

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION  
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1986**

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1985

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
Washington, DC

**COMMANDERS OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS**

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry M. Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Humphrey, Wilson, Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Dixon, and Glenn.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Douglas R. Graham, John H. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., David S. Lyles, Gordon G. Riggle, and Carl M. Smith, professional staff members; Judith A. Freedman, Russell C. Miller, and Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; and Mary J. Kampo, staff assistant.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; John L. Roddy, assistant to Senator East; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Allan Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory P. Craig and James Steinberg, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Phillip P. Upschulte, assistant to Senator Glenn; and John Sheridan, assistant to Senator Levin.

**OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER,  
CHAIRMAN**

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

I apologize for being a little bit late, I haven't a good reason, so I will not come up with one. [Laughter.]

The committee meets this morning to continue our review of the fiscal year 1986 defense authorization bill. This morning's hearing is the first in a series of three at which we will hear from our operational commanders or CINC's, short for commander in chief.

These gentlemen bring a unique perspective to the defense budget, as they have the responsibility for implementing defense plans in various parts of the world should such action be required. Consequently, their views on the composition of the defense budget

(1203)

may not be identical with those in the Pentagon where the focus is often on defense requirements 5 or 10 years in the future.

We are very grateful to have with us this morning Gen. Paul Gorman, the commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command; and Gen. Robert C. Kingston, commander in chief, U.S. Central Command.

This afternoon at 2 we will also hear from the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command, and the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command. On Friday we will hear from General Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and General Nutting, the commander in chief of the U.S. Readiness Command.

Both our guests this morning are distinguished and highly respected officers. I am sorry to note that General Gorman has recently announced his intentions to retire from active duty. I can say, General, that your innovative leadership and candor are going to be missed; and if there is any way to keep you on duty, by God, we are going to do it.

I am happy to report, on the other hand, that General Kingston has not announced his retirement. [Laughter.]

It is obvious he is a much younger man. [Laughter.]

Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to have you with us this morning. We look forward to your testimony. You may put your testimony in the record, ad lib a bit, proceed to anything you want. The place is yours.

Senator WARNER. Would the chairman yield for just a minute? Chairman GOLDWATER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. I am very pleased that the distinguished soldier, General Gorman, is retiring to Charlottesville, VA. I have been one of his long-time admirers.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I knew you would work him in there some way. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. I am a long-time admirer, and I would associate myself with the remarks of our distinguished Chairman.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL F. GORMAN, USA, COMMANDER IN  
CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND**

General GORMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have brought with me today my successor in SOUTHCOM, Gen. John Galvin, who is sitting here, behind me. Jack will take command on this coming Saturday, March 2; and I can tell you that I am mighty pleased that he will be taking on my responsibilities. I have known him for years; I served with him in combat. He was my assistant division commander in the 8th Division in Germany. And he has one advantage coming to this job that I did not when I took it on, in that he has served extensively down in Latin America and speaks Spanish. I am confident he will be able, very quickly, to fit himself for all of the responsibilities that will devolve on him, a number of which I am going to comment on in a moment.

Mr. Chairman, this year I complete 40 years in uniform as a member of the active component of the Armed Forces, and my departure is in accordance with long-established policy in the Army in that this year I will reach both age 58 and my 35th year of commissioned service.

## UNDERSTANDINGS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

I have been, as you know, the Commander in Chief of the Southern Command for almost 2 years, and this has been a period of great change in Latin America, and I believe great change here in the United States with respect to our understanding and our attitudes toward Latin America.

Two years ago, in April 1983, President Reagan in an address to the Nation outlined four basic objectives of U.S. policy in Latin America. I have taken these as my marching orders. He said at that time that it is our purpose there to support democracy, reform, and human rights; that we are there to support economic development; that we are there to support dialog and negotiations; and we are there to support security as a shield for democratization, development, and diplomacy.

And I think that the past 2 years have witnessed distinct progress toward all of those objectives. Concerning democracy, if you go back to 1979, two-thirds of the people in Latin America lived under military or military-dominated governments. Today, over 90 percent of the people in Latin America are living in countries with democratic governments. Since 1980 military juntas have turned back control of governments to civilians in 8 countries, and since 1980, 15 countries in mainland Latin America have held free elections. As I talk today, electoral campaigns are under way in Peru, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

All of these instances of democracy in action have contrasted sharply, in my view, with the parody that was enacted in Nicaragua this past fall, culminating in Fidel Castro's upstaging Daniel Ortega at the latter's inauguration.

If you look across the board, indeed, only in Chile, Paraguay, Suriname, Guyana, and Nicaragua in mainland Latin America does totalitarianism or authoritarianism govern in lieu of democracy. Nicaragua, of course, is the most acutely important case with respect to the President's goals.

As you know, in 1979, the Sandinistas pledged to the OAS and others to implement democracy in Nicaragua. Democracy there, sir, has never been given a chance. Day by day the Sandinista Comandantes tighten their grip on the population, bending to their will the political opposition, the entrepreneurial class, the ethnic minorities, the media, the church, the educational system, and the local public administrations.

And so the personalistic and arbitrary rule of the Somoza family has been replaced by a Marxist-Leninist garrison state modeled deliberately after Castro's Cuba. The Nicaraguan people revolted against a caudillo who stole their money, only to discover that they are now ruled by a cabal of venal men who have stolen not only their wealth but also their dreams of freedom.

It is no wonder, therefore, that more and more Nicaraguans have rallied to one or another of the rebel groups who constitute, as President Reagan has called them, the freedom fighters of Nicaragua.

Now, the other great drama of democracy in Central America is being staged in El Salvador. Despite seemingly insuperable adversity—and 2 years ago I was assured by all of the experts on the

matter that there was little or no prospect for success in El Salvador—Salvadorans have brought into being a freely elected constitutional government. They have reformed their military and their legal systems; they have rectified significantly the maldistribution of land, and built new respect in their country for justice and human rights.

In my judgment, President Duarte has broken out of the stalemate of that war, and is now facing a dynamic situation in which for the first time since 1979, when this whole revolution got underway, democracy, prosperity, and security seem attainable.

Of course, Nicaragua continues to intervene in El Salvador, and the Salvadoran guerrillas, supported by the Sandinistas, form a formidable fighting force. Moreover, those guerrillas in their frustration are turning more and more to urban terrorism, kidnappings, rural minings, roadblocks, sabotage of the economic infrastructure. And all of this has had the effect of increasing civilian casualties.

#### SALVADORAN DEMOCRACY WILL TRIUMPH

But whereas last year when I appeared before you I was conditionally pessimistic about Salvador, this year I am guardedly—and I emphasize the word “guardedly”—optimistic that Salvadoran democracy will triumph. It will be a long, hard fight, but I believe that Duarte, if he continues to receive U.S. support, is going to make a go of it.

#### ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Now, I am going to comment further on the implication of events in Central America for U.S. security, but I want to make a quick pass at economic development.

I have advocated to the Department of Defense interest in moving more of the defense production base into Central America. I believe that that would be consistent with the Caribbean Basin Initiative and with the Jackson plan. I am convinced that in countries like Panama, Costa Rica, and Salvador, even in Honduras, it would be possible to undertake, for example, a great deal more of defense-related electronics subcomponent assembly, the preparation of industrial fasteners, and other modest tasks for defense prime contractors that are now being performed elsewhere overseas.

The Central Americans would have the advantage of proximity, which is good from the point of view of cost, and it is good from the point of view of our strategic posture in the event of larger contingencies than those related to the region.

#### DIPLOMACY

I would like to make a comment on diplomacy. Mr. Chairman, I am one soldier who strongly approves of efforts to find a negotiated settlement of the conflicts in Latin America. I applaud our diplomatic insistence on verifiable arrangements which would provide equitability for all parties to the conflict there, including the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. But I would emphasize to this committee that there would be no dialog, no negotiations, no practicable diplo-

macy with the Nicaraguans were it not for those freedom fighters, and were it not for the U.S. military presence in Central America, which, as you know, has increased substantially over the past 2 years.

Mr. Chairman, somehow the Sandinistas have to be brought to a reckoning. When they came to power in 1979, their government included responsible men, moderate, respectable leaders who themselves believed that the Sandinistas would honor the commitments that they made to the OAS, commitments for elections, genuine nonalignment, respect for the sovereignty of their neighbors. But tragically, the Sandinista Comandantes have plunged recklessly onward toward the goals dictated by their Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Under constant Cuban tutelage they have altered fundamentally the arms balance in the region; they have increased their forces sixfold over a period of 4 years; and the recent addition to their inventory of the MI-24 Hind hunter-killer helicopters, the armored helicopters used by the Soviets for the repression of the Afghan insurgency, is of particular concern to the neighbors of Nicaragua.

The Comandantes have also trained pilots to fly high performance fighters and allowed Cubans and other foreigners to install intercept radar and fighter bases in Nicaragua. The Comandantes have continued to support armed subversion against Costa Rica, against Honduras, and against El Salvador. They have played host to numerous terrorist organizations, providing an operating base for subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere. Radical Arabs of all types and other terrorists have found in Nicaragua a base for their operations in the Western Hemisphere.

The Comandantes have imposed universal conscription and have raised armed forces of well over 110,000, keeping half of them under arms at any one time. And in doing so, the Comandantes have ruined the Nicaraguan economy, made it ever more dependent upon the Soviet dole, and inter alia traffic in cocaine sales to the United States in order to generate hard currency.

#### NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING

And speaking of trafficking in narcotics, I should note that in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, the level and intensity of violence associated with that activity has increased, and is becoming directly dangerous to Americans of all pursuits operating in those countries. And we are now seeing in those countries alliances being formed between the narcotraffickers, with their hundreds of millions of dollars to spend, and the armed ideologues of Marxism-Leninism.

The combined efforts of the narcotraffickers and these insurgents are threatening to rend the very fabric of the democratic societies of those countries. And neighboring countries, notably Ecuador, are being faced with similar incipient problems as the narcotraffickers and the Marxist-Leninists spill their operations across international borders.

our own national security to move some of their off-shore operations to Latin America, closer to home. For example, I hold that the defense electronics industry can, and should, move some significant proportion of its off-shore operations to the Caribbean Basin. The security benefits to the United States of bringing our defense production base closer to home will be two-fold: direct security from shorter and more secure lines of communication for critical materiel, and indirect security from generating jobs in nearby countries potentially unstable, in part, because of unemployment.

Concerning diplomacy, I am one soldier who strongly approves of efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflicts in Latin America. In any way I have been able, I have supported the work of Ambassadors Stone and Shlaudeman, and I have encouraged our allies in their search for a workable formula in the Contadora process. I applaud our diplomats' insistence upon verifiable arrangements which provide equitably for all parties to the conflict, including the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. I am not unfamiliar with the difficulties our diplomats face, having spent two years in Paris engaged in negotiations with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. I agree thoroughly with Ambassador Motley that the Nicaraguans do not come to the negotiating table because they admire it as a piece of furniture. There would be no dialogue, no negotiations with the Nicaraguans were it not for the Freedom Fighters, and were it not for the US military presence in Central America.

Somehow, the Sandinistas must be brought to a reckoning. When they came to power in 1979, their government included responsible men, moderate respectable leaders, who themselves believed that the Sandinistas would honor the commitments they made to the OAS for elections, genuine non-alignment, and respect for the sovereignty of their neighbors. These men included Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, Adolfo Calero, and Alfredo Cesar. The presence of men like these among the Sandinista leadership convinced the United States to become the principal foreign supporter of the new government. Through mid-1981, we poured in more than \$117,000,000 in direct aid, making Nicaragua the highest per capita recipient of US economic assistance during this period.

In August, 1981, the United States undertook 6 months of diplomatic efforts to reverse the Sandinista course, telling the *Cosandantes* that if they would cease their support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, we would both guarantee their security and cooperate with their economic development. Those negotiations came to naught. And by that time it was clear that the men we admired had been squeezed out of power, or had left in disgust, and that the remaining *Cosandantes* were strongly committed both to Cubanization and to support of subversion in El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Thereafter, we have taken steps to shore up these threatened neighbors, and to provide serious incentives for the Sandinistas to reconsider.

