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STATEMENT BY GENERAL PAUL F. GORMAN
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BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
3 NOVEMBER 1983

Chairman Tower, Distinguished Members of this Committee:

I want to share a few observations that I have gained from my personal perspectives on the Joint Chiefs and what we term the joint system. I am both a serving CINC, and a former Assistant to the Chairman. I might add that I was Assistant to the Chairman under both General Jones and General Vessey, and my term of service spanned the period in which the Organization of the JCS became again topical in the public and congressional arenas.

I want to comment on the Unified Command Plan (UCP) which establishes our worldwide system of joint command -- the subject of today's hearing -- as well as my views on the JCS.

Taking the last first, the OJCS has undergone at least 20 reviews in the last 39 years. Each review, when judged on its own merits, has provided good ideas. More recently, Generals Jones and Meyer advanced proposals; and, to their credit, the present JCS, as you know, decided to undertake another review themselves.

There is probably no aspect of military reform which has such persistent advocacy. Some reformers, however, have sought to alter the structure "to augment the role of the Chairman" or "to strengthen the authority of the JCS." Such proposals, in my view, miss the fundamental principle espoused by Generals Meyer and Jones, and more recently by General Vessey. It is a principle consistent with the basic goal of every serious reformer since Admiral Mahan and Elihu Root at the turn of the century. That is, it is the civilian Secretary, not the military head of staff, who is the intended beneficiary. Civilian control as well as military effectiveness and efficiency are better assured by

virtue of a better advised Secretary, a Secretary advised by a competent body of military professionals.

Some argue that the issue is decentralization vice centralization, in which the latter is viewed as a positive evil. I would argue that these matters deserve a better paradigm. But I have learned throughout my 38 years of service to favor centralized planning and decentralized execution, the former as deliberate as possible, the latter swift, sure, and as violent as necessary.

I cite an historical example from 1909 when Admiral Mahan was addressing the problems of a reorganization of the Navy Department. Mahan held that a reorganization was required to ensure military continuity and to ensure good advice was provided to the civilian Secretary of the Navy. Mahan wrote President Roosevelt in 1909 that to be ready for war the Secretary of the Navy needed a fulltime, knowledgeable military staff with mastery of all information, domestic and foreign, that bore on naval policy. Such a body should be endowed with coherence and force by fixing upon its head sole responsibility for advice rendered to the Secretary, "solemnly charged that in all he recommends he is sowing for a future he himself may have to reap." Further, since the purpose of a military organization is war, that body "should be taken entirely from the class to which belongs the conduct of war, and upon whom will fall, in war, the responsibility for the use of the instruments and for the results of the measures which they recommend." Hence, a staff of naval officers should be maintained to provide the Secretary "a clear understanding and firm grasp of leading military considerations. Possessed of these he may without great difficulty weigh the recommendations of his technical assistants, decide for himself, and depend on them for technical execution of that which he

approves." Thus, such a staff would help, not hinder the Secretary, and shed new light on technical issues.

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, 1953, and 1958, establishes the Secretary of Defense with intradepartmental challenges not unlike those of the Secretary of the Navy in Roosevelt's era. In some respect at least, he is in an even weaker position. After all, Secretaries of the Navy then had to contend only with eight semi-autonomous bureaus. Today the Secretary of Defense has to integrate the military advice from the JCS with advice from his civilian staff, three military departments, four Services, and a plethora of independent Defense agencies. I will not take the time to detail the complexities of this arrangement in that these have been well-documented in the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel of 1970, the Ignatius and Steadman reports of 1978, the Brehm report of 1980, and the recent Brehm-Kerwin study for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. What I wish to stress is that divisions within the Department of Defense today could be far more dysfunctional than were the divisions within the Department of the Navy at the turn of the century.

What is essential in all this is the absolute necessity that the Secretary receive a broad, horizontal view of the military world from a joint perspective. And, if you look at the duties prescribed for the JCS under Title 10, you will see that it was intended that the JCS do just that. In fact, the intent of the law is that the JCS provide the military staff for the Secretary. I believe that is the proper function of the JCS.

Of more proximate concern to this Committee today is our current structure of worldwide joint command. Those of us in the military refer to it as the Unified Command Plan or UCP. By law, the President, through the Secretary of

Defense, with the advice and assistance of the JCS, establishes combatant commands to perform military missions. The Military Departments assign forces from the Services to these combatant commands for stated missions, and any force so assigned is to be under its full operational command. Moreover, as President Eisenhower -- who of all Presidents was in a position to know -- stated in his message to Congress on 3 April 1958:

"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of Service. The accomplishment of this result is the basic function of the Secretary of Defense, advised and assisted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and operating under the supervision of the Commander in Chief."

