

The Posture Statement of the Chief of Staff of the Army, 1977

Over the Christmas holidays 1976-1977, the Commander TRADOC and the DCST were in NOVA drafting the CSA's posture statement, General Rogers having been displeased with the draft provided by the Army Staff.

This is the portion prepared by DCST.

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MISSION: TRAIN TO WIN
IN EUROPE.


The main mission for the US Army today is to prepare for battle in Central Europe against forces of the Warsaw Pact. The Army is structured and equipped primarily to participate in NATO's defense of that area, and most of the Army's divisions are stationed in or oriented upon Western Germany. The Army does not underestimate the difficulties it would face in the event of war there, fighting at the end of a long, vulnerable line of communication, against enemy forces with ultra-modern weapons, in greater numbers, operating from sources of supply close at hand. Much of the energies of the Total Army have been dedicated to preparing its units to fight in such a battle, and to win though outnumbered.

TRAINCON 76--TRAIN
ALLIED FIELD COMMANDERS
HOW TO FIGHT.

Indicative of the progress that the Army has made toward these goals was the conference held at Grafenwohr in West Germany in November, just three months ago, termed TRAINCON 76. There ~~was~~ Commanders of the ~~US~~ US Army, together with key officers of the Army of the Federal Republic of Germany, and of other allies, met to discuss concepts for fighting a conventional defense of West Germany, and related individual and collective training. It was a historic occasion--although the alliance has been in existence for more than a quarter of a century, never before had it been possible for its field commanders to come together so basically unified in their appreciation of how to fight, and how to prepare for battle. The conference was hosted jointly by the commanders of US Army Europe and US Army Training and Doctrine Command. It was the outcome of some two years of general staff conversations between us and the Germans, as a result of which

the US Army's basic statement of a doctrine, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, is now thoroughly consistent with the German Army's counterpart manual 100-100.

What was discussed at TRAINCON 76 is illustrative of the challenge confronting the Total Army in 1977: How to train our armor or infantry company teams so that they can withstand the onslaught of a tank-heavy enemy who can mass for attack at odds of 4 to 1 defender, and throw massive amounts of artillery and other supporting fires at the decisive place and time. Our careful analysis of the threat in Central Europe leads us to believe that a US tank company team commander--a captain with, for example, a typical force of 12 tanks and 8 anti-tank guided missiles--should be trained to defeat up to 60 enemy armored vehicles assaulting his position, intent on a breakthrough.




HOW TO WIN OUTNUMBERED

W - **P** - **T** = **E**

W = Weapons
P = Proficiency
T = Tactics
E = Effectiveness


To win in such a situation, our soldiers need the best weapons that American technology can provide. But weapons, no matter how powerful, are ineffective in the hands of inept, ill trained, or unsure operators, mechanics, or suppliers. And even proficient crewmen can be rendered impotent if improperly employed by their battle leader. Overall battlefield effectiveness depends upon weapons capability, the proficiency of teams or crews, and the tactics or techniques of the commander. Thus, TRAINCON 76 portrayed how the US Army can realize the full potential of its weapons by developing fully the proficiency of the soldiers who man them, and training leaders capable of employing those weapons and crews to best effect.

We know from Army-wide evaluations that there is a substantial difference between crews and units trained to peak proficiency, and those who for a lack of practice have allowed a gap to open between their performance and that of which their weapons are capable. On the average, weapon crews which have just completed qualification firing are 25 to 50 percent better than they are just three months later--and our tests and studies tell us that the difference between a high performance company team and a low performance team is exactly the difference between winning and losing the battle just described.




In such a battle, involving two US company teams pitted against 82 enemy vehicles, our analysis indicates that high performance units would be significantly more lethal, and substantially more survivable than low performance units.

TANK GUNNERY PERFORMANCE



DRAGON EFFECTIVENESS DEGRADATION OVER TIME




Clearly the Total Army needs the advantage of high performance units. But gaining and sustaining such proficiency is neither easy nor cheap. Here is a specific example: After intensive training, tank crews engage targets twice as fast. But that alacrity declines rapidly over time. If crews in Europe depended only on one practice per year, most of the time their performance will be much lower. Even with the new anti-tank guided missiles, such as the Dragon, effectiveness degrades over time when gunners do not continually practice for battle proficiency.

