The Azimuth, the official training bulletin of the Army National Guard (ARNG), is prepared and published by the Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) on behalf of the ARNG Training Division to provide training insights, feedback, and lessons learned from ARNG BCTCs, the Battle Command Training Capabilities Program (BCTCP), and the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) program.

This issue, the twenty-sixth edition of The Azimuth, addresses counterinsurgency (COIN) operations from the perspectives of history, environment, culture, and much more. The Azimuth is published quarterly.

The next edition of The Azimuth will address MDMP updates from the final version of FM 5-0, Operations Process, to include a comprehensive look at every MDMP step and sub-step by battle staff actions required, who performs those actions, the outputs of those actions, and associated TTP.

Further editions for FY 2010 will include joint planning doctrine and operations and inter-agency planning.

From the ARNG Training Chief

Foreword from the Chief of Training,
Army National Guard Bureau, Colonel Robert A. Moore

The Army National Guard Training Division (NGB-ART) is pleased to link The Azimuth "training message" with that of the U.S. Army / USMC Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas to communicate new and emerging information in the conduct of COIN.

As we enter our ninth year of being at war, we are still fully engaged in an operational environment characterized by population centrivity, religious and tribal fundamentalism, and zealots of political power...a COIN environment. We are often over-tasked and under-resourced, deployed into harm's way when only a few months separate when we were last there, and challenged to be trained when sufficient training time is not available...yet we still prevail. Army National Guard (ARNG) units have performed, and continue to perform, magnificently, both in this environment and support at home to civil authorities and response to domestic emergencies. Still, the myriad tasks are arduous and delicately balanced against available resources. Our current environment is what it is, and we must embrace it with ingenuity, eagerness, and professional resolve.

We are doing that through the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) model, the ARNG Force Generation Training Model (FGTM), the eXportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) program, and our rapidly expanding Battle Command Training Capabilities Program (BCTCP). This edition of The Azimuth, while a small part of our training commitment and capability, will provide valuable, current insight into the complexity and importance of counterinsurgency operations. Rest assured, the ARNG’s senior leadership has a clear vision of where we are and a focused game plan to ensure that we are a force that is fully manned, trained, and equipped to meet the challenges of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), COIN being a significant part.

Our strength as the ARNG lies in the amazing professionalism of our Soldiers. Their strength lies in the quality and focus of the training we provide them. As trainers, I challenge you to improve the formula’s success.

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INTRODUCTION

This edition of *The Azimuth, Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations-A Battle Staff Primer*, is dedicated to promoting the mission of the U.S. Army / USMC Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC). Its intent is to enhance Soldier, commander, and staff awareness of COIN with particular emphasis on Afghanistan. This edition of *The Azimuth* provides broad coverage of COIN, including information about the COIN Center and its global partnerships, historical perspectives, current state, and insights into COIN from its culture and environment to battle staff planning.

A 2008 article by Tara McKelvey, a senior editor at *The Prospect*, entitled *The Cult of Counterinsurgency*, provides a brief capture that befits the coverage of this *Azimuth*.

“Counterinsurgency means, more or less, an attempt to defeat guerilla fighters who hide among a civilian population over an extended period of time (the word "guerilla" comes from the Spanish term for "small war"). These types of "low-intensity conflicts," as they are known, were fought by the French in Algeria, the British in Malaysia, and the Soviets in Afghanistan. The current U.S. strategy includes a heady mix of politics and military might and is based on French and English doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s, as well as lessons from Vietnam. Counterinsurgency has a special allure for liberal writers and thinkers because it offers a holistic approach, emphasizing efforts to win the hearts and minds of local people.”

As a subject, COIN ranks high, if not at the top, of current military article literary coverage. Preparation of this *Azimuth* was not only based on key information provided by the COIN Center, but the review and analysis of more than sixty COIN articles.

Authors range from newspaper columnists, academicians, and credentialed subject matter experts (SME), to our current leadership.

Interestingly, the BCTC-Lvn found that, while there are numerous methods to address COIN today, they are mostly adaptations of approaches developed in the past. COIN can certainly be framed within the adages of “as you move forward, look back at whence you came,” “the past is prologue,” and “if you do not pay attention to history, you are doomed to repeat it.”

The principal COIN leadership, Generals David Petraeus, commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Stanley A. McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force / United States Forces—Afghanistan (COMISAF / USFOR-A), and Raymond T. Odierno, Commanding General, United States Forces—Iraq, are the key architects and managers for finding operational and strategic solutions, but the real answers are being found by scores of company commanders, platoon leaders, and sergeants at the tactical level.

Much of what is provided in this edition of *The Azimuth* comes from them. It is they who found the workable tactics, techniques, and procedures to allow the latest doctrine (FM 3-24 / MCWP3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in COIN, April 2009, FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, May 2009).

There are generally two schools of thought regarding success in COIN, the first being those who believe that the past clearly says it cannot be defeated (e.g., in 1968, Robert F. Kennedy concluded that victory in Vietnam was "probably beyond our grasp," and called for a peaceful settlement. In 1983, the analyst Shahram Chubin wrote that the Soviets in Afghanistan were embroiled in an "unwinnable war." In 1992, U.S. officials shied away from involvement in Bosnia, fearing entanglement in a centuries-old conflict. In 2002, retired U.S. General Wesley Clark, portrayed the American effort in Afghanistan as unwinnable. In 2004, President George W. Bush said of the war on terror, "I don't think you can win it." Military analyst David Hackworth, among others, explicitly compared Iraq to Vietnam: "As with Vietnam, the Iraqi tar pit was oh-so-easy to sink into, but appears to be just as tough to exit."

The second school of thought being those who view past successes (e.g., U.S. forces defeated insurgents in the Philippines (1899-1902 and 1946-54), as did the British in Palestine (1936-39), Malaya (1952-57), and Oman (1964-75), the Israelis during the West Bank (Operation Defensive Shield, 2002), and most recently the U.S. surge in Iraq) as proof that we can succeed. (Ref. *Must Counterinsurgency Fail?*, Daniel Pipes of the *Washington Times*)

Using past experiences to sharpen future efforts and leveraging the power and influence of global partnerships, counterinsurgency does not have to fail.

The information presented in this edition of *The Azimuth* is provided as tips, techniques, and procedures (TTP), as well as lessons learned. This information is tied to current doctrine, where applicable.
The Logic and Method of Collaborative Design

By Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, US Army, Retired

One of the most brilliant strategists of the 20th Century, Mao Tse Tung, once remarked that success in war depends primarily on one’s method for learning and adapting rapidly and effectively. When conditions require explicit attention to design, it is best to follow Mao’s advice. In my experience of teaching effective design practices over the past few years, it has been commonplace to find resistance from very experienced and highly capable commanders and planners. They say, “We do design already.” They might be correct if doing “design” is imposing a logical structure over a very messy and hard-to-understand situation. The logical structure they impose may derive from several natural sources. They may have reached into their bank of experiences for logical similarities between current and past cases. They may have searched their doctrinal knowledge for logical templates (such as the standard logical lines of effort drawn from the Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual) and compared the fit of doctrine to the case. They might have applied “elements of design,” such as “centers of gravity,” to understand the mission situation and frame the mission problem provided, but we use them most often to give shape and logic to courses of action. They might “analyze” to break the situation and the mission into parts for better understanding. They might make and record assumptions of facts and causal logic not yet in evidence. They might consider the input of respected experts and colleagues.

There are some “un-natural” or rarely-practiced ways to improve any approach to design. First, when drawing on references, whether from experience or doctrine, we should also ask why the reference might not apply – what is different about this situation? Does a logic derived from past experience really apply to the case before me? We often accept such doctrinal logic into our designs without thinking, and without question, and without explicitly recording it as an assumption of logic for later re-examination. In addition to analysis (or breaking things down) we can add the practice of disciplined synthesis -- I see these facts, therefore the following can be true. When we draw such conclusions, and we must make many of these to make sense of complexity, we must remember their basis in fact, and change them when the facts change. In the end, several courses of action seem to make sense after considering all of these factors. On close scrutiny, different courses of action reflect different ways to frame the mission problem. The commander evaluates the courses of action and picks the one that makes the most sense to him. Therefore he not only chooses among different ways to frame the mission problem, but different ways to solve it. This is fulfilling his duty, but how he arrived at his choice is rarely a matter of record, and may never be clear to any one. It is not his obligation to justify such choices. There is good reason to have such rules for tactical decisionmaking, when commanders must make split-second decisions under pressure. Strategic decisionmaking is another matter entirely. Given this method, it will be difficult, under the best circumstances, to avoid hidden and invalid assumptions of causal logic that are drawn from past experience in different circumstances or from irrelevant doctrine. And it is possible to arrive at something that looks like the product of design – parallel lines of operations that pursue a cluster of ends describing an abstract operation “end state” – without having settled explicitly on an understanding of the way the mission world works and how to exploit the potential for positive

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change within it, nor on a way to judge the need to revise a design.

Any method of sense-making that leads to the important decision of what, in this very unique case, is the “right thing to do” is built on an underlying lattice-work of “if-this-then-that” ideas drawn from the various sources outlined above. It is always useful to expose that lattice-work to light by making all parts of it explicit, and exposing it to rigorous examination from multiple perspectives. And having examined it, it is useful to record this lattice-work of assumptions of logic, because it is far easier to know when some of your logic proves false, as it always will, and more easy to revise than to begin from scratch. Any effective design methodology does that.

It is increasingly difficult to write doctrine for the variety of mission situations that we can encounter today. Historical experiences provide us examples that are often more different than similar to the mission contexts we face today. For instance, an uncritical and formulaic imposition of the doctrinally prescribed aims and lines of operations drawn from the recently published COIN manual would be imposing a foreign logic upon a unique situation. We need a way to test the applicability of accumulated wisdom in all of its forms, and transform what we think we know into newer more applicable wisdom tailored to the mission at hand. A critical and collaborative design inquiry by the unit’s command team does that.

To refresh our collective understanding of key terms and concepts developed in the earlier article, deciding the “right thing to do” is called “design” in the Army’s new Command and Control doctrine. However, the recent Army definition of “design” as “a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them” misses the main point of design. Critical and creative thinking is valuable to many arts and endeavors. Design is mainly about “making sense” of a difficult-to-understand and continually-evolving situation. It is complex situations rather than “problems” that appear to have no logical structure. Problems are in our minds. Situations are in nature. It is the commander’s task to apply judgment and synthesis (as opposed to chiefly analysis) to create a structured logical understanding - a hypothesis - that becomes the assumed “problem” the commander chooses to solve through tactical actions. What he must describe is his strategic understanding, or theory, of the situation (its evident inner relationships, tensions, tendencies, and potential for positive change), and not the “ill-structured problem.” His “visualization” should not be “envisioning the broad sequence of events by which the force will achieve the end state,” as implied by the Army’s definition of commander’s visualization. It is useful to describe an envisioned tactical scheme of maneuver toward a near-term tactical objective, and to apply a backward planning logic to tactics that unfold in a short timeframe engagement. It is not useful to do the same for even a small-scale campaign of greater duration. Modern extended missions unfold while immersed in complex and continually-evolving human social situations. The mission-situations of extended operations will tend to evolve continually as the humans within them act unpredictably based on their intentions and beliefs. It would be misunderstanding the nature of open complex human systems to think that backward planning from a visualized “end state” would work, as it would in a closed mechanical or “complicated” system. Imagine trying to draw a route map to a fixed point in terrain that is constantly in motion. And it would be misunderstanding the nature of groups of human beings to think that closed (mechanical) system causal logic could be relied upon to change their behavior. Over time, any “visualized” end-state can become irrelevant and over- or under-ambitious, or even unattainable by the road initially taken, simply because imperceptible internal forces continually cause unpredictable change.

Commanders can visualize a sequence of tactical events in an engagement, but they cannot visualize how a campaign might unfold. They must understand the situation well enough to get things headed in the “right,” rather than “wrong,” direction while they continue to learn and adapt. They need to explain the logic unique to this situation that planners should assume to exploit the potential for positive change. It may be helpful to define a tentative cluster of parallel and sequential goals that, when pursued, could lead to an acceptable mission solution. This much is essential for effective tactical planning and useful action, but more is not necessary. It is setting (or framing) the current mission problem for near-term tactical actions only.

Design is simply making sense of complex situations (making rational the seemingly irrational) so that tactical planning and tactical action can proceed on a sound footing. The object of design is to create a contingent logic, when none is self-evident, that exploits the potential for change toward an improved state upon which to base a tactical plan of action. The more thorough the design inquiry, the better the basis for tactical planning, and the more likely is headway toward mission success.
Even if the contingent logic for exploiting the potential for change were perfectly understood, a great unlikelihood, as time passes it will become obsolete. A focused search for better understanding of the situation continually strives to falsify or disprove the operative one, and to formulate a new one. Learning drives reformulation, which drives tactical adaptation. This is analogous to the process for advancing scientific knowledge.

The logic and method of design outlined below is first and foremost a collective research methodology for considering the best available information to make sense of what is known in order to construct an explicit and shared hypothesis of the very unique, dynamic, and complex power and influence networks that pertain to the mission and how to act through them to take best advantage of the inherent situational potential for change. It is also a collective methodology for continually refining the command’s understanding of them, and for facilitating collective adaptation accordingly.

Effective design requires systematic, collective, critical, and creative thinking within a headquarters. Accomplishing that goal means using a systemic cognitive methodology that systematizes relationships of human actors and a collective design approach that benefits from multiple perspectives introduced in a rigorous and disciplined way. The “mission-problem” is more likely to be a shared view within the headquarters, better defined, and more rigorously documented making redefinition easier and faster. Tactical planning is likely to proceed more effectively and more rapidly.

The accompanying graphic outlines the major ideas of this approach. First, design is philosophically different from tactical planning in all the ways described in the previous article. Principally, whereas tactical planning employs analytical thinking to derive optimized “real world” solutions to an assigned “problem,” design employs a combination of analytical, inductive, and abductive thinking (much as a doctor’s diagnosis does) to build a unique, cognitive construct that represents the command’s best judgment of what needs doing to succeed in the assigned ambiguous mission. Therefore, whereas the art of tactical planning benefits from modes of thinking derived from the science of systems engineering, or “hard systems thinking,” the art of design benefits from “soft systems thinking” or Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) that has evolved out of the science of systems engineering over the past thirty years specifically to address humans affairs systemically.

The SSM approach is in accord with the way experienced military professionals naturally think of human affairs. SSM implicitly takes as given that “human systems” can only be complex systems, and that human beings, the product of their genetic inheritance and previous experiences, continually negotiate and renegotiate with others their perceptions and interpretations of the world outside themselves. And from this follows the idea that the course of human affairs is continually generated and regenerated from inside the system rather than from outside. This view rejects the “goal seeking,” and “cybernetic” models of human life imposed by earlier systems engineering approaches for making sense of human affairs, as have most savvy military professionals, because human goals are seldom singular, compatible, and rational. SSM conceptualizes the world in terms of a system of layers. The SSM researcher or observer interested in understanding, say for example, the group of people referred to as “Hizbullah,” will construct a “system” of relationships that describes and explains it. They will also conceive of the relationship of this system to a “wider system” above and to component “sub-systems” below. Other implicit tenets of SSM are that individual humans and groups:

"Effective design requires systematic collective critical and creative thinking within a headquarters."
perceive the world selectively, making judgments of fact (is this the case?), as well as of value (is it good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable?) about it; they envisage acceptable forms of the many relationships they have to maintain over time; and they act to balance those relationships in line with their judgments.  

(SSM literature addresses human situations that are far less complex than those to which this article is addressed, therefore methodology in SSM literature will appear simplistic in comparison to the one presented here. This methodology draws on wide sources and practical experience over the past five years. And there is no doubt that this methodology will continue to evolve as it is employed, as have all practical fields of knowledge.)

Most importantly, this approach rejects the notion that human beings can be caused to act in a certain way, as in a mechanical closed system causal chain. “Since human beings act for reasons, having intentions made up of beliefs and desires, the realm of human activity possesses much more difficult and much less scientific predictability. … Representing reality on the basis of cause and effect does not develop robust enough understanding to enable informed and meaningful action.”

“This way of thinking was the downfall of “Effects Based Operations.””

Collaborative design is commander-led, and the commander decides key questions concerning the interpretations of facts and the acceptance of key causal theories, but the quality of the result depends on the commander’s willingness to entertain and consider challenges to his or her understanding (without considering them as a threat to authority or position). An important aspect of this methodology is that every product is sanctioned by the commander (or leader responsible for the action and outcome along a particular line of effort), otherwise it would be a staff product without sufficient authority to be the basis for command tactical planning. Questioning to achieve shared understanding of facts and expected consequences is a mark of professional conduct, not a challenge to authority to decide and direct. True discipline requires honest professional dialogue between peers, with subordinates, and particularly with superiors. Learning about complex situations is very much a bottom-up process. Business literature has long advocated “management by walking around.” The military leadership version is called “battlefield circulation.” The understanding of leaders is greatly enhanced when subordinates one or two levels down share their understandings candidly.

