"Free and fair elections in Afghanistan is not a mission, it is the mission!" That is the message that I passed on with regards to Election Planning preparation for the recent Presidential Elections in Afghanistan at every meeting that I had with security forces in Afghanistan or Washington when I was the security advisor to the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan in 2008. I often felt that my council was falling on deaf ears. In fact, I was once told by a very high ranking ISAF officer that, "we are running a war here and that is the priority, not support to elections." Wrong answer Sir! In a counterinsurgency, political legitimacy is the main effort! Until Afghans are able to choose their political representatives and have faith in their government and its institutions, all fighting is for naught and will spiral into an unending cycle of continuous fruitless violence.

So, what happened this year? Polling centers were opened but not secured; this led to ballot stuffing. In the spaces in between polling centers, Taliban were able to set up roadblocks in order to prevent Afghans from reaching the polling centers. It is not as if we could not have seen this coming. In 2005 it was well known that in Paktia and Paktika there were more "voters" than people that lived there. In the conservative south, there were more women voters than in any other part of the country. In this election, men showed up with sacks of voter registration cards for women in order to "vote for them."

The Electoral Complaints Commission declared so many ballots fraudulent that the IEC was forced to schedule a run-off to take place between President Karzai and his closest competitor Abdullah Abdullah, on 7 November. Electoral fraud has caused the legitimacy of the Karzai Government to suffer in the eyes of Afghans and the domestic audience of troop contributing nations on which Afghanistan depends upon. This has increased voter apathy and distrust from among the electorate. The legitimacy of the IEC and the impartiality of its Chairman, Mr. Lodin has diminished and further weakened its effectiveness as an impartial, effective body that inspires public confidence. Allegations of interference by western officials at the Electoral Complaints Commission (EEC) have weakened its stature as well. No public institution has gone untainted in the wake of this fraud-riddled election.

On 1 November, Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s only rival, pulled out of the run-off in protest, leaving the field clear for a Karzai victory. The run-off has now been cancelled.

So, where does this leave the counterinsurgency? Well, come 8 November, President Karzai will still be the President of Afghanistan. In spite of his loss of support both internally and internationally, this is not a good or bad thing. In short, time will pass and we and the Afghans will soon be concerned with more important things like who is dating which Hollywood/Bollywood starlet. The departure of President Karzai is not the solution to what ails Afghanistan and his removal will no more fix the problems of Government legitimacy than the removal of President Diem improved the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese Government in 1963. Government is bigger than the president alone.

Next year, there will be two more elections: Parliamentary and District. It is paramount that these elections take place in a climate that is free and fair and seen to be so by the Afghan people.

What needs to be done? Presently, rather than being appointed by the Parliament, the IEC is appointed by President Karzai. Thus the members of the IEC are beholden to the President for their jobs and Chairman Lodin made no secret of the fact that he wanted President Karzai to win. The IEC needs to be revamped and the appointments need to be done by an impartial body.

The Afghan Constitution which covers electoral law is flawed with regard to unworkable electoral timetables and runoff dates. In the last election, the unrealistic election date of 22 April allowed President Karzai to play with the IEC and the international community. Next year’s elections need to take place in mid to late October when the fighting season has died down and civil service penetration is at its height. To date, President Karzai has refused to appoint the Constitutional Commission, mandated by the Bonn Agreement which monitors and fixes constitutional irregularities of which there are many.

The system of Single-Non-Transferrable-Vote which does not allow for political parties is further retarding the development of the Afghan Parliament because it ensures that each of the 349 members is an island unto himself with no central direction or long term party policy. Political parties need to be brought into the process

Voter apathy is at its height. A concerted voter education and IO campaign needs to take place in order to attempt to explain elections and re-establish some form of legitimacy and faith in the system between Afghans and their government.

It is essential that district elections take place next year. In 2005 they were cancelled and district governors were appointed -- many of which did not represent the interests or enjoy the support of locals. The district is where people live and in Afghanistan all politics are local.

Next year, election security will require a full court press by all security stakeholders. The security model that I advocated has three rings of defence: Afghan police at the polling centers and villages; Afghan Army and highway police in the areas between population centers; and ISAF operating with the Afghan Army in those outer spaces. In order to make this work, all hands need to be at the pump. This is not an economy of force operation! Roads must be clear in order to facilitate voting, and only those polling centers that are secured and have an international presence, i.e. ISAF personnel, should be allowed to open.

I am a soldier, so I know that the natural inclination is to fight, but fighting for the sake of fighting will bring no end. In this type of war political legitimacy is key and next year’s local elections will be more important to Afghans then this year’s presidential elections, even if less newsworthy. It is not "a mission" in 2010, it is "the mission" and it is a "no fail" mission.

LCol JJ Malevich, Director of COIN, US Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center, Canadian Exchange Officer.