

SEVENTH ARMY BRIEFING FOR CINCUSAREUR, General Bruce Clark
by
Lt. Gen. Garrison Davidson, Commander, Seventh Army
and
Major Paul Gorman, Seventh Army Staff

December 1960

Lieutenant General Davidson:

[Addressing General B.C. Clarke, CINCUSAREUR] I am glad to have the opportunity to talk to you this morning, because I feel that the Seventh Army is nowhere near as combat ready, as it stands, as it should be. Further, I feel that the circumstances under which we are conducting our training is undermining the moral fiber of our officers and our noncommissioned officers, and is preventing us from carrying out our responsibility to our junior commanders. When I first started my round of visits last summer, invariably I got the impression that there were circumstances that did not permit us to carry out our mission of combat readiness as we agreed that we should.

Last September I received a letter from one of the professors at West Point in which there was enclosed a letter from a young graduate over here in USAREUR recounting certain experiences that he had run into here, and pointing the finger at the fact that he felt that he didn't want to serve a country where honor was no longer being properly observed in its military. When he objected to his commanders about the experiences he had, they said that this was the way we operated, and that complaining would do no good. He was advised that if he persisted, he would be a threat to no one but himself. This letter did provide indication of certain deficiencies that I had suspected. So I asked my IG to select some of the newly assigned officers in my headquarters who have recently come from troop units. I told him to go down and question these people about interfering with training, command inspections, and the like, to get a consensus of opinion as to whether the circumstances that this young man had related were in fact true. Almost half of these captains and majors did in fact verify these circumstances did exist. This confirmed my suspicions.

When I held my commanders conference in the early part of November, this became a matter of major discussion over a period of almost a full day. As a result of that discussion, I sent two letters to my commanders on the subject of integrity, on decentralization of responsibilities, and the question of clarification of missions. At the same time, I also told the commanders to canvas their chain of command, starting at the bottom, to find out exactly what circumstances existed that affected honor. In this anticipation, I immediately set up a meeting in December, with my two corps commanders and my chief of staff. That meeting was held on December 8th, and what I have to present to you today represents the unanimous and enthusiastic opinion of the command chain of Seventh Army.

I consider that the situation that exists at this time must be corrected. We are willing to take certain actions at our headquarters. But there are certain actions that can be taken only depending on the outcome of this conference with you. Tomorrow, Colonel Zais, my G3, is going to make a similar presentation to your command conference in the time that is allotted to us. I thought it would be advisable for me to tell you prior to that conference exactly what we had in mind, and what was bothering me. As background for you I have asked Major Gorman, of my office, to go through a list of talking points here which will orient you on circumstances as we see them. Then I am going to follow with my recommendations as to what I think we ought to do about these circumstances.

Major Gorman: General Clarke, I was part of a team who recently completed a staff study on that part of the problem outlined by General Davidson that has to do with the training with which commanders of battalion or lower level units are most directly concerned.

In USAREUR today, those commanders must translate training policy into a training program in terms of allocating a definite number of hours to scheduled training. We have studied training schedules for units as units, and for individual soldiers in those units, for some time, and we have reached certain conclusions. For example, we find, sir, that if we were to represent, graphically, the total annual requirements for training imposed on commanders in Seventh Army, and then compare the required hours with the time actually available to commanders for scheduling and conducting training, they compare like this:

THE TRAINING PROBLEM

★ 1. SCHEDULING


WHAT SUBJECTS
WHEN
WHERE

2. EFFECTIVE MAN-HOURS

WHO TRAINS WITH UNITS

3. TRAINING POLICY

PROGRAM CONTROL
TIME IN MAJOR TRAINING AREA
MAJOR FTX
TRAINING TESTS



There is a disparity between what the commander is expected to do, and the time that is available for him. Moreover, those commanders, in their effort to match training program with the available time, have to meet priority command missions other than tactical training. To perform those missions, they cut required tactical training, especially that for individual soldiers at home station. As a result, the individual soldiers in Seventh Army are receiving 50 percent of the training that they should receive annually in their units — 50 percent of the advanced individual training that they ought to get. But let me show you how we derived those figures.

Our study method was based on a sampling of actual units in the Seventh Army. We took a group of typical combat units and put them under scrutiny. To explain the approach that we used, I am going

to refer to a study of one unit in some detail, the examination of an armored rifle battalion that we conducted. We set this problem for ourselves:

In order to solve the problem, we put ourselves in the role of the commander of that armored rifle battalion. We used the records of an actual armored rifle battalion, and in effect we executed a training estimate, using data from about a year ago. The first step in performing the estimate obviously was to make a list of the training requirements that we would have to accomplish.

