

Effects of Operational and Strategic Pauses on Mission Success

**A Monograph
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Abstract

EFFECTS OF OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC PAUSES ON MISSION SUCCESS by MAJ Eric D. Beaty, USA, 50.

Operational pauses are part of campaign design and remain relevant in 21st century expeditionary warfare. The United States should maintain the military in a subordinate role as only one element of national power. Where this is infeasible, use of force should establish the discourse space required to recapitalize upon the information, diplomatic, and economic elements of national power. This author posits that in the foreseeable future of global conflict and contemporary operating environment, military engagements and operational pauses will facilitate strategic pauses which allow discourse space and lead to more rapid conflict termination. This thesis is supported through the thread of reviewing current doctrine, examining the work of prominent military theorists, and the presentation of operational and strategic case studies.

After an extensive review of modern literature pertaining to the concepts of operational art, culmination points, logistics, and operational reach, this monograph explores the feasibility of using an expeditionary military as a means to create a strategic pause. Whereupon, other elements of national power take rightful primacy to fully resolve the conflict. Additional discussion into the effectiveness of operational and strategic pauses against insurgent, terrorist, and non-state actors is explored. In order to limit the scope of this paper and remain at or above the operational level, tactical pauses are not discussed.

The planning of operational pauses throughout history, and particularly in the case studies discussed within this paper, provide evidence of utility in modern warfare. Mechanization and industrialization increased the amount of logistics required to sustain a force and subsequently forced commanders and staffs to plan accordingly to avoid culmination. Paramount to success is the ability of a force to utilize operational art to affect the outcome of conflict.

Utilization of strategic pauses to affect conflict termination has a mixed set of results. From the case studies provided, it is seen that they rarely force capitulation. Only under very exact conditions are they applicable and this set of conditions is very hard for the strategic leader to recognize as being present. According to compellence theory, pauses are utilized to afford the opportunity for presenting the proverbial 'carrot' or 'stick' to the opponent. The threat of a bigger stick has to possess real potential and the threat must be believed by the opponent. The opponent must also be outside his threshold of tolerance for punishment.

Of limited academic discussion is the usefulness of implementing pauses, operational or strategic, against non-state actors like terrorist organizations. Most theory and scholarly study is focused on the type of conflict engaged in by nation-states against nation-states. Attempting to utilize this theory against other types of actors merits great caution. Of particular interest is the fact that a non-state actor may benefit greatly by exercising a pause where state actors are not afforded the opportunity. While nation-states can conduct limited operational pauses against non-state actors, they do not enjoy the luxury of conducting strategic pauses.

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INTRODUCTION

Operational pauses are part of campaign design and remain relevant in 21st century expeditionary warfare. The United States should maintain the military in a subordinate role as only one element of national power. Where this is infeasible, use of force should establish the discourse space required to recapitalize upon the information, diplomatic, and economic elements of national power. This author posits that in the foreseeable future of global conflict and contemporary operating environment, military engagements and operational pauses will facilitate strategic pauses which allow discourse space and lead to more rapid conflict termination. This thesis is supported through the thread of reviewing current doctrine, examining the work of prominent military theorists, and the presentation of operational and strategic case studies.

The use of pauses at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels presents many advantages and disadvantages. Tactical pauses are usually conducted to gain further intelligence, await reinforcement, maneuver forces, or simply to set conditions before progressing with the current mission at hand. Operational pauses are utilized to facilitate the avoidance of culmination and serve as a logical break before transitioning to another phase of an operation. *Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, states that “effective phasing must address how the joint force will avoid reaching a culmination point.”¹ At the strategic level, pauses offer a space for discourse and other elements of national power to affect the course of events. Utilizing the military element of national power in an expeditionary environment may facilitate the greater needed strategic pause whereupon other elements of national power will again take primacy.

In order to explore the aforementioned possibilities it is prudent to ensure that a common understanding of doctrinal terms is provided. The first term of relevance is operational art. The concept has direct ties to work by Soviet military theorists Aleksandr A. Svechin and V.K. Triandafillov during

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, II-18.

the Interwar Period. The Soviet's reluctant incorporation of their concepts revived them from defeat and then led them to success in the second half of World War II. United States doctrine writers incorporated their ideas and later created the Airland Battle doctrine of the 1980s. Their principles remain infused in current Joint doctrine.

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines operational art as the “application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience – to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war.”² It seeks to ensure Joint Force Commanders (JFC) maintain sight of the strategic vision while executing operational missions and planning future operations. Connected to operational art, campaign plan design provides the “conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means” required to succeed in the operational environment.³ JFC's utilize operational art to employ forces on the battlefield, but also use it to understand the force's “sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose.”⁴

Proper sustainment of forces across the area of operations is rarely accomplished without first understanding a particular force's operational reach. *Joint Publication 1-02* defines operational reach as the “distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities.”⁵ General Antoine Henri Jomini coined the opinion that “Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point.”⁶ A common critique of Jomini is his tendency to apply a great deal of mathematical formulation and make warfighting an equation. Although there exists a great deal of quantifiable and

² Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001, 397.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, viii.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-0, Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 13 February 2008, IV-3.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001, 399.

⁶ Jomini, Henri, Baron. *The Art of War*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975.

statistical data supporting the duration of helicopter blade-hours or kilometers the M1 Abrams main battle tank can operate, the true test of today's commanders is understanding more of the intangibles that define a particular force's operational reach. What is the physical and mental conditions of the Soldiers? What other hardships has the unit experienced (i.e. mountainous terrain, harsh weather, personnel losses, etc)? Escaping beyond the science, these considerations surface in the realm of art. Svechin said that "The appetites of automatic weapons can be reduced more than the appetites of the human stomach. An automatic weapon is a machine which can fall silent, while the second is a living being which cannot come to a standstill for even one day."⁷

The dangerous event that looms at the horizon of operational reach is the culminating point. This is defined as the "point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense. In the offense, the point at which effectively continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause."⁸ Similarly, the culmination point of a defense is when the option of conducting a counter-attack is no longer available. While striving to maintain the initiative, the JFC commander may encounter circumstances where he cannot due to "logistic constraints, force shortfalls, or political considerations."⁹ Because of the inherent danger in approaching the culminating point, MAJ Scott W. Heintzelman recommended adding culmination considerations to the joint doctrinal definition of operational reach in his School of Advanced Military Studies 2003 monograph.¹⁰

⁷ Svechin, Aleksandr A. *Strategy*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992, 238.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 12 April 2001., 138.

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, II-19.

¹⁰ Heintzelman, Scott W. "Operational Reach: Is Current Army Doctrine Adequate?" Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2003.

The answer that joint doctrine provides to these questions is the timely execution of an operational pause – “a temporary halt in operations.”¹¹ *Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics*, does a much better job of expanding that definition by incorporating the considerations of extending operational reach and avoiding culmination.¹² *Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operations Planning*, specifies that operational pauses be utilized to prevent culmination and to mark the transition between phases of an operation.¹³ Imposing an operational pause on the enemy by causing his offensive operation to transition to a defense is considered a success and should be exploited. In forcing an end to the enemy’s operation, Svechin remarks that “by causing the operation to stop, the defender has already achieved a great deal.”¹⁴ *Joint Publication 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*, does provide additional caution for the planning of operational pauses by stating that they “obviously reduce operational tempo and risk forfeiture of strategic or operational initiative.”¹⁵

Commander’s and staff’s share great responsibility in the planning of appropriate operational pauses. Operational art underscores the importance of the commander’s visualization and situational understanding. Either overestimating the unit’s operational reach or underestimating the enemy’s culmination point can be detrimental. While discussing military dispositions, Sun-Tzu informs us that “One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. In these circumstances by assuming a defensive posture, strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it would be inadequate.”¹⁶ Identification of operational reach, predicting culmination points,

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, 399.

¹² Department of the Army. *FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, September 2004, 1-139.

¹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 26 December 2006, IV-32.

¹⁴ Svechin, Aleksandr A. *Strategy*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992, 296.

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, II-20.

¹⁶ Sun-Tzu. *The Art of War*, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer. New York: Barnes & Noble Books Inc, 1994, 183.

identifying transition points, and properly planning for operational pauses is paramount to mission success with the exception of individual fortitude.

While the term strategic pause is not defined in Army or Joint doctrine, it is commonly used in academic and historical works. It has also worked itself into the military lexicon. The final portion of this work will posit a strategic pause definition for inclusion in future military publications. While writing of Chinese military thought, author Francois Jullien wrote “strategic waiting involves far more than – or rather something quite different from – waiting for ‘plans to mature’ as opposed to ‘hast that makes everything go wrong’.”¹⁷

After an extensive review of modern literature pertaining to the concepts of operational art, culmination points, logistics, and operational reach, this monograph explores the feasibility of using an expeditionary military as a means to create a strategic pause. Whereupon, other elements of national power take rightful primacy to fully resolve the conflict. Additional discussion into the effectiveness of operational and strategic pauses against insurgent, terrorist, and non-state actors are also explored. In order to limit the scope of this paper and remain at or above the operational level, tactical pauses are not to be discussed.

¹⁷ Jullien, Francois. *A Treatise on Efficacy*. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2004, 75.

EVALUATION OF MILITARY THEORY

Jomini

Born in 1779, Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini was voyeuristic with respect to warfare. Never having actually led a unit into combat, his perspective was more detached than that of Clausewitz's. He was a Swiss citizen initially caught up in the French revolutionary movement when he entered military life at the age of nineteen. Later in his career, he moved further away from initial revolutionary motivations and wrote to dispel the misconceptions of glorified, metaphysical, uncontrollable warfare. His view of warfare assumed a more "Enlightened" perspective as his works progressed. As a staff officer, he wrote extensively and took much of his leadership influence from Napoleon. Jomini believed that war was indeed rational and that a complete theory could be established.