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At TRAINCON 76 the US Army was able to report on and demonstrate progress in training techniques involving the use of simulators, miniature ranges, and subcaliber ammunition which supplement live firing and assure proficiency year round. Moreover, as discussed and demonstrated in TRAINCON 76, the Army has now prescribed training standards which require its units to engage multiple targets, at battle ranges, in short periods of time. Outlays for training devices and training ammunition in Europe were greater in 1976 than they had been the previous year. But the Seventh Army recorded that its tankers achieved an increase in first round hits, compared with what it had seen in 1975. As new devices and techniques become available, it expects to realize further increases in 1977 and 1978.


The interest of our allies in the concepts and training techniques displayed at TRAINCON 76 was notable. We regard it as an important step towards that congruence of doctrine essential for interoperability among NATO forces in the field.

For example, we showed them an innovative training method introduced into USAREUR in 1976 called Engagement Simulation, a technique for conducting two sided field exercises in which weapons systems effects are realistically



simulated, and small units can learn cover, concealment, suppression and combined arms teamwork ^{IN} contest against a skilled adversary. Units trained with this nicknamed technique REALTRAIN have shown increases of effectiveness greater than 50% in finding an enemy, engaging him first, and eliminating him even when outnumbered as much as 4 to 1. Moreover, we have found that such training evokes the competitiveness inherent in American soldiers, and arouses their interest and enthusiasm to a degree that traditional methods of training do not. In 1977 we will extend this technique throughout the Total Army.

TRAINING DEVICES PROGRAM




Thanks to investments in research and development which have increased steadily over the past three years, the Army looks forward to being able to apply simulators and low cost training ammunition even more broadly in 1977 and following years. These will be especially important in our continuing efforts to raise the readiness of Reserve Component units.

TRAINING IS THE LINK BETWEEN DOCTRINE AND BATTLEFIELD EXECUTION

Weapon systems are evolving, battle tactics are changing accordingly and so our doctrine is dynamic. The Army's training methods have been changing apace. Training is the link between doctrine and ^{BATTLEFIELD EXECUTION} readiness for modern battle means training aimed at payoff now. The Army must train in peacetime as it expects to fight in war. In the Army's Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP), it has set forth minimum standards which all commanders, Active and Reserve, anywhere in the Army, must meet. As ARTEP has been implemented, the demonstrable capability of units to move, to shoot, and to communicate has advanced throughout the Total Army.

GROWTH OF TANK AND ARTILLERY RANGE FANS




STRATEGIC MOBILITY
EXERCISES PROVIDE UNIQUE
TRAINING, CONCEPT TESTING,
AND EVIDENCE OF U. S. RESOLVE

But the Army recognizes a need to reach even further toward readiness. As new weapons systems are introduced into the force, and as requirements for collective, live-fire training have grown, the Army has felt increasingly constrained by the land available to it for support of training. It is not simply that weapon ranges and lethality have increased dramatically since World War II, requiring more extensive range safety areas, but also that practice for battle today entails the use of airmobile anti-armor weapons and maneuver units, electronic warfare, and US Air Force support which never figured in past calculations of space required for training. We strive, as Josephus said of the Romans, to make our training drills "bloodless battles" so that our battles shall be "bloody drills." But such training consumes much land and air space to accommodate the sprawl and dynamism of modern battle. Some of the Army's existing posts will have to be expanded. Assuredly, we will have to take better advantage of our underutilized military reservations. The Army foresees one or more National Training Centers, large military reservations which can support the kind of combined arms training needed to ready the Total Army for battle in Europe.

