



AIWFC

Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center

Newsletter

30 November 2012

From the Director

Our colleague Phil Smith over at the USMC Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare recently reviewed the book, *Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of Insurgency and Global Instability in the Twenty First Century* ([see here](#)). He notes on Small Wars Journal that the author, G.L. Lamborn is explicit about the lack of understanding of the nature of irregular warfare in America. Lamborn states that “The American society, along with civilian and military leaders remain unprepared to deal with the complexities of insurgencies and small wars.”

Phil Smith writes: “Lamborn peppers his book with poignant questions, in a manner expected in a seminar, framed to educate through cognitive dissonance. What is our response to the overwhelming historic fact that conventional forces have usually outnumbered irregular forces 30-40 times but rarely ‘defeat’ the insurgents politically or strategically? Where in our PME for leaders and planners is the dedicated study to small wars? Why do so many of our leaders still think that firepower, massive force and high technology are keys to winning in small wars? Which of our adversaries present an existential technological or conventional threat to the USA?”

Phil goes on to show that we in America (and especially the US military), “even while we have been engaged in many small wars we have yet to institutionalize, or commit to philosophy and organizational memory the national, strategic and tactical lessons.”

From a national level, it is *vital* for civilian leaders in the security apparatus to themselves understand history and the nature of irregular challenges so they can properly weigh the advice of their military counterparts when irregular threats and challenges arise. From a military readiness standpoint, it is even MORE important for soldiers to maintain a satisfactory level of knowledge of small wars – to be ready when given the task to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations, stability operations, or security force assistance operations.

Thoughts? Please comment on our [blog](#) or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.

COL Nestor Sadler, Director

IRREGULAR WARFARE INTEGRATION

- **7th Warfighting Function (WfF) Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) Study Plan Information Brief, 15 Nov:** Special Operations CoE provided a brief to the 7th WfF Integrated Capabilities Process Team (ICDT) to illustrate the way-ahead for a proposed CBA timeline. SOCOE reiterated the military problem which is: “How does the Army generate, organize, and provide lethal and nonlethal capabilities to the Joint Force Commander to shape conditions in the operational environment that influence unified action partners and deter adversaries in order to provide our country with an unsurpassed capability across the range of military operations? SOCOE further provided a definition of the 7th Warfighting function and a proposed schedule for conducting and completing the CBA from November 2012 through March 2014. Near and mid-term goals are to: gain concept approval of the 7th Warfighting Function by the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) no later than 15 Dec; complete functional area analysis by Feb 2013; complete functional needs analysis by Jun 2013; and complete functional solutions analysis by Sep 2013.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

- **FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Revision.** AIWFC and the USMC Center for Irregular Warfare and Integration Division completed the initial draft and submitted to the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD). CADD is currently completing its review for consistency and nesting it with current doctrine and policy. CADD will release for staffing after completion of above tasks and editing (date to be determined).
- **Counterinsurgency seminar in support of 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, 13-16 November 2012.** AIWFC Seminar Team provided a seminar tailored for an OEF Security Force Assistance Advisor Team (SFAAT) mission and task organization focused on advising across the full range of SFA activities. Key topics presented at the seminar included: Understanding the Operational Environment; Insurgent Strategies; Advising on Counterinsurgency; Insider Threat Trends and Mitigation Techniques; Counterinsurgency Fundamentals; and Sustainment of the ANSF. The unit conducted one video teleconference with in-country planners and a focused teleconference with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), with emphasis on the current transition plan.
 - The seminar was attended daily by approximately 80-100 personnel throughout the seminar period, comprised of senior and mid level officers and NCOs. Participants received detailed presentations on a variety of focused COIN and

advisor related topics in compliance with the United States Forces Command (USFORSCOM) guidance for deploying forces. Further, the participants executed a series of practical exercises linked to the given presentations to further develop and apply the various concepts.

- The seminar team continues to evolve the construct of the seminar activities focused on promoting robust discussion which requires participants to think critically about the given topic while drawing upon their varying levels of experience. 2/25IBCT command team was pleased with the level of discussion the seminar generated throughout the week.
- **Army IW Fusion Center participation in 1st ABCT, 82nd ABN Division Umbrella Week, 13 November, Ft Bragg, NC.** Purpose of the visit was to gain irregular warfare and counterinsurgency insights, lessons learned and observations from 1/82ABCT combat experience in southern Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, Feb 12 – Sep 12. 1/82 conducted relief in place from Polish Battalion in Regional Command-East and conducted mission to secure Hiway 1, defeat insurgency along Hiway 1, increase capacity of Army and Police units through partnering, and connect local (village) leaders to the district government. 1/82 main effort was security of Hiway 1. Significant lessons included:
 - Security Force Assistance teams key to building ANA and Police staff proficiency,
 - But 1/82 line unit partnering key to building confidence in ANA and Police, especially in extending reach off Hiway 1 into insurgent areas of operation
 - ANA and Police largely tactically proficient, but needed confidence through conducting partnered operations to operate independently
 - ANSF “are not slow, or dumb, or weak. Once you teach them, they readily take over”
 - Capacity building of ANSF strongly improved by ensuring units and leaders used Afghan processes and did missions themselves
 - “We helped them see how to use their own systems”
 - “NCOs and officers had to change their mindset to ensure ANSF conducted missions, not 1/82”
 - 1/82 would not do any operation that their Afghan counterparts could not sustain themselves. “We forced ourselves to do less and for ANSF and GIRoA to do more”
 - 1/82 gained understanding of OE without benefit of relieving a US unit
 - Polish unit of little assistance in transferring knowledge of AO
 - 1/82 used village assessments, key leader engagements, and continual visits of villages and population centers to rapidly gain situational understanding
 - Conducted assessments of counterpart organizations (to “get in their shoes”) in order for 1/82 to help the ANSF help themselves
 - Used pre-deployment training to understand broad cultural factors and gained knowledge of local area through classified intelligence summaries and products

