



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

ATTNG-AS-CT

15 OCT 1975

SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Iran 3-10 October 1975

Commander
HQ TRADOC
Fort Monroe, VA 23651

1. PURPOSE OF VISIT: To survey training within the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces (IIGF) and to propose training improvements.
2. TEAM MEMBERS: The survey team consisted of MG Gorman, DCST, and LTC Bahnsen, ODCST, TRADOC; Mr. DeGroot, DCSLOG, DA; and MAJ Wells, Training Support Activity, TRADOC.
3. PERSONS VISITED/CONTACTED: A list of persons contacted is at inclosure 1.
4. OBSERVATIONS:

a. After an Army Section (ARSEC), ARMISH-MAAG, orientation, and an initial meeting with General Oveisi's Chief of Staff and General Staff principals, the team visited the IIGF's schools: Signal, Armor, Infantry, Transportation, Adjutant General, Quartermaster, and Ordnance, plus the IIGF 55th Airborne Brigade (detailed itinerary at inclosure 2). Institutional and unit training is patterned on the US Army model of 15 years ago, when most IIGF senior officers received their US Army training. Following are general observations:

(1) The link between IIGF service schools and units is weak, and training is thereby impoverished. The service schools have not been tasked, nor have they accepted responsibility for branch-related training conducted in IIGF units. This school-unit separatism is reinforced by the culture: loyalty is focused upward, within command lines. School commandants look inward to their classes, or upward, but seldom outward to the force.

(2) The Training Publication System is weak. Printing and paper quality is poor, illustrations minimal. Texts are not designed for easy reading. Long delays exist in translating English training material into Farsi.

(3) The Technical Documentation Program is particularly weak. There is a shortage of technical publications on a wide range of equipment, a slow, ponderous system for translating material into Farsi, and in general, poor readability in most technical publications. Russian equipment is provided with Russian technical documentation and some English documentation, but none in Farsi.

(4) IIGF training technique places great reliance on rote memorization and repetitive drills. There is little evidence of performance-oriented or self-paced instruction. The noncommissioned officer has apparently not been given a responsible role in the training process. NCOs generally serve in a supportive role, with instruction being conducted by officers.

(5) Training aids consist of an eclectic sampling of new and old: a modern basic electronics simulator at the Signal School, and the very sophisticated Link-Miles Chieftan Tank Driver Trainer at the Armor School, contrast with a broad reliance on sectionalized equipment and older vintage, unsophisticated US devices and graphics. IIGF also makes limited use of commercially available, unsophisticated audio-visual equipment, mainly slide projectors. No rational audio-visual network exists which would allow the wide distribution of training support material from a central agency. Audio-visual standard formats have not been established. No television was in evidence, although there was reference to plans for closed circuit systems in the schools.

b. MG Gorman presented the observations listed above to General Oveisi in an exit briefing (inclosure 3). General Oveisi's response was as follows:

(1) He acknowledged a gap between Iranian and US Army training, and stated that it was to our mutual benefit to close this gap.

(2) He stated that IIGF places a high priority on improving training. IIGF will upgrade the expertise of their training cadre with US assistance. He said he wants MAAG officers who are critical, and capable of helping.

(3) He recognized both the short and long term difficulties of improving IIGF training, and requested continuing US Army foreign military sales and advisory assistance.

c. Observations pertinent to visits to specific sites are described in inclosures 4 thru 8.

5. ACTIONS TAKEN AND PROMISES MADE: The exit briefing to General Ovcisi on 9 October 1975 incorporated the following proposals:

a. An FMS contract study. TRADOC will assist IIGF to contract for a civilian consultant firm, which will study design for a IIGF training support system. TRADOC will assist in preparing contract specifications, reviewing contractor proposals, and sending representative(s) with the contractor to Iran to assist. It is anticipated that this visit will take place between three and five months from now.

b. An M-31 Demonstration. TRADOC will introduce the US' modified M-31 subcaliber field artillery trainer to IIGF within three months, via a demonstration team. This visit will facilitate IIGF decisions whether to obtain this (FRG) training device, which is basically of German manufacture.

c. SCOPES/REALTRAIN Demonstration. TRADOC will introduce the REALTRAIN engagement simulation training technique through visits of two teams, one within three months and a second within six months. This action will illustrate performance oriented, NCC based training and will assist IIGF to decide whether to adopt these training techniques, and to procure or make requisite devices.