We also need to broaden opportunities for our field commanders to exercise battalions, brigades and divisions in simulated battle. In 1976 the Army continued to profit from the exercises directed and coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in which our forces trained with the Air Force, the Marines, the Navy, and units of our allies. One of the major exercises in this program is the annual strategic mobility exercise, REFORGER. REFORGER 76 marked a major turning point in the conduct of the annual strategic mobility exercises. In the past, troops of the 1st Infantry Division and support units flew to

HOST NATION
SUPPORT TO
NATO
TRAINING




Europe where they participated in field training exercises using prepositioned equipment. In REFORGER 76, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) deployed to Europe by both sea (equipment) and air (personnel). This step provided a long overdue demonstration and rehearsal of strategic sealift capability. Upon arrival in Europe, equipment disembarked through Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg (BENELUX) ports, its movement relying heavily on host nation support. One aspect of the Federal Republic of Germany's commitment to NATO is the training areas it makes available to the allies. The shaded areas represent the territory that this densely populated nation devoted to maneuver space for five separate training exercises of REFORGER 76. Other support provided included medical services, communication, equipment recovery, and convoy management. Exercise of such support is critical since this concept underpins the US efforts to compensate for reductions in its own support forces. While in Europe the deployed forces, which also included some Reserve Component units, took part in four field training exercises. The exercises were included in AUTUMN FORGE, the name of a number of NATO and national exercises that take place each fall. The concept was initiated in 1975 by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The AUTUMN FORGE program incorporates about thirty exercises across Europe. The broad objectives are to improve the readiness of NATO forces, to promote standardization and interoperability, and to increase flexibility in force employment.

The 1976 strategic mobility exercise was the largest and most complex to date. Departing significantly from the past, it presented challenges and introduced innovations designed to support national and NATO objectives. It provides the best possible means--in some cases the only means--by which the services can develop,

test, refine the tasks associated with a large-scale joint strategic deployment, and improve the ability to fight alongside allied forces.


Future annual strategic mobility exercises will include further innovations that realistically employ Active and Reserve organizations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A 5-year program is being developed that plans for the use of sea and air transport, exercise of the BENELUX line of communications, and a balanced schedule for employing CONUS and European forces in maneuvers in the Central and Northern Army Group areas.




But in its efforts to enhance the collective proficiency of units, the Army has not lost sight of the individual soldier. Most soldiers spend most of their Army careers in units, and there they receive most of their individual training. From the perspective of the soldier, the Army is his job, and his attitude toward service -- toward re-enlistment -- is strongly conditioned by his experience within his job, MOS, and unit. Accordingly, the Army has undertaken an extensive program to define the jobs soldiers perform in units, and to establish the proficiency standards which each man must meet. In 1977, for the first time in its history, the Army will begin to issue to each man in its ranks a Soldiers Manual, wherein he will find defined what it is that the Army expects of him on his job. The Army has tasked its noncommissioned officers to use these Soldiers Manuals to train the soldier for his job, and it is our expectation that these measures will add importantly to the understanding, commitment, and job satisfaction of the individual soldier. Moreover, in an annual

Skill Qualification Test, each soldier will be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate his mastery of his job skills and his performance on that test will figure in his promotion and selection for further training.

The Army's progress towards meeting its battlefield challenges has been materially aided by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC performs four functions for the Army: training, combat development, training development, and Army wide training support. The service schools and training centers of the Army constitute a prime resource for readying our soldiers for combat. The service schools are the Army's source of combat development and doctrine, an important means for inculcating leaders and trainers with the tactics and techniques which will contribute to battle success. The service schools express standards throughout the Army by the way they teach, by the manuals they write, and by the Soldiers Manuals and ARTEPs which they prepare to assist training in units. The TRADOC is then more than just a training command: it is the locus of the Army's work on its future.




End Strength per Division



The efficiency of TRADOC has been questioned. It has been alleged that the Army has invested too large a proportion of its manpower in its training base. Two points must be borne in mind: the Active Army of 1977 is leaner than it has ever been in recent history--one division per 50,000 men vice over one division per 75,000 men twenty-five years ago. Secondly, TRADOC which has been in existence only since 1973, has improved

WORKLOAD / RESOURCE TRENDS



its efficiency year by year so that in the upcoming fiscal year, it will be handling 20% greater load with 10% less manpower than in fiscal 74.

