


Speech at Officers' Leadership Symposium

Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK, 30 November 1976

Major General Paul F. Gorman

THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND IS TRAINING MANAGEMENT




I am, as COL Malone well recognizes, a little bit ill at ease addressing so distinguished a military audience on the subject of leadership. I'm normally not invited to symposia on leadership because I say rude things about those of the profession who over the years have tended to address leadership in terms of individual behavior, or attitudes, or worry about moral attitudes. This includes whether a given set of actions constitutes careerism. From my point of view, if you are going to discuss leadership, you have to begin by examining the followers.


There never was a leader, you know, that didn't have somebody to lead. By definition there is something, someone, some group or maybe just one other individual to whom you lend your service as a leader. I deplore the tendency in our profession to get away from concern for and understanding of the followers. Therefore I congratulate you on having asked Colonel Mike Malone to launch these proceedings. Of all the fellows that are in the ivory tower business around the school system of the Army, he has, more admirably than anybody I know, managed to keep contact with the Army down at the bottom of where the Army really is. I know, too, that I am talking here to a group of officers who have recently come from direct contact with the Army in the field, and so a good bit of what I'm going to tell you will come as no surprise to most of you. I think it important, however, that I spend a little bit of time at the outset to diagnose the problem, as I see it, for the leadership of the Army today.

The major problem! I'm going to do so in terms which define what the followers are and what they think in the United States Army today. Who is the soldier that we lead today?

This is one way of looking at him: you've seen depictions like this, but just let me remind you what we are looking at is the percent of the total Army: The curve represents the mental distribution of adult males in the population at large, and the bars show the Army as it looked when the draft ended and the Army as it looked in March of this year broken out into the five mental categories 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Now what this chart shows you, gentlemen, is that our soldier today is preponderantly a pretty average guy. The Army today has a lot fewer people of lower mental categories than it did when the draft ended. This fact often comes as a surprise to some of our civilian friends. On the other hand, we have a lot more guys of just sort of average ability. Now what does that mean? It means, among other things, about fifth grade reading level. It means that if a general or a colonel or captain stands in front of a group of soldiers and addresses them in long and theoretical terms he's probably going to talk right over their heads. It means that if you are the kind of commander or staff officer who believes that you can genuinely communicate with today's soldier with a mimeograph machine, you're missing the boat. Most of our soldiers are right down at the lower reading levels. That's the television generation. That's a group of young men who want to show and do, as opposed to reading and reasoning. That fact has a lot to say to anybody who aspires to be a leader in the United States Army today.




We are an Army, gentlemen, that is becoming very difficult for this average soldier to get along in. This chart represents the equipment density in a division of the United States Army today... the amount of equipment which we expect the number of people assigned to maintain and use effectively.



Almost every soldier today is going to be in contact with complicated machinery of one kind or another. The General Accounting Office, the Congress of the United States, the Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Defense and everybody else that has paid for that expensive equipment is very concerned with what that soldier will do with it. If you go to the force and you ask the force, "What is it that your commanders think is the single most important thing that you do, soldiers?" What's he going to answer? Race relations? Military discipline? Hair cut? No! I tell you, factually based on very extensive surveys, that across all ranks of the United States Army the number one item on the consciousness of the soldiers of today's Army is maintenance. Whatever else we've done, we've saddled our army with maintenance consciousness. These figures show why. Because the equipment is there and commanders get hung by the thumbs if they don't take care of it.

The N.W. Ayer Company is the public relations firm that was hired by the Army to handle its recruiting in the era of the volunteer force. Each year N.W. Ayer conducts an extensive survey of soldiers. They are particularly interested in determining nowadays why it is that soldiers fail to reenlist, and this is a judgment from their latest report, January of 1976, which clearly states the importance of job satisfaction. It also shows the importance of what the unit does together. It addresses mission accomplishment.


Now, every one of you young soldiers understands that your future and the future of your profession, depends in large measure on the degree to which you, all of us collectively, understand and are able to influence those factors. Whatever else we are doing in this business that is referred to as leadership, we've got to be addressing that issue because that is the issue that is important to the soldier. You can take any one of the military occupation specialties of the Army today, and you will discover that very few of them indeed are reenlisting the number of soldiers that we need to reenlist in order to sustain the force. Indeed, in some of them our ability to convince soldiers that their job is satisfying or that their units have an important mission is faltering. We are losing ground rapidly, and that puts us in an evermore difficult business of competing in the market place for new recruits in order to replace them.