The men I named -- Cruz, Robelo, Calero, and Cesar -- became leaders of the Freedom Fighters. Today there are 10,000 to 15,000 armed followers openly resisting the Sandinistas. Tragically, the Sandinista *Comandantes* have plunged recklessly onward toward the goals dictated by their doctrine. Under constant Cuban tutelage, they have:

- \*Altered fundamentally the arms balance in the region, increasing their armed forces six-fold over a period of four years, fielding an armored brigade strike force of over 300 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 70 large artillery pieces, numerous multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and a profusion of motor transport. The recent addition of modern attack helicopters, the MI-24 HIND hunter-killer used by the Soviets against the Afghan Freedom Fighters, is of particular concern to all in the region. I have attached a detailed comparison of the military forces in Central America, a portrayal of growing, destabilizing imbalance.

- \*Trained pilots to fly high performance fighters, and allowed Cubans and other foreigners to install intercept radars and to build air bases in Nicaragua -- one of which, Punta Huete, will soon be capable of supporting both jet fighters and the heaviest transports in the Bloc inventory.

- \*Continued to support armed subversion against Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador, and have played host to numerous terrorist organizations from around the globe, providing an operating base for subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere.

- \*Imposed universal conscription and raised armed forces of over 119,000, keeping more than half on active duty. Recently the draft has been extended to men through age 30, and the *Comandantes* are talking about putting 100,000 men in the field to defeat 10,000 Freedom Fighters. The cynical cannon-fodder use of untrained Sandinista militia has already prompted violent protests among the citizenry in lowland towns, and prompted an unprecedented flood of Nicaraguan refugees into Honduras and Costa Rica.

- \*Ruined the Nicaraguan economy, becoming ever more dependent on Soviet dole, and trafficking in cocaine sales in the United States to generate hard currency.

And speaking of *narcotraffickers*, I should note that in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia, the level and intensity of violence have increased. And we are now seeing there other alliances being



50,000 that we are talking about. But Honduras is woefully incapable of dealing with the 20,000 to 30,000 refugees that they already have in hand. The prospect of having this large additional population thrown on a country that is the poorest in the region, with the social services least capable of coping, is, it seems to me, a matter for genuine concern on the part of the Hondurans.

There is no doubt, moreover, that many Hondurans, particularly those who are veterans of the 1969 war, regard the Salvadorans as their principal enemy, and they are gravely concerned, Senator, because they, the Hondurans, believe that the Salvadorans are winning their war. They believe that there will shortly be on the other side of the mountains a victorious Salvadoran armed force, trained, well equipped, ready to settle old scores. And those old scores include that border controversy.

Now, it is not for me to comment on the course of diplomacy, but I would tell you that I was in San Salvador just this past weekend, and I found there the most relaxed, optimistic attitude toward the resolution of the border problem that I have encountered in the past 2 years.

The Minister of Defense and several of his principal assistants had just been to Tegucigalpa, and had met with Honduran counterparts, Gen. Walter Lopez and his officers, and had returned confident that the problems to which you make reference can be resolved, and resolved in the near future.

So again, while I want to be very careful to avoid presenting too rosey a picture of events down there, I would tell you that things are moving in the right direction from the perspective of both the Hondurans and the Salvadorans. And that is a marked change. A year ago there was real intransigence, and I think that the public reporting on these matters tends to sort of lag events for obvious reasons. Nobody wants to talk about ongoing delicate negotiations.

Nonetheless, I think it is entirely fair to say that there are a lot of Hondurans out there who really believe that the problem is as much Salvador as it is Nicaragua, and they have got a great deal to fear from both.

Let me underscore how important is the fact that the Hondurans accepted onto their soil 5,000 Salvadoran soldiers into the Regional Military Training Center. That fact is a great tribute to the leadership of Honduras and its being able to cope with indigenous political problems, and with all of those nationalist antipathies natural in the Honduran junior officers. And that training was a great achievement. Although Salvadoran training is now suspended, the fact is we did train over 5,000 Salvadorans and 5,000 Hondurans side by side, and that cannot help but be a very positive factor in the resolution of that border conflict, and in the avoidance of further difficulties between those two countries. Leaders in both countries have acknowledged that to me.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, General Gorman.

#### PANAMA AREA

Let me ask another question about your region, the Panama area. Let's say the Panama Canal Treaty had failed in the Senate or had not been ratified. Where would we be in your opinion? After

The recognized major languages plus the different dialects are well over several hundred throughout those 19 countries. We need personnel to conduct our intelligence business, our special operations business, and as interpreter-translators in the major languages.

I do not believe we will ever get personnel to assist us until we actually are invited into the area for the different dialects. We have countries that have an official language that a great percentage of the population does not speak.

Senator THURMOND. So you feel that the Lodge Act, which I have introduced again this year, would be helpful?

General KINGSTON. I think it would be helpful in obtaining trained linguists for those types of forces and types of operations that I mentioned, sir.

#### AID TO THE CONTRAS

Senator THURMOND. General Gorman, there has been a great deal of controversy about aid to the Contras. Since you are retiring shortly, and I for one am very sorry that you have decided to do so, do you have any advice for the Congress concerning our relations with the Marxist Sandinista regime other than what you have said?

General GORMAN. Three bits of advice. First of all, the fundamental problem in Central America is Fidel Castro. And our relations with Cuba—again, a country, Mr. Chairman, which lies outside of my purview—but our relations with Cuba are crucial to the success or failure of U.S. policy in Central America.

The Sandinista regime in Managua is modeling itself after that in Havana, and the role of the Cubans in the country today is pervasive. They are involved in the military activities of the Sandinistas right down to the fighting unit level. They are engaged in most of the technical activities of the Sandinista armed forces, including, in particular, their intelligence operations.

The Cubans are broadly involved in the social reform programs of the Sandinistas, the Sandinistas having two principal ways of politicizing their population, one of them being the armed forces, and the other being nationally run, centrally directed programs such as the national literacy campaign or the national health campaigns, both of which are fundamentally designed to bring people into the regimens of the neighborhood block committee, and the other forms of organization that Cubans have developed to the nth degree in their own country.

And so I say first of all, you have to find a formula for dealing with Fidel Castro to provide him disincentives or serious reasons to stop his adventuring on the mainland. We have done that before. I think that can be done again.

A second bit of advice is that we have to find a way, as I indicated in my statement, to bring the Sandinistas to a reckoning. I do not know of any way to do that except to keep talking to them and to keep providing them adequate incentives to modify their behavior. Those incentives now bearing, as I indicated, are the existence of a substantial and growing resistance movement among their own people and the presence of U.S. military forces.

The Sandinistas have to be brought to realize that their connivance with Castro has brought about a major reversal in U.S. strategic policy. We began pulling out of Latin America in 1970, Senator. There would not even be a U. S. Southern Command today, I am convinced, had it not been for the propensity of these Marxist-Leninists to pursue their own goals, ignoring the aspirations and the needs of their peoples. But if they want us out of there, they, the Sandinistas, are going to have to modify substantially their agenda, and their modus operandi.

A third bit of advice is that we have to continue to support the threatened neighbors of Nicaragua, including Costa Rica, who has no substantial armed force. But I think you gentlemen should know that there is in training right now at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras 45 Costa Rican officers who will be the leaders of a battalion of the Guardia Civil, the first such organization that that outfit has ever had.

Then you are going to have to deal with the Honduran problem that we just discussed. It is an acute one, and we are going to have to provide support for those people.

Specifically with respect to the freedom fighters, I believe they deserve the support of the United States. Now, how you do that, I would not presume to advise this body.

Senator THURMOND. General, my time is up. I have a few more questions here, if you would answer those for the record. And Senator Denton has asked me to propound a question. If you will answer that for the record, I would appreciate it, too.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

#### COMMITMENT TO HONDURAS

General Gorman, I gather from what you have said this morning that because of the situation regarding Honduras and Nicaragua, and Honduras and El Salvador, and the Mexican concern, that all of this put together would see us as being pretty much locked into the support of Honduras or having a commitment to Honduras in that area for the indefinite future. Would that be a correct statement?

General GORMAN. I think that we should always operate in there so that we could on very short order remove ourselves. We should remove ourselves as soon as we are asked to. We should remove ourselves as soon as the conditions that brought us there in the first instance no longer obtain.

I am not an advocate of any kind of permanent commitment. I do not think they want that. I do not think we ought to pursue it. But the circumstances right now argue our being there for the foreseeable future, yes. I think for the next year or two, or certainly until the present crisis is resolved, we are going to have to stay.

Senator GLENN. Just overnight we have had some rather dramatic new proposals by Mr. Ortega. I am sure you have looked at those, or probably know about them, or read them in the morning paper at least. Do you think those offer some hope, are they something we should give a chance to work, or do you see those as futile?

General GORMAN. I think we ought to examine very carefully any kind of proposal they put forward. And I believe that we should explore diplomatically directly with them and through their neighbors what precisely it is that Ortega has got in mind.

Senator GLENN. You would not just dismiss those proposals out of hand?

General GORMAN. I would not.

#### CONTADORA PROPOSALS

Senator GLENN. It is sort of an expansion of the Contadora proposals made previously. Do you see much hope for the Contadora process working out successfully?

General GORMAN. It is the only game in town, Senator. It is the only serious attack of the problem by the people who are most affected by it. It is the only process by which we can consult the needs and aspirations of Costa Ricans, Hondurans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and bring to bear on these the Panamanian, Colombian, Venezuelan, Mexican view. I do not see any other way to tackle the problem, so I am a supporter of Contadora. But like most of the people that have worked with the Contadora, and I am on at least the fringes of it, the first draft proposals lacked realism and lacked specificity. And if Mr. Ortega is going to help us in that respect, then I would say by all means, let us tackle his proposals.

#### COORDINATING POLICY AND MILITARY MATTERS

Senator GLENN. The Chairman yesterday when we had the Secretaries of State and Defense before us talked about the need to coordinate policy matters and military matters, and I agree with him 100 percent on that. As I said yesterday, I have been somewhat concerned that our policy changes in the Central American area have been rather—well, they have not been too rapid, but they have changed somewhat over the past couple of years.

We argued on the Foreign Relations Committee that I was on at that time whether we should have I think it was 37 advisers versus 54, and we debated for days about whether we were going to put it up to that number or not, and now we have seen quite a change.

General GORMAN. Both numbers are irrational, sir.

Senator GLENN. I do not disagree with that statement at all. But we started out in your command there with a purpose of stopping the inflow of arms to El Salvador. That was the overall purpose. That was all that was ever mentioned by anyone concerned with that area. Then we went to expanding our capability in that area. We went into Honduras, and we were doing the airstrip building and some other things that not everybody was aware of here. Now we have gone to the President talking about overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government as an objective.

If we are going to coordinate policy and our ability to carry out policy and defend our interest in these areas, I guess my question to you is through these changing policies have your assets or your orders as the top military man in that area been changed at all?

General GORMAN. I spend a lot of my time up here in Washington, sir.

Senator GLENN. More than you would like, I am sure. [Laughter.]

General GORMAN. I would comment, Mr. Chairman, that in my 20 months as commander in chief down there, I have traveled 270,000 miles, most of it running back and forth between my headquarters and the seat of government for the purpose of getting the latest nuances in U.S. policy, or in many instances directly contributing to the formulation of those shifts of which you make mention.

I think, if I may say so, that there has been a remarkable consistency in policy. Yes, tactical shifts and changes and greater emphasis on this and that or the other aspect of our policy, but by and large, if you go back to 1983 when I went down there and looked at the instructions I received at that point in time—and I did that just the other day—I think that you would agree that there has been remarkable continuity in what we have been doing.

