IRREGULAR WARFARE (IW) GUIDING DOCUMENTS
(V30) (12 JUNE 13)

Below is a compilation of official unclassified documents as well as articles and speeches by DoD personnel that mention irregular warfare activities, security cooperation, and hybrid and asymmetric threats. Irregular warfare activities are those listed in DoDD 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare,” 1 December 2008. IW terms are highlighted blue.

Also included are statements regarding security cooperation (SC). These are included because several IW-related activities are also SC activities; specifically, foreign internal defense, the closely-related activity of security force assistance, and the objective of building partner capacity. Those terms, however, are not highlighted.

IRREGULAR WARFARE JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT 1.0 (11 SEP 2007)
(Entire document is devoted to IW.)

Per IW JOC 2.0, “The capabilities listed in the IW JOC v. 1.0 remain valid and are still being considered and assessed in other venues.”

DOD DIRECTIVE 3000.07, IRREGULAR WARFARE (1 DEC 2008)
(p. 2). “It is DoD policy to:

a. Recognize that IW is as strategically important as traditional warfare.

b. Improve DoD proficiency for IW, which also enhances its conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct across the full range of military operations.”

e. Maintain capabilities and capacity so that the Department of Defense is as effective in IW as it is in traditional warfare.…”

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, QUADRENNIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS REVIEW REPORT (QRM) (JANUARY 2009)
Core Mission Areas: The QRM defined five key attributes for the Department’s Core Mission Areas: they represent relatively enduring missions; they are necessary for achieving strategic end states derived from the 2008 National Defense Strategy; they constitute a broad military activity; they describe a unique Department of Defense capability and capacity; or they identify a mission for which the Defense Department is the U.S. Government lead and/or provides the preponderance of U.S. Government capabilities.

4. Irregular Warfare encompasses operations in which the joint force conducts protracted regional and global campaigns against state and non-state adversaries to subvert, coerce, attrite, and exhaust adversaries rather than defeat them through direct conventional military confrontation. Irregular warfare emphasizes winning the support of the relevant populations, promoting friendly political authority, and eroding adversary control, influence, and support.

The Department’s vision is to shape the future joint force to be as effective in Irregular Warfare as it is in Conventional Warfare. [T]he Department acknowledges it has more to do to accomplish its Irregular Warfare mission. Gaps still exist in institutionalizing irregular warfare concepts and capabilities needed for future joint operations, and for operating in concert with our interagency partners.

US GOVERNMENT COIN GUIDE (JANUARY 2009)

Preface. “Irregular warfare is far more varied than conventional conflict: hence the importance of an intellectual framework that is coherent enough to provide guidance, and flexible enough to adapt to circumstances. Counterinsurgency places great demands on the ability of bureaucracies to work together, with allies, and increasingly, with nongovernmental organizations.”

“Insurgency will be a large and growing element of the security challenges faced by the United States in the 21st century.”

“Whether the United States should engage in any particular counterinsurgency is a matter of political choice, but that it will engage in such conflicts during the decades to come is a near certainty.”

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS (CCJO), V.3.0 (15 JANUARY 2009)

(p. 28). 7. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING THIS CONCEPT. (p. 30) “Improve knowledge of and capabilities for waging irregular warfare. While a good deal of theory exists concerning irregular warfare, and while U.S. forces continue to improve dramatically in this area, irregular foes will continue to pose significant challenges for the foreseeable future. U.S forces
will require the same level of expertise in **irregular warfare** that they have developed for conventional warfare.”

“A BALANCED STRATEGY: REPROGRAMMING THE PENTAGON FOR A NEW AGE.” ROBERT GATES, SEC DEF. *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*. (JAN/FEB 2009)

(p. 4) “As secretary of defense, I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing **counterinsurgency** skills and the ability to conduct **stability** and support operations.”

(p. 5) “[F]or decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage **asymmetric** or **irregular** conflict -- and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of forces engaged in these conflicts.”

“JOINT WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY.”
GEN JAMES MATTIS, COMMANDER, JOINT FORCES COMMAND
SPEECH AT DEFENSE SHOWSTOPPERS CONFERENCE, 12 FEB 2009

“I was asked to talk about 21st Century warfare. We will fight in coalitions—first, last and always. We will be fighting against enemies in **hybrid** conditions. War is war; I accept that. Some people have challenged me, “Why do you use the term ‘irregular war’?” We do so because if we don’t set up some kind of tension, some kind of magnet to pull the department out of its good old mano-a-mano conventional war, then we won’t shift the budgeting, we won’t shift the focus over to where it has to go. Really, we’re going to have to be able to fight **hybrid** enemies, and that could be something like the Second Lebanon War... But the area that we are not superior in is **irregular warfare**, and we are going to make **irregular warfare**—per Secretary Gates’ speech about balance1—a core competency of the U.S. military. We’re not going to hold our breath. We’re not going to say it’s going to go away—that’s not going to happen. And we’re going to figure this thing out and decide who does what in this effort. It doesn’t mean that every service is 50/50 conventional and **irregular**. Actually, it means an awful lot of our troops are going to have to fight across that entire spectrum. So the bottom line is we’ve identified what we think is the fundamental problem—and that is gaining competency at the national level and right down to the tactical level, under the strategic tactical compression, in **irregular warfare**, without surrendering our nuclear superiority and our conventional superiority, behind which the international community gains great benefit.”

“THE CONTESTED COMMONS,” *PROCEEDINGS*, JUL 2009
MICHELE FLOURNOY, OSD POLICY
SHAWN BRIMLEY, OSD

“[T]he U.S. military will increasingly face three types of challenges: rising tensions in the global commons; hybrid threats that contain a mix of traditional and irregular forms of conflict; and the problem of weak and failing states.”

