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As Delivered

I recently spoke with a great WWII artillery hero and asked him what he thought I should talk to you about today.

BG (Ret) Robert Johnson who served with the 11th Airborne Division in WWII and taught gunnery at FT Sill in 1942, and taught the first OCS school at Sill, offered two recommendations:

1. Tell them they must maintain their basic skills
2. Tell them they must adapt

BG Johnson tells a story about transitioning the 11th ABN Division from gliders and Paratroopers, to strictly Paratroopers during the war. The Division had to stand up an Airborne school in New Guinea and train by jumping into pineapple farm fields. He was a glider BN CDR one day and the next day he was an ABN BN CDR (674th Para Field Arty BN) and he had about a week to do “Airborne School” downrange. That’s what I mean about being an adaptable leader.

Are you all familiar with the folk tale, “The Emperor Has No Clothes,” by Hans Christian Andersen? In the story there lived an emperor who thought so much of new clothes that he spent all his money in order to obtain them; his only ambition was to always be well-dressed.

Two weavers con this gullible emperor by selling him expensive cloth they claim is so exquisite only the very wise can see it. The emperor parades before his subjects in his imaginary finery, until an astute child calls out: “But the emperor has no clothes!”

Why do I relate this short allegory to you? Because MG Pete Vanjgel and his team and other FA Commanders have had the courage and candor to bring up important and tough issues that if not addressed could potentially leave us vulnerable in future conflicts. I appreciate the recent white paper “The King and I”. I commend the three former brigade commanders who wrote the paper (note: they’re not “former” just because they wrote the paper). ☺ This is where we need to be going with the entire Army – we must be open and engaging. I’m glad this is being done, and it must continue.

They had the courage to tell the senior leaders in our Army about their concerns in time for us to discuss these issues and begin to formulate solutions. They displayed loyalty and yet candor as they:

- Provided blunt and straight forward advice yet kept disagreements in house, and have implemented faithfully decisions that they may not have agreed with

Maneuver commanders since Alexander the Great have been wise to the importance of integrating fires into their war plans.....and this is a prerequisite for success that does not elude us today.

As former Army Chief of Staff GEN Eric Shinseki once said, “Warfighting is about fires and maneuver – fires enable maneuver; maneuver enables fires. You can’t have a discussion on just one of those principles. Close supporting indirect fires destroy the enemy, suppress the enemy’s capabilities and then protect our forces.”

This morning I want to talk to you all about three things:

1. Highlight some aspects of the current contemporary operational environment, and give a few historical vignettes relating our struggles now to those of the past. The environment has changed....and it won’t ever go back.
2. Explain why our doctrine had to change and highlight for you some important aspects from FM 3-0 and FM 7-0. We must embrace and accept that the future will be different.
3. Touch on the discussion generated from “The King and I” and take any related questions from you all.

Contemporary Operational Environment

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently told an Army audience, “It is hard to conceive of any country challenging the United States directly in conventional military terms – at least for some years to come. Indeed, history shows us that smaller, irregular forces – insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists - have for centuries found ways to harass and frustrate larger, regular armies and sow chaos. We can expect that asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the contemporary battlefield for some time.”

Our fire supporters and air defense artillery Soldiers have to do a multitude of tasks to win in Iraq and Afghanistan that most of us never considered when we

were LTs and CPTs. As my CAC CSM Johndrow just brought up, he's seen the adaptability of our Soldiers many times in his 42 months deployed in Iraq.

As a young artillery captain recently wrote in our Artillery Journal, "As a Field Artilleryman, I knew we were a brigade indirect fire asset; but as a leader, I did not want to deploy knowing my Soldiers and I were not ready to fight as infantrymen." This leader understood the operational environment. He understood the operational environment in which we would be operating.

These same young leaders today are also serving as civil affairs officers, company intel officers, city planners, and mayors. I hear some say they can't synchronize fires, and yet I read reports from the field about LTs less than 1 year removed from this school controlling and synchronizing several different types of UAVs, and rotary wing aircraft in direct support of counter terrorist operations.....while the next day they are planning and implementing multi-million dollar reconstruction projects. We must be able to do the basic skill sets well, but we must ask ourselves at what level we must maintain these skills until we can get back to training for major combat operations again.... try explaining this to your civilian friends – it is almost unimaginable what we ask our leaders to do – and they do it!

I read about PFCs and SPCs calling in and adjusting fire while the Air Force drops 500 pound bombs in the Diyala River Valley on known insurgent locations.