The commander's first discovery is that his training requirements proceed in general from five sources or categories. The first is the **Seventh Army training directive**, or its divisional derivative. In the second category, **Command Responsibility**, is the time that the commander had to allocate in order to meet his responsibilities to his equipment in terms of scheduled maintenance, and to provide for his soldiers time for personnel processing, parade, reviews, or other morale sustaining activities. Also, time had to be set aside for any command mission for special demonstrations, hosting marksmanship matches, and the like. I'll come back to this category of scheduling requirements, and discuss it in some detail later on. In the third category is **infantry training** any commander of that arm anywhere in the world should conduct every year. The fourth category is the emergency training that he should accomplish in order to prepare his unit for **EUCOM missions** under atomic conditions today. The fifth category, **leadership**, speaks for itself.

Having identified sources of requirements, it is possible to make a listing of specific subjects for training, and opposite each subject to supply an hour value for time to be scheduled to train.

When we executed our study, we adopted as our rule for determining that hour value the most conservative figure possible, making the assumption that the training would be conducted with absolute efficiency. That is, the instruction would be perfect, and it would be unnecessary, therefore, to repeat the training, and that in the minimal number of hours assigned, each instructor could get across his subject. We did this deliberately so that we could develop a conservative picture of the total number of hours of training that would be required. When the lists were totaled up, we could

STUDY THE SCHEDULING OF A TRAINING YEAR FOR AN 
TO DETERMINE ITS EFFECTIVENESS:
-IN READYING UNIT FOR COMBAT
-IN DEVELOPING CONFIDENT, SELF-RELIANT JUNIOR LEADERS

SOURCES OF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

1. TRAINING CIRCULAR 20-1 OR DERIVATIVES.
2. DEFINITIONS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN ARs, USAREUR CIRCULARS, ETC.
3. ARM'S TRAINING PROGRAM.
4. EMERGENCY MISSION.
5. PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF NCO AND OFFICERS.

HOURS TRAINING REQUIRED-SCHEDULED
TOTAL: 3216 2416

1. 7A CIR 20-1: 621 356
2. CMD RESPONSIBILITY: 1497 1477
3. ARM'S TNG PROGRAM: 870 583
4. EMERGENCY MISSION: 228 0

TRAINING YEAR				
	HOURS AVAILABLE	HOURS REQUIRED	HOURS DEFICIT	% DEFICIT
HOME STATION	1584	2341	757	48
MAJOR TNG AREA	832	875	43	5
	2416	3216	800	33

compare hours required for training with hours available. The comparison for the year is as shown: on the left you see the hours that are available. This takes into account the holidays, and the paydays, broken down by the time the unit spends in at home station, and the time it spends in Grafenwöhr or Hohenfels. You will note that there is, in red, a 48 percent disparity between the home station requirement for time

available in one annual cycle. In the MTA, the disparity drops to 5 percent the annual average is 33 percent total overcommitment. This shortage of training time puts the commander into a distinct quandary, because he knows that his training schedule must provide time for activities other than training in tactical subjects. In short his deficit will really be much worse than these figures show. In particular, the commander knows that there will be large, invulnerable requirements coming out of the second source of training time requirements, **Command Responsibility**, on which he will have little flexibility. To allocate time, to schedule the hours to support these missions, he has to make a further careful inventory of the hedge time he will need to provide.



Here is the list from that actual battalion. He needs to allocate another 1000 hours or so. To be realistic, he ought to hedge that by another 10% to take care of VIP visits and demos, and extra work to get ready for inspections. If his unit is unfortunate enough to catch one of the big unit taskings listed on the lower right, he will need another 3 to 12 weeks of time.

The commander thus discovers that for six months out of the year, the primary mission for his unit is something other than tactical training. It is preparation for, and conducting inspections; it is preparing for a marksmanship event; it is the staging of a demonstration; or some activity other than tactical training. In taking a look at this category of requirements, the commander can quickly and definitely identify that portion of time that he must set aside in his programming. And it is this 1200 hours or so here [points to the sum of 1062 and 120].

This is the amount that he must set aside to support command activities at home station, out of a total of 1584 hours available for scheduling at home station.