“America’s continued advantages in traditional warfighting provide powerful incentives for our adversaries to employ a mix of traditional and irregular approaches that span the range of conflict.”

THE ARMY CAPSTONE CONCEPT 2016-2018 (28 DEC 09)

(p. 15). Para 2-5: “Army forces must be prepared to defeat what some have described as hybrid enemies: both hostile states and nonstate enemies that combine a broad range of weapons capabilities and regular, irregular, and terrorist tactics….”

QDR (FEB 2010)

Executive Summary (p. viii). “United States must retain the capability to conduct large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in a wide range of environments.”

(p. viii). “QDR initiatives include: Increase counterinsurgency, stability operations, and counterterrorism competency and capacity in general purpose forces”

(p. x). “U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.”

(p. xiii). “DoD will continue to place special emphasis on stability operations, counterinsurgency, and the building of partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies.”

Introduction (p. 2). “The QDR analysis strongly suggested that the Department must further rebalance its policy, doctrine, and capabilities to better support the following six key missions:
- Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations”

Rebalancing the Force (p. 17). “six key mission areas:
- Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations”
Succeed in **Counterinsurgency**, **Stability**, and **Counterterrorism** Operations (p. 20). “The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together demand that the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale **counterinsurgency** (COIN), **stability**, and **counterterrorism** (CT) operations in environments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega-cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral regions.”

(p. 20). **Stability operations**, large scale **counterinsurgency**, and **counterterrorism** operations are not niche challenges or the responsibility of a single Military Department, but rather require a portfolio of capabilities as well as sufficient capacity from across America’s Armed Forces and other departments and agencies. Nor are these types of operations a transitory or anomalous phenomenon in the security landscape. On the contrary, we must expect that for the indefinite future, violent extremist groups, with or without state sponsorship, will continue to foment instability and challenge U.S. and allied interests.”

(p. 21). “Accordingly, the Department is continuing to grow capabilities for critical **counterinsurgency**, **stability**, and **counterterrorism** operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. To institutionalize the lessons learned over these years, DoD has made and will continue to make substantial changes to personnel management practices, professional military education and training programs, and career development pathways.”

(p. 28) “Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale **counterinsurgency** campaigns. By emphasizing host-nation leadership and employing modest numbers of U.S. forces, the United States can sometimes obviate the need for larger-scale **counterinsurgency** campaigns.”

**Guiding the Evolution of the Force** (p. 39). “Changes directed under the QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:
- U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained **counterinsurgency**, **stability**, and **counterterrorist** operations alone and in concert with partners.”

**Developing Future Military Leaders** (p. 54). “As part of our commitment to ensure that tomorrow’s leaders are prepared for the difficult missions they will be asked to execute, DoD will place special emphasis on **stability operations**, **counterinsurgency**, and building partner capacity skill sets in its professional military education and career development policies.”

**Chairman’s Assessment** (p. 102). “I also strongly endorse the QDR’s efforts to address joint force readiness for the full range of challenges we face. The focus is on building joint force capability and capacity for **irregular warfare** without compromising our conventional and nuclear superiority.”

**JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (FEB 2010)**
(p. 4). “The next quarter century will challenge U.S. joint forces with threats and opportunities ranging from regular and irregular wars in remote lands, to relief and reconstruction in crisis zones, to cooperative engagement in the global commons.”

(p. 62). “The second scenario of particular significance confronting the Joint Force is the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s. The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War.”

(p. 65). “Nuclear and major regular war may represent the most important conflicts the Joint Force could confront, but they remain the least likely. Irregular wars are more likely, and winning such conflicts will prove just as important to the protection of America’s vital interests and the maintenance of global stability.”

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (MAY 2010)

IW – Not mentioned.

(p. 14). “We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations, and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.”

IRREGULAR WARFARE JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT 2.0 (17 MAY 2010)
(Entire document is devoted to IW.)

(p. 3–4). [T]his JOC describes how the future joint force will conduct operations, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose irregular threats. The joint force must be prepared to address them without compromising its ability to address conventional threats.”

(p. 4). “Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks as well as states will increasingly resort to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to challenge conventional military powers.”

(p. 5). “The approach to the problem is to prevent, deter, disrupt, or defeat irregular threats. There are principally five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO).”
(p. 7). “IW Joint Logic.” “Ends: A joint force with an improved ability to prevent, and when necessary, counter **irregular threats** through a balanced approach aimed at both the threats themselves, as well as elements of the operating environment, including the population and the causes and conditions that give rise to the threats.”

(p. 8). “A joint force with an improved ability to prevent, and when necessary, counter **irregular threats** through a balanced approach aimed at both the threats themselves, as well as elements of the operating environment, including the population and the causes and conditions that give rise to the threats.”

(p. 8). “Given the prevalence of **irregular threats** in the current and expected future operating environment, the U.S. military must become as proficient in addressing **irregular threats** as it is in confronting conventional or regular threats.”

**CJCS INSTRUCTION 3210.06, IRREGULAR WARFARE (10 JUNE 2010)**

(p. 1). “This instruction provides direction and guidance for implementation of reference a (DoDD 3000.07). It
a. Establishes policy for integration of concepts and capabilities relevant to **IW** across all DOD activities.
b. Establishes policy for development of DOD contributions to a comprehensive approach to **IW**.

a. Maintain military capabilities and track inventory and proficiency to meet combatant commander **IW**-relevant requirements articulated in strategic guidance documents.”
b. Ensure curriculum….
c. Submit an annual assessment….
d. Report on identified **IW**-relevant…mission essential tasks….
e. Measure and assess density and experience in **IW**-relevant skills….”

