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
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*Internal Defense and the
Less Developed Countries*

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PAUL F. GORMAN

The great battlefield for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the whole southern half of the globe—Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East—the lands of the rising peoples. Their revolution is the greatest in human history. . . .

—John F. Kennedy (Special Message
to Congress on May 25, 1961)

Looking across Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House, the President can see statues to Kosciusko, the Polish military engineer; to von Steuben, the German expert on military organization and training; and to Lafayette and Rochambeau, the French strategists and commanders. It is possible that these reminders of the debt we owe to foreign military assistance during our own revolution have comforted those who have assumed responsibility for extending U.S. military assistance across the developing world—and each President since Franklin Roosevelt has committed American soldiers and resources to conflicts in Latin America, Asia, or Africa.

Jordon, Amos A., Jr. ed., Issues of National Security in the 1970's. New York: © Praeger, 1967. Pp. 126-150. Reprinted by permission.

Internal Defense and the Less Developed Countries

The Nature of Conflict

The future seems likely to be as stormy as, or stormier than, the past. The incidence of violence in the world does not appear to be declining. In February, 1958, there were in progress, world wide, twenty-three prolonged revolutionary wars, or insurgencies; in February, 1966, forty were being waged, including fourteen of the original twenty-three, and twenty-six other, similar wars. Over the intervening eight stormy years, there have been 164 internationally significant conflicts, involving eighty-two nations. Some 10 per cent of these conflicts were wars in the classic sense—overt clashes between conventional military forces of sovereign states. The other 90 per cent was divided almost equally between resorts to force in the political process within a state—primarily military coups d'état—and irregular or guerrilla wars. Virtually all of the 164 conflicts occurred in the developing nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa, afflicting roughly four out of five nations in those regions. The incidence of violence in these lands shows an upward trend:

ANNUAL INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE, WORLD WIDE*

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Conflicts per calendar year	34	35	42	43	47	59	56	58

In the fall of 1965, the World Bank published a study dividing 132 of the world's polities into four categories according to per capita gross national product. Relating the conflict data above to the World Bank figures, the following picture emerges:

* Based on data furnished by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense. Trends and figures in this and the following chart were cited by The Honorable Robert S. McNamara in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Montreal, Canada, on May 18, 1966.

WORLD POPULATION, WEALTH, AND VIOLENCE*

Category	Per Cent of World's Population	Per Cent of World's Gross National Product	Number of Conflicts	Per Cent of Countries Afflicted
Very Poor Countries	29.6	4.4	70	87
Poor Countries	34.5	8.3	84	69
Middle Income Countries	11.7	10.0		
Rich Countries	24.2	77.3	10	37

Less than one quarter of the world's people now produce more than three quarters of its goods, the 800 million "rich" producing seventeen times as much as the 1,000 million "very poor." Moreover, the concentration of the world's income in a few countries—mainly those of the northern hemisphere—is intensifying. A century ago, the richest quarter of the world's people produced half of its goods; fifty years ago, they produced about two-thirds; today, as noted, they contribute about three-fourths. It is not poverty per se, however, that drives men to political violence. The fabric of revolution is hope, not despair. Men must be aware of deprivation but aspire to change before they become political capital. One of the grave difficulties of our times is simply that it is ever easier to perceive the widening gap between the standards of living in the northern and southern hemispheres. In the remote regions of the Andes, in the African market place, in dusty villages all across Asia, transistor radios and movies open vistas of new worlds.

This revolution of awareness and hope lies at the heart of

* *Ibid.*, for conflict data. Wealth and population figures are from Escott Reid, *The Future of the World Bank* (Washington: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965), pp. 60-71.

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the security problems facing the nations of the southern hemisphere. Their dilemma is not simply that their population growth nearly outstrips their economic progress; they face immediate political crises because their people are demanding more of government and expecting more of life in a material way. Heightened popular awareness of the continued economic success of the United States or of the economic "miracles" in Germany, France, Italy, and Japan only adds to the urgency of the crisis.

Development efforts, up to the late-1960's, have clearly been inadequate. Population growth rates have continued to exceed estimates, and wars, rebellions, and the extension of the Cold War into the Southern hemisphere have attenuated expected progress. Frustration contributes to instability, and to disequilibrium spiraling grimly toward violence. It is clear, therefore, that the developing countries must

. . . accomplish deep-seated changes: in outlook, in social institutions, in economic organization. . . . The sheer bulk of the problems of underdevelopment—the number of mouths to be fed, the number of human beings to be maintained in decent shelter and gradually to be educated and made productive—continues to grow. If we do not begin to make faster progress in these matters, the prospect is for discontent, unrest and tensions that in the end must spill over national boundaries and ultimately infect the rich nations as well as the poor. . . . *

