

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, first of all, let me just say thanks to everybody for showing up today. And I hope we can provide some insight to you as to where the United States Army is currently going with its doctrine that we've been working on lately.

I think you've all heard, we just recently published our new Army Field Manual called FM 3-07. It's called "Stability Operations." For us in the United States Army, it's a very significant manual.

It's, in fact, a culmination of 10 months of very intense work we have done, in cooperation between the United States Army and our close friends in the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development, the United States Institute for Peace, InterAction as well as many others within the broader interagency community, our allies and even the private sector.

Over the course of that time, we've accomplished something, to be very honest, that went far beyond our initial expectations. Last November, we set out to revise the Army's stability operations doctrine, drawing on the experience of the practitioners that are out there in the field, doing it day-to-day today, in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But along the way, this effort became a journey unlike anything else we have experienced before.

In crafting this doctrine, we were trying to take into account the unique challenges that we will face, we as a nation will face here in the 21st century. We've blazed a trail into a very uncertain future by focusing on three very needed outcomes.

First, we realize this doctrine has to be a bridging -- has to bridge a great divide that's out there today and the knowledge base that addresses both today's and tomorrow's challenges. It's a doctrine that answers the call for those who are currently engaged in doing nation-building under fire. But it's also a doctrine that's going to look to the future, where fragile states pose the greatest threat to our national security, a future where regional conflicts threaten to expand into international crises (sic).

The doctrine is founded on the principle that enduring success can only be achieved by five things. The first one is, we must build partner capacity. The second is, we have to strengthen the institutions of legitimate governments -- governance. The third is, we have to establish and maintain the rule of law. The fourth is, we have to foster economic growth. And the fifth is, we have to help forge a strong sense of national unity wherever we're operating.

It is essentially chartering (sic) a path from violent conflict to stable, lasting peace by providing a road map to the future while studying critical waypoints for the conflicts of today.

Secondly, it's building the intellectual foundation for leveraging the soft-power capabilities our military has in support of other instruments of national and international power -- something very vital to an effective strategy at this very critical time in our history. This foundation is firmly rooted in the human dimension. So long as conflict is fundamental to human nature, any approach has to begin by addressing the human condition.

As we crafted this doctrine we did so with great respect for the roles and missions of our respective organizations. It's critical that we each preserve our proven core competencies, not only those of us in the military but those outside the military especially too. But at the same time for us, we have to preserve our proven core competency while adapting our institution to the realities of the changing world here in the 21st century.

This effort is about achieving true civil-military integration while posturing our government and nongovernmental colleagues for success. It is about defining our role in support of broader national and international efforts.

And third, it's a driver for change, within and outside of our Army. In basic terms, this doctrine, this manual on stability operations, is driving a bow wave of unprecedented change. Even before today, it was driving change across our Army as we reexamined our organization, our training, our leader development, the very principles upon which our military operations are based.

But it also drove change in many other agencies and departments. It today is a key educational resource within the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.

It's also a critical reference in the ongoing efforts of the United States Institute for Peace to develop interagency guidelines for stabilization and reconstruction. Our allies drew on early drafts of this manual to shape their own approaches and organizations and they continue to reflect on the efforts we've made and the study that we've done thus far.

But what makes this manual truly invaluable is its -- (inaudible) -- flavor, the hard-won experience of the practitioners from the field. This manual calls together those experiences into a doctrine built on a unity of effort, a comprehensive, collaborative and cooperative approach that forges a shared vision of a common goal.

In closing, this doctrine is a powerful force for change, crafted through a unique community of practice ensuring that our nation is prepared for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where we're going to find brave and committed civil servants and soldiers who will carry the banner of freedom, of hope and of opportunity to the people of the world.

And with that, I'll be glad to help take your questions. It'd like to first, if I could, introduce a colleague of mine here today, Colonel Steve Leonard, who will be here with me and be glad to also take questions. Steve was the author of this manual. As we sat down about a year ago and started to work towards developing this new doctrinal manual, we called upon Steve, who has been with us out there at Fort Leavenworth, previously deployed into Iraq, himself, to take the lead in working this.

What we found as Steve was working this manual is we started to develop a product, but out of it became something far more than just a product; it became a process. It became a process by where we found that the

more we reached out, engaged and touched and interfaced with those outside of the military, the greater the knowledge, the information-sharing and the dialogue that we continued to develop. Organizations that -- perhaps initially in the first four to five months we working this -- that really did not want to even talk to us in the United States military, by the time we developed the product, as we worked this process, we found that we have an open dialogue and communication ongoing today.