**THE UNITED STATES ARMY OPERATING CONCEPT, 2016-2028 (19 AUG 10)**

(p. 9).  b. “The types of enemies the U.S. might face in the future include the following.
   (2) Terrorist groups, insurgents…that will likely focus on **irregular warfare** operations, terrorism….
   (3) Emerging military powers and advanced nonstate entities will seek limited advanced military capabilities…while also developing capabilities to impose costs and undermine U.S. resolve through **irregular warfare**, terrorism….”

d. “Enemies will exploit complex and urban terrain, associate with **irregular forces**….”
(p. 14) “Wide area security missions include protracted counterinsurgency….”

(p. 26). “Army forces must remain capable of full-spectrum operations with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.”

SECDEF ROBERT GATES, USMA (25 FEB 11)

“When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more – we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged.”

“In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should “have his head examined,” as General MacArthur so delicately put it.”

“From the look of things, the Army will not repeat the mistakes of the past, where irregular warfare was shunted to the side after Vietnam. The odds of repeating another Afghanistan or Iraq – invading, pacifying, and administering a large third world country – may be low. But in what General Casey has called “an era of persistent conflict,” those unconventional capabilities will still be needed at various levels and in various locations. Most critically to prevent festering problems from growing into full-blown crises which require costly – and controversial – large-scale American military intervention.”

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY (FEB 2011)

IW, COIN, and SO not mentioned. “Stability” used only in terms of regional stability.

ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE 2011 (25 MAR 2011)

(p. 6) INTRODUCTION: “To succeed in this environment, the Army will build balance in the force: balance between winning the current war and preparing for the future, balance between conventional and irregular capabilities, and balance between the cultural advantages….”
GEN CONE, TRADOC COMMANDER (APPROX. 25 MAY 2011)

Paraphrase of comments based upon e-mail from TRADOC regarding the Army IW Fusion Cell. The TRADOC e-mail is quoted: “This is cell that was stood up out of necessity (support for OIF, OEF) and is now an enduring requirement – Said it needs to talk to the transition to an enduring requirement.”

GEN. ODIERNO TESTIMONY TO SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (21 JUL 2011)

Pre-hearing questionnaire reported in Washington Post, 26 July 2011. “‘The future battlefield will be populated with hybrid threats—combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. We must train and educate our leaders and units to understand and prevail against hybrid threats.’ He explained that approach required ‘both combined arms maneuver and wide area security,’ the latter including counterinsurgency operations. To establish and train troops in these areas the Army has created a series of institutional units which Odierno described.…. The Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell…coordinates irregular warfare training doctrine, primarily on counterinsurgency….”

2012 – 2015 CHAIRMAN’S JOINT TRAINING GUIDANCE (31 AUG 11)

“Counterinsurgency (COIN), Stability Operations, and Counterterrorism (CT) Competencies and Capacities in Conventional Forces (CF). The Department of Defense envisions institutionalizing these areas as core competencies in the joint force to foster effectiveness in these complex mission areas while maintaining our advantage in conventional warfare.”

GEN ODIERNO, WWW.ARMY.MIL (8 SEP 11)

Future leaders must be adaptable, agile, and able to operate in a threat environment that includes a combination of regular warfare, irregular warfare, terrorist activity, and criminality. (Paraphrase)

38TH CSA INITIAL GUIDANCE (11 SEP 11)

“Our Nation’s Force of Decisive Action: Decisive in a range of missions—conducting regular and irregular warfare against hybrid threats.”
DAVID M. RODRIGUEZ, “LEAVING AFGHANISTAN TO THE AFGHANS: A COMMANDER’S TAKE ON SECURITY,” FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SEP/OCT 2011

“The army must be versatile enough to succeed in regular wars, irregular wars, and wars that combine aspects of both.”

ADP 3-0, UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS (OCT 2011)

(P. 2-3) “Army forces simultaneously and continuously combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations through a blend of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.”

(P. 5) “Army forces conduct regular and irregular warfare against both conventional and hybrid threats.”

MG PETER BAYER, DIRECTOR STRATEGY, PLANS AND POLICY DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7 TESTIMONY TO HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, 3 NOV 11

“In the past decade, the Army has captured that adaptation [Iraq and Afghanistan] by institutionalizing irregular warfare capability and capacity across the force. We now possess a versatile mix of capabilities, formations and equipment capable of decisive action in a range of missions, including regular and irregular warfare against conventional and hybrid threats.”

‘The following answers to your questions reflect a candid assessment of the Army’s efforts to institutionalize irregular warfare….

1. (paraphrase) Institutionalization of IW is evident in the Army’s foundational doctrine which identifies IW as critical…., the Army Capstone Concept, and the Army Operating Concept. DoDD 3000.07 is reflected in Army doctrine for stability ops, including ADP 3-0, FM 3-07, FM 3-07.1, FM 3-05.2, and FM 3-13. The Army created the AIWFC and PKSOI. Army has a proponent for SFA. JFKSWC identifies gaps and solutions for irregular challenges. CALL produces Lessons Learned pubs. “The most important thing the Army can do to advance the institutionalization of irregular warfare is to continue the professional military education of our leadership.”

2. “Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats: combinations of regular, irregular, terrorist, and criminal groups. The Army continues to partner with the U.S. State Department to formalize enduring civil-military integration across a range of steady state activities that support irregular warfare.”
3. “The Army is properly postured to deal with future **irregular warfare** challenges provided adequate time and resources to reset and refit at the conclusion of current operations. In our brigades, the Army has embedded a host of **irregular warfare** specialties, including information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, military information support operations, electronic warfare, and human terrain teams. To support the necessary flexibility, the Army rebalanced its force structure across all components to support **irregular warfare**…. The key to advancing the Army’s ability to respond to **irregular threats** will be to ensure the necessary force structure to support a versatile mix of capabilities in an uncertain future.”