Because systems of human relationships, the ecosystem of today’s missions, are complex rather than complicated, design requires maintaining a skeptical posture. Every interpretation of facts is challengeable. Every analogous case is judged, not only by the similarities, but also by the differences. Every understanding is provisional. Collaborative and recursive learning is continuous. Every explanation is up for challenge. Every key assumption of logic is repeatedly reviewed.

This layer-by-layer approach of building understanding through a recursive dialectical process is the empirical, inductive vehicle science employs to propose and test theories. Informal, inductive case-building is the procedural workhorse of the command’s design enquiry. This collective design methodology assumes a continual, cyclical assessment for relevancy and periodically feeds new guidance to planners and subordinates.

Design relies on mental models to structure thinking, learning, and shifts in thinking about a reality that is fundamentally unstructured and intractable (complex). A map is best for describing and explaining relevant relationships economically. A narrative is best for describing and explaining the logic and sequence of how the situation evolves. Doing both is best.

Design is somewhat similar to the process called intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) in that it takes a systematic approach to organizing a systemic understanding of the situation, but it differs in significant ways. IPB builds a theory (“doctrinal” and “situational” templates) to describe how the “enemy” should or could act in a given tactical situation based on what is known of his doctrinal patterns and recent behaviors. But it must assume knowledge of the enemy mission and intent, and it must also assume a problem definition and friendly patterns of behavior. This design methodology needs to make no such assumptions, and takes a much more holistic approach. For instance, in addition to other obvious differences of focus, if an important mission hindrance turns out to be the corrupt, lawless, and destructive behavior of a necessary mission ally, design takes this into account whereas IPB normally might not.

“Design relies on mental models to structure thinking, learning, and shifts in thinking about a reality that is fundamentally unstructured and intractable (complex).”

Second, the three numbered ellipses represent the three main groupings of cognitive activity, or stages of design, associated with this methodology. The first represents a point of beginning followed by the second and third. Just as in the military decisionmaking thought process, there is a logic to this sequence, but this thought process is far less rigid, in that, while the logic of the second and third stages builds upon the understanding of the situation built previously in the first, it is not uncommon to learn something in a later
stage of thinking that clarifies the previous ones. The circular arrow indicates a normal recursiveness of the discipline of this design methodology that requires making adjustments to the previously-formulated latticework of ideas before moving forward again. This ensures a critical thought process. This circularity of the stages of this research methodology also indicates that there is no beginning or end to collaborative design during an extended operation. Regardless of how well the situation is understood at any point in time, human systems evolve even without outside stimulus.

The first stage of design formulates the greater logic of the situation. For instance, how did the situation come to be, how might it evolve, and what aspects of the greater situation need to change? This creates a frame of reference for further learning that extends well beyond the writ of the command to affect, but is necessarily from a higher level and wider perspective. A simple guide is to try to take a “birdseye” perspective at least two echelons of authority higher and one that broadly takes a fresh, institutionally “un-bindered” look at all forms of human influence networks that may have created the situation higher authorities have asked the command to address. Without a theory of the situation that describes and explains the contextual dynamics (the inner forces that influence systemic change) that this stage of the enquiry uncovers, no sound design can emerge.

Based on the framework of reasoning and logic of the first stage, the second stage of design formulates the greater logic for an intervention to transform the situational system as it is (or seems to be) into a system that would satisfy the desires of higher authorities and the broad intent of the mission. As a minimum, this stage of the enquiry would clarify: what stands in the way of change; what and who also promotes desired change; what alliances are required and helpful to affect systemic change; and what means, such as will, energy, resources, and capabilities, are required and how can they be brought to bear? This reasoning develops a theory of how the situation can be transformed to the desired state considering all practical forms of efficacy (power to bring about results); for example, from a “whole of governments” perspective, inclusive of the command’s role in the intervention. The issue of practicality is an important one at this stage of design. Without a theory of transformation by such a broad and holistic intervention, one that describes and explains the role of all players and accounts for all systemic trends and tendencies, the command’s own mission design might not mesh well with other influences in the mission context.

The third stage of design formulates the logic for the command’s own intervention. This stage of the enquiry must answer at least these four questions: what specific objectives (in terms of desired behavioral changes of specific systemic actors) will the command pursue by what logic; how will it organize to pursue them, both internally and by, with, and through others; how will it learn to make progress; and what messages must this intervention send to relevant publics?

Collaborative design is a continuous and recursive journey of learning. No commander should be satisfied with his understanding of the situation. And no design is a finished product. It is only a provisional platform of logic for short-term tactical plans and immediate actions.

This overview of the philosophy and stages of design is now followed by a more detailed description and explanation of each of the three stages and how these relate to one another. It is important to note at this point that following the philosophy and logic of this approach is useful even when time and initial knowledge of a situation is limited, and all of the questions suggested by this approach cannot be fully answered. Design is an iterative and continual process; relevant detail is inserted into the lattice-work of ideas as learning takes place, and enriches over time. The rigorous discipline of this methodology leads to more rapid growth of relevant knowledge than a less-structured approach would.

**STAGE 1 OF DESIGN: FORMULATING THE GREATER LOGIC OF THE SITUATION -- THE THEORY OF THE SITUATION**

This stage of design is addressed anytime there is a reason to take a fresh look at the situation. For instance, there could be an obvious and significant new emergence in the flow of events that prompts the commander to redesign. The command could be assigned a new mission. The command, during extended operations, may institute a periodic review of this stage of design, or something that has been learned in a later stage prompts a fresh look at an earlier one.

As noted above, the first stage of design formulates the greater logic of the situation, or the theory of the situation. This theory comprises three sub-theories that organize critical and creative thinking during this stage and become the logical foundation for later stages of design: a theory of how the system emerged; a theory of current systemic relationships and their inherent evolution (the observed system); and a theory of desirable systemic relationships and behaviors (the desired system).
The first step to constructing (or revising) these theories, is to thoroughly “read into” the situation, and to examine (and re-examine) higher authority guidance to understand the situation from a higher level, to note intentions, concerns, and desires. Every situation has a history, and being informed of it not only highlights significant actors and relationships, but also helps to understand trends and tendencies in relationships. Higher authorities are themselves constrained or motivated by applicable policies, laws, treaties, and formal or informal agreements. As noted previously, they may be acting under pressure and without a full appreciation of the emergent situation, and the policies, laws, treaties, and formal or informal agreements that motivate and constrain them are based on a previous situation—they may not accord with the emergence. This review will indicate what is relevant, what is undesirable about the situation, and what changes are judged desirable. It will also uncover the often-implicit causal logic at the base of the mission assignment. This guidance, if taken too literally in this stage of design, will impose blinders and hamstring creativity. Ignoring it would diminish critical thinking.

The next task is to record observed reality and learn about its complex evolution. This requires constructing a “contextual system,” a broad conceptual frame of reference, which rationalizes all influence networks that appear to affect the situation (the situational system observed from an outside and elevated vantage point). This frame systematizes the relationships of all actors in the broader mission context, and makes it possible to propose and test a theory of how the situation emerged, and how it is likely to trend without intervention. It also aids in understanding the perspectives of higher authorities at least two levels up in the chain of command. (Conventional wisdom is to think at least two levels down when drawing up tactical plans and assigning subordinate tasks. Designing wisdom is to initially think two mission levels up to frame the problem context.) By comparing this systemic construct (based on what is knowable from study and observation) with a desirable systemic construct (based on the conditions desired by higher authorities and a better understanding of the situation), it is possible to conclude what aspects of this system need to change to meet mission intent.

A conceptual map and written narrative can best describe and explain the command’s understanding of the emergent situation. A map symbolizes relationships. The accompanying narrative notes relevant observations about the relationships and makes a relevant judgment about them individually and collectively. (For example, whereas facts a, b, and c are evident, therefore hypothesis x characterizes that relationship. Reasoning abductively across all or several of the relationships yields new hypotheses about aggregations of relationships.) It will be useful to create multiple level maps of relationships. For instance, a map of the Taliban’s relationship with other actors may be a starting point of a more extensive three-level mapping. One system map would show how the Taliban fits into a system of local relationships astride the Afghan-Pakistan border area. This system of relationship could also be a component of a wider system, and “Taliban” is also an aggregation of actors. Therefore a system of those relationships would be a third level mapping. If a recent system frame exists, the new one validates and adjusts previous maps and narratives. An initial system frame may be fairly sketchy but grows richer over time as learning occurs.

All people individually reason informally in similar fashion, consciously or not. But one rarely creates a detailed, collaborative, graphic, and narrative interpretation of the relevant actors and their relationships in an emergent situation. More rarely does anyone make an explicit record of theory, of influence networks, and of how a situation may evolve further if current strategy does not change. Even more unlikely is the event that an individual, much less a group, ever conducts a logical, comprehensive, and systemic enquire suited to setting the problem (design) as opposed to solving one (tactical planning). The exercise of creating, sharing, and periodically renewing such an explicit conceptual construct is an “official” reference and record of past assumptions of logic and provides a shared baseline for learning and further critical thinking.

One aspect of this methodology assists the command with collaborative creative thinking. While it is relatively easy to identify the most apparent relationships based on the conventional or current way of looking at the situation, what is valuable, albeit more difficult, is to tease out relationships that exist outside the unthinking ways of thinking common to groups of people.

Meta-questioning is an intellectual habit that can help one escape conceptual paradigms to tease out relationships. For example, Afghans are members of a tribal society. A meta-question would ask, “How does being a tribal member affect the way Afghans view governance, international boundaries, drug trafficking, and support for the Taliban?” While doctrinal definitions, categories, and patterns of behavior are useful for sharing understanding and organizing tactical efforts, they also confine one to current paradigms in thinking. Sound design requires one to critically test, break, and construct new and more relevant ways of understanding.
The next step of this stage is to create a mental model that defines the desired situation and outlines the strategic logic for intervention, implied by higher-authority guidance and as modified by any new knowledge gained thus far in the enquiry. The desired state is described in terms of changes in the system or its dynamics from one (the current) characteristic to another (that desired). Model creation involves creating two models of the “observed” and “desired” states that can be juxtaposed to grasp the tensions between the two. Reflecting on these two frames of reference and the tension between them leads to recognition of what actors need to behave differently and what influence networks need to be altered, but not necessarily “how.” Jumping to conclusions about the “how” is a common tendency, but should be avoided at this stage of understanding.

**STAGE 2 OF DESIGN: FORMULATING A GREATER CAUSAL LOGIC FOR THE INTERVENTION -- THE BROADER THEORY OF THE INTERVENTION (THE FULL PROBLEM FRAME AND STRATEGY)**

The second stage of design shapes thinking about action and how the situation can be transformed to the desired state considering all practical forms of efficacy. Before the command can formulate the full logic for its own intervention, it must understand the logic for the entire effort, inclusive of its own role. This is a necessary intermediate step. (The command does not presume to design for higher authorities, but this is a check of that design from another perspective, that of the command and its unique position in the larger system. Nothing but good can come of this effort, especially when the command’s understanding of the logic at the end of this stage differs from that of higher authorities or parallel collaborating partners. Resolving such differences should cause all to learn and adjust. Even when differences in understanding persist, attempting to resolve them enlightens the command of the thinking of its partners in the intervention. In the end, the command adjusts to, and compensates for, the views and theories of its partners in the next stage of design.)

This stage of design produces a finer-grained appreciation of the tensions between the observed system and the desired one. It narrows the broader contextual perspective into the frame of reference that systematizes (forms into a system) the most relevant and useful influence networks, as well as systemic potentials, trends, and propensities, for transforming the contextual system into the desirable self-regulating system that would satisfy mission intent. It considers what is practical from multiple viewpoints. It formulates the greater logic for an intervention to transform the situational system as it is (or seems to be), into a system that would satisfy the desires of higher authorities and the broad intent of the mission. It develops a broad theory of action inclusive of the command’s role in the intervention in the context of collaborative “whole of government and alliance” efforts connected to a broader team of actors who are wholly or even partly in pursuit of the same outcomes.

This frame of reference, or systemic understanding, emerges from the previous one by systematizing at least three aspects of the situation. One is whatever stands in the way of change. Another is what and who promotes desired change. A third is how to bring to bear system-changing means (will, resources, logistics, energy) at transformational leverage points. From this effort the command understands the broader strategy -- how it must cooperate with or support and enable outside agencies. Also, if this new understanding indicates a need to modify higher-level strategies, it provides the logical case for change.

The system opposed to desired change results from systematizing whatever actors and systemic trends, tendencies, and propensities will oppose or stand in the way of desired system changes. Systemic changes (or disturbances) can produce an undesirable “emergence.” Any factor that tends to worsen prospects for a desired outcome is an undesirable emergence. Combined, the source of the change and the emergence itself can be thought of as the “system of opposition.” This system may comprise actors in full or partial alliance, tendencies of particular allies, or the character and propensities of the environment. The next step is to give this opposed system more definition and use it as a foil to reflect on the path from the observed state of affairs to that desired. This step is analogous to Sun Tzu’s dictum to “know your enemy” but more broadly applies to the milieu of opposition. The object is to understand as much as possible about environmental tendencies and propensities. That enquiry would involve wrestling with the asymmetries between the system of opposition and one’s command and allies as a system. A minimal enquiry into the system of opposition would address:

- How we can learn about it.
- The impacts of culture, politics, economics, and social dynamics on the opposing system’s behavior.
- The nature and structure of its “logistical” system.
- Its visible and invisible modes of operational maneuver.
- How this system of opposition might be disrupted.

“Before the command can formulate the full logic for its own intervention it must understand the logic for the entire effort, inclusive of its own role. This is a necessary intermediate step.”
The system promoting desired change results from systematizing the actors, alliances, and systemic trends, tendencies and propensities that will work in favor of the desired system state. This creates a foil for reflecting on the asymmetries between the “system of opposition” and a system that hypothetically embodies all sources of potential resistance to it, specifically to the undesirable emergence. This step is analogous to Sun Tzu’s dictum to “know yourself,” only more broadly applied to understanding oneself as a system, and oneself as a member of a “system of collaboration” toward compatible desired outcomes. This means pursuing answers to the following questions:

- How elements of this system can combine efforts of very different kinds of actors (for instance, relevant Service elements, coalition contingents, non-military governmental agencies, indigenous organizations, multinational corporations, inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations) to achieve comparative advantage?12
- How to create a networked system of collaboration to effectively engage and sustain these varied potentials throughout the campaign, and at the same time, share information and learn effectively about the ever-evolving situation?
- How to exploit the self-defeating habits and tendencies of particular adversaries, the inclinations and propensities of neutrals, and aspects or trends of the contextual environment that oppose the undesirable systemic emergence?
- How the command itself should organize to learn, adapt, and continually re-design throughout the campaign?

The system of ways and means enabling change results from systematizing how to bring to bear system-changing means at transformational leverage points. This aspect of the enquiry focuses on the tension between what is required and what is available to actors and agencies that can be mobilized, and on deciding major systemic logistical issues of positioning, staging, timing, and geography.

Given the specific situation, other relevant systemic perspectives may also apply to further limit, scope, and shape the form of the intervention. And each of these expands understanding relevant to the mission, leads to more revisions of the cognitive map and narrative record of the design enquiry, and further outlines and limits the scope and form of the intervention.

And thus is created the frame of reference that actually shapes our thinking about the distinct objectives that need to be pursued to transform the observed system into the desired situation, who needs to lead and support in the pursuit of them, what trends and propensities in the situation can be facilitated, and which ones need countering, and where and how to apply positive and negative energy to the various causal and influence networks within the system. Putting this into words and pictures is framing the broader theory of the intervention, and formulating the greater causal logic for the intervention – in other words, formulating the strategy for all relevant forms of efficacy (ability to produce results) to transform the system. (Strategy in its original sense is the central and unique idea for exploiting the peculiar characteristics of any complex situation to achieve desired outcomes. In this sense, strategy is not a level of war. It is the product of design, just as tactics is the product of planning. It is design that formulates the causal logic central to strategy. Tactics is about optimizing a given causal logic. It is design that conceives of the system of opposition and gives shape to its nature and tendencies, and it is design that gives form to the asymmetries between the system of opposition and the system promoting desired change. And it is the design enquiry that uncovers systemic propensities that can be leveraged. Strategy is the product of design at any level of an organization that deals with complexity.)

What remains for the next stage is to narrow a broad theory of intervention down to the role of the command itself: for instance, where it will support, where it will lead and be supported, and how it will apply systemic leverage – the command’s own unique strategy.

**STAGE 3: FORMULATING THE CAUSAL LOGIC FOR THE COMMAND’S INTERVENTION**

The third stage of design shapes thinking about the command’s own actions and learning as it plays its role in transforming the undesirable situation into the desired state. The product of this stage is the commander’s provisional conceptual problem frame to guide tactical planning, learning and action. Stage 3 of design is formulating the logic for the command’s intervention into the complex mission environment.

This stage of design produces an even finer-grained appreciation of the tensions between the observed system and the desired one that are most relevant to the command’s own mission. It narrows the previous collaborative perspective above the command into the frame of reference that systematizes the causal and the influence networks, as well as systemic potentials, trends, and propensities most relevant and useful for the command’s role for satisfying mission...
intent. It considers what is practical from the command’s viewpoint. The logic for the command’s own intervention emerges from the construction of the “system” into which the command itself will intervene; one that will facilitate the several design decisions outlined above.