INVULNERABLE SUBJECTS		HOME STATION SPECIAL EVENTS	
SUBJECT	HOURS AT HOME STATION	HOURS	ACTIVITY
*CO & BN INSPECTIONS (3 HOURS/WEEK)	120	12	VIP DEMON
		6	CG INSP
		24	CMH (8 HRS EXTRA/3 WKS)
*COMMAND MAINTENANCE INSPECTION (4 HOURS PREP; 2 DAYS INSP)	20	6	7TH ARMY CG VISIT
		28	AGI (8 HRS EXTRA/2 WKS) (12 HRS EXTRA/1 WK)
*ANNUAL GENERAL INSPECTION (20 HOURS PREP; 2 DAYS INSP)	36	12	VIP DEMON
		6	VIP DEMON
*SPECIAL EVENTS	112	6	CG DEPART
		10	CG ARRIVE
GUARD, DETAIL & MAINTENANCE (20 WKS-1 DAY/4 DAYS; 20 WKS-1 DAY/8 DAYS)	328	8	G-A DAY
		120	WIRINUM
*UNIT MAINTENANCE (8 HOURS/WEEK)	320		
READINESS TESTS	10		
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION	10		
CEREMONIES (3 HOURS/MONTH)	30		
TROOP MOVEMENTS (5 MOVES - 1 DAY/MOVE) (3 MOVES - 1 1/2 DAY/MOVE)	76		
TOTAL	1062		
*SUBJECT TO COMMAND PRESSURE			
			DIVISION UNIT
			MAJOR HOST OR DEMON REQ
			ENTIRE BN TIME
		7 WEEKS	PRIX LECLERC HOST
		12 WEEKS	TANK GUNNERY SHOOT
		3 WEEKS	MAJOR AREA DEMON
		3 WEEKS	MAJOR AREA DEMON
		3 WEEKS	GUEST OBS BUREAU CADRE

METHODS OF CUTTING SCHEDULED HOURS

1. TRAIN OUTSIDE OF SCHEDULED HOURS
2. SCHEDULE AS INTEGRATED OR CONCURRENT TRAINING
3. ELIMINATE NON-MANDATORY SUBJECTS
4. REDUCE MANDATORY SUBJECTS TO MINIMUM DEFENSIBLE LEVELS
5. DROP BY ASSUMING REQUIRED LEVELS OF PROFICIENCY


find the time to train their soldiers to pass it. The interesting thing about that list is that as one proceeds down through it, the commander enters more and more into an area in which he is engaged in some sort of professional delusion. He is deluding himself, he is deluding his subordinates, and he is deluding the command. Ultimately the schedule reflects time available rather than ability to perform mission.

Utilizing all of these methods of cutting, he can come up with a training program, which both fixes the time available to him for scheduling, and fulfills his obligation in terms of his mission. Here is an analysis of that program that we were talking about. Yellow denotes requirement, red what actually appeared in some fashion on the unit's training schedule. You will note that in terms of the second category of the invulnerable requirements the commander guarded his time pretty well. He eliminated Emergency Mission training altogether because he is only expects to accomplish a minimum amount of tactical training anyways, and as this is a pretty advanced subject for which there is not much point in scheduling at all. Moreover, it does not appear on anybody's training records anywhere. We took analysis of this program a bit further, and looked at it in terms of Advanced Individual Training, Basic Unit Training, and Advanced Unit Training. The lower set of figures show that 45% of the AIT the unit should have scheduled for its soldiers was just not there. The BUT figure looks pretty good, but in our analysis, we attributed most of Home Station scheduled training to Basic Unit Training, and we know that consists of mostly non-tactical training or administrative activities. Advanced Unit Training, on the whole, turned out very well. The unit accomplished most of what AIT it should have gotten in, almost all of it at the MTA; the drawback is that MTA time is perforce centrally managed.

But the commander still has to reconcile his growing training program deficit, in order to match his schedule to the time available. We found that commanders did that by whacking back training requirements by some or all of the means shown left. When we say training outside of 50 scheduled hours we meant simply that company commanders will know that battalion will schedule a PT test, and that they will have to

HOURS TRAINING					
REQUIRED-SCHEDULED					
TOTAL: 3216 2416					
1. 7A CIR 20-1:		621	356		
2. CMD RESPONSIBILITY:		1497	1477		
3. ARM'S TNG PROGRAM:		870	583		
4. EMERGENCY MISSION:		228	0		
ADVANCED	BASIC	ADVANCED			
INDIVIDUAL	UNIT	UNIT			
TRAINING	TRAINING	TRAINING			
963	433	1897	1660	356	323
45%	88%	91%			


When we got to this part in our study, the figure on the lower left under Advanced Individual Training unit appalled us, and made us wonder if we had skewed the results somehow. Fortunately, we by then had available to us a number of parallel studies of other types of units, which when we compared them, pretty well bore out the specifics that emerged from our examination on the armored rifle battalion. In terms of Advanced Individual Training, 60 % scheduled for the tankers, compared with the Armored Rifle Battalion's 45%.



armored infantry battalion training program. Again note that the big shortfalls remain AIT and Tactical Training in general.