**ADM JAMES WINNEFELD, VCJCS, STRATCOM/AFCEA**
**CYBER & SPACE SYMPOSIUM, OMAHA (17 NOV 11)**

“We’re not likely to have, as our next fight, a **counterinsurgency**. We can’t dwell on the wonderful **COIN** capability we have developed. While we’ve been fighting these **COIN** fights, the world has changed…. [T]he conflict that I’m hoping to deter by clearly demonstrating that we’re able to win it wherever it occurs, will be in a far more technically challenging environment than our fights today.”

**CJCS DEMPSEY, LONDON FINANCIAL TIMES (1 DEC 11)**

“We will retain capability across the spectrum, that is to say from low end **irregular [operations]** all the way up through nuclear deterrence.”

**GEN CONE, NATIONAL DEFENSE MAGAZINE (DEC 11)**
*article by Sandra I. Erwin*

Author quotes GEN Cone: "He expects the Army to continue to practice its **COIN** skills 'We are not going to forget the importance of the population and many of the lessons we learned so painfully in the past 10 years,' said Cone. To prepare for **hybrid** threats, there will be more training focused on 'offense' and 'defense' against a mix of conventional foes, terrorists and criminal networks.'”

**MARCHING ORDERS, 38TH CHIEF OF STAFF, US ARMY (JAN 12)**

“**CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE FORCE:** Flexible and Agile: We must be…able to dominate any operational environment against conventional and **hybrid** threats. Flexibility is achieved by preserving responsiveness to a broad range of missions including regular and **irregular warfare**….”

11
SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE (5 JAN 12)
Signed by SecDef Panetta
Introductory letter signed by Pres. Obama (3 Jan 12)

P. 4. “Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, we will continue to build and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for counter terrorism and irregular warfare.”

P.6. “Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”

P. 6. “The overall capacity of U.S. forces, however, will be based on requirements that the following subset of missions demand: counter terrorism and irregular warfare; deter and defeat aggression; maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; and defend the homeland and support civil authorities.”

P. 8. “Over the past ten years, the United States and its coalition allies and partners have learned hard lessons and applied new operational approaches in the counter terrorism, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance arenas…. Accordingly, similar work needs to be done to ensure the United States, its allies, and partners are capable of operating in A2/AD, cyber, and other contested operating environments. To that end, the Department will both encourage a culture of change and be prudent with its ‘seed corn,’ balancing reductions necessitated by resource pressures with the imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs.”

GENERAL OFFICERS’ OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT (25 JAN 2012)
with CG FORSCOM, CG TRADOC, others:

GEN Cone (paraphrase): Army needs a long-term strategy, that addresses what the Army must do and how it fights. All discussions/proposals were based on a hybrid threat that was a combination of regular, irregular, terrorists and criminals.

GEN Odierno (paraphrased by GEN Cone): We will be engaged in IW for the foreseeable future. We know Air-Sea Battle is not the total answer. We need a land component capability to complement that. We should emphasize the human domain, not just the land domain.
GENERAL ODIERNO PRESENTATION (25 JAN 2012)
AUSA Institute of Land Warfare Breakfast

“We must apply the lessons learned over the past decade, to include…(3) sustaining the tactics, techniques and procedures that have made us successful in counterinsurgency and regular warfare…. We must be able to operate across any operational environment…including regular and irregular warfare, stability operations, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance, and any other mission that is out there.”

DEFENSE BUDGET PRIORITIES AND CHOICES (JAN 2012)
The force “will be a force that is adaptable and capable of deterring aggression and providing a stabilizing presence…. Our approach to readiness recognizes that after a decade of focus on counter-insurgency operations, the U.S. armed forces must re-hone other capabilities needed for a wider spectrum of missions and adversaries.” DoD will “No longer size active forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations while retaining the expertise of a decade of war. The new strategic guidance emphasizes flexibility and adaptability. While the U.S. does not anticipate engaging in prolonged, large-scale stability operations…we cannot rule out the possibility. [E]ven as troop strength draws down, the Army, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command will preserve expertise in security force assistance and counterinsurgency training.”

ARMY POSTURE STATEMENT (FEB 2012)
P. 5. “We anticipate a myriad of hybrid threats that incorporate regular and irregular warfare, terrorism, and criminality.”

P. 32. “The active component O&M base budget provides funding for a training strategy that produces Soldiers and units that are decisive in a wide range of missions including regular and irregular warfare against conventional and hybrid threats…."

P. 36. “Characteristics of The Future Force. Flexible and Agile: Flexibility is achieved by preserving responsiveness to a broad range of missions including regular and irregular warfare…."

FY 2013 BUDGET REQUEST OVERVIEW (FEB 2012)
P. 2-3. Lists the ten 21st Century Priorities, which include CT, IW, Stab Ops, and COIN.
“As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counter terrorism efforts will become more widely distributed for counter terrorism and irregular warfare.”

ARMY DRAWDOWN AND RESTRUCTURING: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (20 APR 2012)
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Ref “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense” (5 Jan 12): Report states the Army must “Preserve expertise in security force assistance and counterinsurgency.” Report also states that the Army will continue to train “NATO partner and non-NATO European forces in counterinsurgency in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan.” That training mission probably will transition to one for building partner capacity.

POSTURE STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE 112th CONGRESS, SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
MARCH 6, 2012

“Insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal organizations, nation states and their proxies exploit gaps in policy developed for the more predictable world of yesterday. Increasingly these threats are networked, adaptable, and empowered by cyberspace to find new ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate. In short, the strategic environment is changing – quickly and constantly.”