Jomini defined strategy as "the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion."¹⁸ Written primarily for princes and statesmen, *The Art of War* failed to delve into the aspects of operational art that other theorists discussed. Resembling an operations manual, Jomini's book was intended to serve the political leader, who at the time, also led the military into battle. While the principles he derived would not guarantee success, the omission of their consideration assured failure.

In line with his belief that the offensive is the superior form of warfare, Jomini wrote that if an army was strong enough it would capitalize upon one victory though the continued progression toward subsequent objectives. Only if those distances were great would an operational pause be necessitated. "If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate point of support."¹⁹ Placing a heavy emphasis on logistical culmination, he cautions military leaders to avoid operational overreach and always maintain lines of communication.

¹⁸ Jomini, Henri, Baron. *The Art of War*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975, 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 67.

Joint doctrine states that operational reach is “the distance and duration, across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities, is inexorably tied to the concept of lines of operations.”²⁰ Wars of invasion are particularly dangerous according to Jomini because of the inherently long lines of operations they necessitate. He posits that interior lines of communication are always superior to those that are exterior. Interior lines allow the commander to reinforce and resupply his forces quicker and with greater security while minimizing the number of soldiers diverted to maintaining the line of communication. Jomini understood the effects that deep operations have on both operational reach and the potential for logistical culmination.

Clausewitz

Carl Von Clausewitz was a Prussian military theorist who lived from 1780-1831. Entering German military service at age twelve, he fought Napoleon during the French Revolutionary Wars, and then later fought on the Russian side where he saw Napoleon defeated at Waterloo, and subsequently rejoined the Prussian forces where he ran the *Kriegsacademie* - the pinnacle of German military education. As evidenced in *On War*, his pessimism concerning warfare was based on his own personal experiences. Clausewitz heralded revolutionary military theory concepts. His cognitive approach to warfare and acknowledgement of the “fog” and “friction” associated with war ensured his place in the evolution of operational art.

Clausewitz placed great emphasis on the role of the commander and military genius. A student of the massive Napoleonic wars, he witnessed the effects of long campaigns operating away from internal lines of communication. Much ado is given to the logistics of offensive and defensive operations. He describes the role of the commander with relation to culmination and states “Thus, in the midst of the conflict itself, concern, prudence, and fear of excessive risks find reason to assert themselves and to tame

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, B-1.

the elemental fury of war.”²¹ This concern, prudence, and fear of excessive risks are the tools that a commander utilizes to examine operational reach, maintain situational awareness, and prevent culmination – all part of operational art. “If we remember how many factors contribute to an equation of forces, we will understand how difficult it is in some cases to determine which side has the upper hand. Often it is entirely a matter of the imagination.”²² Clausewitz utilized the term “discriminative judgment” to describe how the commander’s intuition and experience enables situational understanding and may necessitate a pause prior to culmination.²³

Consistent with his experiences and emphasis on the destruction of enemy forces, Clausewitz does not advocate the use of pauses in warfare. On the suspension of action in war, Clausewitz says, “this phenomenon is mainly due to the influence that the demands of the one belligerent, and the condition and state of mind of the other, exert on the conduct of the war.”²⁴ Counter to his belief that the defense is the superior form of warfare, he posits “Our belief then is that any kind of interruption, pause, or suspension of activity is inconsistent with the nature of offensive war. When they are unavoidable, they must be regarded as necessary evils, which make success not more but less certain.”²⁵

Similarly, Clausewitz was not an advocate of the use of any form of strategic pause. He wrote that “The sole aim of war was to overthrow the opponent. Not until he was prostrate was it considered possible to pause and try to reconcile the opposing interests.”²⁶ He attributes succumbing to the passions of the people as a defeat mechanism that leads to the much despised limited war. In keeping with his premise, this contradicts with the total destruction of enemy forces and maintaining the offensive.

Strategic initiative is paramount to his theory. On waiting until things take a better turn, Clausewitz states,

²¹ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2007, 154.

²² *Ibid.*, 198.

²³ *Ibid.*, 198.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 154.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 247

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 239.

“that prospect always underlies a ‘waiting’ war – that is, a defensive war.”²⁷ Accordingly, any type of pause should be perceived as waiting which should be perceived as a defensive posture. He is not a proponent of the strategic pause.

Delbruck

Hans Delbruck was born on Rugia, the largest German island, in 1848 and he died in Berlin in 1929. Born into a highly academic and political family, Delbruck studied at the Prussian universities of Bonn and Heidelberg. As both a theoretician and limited practitioner of military art, he fought in the Franco-German War where he realized the horrors of war and shown the true face of warfare. No longer glamorized, he was then enabled to comment on the romanticized histories of ancient wars. Considered one of the first modern military historians, Delbruck used demography and economics to attain a greater understanding of warfare within political and strategic context. Unfortunately, his works remained unavailable to the West until the late 1960’s upon which time they were translated. He is most remembered for his analytical, versus romanticized, approach to history; firm belief in the marriage of civilian-military affairs; and his two-pole strategy of conducting warfare.²⁸

Unique for his time, Delbruck attempted to place military history within its political and economic context of general history. Through application of science and study of geography he wrote anew of past battles, like Marathon, and debunked many Enlightened writings. This drew much criticism from peers because of his lack of military leadership experience and critique of writings held unquestioningly true. Similar to the total and limited wars of Clausewitz, Delbruck believed there were two strategies in war – attrition and annihilation. His analysis of past battles informed that while many thought leaders like Frederick the Great had utilized a strategy of annihilation, superior logistics and troop

²⁷ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2007, 248.

²⁸ Paret, Peter, and Craig, Gordon A. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, 341.

strength actually determined the true attritional outcome. Upon study of Napoleon, he commented that the “greatness of Napoleonic warfare lay in the fact that at that moment when the emperor had achieved military success he employed political negotiations to reach his goals.”²⁹ To Delbruck, pauses were operational in nature, but always a strategic choice.

In line with Clausewitz, Hans Delbruck continually stressed the importance of subjugating the military to political control. Although his initial writings claim that the Reich would be victorious under the Kaiser’s unifying control,³⁰ Delbruck ultimately blamed General Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff for the collapse of Germany. “Ludendorff changed the defensive war into a war of conquest. He did not understand the strategic requirements of the war...”³¹ The military leadership ceased tying military objectives to political goals. Ludendorff neither saw the point of culmination nor understood his army’s operational reach. In effect, Delbruck felt that “wearing-down actions, not great offensive attacks, had to persuade the enemy to open peace talks”³² and this pause would affect conflict termination.

Acknowledging that German forces would reach culmination in World War I, Delbruck argued that the country should adopt a strategy facilitating success against Russia in the East, minor victories in the west against France, and then sue for peace. He was heavily criticized for his commentary and even the Kaiser publicly ostracized him. Ultimately Delbruck wrote that the “weakening of the fighting power was a result of the terrible losses, enormous exhaustion, poor supplies, and insufficient successes.”³³ Within a period of mere months, the German army touted victory only to soon see complete defeat.

²⁹ Delbruck, Hans. *Delbruck’s Modern Military History*, edited and translated by Arden K. Bucholz. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1997, 67.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 192.

³² *Ibid.*, 28.

³³ *Ibid.*, 191.

Svechin

General-Major Alexander Andreyevich Svechin was an instrumental leader in the Soviet army during its golden age of military theory that lasted from 1918 to 1937. Often called the “Soviet Clausewitz,” Svechin was integral to the reformation of Soviet military thought. His book, *Strategy*, enjoyed a second publication in 1927 but his thoughts were politically suppressed by Josef Stalin because they were viewed as anti-Marxist. It was only after the Soviet army was on the verge of destruction at the hands of the *Wehrmacht* in 1941 that Stalin began to implement Svechin’s thoughts and move away from the principles of large, massed mechanized formations designed to execute continuous deep operations.

Believing that studying history was a precursor to studying strategy, Svechin was a student of Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, the Napoleonic Wars, and the Russo-Japanese Wars. Influencing the Red Army during his career were the effects of industrialization and the mechanization of warfare. *Strategy* offered a new and revolutionary understanding of modern war. Svechin took these lessons and transformed the understanding of *operatika* and the link between strategy and tactics to deliver the first definition of operational art in the 1920’s.

He posited that “tactics is an extension of operational art and operational art is an extension of strategy, strategy is an extension of politics.”³⁴ His work and theories revolved around the emphasis on the political and economic preparations a country should make for war as well as the execution of a war of attrition vice decisive strategic victory. Of particular interest are his postulations on strategy, culmination, operational art, and operational pauses.

Above all else, Svechin revolutionized the way that the Soviets viewed war. His transformation was from warfare focused on destruction to one of attrition. He defined strategy as “the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed

³⁴ Svechin, Aleksandr A. *Strategy*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992, 70.

forces.”³⁵ Further, strategy was all-inclusive. Independent services have the art, not the strategy. This was based primarily off the then independent goals of the services. Not only did he modify the cognitive approach to war, his formulation required the national level to establish strategy and intermesh services to accomplish national objectives.