Here is another comparison, in which we examined the same two units plus an Infantry Battle Group and an Engineer counterpart. The figures report the deficit, that is, the difference between what is required and what is scheduled. You will note across the board the total deficits were within in a few percentage points from one another. These figures suggest, that while there may be some points of important differences among these type units, there is quite a distinct similarity in their training management.

To eliminate the difficulty we encountered in accounting for Command Responsibility activities, we then compared the ARB and Armor Bn programs further using two categories we invented. What we call Tactical Training here is all the training requirements related to battle readiness that were previously identified, whether AIT, BUT, or AUT, from whatever source. Combat Readiness Training is that Tactical Training plus scheduled maintenance time, figuring in the time required to keep equipment ready for war, vice available for inspection. We can now get a better comparison of how an armor battalion training program compares with an



Here is another comparison for you to note. This is the total deficit for a group of units in Seventh Army, represented among which are both of the corps, and three of the five divisions. On the average, there were 1/3 more training requirements than there were training hours to be scheduled.



From these statistics, we proceeded to analyses. What do the statistics mean? As we considered it sir, these are two main points that one should emphasize about them. The first point is that the commodity which is in shortest supply in Seventh Army training is not gasoline, it's not CBR equipment, it's not even training areas. The commodity that is in shortest supply is training time.



Literally we suffer in Seventh Army from too many good programs, we have too many fine things to do. If you were to take any one of the activities listed in our study, you would find it difficult to argue with it. They are all worthwhile programs, but there are too many of them for the unit commander to handle. The unit commander is forced to be in the business of establishing a

priority among essentials, looming foremost among which are those invulnerable, imposed time-consumers over which he exerts little or no control. Any additional programs, that is any time requirement based upon unanticipated missions, requires him to strip from his already inadequate program some essential piece of tactical training. We feel very definitely after completing this study, that the training policy that has been enunciated by Seventh Army should at least assist this commander in protecting tactical priorities.



The next point that emerges from our training study is the contrast between Advanced Individual Training and the Advanced Unit Training. In Seventh Army, as you know, we have a magnificent program of Advanced Unit Training. But statistically, we are conducting this Advanced Unit Training with half-trained individual soldiers. Our study suggests that the efficiency of this Advanced Unit Training is attenuated by a factor that is at least proportional to the fact that people who are taking it are only half trained. If a higher command directs additional field training exercises, it

may improve Advanced Unit Training. However, it thereby also causes commanders at lower levels further to cut their Advanced Individual Training, and those commanders find themselves engaged in a spiral downward of overall training efficiency. Most important, however, the commander at a lower echelon may not have a statistical appreciation of his problem in the terms that I just gave them to you, but he does have a definite sense that his soldiers are not getting the training they need. How can we expect those soldiers to develop into the self-reliant, completely competent individuals we are looking for on the modern battlefield?

Units in Seventh Army spend one quarter of their time, 25 percent of their time in the MTA. Because at the MTA they train very intensively for 12 hours a day, actually 33 percent, or one third of all training that is scheduled and conducted annually in Seventh Army, takes place in the MTA. But two thirds, 67 percent, of all the tactical training we get under our belt, is during MTA time. Now, this means that we have a good part of our training money riding on the short period of time, one quarter of the year, that units are at the MTA. If any thing happens to pull the unit from training, the unit commander sustains a serious blow to his overall training program. I mean by that such perturbations as a large personnel turnover; I mean such things as a major firepower demonstration. Anyone of those can cause a commander to face virtual ruination of what he was attempting to accomplish by way of tactical training.

Moreover, sir, when a unit is at a major training area, training this intensively, it perforce adopts a degree of centralization of training which is the exact opposite of the sort of training environment we would like our junior leaders to encounter. When an armored division, for example, is training at Grafenwöhr, it is literally impossible for a platoon leader to move his platoon on a tank trail without getting a road clearance from Range Control.

Units of Seventh Army spent three quarters of a year at their home station, but only 17 percent of that program of home station is tactical training. In other words, four-fifths of the time our unit is at home station, it is devoting its time to inspections, to demonstrations, to holding marksmanship matches, or to some activity other than tactical training. This is our estimate, but if you are looking for room for improvement, recognizing the intensity of what is already ongoing at our major training areas, home station training is where you ought to look.