ARMY STRATEGIC PLANNING GUIDANCE (APRIL 2012)
P. 1. “ The Army must transform itself from a force that focuses on counterinsurgency operations to an Army that is operationally adaptable, able to meet the range of Combatant Commander requirements as part of the Joint Force, including counterterrorism and irregular warfare . . . ; conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations. . . . While not every Soldier will be trained for all missions, the Army as a whole will be trained to and capable of accomplishing all the missions with which it may be tasked.”

P. 5. “Shaping activities may include. . . building partner capacity, security force assistance. . . foreign internal defense, counterterrorism. . . .
P. 7. “Adaptability within the force is a combat multiplier across the range of military operations, especially when operating in a complex environment, countering irregular threats, or developing foreign security forces.”

P. 16. Annex A: Army Interpretation of Defense Guidance. “Countering Irregular Threats. This Joint Operating Concept is reflective of Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare in Department of Defense guidance. There are five activities that are undertaken to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations.”

P. 17. Annex A. “Project Power despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges. The Joint Operational Access Concept and its developing subordinate concepts describe this requirement in Joint terms. This requirement also is reflective of efforts to assure access and is resident in the requirements for Countering Irregular Threats. . . .”

“Cooperative Security (CS). This Joint Concept is reflective of Providing a Stabilizing Presence in Department of Defense Guidance. CS is the set of continuous, long-term integrated, comprehensive actions among a broad spectrum of U.S. and international governmental and nongovernmental partners that maintains or enhances stability, prevents or mitigates crises, and enables other operations when crises occur. Many of these operations overlap and support efforts to counter irregular threats.”


DECADE OF WAR, VOL I: ENDURING LESSONS FROM THE PAST DECADE OF OPERATIONS
JOINT AND COALITION OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS (JCOA), JOINT STAFF J7
15 JUNE 2012

Ref Iraq and Afghanistan: “It is critical for the US to retain this capability to provide overmatch capability in major combat operations against peers and regional aggressors. However, conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects. This was necessary in part because adversaries, seeing the overmatch capability of the US in conventional war, decided to employ asymmetric means instead of conventional force-on-force combat operations.”

THE VIEW FROM THE E RING
CJCS DEMPSEY INTERVIEW WITH JAMES KITFIELD, NATIONAL JOURNAL
28 JULY 2012
NJ: During the post-Vietnam drawdown of the 1970s, the Pentagon infamously favoring force structure and modernization at the expense of readiness, leading to a “hollow force.” The Army also largely expunged the lessons of counterinsurgency after Vietnam. Has the military internalized the lessons from those mistakes?

DEMPSEY: On readiness, the short answer is yes. Because we lived through that experience, most flag-rank officers are committed to the premise that no matter what size force we maintain, we will keep it in balance. Nor can we allow the lessons in counterinsurgency operations learned over the past decade to be lost. Right now, however, I have the opposite problem. If you are a lieutenant colonel or sergeant first class in the Army today, for instance, you don’t know anything else except counterinsurgency. And that’s not the only type of conflict we need to be prepared for.

NJ: The national-strategy guidance says that the military will no longer be sized for large-scale, prolonged stability operations. It will cut 100,000 ground forces in coming years. Doesn’t that mean no more Iraq- or Afghanistan-like campaigns?

DEMPSEY: Not really. We like to think we can pick our conflicts, but in reality, conflict picks you. There is still the thorny matter of our alliance with the Republic of Korea. That scenario certainly has the potential for significant land forces and stability operations. What we have tried to do with the new defense strategy is anticipate a decline in resources, and consider how we might leverage cutting-edge technologies to accomplish our current missions differently. And if we did get into another large, long-term stability operation, it would probably require us to access the National Guard and Reserves in ways we haven’t in the past.

QUADRENNIAL ROLES AND MISSIONS REVIEW
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
20 JULY 2012

P. 2. “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. However, we will ensure that U.S. forces retain the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities developed over the past decade in conducting stability and counterinsurgency operations.”

P. 4. “Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare. Acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. forces will continue to expand their capabilities to conduct counterterrorism and irregular warfare as we combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, wherever they may be. As the United States transitions the lead for security in Afghanistan, global counterterrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance. Reflecting lessons learned of the past decade, DoD will continue to build force capacity and sustain tailored capabilities appropriate for this mission area.”
P. 10. “Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations. Although overall capacity in the Army and Marine Corps will decrease, and the ground forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations, U.S. forces will continue to institutionalize lessons learned from current operations. They will maintain and, in some cases, enhance capabilities for stability and counterinsurgency operations. Stability Operations will remain a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with a proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”

P. 11. “Sustain Training and Doctrine. The Department will continue to support institutions that provide training and education for counterinsurgency and Stability Operations in order to maintain capability and to be able to expand capabilities [as] quickly as required.”

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS TO 2028:
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT FOR UNIFIED LAND OPERATIONS
TRADOC, AUGUST 2012

NOTE: ADRP 1-02 (Aug 2012) defines “hybrid threat” as “The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.”

P. 2. “Potential threats will range from standing conventional and unconventional forces, to irregular militias and paramilitaries, to terrorist groups and criminal elements. Training, education, capabilities development, and concept development should reflect this reality. The current strategic environment seems more ambiguous, presenting multiple layers of complexity and challenging the Army with requirements beyond traditional warfighting skills and training.”

P. 4. “Future conflicts, moreover, will primarily: … Be asymmetric and irregular rather than symmetric (involving at times states but also various types of non-state actors, e.g. terrorist groups, criminal organizations, guerrillas, etc.)