So we have to ask ourselves: What should we seek in the UCP? I think we should at least attain what President Eisenhower sought in his reorganization of 1958. To use once more his words of 25 years ago: "Strategic planning will be unified . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff will be provided professional military assistance required for efficient strategic planning and operational control. The control and supervision of the Secretary of Defense over military research and development will be strengthened . . . the new weapons and other

defense undertakings are so costly as to heavily burden our entire economy. We must achieve the utmost military efficiency in order to generate maximum power from the resources we have available."

From my perspective as USCINCSOUTH, there are two messages in these quotes: First, the purpose of our Defense Department, of which the CINCs are the operating arms, is to ensure the success of deterrence by being ready to fight. And that implies being ready in peace for the rapid transition to war. The second is that we must seek that effectiveness which comes from the integration of the Service parts into the combatant whole, the effectiveness of which is greater than the sum of the individual parts. Admiral MacDonald has commented on the combination of Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force combatants which were brought to bear in the Grenada operation.

Effectiveness is therefore a matter of readiness for joint and combined operations, a function of training, of joint command control and communications prepared for such operations. But effectiveness is also in part a matter of resources, and resources are provided through the budgets of the Military Services. To obtain these resources, the Service components of the unified commands submit resource needs or requirements to their parent Service for incorporation into the Service Program Objective Memorandum and budget. These requirements compete within Service channels, and the allocation of resources is dependent on the funding level of the Service budget, and the priority assigned by the Service to the particular requirement.

Effectiveness is also a matter of ideas -- call them "concepts," call them "requirements," call them "doctrine." These are also peculiarly the province of each Service, which is charged with developing and procuring Service-peculiar

materiel, and raising and training units to man that materiel. The situation can arise, however, in which joint concepts, requirements, or ideas are slighted by a Service.

Clearly then, there is need for striking some balance between Service needs and the "joint" programs which are the concern of the CINCs. The present Secretary of Defense and the present Chairman have both acted to improve the voice of the CINCs in assuring force effectiveness. But, in my view, more might be done to strengthen the Joint Staff to act as advocates for the CINCs, so that the JCS can more fully meet assigned responsibilities under the law. The senior military advisers, the JCS, representing the joint warfighting needs of the CINCs, are best qualified both in experience and in position to provide the needed balance. They have the clout to discipline Service programs, and they are directly interfaced with the Secretary and the President as advisers on force effectiveness.

In closing, I would suggest to you in your inquiry guidelines formulated 74 years ago in President Theodore Roosevelt's report on military reorganization to this very body:

"The requirement of war is the true standard of efficiency in an administrative military system . . . Success in war and victory in battle can be assured only by that constant preparedness and that superior fighting efficiency which logically result from placing the control and responsibility in time of peace upon the same individuals and the same agencies that must control in time of war. There would be no shock or change of method in expanding from a state of peace to a state of war. This is not militarism;

it is a simple business principle based upon the fact that success in war is the only return the people and the nation can get from the investment of many (billions) in the building and maintenance of a great (defense establishment)."

General Gorman, you have served on Joint Staff in Washington and now serve at the Southern Command. What are your views on changes in the existing system?

General Gorman: I advocate strengthening the Joint Staff at the expense of the Service staffs, transferring to the Joint Staff personnel spaces to bolster its capabilities for operational and strategic planning (including politico-military planning), for supporting the Chairman in his role as a DRB member, and for exerting joint influence on behalf of the CINCs and CJCS across OSD and the Defense agencies. I believe that the selection, training, and assignment-management of joint staff officers and commanders remain underemphasized by the Services, and that CJCS and OJCS should be given more clout in the military personnel systems to protect and enhance the joint system. I believe CJCS should be able to affect all promotions to 3 or 4-star joint or combined positions.

General Rogers, General Gorman and Admiral McDonald, each of you have subordinates who report back to their respective military Services. What problems does this cause for you?

General Gorman: SOUTHCOM's components are weak advocates for USCINCSO within their respective services in that they are subordinates of major commands whose missions and interests are remote from Latin America. This causes problems on issues relating to tasking, augmentation for exercises or operations, force structure, unit equipment, installation planning, and service doctrine.

General Rogers and General Gorman, the Department of the Army controls assignments of personnel to and from your commands. Do you believe the regimental system will decrease personnel turbulence?

General Gorman: SOUTHCOM has assigned only three infantry battalions affected by the new system. We are now examining with Department of the Army how the system will apply to Panama, and so I cannot at this time state with certainty whether personnel turbulence will be decreased. However, reduced turbulence is a goal both DA and SOUTHCOM are pursuing, so I am hopeful.