I understand all of the controversy that grew up around the startling appearance of U.S. engineer battalions building C-130 strips down in Central America, but I am confident my colleague here to my left would agree that that is damn good training for his engineers—they were his engineers—and damn good training for his C-130's. They were his C-130's.

And I would point out further, sir, that while I was not asked to brief the Foreign Relations Committee, reference the earlier comment about appearances before Foreign Relations, I did appear before this committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and gave them a rather extensive preview briefing on all of that activity in Central America before the event. And we deviated in no major way whatsoever from that briefing presented, as I recall, in July 1983.

Senator GLENN. Well, I have been concerned that as we change our policy that whatever our policy is going to be, whether we all agree with it or not, that the military assets and the commitments there match our policy changes. And that was basically what I was asking.

General GORMAN. I certainly agree, sir, that among the shortcomings of our policy that we have not articulated well what it is we are doing to the Congress of the United States.

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much.

#### RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE

General Kingston, I have been concerned about the Rapid Deployment Force, and you are more involved with that than anybody else, whatever we call it these days. We have changed names on it about three times.

But this prepositioning versus mobility has bothered me somewhat. I had a career in the Marine Corps and was very much concerned with mobility and readiness and 24-hour departures and all that kind of thing for a good part of my life. It has rather boggled my mind to think that we can preposition material over there for a major war, landbased, and in effect put the supply lines out ahead of the troops, and then expect that material to still be there after the war really starts.

I know we are into floating dumps and things like that, prepositioning all of those, and I support all that. But a couple of us vis-

When it became a directive that we become a unified command, I lost that worldwide responsibility for Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and we settled down to concentrating into the central area. There was no thought to my knowledge of transferring the location of that command out of MacDill at that time. We had people who had just arrived with families. It may be the logistical and financial tail wagging the tactical and strategic dog, I am not sure, but the decision was made. We built a new headquarters, and on December 31, 1983, I had a forward headquarters established and activated aboard my command ship in the Persian Gulf, and it's co-located with the Commander of the Middle East Force, who is a Navy rear admiral. I have a small command element out there, not reporting through the Commander of the Middle East Force nor my naval component commander, who is located in Hawaii, who Commander Middle East Force reports to. He reports directly to me as do the security assistance personnel throughout the 14 countries in that area.

I have been offered a land-based forward headquarters element, and that is all we intend to ever base in that area, in one country. The country is not really suitable for the great percentage of my missions in that area, and I have rejected that kind offer. We will continue the Middle East Force and forward headquarters elements.

Senator WARNER. So at the present time there are no plans for relocation? All right.

#### SANDINISTA FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Now, General Gorman, you covered this morning in various ways your concerns over the assistance that this nation is providing the anti-Sandinista forces. Let me just rephrase the question to make sure that you have had adequate opportunity to provide this committee with your views.

I would revise it by saying if we were to cut off the aid to the anti-Sandinista Freedom Fighters, what would be your prediction as to the consequences?

General GORMAN. Let me state that I have no direct information concerning the Freedom Fighters upon which to base my reply. The information is provided through other agencies that are more directly in contact with them. I do, however, talk with Hondurans and Costa Ricans who are talking directly to them, so that in that sense I do have, in effect, independent verification, if you will, of our own reports and assessments.

Despite the fact that decisions were taken here in Washington to cut off U.S. assistance, and that led, based on what I understand of the situation, to a very severe blow to the capabilities of the Freedom Fighters to operate well inside of Nicaragua, particularly in that they have been hampered logistically.

Nonetheless, the fact of the matter is that the fighting has intensified, and the fact of the matter is that the movement has grown, and it has grown significantly over the last several months. The numbers of recruits available in Costa Rica and in Honduras I am told exceed the capacity of the local representatives of the Freedom Fighters to arm or train them. The numbers of recruits inside of

Nicaragua are even larger, and they greatly outstrip their capabilities to organize them.

I have heard statements from both our own sources and Hondurans and Costa Ricans to the effect that if support were forthcoming, the movements could readily field half again as many fighters in the next several months.

What is more remarkable about all of this, looking at it now as an outside observer of an unconventional warfare campaign, is that this movement really did not get started until 1983. There were isolated acts of sabotage in 1982, and there were cross-border raids by the FDN in particular in that year. But in terms of unconventional warfare—that is to say, the establishment of controlled resistance areas and guerrilla warfare—that is a relatively new phenomena, and the fact that it has been implanted and is able to grow despite the lack of U.S. support is an indication that there really are substantial wellsprings of resentment and antipathy in Nicaragua upon which to build such a movement.

If my sources can be credited, however, what they have been able—what the Freedom Fighters have been able to gather up from their various sources around the world is at its limit right now. They do not see any more additional help coming in. And since they are marginally able to maintain what they have got, I suspect, in knowing the dynamics of movements like this that the campaign will soon begin to peter out and wear down.

The nature of the beast is that if you are willing to be a guerrilla, you join what you think is the winning cause. You are laying your life on the line; if you sign up with one of these FDN or ARDE groups, you put your family at hazard. There is a great deal of danger or risk entailed in this for any Nicaraguan who signs on or associates himself with the Freedom Fighters, let alone put on their uniform and carry one of their guns. Not lightly to be undertaken.

But again the facts are that the movement has grown absent assurance of U.S. support. I would think, however, that unless new help can be found, the presumption would grow that this is not a winning cause, and the numbers will begin to fritter away, or worse, to take the Honduran worst fear, that they will decamp into Honduras with their families and go into exile.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONRY

Senator WARNER. One last quick question, Mr. Chairman, and I do not wish to invade others' time, so the answer could be for the record. But we are going to have as a committee extensive hearings on the question of chemical weaponry, and I wondered if General Kingston might provide very briefly now his views on the necessity to go forward with such a program, and then supplement his response for the record.

General KINGSTON. We have problems, and I will just go over them lightly. A lot of the area we have is sometimes 130 degrees Fahrenheit with blowing winds and high humidity. Our current equipment is next to useless in that environment. We are up against potential enemies that either have used chemical weapons in the area, or reportedly have used it, while they have used it in

other areas, and we know that if they feel that they can use it to their advantage, probably would use it in the future.

Senator WARNER. And therefore, probably the best deterrent would be an offensive capability to respond?

Thank you very much.

Chairman GOLDWATER. Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also pay tribute to General Gorman for a long and illustrious career, and welcome back to the committee.

General Kingston, I have had an opportunity myself to visit the MacDill center which you command and found it extremely valuable and helpful to me in understanding your mission.

#### VIOLENCE IN EL SALVADOR

General Gorman, yesterday in the newspapers' reference to the violence in El Salvador there is a story about the increasing activities of death squads again; and I was just wondering if you could bring us up to date about whether you saw the story and whether that is accurate?

General GORMAN. I did not see the story to which you make reference, but there is no doubt that there has been an increase in violence in San Salvador dating back to early December.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you tell us the reasons for it?

General GORMAN. I will come to that, if I may, sir. In October there were decisions taken in Managua forwarded to the field commands of the FMLN to reverse the strategy that they had been pursuing up until that time to recruit large number of fighters for their guerrilla formations, and to conduct an offensive against Duarte in the hope of pressuring him into negotiations.

The October instructions, which we have copies of, dictated that the guerrilla fronts break down into smaller units and return to forms of warfare that they had abandoned a couple of years ago, most notably resurgence of what they refer to as the urban front. And we know that from about 50 identified FMLN guerrillas in San Salvador, that number has grown to something like 500, with a number of new organizations operating inside of the city with specific missions, some of them aimed at economic targets, a number of them aimed at killing or kidnapping members of the government, some of them aimed at penetrating labor organizations—the usual sort of thing that you would expect to see. But the shootings have started again in San Salvador, and in my judgment much of the violence has been a product of this FMLN decision.

There are a lot of guns in San Salvador. You have been there, sir. You know virtually everyone is carrying a gun. And it is a relatively simple matter to arrange for some gunbearer to wreak violence for whatever purposes. If you are an estranged husband, an outraged lover, or you want to settle one debt or another, there are people around who are prepared to do your bidding.

The Salvadorans I think have made, referring now to government, considerable progress in cutting down on this kind of illegal activity, but given the stimulus from the left and given the fact that this is a political season in San Salvador, there are people both on the right and on the left who really do believe in violence

as a method of settling political differences. I can readily believe, therefore, that some significant portion of that violence may be associated with the right.

I want to be clear, however, that we know of—we have no reason to believe that this is associated with government or the armed forces. And I guess what I am worried about is that when you say “increasing death squad activity,” it used to be common here in Washington that that terminology implied some kind of systematic, but undercover operation by the government or leaders in the government. We have no reason to believe that that now is the case. I would regard what is going on there as wildcat activity on the right and the left. It is certainly deplored by President Duarte and his leadership.

#### NICARAGUA

Senator KENNEDY. Moving to Nicaragua, could you give us an evaluation of the Contras' military capability right now?

General GORMAN. They have about 16,000 men under arms. The principal coherent fighting force is that of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the FDN, which in turn is one of the three fighter groups that are generally affiliated or grouped under the Nicaraguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR). The other two, Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indians, or Misura, Misura have about 5,000 fighters, and then the Misurasata, the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Sandinista unity group have about 300 fighters. So that UNIR group constitutes the real fighting capability.

Senator KENNEDY. Is there any reasonable likelihood that this military force can defeat the military force in Nicaragua?

General GORMAN. Not in the foreseeable future.

Senator KENNEDY. And can you tell us how effective this force has been in interdicting supplies to El Salvador?

General GORMAN. My Salvadoran colleagues—and I refer here to all of the military and political leaders of Salvador—are entirely convinced that if it were not for the Sandinista opposition, the Freedom Fighters, they, the Salvadorans, would have significantly increased military problems. The Freedom Fighters have drawn off the energies of the Sandinistas, and have diverted one heck of a lot of money. And you have to understand, as I think we have discussed in the past, that the Salvadoran revolution, referring to the FMLN, is a cash and carry operation. It operates on money. And in the past year the amount of money flowing from Nicaragua to support—and from other sources—to support the FMLN has been severely attenuated. And I attribute that to a major diversion of Sandinista attention.

Now, I think that we as a government were probably wrong in using the word “interdiction” with this body, because interdiction to me as a military man implies some sort of physical estoppel or blocking. That has not happened. But I think that this diversion, strategic diversion, if you will, assuredly has occurred. And I will tell you that whatever you have invested in those 16,000 fighters, you are getting more than your money's worth. It is a lot more expensive to do it other ways, if you have to support Honduras and Costa Rica to cope with the Nicaraguans on their own.

Senator KENNEDY. But with regard to the equipment itself, as I understand, your response is that the effects relate to a general impact on El Salvador. That is what has been the report, as I gather from the response to you. But in terms of being able to halt or stop the supply routes for the insurgents in El Salvador, that has not resulted.

General GORMAN. I know of no reason to believe, sir, that that is the case.

#### SAUDI ARABIA

Senator KENNEDY. General Kingston, could you give the committee an assessment of the Saudi needs for additional U.S. military equipment and outline any plans the administration has for additional sales?

General KINGSTON. As you know, there is a relook going on right now in military sales by the State Department and other agencies in my area. I cannot comment on that study because I am not privy to it at this time.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, could you give us your own assessment as to what their needs might be?

General KINGSTON. Again, they vary by country.

Senator KENNEDY. I am talking about Saudi Arabia now.

General KINGSTON. I thought you might be, Senator. I believe they will come in for sophisticated aircraft. They have already been sold some sophisticated aircraft. We have operating aircraft over there now under my command until they can get their own. They will be coming in for sophisticated fighter aircraft, sophisticated weaponry to go with that aircraft, and the command and control mechanisms to control it. They are now building sophisticated command and control for all of their military organizations.

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up. I, too, would like to submit some questions for the record.

Senator NUNN [presiding]. Senator Levin, I believe you are next.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nunn.