We were very excited by the fact that many of these nongovernmental organizations, allies and partners took the time to read through the drafts, to provide us written comments back, to tell us when there is something they're uncomfortable with. And in every single case, we went back and addressed their concerns. We wanted to do that because we needed a manual that would read such that anybody could pick it up who was engaged in or associated with stability operations.

It doesn't have your typical military jargon in there. It should read as a manual that is made for anybody who is engaged in or associated with stability operations. We, the United States Army, just happened to be the ones who put the product together.

So with that, feel free to ask any questions y'all may have, or ask them to Steve, too. We're both right here.

MODERATOR: Please wait for the microphone, which can come from either side, and state your name and publication. So, go ahead Sara.

Q Thanks. My name is Sara Hussein. I work for the Saudi Press Agency. I'm wondering whether you could give me any specific examples of lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.

(Audio break.)

Q (In progress following audio break) -- the insurgents. Since then, Defense Secretary Robert Gates has described the brigadier's comments as defeatist. I'm interested in your opinion. Was the brigadier right? And was he right to say it? (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. Here's what I would tell you, if I could go back to this manual we've just published. We recognize and we state the fact that our military, the United States Army, can fight and win any conflict in which we're engaged. Military force is a necessity but is not sufficient. The military will never win the peace.

If we're going to win the peace, it requires stability operations to be understood, embraced and worked in a comprehensive manner that involves not just the United States military but all of our friends, our allies, our partners out there to -- working in some sort of collaborative, coordinated and cooperative manner so that we can bring all the different resources together to help, in this case like the country of Afghanistan.

But military force alone is never going to be sufficient. So perhaps what the brigadier was getting at -- and again, I did not watch the press conference or see -- I've only read just the excerpts from it, so I don't know the context fully in which it was said.

But there may be a sense that we need more stability operations- type activities taking place that in fact the very nature of which brings greater resources back to the people, you know, because what the people want, they want some sort of basic rule of law, some level of governance. They want their basic necessities met. I mean, that's what people want. I mean, anybody would. We are -- I know I would.

And so the more that we can help set those conditions, and not just with military force, but rather, again, working in a comprehensive manner in, you know, making sure that the nongovernmental organizations have enough security so that they can operate freely and do what they need to do that they do best, separate and distinct from us; that in fact we can get those from the interagency, our State Department partners and everybody else in there too to be able to operate too and do what they do best; that, you know, Treasury and Justice can get in there and do what they do best.

So it takes a real comprehensive approach to this thing.

And perhaps that's where he was going. But again, I was not there, so it's very difficult to comment on, not knowing the exact context in which it was stated.

Q (Name and affiliation inaudible.) What is the importance of cooperation with allies such as Turkey in this doctrine? Could you give some more specific information about the cooperation with Turkey and Afghanistan and Iraq?

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, I'll take it and then I'll pass it to Steve. Well, I tell you, it's absolutely imperative. In the 21st century, what we will find is the world is more interconnected -- we call it globalization -- than ever before. So the more that we as a world, as an international body, can collectively come together to find solutions for challenges that are out there, the better it will be, because ultimately when the world body collectively does it together, it's more enduring and sustaining in the final outcome than it is perhaps if just one nation, such as ourselves, is engaged.

There is a lot of allies and friends that were engaged in this effort and writing this manual. Steve, why don't you talk about that just for a second?

COL. LEONARD: Hi. What General Caldwell is getting to is that throughout this whole process, and it was a process, the collaborative, cooperative efforts that went on was what brought it all together. We shared this with more allies, more friends than we can possibly count. Every foreign liaison officer that works on Fort Leavenworth took a copy of the manual, took a copy of every draft and circulated it. It circulated well beyond those into communities from one corner of the world to another. I would get e-mails from Turkish liaisons, from Belgian officers, from German officers, people as far away as India and Pakistan, South Africa, that people had ideas.

And in every case, what we would do, because this has to be a solution that anybody can apply, a practitioners guide for anybody, then we would take those ideas and we would, we would, we would cull them into

the document so that it had a true international flavor to it, one well beyond anything we've ever written.

And if you look at the manual, when you read the manual, it doesn't read like a piece of Army doctrine. It has a flavor that extends beyond the Army, beyond the military, into the private sector even, that as wide a collaboration next as you can achieve. Because we needed to do that to make this a truly credible document that anybody can pick up and use.

