



AIWFC

Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center

Newsletter
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From the Director (Striking the Right Balance)

Striking the Right Balance - What is the right balance of irregular warfare and traditional warfare within DOD? Albeit an extremely difficult question to answer during a time of pending budget cuts and downsizing, the Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center, in direct coordination with other stakeholders to include the Joint Staff, Army Staff, and Sister Services is addressing this question and many like it head on. In this context, what do we mean by striking the right balance? It is about placing the appropriate degree of emphasis on irregular warfare. There are those who have served in the Army of the 1960's through the 1990's and saw firsthand the abrupt and near total abandonment of IW doctrine, training, and education. Now there is the current generation of Soldiers who have never experienced an Army at peace. There is a consensus among the most senior and junior members of our Army that the lessons learned in past conflicts must not be relearned by future generations. I'm convinced though, that senior Army and Joint service leaders are sincere in their efforts to retain the experiences and lessons of the recent past through the institutionalization of IW in our Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leader Development, Material, Personnel and Facilities.

MG Peter Bayer, who as the Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, stated during his testimony to the House Armed Services Committee: "We believe the future operational environment demands irregular warfare competency. To do this, we must optimize the balance between soldier, structure, readiness, and modernization, and continue to focus on the professional military education of our leaders and soldiers." (See also video of the testimony here). *

The hard question is: In a resourced constrained environment, how does the Army institutionalize IW capabilities IN doctrine, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities? What do you think? Please comment on our [blog](#) or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.
COL Nestor Sadler, Director

* Institutionalizing Irregular Warfare Capabilities Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress First Session. Hearing Held November 3, 2011

IRREGULAR WARFARE INTEGRATION

- **Irregular Warfare Executive Steering Committee, 16 August 2012.** Army IW Fusion Center participated in a briefing presented to Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations/Light Intensity Conflict (Mr. Sheehan) and Director of Joint Force Development, JS J7 (LtGen Flynn). Attendees included representatives from ASD SO/LIC, JS J7, USSOCOM, USA, USAF, USN, USMC, Coast Guard, SOCEUR, TRANSCOM and others. Purpose was to review priorities of work that need clarity and resolution for DoD to conduct irregular warfare in the future, particularly with respect to new Defense Guidance. Overall idea is to identify IW capabilities and capacities across the services, and then ensure implementation of requirements in accordance with fiscal restraints. Updates included status of draft Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) – document has been staffed through VCJCS and is now with CJCS for review. Joint Chiefs will review CCJO approximately 10 SEP.
 - JS J7 (IW) (Mr. Dave Stephenson) provided review of current IW requirements from the IW JOC 2.0 CBA and related analyses. Top required capabilities included need for institutionalized planning and synchronization processes to achieve Unified Action; shared understanding of the operational environment across mission partners; and tailored authorities and capabilities to support partners.
 - ASD SO/LIC (Dr. Pauline Kusiak) provided OSD's current assessment of service compliance with DoD IW directives and guidance: over last ten years, all services have organized to respond to IW challenges (but there are some questions about level of effort). Since disestablishment of JFCOM, the preponderance of burden for managing/implementing IW DOTMLPF Change Recommendations has fallen to USSOCOM – this is sub-optimal for building capabilities across DoD. The IW Working Group will prepare courses of action to assign responsibilities outside USSOCOM. Dr. Kusiak also cautioned that some IW programs in their infancy may be at high risk if continued resourcing is not assured. This will be a challenge during the coming budget years with the expectation of funding cuts across the services. This is especially true if Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding is eliminated – IW programs will likely be a first target for elimination. Mr. JQ Roberts (ASD SO/LIC) stated that many leaders, justifying cuts to IW programs, will base reasoning on the statement “IW is a lesser included case of conventional warfare.” Mr. Roberts emphatically concluded that this is false reasoning.
 - LtGen Flynn concluded by directing the IW Working Group to consider other factors for assessing capabilities and capacities to ensure DoD clarifies enduring IW requirements for both the generating and operating forces.

- Next steps: AIWFC participates in the IW Working Group 22 August and continues to provide input to IW JOC 2.0 CBA implementation actions.
- **The Seventh Warfighting Function.** The Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCoE) released the initial draft of the functional concept for the Seventh Warfighting Function (WfF). According to SOCOE, “the Seventh WfF uniquely considers the importance of special operations and conventional forces interdependence as well as related concepts of building partner capacity, special warfare, and surgical strike. When considered thoughtfully and used appropriately, the Seventh WfF will help commanders and their staffs better assess, shape, and influence the operational environment abroad in which there are emerging or imminent threats to U.S. security interests.” SOCOE is collaborating with both SOF and Conventional Force institutions and formations to ensure consideration of diverse points of view. Next steps: SOCOE receives comments and adjudicates input for second draft.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