I want to add my good wishes to General Gorman. I wish you all the best on your retirement. I know your successor, and I have had a chance to meet him, and I know you rest comfortably with him, as all of us do, at least those who have had a chance to meet him. And I also want to welcome General Kingston.

#### CONTADORA INITIATIVE

General Gorman, you have indicated that you are a supporter of the Contadora initiative. Do those countries support our military assistance to the anti-Sandinistas?

General GORMAN. I want to be very careful in an open session that I do not create more problems for Secretary Shultz in doing his difficult job. But I would tell you that I have met with all of the leaders of the Contadora countries with the exception, sir, of Mexico. My dialog with them has been through attaches.

Senator LEVIN. We are going to have to patch up that relationship. [Laughter.]

General GORMAN. That is Jack Galvin's major charge. [Laughter.]

But with respect to the other members of the Contadora group per se, and certainly with respect to the leadership of the core Central American neighbors of Nicaragua, the core four, they are unanimous in telling me that we should continue to provide incentives.

Now, some of them are more explicit than others, but it is crystal clear in our conversations that the incentives are of two general types. One is the U.S. direct pressures—military, economic or whatever—on Nicaragua. And the other are the pressures engendered by the domestic opposition in Nicaragua. And they are very clear with me in such conversations that there would be no Contadora process were it not for the incentives bearings on the Sandinistas to solve their problems.

They all profess to be in one sense or another experts on revolutionary movements. Most of them are avowed revolutionaries themselves, and they are very clear that left alone the Sandinistas will press ahead into another Cuba.

Senator LEVIN. Have they made any public statements, those four governments, supporting our aid?

General GORMAN. Their confidential remarks are, as you can imagine, prefaced by a statement that of course, I cannot say this in public without sabotaging the process; but you should understand, General, and please, et cetera, et cetera.

Senator LEVIN. Have any of them made any public statements saying they support the anti-Sandinista effort?

General GORMAN. Not among Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Mexico, no. They have been very careful to avoid that.

Senator NUNN. Senator Levin, would you yield without losing any time?

Senator LEVIN. Oh, yes.

Senator NUNN. I want to try to pin General Gorman's view down a little bit on this subject, not that you have evaded it; you never do. But we are struggling with this question now, and not just here but in the Intelligence Committee. You have made a key point, that it never should have been described as an interdiction effort. That is not in reality what it is in a direct sense, but instead indirectly. I think your point is valid. I agree with it. Indirectly I think it has had an effect.

General GORMAN. Sir, you will recall a hearing at which you and I went around and around on that word, and I said in terms of military definition, the word does not apply.

Senator NUNN. And that is the key. Of course, in the Intelligence Committee that has been one of the things we have talked about a great deal from the very beginning, although I was not there at the very beginning.

Now the other question is overthrow. We have a word that does not really apply practically. Overthrow is another word that has been used over and over again. This government has said, to the Congress at least, that was not our goal. I know we cannot control the goals of other people.

The other new twist we have now, that is somewhere in between those, is crying uncle. We have interdiction, which is not applicable; overthrow which has been disavowed, although recently per-

haps amended by the Secretary of State and the President; and now we have another goal here called crying uncle.

Could you give us something that those of us in Congress who are inclined to support this could hang our hats on, in terms of a realistic goal, expressed in terms that ordinary people can understand?

General GORMAN. Well, let me seize on Senator Levin's question and tell you that the leaders of the Core Four that I have had discussions with on this subject have stated unanimously that they cannot live with a Marxist-Leninist garrison state in their midst. That must change.

Now, when you go on and ask the question you have just asked me, their response is that the Sandinistas started out with a pluralistic leadership and that if they would return to a pluralistic leadership, if they would agree to a removal of the foreign presence and the demilitarization of the region, they, the Core Four, could live with the Nicaraguans. But they cannot live with them as a Marxist-Leninist garrison state. And they will then usually go on to say if that means the Sandinistas must be removed, then so be it.

Now, the closer you get to Nicaragua, the more definite, the more assertive those statements become. And you would hear much more clearly that kind of a message from a Costa Rican or a Honduran leader than you would from a Panamanian or a Venezuelan certainly.

Nonetheless, somewhere between changing their present way of doing business and overthrow—forceful overthrow I guess is what is implied there—it seems to me is where realism lies. As I commented earlier, I do not see any immediate prospect that these guys in blue suits in the hills are going to march into Managua. It seems to me that the whole resistance movement has another year or more of slogging to go before that were ever in prospect, and a lot of violence associated with it.

I think that, therefore, as I indicated earlier, the answer lies in some kind of combination of pressures plus diplomacy, and I believe the formulae that we have been reaching for in Contadora are an adequate basis for proceeding. They are the only ones that I think realistically the people in the region would live with.

And we ought to also be clear, sir, that whether or not the United States supports the Sandinista opposition, opposition there will be. The question is really how much is going to be in country and how much is going to be out of country.

You may be aware that just within the past 2 weeks the Ortegas announced that they are going to apply conscription to all males through age 30, and almost immediately the number of Nicaraguan males coming across the border into Costa Rica and Honduras went up and went up dramatically. The Panamanians told me the other night they are beginning to see them in northern Panama.

So out of that somewhere in there is where the truth lies. And I would argue that you build your policy on what is possible. I do not think overthrow is feasible in the near future.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Senator Levin, I apologize for interrupting.

#### ANTI-SANDINISTA GROUPS

Senator LEVIN. You have indicated there are a number of forces that are in the anti-Sandinista groups. Do some of them have as their objective the overthrow of the Sandinista government?

General GORMAN. There is no question, sir. Most of these folks, as I understand it from talking to Hondurans and Costa Ricans, are uneducated campesinos. Most of them cannot read. I think the only people that have used the manuals that were produced for them effectively are Members of this body. [Laughter.]

These are people who have given their lives for a cause, and I think they think that cause is the downfall of the Sandinista government.

Senator LEVIN. So while it is not our goal to overthrow that government, it is your belief that we should assist groups whose goal it is to overthrow that government?

General GORMAN. I believe that we should assist men who are fighting for freedom.

Senator LEVIN. And the way they define it is overthrowing that government.

General GORMAN. Right.

Senator LEVIN. And interdiction is—is not our purpose we are not achieving any of that in terms of arms, as I gather from what you said here this morning?

General GORMAN. In the military sense there is no physical stoppage of the movement of arms occasioned by the operations of the Sandinista opposition.

Senator LEVIN. Are we in any way, by the way, assisting or supporting the anti-Sandinistas?

General GORMAN. To the best of my knowledge and belief, sir, we are not. Certainly the U.S. Southern Command is not. One thing that I am not involved in, Senator Levin, is a secret war.

Senator LEVIN. So to the best of your knowledge, we are not in any way assisting the anti-Sandinista groups?

General GORMAN. I know of no way that the U.S. Government or any of its arms agencies, or appurtenances are engaged in such activities.

Senator LEVIN. Are people that we contract with or assist?

General GORMAN. I am confident, given my own sources, that if that were going on, I would know it.

Senator LEVIN. And you do not know of any?

General GORMAN. So I assume that it is not.

Senator LEVIN. Now, there have been many newspaper articles about it, and we might as well clear the air. One reads articles from time to time saying we are giving assistance in various ways, that has been described in various articles, and you have given me assurance that at least you know of none—of giving assistance—and that if any were going on, that you would know of it, I believe. So that is good enough for me, and I hope that puts the matter at least in some clearer light.

#### JOSEF MENGELE, NAZI WAR CRIMINAL

A number of questions have been raised on a wholly unrelated matter, but which is physically in your command area about the

Nazi war criminal Dr. Josef Mengele, living in Paraguay. I wonder if you have any knowledge of his presence there in the last few years?

General GORMAN. I do not, sir. I have a very small military group in Paraguay, and none of the reporting that I have seen out of the military group or out of any of the other agencies in Paraguay have dealt with that subject.

Senator LEVIN. I have a number of questions for General Kingston, if I have a moment.

#### RAS BANAS, EGYPT

Are we pre-positioning equipment at Ras Banas in Egypt now?

General KINGSTON. We are not.

Senator LEVIN. I know we are in open session, and I do not want to ask anything that you cannot answer.

General KINGSTON. We are not.

Senator LEVIN. How many ships have been hit in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war?

General KINGSTON. Fifty-seven as of February 19.

Senator LEVIN. And how many have sunk?

General KINGSTON. Three to my knowledge.

Senator LEVIN. What is the reason for the small number of ships being sunk?

General KINGSTON. Both Iran and Iraq have used missiles to attack shipping. We believe that they are choosing their targets carefully.

Senator LEVIN. Why would that be the case?

General KINGSTON. There could possibly be several reasons, but that would be personal conjecture on my part.

Senator LEVIN. In other words, what you are saying, it is possible the countries that are firing these missiles do not want to sink the ships?

General KINGSTON. That is possible. Since both countries use international merchant shipping, the sinking of large numbers of tankers may not be perceived by either country as being in its best interest. Some of the missiles are not capable of sinking some of those ships they have hit.

#### STATUS OF IRAQ/IRAN WAR

Senator LEVIN. What can you tell us about the status of the Iraq-Iran war and how does that war affect our security in terms of its outcome?

General KINGSTON. Again, in an open session, I would say that to me it looks like Iran is unwilling to negotiate or the negotiation terms they have set down are so unrealistic and unacceptable to Iraq that it will probably continue with limited attacks on both sides. As a ground war it is almost a stalemate. I think the recent increased use of the Iraqi air force is indicative of the stalemate situation of the ground war, and they have moved it down into the gulf, into the so-called tanker war. They, of course, are using this against Iran's economy to try and pressure, try and stop or at least control some of the flow of oil from Kharg Island. Of course, they have pushed Iran into other means to get that oil itself.

Both countries have the capability to continue the ground war like it is going. If the tanker war continues, it could have ramifications affecting more than just those two countries.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman GOLDWATER [presiding]. Senator Exon, do you have any questions?

Senator EXON. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### EL SALVADOR

General Gorman, let me get back to the situation in El Salvador. We hear a lot of conflicting conjecture today as to what the situation is down there. Some say that the guerrillas in El Salvador are slowly losing the battle and eventually they will be a force not seriously to be reckoned with, and others claim that even if there is no decisive military victory over the guerrillas, they would be a force that would cause a great deal of difficulty and instability in the region.

Can you clarify for me what your view is on the El Salvador military situation today and what you might project or expect it to be a year or two years from now?

General GORMAN. One word that has frequently been applied to the situation there in the past that no longer accurately describes what is going on is stalemate. I indicated earlier there has been a good deal of dynamism evident in El Salvador in the past year, and let me begin by taking you back just 1 year ago. About the time that I testified here last February, we were looking at an FMLN force that had dared to form itself into brigade sized organizations for the purposes of conducting what amounted to conventional military operations, large scale attacks against Salvadoran Government units in the field, very successful in the fall of 1983, or against government installations, the attack of the garrison of the Fourth Brigade at El Paraiso on the 30th of December of 1983, and then the subsequent destruction of the Cuscatlan Bridge over New Years.

In these battles, the guerrillas won, and won handily. The Government response was wholly inadequate. They lost a lot of people killed, wounded, a lot of weapons captured, et cetera.

At that point in time you were looking at perhaps 30,000 Salvadoran Government troops facing an FMLN of somewhere between 9,000 and 11,000, and the word stalemate I think was a reasonable representation of what was going on.

There has been a dramatic change in the past year. The guerrillas can no longer mass in that sense, and they know it. And they have given orders to their subordinate organizations to break up into smaller units, to revert to classic guerrilla warfare, harassment, mining, roadblocks, etc. to renew urban warfare, meaning terrorism, and to move forces out of the vaunted conflicted areas where a year ago they claimed that they were virtually the Government, but to move forces out of there into the heretofore pacified areas of the country, particularly the western portions of the country, all of this indicating to us a significant reappraisal of their prospects for imminent victory.