The development process characteristically involves urbanization and centralization of political life in the cities. Vivid contrasts are set up between life in the cities and in rural areas, and the urban areas attract people out of the countryside far beyond their capacity to shelter or employ them. Restive urban masses enter the political equation and rapidly become politicized. Uncoordinated and disproportionate growth occurs in politics, in the economy, and in society,

* George D. Woods (President, World Bank), Address to the Boards of Governors, International Finance Corporation and International Development Association, September 27, 1965, Washington, D.C.

creating groups of educated and expectant citizens who can find no satisfying employment; political parties headed by extravagant nationalist leaders who are chauvinistic and intolerant of internal opposition; secularization movements against orthodox religious ethics, customs, and organization, offering no replacing values; or a melding of any of the foregoing with ancient tribal, racial, or class antipathies.

The Role of the Military

In view of such explosive potential, the armed forces of these developing countries are of central importance. If the armies of these developing, threatened societies could be counted on to uphold governmental authority and to insure that the opportunity for peaceful change were held open, then the prospects for stability might seem brighter. But, as noted, nearly half of the violence visited upon the developing nations is attributable to actual or attempted coups. In the period 1958-66 there have been, on the average, eight of these a year. New nations are particularly vulnerable: Roughly half of the nations that came into being in 1958-66 experienced coups or mutinies. By early 1966, twenty-two of sixty-four non-Communist "poor" and "very poor" nations were ruled by soldiers.

Nonpolitical military establishments in the Anglo-American tradition are quite unknown in most of the developing world. For example, Asia's earliest encounters with the West were military, and its military establishments were intimately involved in the first steps toward Westernization. Japan's nationalism early acquired a militaristic hue, and, after the death of Sun Yat-sen and the emergence of Chiang Kai-shek, so did that of China. Mao's view that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"* sums up the Asian Communists' orientation. In South and Southeast Asia, only Malaysia,

* Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1954), II, 272.

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Singapore, and India have escaped dominance by soldiers. In the Islamic world, Ayub Khan of Pakistan, the Shah of Iran, and President Nasser of Egypt emulate Riza Shah Pahlavi and Kemal Ataturk—each a soldierly apostle of modernism, each ruling consistent with a millennium of Moslem politico-military tradition.

In Latin America, the seizure of political power by the military is virtually commonplace. Though extreme, Bolivia's record is not atypical; its military coup in 1964 was the 180th revolution in 138 years of nationhood. Military men occupied the presidency of Latin republics 28.7 per cent of the time in the decade 1917-27; 38.5 per cent in 1927-37; 49 per cent in 1937-47; and 45.5 per cent in 1947-57. In the period since 1958, military men have occupied the office of president less than 30 per cent of the time; in this sense one can note recent progress toward constitutionalism.* Nonetheless, by any standard, Latin America is in revolutionary ferment; with weak civil governments everywhere under severe stress, it is doubtful that military intervention in politics is permanently waning.

Sub-Saharan Africa is no exception to the general rule of a politicized military in the developing world. African military traditions are altogether different from those of Oriental, Islamic, or Iberian cultures. Yet Quincy Wright noted that, among the primitive peoples, war as an instrument of national policy was most highly developed in Africa, and Africans stood highest in his measure of "warlikeness." Some Western observers of African military institutions have hoped that the military professionalism formed during the colonial tutelage would preclude the development of praetorianism after nationhood. They have been increasingly disappointed, for the apolitical precepts of Europe have not conspicuously figured in the armies of the Sudan, Congo, Algeria, Gabon, Dahomey,

* For lists of presidents, see S. H. Steinberg, ed., *The Statesman's Yearbook 1964-1965* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1965). See also Ronald M. Schneider, "The U.S. in Latin America," *Current History*, XLVIII, No. 281 (January, 1965), 1-8, 50.

Central African Republic, Upper Volta, and Nigeria. Also frustrated was the hope that since national armies were virtually non-existent in Africa until the 1960's, African armed forces might be eliminated or limited in size and sophistication of armaments. But possession of a comparatively modern, effective army, however small, remains a mark of status that few of the newly sovereign nations have been willing to forego.

The Congo's unpopular, ill-trained, and poorly led and equipped Force Publique reiterated the dangers of a disaffected, rag-tag army; in 1960, in the absence of any other security force, it was able to terrorize the nation's political life and to influence leaders and events. Significantly, many of the leaders of the new nations have responded to this type of danger by quite deliberately seeking to integrate the army leadership into their political elite.