Svechin informed that “the war’s culmination or highest period of tension would occur not at the beginning, but several months after the primary mass of forces had been drawn into battle.”³⁶ Looking at warfare through an attritional lens, he understood the importance of logistics in mechanized warfare. He also stated that “the operational plan must always be tied to existing material capabilities.”³⁷ Particularly through the experiences of the Bolshevik Revolution and World War I, Svechin realized that logistical plans were paramount to surviving extended conflict and avoiding culmination. “The operational plan should include: a plan for initial operations, and a plan for all auxiliary transports, for the creation and operational deployment itself, and a supply plan.”³⁸

This logistical planning and understanding of culmination had effects on how the Red Army was to execute both defensive and offensive operations. Discussing the defense and forcing enemy culmination he stated that it was a “means for providing conditions for going over to an effective counteroffensive, leading to the defeat of an enemy.”³⁹ Experiences in Manchuria during the early part of the 20th century demonstrated how the battlefield had evolved – “It required a new sort of commander who could conquer space and time to bring about concentration of combat power at the decisive point and time to press the combat to culmination.”⁴⁰ It was these understandings of the operational environment that directly contributed to his revolutions on operational art.

³⁵ Svechin, Aleksandr A. *Strategy*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992, 5.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 235.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 217.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

Svechin claims that operational art is “a third category of military art between strategy and tactics.”⁴¹ Operational art is the bridge between tactics and strategy, the “totality of maneuvers and battles in a given part of a theater of military action directed toward the achievement of the common goal, set as final in the given period of the campaign.”⁴² Part of this art is understanding the “path to the ultimate goal is broken down into a series of operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses, which take place in different areas in a theater and differ significantly from one another due to the differences between the immediate goals one’s forces temporarily strive for.”⁴³

The pauses that Svechin are referencing are those of operational nature and they are meant to provide the effect of political flexibility – providing a cessation where politics (which has primacy) decides to continue the offensive or switch to defensive. Svechin realized that warfare was an amorphous entity and that a complex operational environment may change national goals during conflict. “The political goals established during preparations for a war can in no way be considered unalterable. On the contrary, these goals may be narrowed, widened or completely altered, depending on the course of the war.”⁴⁴ Operating during a time of mechanization and industrialization while advocating a change from destruction based warfare, Svechin understood the importance of utilizing pauses to mitigate friendly culmination, maintaining material superiority, and attempting to force enemy culmination.

The tenants inside *Strategy*, as well as Svechin himself, languished while being politically suppressed through the 1930s. In 1938 Svechin fell victim to Stalin’s great military purge. He was vindicated in his controversial theories after his death when Soviet’s forces were decimated and subsequently recreated during WWII – “Moscow and Stalingrad were his victories.”⁴⁵ The true worth and relevance of *Strategy* only became recognized after the recent fall of the Soviet Union.

⁴¹ Svechin, Aleksandr A. *Strategy*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992, 23.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 38.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 55.

Triandafillov and Tukhachevsky

V.K. Triandafillov's book, *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*, is another work that has impacted the U.S. military's current doctrine and understanding of both deep operations and operational art. Triandafillov was an important inter-war period leader who assisted in laying the foundation for Soviet military theory. Written with a future orientation, he focused on deep battle, successive operations, and deep operations.

Seeing combat in World War I, the Russian Civil War, and the Polish-Soviet War, Triandafillov's views began to deviate away from traditional Russian thought. The education of the Polish-Soviet War particularly taught him the important lessons he utilized to theorize about deep operations and culmination. As a soldier-revolutionary, Triandafillov was considered a realist who opposed the conservative's beliefs and traditional military thoughts. He sought to outline a predictive theory that could link theory with the actual practice of war.

Triandafillov favored an offensive shock army and thought that large, mechanized forces would permeate the future. Through modernization, the Soviet army would require less troops with a larger logistical support structure. To support his thoughts, Triandafillov went into great detail on the math of logistics to execute both offensive and defensive operations. These calculations were necessary to support his theory of deep operations and campaigns. Retaining relevancy today, his battlefield calculus went further to define the frontage and reach of operational units. In his introduction to the 1994 version of the book, former Foreign Military Studies Office director Dr. Jacob R. Kipp stated "Triandafillov's volume became both a basic work in the development of Soviet theory of operational art and a model for the method of engaging in foresight in military affairs."⁴⁶

Triandafillov was a student at the Soviet military academy under General-Major Svechin when he lectured that operational art was "the means by which the senior commander transformed a series of

⁴⁶Triandafillov, V.K. *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*. London: F. Cass, 1994, vii.

tactical successes into operational ‘bounds’ linked together by the commander’s intent and plan and contributing to strategic success in a given theater of military actions.”⁴⁷ Triandafillov took this definition further and explained that “Tactics, operational art, and strategy as a whole stem from the materiel and personnel that a state allocates for the conduct of war. Military art torn from this foundation inevitably is converted into adventurism and fantasy and can lead to nothing good.”⁴⁸

Triandafillov’s “most significant impact on the subsequent development of Soviet thought was to provide the basis for the theory of the *deep campaign*.”⁴⁹ “Deep operations would employ operational maneuver to encircle and destroy the opposing force.”⁵⁰ In order to increase the chances of success, Triandafillov postulated that effective command and control and a robust system of logistical norms had to support military action in the theater. While developing his battlefield calculus to support geographical-economic conditions in the operational environment he posited “Individual corps may move up to 20-25 kilometers, some divisions even farther, and the army as a whole up to 15-20 kilometers.”⁵¹ Focusing on the availability and status of railroads and the efficiency of motor transport operations, Triandafillov is credited with determining that the operational reach of a corps sized unit is 250km (without constraints). Going beyond this distance would risk reaching a point of culmination.

The 1920 Soviet campaign into Poland illuminated insufficient mobilization and an inadequate logistical system to Triandafillov. This experience showed him that the “Red Army suffered an attrition of combat power so that at the culmination of the campaign its divisions had exhausted their combat power and were vulnerable to the Polish counteroffensive.”⁵² This experience is directly attributed to his development of the theories on deep operations and deep campaigns.

⁴⁷ Triandafillov, V.K. *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*. London: F. Cass, 1994, xv.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, xlv.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, xlv.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, xiv.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁵² *Ibid.*, xii.

Many of his points were integrated into the development of operational pauses that served as phase changes during operations. During his study of operational art, Triandafillov found that “It will be erroneous to rush into a transition to a counteroffensive without waiting for a full concentration of forces and their sufficient support from suppressive assets (artillery, tanks). A counteroffensive undertaken with insufficient forces can lead only to the rout of these forces and may play into the hands of the enemy.” This clearly demonstrates an understanding of timing and tempo, arranging operations, synergy, and culmination. Fully understanding what mechanization created and how important operational art was to overcome these dangers, Triandafillov said that “the capabilities of modern armies to inflict a series of deep blows are limited.”⁵³ Sequencing operations, planning operational pauses, and avoiding culmination were of paramount importance.

Triandafillov, the soldier-revolutionary, contributed many tenants to the current form of operational art utilized by the U.S. military. A product of his experiences, particularly the Polish-Soviet War, he paved the way for military theory innovation during the rapid changes associated with mechanization and industrialization. As with Svechin, the true importance of his contributions was not recognized until well after his death and eventually the fall of the Iron Curtain.

In tandem to Triandafillov’s theories on the deep campaign and importance of logistical support of mechanized Soviet forces, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky pioneered the concept of *gluboky boi* – deep battle.⁵⁴ Combined, they “developed a strategic theory of successive operations based on the Soviet military failure against Poland in 1920 and the failed German offensives against France in 1918.”⁵⁵ Tukhachevsky was born to an aristocratic family in western Russia in 1893. He received his commission from the Aleksandravskoye Military School and saw duty in World War I. After being captured by the

⁵³ Triandafillov, V.K. *The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies*. London: F. Cass, 1994, 128.

⁵⁴ Vlakancic, Peter J. “Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Deep Battle: An Analysis of Operational Level Soviet Tank and Mechanized Doctrine, 1935-1945.” *The Land Warfare Papers* (November 1992): 14, 1.

⁵⁵ Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan M. *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995, 7.

Germans, he finally made his escape back to Russia as a hero after his fifth attempt. Following the Russian Revolution he joined the Bolshevik Party and quickly rose to great preeminence in the Soviet army because of his accomplishments during World War I. By the end of the civil war he had risen to command one of the Soviet's armies.

Tukhachevsky learned from battlefield defeats of Soviet armies during the 1920 Polish-Soviet War and began to institute organizational changes upon assumption of the position of chief of staff of the Red Army. His theories, and his status as a national hero, intimidated Soviet leadership and Stalin suppressed him. Tukhachevsky's theory of deep battle would remain taboo until the Soviets faced defeat in World War II.

His theory of *glubokoy boi* stressed the importance of combined arms forces penetration of enemy lines and subsequent forces destroying subsequent formations and logistics. These operations were characterized by the multiple corps or army sized units consolidated to execute them. There were four echelons in his offensive. The first echelon consisted of aircraft with the mission of destroying enemy formations and gaining local air supremacy. Next, an infantry and mechanized mix would engage the enemy front-line forces and develop a penetration. The third echelon consisted of mechanized and armored formations intent on exploiting a breakthrough and encircling enemy rear formations and logistical centers. Finally, a reserve formation would consolidate the victory. The intent of rapidly moving mechanized formations in the four waves was to overwhelm the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield, induce operational paralysis, and force culmination.⁵⁶

As Stalin's paranoia increased, Tukhachevsky fell victim to the Great Purge in 1937. The Red Napoleon was blamed of conspiracy, arrested, tried, and executed in secrecy.⁵⁷ The remaining Soviet leadership distanced themselves from the concepts of deep battle. While Triandafillov also focused on deep operations, his work contributed more to the sustainment and phasing of offensive maneuver. When

⁵⁶ Shukman, Harold. *Stalin's Generals*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1993, 256.