They are gearing for the long haul, and they feel particularly inhibited, I should add, both by the cutbacks, or slowdown in funds reaching them from abroad, and by the political successes enjoyed by the Duarte government, particularly abroad, in Europe, where theretofore they had gotten a lot of sustenance.

On the government side of the equation, they not only have more forces in the field (there is now a force structure about 40,000), but also whereas last year there was a garrison mentality and a defensive minded leadership, very poor use of central reserves, and certainly a lack of confidence and planning, there is now the antithesis. Today these people think ahead. They have satisfactorily acted on intelligence, much of it their own, incidentally, anticipated guerrilla operations, taken the battle to the guerrillas, and in it, the leadership has directly participated. In the last pitched battle in the 6th through the 9th of January at a place called San Bartolo Ichanmico, the chief of the joint staff went to the field and took command of the forces in the field, and I think that is probably the first time in the history of El Salvador that any senior left the capital like that to take command in the field.

I would tell you that you are looking at an armed force this year that is substantially more capable than it was just a year ago.

#### INTERRUPTION OF SUPPORT FROM NICARAGUA

Senator EXON. And may I ask, if there has been, for whatever reason, an interruption of the flow of support from Nicaragua into that area?

General GORMAN. It has certainly made it a heck of a lot more difficult for that to occur.

I have got here just a quick wrap-up of events in Salvador from February 18 through 22, and if I may, just let me draw on that paper.

In the past several months, I would say perhaps as early as 6 months ago, but certainly 4 months ago, I think the El Salvadorans went from reacting to information that infiltration was under way, to anticipating it, and whether this has been as a result of the urgings that we have made to them in this respect, or whether they are doing it because Senor Duarte, the President of the Republic, has told them that he wants to stop that—and I know that to be the case—or whether this simply represents another reflection of their growing professionalism, the fact of the matter was that they did anticipate correctly that some time around the 20th of the month there would be one of these cross beach operations in the vicinity of Jucaran, down in the center of the country, and probably because from their own sources there, they were able to deploy forces and got into a fight with a guerrilla group that was down there to safeguard this movement. I don't think that they stopped the entire shipment, but I do think that they scared off a good part of it, and I think that that reflects the pattern that we have been observing from the outside. They are interrupting it. They are making it more difficult for the guerrillas to move supplies, and move units around. They are certainly making it more difficult for the guerrillas to support large units massed together.

And all of this is a reflection of their increasing activity and their increasingly efficient intelligence.

So I would tell you that they are doing very well. This is the dry season, Senator EXON, and in the dry season the guerrillas make much broader use of overland infiltration as well, and again, in this past week, on the 20th, the Salvadorans sent one of the U.S. trained battalions, the ARCE battalion, which was trained at the Regional Military Training Center, into a guerrilla base area up close to the Honduran border there to dismantle four guerrilla base camps, capturing not a significant amount of supplies but enough to indicate that they were on the money in putting them in there at that time.

Senator EXON. One last question, Mr. Chairman, if I might.

#### CONCERN OVER MIG'S

Last year at election time there was an announcement that we thought Mig fighters were being delivered into Nicaragua. At that time I said that I felt that if Mig's were going into Nicaragua, that would be destabilizing to the area and that I hoped that we would move with whatever projection of force was necessary, to see that that did not happen. I feel very strongly about that.

Now, what can you say for the record, first, on what action could have been taken or would have been taken? And second, since it seems that that was a false rumor put out since Mig's have evidently not arrived, what could you do to clarify the false information that came out at that time? How adequate is our intelligence capability in this part of the world?

General GORMAN. Well, let me take those points in reverse order.

#### DESTABILIZATION

On the destabilization of the area, I would tell you what the Costa Ricans and the Hondurans tell me, that they are far more concerned about MI-25 armored HIND helicopters than they are about Mig's, and they ought to be. They understand in spades that the Mig's don't pose as direct a threat to them as do those helicopters. They have seen the television footage from Afghanistan and so forth. And so in that respect, I would say the destabilization of the region is well under way.

I believe myself that the movement in there of high performance aircraft like the Mig's would in fact be an event of which the United States would have to take strategic notice. There is no question about it.

The second point I would like to make concerns the adequacy of the information at our disposal. I would not want to comment at length in open session, for reasons that are obvious to you. But I would tell you that all of the concern that was manifested here about those Mig's was entirely well taken. We really did have reason to be concerned, and I will be glad to go into that in some depth with you in another forum.

I do not know to this day whether those deliveries took place or not. I have plenty of sources in the region that keep assuring me that the Mig's are already there, and that we cannot see them. We do know from what we can see that they are making preparations

for the reception of some kind of an advanced aircraft of the sort that the Mig represents. The airfield that they are building north of Managua at Punta Huete has revetments that are identical to those that we see in the airfields in Cuba that do house Mig's.

So our inference is they are getting ready for some kind of an event of that sort. The construction on that airfield has not proceeded as rapidly as I had predicted with this committee last year, but they have got about 10,000 feet of runway completed, which is more than adequate for fighter operations, and these fighter revetments and ready areas are sitting there now complete. The fueling facilities are being finished up, and they are putting in the anti-aircraft weaponry around the airfield.

It is interesting to note that in the past year they have begun to practice ground controlled intercept with their radar, exactly the sort of thing, using the same techniques that we see the Cubans practicing with their Mig's in Cuba. They don't have an aircraft that could hope to be used for GCI absent the arrival of something new.

So the evidence is still there. They continue to signal to us that something is coming in.

Senator EXON. Are you telling me that from our surveillance and from our sources of information on the ground that are considerable in Nicaragua, that we do not know whether there are Mig's in Nicaragua at this time or not?

General GORMAN. I have no firm information that would lead me to believe that Mig's are there.

Senator EXON. So you think they are not there?

General GORMAN. I believe they are not there.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

General GORMAN. I cannot produce information that would confirm the opposite.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I do have some questions for you, General Gorman, that I will submit and you can answer for the record.

#### KHARG ISLAND

General Kingston, if I were in command of the Iraq forces, I would be sorely tempted to attack Kharg Island.

Why in your opinion haven't the Iraqi forces attacked Kharg Island, or even more, the two supply lines flowing from Iran are not at a great depth, I think around 100 feet, and I wondered why the island has not been attacked or the supply lines have not been mined.

General KINGSTON. The island, Mr. Chairman, has been attacked, not in any great repetitive flights. They have some protective mechanisms around them other than physical. They have passive protective measures that have worked, and so much so that they are using other means now to get the oil distributed from Kharg Island without tying up a great percentage of the tankers at Kharg Island.

I would be glad to go into that in closed session.

Chairman GOLDWATER. If you feel that should be classified, you could answer it to me in a classified way.

General KINGSTON. It is a little bit early because the delivery is not due until 1986, but we are kept abreast of the status but not the actual agreements. I am sure the command will be when they are about to be implemented or do in fact go into effect.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

#### MIG SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

One question for General Gorman on the Mig Nicaragua situation that Senator Exon was pursuing.

On the intelligence part of it, how much damage was done by the announcement or leak here—I am not sure which it was—about the Mig-21 or Mig delivery over there and the fact that we were trying to determine that? How much damage was done to our ability to really tell whether the Mig's were being delivered?

General GORMAN. It is going to make it a lot more difficult in the future, there is no question about it.

#### READINESS

Senator NUNN. I have three questions for the record, one on readiness and how you measure readiness. We are trying to determine whether we revise some of the ratings on readiness which have been so controversial.

Also, General Kingston and General Gorman, I am going to pose a question to both of you about the effect, as you see it, of having a 3-percent growth rate in the budget rather than what is now being projected in the 5-year plan, if you assume that we fence off and give priority to strategic programs and to the strategic defense initiative.

I am particularly interested in your analysis, General Gorman, since you made such an excellent statement. I thought about the low intensity combat. I would like to get your view on that for the record, or now if you have something.

General GORMAN. You know better than I, sir, most of the moneys in the Defense program go for readiness to meet very different kinds of contingencies than I face in my command.

So the answer to your question from my perspective is that substantial reductions in the Defense budget would not impact my command, assuming that the readiness for those types of forces that I have cited in my probably overly pedantic presentation here were safeguarded. The assumption that because forces are ready for mid-intensity warfare or high-intensity warfare, they are also ready for low-intensity warfare is false. You have to build the right kind of forces and prepare for low-intensity warfare, and you have to look at the overall structure of the armed forces, and you have to be willing in our instance to permit me to draw on the capabilities of the reserve components, which I am doing.

And I am grateful for the support of this body in making that possible.

So assuming that I would have those authorities, and the sorts of considerations that I cited to you earlier were safeguarded, cut-backs in the Defense budget would not impact SOUTHCOM's readiness.

Senator NUNN. I will put the rest of these questions in the record. I have one on support forces for both of you, too, and one on the effect of a 10-percent cut in support forces across the board, because that is being talked about. I would like to get that, but I will do that for the record because I know we need to get away. You have been here a long time.

I thank both of you for not only your testimony but your service to the Nation.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER

##### AID TO THE CONTRAS

Chairman GOLDWATER. General Gorman, on aid to the Contras, in your view, what would be the military and political implications of maintaining the ban of U.S. assistance to the guerrillas in Nicaragua?

General GORMAN. Massive migrations from Nicaragua into Honduras and Costa Rica, and distinct turns toward neutralism in both countries. We would see a hardening of Sandinista positions in Contadora, and a tightening of their internal controls.

Chairman GOLDWATER. From the regional point of view, what would be the pros and cons of overt U.S. assistance to the Contras?

General GORMAN. The only objections would come from the Sandinistas. All those who support democracy would rejoice.

Chairman GOLDWATER. One of the main reasons the United States has given assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras is to stem the flow of arms from Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador.

To what extent have the Contra operations affected Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas?

General GORMAN. The Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua have diverted substantial resources—funds, manpower, command attention—which otherwise would have been available to support the FMLN.

##### U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Chairman GOLDWATER. General Gorman, over the past year, the press has reported a general increase in the U.S. military presence in Central America.

Could you briefly give the committee a sense of the numbers and types of presence the U.S. military is maintaining in and around Central America?

General GORMAN. The data in my prepared statement are as far as I believe it prudent to discuss in open session.

##### BIG PINE III

Chairman GOLDWATER. The Big Pine III military exercise in Central America is scheduled to begin this month.

Could you tell us the duration and scope of this exercise?

General GORMAN. Ahuas Tara III is a joint combined exercise of U.S. and Honduran forces designed to increase the readiness and interoperability of both forces for the defense against armed attack, and for operations against guerrillas within Honduras. Most exercise events will occur in March and April.

##### U.S. MILITARY ADVISORS IN EL SALVADOR

Chairman GOLDWATER. There have been press reports of an increased U.S. military role in behalf of the Salvadoran military, for instance, the provision of realtime intelligence to the Salvadoran military and more freedom of movement for U.S. military advisors in El Salvador.

Could you explain the role of the U.S. military in El Salvador and how that role has changed in the recent past?

General GORMAN. There has been no change in the numbers of U.S. trainers in El Salvador, and no change in their function. Press reports to the contrary are inaccurate.

## NICARAGUA MILITARY BUILDUP

Chairman GOLDWATER. Could you give us a status report on the Nicaragua military buildup, especially in terms of the jet aircraft they are acquiring? Also, what is your assessment of where the Nicaraguan military is going in terms of future development?

General GORMAN. The data I have provided, and the statements I made concerning advanced aircraft and the preparations that the Sandinistas have undertaken for advanced aircraft, indicate that the Nicaraguans are determined to establish and maintain clear military superiority in Central America. It is a military superiority which is beyond any legitimate needs for defense against their neighbors and is plainly aimed at intimidation. It also serves, as I have said, the purpose of politicking their youth.

## UNITED STATES-HONDURAS SECURITY RELATIONS

Chairman GOLDWATER. What is the status of security relations between the United States and Honduras?