I read the Silver Star account of the 1st Cav Trooper PFC Christopher Fernandez, who in May 2004, was a SAW gunner on a patrol in a Baghdad neighborhood when insurgents detonated an IED on his patrol and opened fire with small arms. Two US Soldiers were instantly killed and five others were wounded. PFC Fernandez expended all of his rounds holding off the enemy while his buddies were being evacuated. When his ammo was expended, he ran to the disabled HMMWV in front of him and grabbed the M240B (which had the hand guards melted off) and continued to suppress the enemy long enough to evacuate casualties, completely disregarding the fact that the machine gun was severely burning his hands.....To all of you, I don't think this is the "lost generation"..... Instead, as Tom Brokaw has said, this is the next greatest generation!! The ability of our young leaders to adapt and be creative just amazes me.

This generation is up to the Herculean task we have been given – to fight and win a two front insurgency as we prepare for the uncertain future that lies ahead... as well as win the peace in full spectrum operations.

But as you all well know, it is going to be challenging. We must have adaptable leaders that understand this new environment and provide us with the skill sets necessary to win the peace.

The Combat Studies Institute at FT Leavenworth recently published “Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of the US Experience”.

This important study highlights the fact that while these challenges we face now are real and worrisome...they are not new to the American military. Shortly after the civil war where artillery was very decisive, our country fought conflicts of a different nature with unique roles for the artilleryman.

Engaging in the Indian campaigns of the late 19th century, it was argued, “degraded the skills of the artilleryman and all too often forced them to serve as cavalry and infantry. There were fears in the War Department that artillerymen on the frontier would not be able to perform well if called on to perform their mission in formal warfare.”

However, the environment of the day did not dictate a traditional use of artillery, a trend that echoed across almost half a century.

“Between 1898 and the American entry into WWII in 1941, US military forces deployed overseas in one major conflict, WWI; a limited conventional conflict, the Spanish-American War; and several “stability-type” operations.

Reflecting on many of these limited excursions, the Marine Corps published the Small Wars Manual in 1940 to capture many of the lessons learned from these operations.

The Global War on Terror has shed light once again on the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual, a book largely forgotten until after 9/11. In this timeless piece on fighting “small wars” the manual has this to say about the use of artillery, “The role of artillery in small wars is fundamentally the same as in regular warfare. Its primary mission is to support the infantry.”

It goes on to state the need for artillerymen to be prepared to serve as guards and infantry, and it outlines procedures for parceling out artillery batteries within a battalion to small units. Adaptable leaders have always had to successfully balance many roles.

Roles such as General Cruikshank, who 75 years ago, had to manage the duties as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) director in several western states while also being the Commandant of the Field Artillery School. That same year (1933), George C. Marshall ran more than 34 CCC camps as an infantry battalion commander, and later oversaw all CCC camps in Washington, DC, as a one star general. These great patriots fulfilled their duties, and met the challenges of the day head on, and in doing so led our country through some of the toughest years imaginable as we pulled through a depression and fought a world war.

Doctrine

But you didn't invite me here to discuss history. Rather, we must look at lessons of the past in order to better understand the future. Your boss asked me to talk about the implications of our new doctrine on Field Artillery.

As in 1933, these are extraordinary times. We have now been in combat longer than at any time in our nation's history other than the Revolutionary War. Drawing on these seven years of combat experience, our Army is developing new doctrine and TTPs as fast as we can capture them and get them into print. There is no question we are a learning, adapting force in a global war.....but so is our enemy.

Our doctrine and TTPs have changed, and so has our organization. This great Army of ours has seen the entire force go "modular" since 9/11 in one of the largest structural overhauls this Army has seen since WWII, and we did it while fighting a war on two fronts – now that takes adaptable and creative leaders! We as leaders must embrace and lead change. Charles Darwin once said, "It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent, but the one most responsive to change."

And our doctrine has changed. Our new doctrine is timely and reflects many of the challenges facing our force today, and it institutionalizes the lessons learned from almost 7 years of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Arguably, the biggest impact of FM 3-0 on the military at large is the recognition that the security environment has significantly changed and we are, in fact, in an era of persistent conflict in which many of the non-traditional missions that characterize current operations will likely be the norm.

- In FM 3-0 we assert that "Military power can contribute to the resolution of irregular warfare like we find ourselves in now in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it alone is not decisive."
- "In the modern conflict, information has become as important as lethal action in determining the outcome of operations."

Information travels instantaneously and what we do and say is seen by all. Understanding this is paramount in the conflicts we're engaged in.

As artillerymen, you all coordinate and synchronize our non-lethal fires and thus you all are more important now than ever in this fight, and I believe will ultimately determine our success in achieving our political and military objectives abroad.

As Clausewitz said, “War is a continuation of politics,” and our success will largely be based on your ability to synchronize our lethal and non-lethal fires to achieve decisive effects in full spectrum operations.

In the military, we used to talk about how many bombs we dropped, or the number of enemy killed. However, we won’t ever be able to go back to the way it was.