⁵⁷ Alexandrov, Victor. *The Tukhachevski Affair*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1964, 182.

combined with the theory of Tukhachevsky, the Soviets would find the ability to execute operational art against the Wehrmacht and see eventual success after initial defeat in World War II. This combination enabled the Soviets to extend operational reach and induce enemy culmination.

Van Creveld

Martin Van Creveld is an Israeli military historian and theorist born in 1946. He has authored seventeen books to include *Command in War*, *Rise and Decline of the State*, and *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton*. His comments from a book published in 1979, *Supplying War*, pertains most greatly to the subject at hand.

The purpose of the book was “to investigate the effect of logistics upon strategy during the last centuries.”⁵⁸ With an eye on the future, Van Creveld was critical of Clausewitz’s trinity of the military, people and the government. This critique is derived from Van Creveld’s observations on the decline of the nation-state as primary one-on-one warfare of the future. Although many great military leaders and their campaigns are studied in *Supplying War*, he emphasizes the cumulative effects that logistics and its considerations, or lack thereof, played on the success of military campaigns.

Van Creveld did not delve into the utilization of operational pauses often in his work. Only during discussions of armies stopping an advance during the 16th and 17th centuries to allow logistical trains to catch up and markets to be established did he mention the use of a pause. The reality of temporarily halting operations to facilitate resupply and consolidation pervades even the most current operations. It is with this respect that an analysis of how logistical concerns affect strategy development and campaign planning is notable.

The campaigns of Napoleon are among the most studied and written about. It was from these experiences that theorists Clausewitz and Jomini derived most of their examples. Van Creveld posits that logistics was the driving factor in causing Napoleon to alter unit formations, create robust staffs, and seek

⁵⁸ Van Creveld, Martin L. *Supplying War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 1.

decisive victory at the single point of battle. The utilization of magazine supply locations on interior lines did not facilitate the type of operations that Napoleon was to conduct. In order to fight on these exterior lines Napoleon established the corps system to facilitate convergence of forces on an enemy, but also to facilitate dispersal of forces so that they may forage on enemy lands in less concentrated numbers. Van Creveld noted that “the limits of warfare in this period resulted not so much out of choice as from necessity, and among the factors contributing to these limits, logistics are usually allowed pride of place.”⁵⁹ Both the limitations and capabilities of 18th century logistics drove military strategy.

The pursuit of decisive battle and extremely long distances of march characterize Napoleonic warfare. Again, logistics influenced strategy immensely. Remaining on the move, battle after battle, prevented the large forces from running out of sustenance during their operations. This is why Van Creveld highlights the fact that Napoleon “conducted only two sieges during his entire career.”⁶⁰ Executing siege warfare at these great distances simply was not logistically possible. Where this strategy failed Napoleon was when he underestimated the amount of foraging that his forces could conduct in the harsh environment of Russia during his drive for Moscow in 1812. Execution of an operational pause or possibly relooking the strategy of the campaign would have behooved Napoleon in retrospect.

The study of logistics during military campaigns conducted by Van Creveld illuminates how paramount it becomes during strategy development. From Napoleon’s campaigns of 1808 and 1812, to Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, to the impact of motorization and rail, to OPERATION BARBAROSSA, and finally to the Allied breakout and pursuit during World War II; Van Creveld provides multiple examples of where logistics affected operations. *Supplying War* emphasizes the importance of integrating logistical considerations into initial strategy development, realization of operational depth, planning operational

⁵⁹ Van Creveld, Martin L. *Supplying War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 36.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 41.

pauses, and avoiding culmination. It was with these considerations that Van Creveld posited that “logistics makes up as much as nine tenths of the business of war.”⁶¹

Naveh

Shimon Naveh’s work, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, provides both additional thoughts and contested insight into the development of operational art and integration of Soviet theories into U.S. doctrine. Naveh has lectured at the Tel Aviv University and is a retired Israeli Defense Force brigadier general. Particular bias is given to the Soviets over the Germans, and the book fails to provide quantifiable or substantial analysis. The book does serve as good contrast to the other works focusing on military doctrine though. Much discussion is given to Clausewitzian theory, the German practice of the *Blitzkrieg*, Soviet operational art, and the evolution of the U.S. Airland Battle doctrine into operational art.

His primary focus is the operational level of war. Advocating systems theory, Naveh recommends looking at military forces as a system of parts that together use tactics to realize strategic goals. The better friendly forces integrate those parts, the greater the chance of success. He also posits that the destruction of enemy forces should not be placed in the forefront. Disruption, not destruction, of enemy systems is vital to victory according to Naveh.

One particular agent that Naveh focuses on is the Soviet military. He is particularly fond of the advancements the Soviet army accomplished with regards to implementation of operational art during World War II. He is so fond of it he goes as far to say that the U.S. would do well to come close to their level of mastery over the art. Naveh attributes much of their success to the fact that Soviet operational art was a conceptual revolution more than a technological revolution in military affairs. This revolution was heralded by the theories of Svechin, Triandafillov, and Tukhachevsky. The Soviet’s success and

⁶¹ Van Creveld, Martin L. *Supplying War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 231.

realization of the importance of operational shock, culmination, operational reach, and deep operations is attributed to this cognitive evolution and adoption of operational art.

Although more critical, Naveh also spends a great amount of time discussing the German military machine of World War II. The German army did capitalize upon mechanization and industrialization; however, Naveh points out their failure to integrate major tenants of operational art into their campaigns. These failures include operational reach, avoiding culmination, understanding deep operations, and an overall “absence of operational cognition.”⁶²

“The greater their tactical successes and the deeper their penetration into the adversary’s territory, the flimsier their operational position became. The German inclination to grab the largest possible number of enemy troops into the cauldrons created by the deep penetrating armored blows overstretched their resources, split the mechanized formations from the infantry, and severed the succession of operations, thus bringing complete exhaustion upon themselves. The initial successions in Poland, France and the Balkans induced a state of euphoria among the German strategic and operational leaders and convinced them that their operational method was coherent and invincible.”⁶³

Similar to how Svechin recommends the utilization of operational pauses to provide political flexibility, Naveh discussed creating operational flexibility through detailed planning for transitioning between forms of maneuver. “Operational flexibility is attained through planning and implementation which strive to harmonize the available resources and forces with the theatre conditions in a manner which permits the accomplishment of the operational aim despite the opposition.”⁶⁴ Again, operational reach, depth, culmination, and operational pauses remain inexorably tied.

While Naveh does not espouse entirely new concepts for the utilization of operational or strategic pauses, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence* does consolidate many of the tenants of operational art that are precursors for the identification of culmination and the need for a transition during operations. Based on the writings of Clausewitz, Triandafillov, and Svechin, the author provides many examples of Soviet

⁶² Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. London: F. Cass, 1997, 128.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 137.

cognitive aptitude and just as many German failures during World War II. His work maintains relevance to the military professional desiring to gain a better conceptual and historical understanding of the American system of operational art. While discussing American doctrinal history and *Field Manual 100-5 Operations*, he stated that “By replacing the term ‘operational level’, employed in the 1982 manual, with ‘operational art’, the 1986 manual made a perceptual breakthrough and laid the foundations for a long ensuing debate.”⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Naveh, Shimon. *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*. London: F. Cass, 1997, 12.

CASE ANALYSIS

OPERATIONAL PAUSES

In order to clarify the selection of the following cases as different from subsequent ones it is important to first define the operational level of war. *Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations*, states that it “links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives through the design and conduct of operations using operational art.”⁶⁶ This level has traditionally been considered in terms of operations residing at the corps and division level. In the current operating environment, it is arguable whether or not newly organized brigade combat teams are able to accomplish national strategic objectives or whether they are simply applying tactics to accomplish those objectives. Regardless, the consideration of pauses must exist at all these levels and remains relevant across the full gambit of unit sizes.

The two cases presented for discussion at the operational level are those of the Allied breakout and pursuit during World War II and that of coalition operations during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. These operations are at the appropriate level for consideration and bear merit on the consideration of operational pauses to avoid culmination. “Because military operations cannot always be conducted continuously, there may be a need to plan for periodic pauses. Operational pauses may be required when a major operation has temporarily reached the end of its sustainability.”⁶⁷ Following industrialization and the subsequent advent of mechanized warfare, logistical considerations became paramount during mission planning in order to avoid culmination. The necessity of operational pauses can either be regrettably realized while in contact with the enemy or planned for as the following two examples display.

⁶⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-0, Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 17 September 2006, xiii.

⁶⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, xi.

Allied Breakout and Pursuit of World War II

On June 6, 1944 the Allies initiated the largest amphibious assault ever conducted – OPERATION OVERLORD. The invasion into northwest Europe involved more than three million troops. Critical to liberating France from German control and initiating attacks aimed toward the German motherland was the ports of western France, particularly Cherbourg because of its deep-water capability. None of the initial assault objectives were seized, and through determined fighting, the Allies were able to establish a tenuous beachhead. Extending that line proved slow and it was at this point when the commander of U.S. forces, General Omar Bradley, proposed a breakthrough of the German lines. After a three-week military buildup, OPERATION COBRA began on July 25, 1944. Author Max Hastings refers to this operation as the “supreme American military achievement of the Normandy campaign.”⁶⁸

Breaking with Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower’s initial intent of maintaining a “broad front,” the plan called for a “knifelike thrust” through weakened German defensive lines in order to force them out of their positions.⁶⁹ Through supporting actions of British and Canadian allies in the north, as well as a combined Allied carpet-bombing operation, OPERATION COBRA began. The Germans were unable to maneuver and were too occupied with other fronts to reinforce units in the Normandy battle area during the initial stage. The right-hook movement of General Patton led to the destruction of the German 7th Army and the seizure of Le Mans, Rennes, and all of Brittany.