Q I'm from the Philippines, ABS-CBN. And as far as I know, you've been practicing the soft-force approach even before you started practicing it in Iraq or Afghanistan.

And I was just wondering, since that strategies more or less were developed in the Philippines, how do you see the possible pitfalls of combining, you know, this holistic approach; primarily civilian agencies supporting military, civil-military operations in the area, being targeted by hostile elements?

Since you're now working together, NGOs and military, don't you think they will become targets of attack by the enemy?

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, first of all, let me just say, welcome here today. And as you know, right after 9/11, that's where I in fact deployed to and spent most of my time, was in the Philippines.

It was a key, critical area. And we think it's so important, out at Fort Leavenworth, that we currently have a key member of my personal staff deployed to the Philippines for a year, to in fact capture the lessons learned and understand how, in fact, your country, your nation today is dealing with the rebel forces that you've had there. Because it has been a very successful story and one that we can all learn from, with actually minimal amount of military force but rather working much more powerfully with the softer elements to solve the challenges that you've had.

And so my congratulations to what your nation has been doing, and we hope to continue to learn more from you in that process.

Your other point is -- I would make sure that I -- (inaudible) -- real quick. There's a real clear distinction between what the nongovernmental organizations do and what we do. The terminology they have asked us to use is they don't want to be our partners; they just want to be friends. They don't want to collaborate with us, but rather they'll be cooperative with us. And those are real clear distinctions, because they do not want people to ever think that they are working in support of or alongside of the United States military. They're independent. They have their own agendas. They will be prioritizing as they so direct and they will do what they want to do.

What we have asked is, as much as possible, if we can share what we're doing so they're aware of it and then ensure there's enough inherent security wherever they're operating -- very far external to them -- so they can operate safely is real important to us, because they bring a dimension to any situation far beyond what we could bring to it. And so we want them there. We encourage them to come and to do whatever they

want to do however they want to do it. But in that comprehensive approach to looking at finding solutions to challenges in this 21st century, they're going to be key in that overall effort.

Q Rebekah Moses from the Asahi Shimbun in Japan. Kind of in a similar vein, to what degree do you expect U.S. forces will continue to rely on the previous field manual, I want to say, in more violent AOs -- Baqubah, Diyala, Mosul -- areas where combat arms are still going to be more employed than in relatively stable regions?

GEN. CALDWELL: I guess what I'd start out saying is we will always maintain our core competency of being able to fight and win in a direct confrontation with violent force whenever required. We will not lose that capability. But what we do recognize and understand is that inherent in the military is this incredible constructive piece, the helping hand that exists that can be leveraged and utilized in support of other organizations, and specifically the Department of State.

The challenge we have in the United States is we have not resourced the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for International Development with the people and the money that they need. They don't have it. They are more than willing. They have the desire. But they don't have the capacity. And so in the absence of that capacity currently existing within either the State Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development, we, the United States military, must be prepared and willing to support them in their efforts when we're talking about employment of the soft power. And so it's kind of that recognition and understanding and appreciation that we, as part of the U.S. whole government, have to operate as one team. And so that's what we, in fact, talk a lot in this manual about being ready to support -- work in support of the Department of State.

Q I'm sorry, can I ask one follow on?

So given the emphasis on soft power, do you see this as the field manual that's going to take us through the remainder of time in theater?

GEN. CALDWELL: I do.

I mean, Steve, do you want to comment on that?

LT. COL. LEONARD: Yes, sir.

I think what we've tried to look at with the book is that it actually transcends beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. It draws from those lessons, but it also draws from the lessons of history, which is nothing new. We've always done these types of things in the past, but we've never codified it. This is definitely a road map that sets waypoints for both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as other places in the world. But it has to look beyond them because we don't want a doctrine that only focuses on the next few years. We need something that is generational, something that looks forward and looks at the future and addresses the fundamental nature of human conflict, which is enduring, not something that we can turn away in five years and rewrite. We want this to be a lasting document that we can all use.

Q Thank you.

General Caldwell, nice to see you. We used to see you quite often on television when you were in Iraq, so it's an opportunity to meet you, and I must tell you that I read perhaps in The New York Times a very positive story about you when you took over as the new commander for this center. You are kind of an intellectual guru of the Army or something like that.