d. TEC Experimentation. TRADOC will assist, thru an FMS contract, conversion to Farsi and validation in country, of selected Training Extension Course (TEC) lessons. Initial efforts will be limited to artillery lessons on the M109A1B. Upon validation, assistance will be given IIGF to establish procedures whereby a wider range of TEC lessons can be obtained for IIGF use. An assistance visit in six months is envisioned.

e. Training Management Course. DCST in conjunction with CGSC, will establish an electives program for selected Iranian officers currently at C&GS which will prepare them for assignment to the IIGF Training Support Center/System. Possibly additional officers from Iran will be sent to this special training.

f. Improved Technical Documentation. TRADOC will assist IIGF to avail themselves of the TRADOC/AMC Improved Technical Documentation program. Specifically, the feasibility of adding IIGF requirements to ongoing US Army contracts for the TOW, DRAGON and M109A1B will be explored.

g. Manager Orientation. TRADOC will host a visit in early '76 to CONUS for key IIGF trainers. This visit will demonstrate up-to-date TRADOC training and training support material programs. Additionally, TRADOC (IMA) should conduct in Iran a workshop for MAAG personnel on training technique and management.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Approve actions in paragraph 5 above.

b. Commandant, Institute for Military Assistance be tasked to coordinate demonstrations and workshop in Iran, supported by USAIS, USAARMS, USAFAS, and CATB, TMI and TSA as appropriate.

8 Incl
as



PAUL F. GORMAN
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Training

PERSONS CONTACTED

VISIT TO IRAN 3-10 OCT 75

I. IMPERIAL IRANIAN GROUND FORCES (IIGF)

GEN Oveisi	Chief of Staff, IIGF
LTG Siuchansi	Vice Chief of Staff, IIGF
LTG Naini	Staff Coordinator, IIGF
LTG Salleh	Dep Chief of Staff for Training, IIGF
LTG Nasserli	Dep Chief of Staff for Operations & Intel, IIGF
BG Haghayeghi	Commandant, Signal Center
COL Keiyantosh	Chief, Training Aids Center
MG Khaltbari	Commander, Infantry Center
MG Jahanbari	Commander, Armor Center
BG Ghaffari	Commander, 55th Airborne Brigade
MG Iravanlou	Commander, Combat Service Training Center
BG Tajmehrabi	Dep Commander, Combat Service Training Center
BG Bidabadi	Commander, Ordnance School
COL Bidabadi	Commander, Transportation School
LTC Nassri	Commander, Quartermaster School
COL Zarshenas	Commander, Adjutant General School

II. ARMISH-MAAG

MG Vandenberg	Chief, ARMISH-MAAG
BG Partain	Chief, Army Section
COL Storey	Chief, Airforce Section
Rear Admiral Boyd	Chief, Navy Section
COL Henry	PERSIT, ARSEC
COL Sullivan	G3 Advisor, ARSEC
LTC Crumbley	Advisor, IIGF Armor School
LTC Livingston	Advisor, IIGF Infantry School
LTC Barnes	Advisor, IIGF Signal School
LTC Hammond	Taft II, Combat Support Center
CPT Williams	Artillery Advisor, G3 Section, ARSEC*

*Escort Officer

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TRIP TO IRAN

ITINERARY 3-10 OCTOBER 1975

FRIDAY, 3 OCTOBER 1975

2210 Arrive Tehran

SATURDAY, 4 OCTOBER 1975

0700-0725 En route from billets to ARSEC
0730-1030 ARSEC discussions
1030-1145 Planning time
1145-1155 En route to Tehran Officers Club (TOC)
1200-1255 No host lunch
1300-1325 En route to HQ, IIGF
1330-1530 Discussion with GEN Oveisi's staff

SUNDAY, 5 OCTOBER 1975

0700-0725 En route to Signal School
0730-0930 Visit Signal School
0935-1035 En route to Mehrabad Airport
1200-1530 En route to Shiraz

MONDAY, 6 OCTOBER 1975

0700-0725 En route to Armor Center
0730-1000 Visit Armor Center
1005-1015 En route to 55th Abd Bde
1020-1220 Visit 55th Abd Bde
1220-1230 En route to lunch
1245-1330 Lunch
1335-1345 En route to Infantry Center
1350-1550 Visit Infantry Center