Patton was known for his penchant of continuously pushing his men to the limits of their capabilities. This boldness was further amplified following his daring success during COBRA and his subsequent promotion to command Third Army for the remaining excursion to liberate France. “General Patton refused to be tied down by the logisticians’ tables” and “throughout the campaign of 1944-5, he

⁶⁸ Hastings, Max. *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, 249.

⁶⁹ Van Creveld, Martin L. *Supplying War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 216.

only saw his G-4 twice.”⁷⁰ Although the logisticians thought rapid advance was impossible, his leadership affected the breakout of Normandy and the swift assault to the Siegfried Line in December 1944. Good weather, an extensive French road network, and minimal German air support were all contributing factors to his success. The logisticians would have preferred an operational pause to affect the buildup of supplies at the French western ports and shorelines after COBRA.

Whether Patton’s drive was fortuitous or genius has generated much debate. At one point, he gave orders for units to drain fuel from tanks to fill the lead ones. When all were out of fuel, they were to dismount and continue the fight on foot.⁷¹ Patton is an excellent example of a commander executing operational art. He understood not only his own culmination point and operational reach, but he understood the enemy’s. Any pause by Patton’s Third Army may have facilitated the retreat of German forces to more defensible positions or the reinforcement of troops into France from other portions of the theatre. Initiative had been seized. General Eisenhower on the other hand, saw that the Allies had outrun all supply capabilities and forced an operational pause on Patton so that the entire force could refit prior to the assault into Germany itself. The war lasted another nine months.

To place additional context on the forced pause, Eisenhower had assumed direct operational command of the Allied forces in northern France September 01, 1944. It was his responsibility to direct the logistical flow to competing Allied advances during this pursuit phase. In the third week of September, Eisenhower had to choose between supporting Patton’s drive through the Moselle-Sarre Line and Montgomery’s plan to leap across the Rhine in Holland. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was tasked to clear the Schelde approaches to Antwerp and given priority of logistical assets because the Allies believed that “an additional major deep-water port on the north flank is an indispensable prerequisite for

⁷⁰ Van Creveld, Martin L. *Supplying War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 214.

⁷¹ Providence, Charles M. *Patton’s Third Army: A Chronology of the Third Army Advance, August, 1944 to May, 1945*. New York: Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1992, 32-32.

the final drive deep into Germany.”⁷² The German heartland and Berlin lied over 300 miles from operational ports and the Red Ball Express strove to keep up with the pace of advancing units. “In the face of the glowing opportunity for continued pursuit of disorganized forces, the Allies decided to keep moving as long as possible.”⁷³ When faced with the realization that German organization was disintegrating, Eisenhower carefully chose to pause only long enough to extend operational reach, prioritize scarce resources, and ensure that Allied forces did not culminate. Accomplishing this feat while not surrendering strategic initiative is a testament to the grasp of operational art by the Allied commanders.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

“There is a finite range beyond which the joint force might not be able to operate or maintain effective operations, i.e., its operational reach. Operational reach challenges can be addressed in campaign plans.”⁷⁴ The campaign plans developed by LTG Wallace and the V Corps staff took these considerations into account during development of the invasion concept for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). On March 20, 2003, the Coalition initiated the ground offensive against the Iraqi regime. Baghdad was the operational goal of Wallace and viewed as the regime’s center of gravity. With the capture of Baghdad, Hussein would lose effective control of his seat of power and this would facilitate the establishment of a post-war occupation. The Corps’ rapid advance, utilization of operational art, and meticulous planning for logistical requirements led to the fall of Baghdad on April 09, 2003.

U.S. strategic objectives in the invasion of Iraq included removing the Saddam regime and Ba’athist party, to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction (WMD), alleviate human suffering

⁷² Cole, Hugh M. *The Lorraine Campaign*. Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, United States Army, 1950, 256.

⁷³ Blumenson, Martin. *Breakout and Pursuit*. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961, 677.

⁷⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 25 January 2002, II-18.

delivered by the hands of the regime, sever Iraqi support and harboring of Al-Qaeda, and support democracy. While incomplete, or faulty, intelligence on Iraq's WMD capabilities has been aired, no evidence has been provided on their existence. Also of controversy and prone to circulation upon conspiracy theorists is the belief that the invasion was executed solely to seize control of Iraq's oil reserves. However faulty post-invasion operations were conducted, the U.S. administration had but the noblest intentions on ordering the operation.

Iraqi enemy forces were comprised of over 400,000 conventional and paramilitary personnel.⁷⁵ There were fourteen divisions in northern Iraq, three in central Iraq, and another six in southern Iraq. An additional three armored divisions of Republican Guard augmented the Baghdad area. Unconventional forces included Saddam's *Fedayeen* as well as an innumerate amount of paramilitary forces located throughout the country's populated areas. While the equipment remained a threat, it was by no means close to the level of technological advancement of Coalition forces. The greatest threat posed against the U.S. Army emerged to be that of paramilitary forces with technical vehicles, AK-47 rifles, and rocket propelled grenades (RPG) who would fight without uniforms from within the populace. The type of non-linear operations these paramilitary forces conducted was a direct threat to Wallace's lines of communications (LOC) and he found himself committing reserve units to secure them.

Although U.S. assessments of Iraqi capabilities were quantifiably accurate, the mindset of Hussein and his conception of what a second Coalition war would look like were far from complete. After the Gulf War, Hussein prioritized the military's mission: "first, secure the regime; second, prepare to handle regional threats; and third, defend against another attack by an American-led Coalition."⁷⁶ The United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, failure to complete the task during DESERT STORM in 1991, and retreat from Somalia in 1993 made Saddam think of the United States as a "paper tiger." Even the

⁷⁵ Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003, 6.

⁷⁶ Woods, Kevin M. and Pease, Michael R. *The Iraqi Perspectives Report*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 25.

extended bombing campaign of the Gulf War caused Hussein to think that the Americans were reluctant to initiate ground operations. The result of these flawed perceptions led to Saddam believing that it was “inconceivable that America would engage in a major land campaign to overthrow his regime.”⁷⁷

Coalition forces numbered 509,972 at the onset of the operation. The U.S. provided 466,985 while the remainder of the Coalition comprised of Great Britain, Australia, and Canada provided 42,987.⁷⁸ LTG William Wallace provided the lion-share of planning and resources for the Iraqi invasion. The units assigned to him included the 3rd Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The V Corps, based out of Heidelberg, Germany, had a robust staff of approximately 1,500 personnel. They entered combat with the benefit of working with the aforementioned units during extensive planning sessions and joint operations conducted in the European theatre prior to the invasion. This enabled Wallace’s understanding of assigned units, the types of missions he could assign them, and what their operational reach might look like.

During the Gulf War, the U.S. infiltrated special operations forces (SOF), executed an extensive air campaign, and then began the ground offensive. The objective at that time was to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The primary goal of the OIF campaign would be the ousting of the Saddam regime and Central Command (CENTCOM) planned for an infiltration of SOF followed with a blitz of ground forces supported by subsequent air strikes. Although some claim that the war began in late 2002 with the increased U.S. and British strikes against Iraqi air defense artillery, indicators met acceptable tolerance on the location and disposition of key Saddam regime leadership on March 19, 2003. It was at this point that V Corps was ordered to execute the attack.

⁷⁷ Woods, Kevin M. and Pease, Michael R. *The Iraqi Perspectives Report*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 16.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

LTG Wallace's V Corps line of operation extended from the border crossing of Kuwait into Iraq, to Al Basra, An Nasiriyah and the airfield adjacent to Tallil, As Samawah, An Najaf, through the Karbala Gap, and the final seizure of Baghdad. Along the way, LTG Wallace knew he would have to secure sites for logistical bases and key river crossings that would facilitate the push of logistics to his forces. Third Infantry Division would spearhead the attack into Iraq.⁷⁹ In order to reach Baghdad quickly and topple the regime, LTG Wallace knew that his operational reach would be tested. The initial V Corps advance penetrated deep into southern Iraq. "Within four days, the U.S. Army was outside An Najaf, some 60 miles from Baghdad."⁸⁰ What the V Corps soon realized was that their logistical lines of communications (LOC) would quickly be threatened by the large paramilitary force presence along the LOC. Authors Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn note that "Wallace's constant balancing of rapid maneuver against the need to secure the LOCs and ensure the forces did not reach a culmination point due to logistics shortfalls"⁸¹ was paramount. Elements of the 101st Airborne Division and 82nd Airborne Division were committed to defeating these forces and maintaining the umbilical cord of supplies to the rapidly advancing armored forces.

Of particular note within the V Corps plan was LTG Wallace's acknowledgement that the Corps would need an operational pause "just to the west side of An Najaf"⁸² prior to beginning the assault on Baghdad and the remainder of Saddam's elite forces. "Rather than pause for an extended period, the V Corps and I MEF also soon went on to fight a series of battles...that shattered the cohesion of the Iraqi army...and forced the Republican Guards to deploy."⁸³ Wallace did not want to pause in front of the

⁷⁹ Fontenot, Gregory, Degen, E.J., and Tohn, David. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005, 87.

⁸⁰ Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003, 62.

⁸¹ Fontenot, Gregory, Degen, E.J., and Tohn, David. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005, 90.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 146.

⁸³ Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003, 63.