From this systemic frame emerges the concept of the command’s “mission-problem” and a theory of how the command contributes to systemic transformation, and equally important, a theory of how the command can learn, not only “how to do things right,” but whether it is “doing the right thing.” And from this flows the commander’s appreciation of the situation, re-statement of the command’s mission, commander’s broad intent, and concept design guidance for the command as outlined above.

Because the novelty of all complex situations, templates and general theories based on analogy or developed for previous cases can often lead to doing the wrong thing, no matter how correctly we do them. Sound strategies rest on being able to describe and explain four unique, well-grounded theories about the mission-situation. The first of these describes and explains the causal logic for the systemic emergence, the new development within the system that has prompted the mission. This is the one upon which the other theories, and the mission strategy, are constructed. A second one imposes a unique logical structure on the systemic intervention to bring about desired changes in behaviors of system actors and in positive and negative systemic trends. While historical or generalized theories provide foils for reflection, they should not be applied without reflecting on the impact of novel and specific aspects of the unique case before us. A third one imposes a unique logic, structure, and discipline for how to learn about the unique and continually-unfolding situation confronting us. The novel and the complex require special attention to a process called forward learning, the notion of setting the conditions beforehand for effective learning during the intervention. This is required because systems theory and experience tell us that our own interventions will create unpredictable changes in the contextual system. A theory of organization imposes a logical structure for organizing functions and effort in space and time. Generalized doctrinal or historical patterns may be useful for reflection, especially for gaining insight about the uniqueness of the present case and necessary changes to the design. They are neither right nor wrong. They are either useful or not. They require organizing theories proposed by doctrine for the general case. These foundational theories become the substance of continual reformulation as our knowledge about the situation expands and evolves. There is no formulaic way of presenting the product of design, but abstract concepts have to be translated into clear and concise language and a logical flow of ideas to enable the formulation of guidance for the command’s planning efforts and subordinate-level designs.

One actual product of this stage of design is the commander’s appreciation that explains the logic of the emergence that prompted the mission, and the strategic logic for it from the higher perspective. This is summarizing the products of stage 1 and 2 of design.

Another is the command’s intervention strategy. It is the central and unique conceptual “how” to exploit: the peculiar characteristics of the situation; the nature and tendencies of the system of opposition; the asymmetries between the system of opposition and the system of collaboration; and other systemic propensities. A statement of the intervention strategy will normally address: what objectives (in terms of behavioral changes of specific systemic actors) the command will pursue by what logic; how it will organize to pursue them; how it will work “by, with, and through” others; how it will learn to make progress; how it will know to re-design; and what messages must this intervention send to relevant publics. The mission strategy is defined by deciding what goals or objectives, if achieved, add up to mission success. To be most useful, these must identify specific groups of people within the mission context and their new desired actions or relationships. It is further defined by the logic planners should assume to plan initial actions and learning along each goal-oriented line of effort. Still another key strategic decision is the concept for organizing alliances with others beyond the command toward these goals. A fourth key strategic decision is how to organize the command and the collaborating team of others to learn and adapt together. A fifth is deciding the means required to achieve each goal and the concept for mobilizing and deploying them. A final one is formulating the overall message the pursuit of the mission intends – summing all actions, images, and verbal communications. This is as much an internal control mechanism to align all words and deeds of the command as it is a theme for messaging to relevant external publics. This is recognizing that what we say influences far less than what we do.

This guidance to planners must outline a concrete logical basis for immediate planning and action, but it should be clear that it is all subject to change based on command-level learning and re-design as the situation evolves.
The same logical sequence applies to the design efforts of subordinate leaders as they pursue assigned goals and lines of effort intended to wield various kinds of power to influence the decisions, intentions, beliefs, and actions of groups of humans in the mission context.

Although design enquiries of higher and lower echelons will overlap, they do not duplicate. When the next higher authority applies the same or similar systemic approach to design, as shown here, the design work of the lower headquarters goes more quickly. Different echelons have different perspectives and see their world at different levels of granularity, as noted earlier. It will be normal for problem framing at one level of design to differ from that of a higher authority. Difference may simply result from considering different sets of facts and different interpretations of the same facts. Different assumptions—theories of cause and effect—can also lead to different framing. Professionally, subordinate commands should challenge the understanding of the higher authority based on their own comprehensive design enquiries. Under the best of circumstances both levels will refine and harmonize their understandings and their designs. Harmonizing understandings, up and down, as well as laterally, benefits all if it includes deliberate consideration of the basis for differences, not simply a lowest common denominator compromise. The commander’s decision of problem formulation should not gloss over differences, as these differences can become the basis for framing priority questions that could falsify the reigning mission hypothesis.

This journey of learning is continuous, iterative, and reflective because whatever strategy is applied in the real world, the mental models constructed along this journey are only imperfect representations of it. New constructs must account for new observations and new desired system states. New tensions between observed and desired states need to be reconciled. Enriched understanding then needs to translate into strategic and tactical adaptations and reformed intervention. Periodically, new design guidance will flow to subordinates and tactical planners while the command team continues to learn.

Given my experience over the last five years, this new approach to operational art has produced results superior to the alternative in every case. People who have the greatest experience of complex operations are its most ready converts. Converts have been more easily won among practitioners in actual operating environments than in sterile academic settings. Open-minded skeptics, as I was initially, who have gained experience and understanding of the method, have been brought around. Those who believe the military has no business in ambiguous missions and complex settings, and those who see no difference between strategy and tactics, except for echelons in a hierarchy, are its most ardent opponents.

Footnotes:

1 What is written here does not differ substantively from the intent of what is now in U.S. Army doctrine. It is, however, a more complete elaboration of the art of design based on my own experience and study. I owe much to other colleague’s for my education, most notably to Brig. Gen. (Res) Shimon Naveh. Dr. James Schneider, and Dr. Timothy Challens. They might not fully agree with my views. I have my own way of approaching the subject.

2 Systematic means “according to a system or method” or “orderly in doing things.”

3 System means a combination of related elements organized into a rational whole or an assemblage of elements forming a whole, unified by the nature of their relationships. Systematize means “to form into a system.” Systemic means “to affect or address the entire organism or bodily system.” To apply a systemic cognitive methodology means to aggregate elements into meaningful wholes or systems of meaningful relationships.
Footnotes: (cont)

4 The word methodology is used here in the sense of a body of methods used in a particular activity, that activity here is to conduct an inquiry into the human affairs that pertain to a mission context. Soft System Methodology is an approach to making sense or rationalizing human affairs. Scientists such as Geoffrey Vickers and P.B. Checkland and others have evolved this methodology over the past thirty years. The methodology presented here builds on some of this work.


7 This refers to a distinction made by the author in the previous article. Complex systems are interactively dynamic, impossible to separate from their environment, impossible to “see” all players and relationships without engaging the system, are subject to change through the interaction of internal forces, and are subject to “self-regulation.” Understanding them implies overlaying an artificial logical structure for the purpose of transforming them to a more desired, self-regulating state. Systems of humans are complex. Complicated systems are stable (normally man-made) structures that do not change of themselves, but require outside energy to change them. They may be made of very many sophisticated parts and pieces, but they are separable from their environment, and understandable by observing, studying their parts, and mapping their components.

8 The Military Decisionmaking Process, or MDMP, was developed based on the logic of the engineering problem solving methodology. It was also designed principally for tactical decisionmaking rather than for strategic decisions. It remains an unsurpassed approach for its intended purpose.

9 This desired system is not an “end state” because the situation will continue to evolve. It is a state that meets the strategic desires of higher authorities, and can “self-regulate” or remain stable after the withdrawal of outside intervention. It is a cognitive model that will evolve over time along with changes in the command’s understanding. It’s function is merely cognitive, to derive understanding about what changes are desirable, and what dynamics promote movement toward desired change, what dynamics oppose or retard it, etc.

10 This is merely your author’s rule of thumb and should not bind the designer with a good reason to include higher level perspectives as well. But it would be foolish, in this open world, not to disregard lines on a map to a certain extent. I consider two up a minimum.

11 Abductive reasoning is to open systems what inductive reasoning is to closed systems – drawing a general hypothesis based on an assortment of observations or facts. Inducing from facts and observations within a closed, mechanical system leads to greater certainty than does abducing from such evidence in an open system. For instance, it is impossible to prove conclusively that all swans are white, but it takes finding only one black swan in a population to falsify the hypothesis. This collaborative design inquiry requires us to proceed in our daily tactics on the basis that all swans are white as long as we are on the lookout for swans of a different color. As soon as we find one, we revise our hypothesis, and proceed on the new basis.

12 A comparative advantage is achieved when every partner can contribute what they do best in a comparable, rather than absolute, sense. In this way, the combination is most effective.

13 This is the most ignored product of designs I have experienced. Learning occurs most expeditiously from asking the right questions. If our strategy rests on the hypothesis that all swans are white, then we must be on the lookout for swans of another color. We must think clearly about what kind of evidence would falsify our hypothesis, rather than searching merely for confirmation.
COIN is a broad and encompassing term that requires the American Military to grapple with numerous tasks, including fighting insurgents, nation building, providing essential services, and establishing the rule of law. The current upsurge in public interest regarding COIN is obviously tied to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The subject is not new. You might even call it a new look at an old wheel. Nevertheless, it is critical that commanders and battle staffs understand the efforts involved in countering the effectiveness of an insurgency to achieve political change and response to insurgent campaigns and challenges.

Achieving this understanding is tied to a seemingly endless list of questions, including: What is an insurgency?; how does it differ from guerilla warfare and terrorism?; how have strategies and tactics changed to meet current needs?; who are the foremost ideological and doctrinal exponents of insurgency and why?; who are the foremost counterinsurgency practitioners?; what is the current state?; what is the precipitating culture?; what is the environment?; what about centers of gravity, enemy-centric COIN, and population-centric COIN?; what is the “clear-hold-build” strategy?; and how do we plan and apply intelligence and targeting? This edition of The Azimuth does not endeavor to answer all of these questions, nor present the detail that current doctrinal sources provide. Rather, it is designed to provide commanders and battle staffs insights into these areas and direction to more detailed information as may be needed.

**Elements, Principles, and Imperatives**

- Movement leaders
- Combatants (main, regional, and local forces [including militias])
- Political cadre (also called militants or the party)
- Auxiliaries (active followers who provide important support services)
- Mass base (the bulk of the membership)

**Dynamics of an Insurgency**

- Leadership
- Objectives
- Ideology and narrative
- Environment and geography
- External support and sanctuaries
- Phasing and timing

**Elements of Insurgency**

- Population
- Corruption
- Geography
- Insurgents’ need for secrecy
- Overreaction
- Insurgent Vulnerabilities

- Insurgency
- Insurgent Approaches
- Insurgency
- Ideology
- Culture
- Environment
- Overreaction
- Terrorism
- Identity-Focused
- Collateral Damage
- Identity-Focused
- Coalition

The accompanying graphic reflects the overlapping, concentric intensity of an insurgency and the numerous situational factors that are involved.
Counterinsurgency—An Overview

Elements, Principles, and Imperatives (cont)

Derived From FM 3-24

- Movement leaders provide strategic direction to the insurgency. They are the “idea people” and the planners.
- Combatants (sometimes called “foot soldiers”) do the actual fighting and provide security.
- The cadre forms the political core of the insurgency. They are actively engaged in the struggle to accomplish insurgent goals. The cadre assesses grievances in local areas and carries out activities to satisfy them.
- Auxiliaries are active sympathizers who provide important support services. They do not participate in combat operations.
- The mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement—the supporting populace.

- Leadership is critical to any insurgency. An insurgency is not simply random violence; it is directed and focused violence aimed at achieving a political objective.
- Effective analysis of an insurgency requires identifying its strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgents’ desired end state.
- Ideas are a motivating factor in insurgent activities. Insurgencies can gather recruits and amass popular support through ideological appeal (including religious or other cultural identifiers). The central mechanism through which ideologies are expressed and absorbed is the narrative.
- Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. The manner in which insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each.
- Access to external resources and sanctuaries has always influenced the effectiveness of insurgencies. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. Sanctuaries may range from virtual (e.g., internet) to traditional, physical safe havens.
- A single insurgent movement may be in different phases in different parts of a country.

- A conspiratorial approach involves a few leaders and a militant cadre or activist party seizing control of government structures or exploiting a revolutionary situation.
- Users of military-focused approaches aim to create revolutionary possibilities or seize power primarily by applying military force.
- This approach uses terrorist tactics in urban areas to accomplish insurgent objectives.
- Protracted popular war approaches are conducted along multiple politico-military logical lines of operations (LLO) and are locally configured.
- The identity-focused approach mobilizes support based on the common identity of religious affiliation, clan, tribe, or ethnic group.
- Contemporary insurgents may use different approaches at different times, applying tactics that take best advantage of circumstances. Insurgents may also apply a composite approach that includes tactics drawn from any or all of the other approaches.

- Any group beginning from a position of weakness that intends to use violence to pursue its political aims must initially adopt a covert / secret approach for its planning and activities.
- To mobilize their base of support, insurgent groups use a combination of propaganda messages and intimidation, and they may overreach in both.
- Insurgents can experience serious difficulties finding a viable base of operations, as they must find the right distance from centers of activity.
- Insurgencies usually cannot sustain themselves without substantial external support.
- All insurgencies require funding to some extent.
- Counterinsurgents remain alert for signs of division within an insurgent movement.
- If insurgents lose momentum, counterinsurgents can regain the strategic initiative.
- Nothing is more demoralizing to insurgents than realizing that people inside their movement or trusted supporters among the public are deserting or providing information to government authorities.
Elements, Principles, and Imperatives (cont)

The accompanying graphic reflects the overlapping, concentric intensity of countering an insurgency and the numerous situational factors that must be dealt with.

- Legitimacy is the main objective
- Unity of effort essential
- Political factors are primary
- Counterinsurgents must understand the environment
- Intelligence drives operations
- Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support
- Security under the Rule of Law is essential
- Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment

- Manage information and expectations
- Use the appropriate level of force
- Learn and adapt
- Empower the lowest levels
- Support the Host Nation

- Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be
- Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is
- The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction
- Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot
- The Host Nation doing something tolerably is normally better than us doing it well
- If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next
- Tactical success guarantees nothing
- Many important decisions are not made by generals

- Maintaining a constant, forward presence with the population
- Acquiring and disseminating accurate and timely intelligence
- Avoiding overreaction to insurgent activity
- Ensuring the population has the basic level of essential services
- Developing relationships with competent Host Nation officials
- Using countersniper operations, especially at roadblocks, outposts, and sentry posts
- Reacting to the ambush of patrols and firing on helicopters
- Emphasizing countermeasures against explosive hazards (to include improvised explosive devices and mines) and booby traps of all types
- Controlling access to weapons, uniforms and other supplies the insurgents may use
- Protecting industry and public services from attack and sabotage
- Preventing riots, protests, and other large population incidents

- Overemphasize killing and capturing the enemy
- Conduct large-scale operations as the norm
- Concentrate military forces in large bases for protection
- Focus Special Forces primarily on raiding
- Place low priority on assigning quality advisors to Host Nation forces
- Build and train Host Nation security forces in the U.S. military’s image
- Ignore peacetime government processes
- Allow open borders, airspace, and coastlines

- Emphasize intelligence
- Focus on the population, its needs, and its security
- Establish and expand secure areas
- Isolate insurgents from the populace
- Conduct effective, pervasive, and continuous information operations
- Provide amnesty and rehabilitation for those willing to support the new government
- Place Host Nation police in the lead with military support as soon as the security situation permits
- Expand and diversify the Host Nation police force
- Train military forces to conduct COIN operations
- Embed quality advisors and Special Forces with Host Nation forces
- Deny sanctuary to insurgents
- Encourage strong political and military cooperation and information sharing
- Protect key infrastructure
The following information is intended to acquaint readers of *The Azimuth* with the U.S. Army / USMC Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center, U. S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas with a view towards encouraging communications that will assist ARNG commanders and battle staffs with COIN planning and training. Readers are encouraged to visit the COIN Center website home page at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/COIN/index.asp for up-to-date information regarding the myriad activities of the COIN Center. You may also contact the COIN Center by phone (913) 684-5196 or email: COIN@conus.army.mil. A request for information (RFI) system is also available at the COIN website. The BCTC-Lvn extends a special thanks to COL Daniel S. Roper, Coin Center Director; LTC John Malevich, COIN Branch Chief; LTC Storm Savage, Counterinsurgency Integration Chief; and MAJ Nate Springer, Counterinsurgency Operations Chief, for their approval of, and contributions to, this edition of *The Azimuth*.

**The Beginning**

In 2006, U. S. Army CAC Commander, then LTG David Petraeus, and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC) Commander, then Lt. Gen. James Mattis, established the COIN Center in response to a need to better educate and train all U.S. ground forces on the principles and practices of counterinsurgency, and to better integrate COIN efforts among the Services. To this end, the original COIN Center mandate was to “connect the dots” among the diverse operational elements to facilitate the implementation of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and the U.S. Marine Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and to foster integration of COIN efforts among Service components preparing to deploy or already conducting COIN operations. Though it continues to function under that original mandate, the COIN Center focus has expanded its focus to sister Services, interagency, and coalition partners dealing with COIN and broader COIN-like threats.