P. 5. “The tactical manifestation of an actor using a hybrid strategy is a hybrid threat. The hybrid threat components of adaptive strategy include two or more of the following: …
  • Insurgent organizations (movements that primarily rely on subversion and violence to change the status quo)
  • Guerrilla units (irregular indigenous forces) operating in occupied territory

P. 5. “At the tactical level, hybrid threats will employ four key designs that specifically adapt resources available in the strategic environment for use against the U.S. and its partners…
  • Exploit Regular/Irregular Synergy

P. 7. “Key themes emerging from analysis of SE conditions and adversaries are proliferation of WMN, hybrid threats, advancements in technology, and an explosion of ICT (Information and
Communications Technology) capabilities among actors of all types. Adaptation will be rampant among adversaries, so we must train and prepare for a multitude of these conditions on a wide array of OEs.”

P. 13. “Malicious actors will use violence in pursuit of their goals and will potentially challenge U.S. national interests and vulnerabilities. Threats will use this complexity to their advantage and often employ hybrid strategies.”

P. 16. “The Army must be prepared to deal with failing states and those actors seeking to benefit from such conditions.”

P. 17. “The range of threats across the strategic environment over the forecast period, include criminal organizations, terrorists, states and non-state actors, insurgents, transnational groups, proxies, technologically-empowered individuals, and paramilitaries. These actors are increasing in number and capabilities, and may operate as regular, irregular, or hybrid threats that can and will challenge conventional military forces.”

P. 17. “The Army must be capable of decisive action against a wide array of adaptive threats, and be operationally prepared for a wide range of missions.”

P. 17. “The Army will need to continue to mature its capabilities to counter foreign insurgents and extremists, especially in the Homeland, while maintaining the ability to fight a regular or hybrid threat against state actors and their proxies.”

P. 18. “The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) predicts that ‘terrorist or insurgent organizations acting alone or through middlemen may acquire nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons and may seek opportunistic networks as service providers.’”

P. 29. “Iran would most likely present a highly adaptive threat, using both high- and low-tech threat capabilities. Regular, irregular, and criminal elements would combine to counter U.S. forces and employ anti-access strategies.”

P. 30. “North Korea would present the U.S. with the challenges of countering a hybrid threat. It would utilize both its conventional forces and irregular elements to conduct hit-and-run attacks and terrorist acts.”

P. 39. “The tactical manifestation of an actor using adaptive strategy that will be encountered by our forces is a threat employing hybrid strategies. The hybrid is the natural result of a political entity arming and organizing to coerce or deter other entities in the region. Such threats provide the operational and tactical space for moving rapidly from conventional operations against a neighbor to decentralized irregular operations against an intervention.”

P. 40. “Hybrid threats will use a strategic capability that forces any intervening power to adjust operations. This will not affect the transition between regular and irregular operations, and the threat of the capability still provides a tool for manipulating the intervening force. All
components of a hybrid threat will use cyber operations to either degrade U.S. mission command capabilities or to conduct perception management campaigns.

Hybrid threats have the ability to combine and transition between regular, irregular, and criminal forces and operations and to conduct simultaneous combinations of various types of activities that will change and adapt over time. Such varied forces and capabilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize on perceived U.S. vulnerabilities.”

Iran and North Korea would most likely present a hybrid threat. Regular, irregular, and criminal elements would be combined to challenge U.S. forces.”

P. 41. “Adversaries understand that the environment that would produce the most challenges to U.S. forces is one in which conventional military operations execute in concert with irregular warfare. Units that are well-trained and equipped for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations often do not retain the precise skills, equipment, and mindset for conventional combat and vice versa. In addition, there is a synergy to the simultaneous use of conventional and unconventional methods by both regular and irregular forces that is difficult to counter. Synergy will be achieved in one of two basic ways: by a threat state actor executing conventional operations that ensure the U.S. is also simultaneously presented with an irregular warfare environment; or by a threat non-state actor conducting irregular warfare that integrates conventional means and tactics into its operations.”

P. 44. “Training venues must contain adaptive, intelligent, and innovative opposive forces (OPFOR), organized and equipped in a flexible fashion that can replicate a mix of regular and hybrid threats.”

P. 45. “The Army must build and sustain capabilities to deter threats ranging from counterterrorism, to counter-insurgency, to aggressive states conducting major combat operations. Training, education, capabilities development, and concept development should reflect this reality.”

P. 47. “Counterinsurgency and counterterrorist training is still important, but the scope and depth of training must expand to include the entire spectrum of potential operations.”

P. 52. “Potential threats in this environment will retain hybrid capabilities.”

P. 53. “To succeed will require a force that can deal with sophisticated information campaigns, integrated regular and irregular operations.”

P. 60. “The Army may be called on for a higher tempo of combined training and exercises with Southeast Asian militaries. Light infantry training for counterterrorism, counter-piracy, and counterinsurgency missions will predominate.”

P. 61. “Irregular Warfare: Over the past decade, India, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Bangladesh have all experienced insurgent and terrorist violence from Islamist extremist groups that continue to operate in Southeast Asia and receive support from Persian Gulf
extremists. Although these threats are largely contained at present, the U.S. will need to be prepared to assist any democratic nation in the region whose stability is threatened by future growth of extremist violence via the deployment of special operations forces (SOF), light infantry, and support forces….”

P. 70. “Irregular Warfare: U.S. Army involvement in irregular warfare in the Europe/Russia region during the forecast period appears unlikely. Only the Balkans and the Caucasus exhibit the potential for insurgent movements, and neither region currently harbors vital U.S. interests that would justify the Army being committed in a counterinsurgency role. One exception that could arise late in the forecast period would involve a request by a weakened Russia for NATO assistance to stabilize key oil producing regions upon which Europe depends.”