- **FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Counterinsurgency) Revision.** The Irregular Warfare Fusion Center and US Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare supported the Combined Arms Center Commander and Commander, US Marine Corps Combat Development Center for a FM 3-24 (Revision) Community of Interest Working Group on 1 August in Washington, D.C. Purpose of the working group was to solicit input on the revision of FM 3-24 to improve content and consider what should be added or dropped. Participating agencies in addition to CAC and USMC MCCDC included Army War College, Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, National Defense University, and US Agency for International Development. Key points from the meeting:
 - Must determine the effects that need to be achieved
 - The exit strategy begins with the entry strategy
 - The US will have a mission to train and advise
 - Brigade/regimental level is where the reality of what is happening on the ground meshes with guidance from above
 - Must determine whether there are alternatives to Clear-Hold-Build

Next steps: The writing team considers the above points and other discussion from the working group to guide refinements in the content and structure of the manual. The IW Fusion Center continues to collaborate with USMC MCCDC and other key agencies in developing the initial draft revision.

- **Irregular Warfare Seminar.** The AIWFC conducted a five day seminar in support of 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Mountain Division, at Fort Drum New York, 20-24 August, 2012. The construct of the seminar was deliberately tailored to the 2-10th BCT given their current mission and task organization focused on advising across the range of Security Force Assistance

(SFA) activities. This seminar is the fourth advisor centric mission focused organization and represents a trend for deploying BCTs which the AIWFC leadership and faculty have identified and adapted in support of the target audience's requirements and feedback. Specifically, the commander requested the seminar be expanded to discuss the following topics: Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police program; Insider threat trends and mitigation techniques; and logistics processes and challenges across the Afghan National Security Forces.

- The seminar was attended by approximately 100 personnel comprised of senior officers and NCOs. Each morning the participants received detailed presentations on a variety of focused irregular warfare and advisor related topics in compliance with the United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM) guidance for deploying forces. Each afternoon the participants executed a practical exercise linked to the morning's presentations to further develop and apply the various concepts. This was the overall flow of the seminar. In addition the BCT conducted a series of targeted Video Telecommunication Conferences (VTC) to include Regional Command East plans update, and two advisor focused interactive discussions with advisors on the ground. The leadership's feedback on the overall quality of the seminar was exceptionally positive. See article in Fort Drum Newspaper, the Mountaineer ([here](#)). For more information on how to schedule your unit for the Irregular Warfare Seminar, send your request to usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

- **SFA Training Baseline:** The Army Staff is working with Office Secretary of Defense (OSD) Training Readiness & Strategy (TR&S) to establish a baseline of SFA activity for each of the services. OSD TRS will pull the Request for Forces, (RFF) from Joint Capabilities Requirements Manager (JCRM). The intent is to pull this data quarterly to establish a baseline of SFA activity by service that would require specific SFA pre-deployment training. The services will be allowed to review the data for completeness and can provide additional entries of activities not captured by the OSD data-pull provided the activities are SFA in nature and supported COCOM requirements. Overall the baseline should drive analysis to best enable the services to determine appropriate SFA training.
 - At the same time, OSD TR&S is assembling an inventory of the programs of instruction (POI) for Service SFA training, using the draft Guidance on Joint Standards for SFA Training (ver 8.1) as a framework. Primarily OSD is looking at the training provided by the 162nd Infantry Brigade. If you are aware of other SFA training provided by the Army please send the information to AIWFC (usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil).
 - The intent of the draft training guidance is to increase effectiveness, interoperability, and management of SFA skills. Ultimately, the guidance provides the services an outline of required Knowledge, Skills, Abilities, and Attitudes (KSAA) to allow individuals and units to operate effectively in the

conduct of SFA activities. The joint SFA training standards address both the individual KSAs required to effectively operate in foreign cultures and contribute to the collective capabilities required to successfully perform the identified SFA development tasks: Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build and Advise (OTERA) Foreign Security Forces (FSF). If you have not yet seen a copy of the Guidance on Joint Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA) Training DRAFT and would like one please write to usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

- **Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information System (SOLLIMS):** PKSOI will present an overview of SOLLIMS at the semi-annual World Wide Joint Training and Lessons Learned Conference 9-21 SEP. This conference is hosted by the Joint Staff J-7 and will allow PKSOI to engage the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) community on actions and strategies to better inform Army stability practitioners on Observation, Insights and Lessons analysis, information sharing, and training support capabilities. It will also allow PKSOI to contribute to the Decade of War Lessons Learned program. For more information, contact PKSOI at usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@mail.mil.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

- **Avoiding Creeping Defeat in Afghanistan: The Need for Realistic Assumptions, Strategy, and Plans**, Anthony Cordesman, report. “The US is not losing the war in Afghanistan in the classic military sense. The US, its allies, and Afghan forces still win virtually every direct military encounter. The problem is that this is a political war where the political impact of combat, politics, governance, and economics are far more important than tactical success in directly defeating the enemy. At this level, the insurgents still seem to have significant momentum and are certainly not being decisively defeated.” This report highlights the critical problems in the current strategy, the way it is implemented, reporting on progress in the war and Transition, and the lack of credible plans for the future. [Download the report here.](#)
- **Afghanistan Weekly Report**, Civil Military Fusion Centre. This document provides a weekly overview of developments in Afghanistan from 31 July – 13 August 2012, with hyper -links to source material highlighted in blue and underlined in the text. The Afghanistan Team of the Civil Military Fusion Centre produces the weekly wrap-up of major stories and issues in and relevant to Afghanistan. Each report is organized according to the following sectors: economic development, governance/rule of law, security/force protection and social & strategic infrastructure. [See this link](#) for current issue and archives.