TRADOC's consciousness of its responsibilities for carrying out its functions with least diversion of resources from the fighting forces has lead it to a number of programs through which the Army has realized significant economies.


Consistent with the authority granted the Army by the Congress, TRADOC has revised and shortened initial entry training programs for high density Military Occupation Specialities. Under previous practice, initial entry training was divided into two phases, each at least 8 weeks in length, often conducted at different stations. In its new approach, TRADOC combined these phases at a single post, assigning each soldier to one unit throughout his training period. The procedures had several important effects. Firstly, time was saved through the elimination of unnecessary movement and administration. Second, the all important drill sergeant-soldier relationship was re-enforced so that training became more personal and direct. Thirdly, the training itself could be better focused on a specific MOS, and more coherently conducted. Further, drill sergeants and officers of the unit were better enabled to judge the potential of each soldier, to assist slow learners, and to eliminate more surely the unmotivated or inept. The result has been training programs shorter than those of previous years, which in fiscal 1976 saved the Army over 1700 man years--that's over two battalions of soldiers which the US Army did not



OSUT

- ⊙ ONE CO CMDR, 1ST SGT, DRILL SGT
- ⊙ BETTER SCREENING
- ⊙ BETTER INDIVIDUAL TRAINING
- ⊙ LESS ADMIN TIME
- ⊙ SAME PROFICIENCY

PERCENT OF SOLDIERS PASSING CRITICAL TASKS AT FIRST ATTEMPT



COMBINED INCIDENT RATES

(NUMBER OF INCIDENTS PER 1000 TRAINEES ENTERING A CYCLE)

	BCT/AT	OSUT
DISCHARGE	133.2	100.8
RECYCLE	88.1	68.3
DISCIPLINE	33.1	21.8
AWOL	36.4	9.1
SICK CALL	2426.4	1000.2


CONCLUSIONS
 ** MORALE INDICATORS (INCIDENT RATES) ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER UNDER OSUT

have to recruit and train in that year. The Army's evaluation of soldier's trained under OSUT has established that the soldier who emerges has been trained to the same standards as his predecessors, and is as well accepted in the force. Importantly, OSUT has also produced a significant reduction in the number of trainees discharged or subjected to disciplinary action. In brief, the Army has demonstrated that One Station Unit Training produces an equally capable soldier in less time, with higher morale, commitment, and discipline.

The Army wishes to extend its One Station Unit Training program. In particular, it wants to establish One Station Unit Training for its infantryman, for through infantry OSUT, the Army could conserve as much manpower as all its other OSUT programs put together -- nearly 2800 infantry manyears in FY-78 alone, and the equivalent of another brigade.


TEC LESSONS VALIDATED

SKILL	NO LESSONS	NO SOLDIERS	AVERAGE POINTS	AVERAGE PERCENT
INFANTRY	67	2,856	28.41	87.00
FIELD ARTILLERY	71	2,806	61.60	83.00
LOGS	133	1,007	46.74	83.00
ACM	130	3,167	60.00	82.70
GEN. MIL. CLERK	22	882	23.66	78.00
GEN. TACTICS	28	834	24.41	82.00




LEARNING IS SELF-PACED
TRAINING OUGHT TO BE

ARMY
SELF-PACING PROGRAM




TRADOC, in discharging all its missions, has had recourse to the most advanced instructional technology. In particular, it has launched some of the largest undertakings in individualized instruction anywhere in the world. The Training Extension Course program is a multi-media program which supports the Soldiers Manuals and the Skill Qualification Tests with carefully designed materials for use in self-study, or small group instruction anywhere in the Army. Within TRADOC's schools and training centers, individualized instruction has been applied to increasing number of courses, permitting soldiers to master new skills at their own pace. Most soldiers graduate early, but slow learners can be helped to master their skills. TRADOC's self-pacing programs, like OSUT, have produced impressive evidence that when challenged, today's soldiers respond affirmatively -- again we have noted every indication of higher morale and commitment among participants in self-paced courses. Currently, self-paced courses, as compared with the same courses taught by conventional methods, will save over 3,000 military manyears of student time -- the equivalent of adding still another brigade's worth of manpower to the operating forces of the Army.

BETTER TECHNICAL MANUALS



The Army is making a major new attack on the old maintenance training problem: the readability of equipment manuals. We have a program underway to bring about integrated technical documentation and training (ITDT) through which we develop concurrently both the technical manual and related training material. In an Army increasingly dependent on complex equipment, readiness hinges in part on our mechanics. Tests have shown that by making the technical manuals more useable, we can increase the availability rate of our weapons, vehicles, and equipment. The payoff is indeed impressive. No equipment, no matter how advanced, is any better than its maintenance and repair.



TRADOC has received invalid criticism for the number of instructors per student. Most such criticism stems from comparing TRADOC with civilian schools, with their fixed school years, extensive recourse to large lectures, and little of the intensive, 24-hour a day supervision requisite in most military training. Some military skills, such as aviation training, require virtually one instructor for every student. Other types of training are less demanding. But the Army can point with some pride to the fact that it schools hundreds of thousands of young women and men in over a score of TRADOC schools and training centers throughout the country, pursuing intensive, physically and mentally stressful training programs, with a very creditable record for learning achievement and freedom from trainee abuse. The true measure of effectiveness which should be applied to TRADOC is its ability to develop skilled and disciplined soldiers in the least time. The most expensive resource in the Army is its manpower, and that manpower, to the degree that it is possible, should be concentrated in the operating forces. Every student manyear conserved in

TRADOC is a manyyear which can be counted towards the Army's primary purpose.

TRAINING IS TOP
PRIORITY

But while TRADOC contributes vitally to training the Total Army, most of the Army's training job remains in the division forces. The Army appreciates that the Congress can equip the Army with the most advanced equipment available, together with ample ammunition and other logistic support, but unless commanders throughout the Army discharge their responsibilities in training, we will not be ready. Training is the foremost priority for all commanders, Active or Reserve components. Everything they do as people-oriented and empathetic leaders, in taking care of soldiers and their dependents, in setting and maintaining high standards of discipline, has as its objective providing a more motivated, more self-disciplined, more receptive soldier participating in training. The challenge for all commanders is to insure that training is tough, challenging to soldiers, and oriented toward performance of battlefield missions. Commanders at all levels must know the tasks which their men and their units are expected to perform. Fire team leaders must know the tasks of individual members of their fire team, and insure that each is qualified to perform these tasks. So too the squad leader, and the platoon leader, and on up the chain of command. The objective of Army training is to produce a professional soldier, a soldier who counts himself an important member of a team, a soldier who understands his responsibilities both to himself and to his unit. These soldiers must be produced in the unit training. FM 100-5, Operations, says:

MAXIMIZING THE POTENTIAL OF THE SOLDIER

PROUD


- OF HIMSELF
- HIS JOB
- HIS UNIT

MOTIVATED

- TO EXCEL ON THE JOB
- TO SERVE
- TO SACRIFICE

CONFIDENT

- OF HIS SKILL
- OF HIS TEAMMATES



RESULTS

SOLDIER CONFIDENCE,
THE CORNERSTONE OF
SUCCESS IN BATTLE

"The soldier receives most of his individual training in the unit. It is in his unit where he will have his greatest opportunities to gain confidence --with his weapons, as a member of a team, and by training under conditions approximating battle. Thus, his unit commander plays a preeminent role in developing the resolve and competence to win outnumbered. The commander must assure each of his officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers the opportunity to improve military proficiency and to prepare mentally and physically for battle. Every unit commander of the US Army is responsible for the progressive, professional development of every soldier in his command."

The results of building such professional soldiers will be confidence, the cornerstone of success in battle, the foundation for the conviction that we will win any future wars. Clearly, the Total Army has its work cut out for it, but it is making progress in providing its troops with the type of training they deserve, and in achieving the highest level of Total Army readiness within its capabilities, and within its resources.