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- The future of irregular warfare in the Army requires a coherent approach to developing DOTMLPF and policy and to ensure both SOF and conventional forces have all they need to plan, prepare, execute and assess future operations.

- COL Gus Benton is the new Army IW Center Director.

Future of Irregular Warfare in the Army

The Army Irregular Warfare Center (AIWC) recently completed a research paper on the future of irregular warfare in the Army. The purpose of the paper was to examine whether the Army should maintain its capabilities and capacity to conduct irregular warfare as a core mission area in the future operational environment. The paper also examined whether the Army has a coherent approach to institutionalizing IW in the generating and operating forces and whether there are gaps in the current approach that must be addressed. Key areas addressed were:

- Definitions - What does Department of Defense mean by irregular warfare?
- History - What has been the Army's historical experience with irregular warfare?
- Understanding the Operational Environment - What irregular warfare challenges are the Army most likely to face in the future?
- Irregular Warfare knowledge and skills - Does the Army need to retain IW knowledge and skills?
- Countering the threat - How does the Army leadership envision countering future irregular warfare challenges?
- DOTMLPF functions - What Army organizations are the current focal points for IW DOTMLPF functions?

The paper resulted in specific conclusions and offered several recommendations. However, the paper is not an end-point, but points up many more follow-up questions and additional points of study, some of which we will take on here at AIWC.

I would like your opinion – join the dialogue. Send us an email message and request a copy of the paper at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil. Then, blog a response at our newly built blog site at <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC/>.

COL Gus Benton, SF, USA, Director, Army Irregular Warfare Center

PS, this paper was peer-reviewed by subject matter experts in the Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Mission Command COE, Foreign Military Studies Office, School for Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, HQDA G3/5/7 (DAMO SSO), Center for Army Lessons Learned, and US Army Special Operations Command (CAC SOF Cell).

New Director of Army IW Center

Colonel Gus Benton, II is the latest director of AIWC and joined the office in August from US Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida. COL Benton is a graduate of Fort Valley State University (1986) and received an ROTC commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Signal Corps.

His initial assignment was to the 8/43rd Air Defense Artillery Battalion (PATRIOT), where he served as a Platoon Leader, Battery Executive Officer, and Battalion Signal Officer. His next assignment was with the 2/72nd Armor Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Republic of Korea. Following his graduation from the Special Forces Qualification Course in 1993, Colonel Benton served in a number of positions within the special operations community from 1993-2001, to include serving as a Company Commander, Battalion Operations Officer, Battalion Executive Officer and Group-level Operations Officer. In Apr 2001, Colonel Benton was assigned to the Joint Staff, J37, Deputy Director for Special Operations in Washington, D.C. In Jun 2003, Colonel Benton assumed command of 2nd Battalion, 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne) and led the battalion during two combat tours in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). In Jul 2007, Colonel Benton was reassigned as the Chief of Staff, United States Army Special Forces Command (Airborne). In Jul 2008, Colonel Benton assumed command of the 3rd SFG(A) and deployed the Group to Afghanistan in support of OEF XIII and XV, serving as COMCJSOTF-A. In Aug 2010, Colonel Benton was reassigned to Headquarters, United States Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida as the J33-Ground Maritime Fires Branch Chief. In Aug 2013, Colonel Benton was reassigned as the Director, Army Irregular Warfare Center, Mission Command Center of Excellence, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Colonel Benton's military education includes the Signal Officer Basic and Infantry Officer Advanced Courses, the U.S. Army Command General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College. His civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science in Electronics Engineering Technology from Fort Valley State University, a Master of Science in Administration from Central Michigan University and a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College.



COL Gus Benton

When the established military conquers an insurgency, is it a coup?

Egypt: When a Coup is not a Coup

LTC Mark Ulrich has written a thought provoking article that has gotten a heavy volume of comments and sparked discussion about what really occurred in Egypt. It takes a different and more analytical look a coup d'état and provides an alternative insight into what actually occurred in Egypt below the surface. This article provides discussion and methodologies that could influence how we look at other nations and regions in crisis. See the article here on Small Wars Journal: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/egypt-when-a-coup-is-not-a-coup>



KU grad students to help AIWC as research fellows

Where can academia and the Department of Defense collaborate in an environment of diminished resources to smartly look at irregular warfare issues? The answer may lie in a soon-to-be-signed memorandum of agreement between the U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center at Fort Leavenworth and the University of Kansas. Under the agreement, three fellows who are doctoral candidates at KU will conduct research and write scholarly papers that focus on issues important to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Read more in the Fort Leavenworth Lamp here: <http://www.ftleavenworthlamp.com/article/20130912/>

FtLeavenworthLamp.com

Lessons on Stability Operations from U.S. Army War College Students

The following is excerpted from the PKSOI SOLLIMS Sampler, August 2013

“Establishing a safe and secure environment involves much more than initial policing actions. The reduction of violence in the given operating environment over time requires a range of other actions and appropriate resourcing.