Anyway, the point is -- the point I'm trying to make is, with this kind of people in the Army, you know -- and you are aware of the image of the Army and trying to just change it. But how it happens, and why does it happen again and again, most recently in Afghanistan, killing civilians, and, you know, all the good things you do, it's all put back, you know?

And you were talking about soft power. I'm not quite sure whether the civilian administration, the president or whatever it is, they really mean it, because the State Department budget is just \$40 billion, and the defense budget is about 12 times of that. I mean, how does it really translate into strengthening your soft power? Could you please explain this to me?

Thank you.

GEN. CALDWELL: Well, first of all let me just say, when you mention the casualties in Afghanistan, any time there's any loss of one civilian life, it's tragic. I mean, it's the very reason why those of us in uniform will avoid military interaction at all cost and always seek to find a diplomatic or alternative solution if possible, because of that very fact.

(Inaudible) -- question, there are concerns that we have, and you'll see that reflected in this manual. When you look at the U.S. Agency for International Development, at the height of the Vietnam war there was well over 12,000 members of the United States Agency for International Development in Vietnam operating there. Today the entire agency is 1,200 people. So they just don't have the capacity today to operate like they did many years ago.

Our secretary of Defense has been very vocal about the fact that our U.S. government should increase the size and capability of many of these departments and agencies; that they need to grow. They need more people and they need more resources. And so in the absence of them having that for right now, the U.S. military understands and appreciates that we need to have -- that we need to take that constructive capability we have where we can help others and make it available so that if the State Department or USAID or somebody else is needing that type of assistance, we in fact can help provide that when appropriate.

There's a lot of talk about what we in the United States call Goldwater-Nichols.

It was the thing done many years ago in the 1980s that brought our different services, Army, Navy and Air Force, together to operate as one.

Well, there's people who have talked and there's ongoing studies today in the United States about how to do that within the U.S. government. How do you create them to operate as -- more as one entity, to where it's more seamless and then the proper resourcing is done where it's needed to be done. And there's -- I know there are a lot of folks looking at that. There's a lot of dialoguing going on about that. But again, that would be something through congressional action.

I can tell you from our part what we're doing. Out at Fort Leavenworth, in Kansas -- and it truly is the intellectual center, has been for Army for probably well over a hundred years out there. It's been the one center in the United States Army where there's an intellectual stimulus and debate and ongoing dialogue that occurs all the time.

And we have a school out there. One of our schools is the Command and General Staff College. In this school of about 1,200 students, about 100 of them are international officers from over 90 different countries around the world, that come and spend a year studying there. Another 200 are from sister services -- from the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines. And then you have about 800 Army folks.

But when you look at how many are there from the interagency, last year there was two. This year there are seven. Next year, we're trying to work towards about 25 or 30, with the goal to get to at least 50.

But that's part of our very challenges. We don't educate and train together on a routine basis. Within the military we have a certain amount of folks that are always identified to be in some kind of school system. The State Department, USAID, Treasury, Commerce, they don't have that kind of capability.

So if in fact somebody from the Department of States comes and goes to our school out there, then they have nobody to backfill that seat. So what we in the Army have offered up is, we will give them an Army officer back to at least fill the seat, perhaps not having the same capabilities and training, but they'll be motivated, energized, smart, and willing to work and to learn. And they can have a good dialogue and exchange with that officer there for the year. So the seat doesn't go unfilled.

And then for the people they send out to go to school, we don't charge anybody any money for that. We'll put them through our master's program, where they get a Master's of Military Arts and Science. They'll graduate after 10 months, and then they'll go back to their department or agency.

I can tell you the Department of State has already pledged up to six people for next summer, and we in turn are going to pledge six military officers to backfill their seats.

And again, we all need to row and do more of this, so we all have a greater appreciation and understanding in the educational process of what we each bring to the table, what our core competencies are and our unique skill sets.

Then we need to do it in training, too. And we have two major training centers in the United States, one at the National Training Center in California, the other down at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. And next month, November, we're going to take the first Department of State Foreign Service Institute Provincial Reconstruction Team that goes through their training with the Department of State, get ready to go to Iraq and Afghanistan and take them out to California and have them go through a training exercise with the United States military for 10 days in a simulated replicated environment of Iraq or Afghanistan. In this case, it'll be Iraq.

So that kind of training has not taken place in the past. When we've done it before, we've hired contractors. We have contractors out there replicating the Department of State and everybody else because they don't -- they have not had that capability to do that. But we have worked through a lot of issues over this last year.