Republican Guard, but he also did not want to run out of fuel during the fight. Operational objectives just north of Karbala enabled the refit, rearm, and refuel of V Corps forces. During this time, Wallace continued to execute attacks via strategic assets and he continued to battle enemy forces throughout his rear along the 450 kilometer LOC.

Expecting another OPERATION DESERT STORM extended aerial bombing campaign, Wallace's rapid armored advance surprised many Iraqi military commanders and "they were never able to regain their footing."⁸⁴ It surprised them so much that the Iraqis gave up the tactical advantage of fighting from within built-up areas and they mistakenly maneuvered into the open where Coalition forces were quick to dispatch them. The rapid advance also forced the elite divisions of the Republican Guard and *Fedayeen* to displace south therefore exposing them to air attack and targeting. Within days of reaching OBJECTIVE LIONS and OBJECTIVE PEACH north of Karbala where Wallace conducted his operational pause, Baghdad had fallen.

LTG Wallace utilized the operational pause to avoid culmination of Coalition forces during the advance toward Baghdad. In an effort to maintain constant pressure on Iraqi regular and paramilitary forces, Wallace would retain the initiative during these pauses through the use of air power and supporting attacks. For these reasons, Wallace is reluctant to confirm that V Corps ever entered a true "pause." Application of operational art, a thorough understanding of the units assigned to the Corps via training exercises prior to the invasion, and a firm grasp of operational reach enabled the Coalition advance in the south to maintain an operational tempo that kept the Iraqi regime and military off balance.

Learning upon previous experiences in DESERT STORM and Afghanistan, the V Corps assault set unprecedented rates of maneuver and directly affected regime collapse with minimal friendly casualties. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks stated during a press conference in late March of 2003 that the attack had "already moved the distance of the longest maneuver in the 1991 Gulf War in one-quarter

⁸⁴ Fontenot, Gregory, Degen, E.J., and Tohn, David. *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005, 102.

of the time.”⁸⁵ LTG Wallace and the V Corps staff set the stage for success during planning for the campaign by emphasizing the logistics cornerstone of operations and appropriately gauging the Corps operational depth and planning of an operational pause south of Baghdad. In *The Art of War*, Sun-Tzu provides five factors from which victory can be known. One of these is “One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.”⁸⁶ The V Corps operational pause and logistical plan is testament to their understanding of this factor.

STRATEGIC PAUSES

Joint doctrine defines the strategic level of war as “that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives.”⁸⁷ This definition implies that the strategic level of war encompasses much more than U.S. military forces can bring to bear. It is at this level that the remaining elements of national power – diplomacy, information, and economics – are most applicable. Although the operational level of war supports national objectives, the strategic level of war involves a litany of other organizations, as well as allied nations, that are not normally associated with subordinate levels and are directly nested with national objectives.

While the term strategic pause is not defined in Army or Joint doctrine, it is commonly used in academic and historical works. It has also worked itself into the military lexicon even though never defined by the Department of Defense. To attempt to give context to the myriad of texts that discuss execution of a strategic pause by the United States, they all discuss a temporary halt of the use of elements of national power to affect the course of some form of conflict. Examples of these include

⁸⁵ Cordesman, Anthony H. *The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons*. Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2003, 71.

⁸⁶ Sun-Tzu. *The Art of War*, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer. New York: Barnes & Noble Books Inc, 1994, 178.

⁸⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *JP 3-0, Joint Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 17 September 2006, xiii.

halting bombing campaigns, forgoing the implementation of trade embargos, and “wait and see” periods of time where the U.S. attempts to measure the opponent up and attempt to predict future actions.

Traditionally, the use of strategic pauses has occurred between nation states. Coercion and threat of action is usually attributed to the execution of these pauses. They allow the necessary space and time for elements of national power to affect the outcome of conflict before implementation of more severe means to include further military involvement – compellence. Although undiscovered in research, the question arises in the applicability of a strategic pause initiated by a nation-state against a non-state organization or actor. The following case analysis provides example of where the U.S. implemented commonly accepted strategic pauses and discusses their effectiveness at attaining national-strategic objectives.

Vietnam

The U.S. involvement in the conflict of Vietnam between 1950 to 1975 is considered by many to be the only time that the country “lost.” The ramifications of over 58,000 killed in action (KIA) U.S. service members and its protracted duration are still felt by America’s citizens and addressed in scholarly work. Exhibiting revulsion to the difficulties found in combating the communist insurgency, military doctrine and educational systems failed to incorporate many of the lessons learned. Utilizing the growing strength of the Soviet Union and the Cold War as an alternative focus for almost two decades, only recently has the U.S. readdressed counter-insurgency operations. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan forced military and political institutions to forward both the successes and failures experienced. Although the Nation is currently combating what some have called a global insurgency against radical extremists, the conflict in Vietnam remained that of nation-state against nation-state. It is within this context that the U.S. attempted to utilize a strategic pause to force capitulation and coerce the belligerent to the negotiating table.

The story of Vietnam is complex and gave rise to a unique environment requiring U.S. intervention in the pursuit of maintaining global stability. Following the defeat of the Japanese in World

War II, a revolutionary and communist leader named Ho Chi Minh began a revolt that eventually overcame those present with French colonial interests. This led to prolonged insurgent action within the country. In 1950, the United States began sending aid to the French and eventually dispatched military and political advisors to the country. Following the resounding defeat of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the actors signed a peace agreement at Geneva that effectively cut the country in two – North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Under communist control and led by Ho Chi Minh, Hanoi began an insurgency against Saigon utilizing the Viet Minh Front.

As the insurgency grew in South Vietnam, American political leaders feared the overthrow of the government. The United States political objective of military action in Vietnam was the containment of communism. Fearful of escalation that would bring both the Soviet Union and China into the conflict, the U.S. began retaliation against North Vietnam utilizing very graduated responses. While the first major air campaign began in 1965, it would be several years until substantial U.S. ground forces were committed. There were three major air campaigns aimed at forcing capitulation by the communist leadership.

The first of these campaigns was OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER executed from February 1965 to October 1968. The military objective of the operation was to “compel Hanoi to cease aggression against South Vietnam and to enter peace negotiations.”⁸⁸ President Lyndon B. Johnson, assisted by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his “Whiz Kids,” maintained strict control over all operations in Vietnam to include approving all targets designated for air interdiction. So much so, that author Dale R. Herspring states “this entire operation – like many others – was directed from Washington.”⁸⁹ The perception of many military leaders was that the administration was trying to fight the war on the cheap by not deploying ground forces to support South Vietnam. During the operation, the lack of an overall air campaign strategy whereupon synergistic effects could be attained produced little

⁸⁸ Blanchfield, Jody L. "Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower in Limited Conflict." (2000): 6.

⁸⁹ Herspring, Dale R. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, 165.

results. Although air interdiction was intended to “dissuade the North from infiltrating men and supplies into the South,”⁹⁰ results were not seen. The ineffectiveness of the U.S. strategy and OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER was painfully displayed during the January 1968 Tet offensive mounted by North Vietnam. What began as an operation to force a strategic pause upon North Vietnam and bring them to the negotiations table in eight to twelve weeks became over three years of “sustained pressure.”⁹¹ Shortly after Tet, ROLLING THUNDER ended.

Throughout the operation, Johnson implemented a series of strategic pauses in an effort to bring diplomacy back to primacy as an element of national power and try to get North Vietnam to capitulate. Understanding their tactical and operational positions in the fight, military leaders were not advocates of the pauses in bombing under Johnson. “Nothing seemed to frustrate the Chiefs more than the bombing pauses the president ordered as part of his graduated response to North Vietnam.”⁹² Johnson called one such pause where he attempted to initiate negotiations with North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Two days later the communist’s summer offensive began and inflicted severe damage on the South Vietnamese military. Another well-known strategic pause Johnson implemented was the Christmas Pause.⁹³ As U.S. military action had produced little results and political pressures were placed on Johnson, he ordered a thirty-four-hour truce to begin December 24, 1965. Going against the advice of his Joint Chiefs of Staff, this pause did not open any further negotiations and allowed the enemy to gain more favorable operational footing. What Johnson and the Whiz Kids failed to realize was that tactical and operational results against insurgents were never great enough to force North Vietnam to the table and end the conflict. Only later in the conflict when the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Kong started more conventional operations in South Vietnam were air campaigns valuable and affected the pursuit of peace.

⁹⁰ Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, 177.

⁹¹ Blanchfield, Jody L. "Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower in Limited Conflict." (2000): 11.

⁹² Herspring, Dale R. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, 168.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 172.

President Nixon took a different approach to the air campaign upon assuming the presidency. Much more hands off, he removed many of the previous restrictions placed upon the military under Johnson. Major Jody Blanchfield posits that “Nixon allowed the Air Force to decide the targets, timing, and attack strength. This allowed for greater surprise, intensity, and simultaneity than had been achieved in ROLLING THUNDER.”⁹⁴ The air campaign that Nixon authorized was OPERATION LINEBACKER I. Much shorter than the aforementioned air campaign, this one only lasted six months – May to October 1972. At this time in the war, the enemy had become emboldened and the insurgency had progressed to the point where the enemy started using conventional formations and tactics which made them much more susceptible to attacks from the air. LINBACKER I did succeed at bringing North Vietnam to negotiate in October 1972; however, South Vietnam delayed the negotiations and the entire enterprise fell apart. When the North subsequently pulled away, the potential success of this pause evaporated.