General GORMAN. Negotiations are underway in a frank and amicable fashion. Further comment is inappropriate.

## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

## AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS

Senator WARNER. I support strongly, along with many of my colleagues, our support for the Afghan Freedom Fighters. However, the criticism has been made that our support for the Freedom Fighters has been only enough to keep them from going under—not nearly enough to give them any reasonable chance of success. Thus, according to the critics, our support would only condemn them to continued fighting, but with little hope of a successful conclusion. Would you comment on these criticisms?

General KINGSTON. Although Afghanistan falls within the United States Central Command's area of responsibility, support to Afghan Freedom Fighters does not fall within the purview of the U.S. Central Command.

## TACTICAL SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

Senator WARNER. On Page 10 of your statement, you mention the tactical deployable communications equipment which is becoming available and, as I understand it, would include tactical satellite communications.

I understand that there is currently a problem of compatibility between Air Force and Army tactical satellite communications equipment.

Would you comment on this problem and describe what actions are being taken to resolve it?

General KINGSTON. USCENTCOM has been aware of potential interoperability problems between Army and Air Force Ground Mobile Force satellite terminals. [deleted.] We are aware that the Services are taking corrective action to overcome this deficiency.

## FORWARD POSITIONING OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

Senator WARNER. You mentioned in your statement some of your initiatives to persuade countries in your area of operations to permit forward positioning of supplies and equipment, to provide host nation support and to improve their own military capabilities.

While I am certain that you have personally made great efforts in this regard, the results, quite frankly, seem rather meager.

Would you provide your assessment of the willingness of the countries in this region to be of real assistance in the event of an emergency?

General KINGSTON. [Deleted.] In addition to wanting to preserve their cultural traditions, many of these countries fear that their nonaligned status will be put in jeopardy or relations with their neighbors will be complicated if they are seen as too friendly with the United States. The Arab-Israeli situation, and the close relationship of the U.S. with Israel further exacerbate the situation.

In spite of this background, many nations in the region recognize the importance of assisting the United States in the event of an emergency. In fact, several countries have demonstrated their willingness already. [deleted.]

Some of the other countries of my area have granted or have indicated willingness to grant us access rights in the event of an emergency, as well as provide us host nation support and allow the pre-positioning of supplies and equipment. Some, [deleted] are also improving their own military capabilities in coordination and cooperation with the United States.

While progress in this area may seem to be meager, it is not. Remember that the United States does not have formal alliances or treaties with these countries. The problems we face in this region will go away slowly and will require a great deal of patient effort on both sides. Compared with two years ago, the U.S. has made good progress persuading countries in my area to help the United States protect peace and stability in the region. It is my assessment that the countries of the region have been and will continue to be of real assistance in the event of an emergency.

## PLANNING FORCES

Senator WARNER. Most of the forces under your command are, in fact, "planning forces".

In your opinion, do your forces have adequate opportunities to train together?

Are you confident that these forces can be brought together to operate effectively in an emergency?

What measures would you recommend to increase the effectiveness of these "Planning Forces" under your Command?

General KINGSTON. My analysis is that the USCENTCOM exercise program is balanced with the appropriate mix of CONUS and OCONUS exercises. This mix permits us to accomplish those objectives critical to improving the operational readiness of the participating combat forces and headquarters. Significant progress has been made in past years which provides a foundation for further development. However, future progress will be largely dependent on continued funding and political/military sponsorship because USCENTCOM does not have a large force structure which routinely works and trains in place to accomplish U.S. objectives in the region.

As you know, my command and its forces are transportation dependent with great distances to cover in order to exercise in the Central Area or other semi-arid locations. I need your support to maintain the currently planned minimums of exercise frequency and magnitude. Cuts or reductions within the exercise program would jeopardize the ability of my forces to rapidly deploy to the Central Area and operate effectively.

In response to your second question, critical capabilities such as rapid deployment, joint interoperability, command and control, intra-theater logistics, combined TACAIR and air defense are focused on in exercises and acceptable levels of capabilities have been attained. Additionally, our accelerated and extensive planning efforts, matched by plans developed by our component headquarters, gives the opportunity to identify and resolve potential problems.

Lastly, to increase the effectiveness of USCINCCENT forces, I need your support of USCENTCOM initiatives to build a supporting infrastructure within the Central Area, to include forward operating and intermediate staging bases and the establishment of effective command and control communications system networks.

## U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Senator WARNER. I'd like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and to commend you for your performance as Commander of the U.S. Southern Command.

I regret that you have decided to retire from the military. I hope that we can continue to have the benefit of your outstanding and dedicated service somewhere in the Federal Government.

I would be interested to hear your views on the termination of our assistance and support to the anti-Sandinista Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua.

Would you provide your assessment of the effects such actions have, not only in Nicaragua, but in other countries in the region?

General GORMAN. I think that we must support those Nicaraguans who are seeking to free their country. Many people, including many North Americans, applauded the removal of Somoza in 1979, thinking that the pledges of the revolutionary government would be met. They are no longer applauding. The revolution in Nicaragua has been stolen and the people are the losers. And the people are now fighting back.

To continue to not support the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters would be a disaster for the region, and for Honduras and Costa Rica in particular. Those countries

would be immediately inundated with thousands and thousands of additional refugees; they already have more than they can handle. Neutralism would be the outcome and the Sandinistas would have a free hand to export their brand of tyranny and terrorism. It would be a major reversal for U.S. policy promoting democracy in Central America.

#### CONTRAS

Senator WARNER. In your view, have the anti-Sandinista Freedom Fighters (Contras) been effective in deterring the Sandinistas from exporting insurgencies to other Central American states?

General GORMAN. Yes. The internal pressures brought to the Sandinistas by the Freedom Fighters have been most effective in deterring the exportation of insurgency from Nicaragua. The Freedom Fighters have provided a strategic diversion to the Sandinistas who must now apply their Soviet bloc supplied resources against their own internal security problem.

Senator WARNER. To what extent do you believe the anti-Sandinista Freedom Fighters offset the substantial military buildup in Nicaragua?

General GORMAN. The Sandinistas now have their hands full with their internal threat and their self-induced hysteria over an imminent U.S. invasion. They have recently extended forced conscription, their single most unpopular activity to meet these threats, causing both patent resistance among their people, and wholesale migration of the youth.

#### HONDURAS

Senator WARNER. There have been recent stories in the media describing some problems we might be having with one of our allies in the region, Honduras.

Would you provide us your assessment of our current relations with Honduras and what we should do to assume that we maintain the appropriate relations between our two countries?

General GORMAN. The United States enjoys excellent relations with Honduras. The press reports to which you refer are exaggerated and conditioned by the electoral campaign which is now beginning in Honduras. The Hondurans are seriously concerned, gravely worried, about what is happening in Nicaragua. In 1979 there was a rough balance of military force in Central America. Today the preponderance of power rests with the Sandinistas. They out-man and out-gun the rest of Central America combined, with the exception of aircraft, and all evidence indicates that the air picture is soon to be altered overwhelmingly in favor of the Sandinistas.

#### U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA

Senator WARNER. Is the quantity of U.S. assistance now being provided to Central America sufficient to support U.S. objectives?

If not, in general terms, what is required?

General GORMAN. No. Honduras needs urgently an economic bail-out, and Guatemala needs help of all types. Full implementation of the Jackson Plan is needed to assist our closest neighbors in political, social, and economic development, while maintaining the requisite security shield.

#### MILITARY HOUSING PROGRAM IN PANAMA

Senator WARNER. The MILCON request contains a build-to-lease housing program for U.S. military in Panama.

What is the reason for selection of this type of construction?

General GORMAN. Lease, or build-to-lease, construction will provide a direct stimulus to the Panamanian housing industry, which is languishing. President Barletta has requested, and the U.S. Embassy in Panama supports, this form of helping the Panamanians help themselves.

#### STUDENT TRAINING IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Senator WARNER. I understand that, in Costa Rica alone, about 200 students will return from training in Communist countries this year.

Can you comment on the approximate number of Central American students now being trained in communist bloc countries and where most of these students find employment upon completion of their training?

How long has the Communist program been operating?

How does the U.S. program compare?

General GORMAN. During the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union observed the political and economic advantages accruing to the United States from training programs that exposed the potential leadership of developing countries to our technologies and the social, political, and cultural aspects of American life. Partly out of a desire to share the goodwill created through such government-sponsored training programs and partly because it needed to cultivate a cadre of individuals in the developing countries with which it could work, the Soviet Union initiated scholarship programs for developing countries. We have all seen the press reports of Soviet "scholarships" for Afghanistan, one of their currently targeted countries.

By 1956, the Soviet Union and East European nations were offering academic scholarships to about 1,000 students from a few developing countries. Since then, estimates are that nearly 300,000 students from over 100 countries have received academic, technical, and military training. In 1982 alone, there were some 83,000 students in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and another 27,000 in Cuba. These large numbers of foreign students, most at the undergraduate level, reflect the development of more sophisticated and competitive programs and an increasing demand for higher education in many countries. An additional 5,000 were attending short-term technical training and another 5,000 were receiving military training, largely related to foreign military sales agreements.

The Soviet surrogate in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba, was also pressed into service and has provided academic and technical training to another 50,000 students since the early 1960s. Of the estimated 27,000 foreign students attending Cuban schools in 1982, about 14,000 were elementary and secondary school children and youth enrolled in the Isle of Youth Program. The remaining 13,000 were enrolled in academic and technical programs at universities and institutes.

Specifically looking at Central America, the following shows the approximate student breakdown for 1982:

Country	Warren Fund	Other	Total
Belize	25	30	55
Guatemala	100	5	105
El Salvador	75	(*)	(*)
Honduras	225	10	235
Nicaragua	1,250	5,000	6,250
Costa Rica	700	5	705
Panama	1,050	50	1,100

\* Unknown.  
\* 75 plus.

Most of these students, when they return to their native country, have a hard time finding jobs in the private sector. As a result, most end up in the public sector, especially in education. These graduates, because large scale Communist recruiting in Latin America is a relatively recent occurrence, have not yet reached high levels in their professional careers. We may not feel the real effects of the Soviet scholarship programs for a few more years when these individuals gain more seniority. There may also be some kind of "critical mass." As more and more Communist-trained students return to a country, they may be in a position to wield real influence.

By comparison, there is no U.S. program. U.S. programs are few and often targeted on the middle and upper classes of Latin America. Our U.S. Government sponsored scholarships underwent a strategic shift in the 1970s: In 1972, 30 percent of the scholarships went to Latin America; by 1982, the Latin American share was down to 18 percent. For all of Latin America, in 1983, some 15,900 students were provided financial assistance by communist countries; there were only 400 students from Latin America in the United States on government funded programs.

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America recognized this problem and recommended a program of 10,000 government sponsored scholarships to bring Central American students to the United States. The Central American Peace, Democracy, and Development Act of 1984 (Jackson Plan) provides more than \$145 million in scholarship money (fiscal year 1984-89).

#### PANAMA AND CANAL SECURITY

Senator WARNER. What is the short and long term outlook for the stability of Panama and the security of the Canal?

General GORMAN. Short term: Depends on economic revival of Panama, its ability to reservice its foreign debt, and to devise a responsible domestic financing plan which is supported by the legislature and the principal political parties.

Long term: In my view, Panama can, with continued assistance from the United States, remain stable and provide for the land defenses of the Canal. But I do not believe that there is any prospect that it can afford to develop the forces necessary to defend against air or maritime threats, even those of a terrorist nature. The just completed Kindle Liberty exercise demonstrated that the Panamanian Defense Forces are developing on the right track and will be capable of handling the projected ground threat.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN QUAYLE

##### REFUGEE CAMPS IN HONDURAS

Senator QUAYLE. General Gorman, is there any truth to reports that Salvadoran rebels are using border refugee camps in Honduras as resting places and that as soon as rebel forces come to the camps to rest, rested rebel forces at the camps take to the field?