"WHILE EACH SOLDIER HAS HIS OWN UNIQUE EXPERIENCES AND OPINIONS, THERE IS A CONSISTENT THREAD TO THEIR THINKING. FEATURES THEY LIKE: JOB SATISFACTION IS CRUCIAL. UNIT INTEGRITY IS ALSO PARAMOUNT, AND ATTITUDES ARE FAVORABLE WHEN MEN FEEL THEY HAVE A MISSION THEY CAN UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT, WHEN THEY FEEL THEY ARE TREATED FAIRLY, AND WHEN THEY FEEL THAT THEIR UNIT IS COMPETENT."

N.W. AYER  
JANUARY 1976

Now, N.W. Ayer is not the only organization that's out asking soldiers what they think about things. This chart refers to the Personnel and Administration Center's survey that was conducted just this past month. We interviewed some 2700 soldiers throughout the Army in USAREUR and in FORSCOM, representing all kinds of units. In fact, the sample was selected to represent a cross section of the Army -- Combat Arms, Combat Support, Combat Service Support -- and to represent a cross section in terms of rank, (e.g. there were in the sample 700 junior enlisted men). The response to this particular proposition, "do you agree, or do you disagree," is as shown. I want to point out, interestingly, that the loser doesn't think that the Army is a rip off. In other words if you take his stripe away, he (the E-1) is prepared to believe the Army means business. Almost automatically, thereafter, you remain up in the area of agreement with the "rip off" until you get to be a Sergeant Major. If you are an officer, young warrant officer pilots, and lieutenant colonels are out to lunch. Everybody else agrees that the Army invites rip off/goof off with little or no punishment.




This graph displays statistics which raise eyebrows everytime it is shown. Every place that I have been in the United States Army over the past six months, and I spend most of my time traveling throughout the Army, every place I have been I have been told by officers from general on down that you guys in the TRADOC have got to let up. You keep shoving stuff at us and we just don't have the time to work with Soldier's Manuals or we don't have the time to do all of that good stuff that you call for in the ARTEP. We don't have the time to concern ourselves with the individual training of soldiers. We don't



have time to do all of the good things that you ask us to do in the name of getting a soldier EPMS qualified. I think that probably the guys that I was talking to - that's very accurate. The generals are overworked and the colonels are overworked. I see I'm really getting a lot of sympathy from you all. Field grade officers are overworked and probably the battery commanders are overworked. But if you ask a group of E1-E4 if they have extra time during the day, the answer is a strong yes. Even more remarkable, 15% of this sample were prepared to admit that they had as much as half a day at their disposal. General DePuy's characterization of this I think is apt. In most of the Army on almost every day of the year soldiers are grabbed off for various work details and the remainder are sent down to the motor pool where boredom and all sorts of inefficiencies set in.

I visited a brigade in Germany last Spring where I was shown by the Brigade Surgeon a log that he had kept on two years of sick call, where he had carefully written down the symptoms displayed by his patients and his analysis of why the soldier had reported to sick call. What his figures show is that the number of sick calls is directly proportional to the lack of activity during the year. A high number of patients in February when there isn't much going on. Outdoor activities are over and the Spring is not yet there and people are confined to the buildings. It is during this period that malaise increases. In this Kaserne in Germany the sick calls went up dramatically about the third month after the unit came in from the field. The number reporting for sick call disappeared almost like magic when the unit went to the field and it remained low for weeks after the unit had returned, but after awhile it began spiraling upward. The sorts of maladies, dizziness, diarrhea, unspecific malaise, the kind of thing that you see when a bunch of children are bored; we have a bored Army out there, gentlemen. That's a big problem for Army leadership.


This response again points out the importance of maintenance, but I want to call to your attention the fact that on their own, given long lists of alternatives, the army picked Individual Training. The troops overwhelmingly selected individual training as the item that they thought was most important. Now they were given lots of other options I can assure you, including some of the great




offerings of the Chaplain's Corps and the Recreational Services, etc. They didn't choose these; they said they wanted to be trained for their job. That is a very healthy symptom in our Army today. But you must understand, gentlemen, that virtually every general in the United States Army considers that individual training is not the legitimate responsibility of a unit commander. Most general officers of the United States Army believe that the only kind of training which is important is what they refer to as unit training (meaning collective training). Unless the whole outfit is out there swarming over the hills or pulling at lanyards or loading this or shooting weapons, you aren't training. They do not accept any responsibility for the individual training of their soldiers. They think that's what the Training and Doctrine Command is for. Of course we have a great share of responsibility for this. For example, we have saddled ourselves with student officers for six months at a time, and we take on other difficult or improbable jobs from time to time. But there is not a clear recognition among the leadership of the US Army that individual training, particularly of young soldiers, is a year long, year in, year out, job. That applies incidentally, to officers just well as it applies to those privates. It applies to every grade in the Army. It's got to go on all the time; if we are not growing, we're not developing professionally.