The final Vietnam air campaign to discuss is that of OPERATION LINEBACKER II which lasted twelve days. Dubbed the “Christmas bombing,”⁹⁵ the operation lasted from 18 to 30 December 1972. LINEBACKER II was intended to compel Hanoi back to the negotiations table and accept a cessation of hostilities. After significant air interdiction of the enemy’s key routes and logistics network, North Vietnam yielded. In January 1973, they returned to negotiations and all parties accepted an accord. The use of a strategic pause immediately preceded by immense military power directly affected the culmination. Unfortunately, without U.S. presence and continued support, North Vietnam invaded the South in 1975 and Saigon fell anyway. Although the air campaigns and the utilization of a strategic pause did eventually bring the communist North to negotiations and achieve military termination criteria, the political endstate was not realized.

⁹⁴ Blanchfield, Jody L. "Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower in Limited Conflict." (2000): 15.

⁹⁵ Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, 196.

Kosovo

The 1999 NATO conflict in the province of Kosovo provides example of the failed use of a strategic pause. Author Philip P. Everts stated that the issues precipitating the conflict were the “manifestation of the traditional struggle over power and influence in the Balkans, over competing nationalist claims and incompatible definitions of identity and nationhood.”⁹⁶ Influenced heavily by public opinion, the United States led NATO’s efforts to contain the situation of ethnic cleansing utilizing the relative low-cost technique of solely utilizing air power to force capitulation. Seventy-eight days of NATO bombardment and the threat of ground troop involvement brought all parties to the negotiations table. While military objectives were attained, the use of a strategic pause did not achieve political resolution.

The most immediate event preceding the 1999 necessitated intervention was the rise of Slobodan Milosevic to power in Serbia in 1989. A leader in the Communist Party, Milosevic acceded to power utilizing Serbian nationalism as a major campaign tenant. It was under his leadership that Yugoslavian security forces entered Kosovo and began systematically displacing ethnic Albanians. Even though the Albanians held the majority of the population, they were severely ineffective at degrading the purge. In 1997, a more militant group of Albanians formed the genesis of an insurgency within the province by establishing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Within months, its numbers exceeded 15,000 personnel. Milosevic countered the guerilla warfare emergence with heavy-hand and soon allegations of ethnic cleansing emerged on the world stage.

The Clinton Administration began to feel the public outcry for action. During his own presidential campaign, Governor Clinton espoused his commitment to human rights. Compounding the issue at hand was that of national sovereignty. By letter of the law, Yugoslavia was dealing with an internal insurgency and U.S. intervention could have consequences. Having the impeachment slung over

⁹⁶ Everts, Philip P. *Democracy and Military Force*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave, 2002, 134.

his head after the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Clinton directed Secretary of State Madeline Albright to take an aggressive role in America's foreign policy and support for military action to stop Milosevic. The other elements of national power being utilized, including economic sanctions and diplomacy, were not deterring continued aggression against the Albanians. The U.S. led the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the commitment of military forces while displaying extreme risk aversion through unwillingness to acknowledge that ground forces might be necessary. Hence, the strategic bombing campaign of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was implemented to compel the restraint of Yugoslavia.

The air campaign began March 24, 1999 with sorties provided by the Spanish Air Force. The publicly announced strategy for ALLIED FORCE was the destruction of Yugoslav military capability within Kosovo. NATO's strategic objectives were "to demonstrate the seriousness of NATO's opposition to Serbian aggression in the Balkans; to deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on civilians and to create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing; and to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war by diminishing or degrading its ability to conduct military operations."⁹⁷ Milosevic was provided freedom of maneuver by President Clinton on 24 March when he stated, "I do not intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war."⁹⁸ The Yugoslav military altered techniques on the ground to combat aerial strikes and it was soon realized by NATO members that air power alone might not remedy the situation. Potentially overcautious of civilian casualties and popular opinion, NATO gradually increased strikes not only on military formations inside Kosovo, but on infrastructure and military units inside Yugoslavia.

On June 3, 1999, NATO implemented a strategic pause as a reward for Milosevic when he approached the negotiating table. When Serbia would not concede to the terms fully and left the table the campaign began anew on June 7. This immediate and heavy bombardment compelled Milosevic to finally

⁹⁷ Blanchfield, Jody L. "Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower in Limited Conflict." (2000): 32.

⁹⁸ Herspring, Dale R. *The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, 368.

capitulate to what became known as the Kumanovo Agreement on June 10, 1999. The agreement called for the removal of the Yugoslav Army from Kosovo and transferred governance of the province to the United Nations (UN). NATO remained at a strategic pause until all military elements left Kosovo and it appeared that Milosevic was adhering to all stipulations.

The case of Kosovo demonstrates that the utilization of a strategic pause on June 3, 1999 failed as a reward against Milosevic according to coercion theory. Robert Pape, author and Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, defined coercion as “efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits” to influence “the adversary’s calculus for decision making.”⁹⁹ Enemy forces had committed only one of three armies to fight in Kosovo and were not reduced to such a state that necessitated compliance. The strategic pause was only one part of a larger compellence strategy that threatened further escalation with the use of ground forces. NATO cessation of military action via the strategic pause that resulted in the Kumanovo Agreement did not affect the realization of political resolution. What ensued was a much extended strategic pause that only ended after the arrest of Milosevic for war crimes in 2001 and finally with the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008. The June 10, 1999 strategic pause proved to be only a temporary solution.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Pape, Robert A. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, 4.

¹⁰⁰ Blanchfield, Jody L. "Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower in Limited Conflict." (2000): 41.

CONCLUSIONS

Operational Pause Synthesis

The planning of operational pauses throughout history, and particularly in the case studies discussed within this paper, provide evidence of utility in modern warfare. Mechanization and industrialization increased the amount of logistics required to sustain a force and subsequently compelled commanders and staffs to plan accordingly to avoid culmination. No longer could large armies rely strictly on foraging to sustain Napoleonic corps formations. Paramount to success is the ability of a force to utilize operational art to affect the outcome of conflict.

That art encompasses the considerations of operational reach, depth, culmination, arranging operations, and timing and tempo. LTG Patton pushed his units to the breaking point during the breakout and pursuit of World War II. While victorious in his drive to the French-German border, only Eisenhower was able to temper Patton's continued advance and make him grasp reality. Although the war lasted another nine months after Eisenhower's operational pause, reflection and study informs that the Allied forces were not logistically capable of sustaining the rate of advance at which they were operating. Allowing the growth of logistical infrastructure and setting the conditions utilizing strategic assets in the theatre facilitated the eventual destruction of the Third Reich in 1945.

Similarly, during the planning for OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, LTG Wallace understood that V Corps would reach culmination during the fight for Baghdad if all conditions had not previously been established. This led to his plan for an operational pause just south of Baghdad where all units would refit while logistical assets linked back up with the rapid armored forces. During execution, Wallace maintained pressure on the enemy with supporting and shaping actions that kept Iraqi forces off balance. Understanding the element of campaign design tenant of timing and tempo enabled Wallace to maintain this pressure while echelons of units conducted pauses, which were indiscernible to the enemy.

Considering the use of operational pauses is a necessary component of any campaign plan. The modular and expeditionary force structure that exists in today's U.S. Army is very powerful, yet

remains heavily dependent on higher echelon's logistical capabilities for sustained operations. Of slightly higher importance is the ability of the commander and staff to anticipate culmination (friendly and enemy), realize the approach of the limits of operational reach, and execute operational pauses while in contact with the enemy without losing the initiative.

Since GEN David H. Petraeus assumed command of CENTCOM, he has taken time to conduct an operational pause and reassess the strategy for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. John Mills, contributor to the Naval Post-Graduate School's Center for Contemporary Conflict posited in March of 2007 that "Those of us who are part of the professional military element of national power need to conduct an operational pause to our efforts in the Long War. We need to understand and apply the Principles of War, re-communicate why we went to War, and clearly articulate the way ahead."¹⁰¹ It is clear that Petraeus' actions demonstrate his grasp of operational art and he is currently utilizing an operational pause to achieve two functions. First, current military strategy is being reassessed. Secondly, Petraeus is leveraging the other elements of national power from a strategic level to affect turning the corner on the growing trouble being encountered in Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan. The results of this operational pause and the ways that additional energy injected into the system is utilized remains to be seen.

Strategic Pause Synthesis

Utilization of strategic pauses to affect conflict termination has a mixed set of results. From the case studies provided, it is seen that they rarely force capitulation. Only under very exact conditions are they applicable and this set of conditions is very hard for the strategic leader to recognize as all being present. According to compellence theory, pauses can be utilized to afford the opportunity for presenting the proverbial 'carrot' or 'stick' to the opponent. The threat of a bigger stick has to possess real potential

¹⁰¹ Mills, John. "It's Now 2007: So Where are We in the Long War?" Strategic Insights 6, no. 2 (Mar. 2007)

and the threat must be believed by the opponent. The opponent must also be outside his threshold of tolerance for punishment.