Again, this manual, what started to be a product, has become a process. And this process is opening many more doors. And this training which is about to occur next month is a prime example of how important that is. And we hope to further expand it from even there. But it's now that understanding and appreciation for what -- we can all benefit by doing this together.

Q Can I have a follow-up question? Thank you. One of the new theaters that you are going to operate in is in Africa, and you have a opened a new AFRICOM, yes --

GEN. CALDWELL: Right.

Q And what specific instructions you'll be giving to the folks there to project more of your soft power and do in a way that people would start liking you? Can you give us some kind of specific examples of how you are going to operate in that region? Because that's going to be a new flash point.

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. Well, let me start off by saying this. We very much recognize the importance of AFRICOM. And out at Fort Leavenworth, in our educational system, last week we had the chief of the defense forces for the country of Kenya out there, and he talked with the students, the 1,200 students we have, and had other engagements with other organizations that we have out there at Fort Leavenworth.

Two weeks ago, we had President Museveni out there, from the country of Uganda. And President Museveni came out and spent two days with us at Fort Leavenworth. And not only did he speak to the 1,200 students that are in our class right now, growing to 1,400, he also had smaller group interactions, sat down with our Center for Army Lessons Learned, sat down with our Counterinsurgency Center and also sat down with our Combat Studies Institute, all that excide and resist (sic/reside and exist) out of Fort Leavenworth and had long dialogue and discussions with them so that we can better gain an appreciation for what has transpired in the past in Africa and where they think their countries are going to go into the future.

And so those kind of dialogues and interactions are absolutely critical. And so we're trying to already lean forward and have those

kinds of discussions and interactions with key leaders from that part of the world by asking them to come to Fort Leavenworth and talk.

If you can imagine in the United States Army, you have everybody at the same -- you know, we have 1,200 majors there. These are officers between their 9th and 14th year of military service that are there for a year of educational studies, getting a masters degree, that have somebody like President Museveni come in and spend a day with them and have these kind of interactions. I mean, what an incredible enriching and growing experience for our majors being -- seeing firsthand and hearing and being able to dialogue and ask the questions that, you know, you would never get out of a textbook or a video or something else. I mean, it's just such a powerful impact when those -- especially those leaders like that are willing to do that with us there at Fort Leavenworth.

So we're going to continue to pursue those kind of activities so that we can better understand not only that part of the world but the rest of the world, too.

MODERATOR: Okay, Brian.

Q I'm Brian Beary for Europolitics, European Affairs News Daily. I was wondering, when you were doing your consultations, did you communicate bilaterally with European countries or did you also collaborate with the European -- the EU institutions themselves?

And the follow-up question from that would be, as you know, there's an increasing number of EU missions in places like Africa and Chad and Congo. Is it sort of the idea from this manual that the U.S. can increasingly take part in these type of missions? And is there any impediment that would prevent that taking place?

COL. LEONARD: Well, let me address your first question and then I may hand this one over to General Caldwell.

Our collaboration initially reached out to the military, but it was also facilitated through the United Nations, so we brought in a lot of other -- a lot of other organizations, not just European, but around the world. But definitely touched on those areas, and all the European militaries had a significant role in helping build this.

Now, what's going on right now is, as we brought this to a close, the United States Institute for Peace, who is drafting the civilian doctrine for the U.S. government that will support what we're doing -- they'll support one another -- the writer of that is actually doing exactly what you said right now.

She is on what we call the European tour where she is going to each of the EU nations and engaging at the ministerial level to do what we did on a much higher level, to ensure that the national, strategic and international aspects of this are captured.

So what we worked to do within our government, in a broader community, they'll also be able to achieve through an intergovernmental level. And I think I'll let you have the second question, sir.

GEN. CALDWELL: When we talk about something like the European Union, a good example of what we're trying to do out at that intellectual center, out at Fort Leavenworth, is next May is, you know, the annual anniversary for the EU.

And so one of the ongoing dialogues and discussion we're having with the staff of the EU right now is, what would we be able to do collaboratively together out at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, during the month of May next year, where they could have a speaker, their selection, whomever they think would be most appropriate, somebody within the structure of the EU, that could come out and spend some time at Fort Leavenworth again with our student body out there, these 1,200 professional officers from all services of the United States and 90 different nations from across the world, 110 of them, and have a, spend a day with them addressing the class, having open discussions and then doing some other follow-on activities?