TUESDAY, 7 OCTOBER 1975 (Official Iranian Holiday - First Day after Ramazan)

1235-1255 En route to airport
1300-1600 En route to Tabriz
1605-1620 En route to billets

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WEDNESDAY, 8 OCTOBER 1975

0700-0715 En route to Combat Support Training Center
0730-1130 Visit Combat Support Training Center
1130-1330 Lunch
1305-1325 En route to airport
1330-1630 En route to Tehran

THURSDAY, 9 OCTOBER 1975

0715-0800 En route to HQ, IIGF
0800-1000 Brief GEN Oveisi and staff
1000-1030 En route to ARSEC
1030-1200 Discussion with Chief ARSEC and Staff

FRIDAY, 10 OCTOBER 1975

0600-0630 En route to Mehrabad Airport
0715 Depart Tehran

SCHOOL:

- (1) CONDUCTS Individual Training at Entry and at Key steps upward.
- (2) SUPPORTS Individual and Collective Training in units thru
 - Doctrine
 - Standards
 - Training Technique
 - Training Support

Each school of the U.S. Army is charged with the two responsibilities listed above. We consider it important to establish these responsibilities in the formal mission of the school, and to insure that the school commandant is provided the money and the manpower to execute both missions.

SCHOOL: BRAIN OF ITS BRANCH

DOCTRINE: What is taught
Wherever taught

STANDARDS: How Well

TRAINING TECHNIQUE: Method


TRAINING SUPPORT: Communication
Simulation

In the U. S. Army concept, a service school becomes the brain of its branch. It is true that the heart of an army lies in its units, its brigades and battalions. But brigades and battalions have short memories. They cannot take time for reflection and argumentation. They have little resources they can devote to experimentation. They are concerned with the present and the near future, and seldom take the long-range view. For all of these reasons, they need, the Army needs, institutions charged with thinking for the Army. These are its service schools. Each school, for its branch, functions as shown, and no more than the human body could tolerate a separation between its brain and its heart, the Army suffers when the service schools are isolated from the units. All that a school does should bear upon what the units are doing, and vice versa.

As the chart suggests, we define doctrine as what is taught in the Army, wherever it is taught, by whomever is doing the teaching. Doctrine is what over half of the Army believes and is prepared to act upon. It is up to the school to insure that what is taught, and what is learned is appropriate for the modern battlefield, and adequately prepares the Army for its future challenges. The schools also determine how well the Army shall be trained, expressing the standards which the units of the Army must meet in order to meet readiness criteria. Schools establish standards

of individual training: marksmanship scores. They establish standards for collective training: tank gunnery ranges and scoring procedures, and other aspects of evaluating how well a unit has conducted its training.

To illustrate how a school functions in the U.S. Army, let me show you this diagram of our training system.



For individual training, each school produces two key publications (1) a Soldier's Manual, which for each Military Occupation Specialty describes the skills each soldier is expected to master within each skill level, and the skill qualification test, which is administered to all soldiers of that MOS Army-wide to establish whether or not each has mastered the skills for which he is held responsible. (2) For collective training, the school expresses the Army's training requirements through a document we refer to as ARTEP: Army Training and Evaluation Program. Both the documents for individual training, and the documents for collective training, are built around the scheme shown in the diagram: the school lists critical tasks which must be addressed in training. The word critical means important or necessary in combat. Once the list of critical tasks is developed, the school then proceeds to develop a test which would establish whether or not the individual or group had mastered the tasks, and a related set of training support materials (which will be defined further below). The unit commander then takes the publications and training support materials from the school, and conducts individual or collective training to pass the prescribed tests. At appropriate times during the year, the unit commander, or his superior, can conduct evaluations to establish the proficiency of the individuals or the groups within the units, using the prescribed evaluation procedures. It has taken the U.S. Army over ten years of experimentation and validating tests to establish this system, but as of the Fall of 1975 we at last have a training system based on the foregoing which encompasses our training from the moment an individual enters for

basic combat training through the time he leaves his unit and the Army with an honorable discharge. In this training system U.S. Army schools have been assigned a central role.

One key aspect of that role for the schools, is the devising of training support materials.