**Mission**

The role of the COIN Center is to improve U.S. military COIN capabilities. “It is a collaborative ‘Land Service’ activity that reports directly to its co-chairs, the Commanding Generals of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC) and the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The COIN Center provides assistance to Army / USMC components in implementation / application of the body of thought contained in FM 3-24 in order to improve U.S. ground forces’ capability to operate in a full-spectrum COIN environment. It is also the focal point for CAC matters involving COIN operations.” The COIN Center is staffed with a cadre of knowledgeable Army and Marine Corps subject matter experts who have operational experience and academic education in counterinsurgency operations. It discharges its role using six lines of effort:

- Doctrine Implementation and Best Practice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)
- Integration of COIN Research
- Advise Leaders and Organizations
- Improve Education
- Outreach

The COIN Center supports agencies and initiatives that span the spectrum from policy formation to tactical unit assistance. Involvement ranges from participation in efforts to formulate interagency and international doctrine at the policy level down to direct involvement in the writing of doctrine for the Army / Marine Corps for use at the lowest tactical levels. The unusual span of engagement reflects the general character of COIN, the resolution of which involves a host of issues that no single Service or even combination of military Services is equipped and trained to deal with. Such must be handled as complex operations that require the participation by a wide spectrum of agencies both in and outside of the U.S. Government. As a consequence, COIN Center responsibilities demand close coordination with a broad range of organizations.
Integration...The COIN Footprint

The COIN Center pursues a whole-of-government approach to COIN. “COIN and COIN-like conflicts have a host of subtle dimensions that must be addressed by other than military means, but which the military must understand, appreciate, and incorporate into operationally planning without prejudice. Much of what needs to be done in COIN environments lies in the realm of public diplomacy and reconstruction conducted by non-military agencies...the main burden for such non-military activities has fallen on the military in areas well outside its traditional areas of expertise in such roles as public diplomacy, and carrying the main burden of reconstruction and provision of aid. This latter observation signals that there is a great deal to be done to rectify misdistribution of responsibility with the U.S. Government for COIN, which in large measure remains a key deficiency in our national ability to effectively prosecute COIN conflicts.”
The more we study COIN, the more we visit and pay attention to the past. Insurgencies and counterinsurgencies are as old as empires and rebellions, as familiar as the Romans’ harsh repression of uprisings within their empire. There was the insurgent war of Alexander the Great against the Greek Army; the Jewish Maccabbee Revolt against the Seleucid Empire from 166-164 BC; the Jewish Revolt against the Roman Empire from 66-70 AD; the Spanish Revolt against Napoleon’s occupation in 1808; the French and Indian War; the American Revolution; the American Civil War, to name a few.

The Spanish insurgency against Napoleon gave rise to the term guerrilla warfare. In Cuba, in the late Nineteenth Century, the Spanish used a policy of herding villagers into small, makeshift camps to prevent their support of Cuban rebels. There were the British which used anti-guerrilla methods in the Boer War (1889-1902). In the post World War II era, Britian, France, and Belgium used counterrevolutionary warfare against nationalist insurgents. Americans helped the Filipino Government defeat the Huk Rebellion in 1954; and the French lost to Vietnamese insurgents at the hands of Ho Chi Minh during the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. In the 1960s, there was the protracted conflict against insurgents in Vietnam.

Counterinsurgency doctrine in the U.S. dates back to the publication of the Small Wars Manual USMC 1940. It continued in 1951 with the publication of FM 31-20, Operations Against Guerilla Forces, that prescribed an organization, training, and functions for a prototypical indigenous counter-guerilla unit of platoon size, intended to operate independently for prolonged periods with light weaponry during night operations such as raids and ambushes. In 1961, there was new counter-insurgency doctrine entitled Military Operations Against Irregular Forces as part of FM 100-1, Doctrinal Guidance. This was followed in 1963 with FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations. The Vietnam War became a battlefield for experimentation with numerous techniques and approaches taken in the name of “pacification.” Like the stretched past of insurgencies, COIN doctrine continues to evolve over time.
COUNTERINSURGENCY—DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT

Nations on every continent have been involved in insurgencies of some type, so it goes without saying that determining best practices for COIN, e.g., doctrine, is critical. We have studied the past century’s insurgent wars, and it has helped us understand the nature and continuities of insurgencies in various cultural, political, and geographic settings. Never in our history has more attention been paid to mapping and understanding counterinsurgency. COIN doctrine must address an elusive opponent in an asymmetrical environment where mindset, in terms of changing the past, is often a major obstacle. This section of The Azimuth provides a brief capture of existing and emerging (both joint and U.S. Army / USMC) strategic, operational, and tactical COIN doctrine. Battle staffs are encouraged to collect this library of references.

**Strategic / Operational Level Doctrine**

The United States Government COIN Guide, written in a collaborative “whole of government” process and endorsed at the highest levels of our diplomatic, development, and defense leadership, reflects the latest doctrine (FM 3-24 and also FM 3-07). It is not, however, a tactical or operational “how-to” guide. Rather it is intended to be a “COIN 101” for policy-makers contemplating U.S. intervention abroad.

The Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept describes the military role in protracted Irregular Warfare (IW) campaigns and describes how future joint force commanders will accomplish strategic objectives on a global or regional scale.

**JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations,** provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations across the range of military operations. This includes the description of relationships between COIN, irregular warfare, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense.

**Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution,** provides guidance into the way the military should think about their contribution to stabilisation. It is written primarily for the military commander and staff officer engaged in, or studying, such operations. It fills a gap in our body of professional knowledge.

This edition of FM 3-0, Operations, the first update since September 11, 2001, is a revolutionary departure from past doctrine. It describes an operational concept where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.

**FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5** is a warfighting publication that establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a COIN environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed.

**Field Manual (FM) 3-07, Stability Operations,** is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. FM 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Training System curricula.
Tactical Level / TTP Doctrine

FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, is a warfighting publication that establishes doctrine (fundamental principles) for military operations in a COIN environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. The rewrite of FM 3-24 (FM 3-24 “Next”) is scheduled to be published in FY 2011. Areas of emphasis are highlighted in the accompanying graphic.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations, is the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication for stability operations. FM 3-07 presents overarching doctrinal guidance and direction for conducting stability operations, setting the foundation for developing other fundamentals and tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in subordinate field manuals. It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons and forms the foundation for Army Training System curricula.

FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, addresses common characteristics and considerations for conducting security force assistance and clarifies what units and individual advisors must understand to work “by, with, and through” their counterparts. Since every situation and foreign security force is unique, units and individuals conducting security force assistance must carefully analyze the operational environment, especially the relationships of foreign security forces and their population.

FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, establishes doctrine for tactical COIN operations at the company, battalion, and brigade level. It is based on lessons learned from historic counterinsurgencies and current operations. This manual continues the efforts of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in combining the historic approaches to COIN with the realities of today’s operational environment (OE)—an environment modified by a population explosion, urbanization, globalization, technology, the spread of religious fundamentalism, resource demand, climate change and natural disasters, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

CALL Leader’s Handbook No. 07-27, The First 100 Days, looks at the first days of combat when leaders and Soldiers are adjusting to the tactical environment, the enemy, and each other. The information for the handbook came from more than 1,700 Soldiers and company-level leaders with battlefield experience.

The CALL PRT Playbook provides a knowledge base to individuals operating in, adjacent to, or in support of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), enabling these individuals to work effectively as a team to achieve the purpose of the PRT and providing PRT members with shared operational guidelines and insights into PRT best practices.
It is difficult to make an accurate determination of the current state of the insurgency in Afghanistan. In many cases, it is classified information; for the rest, it is an ever-changing and often overwhelming body of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. Government, Afghanistan Government, interagency, and international policy and methodology changes. Recent communiqués from the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and the Commander of ISAF, General Stanley A. McChrystal, provide some insight. Readers are encouraged to link the information provided in this edition of *The Azimuth* with their respective messages.

Following are excerpts from a January 2010 U.S. Department of State message, *Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy*, signed by Secretary Clinton.

In Afghanistan, our focus is building the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism, and to deliver high-impact economic assistance – especially in the agricultural sector – to create jobs, reduce the funding that the Taliban receive from poppy cultivation, and draw insurgents off of the battlefield. We are focusing our support at the national level on Afghan ministries that can have the most direct impact on service delivery, particularly in the geographic heart of the insurgency – the South and East. Consistent with the President’s recently completed policy review, we are also adapting our programs to account for local realities, and broadening our support and engagement at the provincial and district levels to enhance the visibility, effectiveness, and accountability of the institutions that impact Afghan lives the most. The provinces and districts are where our most consequential programs will be delivered, where we must help the Afghan government provide economic opportunities that increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency – and where we are most visibly expanding our civilian commitment.

President Karzai’s inaugural address set forth an ambitious agenda, focusing on: reintegration; economic development; improving relations with Afghanistan’s regional partners; and steadily increasing the security responsibilities of Afghan security forces. Rapid progress on this agenda is important, and will require international support. Toward this end, we are encouraging the Afghan government to take strong actions to combat corruption and improve governance, and to provide better services for the people of Afghanistan. We will work with the Afghan government to implement a system for evaluating progress and adapting programs as the situation on the ground evolves.

Our focused strategy reflects the urgency President Obama has directed to reverse negative trends in Afghanistan. It consists of the following key elements, which are integrated and synchronized with military activities to achieve short, medium, and long-term objectives. The success of civilian programs depends on an improving security environment in Afghanistan.

**Reconstruction and Development:** Job creation is critical to undermine extremists’ appeal in the short-term and for sustainable economic growth in the long-term. Our top reconstruction priority is implementing a civilian-military (civ-mil) agriculture redevelopment strategy to restore Afghanistan’s once vibrant agriculture sector.

**Improving Governance:** Our governance efforts will help develop more responsive, visible, and accountable institutions in Kabul, particularly at the provincial, district, and local level, where most Afghans encounter their government. We will increase the number of civilian technical advisers in key central government ministries, as well as in provincial capitals and district centers, to partner with Afghans in this capacity building effort.

**Rule of Law:** Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited with their own brutal form of justice. Our rule of law efforts complement ISAF’s expanded emphasis on training capable Afghan National Police and support Afghan-led anti-corruption efforts.

**Reintegration:** Our new strategy recognizes the political dimensions of the conflict and that only the Afghan people can secure their own country. A key element of our political strategy will be supporting Afghan-led efforts to reintegrate Taliban who renounce al-Qaeda, cease violence, and accept the constitutional system.
Regional Diplomacy: Regional diplomacy will focus on shifting the calculus of Afghanistan’s neighbors from competition in Afghanistan to cooperation and economic integration. The Afghanistan-Pakistan-United States Trilateral Dialogue will continue, providing a venue for advancing cooperation on issues such as transit trade, agriculture, interior issues, and intelligence.

Communications: All of our efforts in Afghanistan will be supported by a new communications strategy that will empower Afghans to directly challenge the extremists’ narrative and articulate an alternative vision for Afghanistan’s future.

Focused Civilian Assistance: The President’s resource request for his new strategy will include a sizable amount for civilian assistance to implement our programs. Aligned with our national security objectives, civilian assistance will help build Afghan capacity in key areas and also reassure Afghans that our commitment is long-term. To maximize effectiveness, we have overhauled how we deliver assistance. We are decreasing reliance on large contractors and increasing our direct assistance to select Afghan ministries which we have certified for transparency and accountability. Recognizing that we cannot abandon Afghanistan as we did in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal, our civilian effort must be sustained beyond our combat mission so that Afghanistan does not become a failed state and safe haven for al-Qaeda.

Expanded Civilian Presence: Accompanying an increase in civilian assistance will be a significant increase in civilian experts – beyond the tripling of deployed U.S. civilians that is underway, from 320 civilians on the ground in Afghanistan in January 2009 to nearly 1,000 on the ground by early 2010. Civilian experts come from a range of U.S. Government departments and agencies – including the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of Justice (DoJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – and bring specific expertise. They contribute to the mission in the field, especially in the East and South where a majority of U.S. combat forces are operating and where many of the additional 30,000 forces announced by President Obama on December 1 will deploy. Civilians partner with Afghans to enhance the capacity of government institutions and help rehabilitate Afghanistan’s key economic sectors.

Following are excerpts from a 10 November 2009 Headquarters ISAF memorandum, **COMISAF / USAFOR-A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Training Guidance**, signed by General McChrystal

"The purpose of this training guidance is to convey to each and every one of you, what is most important to focus your limited training time on before you deploy and once you are in country."

**Master the basics.** Become an expert in your field. Whatever your job, train on it, over and over again, so you can accomplish the routine tasks, routinely. Whether you are an Army medic, a Naval aviator, Marine infantryman, or Air Force EOD technician, train to become the absolute best in your field. Everyone, regardless of your nationality, branch of Service or military specialty, must be able to shoot, move, communicate, and medicate.

**The People are the Prize.** We all must understand the people of Afghanistan. Operate in a way that respects their culture and religion. Treat them with respect. Ask yourself, "How would I want Soldiers..."
to treat me and my family?" Learn to hold effective Key Leader Engagements (KLE) with community leaders to help you establish trust. Do not rely on simply attending a course on Afghan culture. I expect commanders to weave cultural scenarios into every training event and teach your subordinates to interact with other cultures. Be creative. Use role players from other organizations. Share and trade ideas.

**Develop Learning Organizations.** We need our deploying forces to be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations upon arrival; however, once you are in country, continue to grow your base of knowledge every day. Learn, share, and disseminate information and intelligence quickly. Flatten the organization. Break down the barriers that impede your progress towards a common goal. Be inquisitive. Question your assumptions. Do not think that you have it "right." If a tactic works this week, it may not work the next.

**Escalation of Force.** Understand my tactical directive regarding EOF procedures ISAF SOP 373, dated 18 October 2008, applies. All deploying personnel require training in the Afghanistan specific EOF procedures mandated by CDRUSFOR-A / COMISAF. EOF training should be conducted as individual and collective events and should be incorporated into all pre-mobilization training to ensure that the procedures become second nature.

**Fire Support.** The ability to accurately call in both ground and air fire support is a critical task, as well as understanding when it is, or isn't, appropriate to use. Study and train the Tactical Callout, to give you additional options. Know my Tactical Directive regarding Close Air Support (CAS). Brigade commanders must ensure their units have enough Joint Fire Observers (JFO) to support dispersed operations. As we grow our partnering capacity with the Afghan National Army and Police, these numbers will significantly increase. Both in pre-deployment training and in theater, I encourage Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC) to teach, coach, and mentor both JFOs and leadership, to ensure this critical skill is cross-leveled at the lowest level.

**Language Training.** Everyone should learn basic language skills. Every deployed person should be able to greet locals and say "thank you." Each platoon, or like sized organization, that will have regular contact with the population should have at least one leader that speaks Dari at least the 0+ level, with a goal of a level 1 in oral communication. These personnel will not replace interpreters, but will enhance the capabilities of the unit. This language skill is as important as your other basic combat skills.

**Detainee Operations.** From the point of capture, to the hand over to the appropriate Afghan authorities, one, expect that our Troops are thoroughly trained in how to conduct detention operations, to include: the handling, tactical questioning, and procedures for processing of detainees. Troops must know the guidelines and limitations applicable when operating under ISAF and the different guidelines and limitations applicable to OEF detention operations.

**Counter-IED (C-IED) training.** Insurgents continue to employ Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to attack our Troops and these strikes are responsible for approximately 60% of all our casualties in Afghanistan. C-IED training must be a continual point of focus for deploying forces and must be flexible enough to rapidly incorporate changes to both friendly and enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Commanders must leverage the vast amount of counter-IED expertise from the Joint Improvised Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Improvised Explosive Defeat Capabilities Integration Team (CIT), and other organizations.

**You must understand your Operational Environment.** Traditional intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is insufficient and it is intimate knowledge of the Human Terrain that is paramount. Know the society's
leadership systems; learn the National, Provincial, and district government structure. Understand the familial, clan and tribal cultures. What are the relationships and tensions among the separate groups? All of us must learn the ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People and Events) methodology to refine our awareness of the operational environment. This gives us an understanding of civil considerations from the point of view of the population, insurgent, and counterinsurgent. Incorporate early into your training program so concepts can be woven into all of your exercises as you prepare to deploy.

ANSF Partnership. Train your Soldiers to be advisors, coaches, mentors, and responsible partners. Learn how to build relationships. I expect Commanders to arrive into the theater with a thorough understanding of the structure of Afghan Security Forces (ANAIANP / ANBP). Become an expert on how they are recruited, resourced, and retained. Master rapport building. Look at your Afghan Security Force partners as team members in your platoon, company, battalion, or brigade. Learn to influence, rather than direct, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). I want you to understand how to take your partnership from supported by ANSF to supporting ANSF.

Know the Civilian component to our Civil / Military Team. Understand how they are organized, their missions, and whom they support. Know the difference between USAID, Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture and our partner nations’ civil capabilities. More importantly, find out how you can work together to accomplish your missions. Help me create unity of effort. Leverage their considerable experience. Understand the tools that they use, like the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAF) that can assist all of us, both military and civilian, with providing a common view of the sources of instability.