Because we recognize again if, in fact, we're going to properly educate our officers that when they leave there, they understand the full dimension of what's out there, in the world today, that can be a contributor to helping us bring greater peace and stability, to some really challenged areas, we're going to need to work in a very collaborative manner with every organization, like the EU and others. And so we want them to come and actually be a part of and discuss with us.

We even went so far as just two weeks ago we sat down with the ICRC out at Fort Leavenworth. They came out there; their director here that works in North America.

And he and two or three of his folks sat down and had discussions with our students, talked about perhaps how they could be integrated into some future exercises so they could highlight to us, on a continual basis, what they do and what they don't do, and what we should not do.

And then the other part was, they're now going out to our two national training centers. And so every time a unit is going through its final mission rehearsal exercise before it deploys to Iraq or Afghanistan, the ICRC is now going out there and then talking with and spending time with that unit for several hours to make sure they're sensitive and aware of that unique organization and what it's doing in those two countries so that we develop a healthy, respectful understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations and kind of where we shouldn't be crossing the line, too, so that we keep our distance where appropriate.

MODERATOR: Okay. In back, and then we'll go to New York again.

Q Hi, I'm Jim Lobe from the Inter Press Service. I have two questions. The first is, regarding your reference to Vietnam and kind of the golden age of counterinsurgency in the '60s, in Latin America we had the Alliance for Progress, which was very sophisticated, lots of USAID activity. You had the Peace Corps very actively involved, and then of course in Vietnam you had a very, very sophisticated counterinsurgency effort through CORDS, through land reform programs that CORDS oversaw, and USAID, as you pointed out, had 12,000 people.

My question is, what's different in your approach now, 40, 50 years later, that you've learned since from what was being implemented in a very systematic sort of way back in that golden age?

And my second question kind of relates to that, particularly historically with respect to Latin America, but also Southeast Asia, including Thailand, for example. To the extent that you're dealing mainly with foreign militaries, is there a danger, as there was 50 years ago, and even more recently, that these foreign militaries have their own interests and their own ideas about issues relating to governance, rule of law that would divert significantly from our ideas about good governance and so on; and that you get caught up as being essentially their sponsor and they being your client; and you don't want to do anything that might hurt their ability to perform locally, but their interests are different?

Sorry. I didn't explain that very well, but I think you probably understand what I mean.

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. If I start with your first question, I guess what I would say is, are we learning lessons from the past or are these new lessons? What is -- we've been doing -- for 233 years, the United States Army has been engaged in doing stability operations. And what we have found is that every time, wherever we have employed military force or had military forces in support of stability operations, when that situation had been resolved to the point where the military removed themselves, we didn't capture the lessons learned. We didn't codify it into our educational processes. We in fact said: Glad that's over. Now let's get back to preparing for major conventional-type operations, our core competency.

What we have done in this case here, for the first time, with this manual, is, we have said we have for the last seven years -- from the muddy boots on the ground practitioners, have re-learned a lot of the lessons of the past. And we can't afford to walk away from those that we've learned. So we're codifying them into a piece of doctrine. We've put it into writing. It's been captured in a manual. It'll be inculcated into our educational systems. It'll be a part of our training processes. It'll be part of our military exercises. And we will ensure that those lessons we have learned we're now putting into place so we have them for the future, for the use in the 21st century.

That's why we kind of call this manual a manual for the future, based on the lessons learned of the past. And that's very, very important, because you're exactly right; if you go back to 1970, '71, I mean, we had gone so far at that point as to -- we would send our very best and brightest military officers to the Foreign Service Institute at the Department of State for courses up to seven to eight months long with a group of about 40 Army officers and 40 members of the Department of State and other entities, like Treasury and Commerce and Justice. And they would spend seven months training together, doing language training, in-classroom instructions, and then they, as a collective group of 80 people, would go to Vietnam and then serve together for a year over there.

So we had really refined the process how we ensured we'd work together in a comprehensive manner at that point.

But at some point after the Vietnam War was over, we quit doing that. And not only did we stop doing it, we didn't codify it in writing.

And not only did we not capture it in writing, we walked away from all the hard lessons learned, from that time period, some great practices that were very, very effective, and moved forward again talking about how we're going to conduct major conventional operations, our core competency. We're not walking away from that core competency today. We must sustain and keep that and always be able to execute it.