- **The Strategic Limitations of Boko Haram in Southern Nigeria**, Jacob Zenn, CTC Sentinel, August edition. “On July 30, 2009, Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf was killed while in custody of Nigerian security forces in Maiduguri, Borno State, in northeastern Nigeria. On August 9, Boko Haram’s new leader announced in a written statement that Yusuf’s ideas would ‘live on forever’ and that Boko Haram would begin a series of bombings in the ‘evil cities’ of Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt, all in southern Nigeria. He stated that Boko Haram’s ‘Islamic revolution’ was not limited to the northern states and that the southern states, ‘especially the Yoruba, Igbo and Ijaw infidels,’ would become Boko Haram’s immediate target.” [Read the full analysis here.](#)

STRATCOM & OUTREACH

- **Counterinsurgency Center Webcast, Transitions in Regional Command – East**, COL Chris Cavoli, 30 August. COL Cavoli, immediate past Deputy Commander of RC-East in Herat, Afghanistan. According to FM3-24, “U.S. forces committed to a COIN effort are there to assist a HN government. The long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation has to win on its own. The sooner the main effort can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.” RC-West made significant strides in transitioning authority and responsibility to [ANSF and GIRoA](#) and COL Cavoli discussed key lessons and observations from RC-West operations. [See webcast recording and products here.](#)
- **Counterinsurgency Center Webcast, Eight Dynamics of Insurgency, 26 July**: FM3-24 (Counterinsurgency) says that each insurgency is unique, although there are many similarities among them. Examining and understanding the specific type of insurgency they face enables commanders and staffs to build a more accurate picture of the insurgents and the thinking behind their overall approach. LTC Mark Ulrich, who leads the COIN Seminar program at the Counterinsurgency Center, discussed the eight dynamics of an insurgency during this broadcast. These dynamics make up a framework that can be used to assess an insurgency's strengths and weaknesses. He chose a very interesting contemporary situation and evaluated it in light of the dynamics. Listen to his presentation and download the slides and other material from the webcast [here.](#)
- **Institute for the Study of War Field Report**. On August 2, ISW hosted Lieutenant General Daniel Allyn, who discussed the evolving security situation in Eastern Afghanistan, the approaching 2014 drawdown, and drivers of instability in the conflict. Allyn recently returned from a year-long combat tour in Afghanistan where he served as Commanding General of Regional Command-East and of Combined Joint Task Force-I. In June, LTG Allyn took command of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg. LTG Allyn previously served as the Deputy Commanding General of XVIII Airborne Corps and Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, including duty as Chief of Staff, Multi-National Corps Iraq. To watch the C-SPAN video of the event, [see this link.](#)

Irregular Warfare Community Events

- 4 Sep** [Special Operations and the Future of American Foreign Policy](#),
Panel Discussion, Center for National Policy, Wash DC
- 5 Sep** [Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's
Vietnam](#), Panel Discussion, Wilson Center, Wash DC
- 5 Sep** [Organizing the U.S. Government to Counter Islamist Extremism](#),
Panel Discussion, Hudson Institute, Wash DC
- 13 Sep** IW Fusion Center Webcast, FM3-24 Revision Update
- 13 Sep** [Author Series Event: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Little Afghanistan:
The War Within the War for Afghanistan"](#), Discussion, World Affairs
Council, Wash DC
- 14 Sep** [Armored Warfighters' Forum Senior Mentor Symposium](#), webcast,
Armored BCT Warfighters' Forum
- 19-20 Sep** [Joint Humanitarian Operations Course](#), Naval Postgraduate School
(open to military members only), Monterey, CA
- 20 Sep** [20th Annual Terrorism Trends & Forecasts Symposium](#), Int'l Ass'n
of Counterterrorism and Security Professionals, Mahwah, NJ
- 27 Sep** IW Fusion Center Webcast, (TBD)
- 16 Oct** [Infantry Brigade Warfighters' Forum Senior Mentor Symposium](#),
webcast, Infantry BCT Warfighters' Forum
- 16 Oct** [Threats and Opportunities Just Over the Horizon](#), Michael Horowitz,
(lecture) Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia
- 4 Dec** [Turkey: Friend or Foe?](#) Michael A. Reynolds (lecture), Foreign
Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia

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