Our statistics, sir, also raised the issue of the system of training testing in Seventh Army. We have a rather complete set of training tests that culminate in Army Training Tests within the company and battalion. But this testing, as we have seen, of course has to take place without completing unit training, with definite shortfalls in AIT and Tactical Training. If the unit commander facing a test knows that his soldiers are less than completely trained, he finds himself facing personal failure. His chief worry, sir, is generated by the command emphasis placed on scoring high in an umpired annual Army Training Test, or ATT. Commanders in Seventh Army have come to accept, and even welcome, a system of preparing for ATT that contemplates units going out on the very ground on which they are to take their test, and rehearsing, one or even more times, the exact set of circumstances or sequence of events that they intend to perform under the eyes of umpires. Thus it is possible for a young lieutenant, who must face a training test with a machine gunner that has not had the Advanced Individual Training that he ought to get, to go out with the gunner during the rehearsal, and to site the gun properly for each test phase. In effect, he shows the gunner where he wants the gun, and drives a stake in the ground at each site. Moreover, he or the platoon sergeant fills out the gunner's range card, and buries it beside the stake, concealed in a can with a little dirt and leaves on top. Then during the actual ATT, when the machine gun is to be deployed, the gunner finds the stake, get out his range card, runs a belt into his gun, traces out the outline of his foxhole as the rules require, and sets up the stakes called for by the range card. That gunner has now earned all the points called for in the test score sheet.

Now, if the company commanders reproaches the lieutenant for this nonprofessional behavior, the company commander is apt to get back one of three rationales. "Everybody is doing it." Or, "I couldn't pass this test unless I resorted to this." Or, most convincingly, "Sir, you told me to get a superior. I didn't want to let you down."

Any commander who listens to this sort of rationale is not really in a very good position to criticize the young lieutenant. The reason the lieutenant resorted to such stratagems is usually because



the commander cut from the training program time that might have enabled the lieutenant to train the machine gunner before the test. Moreover, if the umpires do not report such an AIT shortfall, satisfactory test results are a justification for continuing to drop machine gun AIT from the unit's training.

What's the company commander to do about this circumstance? Well, for one thing, he can attempt to extend his training schedule. That is to say, instead of scheduling 44 hours a week, he might attempt to schedule 65 hours a week, or 80 hours a week. One thing he soon discovers is that he ramming his head into a wall. You recall earlier that when we were talking about the methods by which a commander cuts his program to make it fit the time available, there are already outside the training schedule many unit activities that already demand time outside the schedule. And so when we are talking about an 8-hour day, 44-hour week we are not talking about the time that the unit can use to hold reveille, to go to breakfast, to hold company formations, to run police calls, to take PT, or to clean weapons. Much of that time is not scheduled; nor is the time for lunch; nor to move out to the training area; nor the GI party sometime during the week. Rarely is this necessary unit activity scheduled.



General Farrell remarked in a speech before he went home that units in Seventh Army were training literally 65 hours a week. That is true right now. When a commander thinks about adding more scheduled hours of training, he often finds it more than a little impossible. He might elect to centralize, to set up committees vice training using the chain of command, thus compromising leader development. But any commander soon realizes that to the degree he pushes training, at home station in particular, he is jeopardizing his chances of earning in a "superior" on one of his inspections or demonstrations, or any other type of non-tactical activity that he is directed to perform in which the primary measure of his unit is how well it looks. As he revises his training program more and more, the requirements that we listed under the second category, **Command Responsibility**, become ever more important in his considerations, and ever more infringing on his professional integrity.

The study group made six recommendations to the Seventh Army commander based on our conclusions. The *first* recommendation is to minimize **Command Responsibility**: cut down on the time devoted to demonstrations, to special events, cut down the time that the commander spends on inspections. The *second* is make time for commanders to address AIT shortfalls. The *third* and *fourth* are to reconsider how better to use MTA time, and the *fifth* is to turn the prerogative of planning and conducting training over to battalion and company commanders.

- RECOMMENDATIONS
1. FOCUS PRIMARY COMMAND EFFORT ON REDUCING THE NON-COMBAT-READINESS ACTIVITIES REQUIRED OF COMMANDERS :
 - a. CURTAILING OR ELIMINATING SPECIAL EVENTS.
 - b. ADOPTING STANDARDS FOR COMMAND INSPECTIONS PREDICATED PRIMARILY ON COMBAT READINESS, AND CONDUCT ONE UNANNOUNCED ASI ANNUALLY (NO OTHER CMI).
 - c. CUTTING ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY AND HOUSEKEEPING REQUIREMENTS ON TACTICAL UNITS.
 2. ELIMINATE MANDATORY SUBJECT REQUIREMENTS (PAR 1, ANNEX B). EXPECT THE COMMANDER AT BATTALION-BATTLE GROUP LEVEL TO PLAN, SCHEDULE AND SUPERVISE HIS OWN TRAINING PROGRAM AIMED AT READINESS FOR HIS EMERGENCY MISSION, AND AT MAXIMUM DEVELOPMENT OF HIS JUNIOR LEADERS, GUIDED BY CLEAR COMMAND POLICY WHICH ESTABLISHES TRAINING AS HIS TOP-PRIORITY MISSION.
 3. INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF TACTICAL TRAINING CONDUCTED AT HOME STATION BY:
 - a. DEVSING MEANS TO USE LOCAL TRAINING AREAS FOR DECENTRALIZED TRAINING WHOLLY THE COMPANY COMMANDER'S.
 - b. ACCOMPLISHING AT HOME STATION ALL NEEDED ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING, AND AS MUCH BASIC UNIT TRAINING AS POSSIBLE.
 - c. DEINTENSIFYING AND DECENTRALIZING MAJOR TRAINING AREA ACTIVITIES.
 4. ENUNCIATE AS COMMAND POLICY THAT THE SMALL UNIT COMMANDER'S TOP-PRIORITY MISSION IS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONTINUAL DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION OF HIS UNIT'S COMBAT READINESS TRAINING PROGRAM.
 5. STUDY MEANS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVE MAN-HOURS OF TRAINING TO MAXIMIZE THE RETURN FROM THAT TRAINING SCHEDULED.
 6. STUDY THE IMPACT OF TRAINING SCHEDULING ON TRAINING POLICY.