But we have to recognize and understand that stability operations are just as important. And at different times, the balance will be such that they're even more important. And so we have to have that capability, understanding knowledge, experience and training and resourcing and organization set up so that we can do that mission.

Sorry. That's part of the first question, if I could, to take and try to answer that one for you, to put it in perspective. And that's the reason for writing this manual.

As we said, originally we thought we were going to come up with a product. And then we realized, gosh, this has become a process. And it's really just the beginning. And it doesn't end with that manual we published. But in fact now we've opened doors and have the opportunities to go even further.

In fact, just before I walked over here, I was with the Department of Treasury this morning, meeting with the deputy undersecretary of Treasury for International Affairs and talking about how we and Treasury can do more kind of education and training together in the future. And both were actually pretty excited about some of the opportunities that exist out there.

Again the doors have been open by what Steve, as the lead author, has done here with this manual. And so now we want to take advantage of that and be much more inclusive in these kind of dialogues with each other, even within our own government.

Q (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL: Sure.

Q I guess what I'm saying is that in the '60s and early-'70s, this was operating like, I mean, the kind of cooperation you're talking about, within the government, was like happening many, many, manyfold.

GEN. CALDWELL: Right.

Q And it was systematic. And I mean, the documents that you read from back then are very impressive in terms of how to conduct counterinsurgency, police aid, all kinds of stuff, much more sophisticated than, say, what happened in the '80s when you started doing that in Central America.

Yet it didn't work. It didn't work either in Vietnam and it didn't work really in Latin America, in part because Latin American militaries simply didn't agree with your goals and for other reasons.

So my question is what you makes you think that this experience and putting everything together will kind of work in the future? Or is there a more fundamental structural and political problem here that Vietnam highlights, you know, very, very strongly and that the experience in Latin America also -- yeah, sorry, I wish I could phrase it better.

GEN. CALDWELL: What I would tell you is if we don't move forward to do what we're doing today, than we will absolutely repeat our mistakes of the past; that we have to start someplace, and if we don't take that first step, we'll never move in any direction. And so using the greatest wisdom and thought processes and putting the right folks, as best we could, together and having this continual ongoing dialogue, we're marching forward at this point.

We've all recognized and accept the fact that there needs to be a change. And along the way, if we find we need to alter the course, we will. It is not so prescriptive that it won't allow us to do that. But we are moving forward, and so that's what excites all of us so much about this new manual, is because it starts that process forward. And we'll continue to refine and adjust as we need to along the way.

And you're right, there's a lot of lessons learned out there. As I mentioned, we're in the Philippines today with one of our lead people down there operating day-to-day where he's going to spend the next year. We've got another team we've sent down to Colombia. That's right now -- again, these are all folks from Fort Leavenworth, out of our different intellectual bases out there that are down there and they're working.

We just had -- about a month ago we invited up General Montoya from Colombia. And General Montoya, the chief of the military down there in Colombia came up and, again, we had him talk to the students at the fort there, at Fort Leavenworth. I had ongoing dialogues and discussions with General Montoya afterwards, talked about more exchanges of officers between them and us. We'll probably increase the number of Colombian students, even, that participate in one or two of our programs at Fort Leavenworth next year.

And then out of that also, we recognized and -- he said, please, send a team down that you want to help use to collect lessons learned. And perhaps even as early as this January or February, we'll publish a first paper on what we're seeing about what they're doing in that country and why in those circumstances and situations it's proven to be successful. We'll be doing the same in the Philippines eventually, because there are a lot of lessons -- no two are exactly alike, but a lot of the principles are the same.

Do you want to?

COL. LEONARD: Yes, sir, I do.

You raise one terrific issue. And that's, how can we be assured that these things are going to achieve success, especially when you deal with a culture that may not share your same approach?

And that's why there's a natural inclination, as we write these kinds of things, to apply a Western model. That's normal. That's the way we're brought up, which is why it was so important to reach beyond what we are and who we are and to reach out and talk to people and practitioners in the field that have experience in other continents, in other cultures that are totally foreign to us, even in this room.

Because what they do is, they bring that understanding that the international regard and statutes that we follow, that lead these types of things -- that cultural astuteness is what we, what we like to say -- that's the key to understanding that wherever you work and wherever you try to apply these soft power skills that you do that with an understanding, a fundamental understanding and appreciation for the culture that you're dealing with.