Learn the Integrated Civil / Military Decision Making Structure. The U.S. Department of State, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and USFOR-AIISAF have developed a cooperative leadership framework, the Integrated Command Team (ICT), that will be working together from the district level up to each Regional Command. The ICT consists of, at a minimum, the company / battalion commander, senior U.S. civilian lead, and PMT or equivalent lead. The purpose of this single command team is to ensure CIV / MIL operational planning is integrated into a comprehensive strategy agreed upon by all agencies involved in conducting operations.

Information Management Centers (Fusion Cells). This rapidly emerging capability, collocated with each Regional Command, is being built to assist commanders with creating unity of effort among the various civilian / military / coalition organizations within each area of responsibility (AOR). Learn the capabilities and limitations of each of the organizations participating in your regional fusion cells. Understand how to leverage these centers of information/intelligence sharing to best develop unity of effort and unity of purpose in your AOR. I encourage our National Training Centers to replicate these powerful enablers so commanders and staffs become accustomed to interagency and inter-Service coordination and operations.

Know the enablers. Understand the capabilities and limitations all of the organic, and non-organic, enablers that you can leverage to assist you with your mission. Learn the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms. Anticipate decentralized operations and train multiple operators on the various systems. Build more capacity than you think you'll need. Know what HUMINT / SIGINT resources you can leverage. What benefits can they provide you during your missions? Practice pushing capabilities down to the lowest levels.

Train decentralized operations to the lowest level. It is especially important that senior leadership develop a trust in and empower subordinate leaders to make appropriate, timely decisions. While senior leaders must maintain acute situational awareness, decentralized control usually provides greater success and credibility with our Afghan security force partners in the dynamic environment we encounter daily.
Money as a Weapon System - Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and ISAF Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF). You must become experts at leveraging the various funds available to you to assist the local population. Know which funds to use to solve your particular problem and how to make it happen quickly. CERP funds are important enablers that provide commander's with the ability to initiate small, quick-impact projects and may also be used for condolence payments. POERF provides commanders with the means to respond quickly to urgent requirements for humanitarian assistance immediately following ISAF military operations. Solatia payments, or compensation for loss, are most often made using Operations and Maintenance-Army (OMA) funds. In order to rapidly execute CERP projects, I expect Commanders and staff, from the company through the BCT level, to understand the CERP nomination and boarding processes. Additionally, Commanders must ensure that they have the appropriate number of Project Managers (PM), Paying Agents (PA), and Contracting Officers to be able to execute effective development operations.

Insurgent Summary...

Current state:
- Insurgency is loosely organized, increasingly effective...but growing more cohesive
- Insurgent strength is enabled by Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) weakness
- International support for development has not met population’s expectations
- Security force capacity has lagged behind a growing insurgency
- Perceived insurgent success will draw foreign fighters

Projected overall insurgent strategy going into 2010:
- Increase base of support (continue to expand into West and North)
- Counter ISAF expansion and cause casualties, esp., Coalition partners
- Undermine efforts of good governance
- Consolidate Command and Control, especially in the South
- Strengthen leadership and unity of effort throughout the country
- Maintain momentum in the winter and increase aggressiveness
- Increase influence around the urban centers of Kandahar and Kabul

Projected mid-year adjustment:
- Leverage tribal influence to gain popular support
- Improve command and control and operational security
- Delegitimize participation in GIROA
- Expand operations in the West and North

Taliban overarching goals:
- Expel foreign forces from Afghanistan
- Undermine GIROA’s authority and perceptions of security
- Establish a Sunni state under Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Omar
This section endeavors to emphasize the critical importance of the operational environment in countering insurgency. FM 3-0 defines an operational environment as “…a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.” Other definitions include: The complex of social and cultural conditions affecting the nature of an individual or community; the surroundings of, and influences on, a particular item of interest; the natural world or ecosystem; all the elements over which a designer has no control and that affect a system or its inputs and outputs; a particular political or social setting, arena or condition.

The operational environment greatly influences both the nature of insurgent warfare and the methods of counterinsurgency operations. This section defines the operational environment of COIN by addressing operational and mission variables, civil considerations, the effects of the operational environment, and the importance of cultural awareness.

"Insurgencies embrace asymmetric warfare: the forces they field are non-traditional, striking in ways that maximize the effect they can produce on far larger forces while using only minimal resources. Confronting such a force with yet another force (e.g., using soldiers to stop suicide bombers) can work, in the short term; but to have this as the primary or only aspect of your strategy is to play directly to the strengths of asymmetric confrontations (this is why insurgencies choose this tactic to begin with). We must be more asymmetric than our adversaries, and that involves coalition members striking in ways that maximize the effect they can produce using only minimal resources.” Strategic Insights, Volume IV, Issue 10, The Importance of Treating Culture as a System

The Operational Environment (Operational and Mission Variables)

Doctrine uses eight interrelated Operational Variables to analyze the operational environment. (FM 3-24.2)

PMESII-PT

PMESII-PT (Political) - This political variable describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government. Attention should be paid not just to the formal political system (such as political parties and elected officials) but also to informal political systems (such as tribes, ethnic groups, and other centers of power). Long-term success in COIN is ultimately based on political efforts.

PMESII-PT (Military) - This military variable includes the military capabilities of all armed forces. Most COIN units will need to analyze the insurgency’s military forces (guerrillas), local militias, and the Host Nation security forces. Commanders should consider qualitative aspects, such as conscription or recruitment systems, economic basis (to include appropriations system), and position of forces in national and local government structure.

PMESII-PT (Economic) - The economic variable consists of the general economic categories of an AO, such as energy; raw materials; government development policy; distribution of labor and labor policies; income distribution; national food distribution; free market or socialist interface and functions; consumption patterns; external investment, taxation policy; port authorities; movement of goods; consumer issues; border controls; foreign trade; tariffs; and graft or corruption.
PMESII-PT (cont)

PMESII-PT (Social) - The social variable describes societies within an operational environment. A society is a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity. Both insurgents and counterinsurgents need the support of the population to be successful.

PMESII-PT (Information) - The information variable involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, rapid distribution, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems—both civilian and military—by the global and local communities.

PMESII-PT (Infrastructure) - The infrastructure variable includes the basic facilities, services, and installations needed for a community or society to function. The state of the infrastructure determines the resources required for reconstruction.

PMESII-PT (Physical Environment) - The physical environment variable is often the most noticeable aspect of an operational environment. Terrain affects people, equipment, trafficability, visibility, and the employment of many weapons. The terrain aspects of each AO must be evaluated to determine the impact on both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. For COIN operations, terrain is categorized as either rural or urban.

PMESII-PT (Time) - Time affects everything and influences all decisions. However, the population, the counterinsurgent, and the insurgent often view time differently. Insurgents may design operations with the intent to influence the American political process or elections. In contrast, counterinsurgents must understand that popular support for extended operations may diminish over time.

The Operational Environment (Mission Variables)

**METT-TC**

**METT-TC (Mission)** - Mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken. At the brigade, battalion, and company levels, COIN elements conduct tactical operations, across seven COIN lines of effort.

Counterinsurgency Lines of Effort—FM 3-24.2, Figure 4-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counterinsurgency Operations</th>
<th>Defeat the Insurgency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish Civil Security</td>
<td>Safe, secure and stable environment established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish Civil Control</td>
<td>Rules of law established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Host Nation Security Forces</td>
<td>Self-sufficient national security forces established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Governance</td>
<td>Functioning legitimate government that does not require external support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Essential Services</td>
<td>Essential services restored</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development</td>
<td>Economic foundation with sufficient infrastructure established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct Information Engagement</td>
<td>Increased Support to the HN Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**METT-TC (cont)**

**METT-TC (Enemy)** - COIN operations, by nature, involve a confusing enemy situation, since the enemy generally lacks a traditional task organization. In addition to analyzing the insurgent’s disposition, composition, strengths, and weaknesses, counterinsurgents must identify and understand the five elements of the insurgency: leaders, guerrillas, auxiliary, underground, and the mass base.

**METT-TC (Terrain and Weather)** - When evaluating the effects of terrain and weather on COIN operations, the commander should consider the effects of seasons of the year (to include planting and harvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal tides.

**METT-TC (Troops and Support Available)** - In the COIN environment, the commander realistically appraises the capabilities and limitations of his assets, as well as joint, interagency, international, and multinational elements, to organize and employ them on suitable missions.

**METT-TC (Time Available)** - Stability operations that address political, economic, and social issues usually take a considerable length of time to complete. As such, after the initial period of planning, the time available for modified or future planning is often quite long.

**METT-TC (Civil Considerations)** - Civil considerations are normally the most important mission variable for COIN. This variable comprises the influence of manmade infrastructure on the conduct of military operations.

**ASCOPE (Areas)** - Refers to the specific localities within an AO, where a particular demographic group lives, neighborhood by neighborhood and block by block.

**ASCOPE (Structures)** - Analyzing a structure involves determining how its location, functions, and capabilities support an operation.

**ASCOPE (Capabilities)** - Refers to the ability of local authorities to provide citizens with key services such as public administration, public safety, emergency services, and food. Capabilities include areas in which the populace may need help after combat operations, such as public works and utilities, public health, economics, and commerce.

**ASCOPE (Organizations)** - Organizations are nonmilitary groups or institutions in the AO. They influence and interact with the populace, military units, and each other.

**ASCOPE (People)** - The term people includes all civilians within the AO or area of interest (AOI) whose actions or opinions can affect the mission. Both formal and informal means of passing information, actions, opinions and political influence, are critical to understanding the AO.

**ASCOPE (Events)** - Events, both public and private, are routine, cyclical, planned, or spontaneous activities that affect organizations, people, and military operations.

**The Operational Environment—Analyzing Civil Consideration Using ASCOPE**

FM 3-24.2—"An in-depth analysis of civil considerations is vital for the long-term success of the counterinsurgent unit. There are six categories of civil considerations: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. During intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), the commander and staff analyze civil considerations from several perspectives—the population, the insurgents, and the counterinsurgents—to determine the effects on friendly and enemy courses of action.”
COUNTERINSURGENCY—UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The Operational Environment—Effects

FM 3-24.2—“Describing the effects of the operational environment is the second step in IPB. It involves taking the facts about an area of operations grouped by the mission variables of terrain, weather, and civil considerations and analyzing them to arrive at a conclusion about their effects on enemy and friendly courses of action.”

In addition to select mission variables, commanders and battle staffs can obtain critical, relevant information by considering and analyzing the standard prerequisites of an insurgency: a vulnerable population; a leadership that is available to provide direction to the populous; and real or perceived lack of governmental control. Other important effects information may be obtained through consideration and study of the five, general (root) causes for an insurgency: having a sense of identity; a sense of identity through religion; perceptions of occupation, domination, and being exploited; pervasive and desperate poverty; and loss of government legitimacy because of corruption and repression.

The Operational Environment—The Impact of Culture

Efforts at shifting culture in Afghanistan to embrace democracy and shun extremist military actions will continue to challenge every fiber of governmental and military capability. It is important that commanders and battle staffs understand that they are engaged in primarily a psychological operation, where the intensely social, internal nature of culture is closely tied to the environment within which it exists. They must become familiar with the Afghanistan social structure to include groups, institutions, organizations, networks, organization of social positions, and the distribution of people within those positions.

Defining Culture: “The totality of socially transmitted behavior, patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought typical of a population or community at a given time; a system of shared beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and artifacts that members of society use to cope with their world and with one another, and that are transmitted from generation to generation through learning.” Webster’s New College Dictionary

“FM 3-24.2 “Culture is learned, shared by members of a society, patterned, changeable, arbitrary, and internalized, in the sense that it is habitual, taken for granted, and perceived as ‘natural’ by people in the society. Culture conditions the individual’s range of action and ideas, including what to do and not do, how to do or not do it, and whom to do it with or not to do it with. Culture also includes under what circumstances the ‘rules’ shift and change. Culture influences how people make judgments about what is right and wrong, assess what is important and unimportant, categorize things, and deal with things that do not fit into existing categories. Cultural rules are flexible in practice.”

“In the long term, if you are not able to change a culture internally, you will probably not be able to get it to change by shifting the environment in which it has evolved.’’ FM 3-24
The Impact of Culture (cont)

Learning about any culture calls for a detailed understanding of cultural influences, cultural variations, and cultural manifestations. The “Elements of Culture” detailed in FM 3-24.2 is an excellent source for battle staff understanding in these areas. Note the accompanying culture taxonomy graphic from FM 3-24.2. Chapter 3, Section V of FM 3-24.2, Cultural Competence and Situational Awareness, provides a detailed look at these categories.

Elements of Culture:
- **History** (What from the past may have shaped the culture)
- **Language** (Common languages, common sayings, greetings, slang)
- **Geography** (Boundaries, migration, significant landmarks: religious / cultural / historical)
- **Religion** (Main religions, key events, leader roles, traditions, tensions, tenets)
- **Communications** (How to send; how to receive, gathering places, principal community communicators)
- **Political Science** (View of the Host Nation government, community leader importance, major political parties, laws)
- **Military Arts and Science** (Respect for military, famous military leaders, allegiance of military, uniforms)
- **Sociology** (Affiliations, root issues and problems, displaced persons, core values, populace schedules)
- **Cultural Anthropology** (Factions, tribal cultures, traditional roles, importance of society, leadership)
- **Economics** (Exports, local production support infrastructure, wage structure, black market, job availability)
- **Education** (Literacy rate, schools)
- **Art, Music, Entertainment** (National anthem, type music, favorite holidays, popular recreations)
- **Literature** (Stories, fables, epics, popular legends)
- **Food and Drink** (Local cuisine, traditional foods and drink, forbidden foods)
- **Psychology** (Fears, ranking religion, social position, political parties)
- **Law and Criminal Justice** (Law enforcement, organized crime, punishment, honor)
- **Science and Technology** (Internet, satellite coverage)

**Culture...Some takeaways:**
- Understanding of culture will allow you to pass your message in such a way that it will be accepted favorably by your target audience “the people.”
- Culture is not the be all and end all
- Culture is shifting, evolving target
- Be pragmatic
COUNTERINSURGENCY—ENEMY-AND POPULATION-CENTRIC COIN

The war in Afghanistan has entered its ninth year. For the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the war continues to be a all encompassing struggle for survival against the Taliban and other insurgents, as well as a longer-term effort to establish sustainable security and stability. For the U.S. Government, the war in Afghanistan concerns the security of both Afghanistan and the region, including denying safe haven to terrorists and helping ensure a constructive and stable regional security balance. The character of the war in Afghanistan has evolved from a violent struggle against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters to a multi-faceted COIN effort aimed at smothering the diffuse insurgency by shoring up the efforts of the GIRoA to provide security, governance, and economic development.

Achieving the Nation’s desired end state in Afghanistan and other insurgency environments dictates strategy and methodology development, analysis of what has worked best in the past, and education and training in its application. The two most popular schools of thought when countering insurgent effort are generally categorized as enemy-centric (kinetic) and population-centric COIN. There are clear advantages and disadvantages to both approaches, and within the context of “clear-hold-build” operations, there is application of both.

“Population-centric counterinsurgency is a reasonable operational method and provides several relevant characteristics:

- Populations are always the focus, the center of gravity, and they have to be protected.
- The enemy insurgent as a rule cannot be as important or given the same level of emphasis as the population.
- Population-centric COIN requires patience on the part of the American people.
- It demands a certain tactical approach of dispersion into small outposts to live amongst the people to win their hearts and minds; this has become the concept of clear, hold, and build.
- Population-centric COIN equals nation-building, and it requires a major investment in time to be successful.
- Its historical model of success is the British in Malaya.
- Its supreme historical failure is the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.
- Its current narrative is that the techniques of population-centric COIN practiced by several additional combat brigades, as part of the surge of forces in Iraq, produced success after February 2007.
- Its historical “how-to” text is Counterinsurgency Warfare by a French Army officer who fought in Algeria, David Galula.
- Its current set of rules are prescribed in FM 3-24.” ¹

“Enemy-centric approach basically understands counterinsurgency as a variant of conventional warfare. It sees counterinsurgency as a contest with an organized enemy, and believes that we must defeat that enemy as our primary task. There are many variants within this approach, including "soft line" and "hard line" approaches, kinetic and non-kinetic methods of defeating the enemy, decapitation versus marginalization strategies, and so on. Many of these strategic concepts are shared with the population-centric school of counterinsurgency, but the philosophy differs. In a nutshell, it could be summarized as “first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow.” ¹

Why COIN is Population Centric

- Population-centric COIN is about separating, protecting, influencing and controlling the population.
- The enemy is fluid; the population is fixed -- the enemy may not be identifiable; the local population is.
- Hearts or Trust: the population must believe that our success is in their long-term interests.
- Minds or Confidence: the population must be convinced that we (GIRoA and ISAF) actually are going to win, and we (ANSF and ISAF) will provide permanent physical protection.

Until recently, the approach in Afghanistan focused primarily on directly targeting enemy leadership and building capacity from the top down, with increasingly mixed results. The root causes of a growing insurgency were being overlooked. Too often, the arena of the people was left wide open to extremist influence. Units were clearing without holding and building. Kinetic strikes were driving negative feedback that precipitated the creation of more militants and a expanded sanctuary. Current efforts, population-centric focused, are oriented at defeating the insurgency by taking from them what they cannot afford to lose: control of the people. Units are learning to combine direct action against ideologically driven insurgents and terror networks with an indirect approach that targets the sources of their strength (their critical weakness is their reliance on popular disaffection). The successful combat multipliers in these endeavors are the leaders and Soldiers at the company level.