In Vietnam, OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER failed miserably for several reasons. During the early stages of the conflict, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces utilized guerrilla and insurgent tactics that did not expose them to the aerial bombing campaigns effects. Pauses executed by President Johnson only exasperated American commanders on the ground as they saw the enemy continue infiltration and escalate actions. The capabilities of Ho Chi Minh were not degraded to a point where the implementation of a pause would affect the course of events. Only after the enemy progressed in warfare to massing their forces and conducting conventional-like attacks were they susceptible to attack from the air and this is when LINEBACKER I and LINEBACKER II achieved success. By the time of the final bombing campaign, Minh's forces were so badly degraded that negotiations were seen as the only course of action remaining that was viable. In his 2000 School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, Major Jody Blanchfield confirms that when he stated that "because North Vietnam's military strategy had changed by 1972, the LINEBACKER campaigns were much more effective militarily."¹⁰²

The Allied bombing campaign of Kosovo in 1999 provides further evidence of the failed implementation of strategic pauses. Milosevic, similar to the North Vietnamese, was not in a military position where the risk outweighed the benefit when NATO implemented the pause intended to bring him to the negotiations table. It is argued that the pause did not fully achieve national-strategic and NATO objectives. It is also questioned whether it was air strikes that forced capitulation or whether a negotiated settlement that included political concessions to Milosevic by parties other than NATO that actually ended the conflict. Although Milosevic did pull troops from the Kosovo province and the UN established governance, true independence from Serbian influence did not materialize until 2008. In effect, a greater strategic pause lasting almost ten years is what brought victory.

¹⁰² Blanchfield, Jody L. "Bombs Away: A Strategic Analysis of Airpower in Limited Conflict." Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2000, 59.

For the most part, strategic pauses in the utilization of military power do not achieve desired effects. As often has been the case, airpower is the military arm of choice for affecting pause. Viewed as high-impact, high-visibility, and relatively “cheap,” versus injecting thousands of ground Soldiers, air strikes are easy to both start and stop when ordered by political masters. The U.S. military can be utilized to show resolve and force limited goals in an expeditionary manner, but alone they will not succeed. The other elements of national power must be exercised in conjunction with the military to achieve long-lasting and acceptable results. Primacy must be restored to the diplomatic, economic, and informational elements. Kosovo is but one example where the strategic pause in OPERATION ALLIED FORCE action only brought temporary reconciliation and capitulation.

Was the Interwar Period a two-decade long strategic pause between the two World Wars? What were the German and Allied actions in 1917 that guaranteed another war? Is the United States in a form of diplomatic strategic pause with India since their further underground nuclear testing in 1998? Was the United States in a strategic pause during the 1990’s that could have only ended with another invasion of Iraq and the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime? These are all questions that remain in debate to this day. As evidenced, strategic pauses have an unimpressive history and can only be analyzed in retrospect. What does remain clear is that the U.S. military will continue to be utilized to affect these pauses in the future where diplomatic, economic, and informational influence fails.

Application of a Pause Against Non-State / Extremist Actors

Of limited academic discussion is the usefulness of implementing pauses, operational or strategic, against non-state actors like terrorist organizations. Most theory and scholarly study is focused on the type of conflict engaged in by nation-states against nation-states. Attempting to utilize this theory against other types of actors merits great caution. Of particular interest is the fact that a non-state actor may benefit greatly by exercising a pause where state actors are not afforded the opportunity.

John Mills believes that terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda can conduct pauses. He believes that operational pauses provide “an ideal time for them to resource and reconstitute while they cheer a

meltdown of American resolve. And just like Ho Chi Minh, they may be planning a spring “Tet” offensive to solidify American disillusionment.”¹⁰³ Unfortunately for the United States, non-state actors are afforded the possibility of pause because of their long-term patience, ideology, and minimal footprint. At the operational level, insurgents and terrorists meld back into the civilian population or cross porous international boundaries to survive another day. Strategically, they have the benefit of time because of the immense amount of monetary cost associated with deploying U.S. military forces across the globe. They also count on the American civilian’s resolve and attention span to wane as conflict extends.

To provide caution to nation-states, Clausewitz wrote “Woe to the government, which, relying on half-hearted politics and a shackled military policy, meets a foe who, like the untamed elements, knows no law other than his own power!”¹⁰⁴ These words resound as we enter the eighth year of conflict in the Long War. At the operational level, the military can conduct pauses that lessen the amount of kinetic energy injected into the system while a softer approach is utilized through diplomacy, economic development, and informational campaigns. Strategically, pauses are not feasible against Al-Qaeda and similar non-state actors. When challenged, the United States must respond. The most ready and immediate tool it possesses is the military. The expeditionary brigade combat teams are organized to do just that.

It is important to recognize that the United States can rarely execute strategic pauses. Some form of national power must always be injected to keep situations in Phase I (Shape) or Phase II (Deter). While we have not yet defeated Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, Clausewitz would again support our actions in OIF and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM when he wrote that “no matter what the central feature of the enemy’s power may be – the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin,

¹⁰³ Mills, John. “It’s Now 2007: So Where are We in the Long War?” *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 2 (Mar. 2007).

¹⁰⁴ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2007, 155.

and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign.”¹⁰⁵ Clausewitz is recommending initiating some form of immediate action until you identify the true enemy center of gravity. While we are still executing operations against terrorist organizations and non-state actors today, we had to respond in some fashion. While nation-states can conduct limited operational pauses against non-state actors, they do not enjoy the luxury of conducting strategic pauses.

¹⁰⁵ Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New York: Oxford University Press Inc, 2007, 242.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The use of operational pauses by conventional military forces remains as relevant as ever. Planning for operational pauses should remain an inseparable component of planning military campaigns against conventional and asymmetric threats. In the current operating environment, the United States may utilize an expeditionary Army to affect strategic pauses. These types of strategic pauses should only be relatively short and remain only until the other elements of national power take their rightful place of primacy.

There are several factors that should always be considered before employing military forces in the hopes of affecting a strategic pause. The first consideration is that of availability of follow-on actions and credibility in the threat of continued punishment. David Singer wrote in his 1963 *American Political Science Review* article that “Threat and promise refer to nothing but contingent, probable future events, while punishment and reward are concrete acts that already have taken, or are in the process of taking, place.”¹⁰⁶ The real punishment that the U.S. military is able to enact is undeniable. Further threat of force without the means or will to execute it is detrimental to long-term success.

Another caution for the utilization of an expeditionary force is that of preemption. Once committed to action, the U.S. government must maintain the resolve and political will to see events to conclusion. Svechin posits that “Preventative wars are wars provided by one state because it fears that the growing strength of its neighbor will threaten it in a future war which would have to be conducted under more adverse conditions than those of the present.”¹⁰⁷ While current expeditionary formations enable rapid deployment, the political leadership must continue to acknowledge the inherent danger in deploying forces to affect national policies.

¹⁰⁶ Singer, David. “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model.” *The American Political Science Review* 57, no. 2. American Political Science Association, Jun. 1963, 427.

¹⁰⁷ Svechin, Aleksandr A. *Strategy*. Minneapolis, Minnesota: East View Publications, 1992, 99.

There should be a definition for strategic pause captured in Joint and Army doctrine. While there is a clear understanding and definition for the operational pause, solidifying the strategic pause has proven more difficult. This may be because it contains many components that fall outside of military prevue, but a definition is still warranted. This author submits that the following definition for strategic pause be incorporated into future doctrinal publications: strategic pause – the temporary cessation of action from any or all of the elements of national power designed to affect conflict termination, compliance, or capitulation.

Further research of pauses through the analysis of operations that failed due to extending beyond culmination is warranted. One such case analysis includes looking at the German Wehrmacht’s disastrous drive toward Moscow between October 1941 and January 1942 – OPERATION TYPHOON. The German military offensive consisted of a double pincer movement intended to cut off the capital’s supply lines and destroy the Soviet military. The effects of the previous operation, OPERATION BARBAROSSA, depleted German fighting units and overextended exterior lines of communications. TYPHOON was initiated anyway with full realization of culmination and understanding of operational reach. Authors David Glantz and Jonathan House related the ensuing battle to “prizefighters with swollen eyes, they were unable to see their opponents with sufficient clarity to judge their relative endurance.”¹⁰⁸ Following the successful strategic defensive established by the Soviets, the Red Army mounted a successful counter-offensive campaign that effectively forced the Wehrmacht to conduct their first major retreat since the start of hostilities in 1939.

An additional case looking at U.S. forces that extended operations beyond culmination is that of the 8th Army’s advance deep into North Korea after Inchon in the face of warnings from the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) that it would send volunteers into the conflict. Without an operational pause to facilitate augmentation of troop strength and building of logistical supplies, 8th Army found themselves

¹⁰⁸ Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan M. *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1995, 82.

overextended and eventually overrun by PRC forces. *East of Chosin* tells the story of both the entrapment and breakout of Task Force Smith.¹⁰⁹ The result of this failure to pause was the destruction of the 8th Army and forced withdrawal of X Corps.

In addition to the state-on-state examples provided above, further specific research into the use of operational and strategic pauses against non-state actors is justified. One such example is that of the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) continuing conflict against Hezbollah. After the 1982 invasion of Southern Lebanon by Israel to neutralize the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), a series of strategic pauses have not facilitated long-standing conflict resolution against the emergent paramilitary organization of Hezbollah. Succumbing to popular resentment against Israeli policy and the occupation of a security zone north of Israel, the security force was withdrawn in 2000. Missile attacks and guerilla warfare continued to strike at Israeli settlements close to the border with Lebanon. The 2006 Lebanese War was initiated by a Hezbollah baited ambush on an IDF patrol reacting to rocket fire. The war lasted thirty-four days until the United Nations Resolution 1701 initiated a cease-fire.¹¹⁰ This asymmetric war has been considered a military and political victory for Hezbollah. Is this strategic pause, or cease-fire, going to be successful? Neither the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) nor Lebanese Army have taken on the disarmament of Hezbollah per the Resolution and rockets continue to target Israeli civilians and infrastructure. Finally, the impact that globalization and organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, and United Nations have had on the use of strategic pauses necessitates further research.

¹⁰⁹ Appleman, Roy Edgar. *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987.

¹¹⁰ Sharp, Jeremy M. "Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006, CRS-4.

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