Again and again, in the armywide survey, soldiers offered comments on Army training. They volunteered comments on a lot of Army activities, but I'm sort of zeroing in on this because of the importance they ascribed to training. The comment shown here seems to me to speak volumes to those of you who will in future years be concerned with training soldiers. There is a major gain to be made by the Army simply by going through the process of diagnostic testing.

If you will take the time and trouble to ascertain what the soldier knows, and make it possible for him to avoid unnecessary training and move on to a subject that he does not know, or if you will take the time and trouble to convince the soldier, the recipient of your training effort, that he needs the training, you will overcome a major attitudinal problem that interferes with the training process.




We did ask the field what we could do to resolve some of these problems, and we got this response. The people who ran this survey, and these are professionals, said that this is probably one of the clearest statistical mandates that they had ever seen in a survey. I've been in this training business for some years, at least since 1971 in a very direct way, and I want to tell you that this result which is from an October 1976 survey is entirely consistent with the surveys that were conducted by what General Westmoreland called the Board for Dynamic Training in 1971. Almost statistically identical by grade. They are consistent, moreover, with surveys that were conducted in the Reserve Components on the issue "Hey, what would it take to keep you in the Guard?" or "What would it take to keep you in the Reserve?" It didn't cite PX privileges; didn't cite more pay; didn't cite better equipment. They said, "Get something going on down there at the Armory by way of meaningful training."




"Hey, what would it take to keep you in the Guard?" or "What would it take to keep you in the Reserve?" It didn't cite PX privileges; didn't cite more pay; didn't cite better equipment. They said, "Get something going on down there at the Armory by way of meaningful training."

Next we asked them, "Who ought to run training?" We gave them a variety of options, one of them was manage it at company or manage it at battalion. I have stratified the responses by grade, because I want to show you that across the enlisted corps there is a broad consensus that noncommissioned officers ought to be charged with the individual training of the soldiers of the United States Army. Remember, the soldiers said, Individual Training is my primary interest; and I'm showing you here, the soldiers said my noncommissioned officers should be the guys who should manage that training. Not the battalion.




Not the company commander. That will hit hard at some of our genius battery commanders. But that's not what the soldiers want, not what the noncoms want. They really think that it ought to be done by the NCO.

Here is a summary showing three points of conclusion drawn by the PACDA survey team.






And here is a general summary of this whole problem of training. I haven't touched on many of these points because I was interested in surfacing some of the complaints that are more directly related to the training business. However, I think that we can make the point that many of these are subsumed in the general category of inadequate training management on the part of the leadership of the Army. Referring to that leadership which is exercised from four star command posts as well as those from the battery C.P., we just haven't done our job of training the Army very well. Now what I've said so far has been in the nature of a diagnosis. I've been trying to characterize the leadership problems of the Army today as I see them. I now want to get into kind of a prescriptive business to see if we can find a cure.




Your commandant recently received a television tape from my boss, his commander, General DePuy, which developed the general notion that when you lay out a course of instruction for officers in the TRADOC school system we shall use a model similar to this diagram. In this, we will attempt to develop individual skills, tactical skills, and knowledge of administration and logistics together with the skills of leadership. In brief, our boss defines leadership in these terms. He said our approach to leadership will be to address all four of those areas up on top and our further work on officer courses in the TRADOC is going to follow that pattern. Note also that the skills he defined in his television tape are the skills of a sergeant at Skill Level 3. So we are going to proceed directly from the instructional systems design that has gone into developing the enlisted personnel management system, to form the basic skills that we will teach to officers. There are other skills, and obviously we will have to go well beyond these, but they're going to be the point of departure. You put all of this together and you've got our approach to leadership in the TRADOC today. Now that tells us that we have to pay a lot of attention to this area on the left. And indeed it's important that we do so because those constitute by and large the area that we refer to in the United States Army as Training.