General Clarke, as I noted at the outset, this study did not deal specifically with attendance at, or actual learning from instruction. Yet individual proficiency declines over time, and requires at least annual refreshment. Unit commanders whom we interviewed told us that on an average day, because of their commitments to competitive marksmanship, athletics, and other requirements from higher commands, only 50 percent of their soldiers are present for scheduled training. If there is a 50% shortfall in scheduling, and only half the unit is present for what training takes place, then most soldiers receive 25% of the training they need annually. We concluded that the effectiveness of Seventh Army units is much less than it could be. This is a very serious situation that calls for immediate command action.

Lieutenant General Davidson:

I think, from this presentation, that you can see what gives me my concern. We have been studying this thing, as I indicated, since last September. What we are about to present you now has been gone over with our entire chain of command. And represents the consensus of opinion of our entire chain of command arrived at a conference that I had back last February, with my two corps commanders and my chief of staff the first week of this month. There are many things in this situation that I can solve, but there are some things that require your approval before we make the first move. In any case, I think you should be advised as to what I think. I have with me today, a draft copy of the training directive which I would like to put into effect, am anxious to get this into effect as soon as possible and certainly by the first of the year.

Now, with the background that Major Gorman pointed out, I would like to discuss three of the six barriers that give me concern. These will make a tremendous drain on both our manpower and our time available for training and additionally on our funds. These three are our athletic program, the marksmanship program, and the field of demonstrations. These cost, at the present time, a total of almost \$5 million each year, and about a million man-days are affected. They represent the total training effort of five armor tank battalions over the period of a year.

First would like to deal with the athletic program. This program diverts a considerable amount of manpower from actual training. The most costly programs, to us, are the baseball and the football programs. The personnel that continue in these programs represent the total effort of one tank battalion during a period of about 10 months that these two programs are conducted. I can handle the athletic program with regard to the other primary athletics within Seventh Army. But when we had our discussion on December 8th, we discussed at length the proposition of eliminating all high level competitions and complying strictly with the Department of the Army policy which announced that competition should be on company-level athletic teams. However, after two or three hours of debate on this subject, we came to the conclusion that the baseball and football program should be carried out, to some degree, to change ideas. We would have to accept, therefore, that those programs as a necessary evil with regard to our basic mission of combat readiness training. Excuse the personnel involved, insofar as any training is concerned. While at the same time, as this program is organized (I am talking about baseball and football) on an area context, and it seems that in various areas are people who happen to be located in that area without regard to their major command affiliation. We have a large number of these areas, and consequently a large number of teams. And this is the principal cause for the loss in training time. Now, what we propose is to enlarge the area, still maintain the area context, but go to a conference of eight teams, one team represents each division, one team represents corps, and one team from support command. Organize these teams at the division and other appropriate level, and don't let personnel off in so far as any training except incidental training that could be conducted in the morning for a group of that size.

This chart here indicates the service programs in baseball. At the present time, in Seventh Army, we would organize this number of teams, with this amount of personnel per team which totals this number of individuals overall. And they expend over a period of the season, this number of man-hours. Now I want to emphasize at the start of this presentation, that the figures that I have presented to you are conservative in the extreme. For instance, if I wanted them that way, I could probably equally well specify a figure of at least one-third higher than those I have presented to you. These figures here

represent only three hours a weekday devoted to athletics. It takes no consideration the amount of time it requires for the maintenance of the facilities to support those athletics. The average cost per team of this with a total expenditure over the period of the year amounts to this. What we propose would reduce the number of teams, with this total expenditure of personnel, with this expenditure of funds. This would reduce the demand on our personnel-wise by 80 percent, and reduce the expenditure of funds by over a hundred thousand dollars.

Now coming to football, we are required in football to maintain this number of teams, again with the same specifics, with this expenditure of manpower at this cost. What we propose to do is to reduce these teams to eight, with this expenditure of manpower, and this cost. It would result in a saving of 70 percent of the manpower, almost \$75,000 in cost. The total savings financially then, would be almost \$200,000. Under this new program, we would save almost a half million man-hours along with \$200,000 in funds. The fund picture becomes more acute when we consider the fact when the purchase of foreign goods from our exchange is eliminated this year; I understand that we can anticipate the reduction of about \$4 million in non-appropriated funds for athletic purposes. That will increase the meaning of this figure. I am very anxious to revise our athletic program, starting this down here to go to this set up which we have here of eight teams.

Otherwise, we plan to emphasize competition a particular sport by the division commander. We recognize the fact that we are required by Army Regulations to produce a certain number of boxers each year. That we may be compelled to produce an all-star soccer team so I figure maybe two or three weeks at the end of the soccer season. But those, that type of activity we plan to handle on minimum, non-demand basis by having a tournament at the end of the season for boxing that may last for a week, and soccer limited to forming of an all-star team. Otherwise, the cutting of the athletics program will be restricted to cutting at the battalion level as determined by the division commander.

The next area I want to discuss is the area of the marksmanship program, and this is the area that makes a measured cut. The principal cut in both are manpower and in our funds. I well recognize the value of a marksmanship program, particularly the morale value, if you have a winning team. I recognize the necessity of having a marksmanship program. But also, I recognize with that, that such a program, if it is not conducted within certain bounds, takes from the unit, those men who are the most physically instructed in marksmanship at a time when their services could be self-employed in improving combat readiness and combat training of their unit. This chart here represents the present participation of the Seventh Army in the marksmanship program. In blue is the participation in the small arms program, in red is the class (?) program. The most extensive part of this program is conducted over a period of 7 months with the participation as you see there in order to arrive at teams to represent the Seventh Army. This is the numbers of personnel involved in this program. It varies between 2,500 and 7,700 individuals over this period of time during those 7 months. It is the equivalent manpower of two battle groups and one tank battalion for a period of 7 months. During that time, as the teams are organized, it takes 77+ million rounds of .30 caliber ammunition and 7+ million rounds of .45 caliber ammunition. This we have to get off the shelf, but it costs almost \$3,500,000.

What we propose is this: We propose a program which would provide that for the small arms competition, no teams would be formed prior to the first of February. The shooters would be selected from the qualification scores made the last time they fired. One team would be selected from each division from the corps and support command to participate in the USAREUR match in March or April.

The best shooters then would be assigned to a marksmanship team. In regard to the corps matches, we would propose this: That most teams be formed prior to the first of March, the division matches be held in early April, that one team from each division, one from the 4th Armor group, compete in the USAREUR match, and the USAREUR match be held in early May, and the winner then competes in the national match. Now we require that you, if we can carry out this program, release from us the responsibility of training two teams, and reduce back to one team from the headquarters. And also I want to get you to advance the USAREUR match from the present scheduled date to May. Now both of these programs eliminate the intermediate step as we have now, where we have corps competition to select the best team in each corps.

Again I want to emphasize that the figures I have shown you today are small. Because this shows, for instance, the small arms competition here conducted on a broad scale until these teams are the final team selected here. But, none of these figures now carry these teams all through the year. We don't show any of those teams here, if we had added, those figures would have been much greater. Now, what we are propose to do, is take this 7 months period and condense it into a 3-month period. For instance, for the small arms, we would start as indicated in our program on the first of February and we would hold the competition here during these months here, in order to make the selection for the small arms team in May. Now, you will notice that last year the small arms team was selected in May and conducted its activities during these months here. There would be no change in that whatsoever. People would be practicing at the same time, will be available during the same time for competition. The same principle applies to those in the class except we will restrict starting the matches to the first of March so they will be 3 months here of competition, 2 months of practice before the competition is over. Actually this team will be selected under this program, a little earlier than it was last year, and should be able to practice as a team for a longer period of time. Now it is my opinion that with this number of months, 7 months prior to firing the competition, a marksmanship team should have adequate training and practice. This same thing applies to this other team. This will result in a tremendous savings in manpower and savings in funds of some \$2,285,000, basing the estimate of the fund on the cost of the present round of ammunition and that cost is bound to go up when you have to start paying for the 7.52 rounds after this coming year.