TRAINING SUPPORT

COMMUNICATION

Charts
35mm Slides
Movies

SIMULATION

Rubber wounds
Link-Miles Trainer
TOW Training Set



FMs, TMs, TCs

REALTRAIN

Broadly speaking, we can divide training support into communication or simulation. The IIGF uses many of both kinds of training support. In our visit we saw in use, in training, charts, 35mm slides, and motion pictures. All of these are examples of communicative training aids. We also saw simulators. Some were very basic, such as the rubber moulage wounds for use in first aid training which we saw in the Airborne Brigade. However, we also saw very advanced, sophisticated simulators, such as the Link-Miles Driver Trainer at the Armor Center, and the TOW training set at the Infantry School. In the U.S. Army we have issued to battalion level cassette television equipment, which can serve both for communication and for simulation. As a communicative device, the TV equipment is used to play back tapes made at the schools presenting instructional material, or new doctrinal concepts. As a simulative device, the TV camera can be mounted on a gun, so as to give a recording of firing sequence, permitting the trainer to assess how well the gunner gauged his target.

A vital part of communicative training support is training publications: the Field Manuals, Technical Manuals, Training Circulars, and other publications which provide to the field authoritative advice on what to include in training, and how to conduct training.

Under simulation I have listed a training technique we have labeled "REALTRAIN", because it is a better way of simulating combat for small units of the combined arms. We described this training technique to IIGF officers and U.S. Advisers at the Infantry and Armor Centers, and at the Airborne Brigade. We did so because we believe that the REALTRAIN

technique offers a readily available way of upgrading small unit training within the IIGF. (Here MG Gorman provided General Oveisi copies of the training circulars pertaining to SCOPES and REALTRAIN, and explained how the simulation worked.)

All the foregoing has been a description of training management as practiced in the U.S. Army today. We would now like to offer some suggestions for IIGF consideration. We do so with all reservations appropriate to our short visit, and with knowledge that many of our remarks could apply with equal force to the U.S. Army, or to many other armies for that matter. No army is ever trained in peacetime well enough to meet its responsibilities in war.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IIGF POLICY

- Performance vs Memorization.
 - A strategy for self-pacing
 - Hands On
 - High Density
 - Simple Skills
 - Training Support System
 - Improved School-Unit Links
 - MOS and Skill Level Structure
 - Standards
 - Training or
 - Training Support
- FIRST
- FOR EACH SKILL LEVEL

I have listed here certain matters which must be addressed at the level of the Commander of the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces. First, the IIGF relies today fundamentally upon memorization as a training technique. All of the classes, all of the examinations we witnessed during our tour were built around rote memory, and the students were evaluated largely by written tests, apparently largely subjective in content, wherein the student was expected to repeat back word-for-word what he had memorized of nomenclature and procedure. We believe that orientation on performance as opposed to memorization is absolutely essential before any material progress can be made with training technique, training aids, or any other aspect of training support. It is

not what a sergeant says about a piece of equipment, or a tactic which counts. Rather, it is what he does, and demonstrates he can do, which ought to count.

We note that IIGF school commandants, virtually to a man, are aware that American service schools have recently shifted toward self-paced instruction. Evidently they have received a IIGF directive telling them to move immediately to self-pace their courses. Virtually every commandant we talked to asked us "how do you self-pace an advanced course?" That is a good question, and one for which we have not found an answer. What we know about self pacing would suggest to us that the advanced course is perhaps the most difficult kind of course to self pace, and that courses at the other end of the training spectrum are far more logical and profitable targets for self pacing. I would suggest that the IIGF publish a strategy for self pacing which would direct the attention of commandants first to courses which involve hands on performance oriented tasks, courses which involve a high density of students, and courses which focus upon simple achievement.


The IIGF lacks a training support system. Such training support as presently exists is unorganized, and we will discuss a proposed training support system for the IIGF below.

A training support system is a prerequisite for improved school to unit links. We found that these links are crucial to the management of training in the U.S. Army, and suspect that the IIGF would find them likewise. We believe that IIGF should consider tasking its school commandants as we have tasked ours, to support training in units.

Finally, we note that the IIGF does not have a well defined MOS or skill level structure which would permit coherent individual training throughout the career of a given soldier. We recognize that developing such a structure may take many years, but we would recommend the IIGF begin now to consider how to establish an MOS and skill level structure which would rest upon explicit standards of individual training, specific training courses for each skill level, or training support, or conducting that training in units.

Now let us look at a possible training support system.