However repugnant military intervention in politics may be to Americans, it is a dominant fact in the developing world. Moreover, a reformist coup d'état may be the least of several political evils to which the process of modernization might lead in a given country. Most coups of recent years have purported to be progressive or even revolutionary, rather than conservative. The Turkish Army considered itself "guardian of the revolution"; Nasser saw his army as the revolutionary "vanguard." The Burmese Army took over public administration and entered the grocery business to counter "economic insurgents" among "unpatriotic" merchants, bureaucratic ineptitude in the civil service, and faltering civilian leadership. General Juan Carlos Onganía of Argentina, a key figure in Argentine politics long before assuming power in June, 1966, summed up these sentiments in 1964 as follows:

The armed forces are the right arm of the constitution. . . .

Let us talk without euphemisms. . . . This is the only dialogue appropriate among soldiers.

Obedience is due a government when its power is derived from the people, and for the people pursues the constitutional precepts set forth by the people. This obedience, in the last instance,

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is due to the constitution and to the law, and it should never be the result of the mere existence of men or political parties who may be holding office because of fate or circumstances.

It should, therefore, be clear that the duty of rendering such obedience will have ceased to be an absolute requirement if there are abuses in the exercise of legal authority that violate the basic principles of a republican system of government, when this is done as a result of exotic ideologies, or when there is a violent breakdown in the balance of independence of the branches of government, or when constitutional prerogatives are used in such a way that they cancel out the rights and freedoms of citizens.*

Yet, few competent American analysts have found much praiseworthy in the reign of soldier-politicians. Morris Janowitz, for example, states categorically that "it is most difficult, if not impossible, for the military to manage the politics of a nation in the process of rapid economic development."† Others vehemently condemn the politically transgressing military as foes of progress toward democracy, holding that the military act primarily from institutional self-interest, that frequent military coups d'état are symptomatic of a sick body politic.

Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that military institutions of the emerging nations are compatible with a progressive attitude toward social and economic change. Of its nature, the military profession requires an international orientation—the soldier who would provide for the security of his country must continually measure the opposition abroad, compare it with his own, and seek ways to improve his capability. In the modern era, this seeking often involves travel and education abroad. Moreover, in the military profession, rewards are demonstrably high for modernity, espe-

* Lt. Gen. Juan Carlos Onganía (Army of Argentina), "The Government, the Armed Forces, and the National Community," *Final Report—Conference of the American Armies* (West Point, N.Y.: USMA, 1964), pp. 166-79.

† Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Edition, 1964), p. 104.

cially in technology, and its practitioners tend to be receptive to innovation, especially technical reform. These often combine with the soldier's nationalism into a drive toward modernization in all sectors of society.

A nation's armed services are often its largest enterprise, and military professionals are therefore uniquely experienced in managing large amounts of manpower and sizable funds. These experiences often lead the military to become a developmental and educational arm of the state. Examples abound: Nearly all of South Korea's airline pilots, virtually all its operators of heavy construction equipment, and 80-90 per cent of its civilian motor vehicle operators and electronic technicians learned their basic skills during their military service; the Peruvian Army gives all its conscripts training in literacy, hygiene, and national history, and provides advanced vocational training to at least 1,600 conscripts annually; the Service Civique of the Ivory Coast teaches conscripts improved hut construction techniques and stock-breeding practices, and that of the Malagasy Republic organizes its conscript training as a prelude to homesteading.

In relatively primitive societies, the army is often the only national entity functioning in the society; in its ranks, wearing the nation's uniform, serving under the nation's flag, its citizens acquire meaningful ideas of national unity and dignity. This is not to hold that military service is necessarily always so beneficial. The stationing of rural conscripts in posts near large urban centers may teach farm boys the delights of city life, and thus add them upon discharge to the ranks of the urban unemployed. Not all armies, by any means, follow enlightened training programs. But armed forces can become, and in many developing nations have become, an important catalyst for social change.

Neither the political activity of armed forces in the emerging nations nor their socio-economic roles should obscure

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their traditional mission of providing security to the state against foreign and domestic enemies. As the conflict data given above indicates, about half of the violence in emerging areas has taken the form of insurgency or guerrilla warfare. Such warfare—combat operations conducted by predominantly irregular forces that utilize tactics of surprise, brief and violent action, and studied elusiveness to compensate for lack of military strength—has been historically the resort of the weak, especially the technologically disadvantaged. Its modern history has been written along the outer edges of all the nineteenth century empires: The French had to contend with Abd-el-Kadr of Algeria, the British with the wily Boer and Afghan, the Americans with Aguinaldo.

The Communists, who are now among the principal practitioners of guerrilla warfare, have transformed it in two respects: They have converted an essentially defensive form of conflict into an instrument of strategic offense, and they have integrated combat thoroughly with their political, economic, and social doctrine. Their successes in Asia against the Japanese and the French stemmed from an elaborate military doctrine, from the thoroughness with which their political cadres communicated this doctrine throughout rank and file, from the gigantic scale on which they conceived and executed their feats of human organization, and, above all, from the dedication they inspired in and the discipline they exacted from their guerrilla organization.