We must not repeat what we did after Vietnam where we as a military forgot about counterinsurgency operations. This is a skill set we had.....and yet we had to relearn it. Skills like your non-lethal ones will only become more important in the future.

Constructive vs. Destructive Power...Let’s consider the power of this image vs. the destructive power of bombs.....This image is just as powerful a weapon when used effectively. Two little girls.....going to school..... transcends all cultures and languages.

So what else does our doctrine recognize:

FM 3-0 and the need for change

- Era of “persistent conflict” – a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.
- Future success will require the application of all instruments of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (whole of government)
- Stability operations are now equally weighted with offensive and defensive operations....and will be a part of everything we do.
- We are now writing the new stability operations manual FM 3-07 at Fort Leavenworth.
- Trends that will affect ground force operations in this era of persistent conflict will be: globalization, technological advances, demographic changes, urbanization, demand for resources, climate change and natural disasters, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed or failing states.

Our new doctrine is adaptive and appropriate for the struggle we as a nation currently find ourselves in.

In FM 7-0, “Training The Force for Full Spectrum Operations,” we find that:

- In the past, and even in the 2001 edition of FM 3-0, the Army believed that if we could conduct major combat operations, then everything else – including stability and civil support operations – was a lesser included capability.
- Our recent recognition of the importance of stability operations, and the complexity of the operational environment, and our legal and moral obligations to a population wherever the US military is conducting operations means that that approach is incorrect.
- Skill sets in this spectrum demand that we do a better job in non-lethal. The focus of training will be focused left of major combat operations in this chart. It will take at least 18 months to get to major combat operations training.
- This means the way we have planned training in the past must change – it is no longer just pulling tasks from a CMETL. “The training briefings must now be preceded by a separate commander-to-commander dialogue that discusses the training conditions and corresponding resources required and available; the proportion of effort to be allocated among offensive, defensive, stability operations, and civil support tasks; the risks to readiness; and the core capabilities required of a unit as it adjusts its training focus to prepare for a directed mission.” We can’t get at everything....not for the next 3-5 years.

So how do we get at this? We begin with education. Jean Piaget, a Swiss philosopher, once said, “The principle goal of education is to create men who are capable of doing new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done – men who are creative, and inventive.”

In Iraq today, one size does not fit all. Commanders in different areas fight across the entire spectrum of conflict. Training and education must focus on this range of missions and reflect this reality.

This is an important notion here at Fort Sill where on a given year you will train approximately 16,000 newly enlisted soldiers at initial entry training, more than 1,600 outstanding NCOs at various NCO Education System courses, and more than 1,300 great commissioned and warrant officers will graduate from the Fires Center of Excellence.

As FM 7-0 states, “Training prepares individuals for certainty; education prepares individuals for uncertainty.” Educations must remain in the forefront of our priorities.

White Paper: “The King and I”

Acknowledge issues and challenges associated with the White Paper: (Refer to 5x8 prep cards)

- Issue #1
- Issue #2
- Issue #3
- Issue #4
- Issue #5

Feedback on White Paper:

Senior Army leader feedback:

- Understand the issues of maintaining core competencies.
- Probably not going to be able to reset things properly until units get 18 months back at home station to train
- CSA and W4 don't think it's realistic to add 5 fires BDEs (547K cap is reality)

C3's thoughts:

- You must maintain your skill sets- providing precise, timely, accurate fires. Your non-lethal skill sets must also remain. This type of conflict is not an aberration. You are a key enabler in helping us win the peace.
- Starting this fall, you can expect to see full spectrum (at least irregular warfare and major combat operations) scenarios at the maneuver CTCs.
- Training for full spectrum operations--offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations--is a significant challenge. In fact, before 9-11, we often seemed strapped for time to train on only offense and defense in major combat operations. That is where your role as leaders in your units will be key. You will have to choose which tasks are most important since you cannot do everything.

I talk to a lot of leaders as they rotate back from theater and I recently asked a former infantry brigade commander about this very issue of maintaining core competencies among the FA Soldiers in his brigade. After 15 months in Iraq, he acknowledged the difficulty of balancing training and the COIN fight. He stressed the importance of OPDs and leader development downrange, saying it is a critical component of a plan to maintain core competencies.

In closing, I'll leave you with a few thoughts from chapter one of FM 7-0. "Leaders and Soldiers must be proficient in core warfighting competencies, but also capable of adapting them across the spectrum of conflict. To accomplish that goal, Army leaders must recognize that Army proficiency in stability or civil

support operations is as essential to campaign success as is proficiency in major offensive and defensive operations.

The skills you bring to the fight cannot be replicated and they must be maintained. That's why you are, and must remain "The King of Battle."