"A transition point is a key juncture where the operating environment necessitates the implementation of a new strategy or the adaptation of an existing strategy to accommodate the fluid conditions on the ground." Major Nate Springer

"Changing mindsets in the Squadron took 15-18 months of preparation, study, analysis, and dialogue. The decisions about which strategy to implement or which methods within a particular strategy are tenable to execute in one’s AO are critically important to success.”

"Each Troop / Company in the Squadron would implement a population focused strategy; however, the methods available for implementation were different for each AO based on the enemy situation, the operating environment, and where each unit found itself in time and space using the Army’s standard clear, hold, build methodology.”

"We made Development, Governance, and Information Operations our primary lines of operations, with a heightened focus upon the village and district levels. This strategy hinged upon empowering local leaders, specifically village elders, lifting up and protecting the local population, and improving local infrastructure. Our unwavering focus on the population’s well being necessarily isolated the insurgency, making kill / capture operations more precise with less collateral damage.”

While evidence of company-level success in population-centric COIN exists in myriad publications, Major Nate Springer’s article, Implementing a Population Centric Counterinsurgency Strategy, Northeast Afghanistan, May 2007—July 2008, is a great example and a must read. Major Springer was assigned to the 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry, 137d ABCT during the period referenced in the article and is currently assigned as the Integration / Outreach Branch Operations Officer of the COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Following are quotes and major points of emphasis from this article.

“An enemy-centric strategy worked well in the most volatile central and southern portions of our expansive AO, but we failed to recognize the situation was different in our northern AO. I didn’t know it then but our Squadron missed a potentially game-changing “transition point” in this portion of our AO.”

“"The critical point is to understand the nature of the environment – the people, the insurgents, the factors that drive instability.”

The Relevance of a “Transition Point”

"A transition point is a key juncture where the operating environment necessitates the implementation of a new strategy or the adaptation of an existing strategy to accommodate the fluid conditions on the ground.” Major Nate Springer

DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enemy-Centric</th>
<th>Population-Centric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditions:</td>
<td>Conditions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enemy is foreign or external influence; ideologically, ethnically, religiously, culturally separated from people</td>
<td>- Fighters mostly local; related to elders and villagers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enemy unwanted in area</td>
<td>- Traditional society; elders = local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Popular desire for kill-capture optics to free population</td>
<td>- Little popular desire for kill-capture; popular tolerance for fighters as individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- People connected w/ govt'</td>
<td>- Immature environment; economic deprivation; fractured society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Developed area; enemy disrupts economy, functional activities of daily life</td>
<td>- Little connection with central govt’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method:</td>
<td>Method:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Focus on kill-capture; lethai /+ HVI targeting</td>
<td>- Marginalize and isolate insurgent leaders thru Focus on strengthening traditional leaders, governance, jobs, development, co-op (Lethal and non-Lethal /+ HVI targeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other ULOs as able; esp as follow-on to kinetic strike</td>
<td>- Kill-Capture isolated enemy after deliberately setting conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Colonel Christopher Kolenda, the Commander of 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry during our deployment, devised this comparative checklist to visually depict the operating environment necessary for the appropriate implementation of an enemy-centric vs. population-centric strategy. As the figure clearly delineates, our Squadron’s Area of Operation overwhelmingly demanded a population-centric strategy.”
More Quotes...

“The focus on Development, Governance, and Information Operations within the population-centric strategy implemented in my AO does not preclude kill / capture operations; it makes them more accurate, focused, and sets the conditions for success.”

“Inherent to the success of our population-centric strategy was the success of the National, Regional, and District level Afghan security forces. I made it a rule to integrate with at least one of the three Afghan security forces in my AO on every operation, even if we were simply conducting a daily patrol.”

“Inherent to the successful population-centric strategy I’ve described are the external factors that served as its foundation: importance of personal relationships; distribution of sphere of influence (SOI) responsibilities and feedback loop; understanding tribal complexities.”

“What is the Human Terrain System?

Human Terrain Systems (HTS) is a U.S. Army program which embeds anthropologists and other social scientists with combat brigades (currently in Afghanistan and Iraq) to help tacticians in the field understand local cultures using Human Terrain Mapping (HTM). Between July 2005 and August 2006, the U.S. Army put together HTS as an experimental counterinsurgency program. The program’s building blocks are five-person teams called Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), assigned to brigade combat team headquarters in Afghanistan and Iraq, comprising regional studies experts and social scientists. HTS utilizes experts from social science disciplines (anthropology, sociology, political science, geography), regional studies, linguistics, and intelligence. HTS provides military commanders and staff with an understanding of the local population by conducting research, interpreting, and archiving cultural information and knowledge. The goal of the HTS is to give commanders insight into the population and its culture in order to enhance operational effectiveness and reduce military and civilian conflict. HTTs are forward-based with Soldiers, providing advice to brigade commanders on local customs and traditions, political systems and tribal structures, and economic development. They can provide training to brigade personnel, as requested. In interviews, U.S. military officers in Afghanistan have stated that the aim of the program is to improve the performance of local government officials, persuade tribesmen to join the police, ease poverty and protect villagers from the Taliban and criminals. HTS does not manage infrastructure projects, nor does it conduct military intelligence operations or kinetic targeting.”

“...We still have a lot to learn in Afghanistan but what I internalized the most is that everyone wishes to be respected. So when Troops deploy, it is our responsibility to enter the country with the heart of both a teacher and a student. People support what they help to create. The Afghans have a saying, “If you sweat for it, you will protect it.” As leaders we must analyze, study, and understand the nature of the conflict and the human environment of our areas of operation. Only then can we select the right approach and apply both the appropriate capabilities for success and the right feedback loops and sensors to enable us to adapt, recognize critical transition points, and seize upon opportunities before they disappear.”
Tactical Planning in COIN

Tactical COIN planning uses all capabilities, including basic tactical design, planning horizons, the military decision making process (MDMP), troop-leading procedures (TLP), and targeting. Commanders and battle staffs should refer to FM 3-24.2, Chapter 4, Comprehensive Tactical Planning in Counterinsurgency, for the most current COIN planning methodologies and direction. The new FM 5-0, The Operations Process, dated 26 March 2010, complements the design information presented in this chapter, but adds and replaces some MDMP step inputs and outputs. Since Chapter 4 of FM 3-24.2 is based on the MDMP version in the 2005 edition of FM 5-0, updates / changes in the new FM 5-0 MDMP process (highlighted in the accompanying graphic) are provided as a reference. Commanders and battle staffs are encouraged to compare the COIN MDMP process in FM 3-24.2 (Chapter 4, Figure 4-2) with the heightened changes in the new FM 5-0.

Note: the new FM 5-0 update of the MDMP will be detailed in the upcoming July 2010 edition of The Azimuth. As you conduct COIN planning, have on hand, as a minimum, the doctrinal manuals depicted above, below, and on the next page.

The Steps of the Military Decision Making Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Inputs</th>
<th>Steps</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Higher headquarters’ plan or order a new mission anticipated by the commander</td>
<td>Step 1: Receipt of Mission</td>
<td>• Commander’s initial guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Initial commander’s intent, planning guidance, CCIRs, and EEFIs</td>
<td>• Initial allocation of time</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Updated running estimates</td>
<td>• Mission statement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Assumptions</td>
<td>• Initial Commander’s intent</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Updated running estimates</td>
<td>• Initial planning guidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Revised planning guidance</td>
<td>• Initial CCIRs and EEFIs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• COA statements and sketches:</td>
<td>• Updated IPB and running estimates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tentative task organization</td>
<td>• Assumptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Broad concept of operations</td>
<td>• Revised planning guidance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Updated assumptions</td>
<td>• Updated assumptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Updated running estimates</td>
<td>• Refined COAs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Revised planning guidance</td>
<td>• Potential decision points</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• COA statements and sketches</td>
<td>• War game results</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Updated assumptions</td>
<td>• Initial assessment measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Updated running estimates</td>
<td>• Updated assumptions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Refined COAs</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Evaluation criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• War game results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Updated assumptions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commander-selected COA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• and any modifications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Refined Commander’s intent, CCIRs, and EEFIs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Updated assumptions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure B-1, FM 5-0 The Operations Process, The Steps of the Military Decisionmaking Process

Red text denotes changes from the January 2005 edition of FM 5-0.
The preferred method of planning is backward planning. The commander visualizes and describes the end state and the staff plans from the operations end state, working backward in time. Counterinsurgency can create situations where the end state serves as a distant aiming point for a tactical objective. Over time and through continual assessment, the end state and conditions that define mission success become more clear. Forward planning involves starting with the present conditions and laying out potential decisions and actions forward in time, identifying the next feasible step, and the next after that. The counterinsurgent must effectively combine the two methods of planning to achieve both the immediate objective and those, which must be accomplished over time...the MDMP helps organize the thought process of commanders and staff. It is the process used by tactical counterinsurgent forces to organize large amounts of information orchestrate the appropriate sequence of action to defeat the insurgency.”

FM 3-24.2
**Key Command and Battle Staff Planning Tasks**

- Perform IPB (incorporate enemy and population throughout the process)
- Analyze the mission using the operational variables (PMESII-PT)
- Analyze the mission using the mission variables (METT-TC)
  - Use ASCOPE to understand the civil considerations
  - If not clear from higher, determine the problem. This may be an iterative process
- Determine end state and conditions along nested LOEs
- Determine objectives / tasks
  - Specified (directed objectives and missions)
  - Implied (direct approach to insurgents, indirect approach to insurgents addressing
  - Prerequisites and root causes, supporting higher HQs objectives and end state)
- Organize objectives along LOEs and adjust LOEs and further define conditions
- Identify a potentially decisive line of effort
- Refine each objective and develop—
  - Decisive points
  - MOEs
  - MOPs
  - Transition points
  - Supporting objectives
  - Targets
- Frame the time and resources for near-term planning—
  - Events
  - Ability to predict or analyze
  - Combat power
  - Operating tempo
  - Phasing or timing
- Pay attention to balanced development across all lines of effort
- Prioritize supporting objectives and targets to resources
- Develop order with tasks and ISR Plan
- Make current operations plans
- Execute near-term missions
- Assess current operations, new intelligence or new missions
- Use this assessment to drive the process through another cycle

**COIN Intelligence Planning: IPB Key Tasks**

- Define the battlefield environment
  - Define area of operations, area of interest, and area of influence
  - Identify significant characteristics of the battlefield (do not forget the multidimensional urban environment)
  - Identify specific features of the environment or activities within the environment and the physical space that may influence available courses of action (COA) or the commander’s decisions.
- Describe the battlefield effects
  - Weather and light forecast
  - Weather analysis
  - Terrain analysis
  - Terrain effects
  - Civil considerations
  - Infrastructures
  - Describe the operational environment’s effect on threat / friendly capabilities and broad COAs
- Evaluate the threat
  - Enemy order of battle
  - Focus requirements
  - Knowledge of difficult-to-measure characteristics
- Determine threat COAs
  - Be prepared to take the most likely COA, the most dangerous COA, and the least likely COA
  - Acquaint the commander with the current situation template (SITTEMP)
  - Develop each COA in the amount of detail time allows (enemy COA [ECOA] SITTEMP and ECOA statement and sketch)
- Initial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
  - Recommended priority intelligence requirements (PIR)
  - The purpose of ISR operations during COIN operations is to develop the intelligence needed to address the issues driving the insurgency.

CALL Handbook No. 09-29, COIN Intelligence, April 2009
“Clear-Hold-Build” Operations

FM 3-24.2—“A clear-hold-build operation is a full-spectrum operation that combines offense (finding and eliminating the insurgent), defense (protecting the local populace) and stability (rebuilding the infrastructure, increasing the legitimacy of the local government and bringing the rule of law to the area) operations. Each phase—clear, hold, and build—combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees. In the clear phase, offensive operations usually dominate; in the hold phase, defensive operations are emphasized; and in the hold phase stability operations are preeminent. It is usually a relatively long-term operation and requires the commitment of a large number of forces. This type of operation was used successfully by the French in Algeria and French Indochina; by the British in Malaysia, where it was known as the Briggs Plan; and by U.S. Forces in Tal Afar, Iraq, where it was described as a clear-hold-build-operation.”

Clear—A tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area. The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants and leaders. This task is most effectively initiated by a clear-in-zone or cordon-and-search operation, as well as patrolling, ambushes, and targeted raids.

Hold—After clearing the area of guerrillas, the counterinsurgent force must then assign sufficient troops to the cleared area to prevent their return, to defeat any remnants, and to secure the population. This is the hold task. Ideally, Host Nation security forces execute this part of the clear-hold-build operation.

Build—Consists of carrying out programs designed to remove the root causes that led to the insurgency, improve the lives of the inhabitants, and strengthen the Host Nation’s ability to provide effective governance. Stability operations predominate in this phase, with many important activities being conducted by nonmilitary agencies.

The overarching objectives of clear-hold-build operations are to create a secure physical and psychological environment, establish firm government control of the populace and area, and gain the populace’s support. The strategy begins by controlling key areas first. The approach is to clear, hold, and build one village, area or city and then reinforce success by expanding to other areas—often called an “ink spot” strategy. Other key objectives/tasks are: provide continuous security for the local populace, eliminate insurgent presence, reinforce political primacy, enforce the rule of law, and rebuild local institutions.

When clearing an area, one must remove all enemy forces by destroying, capturing, or forcing the enemy to withdraw. The counterinsurgent must then devote his attention to removing the insurgent’s infrastructure. After clearing an area, friendly forces attempt to hold that area with security forces from the Host Nation. The success of this effort depends on effectively securing the populace and reestablishing the Host Nation’s presence at the local level. In the last stage, building support and protecting the population, the initial priorities of activities must clearly show benefits for the community. Nonmilitary agencies conduct numerous important activities during this stage. Protection of the population must continue or the populace will not overtly support the COIN effort for fear of insurgent reprisals.

Force and Capacity

A Summary Up Front

This is where you win.
COL Dan Roper, COIN Center Director

Slide courtesy of COIN Center
**Counterinsurgency Planning**

### “Clear-Hold-Build” - Typical Preparatory Activities

- Assess the environment
- Conduct overall planning
- Coordinate responsibilities among civil and military elements
- Conduct joint / combined training and rehearsals
- Begin information engagement (IE) operations
- Establish way-stations for basic services to civilians being displaced

### Clear-Hold-Build - vs - Offense-Defense-Stability

**Clear Priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cordon and Search</td>
<td>Block Axis Routes</td>
<td>Essential Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raid/Attack</td>
<td>Establish COPs</td>
<td>IDP way-station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon/Site Exploitation</td>
<td>Protect Civilians</td>
<td>Establish Casualty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike Operations</td>
<td>CounterSniper</td>
<td>Collection Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement to contact</td>
<td>Operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hold Priorities**

**Offense**
- Raids (Leadership, Auxiliary and Underground)
- Ambush (Guerrillas entering cleared area)
- Strike Operations

**Defense**
- Block axis routes / in-process civilians
- Traffic Control Points
- Presence patrols
- Improve COPs
- Curfews
- Cordon and Knock

**Stability**
- Reassess Root Causes
- Address immediate problems/essential services
- Conduct Populace and Resource Control
- Negotiate with local leaders for Build Stage

### “Clear-Hold-Build” - The Objectives

- Create a secure physical and psychological environment
- Provide continuous security
- Eliminate the insurgent presence
- Reinforce political primacy
- Enforce the rule of law
- Rebuild Host Nation institutions
- Gain the populace’s support

**Build Priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Defense</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide QRF</td>
<td>Protect population</td>
<td>Promote political, social, and economic reforms and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismounted foot patrols</td>
<td>Protect Infrastructure and reconstruction projects</td>
<td>Promote mobilization of local workforce and local materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presence patrols</td>
<td>Conduct Populace and Resource Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve COPs</td>
<td>Negotiate with local leaders for Build Stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curfews</td>
<td>Information Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cordon and Knock</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
COIN Targeting Process

“The targeting process focuses operations and the use of limited assets and time. Commanders and staffs use the targeting process to achieve effects that support the objectives and missions during counterinsurgency operations. It is important to understand that targeting is done for all operations, not just attacks against insurgent. The targeting process can support psychological operations (PSYOP), civil-military operations, and even meetings between commanders and Host Nation leaders, based on the commander’s desires.” FM 3-24.2

Targeting in COIN is a key battle staff task. Like other full-spectrum operations it requires the creation of a targeting cell or group that is typically chaired by the XO or fire support coordinator and includes representatives from across the staff. The goal is to prioritize targets and determine the means of engaging them that best supports the commander’s intent and operation plan with a focus to target people, both the insurgents and the population. Effective targeting will involve both lethal and non-lethal options. The decision to use lethal assets is made when missions involve kill or capture operations. Non-lethal assets are normally employed against targets that are best engaged with PSYOP, negotiation, or political, economic, and social programs.