Now there are many of you who may have considered training as different from all of this over here. I'm trying to get across to you that that's not the way the soldier sees it and it's not the way that the Commander of the TRADOC sees it. If there are problems




over here, they deserve to be addressed systematically in the training program, and this wall must be broken down. We are convinced that sound training programs will clear up many, if not all, of those ills over there, or at least tend to ameliorate them. Behind that contention is this view of the Army, gentlemen. To the ordinary soldier, the man that we want to lead, the Army is an amorphous and ill defined entity far removed from his immediate concern. His preoccupation is with the job which he is doing. Out beyond that job, there is the military occupational specialty (MOS) within which that job fits, and certainly his horizons extend to that. As we have seen from the surveys I've mentioned and others, he talks about his unit, and, for most soldiers, that means his battery or his company and not any unit much higher.



Now you've been exposed over the last weeks to a lot of TRADOC's blandishments. I wonder if anybody has pointed out to you that what this command has been involved in for the past three years is simply defining these areas of immediate interest to the soldier. The Soldier's Manual is nothing but a definition of the relationship between the soldier and his job and MOS. The Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) is nothing more than a definition between this guy and that unit. That's all! The US Army is much further down that process than virtually any other comparable institution. We are way ahead of industry, I submit, in defining jobs, devising tests to establish job competency, describing organizational goals, setting evaluation mechanisms in place to measure performance in both areas. It's important that we continue this work. It's important for you, the potential users, potential developers of this work, to understand what's going on there. We are really getting into a position to talk to the Army's problems the way the soldiers perceive those problems.

This is an illustration from one of our recent training circulars which is intended simply to make the point that we want to build a soldier with these characteristics. I emphasize again the point that the soldiers have got to grow. That's an important part of the self fulfillment that all of us strive for. If the soldier feels futile, he is by definition going to be unhappy. If he is not confident of his own skill or the skill of his teammates, he is by definition going to be ill at ease, and he is not going to be motivated. If those conditions exist he will not reenlist in our Army, and we will have an increasingly difficult time moving the Army into the future.



Here are some characteristics of good training. Again we are writing manuals about all of this business, but time and time again I run into commands where I find that there is a direct correlation between the freedom from "command problems" and the soundness of the training program within the organization. The unit that trains hard, with relatively few exceptions, is not plagued with the difficulties that seem to detract from the ability of other commanders to get on with their mission, or to enjoy their command tours.

### GOOD TRAINING

- Holds soldier interest
- Assures soldier of his worth and the importance of his job
- Provides strong job satisfaction
- Shows interest of superiors in him and his job
- Builds teamwork and esprit
- Reduces command problems!

Pivotal in all of this is the noncommissioned officer. Now I'm not going to give you a lecture on that; you've heard generals throughout your careers talk about the backbone of the Army and so on. All I want to get across to you today is that, up until now, we've only given lip service to these concepts. We were not able to define accurately and adequately what it was that we expected the noncommissioned officer to do. I'll give you a specific example.

### NCOs :


- Are the ARMY to soldiers
- Tell soldiers what is expected
- Show soldiers how to do their job
- Supervise soldiers' job performance
- Advise and instruct soldiers for full development

I went down to the Sergeants Major Academy two years ago. I made a speech to the class there in which I said that in my view the responsibility of the noncommissioned officer ought to be the individual training of the soldiers who are under them. And I went on to describe a foreign army where, upon entrance, soldiers were assigned to particular noncommissioned officers of the regiment. And that noncom was held judiciously responsible for the behavior of the soldiers under them. If they screwed up, he got punished along with them. By the time I got back to TRADOC, there were three IG complaints and two letters to the CSA from those fellows down there who are a little bit worried about the radical general who was being let loose on the Army with notions like that.

I think that the Army has improved a great deal since then; I know the Sergeants Major in particular, have since that day. I remember two years ago few of those Sergeants Major were interested in working with those soldiers in the field on terms where they were explicitly responsible.

As I discussed earlier, there is now a broad recognition that the individual training of soldiers is exactly the area where the NCO can make his greatest contribution to the Army. More importantly, it is the noncom who is our hope of coming to grips with the personnel turnover, the problems of time, post details, etc, that eat most unit training programs alive. The noncom knows what training is needed by the soldier. The noncom has day to day contact with the soldiers which permits him to ensure that the soldier has the opportunity to train. The noncom has the ability to find, for the soldier, room in all of those nooks and crannies of time that are available throughout the day. This in order to provide for the soldier the opportunity to master new skills. They can do that if we will decentralize, if we will charge them with that mission.