- Conducting multiple lines of operation was vital in facilitating sustainable control by local leaders
 - force, or lethal capabilities and actions, were crucial to separate insurgents from the population, while non-lethal solutions were important to facilitate establishment of security and governance by the Afghans
 - Air assaults, foot patrols, and mounted patrols conducted with Afghan forces defeated insurgents and allowed freedom of movement by civilian leaders from Ghazni City to outlying district centers and key villages
 - 1/82 magnified growing anger against Taliban atrocities by effective use of inform and influence activities by, with and through ANSF and GIRoA capabilities
- Importance of working with Afghan officials (ANSF, GIRoA, Village elders) to operationalize area of operations
 - Facilitated establishment of police checkpoints, police stations, and district centers to enable sustainable security after departure of 1/82
- Afghan leadership can make or impede success in creating and maintaining positive security and governance solutions
 - 1/82 applied pressure through constant personal interaction and at multiple echelons to replace poor leaders and to energize and motivate substandard performance
- Defeating the IED threat required continual evaluation of insurgent techniques and human networks
 - 1/82 conducted purposeful weekly after action reviews to share CIED techniques and insurgent tactics
 - 1/82 units constructed CIED lanes on FOBs and conducted “pre-jump” training prior to each patrol
 - Disruption of insurgents through air assaults and other operations in insurgent strongholds greatly reduced IED emplacement
- Reintegration of insurgents in Ghazni not possible
 - Unlike Kandahar, ANSF and GIRoA were not well established in southern Ghazni – insurgents therefore had little incentive to switch sides

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

- **DOTMLPF Integrated Capabilities Recommendation (DICR) for Building Partner Capacity (BPC):** Capability Gap #5 from the BPC DICR identifies a lack of “habitual forces” and “long term relationships” with the ability to perform Security Force Assistance tasks with partner nations’ military forces. The solution for this gap recommends that HQDA assign Special Operations Center of Excellence (SOCOE) as lead for the Security Cooperation (SC) Force Modernization proponent in accordance with AR 5-22: to integrate Civil Affairs (CA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Security Force Assistance (SFA), SC initiatives, requirements, and activities.

Additionally, the recommendation states that HQDA should realign SFA from CAC to SOCOE to facilitate integration.

- Mission Command COE concurs with the recommendations, but believes it is prudent to wait and see how the 7th WfF concept develops before making any final decisions. For more information, write to usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

- **Regionally Aligned Force Operational Planning Team (OPT), Ft Polk, 14 Nov:** AIWFC participated in the RAF OPT to develop memoranda of agreement (MOAs) for enabling organizations to inform their commands on establishing business rules in support of the RAF. Each enabling organization (SWCS, LDESP, TCC, ACFL, National Language Service Corps, AIWFC, and DISAM) presented their RAF support capabilities and ability to provide support to the 162nd. OPT members created draft MOAs which enabling organizations will staff with parent units for refinement and resourcing.

STABILITY OPERATIONS

- **Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): New Directions for International Peace and Security**, 21-22 Nov. PKSOI participated in workshop hosted by the Igarape Institute and the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI) and gave a presentation on “R2P and the Military.” In late 2011, Brazil introduced the concept of “Responsibility While Protecting (RWP)” because of concerns that the Libyan intervention allegedly exceeded UNSCR 1973’s Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate by effecting regime change, causing excessive civilian casualties, and failing to coordinate properly with the UN during the operation. This view struck a responsive chord with the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and others in the “global south” who are skeptical about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept. However, the plight of innocent civilians in situations such as Syria are of concern to many in Brazil. Many Brazilian thought-leaders appear to desire to reframe RWP constructively in order to address legitimate concerns, but to avoid obstructionism when R2P genuinely applies in specific situations. This invites the question of whether a separate RWP framework is really required or if the existing R2P framework and those of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) are sufficient.
 - The Brasilia workshop consisted of several panels on topics including: The UN Secretary General Report on R2P; R2P and the Military; Preventive Measures; The Use of Force; RWP; and R2P in 2022. Approximately 100 people attended, including representatives from the US, Norwegian, Indian, and Argentinean embassies to Brazil and a half-dozen O-5/6 level participants from Brazil’s military.
 - If activist voices in Brazil’s government, military, and academia can reframe it appropriately, RWP can be a constructive vehicle for Brazil to take a leading role in R2P, influence the other BRICS, and preventively engage to help reform countries of concern. Brazil’s record as an effective UN contributor (especially in Haiti), its reputation as a peaceful nation, its growing national power, and its own