COIN Targeting (Two Approaches)

The Approach

Insurgent Centric

Type Effect

Lethal Targeting

The Results

Erodes Insurgent Capability

Decreases Insurgent’s Ability to Affect the Population

Population Centric

Type Effect

Non-lethal Targeting

The Results

Changes Perception of Afghan Government

Increases Population’s Support of Afghan Government

“Every action the counterinsurgent takes shapes the attitudes and perceptions of the indigenous population.”
COIN Targeting Process (cont)

**Lethal Targeting:** What are we trying to achieve...and avoid?
- Erode the insurgency’s effectiveness
- Weaken the will of the insurgents
- Fragment the insurgent’s network
- Alter insurgent structure

**Avoid...**
- Angering uncommitted population with collateral damage
- Glorifying insurgents cause through martyrdom

**Non-lethal Targeting:** What are we trying to achieve?
- Focus on how people perceive the government
- Win the population by legitimizing the government
- Institute civil affairs, information operations, and psychological operations
- Make essential services available
- Improve security
- Engage and involve local leaders

**Targeting and the MDMP**

**Decide** — The decide function of targeting focuses and sets priorities for intelligence collection and both lethal and nonlethal plans. Intelligence and operations personnel, with the commander and other staff members, decide when a target is developed well enough to engage. Intelligence analysts need to identify individuals and groups to engage as potential counterinsurgency supporters, targets to isolate from the population, and targets to eliminate. During the decide activity, the targeting board produces a series of products including the high-payoff target list (HPT), intelligence synchronization plan, target selection standards, attack guidance matrix, target synchronization matrix, and the targeting FRAGO.

**Assess** — At the tactical level, commanders use assessment to get a series of timely and accurate snapshots of their effect on the insurgent and the population. It provides commanders with an estimate of the insurgent’s combat effectiveness, capabilities, and intentions, as well as an accurate understanding of the people. This helps commanders determine when, or if, their targeting efforts have been accomplished.

**Detect** — The detect function involves locating HPTs accurately enough to engage them. Targets are detected through the maximum use of all available assets. The S-2 must focus the intelligence acquisition efforts on the designated HPTs and PIR. Situation development information, through detection and tracking, will be accumulated as collection systems satisfy PIR and information requirements. Tracking is an essential element of the “detect” function of the targeting process. For a target that must be engaged by nonlethal means, the detect function may require patrols to conduct reconnaissance of a leader’s home to determine if they are there, an assessment of a potential project, or attendance at a greeting to meet with a leader.

**Deliver** — The deliver function of targeting begins in earnest with execution. The targeting process provides speed and efficiency in the delivery of lethal or nonlethal fires on targets in accordance with the Attack Guidance Matrix or the targeting FRAGO. For a target that requires lethal means, units may eliminate the target using a joint direct attack munition (JDAM) from a USAF aircraft, an Excalibur round, a Joint Tactical Attack Cruise Missile System (JTACMS), or a sniper. Often, it is more important to capture the target, so commanders will choose to execute a raid or a cordon and search.
As emphasized earlier, the real success of counterinsurgency operations is in the hands of the Soldiers and units that have boots on the ground in villages and districts and that pursue face-to-face communication with their traditional leaders. It was true in Vietnam as “pacification” was pursued in hamlets and villages; it still is today. The BCTC-Lvn is privileged to present the following vignettes prepared by Major Nathaniel Springer (at the time of these examples, Captain) as evidence of this. Every unfolding scenario in Afghanistan confirms lessons already learned or presents new ones. There may be a different twist to any given situation, and each time they must be analyzed from the perspective of better preparing for and executing COIN operations. The following vignettes provide commander and staff “takeaways” that will prove valuable in their COIN planning efforts.

**Vignette: Empowering traditional leaders in a population-focused COIN environment using non-lethal assets. (Development, Governance, and Information Operations)**

**Scenario:** A unit arrives in their AO and discovers the traditional leaders passively support both the coalition and the insurgency. No tangible incentive exists to actively support the Government of Afghanistan or the ISAF forces in the AO. The district-and village-level Shura’s (consultations) are being run by the coalition leaders in the AO. Traditional leaders in the area have little influence over the young men in their villages. Aid and project efforts are ongoing within the AO; however, development dollars associated with the projects are often Americanized and external to the local communities. Outside companies and skilled labor from the large cities are often hired to complete the work because they possess the perceived technical knowledge and skill that the local villages do not. As a result, the local traditional leaders in the district and villages gain little from the successful completion of projects in their area in the eyes of their people.

**Objective Scenario:** Village-and district-level leaders began to re-establish their power base. The ISAF unit in the area still participates in the district Shura meeting and many of the village level Shura’s in conjunction with Afghan National Security Forces; however, they do so as a guest not the leader. All non-lethal assets available to the Afghan National Army and associated ISAF tenant unit are focused on empowering traditional leaders in the eyes of their people and giving the leaders and local Afghans a reason to support their government. Passive support for the Afghan Government and ISAF slowly begins to change to active support. Progress is easily seen and tangible to the local population.

**Discussion:**
The unit must find a way to empower the traditional leadership at both the district and village level. In conjunction with both the National and local Afghan security forces, the traditional leaders in the AO must be given a reason to support their government and the ISAF efforts in the area. Leveraging your unit’s non-lethal assets can provide the boost necessary to re-empower traditional leaders in a village or the district governor in the district. The following vignette table represents how one unit accomplished their mission by line of operation (LOO): development, governance, and information operations. Each is color coded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action(s)</th>
<th>Performer(s)</th>
<th>Output(s)</th>
<th>Takeaways</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What actions should be taken / should not have been taken?</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>Empower District and / or Village level leaders (associated shura’s) to control project nominations, hiring, quality control, and payment distribution.</td>
<td>Unit Commander, Project Officer, Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC).</td>
<td>Traditional leaders gain powerful weapon, (control of development / progress and prosperity of their village / district) to assist them to re-establish authority in area.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ensure each project dollar remains within the confines of the area it was intended to benefit if possible.</td>
<td>Unit Commander, Project Officer, Fires and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC).</td>
<td>The maximum benefit the project offers is leveraged within the village / district.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Locally hired project managers / Engineers required to brief project status at associated district / village Shura.</td>
<td>Unit representative, Project Officer, FECC Cell, District / Village level elders.</td>
<td>Project Officer / Engineers are held accountable by the local Afghan leaders / shura that they are to deliver the completed project to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project payments conducted at associated district or village level Shura; minimized corruption of all players involved. Payment made by partnered Afghan National Army Official when possible. (Payments made at 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%).</td>
<td>Unit Shura representative, Project Officer, ANSF rep, District / Village level elders.</td>
<td>Afghan National Army Official legitimized in the eyes of Afghan leaders; project payments made in front of entire Shura which facilitates accountable project management.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ribbon Cutting Ceremony conducted for each project completion by district or village level leaders responsible for its success.</td>
<td>Unit CDR / Shura representative, Project Officer, ANSF rep, District / Village level elders.</td>
<td>Traditional Afghan leaders are able to bring a tangible benefit to their people.</td>
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</table>

Project payments conducted at associated district or village level Shura; minimized corruption of all players involved. Payment made by partnered Afghan National Army Official when possible. (Payments made at 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%).
### COUNTERINSURGENCY – VIJNETTES AND TTP

**Governance:**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What actions should be taken / should not have been taken?</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GOVERNANCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Train, Mentor, Assist, and empower District Governor; Traditional Leaders, and local Shuras.</td>
<td>Unit Leader / Afghan National Army (ANA) Leader.</td>
<td>District Governor Pre-Brief.</td>
<td>ISAF leaders should not be in the business of presiding over District or village-level Shura meetings. District or Village-level pre-briefings should be conducted with District Governor and/or Village elders the day prior to district or village Shura. At the pre-brief, all information the ISAF / ANA leader has that relates to the district or village Shura is discussed. This empowers the traditional Afghan leader to take charge of his district or village and allows the ISAF / ANA leader to attend the meeting as a participant or spectator. That is our rightful role.</td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Assign partnership roles between leaders in unit and Afghan district level leadership to facilitate accountable governance, create personal relationships, and mentor local officials.</td>
<td>Unit Leader / Afghan National Army (ANA) Leader assign; ISAF / ANA unit representatives execute and mentor counterparts.</td>
<td>District Governor Pre-Brief.</td>
<td>Needs and individual development of local Afghan government officials facilitated; local governance leveraged.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Village Leader Pre-Brief.</td>
<td>Locate the internal expertise within your formation. You may have a Soldier who is / was an educator; assign him to the district education official, etc. The unit leader cannot begin to do it all. The more leaders we assign to facilitate the development of local governance the quicker we develop accountable governance.</td>
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<td>Mentor your unit leaders to hold conferences or symposiums to facilitate their Afghan counterparts' success. Education conferences, medical symposiums, or radio and newspaper training events are all great ways to empower our Afghan counterparts while facilitating their training.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Information Operations:**

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<tr>
<th>Action(s)</th>
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<th>Takeaways</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INFORMATION OPERATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>➢ Empower traditional Afghan leaders through multiple media outlets to assist them to re-establish power and legitimacy in the AO.</td>
<td>Unit Commander, S-6, FECC, Afghan National Security Forces.</td>
<td>Traditional Elders empowered through mediums: radio, newspaper, word of mouth.</td>
<td>Create or leverage Afghan-run radio station to empower traditional leaders. Afghan leaders would often speak to their people on the radio after a major event took place; The District Governor would announce a project completion or date / time of next District Shura; a village elder would announce a project approval or pertinent information in his village, etc.</td>
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<td>Create or leverage Afghan run newspaper to cover all events in the AO, interview influential leaders, and ensure the local Afghan population in informed of local and national news.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Give credit to traditional leaders when speaking to their people whenever possible. EVERY meeting or event with a traditional leader is an opportunity to publicize his good work via radio, newspaper, or word of mouth.</td>
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</table>

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**Vignette Table (cont)**
COUNTERRINSURGENCY – VIGNETTES AND TTP

Vignette: Adapting the way we look at village / local level engagement in a population-focused COIN environment in order to set the conditions for a unit to gain the maximum benefit from daily patrols and interactions with local nationals.

Scenario: A platoon conducts a local patrol to a village within their AO for the platoon leader (PL) to conduct a Shura within the village. Once at the village, the PL, interpreter, and a couple of other leaders attend the Shura while the rest of the platoon pulls security within the village. Does this sound like your unit? (While a platoon is used in this example, it applies to any ‘unit’ with a similar mission...could be the company commander, squad leader, etc.)

Discussion: This simple scenario describes the conventional wisdom of most units; however, the platoon is only scratching the surface of the potential information, relationships, and opportunities that exist in the village. Operating in a population-focused COIN environment, where the goal is to both protect and establish a relationship with the local population, demands that every Soldier in the platoon contribute to that end on every mission. How is that done? Assign Spheres of Influence (SOI). Each Soldier, team, and squad should be assigned a specified target SOI for their missions. Once assigned, SOI should become part of unit’s SOP for every mission.

Objective Scenario; Platoon with assigned SOI:
A platoon conducts a local patrol to a village within their AO for their PL to conduct a Shura within the village. Once at the village, the PL, interpreter, and a couple other leaders attend the Shura; the platoon sergeant (PSG) conducts a meeting with the Police Chief, and the squad leaders (SL) interact with business owners and accept project nominations from the local project managers / engineers.

Platoon Leader SOI: District Governor, Traditional leaders (Khan, Elders, Mullah), Police Chief
Platoon Sergeant SOI: District Governor, Traditional leaders (Khan, Elders, Mullah), Police Chief
Squad Leaders SOI: Local National Police Leaders / Policeman, Business Owners, Engineers, Project Managers, Elders, Farmers, Policeman, Business Owners, Shop attendants, Elders, Children
Team Leaders SOI: Farmers, Policeman, Business Owners, Shop attendants, Elders, Children
Soldiers SOI: Farmers, Policeman, Shop Owners, Elders, Children

Note: The above assignment of SOI in no way precludes the leader from engaging children or the individual Soldier from engaging the Police Chief; however, it assigns specific targets to each Soldier in the Platoon.

Example SOI Assignments

Team leaders (TL) and Soldiers talk to the policeman, shop in the local market, talk to shop owners, and strike up a game of soccer with the children. The underlying goal here is to build personal relationships at every level. You want to know the local people by name; you want the local people to know you by name; and you want the kids to get excited when they see you coming the next time.
THE AZIMUTH
TRAINING FEEDBACK AND LESSONS LEARNED

COUNTERINSURGENCY – VIGNETTES AND TTP

Establish the right way to share the information collected by your unit: It is imperative that a unit has a well thought out method of collaborating and sharing the information collected on patrols. Here is one way it can be done:

- Establish an after action review (AAR) tent / building for this purpose (maybe it’s a cleared out corner of the unit’s sleeping area).
- Make the AAR the mandatory last step within your mission execution. Time is of the essence in this situation. Your Soldiers will be tired and more than ready to get back to their hooch and their personal time.
- Get the Soldiers into the AAR tent / building and get right to business.
- Give all (leader, PSG, SL, TL, Soldiers) the opportunity to discuss anything they feel could be relevant to their SOI and experience during the mission. (A Soldier who talked to a shop attendant or a child in the village may later confirm or deny information the PL received at the Shura, etc.)
- Following the AAR, dismiss Soldiers to begin Troop Leading Procedures (TLP) for the next mission while the patrol leader briefs higher headquarters (HHQ) and adjacent units on important information gained from the patrol / mission and AAR.

This strategy has been proven to rapidly increase unit safety, efficiency, knowledge, effectiveness, and cohesion. Units are often surprised when they discover how a bit of information is confirmed, denied, or validated at AARs. Leaders must set the conditions for each Soldier to contribute to unit success and safety. It is a team effort that wins!

The following table supports accomplishing the mission established by this vignette. It is not organized by LOO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action(s)</th>
<th>Performer(s)</th>
<th>Output(s)</th>
<th>Associated TTP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assign SOI to each Soldier in Platoon / Unit</td>
<td>Platoon Leader / Unit Leader</td>
<td>Each Soldier / Leader receives a specific target population (or SOI) assignment</td>
<td>Each Soldier in the Platoon / Unit is assigned a specified target SOI that he / she is to engage on each mission. SOI assignments empower each Soldier to be part of the solution in the Platoon / Unit’s AO and gain a better understanding of the local situation and the actions necessary to improve it. Establish Platoon / Unit level SOP delineating permanent SOI assignments based on Soldier position in PLT / Unit. Conduct brief back with Platoon / Unit to ensure each Soldier understands his SOI assignment in the operations order (OPORD).</td>
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</table>
### Counterinsurgency – Vignettes and TTP

**Vignette Table (cont)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Execute Mission / Patrol</td>
<td>Platoon / Unit</td>
<td>Each Soldier / Leader engages specified target population (SOI) in order to gain / maintain personal relationships, assess village / area, and better understand their Operating environment</td>
<td>As the number of personal relationships established with the local population at each SOI level within a Platoon / Unit increases, the Platoon / Unit’s force protection level increases. Established personal relationships with the local population equal a safer operating environment for you unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish feedback loop / AAR to capture information gained on patrol / mission</td>
<td>Platoon Leader / Unit Leader or designated AAR facilitator as specified by Platoon / Unit SOP</td>
<td>Formal AAR conducted as the mandatory last step of each mission / patrol</td>
<td>Force protection / security remains top priority. Soldier SOI engagement occurs no lower than the Team and Squad level. Every Soldier must understand he is never to be alone and always in a position to mutually support his unit in the event of enemy contact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collate / Share outputs from AAR (associations, information, ASCOPE lessons learned)</td>
<td>Platoon Leader / Unit Leader</td>
<td>Platoon / Unit representative briefs results of AAR to higher / adjacent units</td>
<td>Unit / Platoon Leader establishes mandatory briefing following Unit - Platoon-Level AAR to all organizations that benefit from AAR outputs. (S-2, HTS, Non-Lethal Effects Cell, adjacent units).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Collate/Share outputs from AAR (associations, information, ASCOPE lessons learned)
- Platoon Leader / Unit Leader
- Formal AAR located identified, easily accessible (good to establish close to the gate Platoon / Unit enters following each mission), and Platoon / Unit controlled.
- AAR requires strict agenda to maximize both the information output and time associated with the event. (Soldiers will be tired, you CANNOT waste their time.) Attendance is mandatory by every Soldier on mission / patrol, if possible.
- Recorder established to capture information and lessons learned; Recorder usually the same Leader that briefs higher / adjacent organization. (S-2, HTS, Non-Lethal Effects Cell, etc.).
- Each Leader / Soldier has the opportunity to speak in the AAR. Leader opens the AAR, gives brief summary of mission and his SOI engagement. (Sequence: PL, SL, TL, individual Soldiers).
COIN UNDERSTANDING—LIBRARY AND TERMINOLOGY

Counterinsurgency concepts, operations, techniques, and history are the “buzz” in the literary and doctrinal writer world for the moment. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in Afghanistan and Iraq are the primary impetus for the surge of insurgency and counterinsurgency information, and of course, there is the inevitable critique of National policy, second guessing, and hind-sight observation. Regardless of opinion and purpose, the literature that exists regarding insurgency and counterinsurgency provides an excellent platform from which to understand where we have been, where we are now, and where we need to go regarding COIN operations. Commanders and battle staffs are encouraged to supplement the reading of this edition of The Azimuth with the brief library of articles that follows. With every unique operational activity, there is a corresponding lexicon. That has been added to this section as well.