General GORMAN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. What are the difficulties of moving these camps away from the borders?

General GORMAN. Threefold. First, the camps are under U.N. auspices, and Geneva must be convinced. Second, relocation engages Honduran internal politics in an election year—everyone wants the refugees in someone else's district. Third, some arrangements would no doubt have to be made for repatriating Salvadorans under guarantees of safety, which could pose problems for President Duarte's government. But none of these problems, in my view, are insuperable.

Senator QUAYLE. Is the Honduran government hesitant to help? If so, why?

General GORMAN. As I indicated, it is a matter of local politics. I believe the Hondurans want the camps relocated, but have not figured out how to do it.

##### WAR RESERVE MATERIEL

Senator QUAYLE. General Kingston, in your testimony on page 14 you state that our tendency has been to bow-wave funding for war materiel to provide a near term offset whenever defense budget cuts are enacted and that this dilutes our efforts to "support the initial surge" that could be required in a major conflict. You make specific reference to the need for more spare parts to maintain aircraft sortie rates. Yet you make no reference to preferred air-to-surface and land attack munitions to increase effectiveness and kills per sortie. Nor do you make any reference to SMART munition vehicles such as cruise missiles, which might complement air interdiction missions.

Do we have too much of these items?

General KINGSTON. [Deleted.] I consider these munitions as critical force multipliers and essential for the success of my warfighting capability.

##### COUNTERTHREAT BASES

Senator QUAYLE. In any conflict that the Soviets might involve themselves, would it not be crucial to be able to threaten the bases from which they might attack?

Where might F-111 and F-15E and F-16 be based in the Central Command theater, and what would be their combat radius for air interdiction missions? Could any of them threaten Soviet staging and air bases in the Transcaucasus? If so, which plans from which bases?

General KINGSTON. In any conflict with the Soviets, holding their operating bases at risk of destruction is of great military value if not crucial to ultimate defeat of the enemy.

In addition to the F-111, the modernization of our tactical fighter force with F-15E and LANTIRN equipped F-16 aircraft will give a sharp increase in capability to interdict the Soviets. We must continue closing the gap in night, adverse weather interdiction capability in order to deny the enemy the sanctuary of night operations. Exact basing of these fighter aircraft would be scenario dependent. Given land basing within 600-1,000 nm of the conflict, our added advantage of air-to-air refueling and force modernization, Soviet forces and operating bases would be at risk day or night.

#### BASES IN TURKEY

Senator QUAYLE. How important is Turkey in the staging of any of your command's possible operations?

General KINGSTON. Facilities in many NATO countries may need to be used to support large contingencies in my AOR. [Deleted.]

#### CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS IN PERSIAN GULF

Senator QUAYLE. Although your command could draw upon aircraft carrier battle groups, would it be reasonable to deploy such groups in the Persian Gulf to deal with major conflicts in this region? Under what circumstances would it not make sense?

General KINGSTON. The support of CVBGs in major conflicts in the USCENTCOM area is vital. However, deployment of CVBGs into the Persian Gulf is not anticipated.

#### FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION VITAL

Senator QUAYLE. You mention the desirability of having stronger friends on page 19 of your testimony. How important is the friendship of nations such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia to your command's operations? Is there any sort of weapons system that you do not think would be prudent for these nations to have at this time?

General KINGSTON. Friendship and cooperation with all of the friendly states in the region are important to USCENTCOM.

Saudi Arabia occupies a vital geostrategic position and is acknowledged as one of the leading states in the region. It is a logical Persian Gulf geographical site to support operations in defense of Persian Gulf oil. Saudi Arabia, equipped with systems interoperable with those used by U.S. forces and trained by United States military advisors, would be in a position to assist in defense of the region. Jordan is also of strategic importance to the United States and USCENTCOM. Jordan has the longest frontier with Israel of any Arab state and is a center of political moderation in the Middle East. Jordan has significant military defense needs to meet the serious imbalance caused by the massive Soviet supply of arms to Syria.

At the present time, I know of no weapons systems that have been requested or are being considered by these nations that are not legitimate requirements to meet their defense needs.

#### QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON

##### HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO CENTRAL AMERICA

Senator DENTON. General Gorman, can you tell us your view of the utility and the implementation to date of the so-called "Denton amendment" to allow the space-available use of military resources to transport privately-supplied humanitarian relief supplies to Central America?

General GORMAN. Unfortunately, the Departments of Defense and State have not yet been able to develop, or translate, the Denton Amendment into a workable arrangement. The bureaucracies are just now finalizing the mechanics of the program and the much needed, and proffered, aid beginning to flow. But it is a splendid provision of law, and should be extended and expanded into subsequent years, and regularized by the Departments of the Executive Branch concerned. Procedures are needed to identify requirements at the local level, as are provisions to allow deploying U.S. exercise forces to collect and transport humanitarian relief supplies.

#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN

##### STRATEGIC NUCLEAR PROGRAMS

Senator NUNN. There is a growing tendency by the Defense Department, particularly with resumption of arms control negotiation, to say that the strategic nuclear programs should be fenced from any reductions in the defense budget.

If the defense spending levels of the current Five Year Defense Program are reduced to an average 3 percent level, as they almost certainly will be, what effect would exempting strategic nuclear programs and the Strategic Defense Initiative

used at departmental levels for resource allocation; whether useful for Congress would depend on how closely Congress intends to manage such matters. Note well that USSOUTHCOM is a special case, where assigned forces are very few, and readiness, in the sense of resource allocation, is largely charged to other CINCs.

*U.S. Central Command*

General KINGSTON. With regard to monitoring the readiness of combat forces assigned to me, I am provided a report on a regular basis. In addition to monitoring the C-status, I require a semi-annual situation report from my component commanders that covers the full spectrum of military capability. In addition, the qualitative indicators of military capability are also demonstrated through military exercises. The BRIGHT STAR series of exercises that have been conducted within my area of responsibility are a prime indicator of the combat capability of the forces involved as well as the capabilities of the supporting units and facilities that will be required in a contingency. The successes and failures within these exercises point out our strengths and weaknesses in a most graphic manner.

In assessing progress in military capability, Congress should look at force structure, force modernization, force readiness, and force sustainability. In the past, readiness and military capability have often been incorrectly used interchangeably leading to erroneous conclusions. Our primary concern must be to improve the overall military capability to which readiness is only one of the contributing factors.

In general, the C-rating trends for those units that I monitor have remained fairly stable; although my total military capability has improved through modernization, pre-positioning of supplies (sustainability), and improvements in force structure.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

UNKNOWLEDGEABLE OPERATIONS IMPROBABLE

Senator LEVIN. Would it be possible for U.S. military personnel or employees of the Defense Department or military departments, to operate in your region without your knowledge?

General GORMAN. Possible, but quite improbable.

ANTI-SANDINISTA GROUP SUPPORTED BY U.S. PERSONNEL

Senator LEVIN. Have U.S. military personnel or employees, since December 1982, assisted or supported, directly or indirectly, any anti-Sandinista group?

General GORMAN. I will respond only for the period of my command, 26 May 1983 to 2 March 1985. I am confident that President Reagan's decisions to commit U.S. forces to activities in Honduras and the waters off Nicaragua encouraged the Freedom Fighters and aided their recruiting. But those U.S. forces provided no more direct support.

COMBAT READINESS OF U.S. FORCES

Senator LEVIN. You have been outspoken about the high priority you place on maintaining and improving day-to-day combat readiness of your forces, as well as improving their sustainability. This budget request will be cut. Would you agree that we should minimize any reductions in the O&M, combat readiness, and sustainability accounts and that these accounts should be the "last" cut, if at all, and not the "first" cut?

General GORMAN. No. I am suspicious of glib formulas such as suggested. As a CINC, with forces engaged in maintaining and improving their capabilities by performing real-world tasks, I am naturally concerned with their O&M resources, and their logistic support. But I have need for procurement and construction funds as well. I point out that shaving USSOUTHCOM funds in any so-called account is of very marginal utility for a budget cut, in that the amounts allocated my command in the budget are relatively small. If I had to absorb cuts, I would do so by altering missions or functions to fit reduced resources.

Senator LEVIN. In priority order, what are your most critical shortfalls in readiness and sustainability in U.S. forces in your command?

General GORMAN. I cannot respond in open session since they fall mainly in C3I.

Senator LEVIN. If we were to add funds to the fiscal year 1986 defense budget, what would be your personal, professional, prioritized recommendations as to how much and what top five categories which could be executed in that fiscal year?

General GORMAN. Again, open discussion of such matters would serve no useful purpose. I have submitted proposals to the Department of Defense for improvements in the fiscal year 1986 budget with respect to Special Operations Forces, Security Assistance, Intelligence, Communications, and Mobility.

#### READINESS DEFICIENCIES

Senator LEVIN. What are the most critical readiness deficiencies in each of our allied military forces, by country and in priority in your command area?

General GORMAN. In general, I stand by the extensive analyses presented to the Congress in support of the Security Assistance request for fiscal year 1986. I have recommended to DOD consideration of additional U.S. support for better capabilities among Latin allies to deal with international smuggling of arms, munitions, subversives, terrorists, and illegal drugs.

#### MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING SUSTAINABILITY

Senator LEVIN. You have been outspoken about the high priority you place on maintaining and improving their sustainability. This budget request will be cut. Would you agree that we should minimize any reductions in the O&M, combat readiness, and sustainability accounts and that these accounts would be the "last" cut, if at all, and not the "first" cut?

General KINGSTON. Let me start by saying that all the pillars of defense are so interrelated that no single pillar should be isolated and pronounced the most important. However, I agree with your premise in general terms. We should ensure that the readiness of our current forces is funded, then ensure that these forces can be sustained in combat, and then consider modernization and force structure.

But, when we look at the specifics, the priorities are not as clear cut. For example, over a five-year period, it may prove more cost effective to replace equipment with new gear than it would be to maintain the older equipment, or if shortfalls of equipment degrade combat readiness (e.g., strategic airlift), then new equipment must be purchased. Such trade-offs are considered by the service and OSD staffs, and can best be addressed in detail by them.

#### READINESS DEFICIENCIES

Senator LEVIN. What are the most critical readiness deficiencies in each of our allies military forces, by country and in priority order in your command area?

General KINGSTON. There are two factors to consider in responding to your question about the readiness deficiencies existing in the countries of the USCENCOM AOR. One concerns the problem all industrially less developed nations face, and that pertains to the general lack of technological awareness in an age when military armaments and the means to employ them have become extremely complex. The second factor to consider is that the capability of any one regional nation to provide an adequate defense against an outside threat is very limited. [Deleted.]

Across the board enhancements in the following areas are necessary to achieve [deleted].

*Air Defense Enhancements.* Every effort needs to be made to encourage the standardization and integration of the air defense assets of regional states, particularly in the states bordering the Persian Gulf. [Deleted.]

*Land Forces Enhancements.* With few exceptions, local nations are required to defend vast territories with relatively small populations and consequent small armed forces. Emphasis must be given to enhancing force mobility and firepower. [Deleted.]

*Training.* Training and retraining will be increasingly important dimensions of employment and maintenance as new technologies appear in weapons systems and their repair processes. The training aspects of security assistance must be emphasized. The benefits of foreign military training conducted in CONUS and the use of training teams in the region should be promoted both at home and abroad. Such programs benefit local national trainees and also develop a greater appreciation for the region among U.S. personnel associated with the program. [Deleted.]

*Communications/Electronics.* As electronic warfare has two elements: to effectively confound/confuse an enemy's propagation capability and, equally, to assure our ability to communicate; we must look to improve the communications and electronic capabilities of friendly states with whom we must communicate to coordinate the battle.

*Logistics Support Equipment.* Limitations on the available aerial port capacity, material handling equipment, surface transport and refueling/maintenance capabil-

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

DEFENDING PRE-POSITIONED SUPPLIES

Senator KENNEDY. How would you assess our current capability to defend our pre-positioned supplies from hostile attack during crisis?