“On the surface, most members of the military will likely look at establishing a safe and secure environment as simply providing a policing function with an aim at keeping violence at a minimum. In actuality, it seems that providing a lasting secure environment entails much more. Once basic security is established in a peacekeeping situation, the stabilizing force or team must start building the basic foundations of society based upon a thorough needs assessment of the operating environment.

“One “ground level” challenge is attempting to reduce violence in an operating environment. As a military police company commander in Iraq in 2003, my company was charged with supply route patrols. One of our tasks was to enforce the weapons ban placed on the Iraqi population. While we confiscated many AK-47s and other weapons, the Iraqi populace that we were now charged with protecting frequently reminded us that we were removing from them their basic ability to protect themselves in their homes. Opportunistic crime was still rampant at this point in the war. While we were carrying out orders to remove weapons from the battlefield, we may have also been creating a situation where many Iraqi civilians could no longer defend themselves against the many criminal elements still roaming the country. This likely created a significant anti-American sentiment that would continue to challenge the coalition in the coming years of the war. The point is that if the peacekeeping forces are not available on the ground to provide the security the population requires, then creative approaches that include utilizing indigenous police and military forces in a partnering approach must be considered. This was a big problem in Iraq, however, because the previous indigenous forces were all disbanded, leaving U.S. forces, like my company, having to start from scratch training Iraqi police units – using individuals with no experience and little capability to provide for their own security.”

Read the rest of the story here: <http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/pubs/pubsreview.cfm?ID=37>

Talking COIN with the folks from the Army Irregular Warfare Center

Ryan Evans of War on the Rocks.com writes: "I recently sat down with Lieutenant Colonel Brian A. Payne and David Kasten of the U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Center (AIWC) at the Jefferson Hotel bar here in Washington, DC. This is part one of that conversation. Brian is the Director of AWIC and David is its Chief of Interagency Coordination.



“Our guests show that irregular warfare was a dominant feature of American wars long before 9/11. It was a really fascinating conversation full of thoughtful analysis and war stories – over drinks of course. We hear everything from Brian’s tactical response to a village band in Haiti to David not joining the French Foreign Legion and becoming a sniper instead.

“Needless to say, none of the views expressed by Brian and David represent the opinions of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.”

Listen to the recording at War on the Rocks here: <http://warontherocks.com/2013/07/podcast-talking-coin-with-the-folks-from-the-army-irregular-warfare-center/>

PKSOI operates the Stability Operations Lessons Learned Information and Management System, a collaborative web-tool. See it here: http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/lessons_learned.cfm

War on the Rocks is a web publication that serves as a platform for analysis, commentary, and debate on foreign policy and national security issues through a realist lens.

Regional Alignment in Joint and Combined Exercises

The Regional Alignment of Forces concept is the U.S. Army's way of preparing scalable, tailorable forces to meet the demands of the nation's six combatant commands across the globe.



Regional Alignment includes home-station culture and language training designed, in part, to improve Soldiers' understanding of a particular region before a unit is formally requested to serve in that area. Many Soldiers recently have had the opportunity to take their regional training one step further by joining a foreign military partner in combined and joint exercises within the partner nation's borders.

In South Africa, Soldiers from 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division - which is regionally aligned with U.S. Africa Command - participated in Shared Accord 2013, a biennial training exercise, held July 22- August 5, to strengthen relationships and cohesion between the U.S. and South African militaries. Other U.S. Army units participating in the exercise included the 82nd Airborne Division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Washington D.C. and New York National Guard, and 3rd Infantry Division,

enabling Soldiers across several components to gain experience working with members of the South African Defense Force.

U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), which oversees most of the Army's conventional combat forces based in the United States, is responsible for aligning its subordinate units with the nation's six combatant commands. These alignments enable response to varying degrees of formal need and commitment. All contribute to maintaining a predictable, efficient way of preparing and providing Army forces to support combatant commanders. FORSCOM is flexible and responsive to the needs of the nation, and its operations staff is organized with desk officers who focus directly on the requests and contingency plans of each combatant command.