Now this is a diagram from Training Circular 21-5-7, Training Management In Battalions. It says that we are after something called concurrent training. Most of the US Army is still afflicted with what we refer to as the S3 syndrome. This is the notion that all good training programs are invented by majors in battalion headquarters who have that genius to anticipate all of the problems that the units are going to encounter and then build a schedule which will take those problems into account.




This diagram holds that, to the contrary, we want to go after individual training using the Soldier's Manual as the base, basically with non-commissioned officers down here at the squad/crew level. Company officers, battalion commanders should be trained at the same time that all of this is going on.


It is an interesting point to make in the US Army today, but we need help there. We have a simulation up at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that's called the Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS) where we can take actual battalion command groups, and let them fight a war down in the southern Sinai against Soviet divisions. The battle proceeds in real time, free maneuver; they can do whatever they wish. One of the things that pops out of this simulation is that the supply officers, the S4s, are usually guys just like you, pulled out of the field. They say, "Congratulations you are now the battalion S4 of the old XXX battalion." Those guys simply can't do it. Ninety percent of the participating S4's were unequal to the problem of evacuating combat damaged equipment. They didn't know what to do with this equipment. Now you know if we ever do have to fight in the Sinai Desert, we are going to leave broken tanks, APC's and trucks all over the desert, based upon the performance of these officers. We never really thought through that drill, and we hadn't equipped those young men with the wherewithal to anticipate the problem. What that tells you is that there is a major training problem of individual proportions at staff officer levels that we must solve. Company commanders don't arrive fully trained, as all of you who recently came from battery command well know. Of course, over in the right hand column it says you have to put it together collectively as well, and I won't dwell on that one.

In a soundly conducted training program, while training is going forward with these teams, training is going on up here with leaders. I know of no skill for colonels of the United States Army which is more necessary today than redevelopment of their ability to get out on the hills with captains and talk tactics and tactical problems of the sort to which I just alluded, so that they both understand a little bit better how it's all supposed to go. We have developed for one reason or another a group of inarticulate field grade officers, inarticulate in the tactical sense. I'm sure they are all nifty with pointers and lectures.


Multi-echelon training which I refer to has these characteristics. When we say decentralized, I mean assign the job to the man who has the equipment and stuff to do it. It doesn't mean passing it all off to the company commander. Far from it. It means that the colonel does what he is supposed to do; the major does what he is supposed to do; and SGT Blotz, E5, does, by golly, what he is supposed to do.




Now I'll run through these diagrams-- you have seen many of these concepts before. The philosophy that I refer to is thoroughly consistent with the way the Field Artillery School is organized and run. There is a theme that runs through all of the training of the United States Army, looks just like this whether you are looking at it inside of the TRADOC or down in Forces Command.




General DePuy made a presentation to the assembled leadership of the Army at the recent Army Commanders' Conference using many of the same diagrams and information that I've shown to you. At the conclusion of the conference, the commander of FORSCOM and the commander of USAREUR indorsed this concept. They both pledged to make television tapes to tell their command that they fully supported the TRADOC effort in this respect. Now, if you are talking about individual training you can take a similar flow chart. For those of you who aren't able to follow the abbreviations, SQT stands for Skill Qualification Tests, NCOES - Noncommissioned Officer Education System, TEC - Training Extension Course, NRI - Non Resident Instruction. These are the products the TRADOC schools turn out for the army in the field.




One can apply the same flowing concept to collective training. Here we have substituted for the Soldier's Manual and the Skill Qualification Test the ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Program, and it works the same way.





Training in the unit can be adapted to the same basic model. Who is the Training Manager in the diagram? That's the battalion commander. He is the lowest commander who has a staff capable of making the training program function. So the battalion commander is the principal training manager. Who's this figure marked trainer? The key trainer is the company commander. He is at the level that has the troops, and he is the guy that's got the principal job of training. Who does the evaluation shown at the bottom? Everybody does, as you all know.



This diagram makes the point that in our doctrine today, which is just now evolving, but in use in many units of the United States Army, there is a diagram similar to this that defines the role for generals in training and the role for colonels in training and the role for captains and sergeants. It clearly states that those in companies prepare, conduct and evaluate training. That's what we expect the company level fellows to do. Here the field grade swine state objectives, set priorities, allocate time, provide support, coach trainers. Coach trainers! When was the last time any of you fellows actually had some coaching from anyone. Ensure feedback! Now if we can bring this into genuine doctrine, (that means that over half of us believe it and are prepared to act on it) we will have brought Army training a long step forward. There are a lot of old soldiers who would tell you "Yeah, but that's the way it used to be." Just remember, gents, the United States Army never was the way it was.



In these new documents you will see that we have made no mention of massive training directives or big fat publications. We say that the higher headquarters works off of graphics like this long-term Planning Calendar or short term Forecast.




The details of these are not important. All I'm trying to illustrate is that we must stop turning out poop sheets; we won't get any credit for rhetoric. Here is an example of a Unit Schedule like you're familiar with, and it will convey what training is to be conducted and what support is needed. But interestingly, we say that the Unit Schedule is not published by the company. The company may put it together. The company commander may decide on this sequence and where and so forth, but it will be published by the battalion staff. There will be no more publishing of anything at company level.

Now, I've been talking about a publication that is known as Training Circular 21-5-7, Training Management In Battalions. For those of you who have seen it, I want you to make a mental note to get a copy and use it for yourself when you go to a unit. If you haven't seen it yet, you ought to because you're professionally behind if you are ignorant of these concepts.

LTG Starry in V Corps (USAREUR) has indorsed it and actually has it in use in several of his battalions. He has also been publishing Commander's Notes which are thoroughly consistent with this book's method of applying the specifics of Training in Units.

UNIT: CO A 1/25 INFANTRY (MECH)						
TRAINING PHASE-LOCAL TRAINING (I-G-L)						
DATE	SUBUNIT	MISSION	TRAINERS	LOCATION FACILITIES	TIME RESERVED	NOTES
Mon 30 Aug	11B (adj)	SM	Pvt Sgt	Bulfinch Field Learning Ctr	0800 1200	FM 7 11B SGT Notice 7 10 7x
	11C	FDC procedures	Sectee Sgts	LTA 12	0800 1200	1EG FM 7 11C1
	RTD	Radio Nets CEDI Signal Maint	Bn Commo (M)	Bulfinch Field	1300 1600	FM 7 11B" op 2-11-D1-011
	Co 1	Maintenance	Maint Off	Motor Park	1300 1600	Bn SOP 12 (Maint)
Tues 31 Aug	11B	Sgt Forced March Live Fire	Sgt Ldrn	LTA 14 Rousevelt Rd Range 1/C	0800 1600	ARTEP 1-45 w-C1 App F-21
	11C	Subcaliber firing		LTA 12 Range 12M (subcaliber)	0700 1600	FM 7 11C" Bn SOP B (Ranges)
	Co 1	Maintenance	Maint Off	Motor Park	1300 1630	Bn SOP 12 (Maint)



#### OBSERVATIONS FROM THE FIELD ON TC 21-5-7

LTG DONN STARRY:

"MY GUIDANCE TO TRAINING MANAGERS IN V CORPS IS:

- 1) TASKS FOR TRAINING WILL BE FURNISHED BY BATTALION TO THE COMPANIES
- 2) WE MUST CONSIDER USING LESSON OUTLINES INSTEAD OF FORMAL LESSON PLANS.
- 3) WHENEVER THE TRAINING OF LOW DENSITY MOS IS REQUIRED, CONSIDER USING STANDARD INSTRUCTIONAL BLOCKS (CENTRALIZE WHEN RESOURCES REQUIRE IT)
- 4) TYPEWRITERS WILL NOT BE TOUCHED AT THE COMPANY. (THEY BETTER NOT SINCE THEY HAVE BEEN ORDERED REMOVED FROM THE ORDERLY ROOM.)"

CG V CORPS  
USAREUR

Here is an unsolicited indorsement from a young captain. His last question is for you GEN Akers and all the other TRADOC schools.

"TC 21-5-7 is an excellent publication. It . . . clarifies training responsibilities at all levels. It provides the officer and NCO with more specific and useful guidance than any previous manual in this area. Why don't they teach this stuff at the advanced course?"

CPT \_\_\_\_\_ Infantry  
Fort Ord, CA

That's the end of my formal message, gentlemen. As far as I can see, leadership and training management are very, very close together, and if you tackle the one you will have a pretty good hold on the other.

**THE EXERCISE OF COMMAND**

**IS**

**TRAINING MANAGEMENT**