P. 72. “Irregular threats in Africa include standing militias and insurgent groups with conventional military capabilities, well-organized and well-equipped terrorist groups, pirate groups deeply embedded in local communities, and drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) and other smuggling organizations with a broad range of land, maritime, and aviation mobility assets.”

P. 75. “The Army’s primary mission in Africa over the forecast period will be to conduct training to develop African military capabilities for combating the wide range of irregular threats in the region.”

P. 76. “COIN operations in Africa would involve many of the same challenges as current operations in Afghanistan: providing sufficient force densities to secure local populations; building indigenous security forces from a very low level of capability; bolstering weak governments with little political legitimacy; protecting U.S. forces from mechanical ambushes and improvised rocket munitions; and rapidly acquiring knowledge of local culture, language, and customs.”

P. 77. Central and South America and the Caribbean. “The principal security threats are drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), insurgent movements, terrorist groups, and the potential for collaboration between them.”

P. 80. “The Army will conduct training missions in this region to develop host-nation capabilities for drug interdiction and, to a lesser extent, COIN missions.”

P. 85. “Irregular threat groups that operate inside the U.S. or transit its borders pose unique challenges to the Army. Direct action against these adversaries is typically a law enforcement responsibility; however, DOD responsibilities for counterterrorism and counterdrug intelligence/interdiction require seamless collaboration between the U.S. military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.”

P. 87. “Threats will continually transition between conventional combat formations and dispersed irregular groups, focusing effects at critical times and places to diffuse U.S. and coalition employment of force.”

P. 11. “Develop deep regional expertise: Maintaining regional expertise within the armed forces will therefore remain an important requirement, especially when it comes to cooperative security, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare.”

GEN RAYMOND T. ODIerno
“TODAY’S ARMY: THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION”
ARMY MAGAZINE (“GREEN BOOK”), OCTOBER 2012

“Soldiers must prepare not only for potential peer competitors but also irregular forces that exploit complex physical and human terrain and have access to advanced weaponry and communications.”

ADP – 1, THE ARMY
SEPTEMBER 2012

Para 1-4. “Soldiers potentially face regular, irregular, or paramilitary enemy forces.”

Para 3-4. “The Nation’s leaders recognize the need for landpower in counter terrorism and irregular warfare. . . .”

Para 4-9. “We remain ready for missions spanning regular and irregular warfare. . . .”

CJCS JOINT TRAINING GUIDANCE
9 OCTOBER 2012

Page A-2. 4. Irregular Warfare (IW). State and non-state actors will continue to engage in irregular warfare against the United States, its allies, and partner nations; either exclusively or as a component of a larger campaign. The proliferation of advanced technologies, to include weapons of mass destruction and cyber, will increasingly imbue these threats with global reach, disruptive capacity, and lethality. Commands and components will conduct training to sustain IW capabilities and integrate developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), processes, and capabilities.
a. Focus on achieving partner integration during planning, as well as during execution and transition phases (references h and i).

b. Train to conduct sustained joint Security Force Assistance operations.

c. Command, component, and service training should support regionally aligned forces’ language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Maximize individual and collective training initiatives that reinforce understanding escalation-of-force procedures and minimizing civilian casualties. Integrate consideration of potential civilian casualties into fire support planning and the deliberate and dynamic targeting processes (reference j).

CSA GEN RAY ODIERNO
AUSA, PRESS CONFERENCE, 22 OCTOBER 2012

Future conflict will have “regular warfare, irregular warfare, terrorism, criminality, all combined together…. We are moving the Army in order to deal within that context.”

CSA GEN RAY ODIERNO
ARMY TIMES
5 NOVEMBER 2012

Question: “How do you preserve these (counterinsurgency) skills...? “
Answer: “We are redoing [our] counterinsurgency manual. We are looking at stability operations... in Afghanistan. We are incorporating the lessons learned into our doctrine. That is why the investment now in our institutional Army and our schools is so important, so we sustain these lessons that we have learned.”

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LEON PANETTA
“THE FORCE OF THE 21ST CENTURY”
SPEECH TO NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
18 DECEMBER 2012

“The United States faces an array of asymmetric threats in the world. We are expanding our security force assistance to a wider range of partners... the services are retaining the security cooperation capabilities we have honed over a decade of war and making investments in regional expertise.
P. 7. “The U.S. will also confront a diverse group of threats that may include state and non-state actors, paramilitary forces, proxies, insurgents, criminal organizations, terrorists, and technologically-empowered individuals.”

P. 8. “Hybrid strategies and tactics. Likely adversaries will employ a combination of regular and irregular tactics and seek technologies that enable them to overcome or avoid U.S. military strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses.”

P. 10. “[T]he joint force must access its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in the primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces: counterterrorism and irregular warfare. . . . conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations. . . .”

P. 15. “The Army must also retain the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct counterinsurgency or other stability operations in the future.”

P. 16. “These shaping activities occur simultaneously with decisive action, and often extend before and after specific offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA.”

P. 24. “The environment is uncertain and complex and its threats include: criminal organizations, terrorists, states and no-state actors, insurgents, transnational groups, proxies, technologically-empowered individual, and paramilitaries. These are increasing in number and capabilities, and may operate as regular, irregular, or hybrid threats that can and will challenge conventional military forces.”

THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE
GEN RAY ODIERNO
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, 15 FEB 2013

“With a fundamental role in ten of the eleven identified missions in the new Defense Strategy, the Army designated its force structure and capability requirements in support of this guidance. If sequestration occurs, we will probably have to do a complete review of our Defense Strategy and develop a new strategy based on the fiscal realities.”

“We must provide capabilities to our geographic combatant commanders that assist in their efforts to shape their environment through joint interagency and multinational activities, what we call Phase 0 operations.”