There are, of course, many guerrillas who are neither inspired nor led by Communists—revolutionists seeking to force social change and modernization, ethnic separatists attempting to carve out their own polities from multinational states, tribal autonomists or simple bandits resisting the authority of the state. (But even these types of guerrillas have learned from, and are often used by, professional revolutionaries.) It is not, however, these miscellaneous struggles, but guerrilla warfare conceived and conducted by the Communists as a deliberate instrument of strategic offensive that

is one of the foremost politico-military problems confronting the United States in the decade of the 1970's.

The stresses of modernization have created an environment admirably suited to guerrilla warfare all across the southern half of the globe. The Communists envisage frustrated and aspirant peoples as the terrain of their warfare, and the revolutionary literature of the Bolsheviks, the Maoists, the Viet-Minh, and the Fidelists comprise a coherent body of insurrectionary doctrine that seems particularly relevant to such peoples. It is, moreover, a complete doctrine, which instructs on every aspect of revolt, from choosing appropriate political and social objectives to converting a shotgun into an antitank weapon.

Students from the developing nations have been steeped in guerrilla lore in the Soviet Union, the Communist nations of Asia, and Cuba. Significant numbers have returned to their homelands as professional revolutionaries, each an incendiary of special peril for an igneous society. The doctrine seems well-nigh irresistible, and its aura of triumph, above all, is the special glow that attracts new adherents; by emulating Castro, the young Latin concludes he can be not only "macho" but victorious; by following Mao and Ho Chi Minh, the young political movement or the young nation can successfully defy the greatest powers in the world.

Assistance from the West

More often than not, developing nations originally sought military assistance from the northern hemisphere powers for reasons unrelated to guerrillas or to Communist subversion. Many new nations simply retained military affiliation with a metropole. Each usually had more conventional security problems—one or more traditionally hostile neighbors, or a history of recourse to arms in regional disputes. But as Chinese and Cuban adventurers have pressed their designs on the developing nations, those nations have become increas-

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ingly concerned with internal defense against subversive movements and guerrilla warfare, and have called for military assistance against these threats as well.

Interesting differences have developed in the style of military assistance offered to the developing nations. The British have, on the whole, been the most consistently successful, and their approach is characteristically a cool, "the natives are restless tonight" pragmatism. They have preferred to regard insurgents as outlaws and to treat anti-guerrilla campaigns as manhunts as much as military operations. The French have been relatively more doctrinaire and pretentious. They attributed global significance to their experience in Indochina and Algeria: Like Charles Martel at Tours they stood, shield of the West. They devised an elaborate doctrine, heavily influenced by Mao and Giap, for *guerre révolutionnaire*, or, as they frequently referred to it, *guerre subversive*. *La guerre révolutionnaire*, distinct from *la guerre classique* and *la guerre nucléaire*, was, in essence, a combination of counterinsurgency and psychological warfare. In its principal elaboration, it is a doctrine for total war waged without resort to weapons of mass destruction—warfare in which mercilessly calculated violence, subversion, terror, torture, and intense politicizing, especially of rural areas, are systematically employed by both sides. The French military's frustrations—which they interpreted not as a failure of the doctrine, but of French politicians—seared the soul of their army, figured in its revolts in 1958 and 1961, and will influence its point of view in treating guerrilla wars for years to come.*

The bench mark for serious U.S. involvement in assistance to defeat subversive aggression and insurgency was the year 1958. That was a year of momentous endings: Retirement for

* For the impact of *la guerre révolutionnaire* on the French Army, see, *inter alia*, Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); Raoul Girardet, "Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic," in Samuel Huntington, ed., *Changing Patterns of Military Politics* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and Jean Larteguy, *The Centurions* (New York: Avon Book Corp., 1962), and *The Praetorians* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1963).

the Navy's battleships, for the Air Force B-36—last of the propellor driven strategic bombers—and for the Army anti-aircraft guns. It was also a year of propitious beginnings: An Army rocket carried aloft America's first satellite, Navy nuclear submarines sailed beneath the polar icecap, the Air Force initiated the second generation of ICBM's, and the Joint Staff came into being in a major Defense Department reorganization. Probably none of these departures was so significant as the strategic precept announced in the summer of 1958 by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: Through propaganda, terror, agents, money, and arms for dissident minorities, one nation might destroy the independence of another; the U.S. would view such acts as inimical to its security, for, "if indirect aggression were to be admitted as a legitimate means of promoting international policy, small nations would be doomed, and the world would become one of constant chaos, if not war."*

Since then, in more than twenty nations of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, the United States has supplemented its post-World War II network of military alliances with explicit commitments—formalized by treaty or by unilateral declaration—to help defend against subversion. In a number of instances, these undertakings are more concrete than the assurances to the Republic of Viet-Nam that we have honored at great price.