A POSSIBLE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM



We assume you wish to take better advantage of available U.S. training support materials. Accordingly, we show on this system a proposal for linking U.S. schools and the TRADOC Training Support Activity to the IIGF. You will notice that we have chosen the U.S. Army Institute of Military Assistance at Fort Bragg for that purpose, and specifically the SATMO within the Institute. SATMO can act as a clearing house for tapping the resources of the TRADOC schools, the publications of the Adjutant General Office, the training support materials of the Training Support Activity, and policy and management directives which emanate from the Headquarters of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. SATMO would, according to this scheme, forward these materials to MAAG, Iran. It is important to note here that USAIMA has Farsi language capabilities, and can be of some assistance in translation.


Within IIGF, we note with approval the proposal to establish a Deputy Commander for Training. We believe that the U.S. Army has profited substantially from the establishment of a Training Command, and believe that a Deputy Commander for Training in the IIGF, who could establish coherent policy for individual and collective training throughout IIGF, could go a long way towards simplifying the management of training in the future. In any event, our proposal envisages a training support center subordinate to that Deputy Commander, which would probably be located in Tehran adjacent to the Headquarters IIGF. The training support Center would provide support to the schools and training centers, and the schools in turn would support units of their branch. In effect, the training support center would function as depot level, the schools would function as direct support, and the units would undertake the organizational level--to use an analogy with logistics.

IIGF TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER



The functions of the Training Support Center are shown here. It includes publications, illustrations, the management of various communications media, and the control of training materiel. The personnel in this Center could be largely civilian, and might even consist largely of contractual personnel. But some military leadership would of course be necessary, since this organism would be one of the principal instruments for IIGF training management.

POSSIBLE IIGF TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM



Here are the functions the Center could perform, related to the functions at the school and the unit. Again, note that each echelon in the system sees successively less sophisticated capabilities, but that all parts of the system are equipped for compatibility. In effect, the training support system functions like a communications net, permitting the passing of doctrine from school to the units, or vice versa, and the ready infusion of doctrinal material from abroad.

POSSIBLE TRADOC ASSISTANCE

<u>REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
Training Support System Design	Either FMS or Direct Contract Consultation team in 3 months
Improved Technical Documentation (M109A1B, TOW, DRAGON)	Direct Contract via add-on
Training Extension Course	M109A1B Test Example in 6 months
Television Trainers (3/4" cassette TV)	Direct Contract by IIGF
SCOPES/REALTRAIN (Engagement Simulation)	Light Infantry Demonstration in 3 months Armor/Mech Inf Demonstration in 6 months (LTC Stapleton)
M31 Artillery Trainer	Demonstration by team in 3 months
CONUS Update of Key IIGF Trainers	Special Briefing for selected officers in 6 months
Special Training for IIGF Officers at CGSC	

Now let us discuss what the Training and Doctrine Command of the U.S. Army might be able to do to assist the IIGF in implementing such a plan. In general, the U.S. Army has very little in its inventory which it can sell to the Iranian government for the purpose of enhancing IIGF training. Virtually everything which we will discuss here can be bought commercially or manufactured in Iran.

First of all, we urge that you devote immediate attention to the design of a training support system. When the U.S. Army, several years ago, began to look at its own training support system, it went to management consulting firms outside the military for assistance, since these firms were in a much better position to assess the cost and availability of appropriate materiel. IIGF could contract directly with such a consulting firm, or could obtain the services of one through FMS. However it does it, it should call for the contractor to lay out a coherent, compatible communication system for training support, identifying the

materiel which should be purchased for the system, together with costed alternatives, indicating the source and availability for the IIGF decision makers. We believe that prompt action on this recommendation could permit early implementation.

The U.S. Army is moving to improve its technical manuals, using tested U.S. Air Force methods. Noting that the IIGF is bringing into its force many items of new materiel, technical documentation for that materiel becomes of utmost importance for both institutional and unit training. Accordingly, any opportunity which may exist to add on to the contracts which will shortly be drawn up for improved technical documentation for the TOW, DRAGON, and M109A1B weapons systems should be exploited by IIGF. TRADOC and AMC have developed specifications for such improved manuals, and it appears reasonable to believe that, via an FMS contract, the IIGF could obtain Farsi-English bilingual versions.