experience in related challenges such as prison reform, civil military relations, and diversity management give it credibility with other countries. For more information, contact PKSOI at usarmy.carlisle.awc.list.pksoi-operations@mail.mil.

PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST

- **Countering Criminal Street Gangs: Lessons from the Counterinsurgent Battlespace, by John A. Bertetto.** Criminal street gang members are not insurgents, and street gangs are not insurgencies. Law enforcement agencies are not the military, and our cities are not legitimate battlefields. However, insurgent fighters operating in countries around the globe and domestic street gang members engaged in criminal behavior share more in common than we often care to openly admit. See John Bertetto's article at Small Wars Journal and follow the discussion, [here](#).
- **Why U.S. troops must stay in Afghanistan, article by Kimberly and Frederick Kagan.** Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan. The answer can be yes only if we pursue and support the current strategy, retaining roughly 68,000 troops in Afghanistan into 2014 and about half that number thereafter. See full article in the Washington Post [here](#).
- **Irregular Warfare Center Preps Unit for New Missions, article by LTC Mark Ulrich.** BCT missions in Afghanistan are changing to advisory teams from strictly counterinsurgency operations. The AIWFC assists these units by conducting tailored pre-deployment seminars which include interactive presentations, small group breakouts, case study reviews, and focused exercises. The AIWFC team has adapted its seminar content and format to meet the changing needs of Army units. [See more here](#).
- **Ground Truth in Building Human Security, by Douglas Batson, PKSOI Paper.** The thesis of this paper is that overwhelmingly, the drivers of much violence and instability in many developing countries stem from land conflict, and solutions to this age-old, ensnaring problem are achievable with structured practices and available tools that focus on land administration. This paper provides excellent insight for peacekeepers or any force deployed to areas of instability. [Download here](#).

STRATCOM & OUTREACH

- **Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Webcast, Nesting with your Afghan Partners, 26 Nov.** AIWFC hosted LTC Ben Eiser for this webcast who discussed his experiences while deployed to Afghanistan this year as the Senior Mentor/Advisor to the 2nd Brigade Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP). He led a Security Force Assistance Team (SFAT) responsible for Brigade level staff training/mentorship, including 5 additional ANCOP Battalions consisting of 2,000 Afghan Officers. He covered the aspects of nesting the advisory mission in the

campaign plans of US counterpart units. According to him, this nesting is a key to success, but only when the Afghan endstates are taken into consideration. Not only must US units nest the advisory line of effort up and down the US hierarchy (battalion, brigade, division), but also must account for how Afghan units operate and the endstates or objectives of both these units and US units. During his presentation, LTC Eiser also discussed the art of design, understanding the environment, building the right teams (both US and Afghan), and a highly interesting piece on Afghan logic and understanding. He concluded with answering questions from on-line participants. Download the summary, slideshow and [other webcast products here](#).

- **Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center Webcast, Partnering and SFA in Zharay, 8 Nov.** The Joint Center for Operational Analysis identified partnering and SFA as key enablers and force multipliers in aiding host nation capacity building. Host nation forces have certain strengths such as increased awareness of cultural cues that help them discriminate between threats and non-combatants. Conversely, host nation forces are often challenged with lack of proficiency and experience, corruption, infiltration, and lack of accountability. ([see report here](#)). How do US forces best deal with these strengths and challenges? **LTC Matt Knorr** led a highly relevant discussion on how 4th Airborne Brigade Combat Team, 82nd ABN DIV conducted partnering and SFA in Zharay District, Afghanistan from Feb-Sep 2012. Download the summary of his briefing and other webcast products [here](#).

Irregular Warfare Community Events

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| 4 Dec | Turkey: Friend or Foe? Michael A. Reynolds (lecture), Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia |
| 5 Dec | What Can Data Tell Us About Trends in Terrorism? (briefing), New America Foundation, 1500EST |
| 6 Dec | Infantry Brigade Warfighters' Forum Senior Mentor Symposium , webcast, Infantry BCT Warfighters' Forum, 0900EST |
| 13 Dec | Army IW Fusion Center Webcast , LTC Fernando Lujan, Embedded with the Afghans, 1000CST |
| 3 Jan | AWfF Senior Mentor Symposium , webcast, III Corps Commander, 1330CST |

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