Until the election of John F. Kennedy, the developing world remained largely peripheral for the U.S. military. Kennedy's interest and concern were quickly transmitted to the military. In early 1961, he announced that he was "directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially, in cooperation with our Allies, the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations and sub-limited or unconventional wars." In June,

* John Foster Dulles, Speech given before the National Convention of Veterans of Foreign Wars, on August 18, 1958; as reported in *The New York Times*, August 19, 1958, p. 12.

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1962, he told graduating West Point cadets that to counter "wars of liberation" we needed "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training." About a month later, speaking at the White House to graduates of a national interdepartmental seminar on counterinsurgency, he enjoined them to recognize that: "This is not merely a military effort . . . it requires . . . a broad knowledge of the whole development effort of a country, the whole technique of the National Government to identify themselves with the aspirations of the people. . . ."*

President Johnson continued President Kennedy's policies, and reported progress in a speech in June, 1964:

Our adversaries, convinced that direct attack would be aimless, today resort to terror, subversion and guerrilla warfare. To meet this threat we began a large effort to train special forces to fight internal subversion. Since January 1961 we have increased these specialized forces eight times. We have trained more than 100,000 officers in these techniques. We have given special emphasis to this form of warfare in the training of all military units. . . .

But just as subversion has many faces, our responses must take many forms. We have worked to increase and integrate all the resources, political and social as well as military and economic, needed to meet a threat which tears at the entire fabric of a society.

But success in fighting subversion ultimately rests on the skill of the soldiers of the threatened country. We now have 344 teams at work in 49 countries to train the local military in the most advanced techniques of internal defense. . . . We will continue to increase this strength until our adversaries are convinced that this course too will not lead to conquest.†

* President John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1962* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 535-36.

† President Lyndon B. Johnson, "U.S. Strength Continues Rapid Growth," Remarks at the Coast Guard Academy, New London, Conn., June 3, 1964; as quoted in the Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, (Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, AFRP 190-92), No. 8, July, 1964, p. 2.

Statistics on U.S. efforts to train the soldiers of the developing nations are impressive. From the formal inception of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1950 through 1960, only 85 U.S. training teams were deployed abroad for varying periods to instruct in counter guerrilla warfare and related subjects, and these were sent to only 14 countries. During 1965 alone, 364 teams were sent to 47 countries: The U.S. Army alone dispatched 179 teams—including 81 to Latin America, 79 to Africa and the Middle East, and 19 to the Far East; the U.S. Air Force sent out 123 teams; and the U.S. Navy, 62 teams. Also during 1965, the U.S. provided formal school courses to more than 15,000 foreign military professionals. These data do not reflect the activities of the nearly 10,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in developing countries with full-time assignments of providing advice and training to professional colleagues on the job; nor do they reflect material assistance, which amounted to about one billion dollars to the developing countries in the fiscal year 1965.* These undertakings—advisory and training missions, and material support—are a historically significant extension of the roles of the U.S. armed services.

It is difficult to measure with any precision the results achieved to date with our military assistance programs in influencing the roles of foreign armed forces in their own societies. Opponents of military assistance programs frequently suggest that U.S. military aid causes or encourages political intervention by assisted armed forces. The record does not support such concern, and those who work most closely with the military aid problem—our ambassadors

* For training team data, see Maj. Gen. W. R. Peers, USA, *Presentation to Delegates, Fourth Annual Senate Youth Program*, January 26, 1966 (Washington: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1966), p. 11; for military personnel, see U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Assistance Facts* (Washington: Dept. of Defense, 1965), p. 31. The data on formal school courses and material assistance were compiled from information available in the U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, *Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, Hearings* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 78.

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abroad and U.S. officers administering the programs—are generally convinced that U.S. training and advice have aided importantly in moderating the political ideas of foreign officers and in influencing their behavior in constructive ways. Moreover, American assistance is extended only with the firm support of American civilian officials overseas, and with the full approval of incumbent governments, who evidently do not perceive it as a political threat. Indeed, since 1960, there have been at least six publicized occasions on which MAP-supported forces have protected their governments from attack by factions within its armed services.

Coups can, of course, be perpetrated by relatively small and militarily weak groups, since success is less a function of amounts of arms or equipment than of political perception and timing. Most modern coup attempts reflect not the size of the coup forces—these will usually exist in sufficient strength for a coup in any event—nor the amount of foreign aid, but the political stability and probity of the government. Moreover, most of these contemporary coups seem to have been popularly acclaimed; few of them can be attributed to the depravity or ambition of a military officer or clique.