IIGF has expressed interest in the U.S. Army's Training Extension Course. This is a new program, a new kind of training support material, which we are just now providing in significant numbers to our units. There is a good bit about that program which is still experimental. Essentially, it is a method of teaching soldiers by machines. Whether the materials developed for the machines, and the machines themselves, would work in the IIGF we do not know. We suspect that there may have to be substantial modifications to the TEC materials before they would work. However, we are willing to conduct a limited experiment, in which we would take the audio portion of existing TEC materials, and convert it to Farsi. We would propose to take a series of artillery lessons, appropriate for use with the M109A1B system, put Farsi sound tapes with them, and then bring them over for an experimental validation with IIGF soldiers. We believe that it would take us about 6 months to prepare this experiment.

Concerning the television trainer training equipment to which I referred earlier, we recommend that the IIGF adopt a 3/4" format, and that they proceed to buy them from the least-cost, most available commercial source. We note that there are many Japanese firms operating in Iran, and we found in our own experience with Sony equipment that a maintenance contract with such a firm was very much worthwhile. In any event, television purchases should be undertaken as part of the training support system, in accordance with the recommendations of the management consultant firm.

Concerning the introduction of the SCOPES/REALTRAIN engagement simulation, we would propose to send you a light infantry demonstration team within 3 months to show the Infantry Center and the Airborne Brigade in Shiraz how to conduct rifle squad training using the training

technique. These teams would be composed of Farsi-speaking officers and noncommissioned officers, drawn from General Kingston's forces at Fort Bragg. General Kingston is both Commandant of USAIMA, and Commander of the Special Forces there. Simultaneously, we would prepare the more elaborate armor/mech infantry version of REALTRAIN through the means of training LTC Stapleton, who will become in February the Adviser at the Armor Center, and providing him a demonstration team so that shortly after he establishes himself at Shiraz he can put on a demonstration for the IIGF commanders concerned. The purpose of both these demonstrations would be simply to show the training technique, and permit you to make up your own mind concerning the applicability of this technique to your army. The materiel involved in the simulation is all very inexpensive, and can either be procured commercially, or manufactured locally, with little difficulty. Our teams would be prepared to provide specifications, and to assist in obtaining the necessary materials.

You also expressed interest in the M31 artillery trainer. Patents for both the round and the barrel used in this training device are owned by the Dynamit-Nobel Company of West Germany, and, should IIGF decide to purchase any, would have to be obtained direct from the manufacturer. Before you make a decision to purchase we could show the U.S. adaptation of this material, and its use in our training. We could send you a demonstration team within three months. Based on that demonstration, IIGF could make its own decision concerning purchase.

We observed on our visit that most of your key trainers completed their schooling in the U.S. at least ten years ago. It is not surprising therefore that your Army is at least ten years behind the U.S. Army's training methods, and U.S. Army training support mechanisms. We would propose to you that you organize a visit to the U.S. for your key trainers. TRADOC would take steps to insure that their itinerary was carefully prepared to give them a thorough update of our system.

IIGF has a number of fine majors at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth this year. The Commandant at Fort Leavenworth has offered to establish a special elective in training management for any of the group for whom you may designate to receive such a course. We would hope that you would choose from among those majors at least two for assignment to the Training Support Center we have just described. If you would agree to do this, we could insure that the officers destined for the Training Support Center receive a special orientation on our training support mechanisms. (At this juncture, the question was raised whether the Iranians might send additional officers to Leavenworth to participate in the aforementioned electives. MG Gorman responded that if the arrangements for paying for the training could be worked out, TRADOC was willing to train the officers.)

It is important to emphasize in closing that none of the foregoing suggestions that we have made are worth adopting unless you adopt the

total system: the American training system is now performance-oriented, and depends upon a coherent, integrated system within which the service schools play a vital role. We are prepared to show you how to establish such a system within the IIGF. Some training aids may be useful in implementing that system, but the materiel is far less important than the concept. In our view, what you lack is mainly in the area of concept. Your materiel deficiencies are minor, and can be readily remedied. What you will find difficult, if your experience parallels our own, is in developing the ideas for trainers and if you are willing to profit from our experience, we can save you many years of experimentation.

IIGF SIGNAL SCHOOL

1. ACTIVITY VISITED: IIGF Signal School.

2. LOCATION: Tehran, Iran.

3. DATE OF VISIT: 5 October 1975.

4. TRAINING OBSERVED:

a. Signal officer's basic and advanced course.

b. A number of Signal Technical Courses.