General KINGSTON. Although an absolute guarantee for the protection of supplies is not possible, there are many protective measures that are being implemented. [Deleted.] Overall, our capabilities are by no means fail-safe. However, prudent protective measures have been implemented and methods of improvement are being pursued.

SUSTAINABILITY

Senator KENNEDY. What percentage of our short-term (30 days) sustainability is pre-positioned?

General KINGSTON. Based on a worst case scenario and short-term sustainability (30 days), [deleted]. These percentages of fill also require qualification. All of the ammunition and subsistence is aboard ships of the NTPF and MEDNTPS and are not dedicated exclusively to sustaining my forces. [Deleted.]

TILT ROTOR AIRCRAFT

Senator KENNEDY. You say you have a need for an advanced rotor aircraft. For what mission? What capabilities must it have? In what quantity?

General KINGSTON. Although an advanced tilt rotor aircraft would greatly improve conventional ground force, search and rescue mobility, and the ship to shore movement for Marine Corps forces, [deleted]. Further, the HH-53s are aging and no medium or long range replacements are programmed. [Deleted.]

Regarding aircraft capabilities, the JVX must have the following long range capability: [deleted]. Regarding use of the JVX for conventional ground force and search and rescue missions, further study with the Services is required to determine required numbers.

PHASING DOWN PERSONNEL IN EL SALVADOR

Senator KENNEDY. Looking at your "point paper" attached to your statement, is it fair to conclude that at any given moment in El Salvador, we have about 125 U.S. military personnel? (not counting the U.S. Marine Guard at the Embassy.)

When will it be possible for a phase down in this number to begin to occur?

General GORMAN. I can not foresee precisely, but I could believe the Medical Mobile Training Team (MTT) can be cut back soon, and the National Basic Training Center MTT should finish its mission within four to six months. Much hinges on the restart of the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras; if the Salvadoran Armed Forces return to training there, the load on in-country MTTs should be reduced. I believe that the so-called "stalemate" has been broken and, with continued U.S. support and continued pressure on the Sandinistas so that they reduce their support to the Salvadoran guerrillas, President Duarte can win.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR

Senator KENNEDY. Last August you said that if Congress gave the government of El Salvador what it asked for in the way of military assistance, the government of El Salvador would be able within 2 years to obtain effective control over 80-90 percent of its territory and people. Do you stand by that today?

General GORMAN. Yes.

EL SALVADOR'S AIR ATTACK CAPABILITY

Senator KENNEDY. According to recent reports, average flying hours for helicopters and A-37 aircraft—the core of El Salvador's air attack capability—increased by over 220 hours per month between July 1983 and February 1984.

Could you give the committee an assessment of the needs of the Salvadoran Air Force and outline any planned increase in equipment and firepower?

Fiscal year 1984 and 1985 military assistance of \$328 million has enabled the Salvadoran armed forces to almost triple the number of helicopters in its inventory from 19 in January 1984 to 46 by the end of the year.

Does the El Salvadoran government have the capacity to maintain and operate these aircraft without direct U.S. military involvement?

General GORMAN. First, let me address the premise of your question—that the "core" of the Salvadoran air attack capability increased between July 1983 and February 1984. During that period, the air attack capability did not increase. The attack capability consisted of six A-37 Dragonfly aircraft, one lightly armed Hughes 500 helicopter, and eight O-2A observation aircraft. During this period, it was the air mobility capability that increased by the addition of four UH-1H helicopters. These helicopters are armed only with a door-mounted M60 machine gun—a defensive, not offensive system. The UH-1H is designed for the transport of troops and equipment, not for attack operations. In addition, Salvador's air fleet grew by four MEDEVAC helos, which are not armed. The increase in average flying hours per month was a result of increased emphasis placed on airmobile operations and an in-country training program which is upgrading co-pilots to qualify as pilots. With eight additional helicopters, the 220 hour increase per month represents less than 30 hours per airframe—a flight load which is certainly not indicative of intensified air operations.

The needs of the Salvadoran Air Force (FAS) are dependent on the levels of insurgent activity, battle loss or damage, and absorption capability, which is based on the availability of pilots and mechanics. The primary requirements are for air mobility and fire support. For air mobility, the FAS has received a total of 46 UH-1H helicopters through U.S. security assistance, to include the four MEDEVACs. Four helos have been lost to attrition. Thirteen of the 46 were not received until calendar year 1985. In fiscal year 1985, the FAS will purchase six more UH-1Hs. Projections for fiscal year 1986 are for six additional UH-1Hs. Air mobility will be also improved by the delivery of five C-47 transport aircraft in fiscal year 1985. These aircraft will also be useful as the Government of El Salvador begins to rebuild the economy and infrastructure destroyed by the war.

The FAS attack capability presently consists of nine A-37Es, two Hughes 500 (only one lightly armed), and two C-47 Airborne Support Platforms, plus the O-2 observation aircraft. In fiscal year 1985, one additional A-37B and four Hughes 500s will be purchased. The ground attack capability is a force efficient counter to the guerrilla tactics of destroying lines of communication, ambushing government units, conducting small unit operations, and "spectacular" attacks. Without air support, the government would have to greatly increase the numbers of ground troops, with the attendant political and economic costs.

The Salvadoran Air Force has been very professional and capable in maintaining and operating their aircraft. Their operational readiness rates approach those for comparable U.S. units. The FAS currently has 86 mechanics, with more in training. The emphasis on mechanic training should continue the high readiness rates, although U.S. contract maintenance assistance and occasional MTT/quality assurance teams will continue to be necessary. The FAS currently has some 25 fully qualified helicopter pilots and the 60 co-pilots who are participating in the upgrade training program. Training programs in the United States will produce approximately 10 fixed wing and eight helo pilots annually.

MILITARY BASES IN HONDURAS

Senator KENNEDY. Do you agree with this characterization of the purposes of our military bases in Honduras:

"It is my impression that the U.S. base construction in Honduras has two basic objectives. First to provide U.S. Southern Command with sufficient base infrastructure in Honduras to be able to react rapidly to any directive to send sizeable contingents of U.S. troops into action in Central America. Secondly, at the same time to provide Southern Command with regional training facilities that are no longer available in Panama."

Aren't these bases really there to provide for contingency operations if U.S. forces are deployed to fight in Central America—and to assist in the in-country training of U.S. and Honduran forces?

And if that is not what they are there for, what is the purpose of those facilities?

General GORMAN. No, I do not agree with that characterization. There are no U.S. bases in Honduras. Rather, we have access to a number of facilities on Honduran bases, or the use of airstrips in several parts of the country, as well as permission to use adjacent Honduran land for training. Existing Honduran facilities do support USSOUTHCOM operations as do facilities which many friendly countries make available to us. Current operations include extensive, and invaluable, training exercises for U.S. forces. There is little relationship between these exercises and the U.S. Army School of the Americas, which was moved to Fort Benning, GA, on October 1, 1984, from Panama.

## JOINT EXERCISES WITH NATIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICA

Senator KENNEDY. I would like to ask whether there has been any effort made to have joint exercises with some of the nations of Central America and what the result has been.

Has Guatemala ever been asked to participate in military exercises with the United States? Has it ever declined? Has it ever participated?

Has El Salvador ever been asked to participate in military exercises with the United States. Has it ever declined? Has it ever participated?

Has Honduras ever been asked to participate in military exercises with the United States? Has it ever declined? Has it ever participated?

Has Panama ever been asked to participate in military exercises with the United States. Has it ever declined? Has it ever participated?

Has Costa Rica ever been asked to participate in military exercises with the United States. Has it ever declined? Has it ever participated?

General GORMAN. The United States and the various governments of Latin America, to include Central America, have been participating in combined military training exercises for over 25 years. These exercises serve both U.S. military and host country military objectives of increased readiness and interoperability. Specifically, and limiting my response to the past 2 years:

	Invited	Declined	Participated
Guatemala	Yes	Yes	Yes (observers).
El Salvador	Yes	No	Yes, Granadero I, King's Guard I & II (spring and summer 1984).
Honduras	Yes	No	Yes, e.g. Almas Tara I, II, III (1983-1985); Granadero I.
Panama	Yes	No	Yes, e.g. Kincho Liberty 1983 and 1985; Fuzze Unidos 1984-Panama, Blazing Trails 1985.
Costa Rica	Yes	Yes	No.

## CUBAN MILITARY ADVISORS IN NICARAGUA

Senator KENNEDY. I have heard various conflicting reports as to the number of Cuban military advisors that are in Nicaragua at the moment. Could you tell me:

How many Cubans are in Nicaragua now in toto? and

How many of them are functioning as military advisors to the Nicaraguan military?

General GORMAN. The latest numbers I have seen range from 7,500 to 9,500, of which 2,500-3,500 are military and security advisors. Cubans now permeate throughout all levels of the entire Sandinista government. Since Grenada, the Cuban civilian advisors are almost all male and with prior military service.

## SANDINISTAS AID GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR

Senator KENNEDY. Last August, you gave a news briefing with Ambassador Pickering in which you presented evidence that you claimed showed that the guerrillas in El Salvador were being supplied by the Sandinistas in shipments by sea from northwest Nicaragua to the Salvadoran coast, by land through Honduras, and by air.

Do you have any new or additional evidence showing that—since August—the Sandinistas have continued to supply the guerrillas in El Salvador with guns and ammunition?

General GORMAN. Yes, but the evidence is classified. The infiltration from Nicaragua continues, although it has been hindered by the improved Salvadoran ability to impact the flow of munitions and other materiel, and by the fact that the Sandinistas no longer can devote so much of their resources to supporting the FMLN, but now must contend with the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. The information at our disposal clearly indicates Sandinista complicity, from the top down, in supporting the FMLN from Nicaraguan territory.

## PROBABLE COSTS OF U.S. INVASION OF NICARAGUA

Senator KENNEDY. What would be the cost in terms of U.S. lives and dollars of a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua?

General GORMAN. Depends on when, with the price going up as a function of increased Sandinista military capability.

The cost in lives and dollars would also vary as a function of the antecedent events, e.g., developments enhancing the status of the Freedom Fighters, or undercutting the power and authority of the Sandinista regime.

But whatever the cost in lives and dollars—and I have no way of estimating either—there would be another cost: the historic strategic set-back which would attend another use of U.S. armed force in Nicaragua. We should avoid such a use by any means at our disposal.

Chairman GOLDWATER. I want to thank both of you for being here. It has been an excellent presentation.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

## AFTERNOON SESSION

The full committee met, in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m. in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Barry M. Goldwater (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Goldwater, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, Denton, Nunn, and Glenn.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director for the minority; Allan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Jeffrey H. Smith, minority counsel; Richard D. Finn, Jr., Douglas R. Graham, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, Gordon G. Riggle, Mark B. Robinson, Carl M. Smith, and James C. Smith III, professional staff members; Judith A. Freedman, Russell C. Miller, and Patricia L. Watson, research assistants; Mary J. Kampo and Karen A. Love, staff assistants.

Also present: Gerald J. Smith, assistant to Senator Goldwater; Romie L. Brownlee, assistant to Senator Warner; James H. Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Allan Cameron, assistant to Senator Denton; John Rasmussen, assistant to Senator Gramm; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter D. Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; and Phillip P. Upechulte, assistant to Senator Glenn.

Chairman GOLDWATER. The meeting will come to order.

This afternoon we continue our testimony from the Commanders of the Unified Commands. This morning we heard from General Gorman and General Kingston. This afternoon we will be hearing from Adm. Wesley McDonald, Navy Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command and Adm. William Crowe, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command.

Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming here this afternoon and, unlike most in Washington who usually testify, you have operational responsibilities, giving your testimony a special authority.

You are welcome to submit your complete statements and any supporting material you wish for the record, and we will include that in its entirety. In any case, you may proceed as you see fit. I think we will hear first from Admiral Crowe.