American military aid policy can be credited at least partially with the broader interest taken by foreign armies in forwarding social and economic progress. "Civic action"—as the U.S. terms such undertakings—has not loomed large in the American military assistance budgets: Something like 1 per cent per annum has been usual. Civic action has, however, been an objective the U.S. has sought with whatever influence it could wield as a result of other assistance. The results have, by and large, been encouraging.

President Johnson's foreign aid message of February, 1966, typically called for military assistance with:

Greater emphasis on civic action programs. We shall give new stress to civic action programs through which local troops build schools and roads, and provide literacy training and health services. Through these programs, military personnel are able

to play a more constructive role in their society, and to establish better relations with the civilian population. . . .*

These nation-building efforts of the armed forces—helpful as they may be—cannot, of course, provide a nation's main developmental thrust. If the social and economic ills that so often underlie movement toward either Communist insurgency or praetorianism are to be wiped out, a much broader and more intensive development campaign is needed than the armed forces can mount. In that context, other instruments of American foreign policy—such as economic assistance, surplus foodstuffs, and private capital flows—come into play.

Areas for Improvement

Looking to the future, it is clear that, despite laudable objectives and considerable progress in their achievement, U.S. military assistance to the armed forces of developing nations can be markedly improved, especially in the areas of personnel management, doctrine, materiel, and organization.

Personnel. Except for the advisory group in Viet-Nam, military duty in the developing nations has not been regarded as either important or rewarding by the “main line” U.S. officer. The kind of person needed is well understood. At the 1965 meeting of the Association of the United States Army, the presentation of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations stipulated that:

Personnel who are assigned to such operations and activities must be military professionals, who know and respect technical competence and professional status . . . understand, appreciate and respect his hosts . . . their values, attitudes, and convictions, and what place they and their army hold in their own political process, economy, and social dynamics. Such an understanding may in many instances necessitate a command of the

* President Lyndon B. Johnson, “Message to the Congress of the United States (Foreign Aid Message),” February 1, 1966, in *ibid.*, p. 358.

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language, and thorough study of the history, culture, and politics of the particular country. . . .*

Yet such duty has not enjoyed a suitably high priority. Symptomatic of this fact has been the scarcity of linguistically competent officers for assignment to key overseas positions. Ethiopia, for example, is a nation in which the U.S. has substantial security interests, to which limited military assistance has been flowing for more than a decade, and in which active military operations against insurgents were in progress during 1965, but at that time all branches of the U.S. armed services together had less than ten officers capable of speaking any Amharic.† Personnel management has placed numerous considerations of career development ahead of competence to advise the armed forces of particular countries. The inertia of three wars and two generations of oceanic and Europe-centered military policy, plus Congressional and public misunderstanding of the U.S. role in Latin America, Africa, and Asia—all these have acted to impede reform.

Doctrine. The skimpiness of military doctrine relevant to the roles and missions of armed forces in the developing nations has also been a prime contributor to the paucity of relevant military professionalism in our assistance programs. The counterinsurgency doctrine of the United States rests on dubiously slender appreciation of guerrilla operations in World War II and Korea, and postwar counterinsurgency experiences, especially those in Greece, Malaya, Indochina, Algeria, and the Philippines. The U.S. military profession has contributed comparatively little to its elaboration or further development. What professional energy has been expended has largely been a futile sifting of the same facts for universal

* Brig. Gen. R. C. Taber, USA, "The Army's Role in Stability Operations," Presentation to the Association of the U.S. Army, October 23, 1965 (typed manuscript).

† Department of Defense, *Study of Foreign Language Training Provided for Department of Defense Personnel and their Dependents—Worldwide* (Washington: Defense Language Institute, 1964), Annex A.

principles that might spark a better military doctrine—"force ratios," theories on "border closing," "population control" and the like—because this mode of analyzing conventional war was pursued successfully by Jomini, Clausewitz, and Mahan. Conventional war is homogeneous and symmetrical, in that the combatant forces resemble each other in composition and function, and each pursues the destruction of the other. Useful general guidelines can and have been written for the interaction of conventional forces. The violence prevalent in the developing areas, however, is generally neither homogeneous nor symmetrical, for one protagonist is usually a government, the other an antigovernment, not at all comparable in size, organization, or function. Whether the dissidents base their power within the army or elsewhere in the community, their objective is the polity. The form and pace of the conflict, therefore, vary according to the character of the incumbent regime and the afflicted society.