Read more here: http://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2013-08-28/?s_cid=standto

Quote

"I'm not crazy about the term 'human domain,'" said Maj. Gen. Sacolick. But whatever we formally call the human factors, he said, "it's got to be a planning consideration whenever we do anything."

MG Ben Sacolick, '10 Years Of Object Failure': Army, SOCOM, Marine Leaders Focus On 'Strategic Landpower'
By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Breaking Defense, August 27, 2013

What do you think?

Should human factors be part of planning for conventional force, state-on-state operations?

Send us an email at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil

AIWC Web-based Seminar, Enabler Access in OEF-Afg, IJC Brief, 8 August

The ISAF Joint Command CJ5 (Future Plans Office) provided a briefing on enabler support and what deployed units can expect through the drawdown period to December 2014 and into the Resolute Support mission. AIWC hosted the event using Defense Connect Online-S in order to assist units in pre-deployment preparation.

The briefing was classified SECRET//REL USA, ISAF, NATO and included these topics: Medevac; Route Clearance Packages; Engineer Assets; Counter IED; EOD; ISR (Theater); TF Odin; and Aviation (Lift & Rotary Wing) Air Support. MAJ Rob Parmenter (IJC CJ5 Planner) facilitated the briefing and IJC staff collectively briefed and responded to questions from participants.

For more information about this briefing, to include URLs for downloading briefing products and access-ing the live recording, contact the AIWC by email at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil



The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan, The Other Side of the COIN, By Karl W. Eikenberry

“Since 9/11, two consecutive U.S. administrations have labored mightily to help Afghanistan create a state inhospitable to terrorist organizations with transnational aspirations and capabilities. The goal has been clear enough, but its attainment has proved vexing. Officials have struggled to define the necessary attributes of a stable post-Taliban Afghan state and to agree on the best means for achieving them.”

The above is the introduction to a Foreign Affairs article by former ambassador and retired lieutenant general Karl Eikenberry. The word “limits” in the title is somewhat misleading, in that the author’s issue is not so much with the doctrine itself, but with assumptions that led to how the doctrine was implemented. Protecting the people, increasing the capacity of Afghanistan’s government, and working hand-in-hand with President Karzai are tenets of counterinsurgency doctrine which formed the basis of US operations. Unfortunately, translating those tenets into actions proved to be difficult. The lack of a coordinated and resourced whole-of-

government approach forced the US military to take on nation-building tasks for which it was not prepared. The surge poured more troops into the country, but the President established a firm time for them to be withdrawn, plus the length of the tours was decreased. The result was that the ability of Soldiers and Marines to gain a clear understanding of the operational environment was greatly reduced. Finally, the lack of accountability and openness of the Karzai government led to corruption and incompetence. The overall problem, however, was that the US Government did not have “clear political goals.” That problem was exacerbated by commanders who became “intellectually arrogant and “cognitively rigid.” Eikenberry’s conclusion is that “the use of counterinsurgency doctrine” must be “bounded politically” with clearly defined ends.

To read the complete article go to <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/eikenberry082013>

We're on the Web!
[http://
 usacac.army.mil/
 cac2/AIWFC/](http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/AIWFC/)



AIWC
 Army Irregular Warfare Center

Questions or Comments -
 contact us at:

US Army Irregular Warfare Center
 804 Harrison Ave
 Fort Leavenworth, KS
 66027
 (913) 684-5196/5188

usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil

<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/>

Irregular Warfare Community Events

- 19 Sep** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, US Civil Military Operations in OEF-A, RC-East CJ9 briefing, DCO-S
- 3 Oct** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Interagency During Drawdown, Dept of State briefing, DCO-S
- 17 Oct (T)** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, SOF Capabilities and Conventional Force Integration in OEF-A, CJSOTF-A briefing, DCO-S
- 14-15 Oct** [Countering Terrorism Overseas Conference](#), RUSI, London
- 25 Oct** [20th Annual Terrorism Trends & Forecasts Symposium](#), IACSP, Mahwah, NJ
- 7 Nov** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Regionally Aligned Force Concept, HQDA G3/5/7 briefing, Defense Connect Online
- 21 Nov** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, RAF Lessons Learned, AIWC briefing, DCO
- 5 Dec** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities, Army EW Proponent briefing, DCO
- 9 Jan** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Chinese Cyber Warfare, Foreign Military Studies Office briefing, DCO
- 23 Jan** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Cyberterrorism, National Defense University briefing, DCO
- 6 Feb** Army IW Ctr Web-Seminar, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, AIWC briefing on revised FM3-24, DCO

Contact the AIWC staff to obtain links for the IW Center Seminars at usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil