

FOREWORD

This electronic archive is part of an effort to gather papers from important and influential leaders, whose practical and conceptual work shaped the Army in profound ways and delivered a modern effective fighting force to the Nation. Their work is enduring. The principles of leadership and management they applied are timeless. It is appropriate that we capture the artifacts of their work, study them, and apply what we learn to our Army today.

General Paul Gorman's distinguished career is unique in the balance between tactical focus, service-oriented expertise, and the skills and capabilities required by a joint strategist. He was a pioneer in engagement simulation and key to design of the Army Training Evaluation Program, the adoption of the After Action Review, creation of a National Training Center, reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and employment of low intensity conflict. As the first Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at the newly organized Training and Doctrine Command, he changed training from formal school house instruction and large scale field maneuvers, to first line supervisors training skilled crews and teams within units. He pioneered engagement simulation to achieve fiscal economy while providing credible combat seasoning. He brought systems thinking to training a force undergoing massive restructuring and reequipping.

Gorman became a strategist during a series of demanding assignments, on the Army Staff, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at the Paris Peace Talks, in the Central Intelligence Agency, as J-5, and as Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He completed his active service as Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command. As Assistant to the Chairman, he helped reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Post-retirement he served on the Packard Commission framing the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In SOUTHCOM, General Gorman was a theorist and practitioner of low intensity conflict and counterinsurgency, at a time when the Armed Forces were focused on preparing for large scale conventional war.

These papers offer insights into how the Army and the Armed Forces reinvented themselves after the war in Vietnam. Today, as the Army and other services face a turbulent period of redefinition and reorganization, it is useful to reflect on the ideas that underpinned the current Army major command structure, the need to balance the roles and resources of institutions responsible for coherent combat and training development with those charged with preparing the organized active and reserve forces and the utility of a coherent training philosophy that emphasized skilled individual Soldiers, strong crews, and teams in well trained units, and quality leadership as the primary basis for combat effectiveness.

Victory Starts Here!



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