Too often, Americans have tended to assume that U.S. doctrine, organization, and training methods were sufficient models for all armies, and that our own preparedness for conventional or nuclear war conferred on us ample capability for coping with "lesser" forms of conflict—and for advising others how to do so. Experiences in South Viet-Nam in the mid-1960's have driven home hard lessons on the vacuity of this view, but they have stimulated a new body of doctrine and techniques that is also inapplicable to most impoverished nations. Our massive application of modern communications, firepower, and aerial vehicles to counter guerrillas may result in military successes, but these are technically complicated and expensive solutions beyond the financial and technological resources of most developing nations.

Appropriateness aside, the United States has yet to develop military doctrine for this genre of warfare as extensive as that for nuclear and conventional war. This lacuna is evident, for example, in the curricula of Army schools:

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EMPHASIS ON FORMS OF WARFARE*

By Percentage of Curricular Hours in Selected
U.S. Army Professional Schools
Fiscal Year 1965

Career Courses ^a	Nuclear	Conventional	Insurgency
Infantry	35	30	35
Armor ^b	11	79	3
Artillery ^b	21	70	3
Engineer ^b	8	21	15
Intelligence	8	87	5
Command and General Staff College ^{b c}	34	22	5

^a Professional (branch) education for Captains and Majors, usually of some 35 weeks duration.

^b Course includes other technical subjects not categorized under "forms of war."

^c Professional education for selected Captains through Lieutenant Colonels, about 36 weeks duration.

These schools are not only the schools that train U.S. advisers to foreign armies, but they are also the schools foreign officers attend. For many a foreign army, for instance, a diploma from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College represents the apex of professional education. But how relevant is that college's curriculum to the professionalism required by an Ethiopian officer, a Liberian, a Bolivian, or a Thai? Recognizing our own doctrinal poverty, are we not perhaps as likely to learn from foreign officers how to combat insurgency as we are to teach them? Indeed, is insurgency amenable to the same sort of doctrinal generalizations as are other forms of war, or do its political, economic, cultural, and environmental dimensions warrant different development? These are all questions to which the American military profession has, thus far, found few really satisfactory answers.

* U.S. Department of the Army, *Report of Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Draft (December, 1965) Annex D, Appendix 14, p. 7.*

Materiel. That American air and naval equipment is generally sophisticated beyond the needs and abilities of most developing nations is probably evident, but the proposition holds even for infantry gear. The design criteria for equipment for American forces do not necessarily yield items useful to other armed forces. Structural complexity, difficulty in training personnel to operate and maintain the equipment, and the necessity for extensive spare parts availability increasingly limit the transfer of standard U.S. equipment to developing nations. Helicopters are an example of this kind of problem.

Frequently American equipment is simply over-designed for the needs of other countries. Standard U.S. infantry battalion radios, for example, while comparatively simple and rugged, are designed to minimize interference with other sets in an electronically dense environment and to maximize security from enemy intercept and jamming. In the Asian or Latin American environment, these features are often useless, especially since they render the radios unequal to the distances over which many foreign infantry battalions must normally operate. In addition, foreign armies often need materiel the U.S. services simply do not stock; an example is the armored car, long since dropped as a U.S. standard item, but properly still in much demand throughout Africa and Asia.

There are undoubtedly many items or refinements of existing items suitable for use in less-developed countries, which might be produced by American research and development, but for which no U.S. military requirement has been stated and for which there is hence no effective demand. Finding a modality for bringing the inventiveness of American technology to bear more systematically on the military problems facing these nations through coherent research, development, and production programs could significantly enhance the efficiency of our assistance programs.

Organization. Military assistance, especially in the developing nations, is a highly political operation, which demands the

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closest attention of the Department of State. It is, however, administered by the Department of Defense. It is treated legislatively and budgetarily separate from other defense programs, despite the fact that it is deemed a key contribution to U.S. security: Secretary McNamara has regularly testified that he would prefer to see his own budget reduced before MAP was cut. Within the defense establishment, responsibility is exercised by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, and the Unified Commands—not the military services. But personnel management, military doctrine, and materiel development are all matters otherwise handled largely within the military departments, by the separate services.

However well suited this complex of arrangements may have been as long as MAP consisted essentially of a mechanism to transmit materiel to nations with security problems and capabilities similar to those of the U.S.—as was the case in the 1950's and early 1960's—its continuance as a means of assisting the developing nations needs serious re-examination. Not only have such arrangements dissociated the military assistance program from natural support among government agencies and within the Department of Defense, but they have also precluded strategic articulation between MAP and other long-range U.S. strategic planning. The MAP stepchild must be reared under far different and more changeable rules than any other defense program.