The third area is the area of demonstrations. During the past year, we found that we were called upon to perform seven demonstrations: four firepower demonstrations, plus three atomic artillery demonstrations. The total manpower expended for this program is equivalent to about a company and a half to do these demonstrations over a period of a complete year. First let me mention the four firepower demonstrations that we are called upon to present. They require this expenditure of manpower. We are not able to break these two out because they were conducted over a help (?) and appeal to one another, but the augmentation was the same for both presentations. These are the units that were involved in the presentations. Each presentation was under the command of a brigadier general who chose his planning staff 60 days prior to the time the demonstration was to be held. These demonstrations required this expenditure of resources. These are company days of participation. By 2300 company days of participation, 109 aircraft were involved at a cost of operation of between \$3,200 and \$6,300 a day. And further, the aircraft, which had to be diverted to these demonstrations, were not available for our operational requirements or for our normal training requirements. Our units were deprived of this support during the time that they were required for the practice of these demonstrations or for the specific demonstration itself. Communications personnel involved were this.

Now these people were not even working at their trade because what they were doing was establishing short-range communications between firing point and administrative facilities that were necessary to control the demonstrations. Further, they took these personnel away from their training, it placed even more volume on one of the units, which caused me the most concern because I feel the most overburdened in our Seventh Army is our 166th Signal Battalion. And this figure is apparently the ground its on for the demonstration. This would be much more beneficially and economically expended on things that would be more directly in support of our own personnel. Beside wear and tear on Army equipment, this involved expenditure of a sum sufficient to give one armored division a 3-day FTX. It provides for rail funds and consumer credits which were totally caused by the demonstration and which we would not have had to finance had it not been for the demonstrations.

The estimate for ammunition expenditure involved the total cost of over \$1,000,000 for the field demonstrations. None of these stages include the TDY funds that would have to be expended in order to put on these presentations. So these things are costly in manpower, they are costly in funds, but more important, they are costly in the effect they have on our MTA training facilities. The demonstrations require 34 days of dry run rehearsals and they are conducted over a period of 20 days. For these 34 days, 14 percent of that area involved, denies the unit who had planned to use that in accordance with their training schedule. To deny that opportunity to train they could not make up. While only 14 percent of the area was involved, you can recognize the fact that this is the best of the middle area and eliminated for practical use, a much larger percentage of the terrain. Then the period of the 20 days for the demonstrations, 33 1/3 percent of that was denied the units for furthering training. Also again this took in practically all the usable area, and gave us very little return for our money for almost 2 weeks period of time.

Now, personally, I don't think this is a good investment of our time and money. In the first place, this type of firepower demonstration, a large portion of the people who witness it have seen it before. They have seen it at Benning, they have seen it at Bragg and probably see it at Grafenwöhr. It does have a tremendous effect on our training. I do not think that loss is commensurate with the values the Army derives from the viewing of it. Further, I think it would be more honest on our part, if we took those people out and actually showed them what we do on a normal day rather than give them something like this to see. The other part of the demonstration is the artillery outside display. I don't have the figures for all four of them, but here are is figures on the last one we had here the month before last. These were from General Harris: the number of personnel, the man-days expended, at this cost. Now, insofar as those demonstrations are concerned, last year we were required to conduct four demonstrations, this year the number was reduced to two, and next year we will be required to present three such demonstrations. It is my feeling that a large number now of the officers who should see it throughout the command, have seen the demonstrations. We would like very much to see that demonstration number cut back so that it places the minimum demands on us. With regards to the demonstrations, we have four recommendations to make.

The first we recommend that the firepower demonstrations scheduled for this year not be held. and for next year too. So we ask that atomic the artillery demonstration be moved to 1 February. We ask that USAREUR place no other requirements on us for any demonstrations, and we ask that the Department of the Army be advised of the effect that these demonstrations have on our mission of combat readiness, and further we ask that they not impose further demands on us in this regard.

These are our surveys that cause me particular concern. As I have already told you, I have a copy of a training directive that I am anxious to get out, and as I said I am anxious to try to get into effect by the first of the year. There are many other things that I have not mentioned this morning which I also feel have a very compelling effect on our state of combat readiness. These are [mostly within my area of responsibility] but there are certain possibilities in which I need your help and your approval. I have with me here three separate draft letters with specific recommendations with regard to each of the three areas I just covered -- the athletic program, the question of demonstrations and marksmanship folks. If these recommendations of mine are approved, then these should be the results. It will reduce our total expenditure for these things at least to this amount. And again I must emphasize the fact that our figures are most conservative. It would reduce our manpower to this amount. It would aim to restrict the encroachment on our training in the coming years. So that is the reason that I ask for this briefing this morning. I thought you should hear our story before the meeting tomorrow. I feel, as I said at the start, that I must say these things, as I am convinced that Seventh Army is not now as combat ready as it should or could be. And the basic fitness in our state of readiness is the inability to inject basic change. Thank you.