to do the job. Generally speaking, we need to think about five means for projecting force, which relate to force generation somewhat as shown in figure 4.

Forward deployed forces can be the most prepared to contain, but they are also the most costly in terms of resources or political capital. Pre-positioning supplies and equipment abroad conserves airlift and sealift and takes advantage of our relatively plentiful passenger aircraft. But it is expensive, because the predeployed material has to be sheltered and maintained carefully, and because we usually will buy another set of equipment to support training and ensure that units are equipped and ready for missions in areas where their pre-positioned gear may be inaccessible. Pre-positioning in ships at sea offers strategic flexibility but adds to strains on ports. Airlift can project force quickly, but is now and will remain for the foreseeable future a scarce resource, and airlifted forces will remain, therefore,




Figure 4  
Projection of Forces

constrained in size and capability. Sealift, though somewhat slower than airlift, is essential if the force is large and the operation extensive in time and territory. Fast sealift refers to 30-knot SL-7 freighters, ships which may be uneconomical to operate commercially but which would be obviously advantageous supporting an expeditionary force; these are, however, few in number. Amphibious assault shipping is also relatively scarce, and slower. It is important to recognize, however, that enhanced transportation capabilities aid not only what the SASC staff refers to as "power projection superiority" but also the

major regional missions in defense of NATO Europe, East Asia, and Southwest Asia.

For these latter missions (which entail deterrence of, and hence readiness for, mid and high intensity conflict), we rely on our strategic forces and our general purpose forces. It is instructive to review the relative budgetary emphasis these have enjoyed over the years since World War II. Picking the peak budgets of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, and adding the Ford, Carter, and Reagan budgets, certain trends are evident:<sup>7</sup>

Percent of Defense Budget

Program	Fiscal Year					
	45	52	69	75	80	84
Strategic Forces	14	20	11	8	8	10
General Purpose Forces	52	46	58	52	37	39
C <sup>3</sup> I	3	4	8	7	6	8
Air and Sea Lift	2	2	2	1	1	2
Reserve Components	na	2	3	6	6	5

The make-weight in defense budgets has been the general purpose forces program, which has had its ups and downs but has received consistently some two to four times the share for strategic forces. The growth programs have been communications, intelligence, and the reserves. It is interesting that although the capabilities of allies (especially the British) have decreased while US capabilities and interests (in Asia especially) have increased, budget shares for airlift and sealift have remained fairly constant over the years. But, of course, it is now possible to buy more lift per budget share than was the case ten or more years ago, given the cost-effectiveness of modern aircraft and ships. Some parallels exist for general purpose forces.

The same gains in efficiency can be seen in general purpose forces. The Army is more manpower-efficient today than at any time since 1945: fewer soldiers are in the active force for each combat division, yet the current division has something like ten times the firepower of its World War II counterpart and, given its much improved mobility, communications, and intelligence, is able to control forty to fifty times as much terrain. The

Navy has, in the past two decades, upgraded the fleet's diesel-electric submarines to nuclear-powered boats. A modern *Los Angeles* class nuclear attack submarine can search through 10,000 square miles of ocean in a 24-hour period, nearly ten times what its predecessor craft could cover, detecting enemy forces six times further away, attacking with homing torpedoes from three times as far or with antiship missiles from over the horizon at ranges up to sixty nautical miles. The Tomahawk cruise missile extends that strike range to 250 nautical miles, a far cry from the eight-mile reach of the old subs. During August 1944, as allied forces broke out of the Normandy beachhead, 30,000 crew members in 3,000 heavy bombers of the US 8th Air Force flew more than 18,000 sorties. Today, the same tonnage of bombs could be delivered, much more precisely, by 800 single-seat F-16 fighter-bombers.

We may be on the verge of an even more dramatic surge in force productivity. The combination of communications, intelligence, and long-range precise weapons may make devastating attacks possible on arrays of armor such as Soviet forces would present if attacking in Europe or elsewhere. SACEUR's Follow-on Forces Attack concept anticipates such technologies, and the ongoing NATO Conceptual Military Framework, approved by the national military staffs and the Military Committee in May 1985, provides a mechanism for coordinating the efforts of the alliance in this direction. In prospect are combinations of non-nuclear weapons more powerful against tactical targets like tanks and armored personnel carriers than even modern enhanced radiation nuclear weapons. And it appears possible to field such weapons in the near future without major budgetary implications.

But do these new weapons—for example, the Lance missile with conventional warhead, the Multiple Launch Rocket System, remotely deliverable mines, the TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft, the (German) MW-1 submunition dispenser, the (UK) JP 233 runway cratering munition—obviate the need for tactical nuclear weapons or permit a "no first use" policy? General

Rogers has said that the new conventional weapons will reduce, but not eliminate, NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons:

The price of an attack on Western Europe must remain the possibility of triggering an incalculable chain of nuclear escalation. This incalculability, this uncertainty, has been and will remain a vital component of NATO's deterrence.<sup>8</sup>

The same might be said for other theaters where a US confrontation with the USSR might take place.

Indeed, if containment is to operate on the Soviet mentality, and if we wish to contain in the future what X referred to as "Russian expansive tendencies," "incalculability" should be a major component of our deterrent posture across the continuum of possible conflict and the gamut of possible weapon choices. I, for one, would not define away by declaratory policy any unsureness in Moscow about our willingness or our ability to act militarily as our interests, and those of our allies, may dictate. One bit of advice from X, regrettably, remains current:

The United States must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.<sup>9</sup>

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### Notes

1. George F. Kennan (writing as 'X'). "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947). pp. 575-76.
  2. *Ibid.*, p. 582.
  3. Cf. Paul Hollander, "The Two Faces of George Kennan, From Containment to 'Understanding.'" *Policy Review*, No. 33 (Summer 1985), pp. 32ff.
  4. Kennan, "Reflections (Soviet-American Relations)," *New Yorker* 61 (25 February 1985), p. 62.
  5. B.M. Blechman and W.J. Lynn, eds., *Toward a More Effective Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985), p. 17.
  6. US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Defense Organization: The Need for Change*, staff report, 99th Congress, 1st Session, S. Prt. 99-86, p. 2.
  7. John M. Collins, *U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1981* (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's, 1985), pp. 295ff.
  8. General Bernard W. Rogers, "Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA): Myths and Realities," *NATO Review* 32 (December 1984), p. 9.
  9. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." pp. 580-81.
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