“We will deliver scalable, tailorable packages for a variety of missions, such as building partner capacity, humanitarian disaster relief, multilateral exercises, and rotational forces for operational contingency missions. We will execute this by implementing a process of what we call regionally aligned forces.”
Slide 3: Drivers of Change 2014. Resource the fight – insurgent based threat
Invest in the Future: Intellectual leads the physical

Slide 11: Influencing Human Behavior (talking points on slide 25). Current balance is focused on winning and compelling, more than shaping and preventing. Landpower is the means to influence and control. Close contact – forward engagement allows us to discern who to influence, who to compel.

Slide 12: “Develop how we Prevent – Shape- Win in the future.”
“7th Army Functional Concept: Capture the cultural and human lessons.”


Slide 38: Army Concepts through the Lens of Defense Strategy. Army must have a wide focus regarding threats and environments: Humanitarian Assistance, Cyber, Space, Presence, Homeland Defense, Deter & Defeat, Counter Terrorism, Irregular Warfare, Nuclear Deterrence, Counter WM, Stability/COIN.

Slide 26: “Enduring Landpower Concepts: 7th WfF captures the ideas we learned in the last war. CF-SF and JIIM integration.”


SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAGEL
TESTIMONY, HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBMITTED STATEMENT, 11 APRIL 2013

Threats:

- the persistence of violent extremism throughout weak states and ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and North Africa;
- the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials;
• the rise of new powers competing for influence;
• the risk of regional conflicts which could draw in the United States;
• faceless, nameless, silent and destructive cyber attacks;
• the debilitating and dangerous curse of human despair and poverty, as well as the uncertain implications of environmental degradation.

Ref personnel reductions: “Most of those reductions occur in the ground forces and are consistent with a decision not to size U.S. ground forces to accomplish prolonged stability operations, while maintaining adequate capability should such activities again be required.”

“Cuts and changes to capabilities – force structure and modernization programs – will also be required. The strategic guidance issued in January 2012 set the priorities and parameters that informed those choices, and the FY 2014 budget submission further implements and deepens program alignment to this strategic guidance.”

“Another tenet of the strategy is to support efforts to build partner capacity through innovative mechanisms based on lessons learned over the past decade of war.”

“The service budgets all fund initiatives that seek to return to full-spectrum training and preparation for missions beyond current operations in Afghanistan:

• The Army would prepare for a rotational presence in multiple regions and has begun training in “decisive action” scenarios and is transitioning to training in combined arms conventional warfare;”

FY 2014 budget: “. It is a balanced plan that would address some of the Department’s structural costs and internal budget imbalances while implementing the President’s defense strategic guidance and keeping faith with our men and women in uniform and their families.”

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAGEL
TESTIMONY, HOUSE ARMSED SERVICES COMMITTEE
OPENING SUMMARY, 11 APRIL 2013

Even as the military emerges and recovers from more than a decade of sustained conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, it confronts an array of complex threats of varying vintage and degrees of risk to the United States. These include the persistence of violent extremism throughout weak states and ungoverned spaces in the Middle East and North Africa; the proliferation of dangerous weapons and materials; the rise of new powers competing for influence; the risk of regional conflicts which could draw in the United States; faceless, nameless, silent and destructive cyber attacks; the debilitating and dangerous curse of human despair and poverty; as well as the uncertain implications of environmental degradation.

Meanwhile, the frenetic pace of technological change and the spread of advanced military technology to state and non-state actors pose an increasing challenge to America's military
“The service budgets all fund initiatives that seek to return to full-spectrum training and preparation for missions beyond current operations in Afghanistan.”

GEN RAY ODIERNO  
TESTIMONY TO SASC, 23 APRIL 2013  
“POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY”

Reiterates Army role in 2012 Defense Guidance – CT, Irregular Warfare, Stabilizing presence [SFA, FID], Stability Ops, COIN.

“Regional alignment will provide Geographic Combatant Commands with mission-trained and regionally focused forces that are responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater cooperation activities.”

“The Army’s Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE), which has been incorporated by each of our three maneuver Combat Training Centers, creates a realistic training environment that includes Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and Multinational partners against a wide range of opportunistic threats.” (Component of DATE is stability ops.)

GEN RAY ODIERNO  
DEFENSE WRITERS GROUP, 7 MAY 2013

Paraphrase from news article: So is there any common denominator to guide the Army’s preparation? Yes. All those conflicts would involve mix of guerrilla warfare amidst a largely hostile local population, as in Afghanistan or Iraq, with high-tech weapons—tanks, guided missiles, even cyber attacks—that the Taliban couldn’t deploy in their wildest dreams. That lethal combination is what theorists call “hybrid war.” To prepare its forces, the Army has to come up with what it calls “decisive action” training—training that is now threatened by budget cuts.

“But for unknown contingencies our risk goes way up. The environment we are going to have to operate in will be a mix of high-end, combined-arms maneuvers, but also some aspect of counterinsurgency and some aspect of stability operations. They’ll be mixed together.”

GEN RAY ODIERNO  
TESTIMONY, HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE  
8 MAY 2013

Looking into the future, we are reposturing our force to be globally responsive and regionally engaged. We are aligning forces to geographical combatant commanders to provide mission-tailored, sized, and scaled organizations for operational missions, exercises and theatre security
cooperation activities. For times of crisis, we'll maintain a global response force, capable of conducting forced entry on short notice. We will reinvest in our expeditionary capabilities to deploy forces quickly and efficiently anywhere in the world. And we are refining the integration of our conventional special operations forces and cyber capabilities to ensure we can handle a broad range of emerging threats. In this uncertain world we need an Army that conducts many missions at many speeds, in many sizes, under many conditions.