Suggested COIN Reading:

Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook No. 09-29, Coin Intelligence, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. April 2009.
Suggested COIN Reading (cont):


Doctrinal Terms Defined:

Asymmetric warfare (FM 3-24): Conflict in which a weaker opponent uses unorthodox or surprise tactics to attack weak points of a stronger opponent, especially if the tactics include terrorism, guerrilla warfare, criminal activity, subversion, or propaganda.

Cause (FM 3-24): A principle or movement militantly defended or supported. Insurgent leaders often seek to adopt attractive and persuasive causes to mobilize support. These causes often stem from the unresolved contradictions existing within any society or culture. Frequently, contradictions are based on real problems. However, insurgents may create artificial contradictions using propaganda and misinformation. Insurgents can gain more support by not limiting themselves to a single cause. By selecting an assortment of causes and tailoring them for various groups within the society, insurgents increase their base of sympathetic and complicit support.

Center of Gravity (JP 1-02): The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.

Clear-Hold-Build Operation (FM 3-24): A full spectrum operation that combines offense (finding and eliminating the insurgent), defense (protecting the local populace) and stability (rebuilding the infrastructure, increasing the legitimacy of the local government and bringing the rule of law to the area) operations. Each phase—clear, hold, and build—combines offensive, defensive, and stability operations in varying degrees.

Counterinsurgency (JP 1-02): All political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions that can be taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. COIN operations include supporting a Host Nation’s military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. (JP 3-24): Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat insurgency and address its core grievances.

Document and media exploitation (DOMEX) teams (FM 3-24.2): Teams that process, translate, analyze, exploit, and share hard copy documents and electronic media collected during operations. This capability increases in importance as the rule of law is re-established and insurgents go to trial, rather than long term detention.

Detainee holding area (DHA) (FM 3-24.2): A temporary location used to field process and house any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force, and provide resources for intelligence exploitation.
Doctrinal Terms Defined (cont):

Friendly population buffer zone (FM 3-24.2): This is an area where only civilians believed to be loyal to the government live in the AO. The government relocates all persons whose loyalty it cannot establish.

Guerrilla (FM 3-24-2): A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. Dictionary definition: A member of an irregular, usually indigenous military or paramilitary unit that operates in small units and uses guerrilla warfare. Source: The Spanish diminutive form of guerra (war) that means “small” or “little war.” The word developed in reference to the tactics that the Spanish resistance used against Napoleon’s forces in Spain.

Guerrilla force (FM 3-24-2): (DOD) A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.

Guerrilla warfare (FM 3-24-2): (GW, DOD, NATO) Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces.

Human terrain team (FM 3-24-2): is a group of civilian anthropologists attached to brigades and battalions. This team helps the unit understand local cultures. These social scientists aid leaders in better understanding relevant cultural history, engaging locals in a positive way, and incorporating knowledge of tribal traditions to help resolve conflicts.

Insurgency (JP 1-02): An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. The key distinction between an insurgency and other movements is the decision to use violence to achieve political goals. An insurgency is typically an internal struggle within a state, not between states. It is normally a protracted political and military struggle designed to weaken the existing government.

Irregular warfare (FM 3-0): A broad form of conflicts in which insurgency, counterasurgence, and unconventional warfare are the principal activities.

Line of effort (FM 3-0): A line that links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions.

Line of operations (JP 1-02): 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective. 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective.

Populace controls (FM 3-24.2): Controls that provide security for the populace, mobilize human resources, deny personnel to the guerrilla, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of guerrilla agents.

Resistance movement (JP 1-02): An organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civilian order and stability.

Restricted zone (FM 3-24.2): This is a carefully selected area, varied in width and contiguous to the border. Authorities normally relocate all persons living in this zone. Authorities give public notice that they will regard all unauthorized individuals or groups encountered in the restricted zone as infiltrators or insurgents.

Routes (FM 3-24.2): Based on detailed terrain analysis and intelligence, commanders can determine infiltration and exfiltration routes, support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type of transportation, number and type of personnel, amount and type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and the probable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Continuous and detailed surveillance is required.

Rule of law (FM 3-07): A principle under which all persons, institutions, and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles.

Stability operations (JP 1-02): An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Terrorism (JP 3-07.2): The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.

Terrorist (FM 3-24.2): An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result.

Unconventional warfare (JP 1-02): A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.
This edition of *The Azimuth* is not a how-to publication, rather it has been designed as a command and staff battle staff primer on COIN. Your feedback regarding its intended use is welcome. Please see page 53 on how to submit feedback or prepare an article for submission.

**Battle Command Training News**

The second quarter of FY 10 has proven to be a busy time in the training world. Following the typical first quarter slowdown in training, our trainers are thawing out and hitting the ground running. **Key events in second quarter included the following:**

- **BCTC-Dodge:** Entity Resolution Federation (ERF) fielding, Mar 2010.
- **BCTC-Leavenworth:** GCCS-A Fielding, Mar 2010.
- **G3 Sync Conference 8-12 Mar 2010, at LAX**
- **Over 100 training events where BCTCP program elements travelled to units and provided tough, realistic Battle Staff Training**

Due to changing real world mission requirements, **the following exercises have been CANCELLED:**

- 29th ID Warfighter Exercise at Leavenworth
- 76th IBCT CCMRF Exercise July 2010
- 37th IBCT FSX, September 2010

**DEADLINE APPROACHING!!**

1 SEP 10 is the deadline for officers to request Joint Credit for education, training, exercises or “other” credit. For more info, go to: https://gkoportal.ngb.army.mil/sites/J1_T10/JOM/default.aspx

The new Army BCTS is published, but the ARNG BCTS Implementation Plan (IP) is still being written. This will be added as ANNEX C to the Army’s base strategy. Units can expect to see the completed BCTS IP and begin to train against it NLT 1 July 2010. The IP will address emerging initiatives like Battle Command System of Systems Integration Training (BCSoSIT), Battle Command as a Weapons System (BCAWS) and synchronization of Battle Command to ARFORGEN activities.

**Key Training Points of Contact**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGB Training Collective Division</th>
<th>703-607-7326</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGB Combat Training Center Branch</td>
<td>703-607-9328</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCTC-Leavenworth</td>
<td>913-758-5505</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCTC-Dodge</td>
<td>515-331-5706</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCTC-FTIG</td>
<td>717-861-8778/6729</td>
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<td>BCTP</td>
<td>913-684-5927</td>
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www.bctc.army.mil

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Army Battle Command Systems Support Team (ABCS-ST)

Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) are a major focus of the BCTC. The ABCS-ST provides ARNG units ABCS leader and operator training and systems support to enable them to integrate into a digital command and control architecture for full-spectrum operations in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment.

Celebrating 10 years of training and support at BCTC-Leavenworth . . .

During the past several months, the Army Battle Command Systems Support Team at BCTC-Leavenworth has prepared the Distributive Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) course for the Army National Guard. BCTC Leavenworth is currently fielded with a mobile DCGS-A configuration consisting of a full Work Station Suite (WSS) and classroom set of Basic Analysts Laptops (BAL).

DCGS-A is the replacement for ASAS-L as the intelligence component of Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) and poses several unique challenges for the Army National Guard training audience. The primary obstacles are the classification of the software and the amount of hardware needed for a single class. Typical DCGS-A class hardware consists of the WSS server stack, a BCS server, and thirteen BALs.

The standard course length is three days with a detailed focus on the MFWS (Multi-Function Work Station) framework and native plugins. The course will include an introduction to the functionality, architecture, and purpose of DCGS-A followed by intense hands-on instruction covering the MWFS and related applications reinforced with practical exercises. The MFWS areas of focus in the course include: 2-D Map Viewer, XOI Manager, Entity Management, Entity Visualization, Messaging, and Alerts. The ability to share information with other ABCS systems through the PASS will be taught. The non-MFWS PSI collaboration tool is also covered.

An optional four-day course is available for introduction to non-MFWS applications present on the system. This includes blocks on ArcGIS, the web-based NAI Tool, the DCGS-A Web Portal, and the RSS/Ticker applications. The course length and schedule can be tailored to your unit’s needs and mission requirements. MUTA-6 weekend drills or splitting the course over two MUTA-4 weekends are two typical solutions to achieve training requirements. The minimum number of students for a class is six with a maximum of twelve. Currently the ABCS-ST offers two DCGS-A training options: training at BCTC-Leavenworth and limited area Mobile Training Teams (MTT). Limited area MTTs can be sent to your unit armory within acceptable driving distance (450 miles) from Fort Leavenworth. Steps are being taken to eliminate the restrictive distance. Resident training at BCTC Leavenworth is conducted in one of our secure classrooms. The training itself is at no cost to the unit; the only cost for the unit is related to the cost of the Soldier’s TDY. If the training is conducted via MTTs, there are security clearance requirements as well as physical security requirements for the training site.
The Battle Staff Training Team provides outstanding training support to Army National Guard commanders and their battle staffs as they prepare for major training events including BCTP’s, Brigade Combat Team Full-Spectrum Exercises (BCT FSX) and brigade Warfighter exercises. The team also provides defense support to civil authorities training (for Domestic All-Hazards Response Team, Homeland Response Force, and other State-sponsored training requirements) and supports the Exportable Combat Training Capability Training via execution of the Leader Training Program (LTP). Most importantly, the BSTT provides critical battle staff training in preparation for deployment to overseas contingencies, in accordance with the priorities established in the ARNG memorandum, NGB-ARZ-R, 13 Jan 09, subject: Battle Command Training Capability Program (BCTCP) Training Support Priorities.

Feedback from the BSTT

During this quarter, the BSTT continues to focus on assisting brigade and battalion commanders in their challenging task of conducting realistic, stressful, battle command training. The team continues to utilize the proven combination of commander-centric staff planning exercises (military decision-making process training) and simulation, or master scenario event list-driven command post exercises, in an analog or digital environment. Our current efforts include adapting products based on emerging doctrine particularly as it relates to FM 5-0, The Operations Process. The team will continue to impart doctrinally correct tactics, techniques, and procedures for planning and controlling operations in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments.

The team focus is on execution of the 135 events in support of TY10 units and scheduling for TY11 unit training on a first-come-first-served basis. Training support is at no cost to the unit and usually conducted at home station to reduce the number of unit travel days and expenses. If your unit wants first rate training, please contact any of the POCs listed in this bulletin with requested training dates, focus for the training, what AR-FORGEN year your unit is in, and if it is identified for deployment in TY 11 or TY 12 or beyond.
Most editions of *The Azimuth* will contain staff job aids. The job aids are developed to assist command and staff personnel with their myriad of duties and responsibilities in preparation for, and execution of, training events. Job aids found in this and previous editions of *The Azimuth* may be downloaded in accordance with the instructions below. Any graphic that has been used in *The Azimuth* that is not located on the BCTC website may be requested. All job aids are prepared in accordance with current doctrine and are referenced as applicable.

References Used in this Edition

| FM 1-02 (Operational Terms and Graphics) | FM 5-0 (Army Planning and Orders Production) |
| FM 2-0 (Intelligence) | FM 5-0 Final Approved Draft (The Operations Process) |
| FM 2-01.3 (Specific Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Applications for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield / Battlespace) | FM 5-19 (Composite Risk Management) |
| FM 2-19.4 (Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations) | FM 6-0 (Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces) |
| FM 2-50.5 (Draft) (Intelligence Officer’s Handbook) | FM 6-20-10 (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process) |
| FM 2-91.4 (Intelligence Support to Urban Operations) | FM 7-0 (Full Spectrum Operations) |
| FM 3-0 (Operations) | FM 7-22.7 (The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide) |
| FM 3-07 (Stability Operations and Support Operations) | FM 34-2 (Collection Management and Synchronization Planning) |
| FM 3-07.1 (Security Force Assistance) | FM 34-3 (Intelligence Analysis) |
| FM 3-09.12 (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target Acquisition) | FM 34-2-1 (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counter Reconnaissance) |
| FM 3-09.31 (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Combined Arms Commander) | FM 34-7 (Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to Low Intensity Conflict) |
| FM 3-09.42 (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team) | FM 34-8-2 (Intelligence Officers Handbook) |
| FM 3-13 (Information Operations) | FM 34-60 (Counterintelligence) |
| FM 3-20.96 (Reconnaissance Squadron) | FM 2-01.3 (Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield) |
| FM 3-20.971 (Reconnaissance Troop REECE Troop and Brigade Reconnaissance Troop) | FM 71-123 (Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces) |
| FM 3-21.20 (The Infantry Battalion) | JP 3-24 (Counterinsurgency Operations) |
| FM 3-21.21 (Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Battalion) | CALL Leader's Handbook No. 07-27 (The First 100 Days) |
| FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency Operations) | CALL Handbook (PRT Playbook) |
| FM 3-24.2 (Tactics in Counterinsurgency) | Allied Joint Publication JP 3.4.4 (Counterinsurgency and the Military Contribution) |
| FM 3-90.5 (The Combined Arms Battalion) | United States Government COIN Guide |
| FM 3-90.6 (The Brigade Combat Team) | |

AKO Website Path

Step (1) Sign into AKO and go to the AKO Home Page.
Step (2) Select “Files” in the upper menu block.
Step (3) Select the following, in order, from the left column menu:

“DOD Organizations” / “Army” / “Army Command” / “TRADOC” / “Installations” / “Fort Leavenworth” / “BCTC”

NOTE: If not subscribed to the BCTC Knowledge Center, check the small link box to the left and then click the “Subscribe” button in the menu for approval. Approval is automatic. Then continue on:

“BCTC TAFT Library” / “The Azimuth” / “FY 2010”

GKO Website Path


Scroll down to “BCTC TAFT Library” and select, in order —

“The Azimuth” / “FY 2010” / The Azimuth of your choice

Step (1) Log onto GKO. Select “ARNG” from the menu on the Home screen.
Step (2) Select the following, in order, from the left column menu:


Note: The BCTC-Lvn URL has been changed from www-bctc.army.mil to www.bctc.army.mil
This edition of The Azimuth was prepared in collaboration with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

CALL collects and analyzes data from a variety of current and historical sources, including Army operations and training events, and produces lessons for military Commanders, staff, and students. CALL disseminates these lessons and other related research materials through a variety of print and electronic media. The BCTC-Lvn and CALL work together to provide up-to-date lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures for ARNG units. CALL and BCTC share links on their respective websites in order to provide ARNG units an efficient path to lessons learned and training feedback. For assistance, call ARNG CALL LNO at: phone: 913-684-7661

CALL Publications for Unit Consideration

Most Recent . . .

✓ "Military-Political" Relations: The Need for Officer Education, Feb 2010.
✓ NFTF - Operationalizing Information Engagement, January 2010.
✓ 10-09 CTC Trends, NTC 1-2 Quarter FY09, December 2009.
✓ NFTF - The Deployable Joint Command and Control System, November 2009.

Past . . .

✓ Fiscal Year 2010 Center for Army Lessons Learned Annual Plan, September 2009.
✓ NFTF - Counterinsurgency Training for OEF, August 2009.
✓ CTC Tips for Success 3rd QTR, FY09, August 2009.
✓ 09-42: NTC - Trends for 4th Quarter, FY08, August 2009.
✓ The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, August 2009.
✓ NFTF - Free Chicken: Networking Success at the JRTC, June 2009.
**The Azimuth**

**Training Feedback and Lessons Learned**

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**ARTICLE SUBMISSION**

Since this is your magazine, we need your support in writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing for The Azimuth . . .

- Feature articles can range from 1,500 to 3,000 words, double-spaced pages with normal margins, not counting graphics.
- Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as possible.
- We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted articles.
- Be aware that submissions become property of the BCTC-Lvn and may be released to other Government agencies or non-profit organizations for re-publication upon request.

What we need from you:

- Contact information (e-mail address, telephone number), a brief statement expressing your desire to have an article published, and a copy of your proposed article in Microsoft Word format.
- A Public Affairs release if your installation or agency requires it. Please include that release with your submission.
- Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are relevant to your topic and enliven the article. We need complete captions (the who, what, where, why and how), the photographer’s credits, and the author’s name on the photos. Please do not embed graphics or images within the text, attach them separately. Images should be sent to us in tif. or jpg. formats. Please note where they should appear in the text.
- The full name of each author in the byline and a short biography for each. The biography should include the author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any other special qualifications. Please indicate whether we can print your contact information, e-mail address, and phone numbers with the biography.

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**POINTS OF CONTACT**

The BSTT, TAFT, and ABCS teams supporting have a combined seven hundred-plus years of active Army experience, command at all levels through brigade, staff experience in all warfighting functional areas from battalion through Corps, and Army Combat Training Center (CTC) experience as Observer / Controllers, operations managers, and system and feedback analysts.

The Azimuth is not a doctrinal product. It is designed to share training knowledge throughout the ARNG. The tips and techniques offered within are written to help Soldiers and trainers execute efficient and effective training at the battalion and brigade echelon. If there are questions regarding the tips and techniques presented, or there are tips and techniques that you may want included in future editions of The Azimuth, refer to the following contact list.

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