Of all the U.S. armed services, the Army has the greatest stake in finding a satisfactory solution to the problems sketched above. Armies dominate the security establishments of the developing nations, and usually play a highly significant political, social, and economic role in their society. Among the U.S. armed services, the Army conducts nearly 90 per cent of the schooling for foreign military students, provides approximately 75 per cent of all the personnel and equipment supporting civic action world wide, annually deploys overseas the preponderance of U.S. training teams, and furnishes three

out of four officers serving in embassies, MAAGs, and Missions in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.* Moreover, the Army's experience in Viet-Nam has lent new urgency to its search for ways to help other armies help themselves.

The situation in Viet-Nam as of the late 1960's has cast dark shadows of doubt on all American military involvement in the less developed nations. A fundamental choice lies ahead. The nation can heed those who recount the genuine imperfections of past assistance as proof of American impotence in aiding militarily a nation attacked from within; those who invoke the immensity of the crises pending in the developing world as a reason for cutting off American military aid lest it lead to further costly ensnarement; those who cite U.S. missile and sea power as a sufficient contribution to world security and argue for disengagement from the lands and peoples of Asia and Africa. We can heed all these and draw back from our far-flung outposts to await the future with foreboding, or we can hold to the course pursued by every President since the 1940's—using the power and wealth of the United States to assist the evolution of a world community of culturally diverse, independent, peaceful, and cooperating nations. We can do so assured that, while not limitless, the wealth of the U.S. is considerable and growing, and that if the fraction of our national product invested in all

* These figures were computed from data obtained from the following:

DA General Staff, "Foreign Military Assistance," Congressional Fact Paper, CFP-ODCSOPS-13, November 15, 1965; *Foreign Assistance . . .*, pp. 358, 894; Col. Edwin F. Black, USA, "Dragons Teeth of Freedom," *Military Review*, XLIV, No. 8 (August, 1964), 25; Paul C. Davis and William T. R. Fox, "U.S. Military Representation Abroad," in Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., ed., *The Representation of the United States Abroad* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 181; U.S. Department of the Army, General Staff, "Personnel Assigned to MAAGs, Missions, and Embassies," Disposition Form, DCSOPS to DCSPER, and Comments 2, 3 and 4 thereto (December 9, 1964); U.S. Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools, Annex D, Appendix 14, p. 16; *Military Assistance Facts*, p. 30; Theodore R. Vallance and Charles D. Windle, "Cultural Engineering," *Military Review*, XLII, No. 12 (December, 1962), 60-64.

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types of foreign assistance were restored to what it was in the late 1950's, there would be an enormous increase in the funds available to pursue this course. We can do so assured that the scientific, technological, and industrial strength of this country would not only help buttress the free world's walls against Communist aggression but also help build the solid foundations of economic and social growth needed to stabilize the developing nations.

We should not, indeed cannot, suppress or help others suppress the instability that is a natural concomitant of development; nor, when that instability occasionally generates internal violence, should we intervene. Samuel Huntington has rightly argued:

Even in the United States, the process of modernization required the largest war of the century between 1814 and 1914. The likelihood that the nations of southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America will modernize their social and economic life without violent political dislocations seems relatively remote. Economic and social change requires political change. Without the constitutional tradition of peaceful change some form of violence is virtually inevitable.*

But we cannot expect the Communists to forego the temptation to try to turn developmental instability to their own ends. The "Rockefeller Report" of 1958 identified "concealed wars" as one of the more difficult problems facing the nation.

These conflicts raise issues with which, in terms of our preconceptions and the structure of our forces, we are least prepared to deal. The gradual subversion of a government by concealed foreign penetration is difficult to deal with from the outside, even though the fate of millions may depend upon it. . . . Our security and that of the rest of the non-Communist world will hinge importantly on our willingness to support friendly governments in situations which fit neither the soldier's

* Samuel P. Huntington, *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*, p. 39.

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classic concept of war nor the diplomat's traditional concept of aggression.*

In sum, the task confronting us in the less developed world is an exceedingly complex and formidable one—a task we have not yet adequately geared ourselves to handle in terms of preparing people, devising programs, generating resources, developing doctrine, or building organizations. Yet our success or failure in helping our friends in the less developed nations to succeed is likely to determine, in the long run, the success or failure of our own way of life.

* *International Security, The Military Aspect, Rockefeller Brothers Fund* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1958), p. 24.

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This striking failure [England in 1640, France in 1789, and Russia in 1917] on the part of the rulers to use force successfully is not, however, likely to be an isolated and chance phenomenon.... Long years of decline have undermined the discipline of the troops, bad treatment has given the private soldiers a common cause with civilians, the officers have lost faith in the conventional and stupid military virtues. There is no co-ordinating command, no confidence, no desire for action. Or if there are some of these things, they exist only in isolated individuals, and are lost among the general incompetence, irresolution, and pessimism.

—Crane Brinton