5. OBSERVATIONS:

a. Most instruction was lecture type where instructors were supported with simple, hand-made training aids.

b. The Signal School will soon start training Motion Picture Photographers and Photo Lab Technicians (10 each per year).

c. The Signal School recently purchased a number of GAJON Model 101B basic electronics trainers. These appeared to be excellent training devices. They were purchased with instructor training, maintenance, and installation packages.

d. The Signal School will start, during the next training cycle, a television repair course. This will give IIGF a repair capability should they choose television as a standard audio-visual training format.

e. The Signal School recently moved into new buildings of modern design which will accommodate modern teaching technologies.

IIGF ARMOR SCHOOL

1. ACTIVITY VISITED: IIGF Armor School.
2. LOCATION: Shiraz, Iran.
3. DATE OF VISIT: 6 October 1975.
4. TRAINING OBSERVED: Full range of Armor officer and enlisted technical courses.
5. OBSERVATIONS:

a. The Armor School uses some sophisticated training devices, mostly associated with the British Chieftan Tank, i.e., the Ling-Miles Driver Trainer, Component Trainers and subcaliber devices. Some simple hand-made training devices seemed effective, but some more elaborate locally fabricated devices seemed to be of dubious training value:

- (1) Classrooms which revolve on salvaged tank turret rings.
- (2) System displays which illustrated multiple, complicated systems.

b. The IIGF inventory includes different models of armor equipment of different national origin. The school, therefore, trains specialists on selected items of equipment. For instance, a separate curriculum is taught for:

- (1) Chieftan turret mechanic.
- (2) Scorpion turret mechanic.
- (3) M60/M47 turret mechanic.

c. The Armor School has made a limited attempt to develop printed media to support unit training, but generally their publications:

- (1) Support resident instruction.
- (2) Are of poor printing quality.
- (3) Are not easily read.

d. Most audio-visual courseware was simple and hand-made.

e. The physical plant of the Armor School is outstanding.

IIGF INFANTRY SCHOOL

1. ACTIVITY VISITED: IIGF Infantry School.
2. LOCATION: Shiraz, Iran.
3. DATE OF VISIT: 6 October 1975.
4. TRAINING OBSERVED: Full range of infantry and enlisted courses.
5. OBSERVATIONS:
 - a. Simple, locally fabricated training devices and visual aids were in use.
 - b. Crew drills and other repetative exercises were very much a part of the curriculum.
 - c. The physical plant at the Infantry School is outstanding.

55TH AIRBORNE BRIGADE

1. ACTIVITY VISITED: 55th Airborne Brigade.
2. LOCATION: Shiraz, Iran.
3. DATE OF VISIT: 6 October 1975.
4. TRAINING OBSERVED: County Fair training on weapons systems/equipment, demolitions training, obstical course, and bayonette training.
5. OBSERVATIONS:
 - a. This is a highly motivated unit who's members train with enthusiasm. Officers conducted training. NCOs acted in a supporting role.
 - b. Crew drill and repeated weapons assembly/dissassembly (blindfolded in one case) accounted for a significant portion of the training observed.
 - c. The brigade has one TOW trainer. Additional TOW trainers are deemed necessary to provide the brigade constant access to this essential device.
 - d. BG Ghaffari, Cdr, 55th Abn Bde, seemed willing to embrace new training techniques and accept new training devices.

IIGF COMBAT SUPPORT TRAINING CENTER

1. ACTIVITY VISITED: IIGF Combat Support Training Center.
2. LOCATION: Tabriz, Iran.
3. DATE OF VISIT: 8 October 1975.
4. TRAINING OBSERVED: Officer and enlisted transportation, ordnance, quartermaster, and adjutant general training.
5. OBSERVATIONS:
 - a. The Combat Support Training Center seems to enjoy a lower priority for resources than the other service schools visited. Equipment and accommodations were more austere.
 - b. All school representatives presented lists of things required by their schools. These lists ran the gamut from training devices to housekeeping supplies.
 - c. Poor technical documentation was the most frequently expressed training problem. School representatives would prefer technical manuals written in Farsi, but would settle for English versions in most cases.
 - d. Both US and Russian graphic training aids (GTA) (flip charts) were in use. It is of interest that the Russians provide GTA in English, but do not translate them into Farsi. Russian technical documentation was reported as being particularly poor.