What's normal in one country or in one region might not be normal in another. If you understand that going in, if you have an appreciation for that, it helps shape your approach a little bit differently. Like General Caldwell said, no two are ever going to be the same. And that understanding helps to achieve better success. Not always going to be a perfect solution, but that's essential to what we call capacity-building, which is where you build the institutions and the knowledge within, within a host nation.

And what's accompanied with that is an adviser effort that culturally astute advisers will not try to impose a different model onto a culture but help those people find a model and a solution that fits for their culture.

GEN. CALDWELL: One more thing, if I could just add, when I was talking about General Montoya, what was very interesting, when he came out, he shared with the students, when he had the discussion with the entire class, he said, I've never met a general that hasn't failed; interesting kind of comment to make.

But he went on to share with the students, he was at that point talking about this hostage rescue mission they did in July.

But then he went back to two thousand and -- I believe it was two, when he was attempting to do one, and of the 12 hostages they went in to rescue, nine were killed before he got to them.

And he talked to the students about the fact that what he used at that time was overwhelming military force. He knew where the rebels were, he knew where the hostages were, he isolated the area with military force, and then he went in with tremendous military might to bring the hostages out. And instead, in the process, nine of them got executed by their captors. Fortunately, they got there to save at least the last three.

But as he said: I failed in that mission. Military force was sufficient, was required, but, you know, it wasn't what was needed in the situation.

And so he said: Here I was now in 2008, an entirely different situation but still hostages. I knew where they were again and we worked it an entirely different way. We use other than strong military force.

It was a fascinating discussion to listen about how he had learned and adapted as he went forward. In fact, I got on our blog site -- at Fort Leavenworth we have an internal blog site. It's open to the American public. Anybody can access it. But we built one so all the students can feel comfortable blogging out there.

And I talked about it because it was just such a striking, interesting thing to hear the most senior military officer of this country of Colombia talking about how he had failed in 2002 in a rescue operation but had learned from that so that in 2008 he conducted it much differently. I mean -- okay.

MODERATOR: Okay. James in New York, go ahead.

Q Thank you. Another question on Afghanistan. Thank you, General.

The United Nations envoy to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, and President Hamid Karzai have been looking to talk with the insurgents, bring them to the negotiating table. Wherever it leads, we don't know. I know that at Leavenworth you've got a whole department that studies the history of insurgencies, looks at how they are eventually resolved. And I'm wondering what we can learn from the history books and what we have in this manual that can guide us on whether we should be talking to the Taliban.

COL. LEONARD: James, it's good to see you again. I think that the right answer to that is, certainly those decisions are made at levels far above ours, but what's essential and what's addressed in the manual is the importance of communication throughout these entire processes. But engagement is always a preferred means to resolve conflicts than armed force. We all understand that a diplomatic solution tends to preserve the blood and treasure of any country, and that's always the preferred solution.

But again, those decisions, whether you want to engage someone that may be not considered a friendly element, is always something to be considered. You can look at Iraq today and you can see where they've achieved great success by reaching out to groups that two or three years ago were considered enemies, but at the same time you see where some groups may be considered irreconcilables, that you cannot bring them to the table; and you have to understand the difference between the two and know that there are workable solutions with some groups and there are not always with others.

Q Tim Shipman, with the Telegraph from London. Can I just try and pin you both down a little bit more on what this means in practice? I mean, I hear what you're saying about you've been doing this stuff for a long time and it's a codification for the future, but what in practical terms is this going to mean in Afghanistan?

I was going to ask a similar question to the one that's just come up. This is obviously a huge bone of contention between the British and the

Americans particularly about how much you engage, when you engage. Can you be a bit more precise about what in practical terms is actually likely to change as a result of you codifying this set of practices on the ground? And will that in any way affect or make more likely what we've just been talking about?

GEN. CALDWELL: I'm not sure this manual -- the manual is a codification of what we already see ongoing today. The most significant changes you'll see as a result of this manual is the enduring capability now to be -- to exist in our Army. You'll see it into our educational programs and into our training programs, where it is -- we've got it in a lot of those places now but, again, it's the ensuring that will endure.

Any time we produce a manual, though -- and that's what key about Army -- it drives change. The doctrine drives change. And the change that this will require is it's going to now force us to go in and take a very close work at -- we have an acronym for it, but it basically means we'll go in and we'll look at our organizations, our manpower. We're going to go look in how we do leader development and training. We're going to go look in the facilities. I mean, we're going to -- we will go back and in a very systematic manner over these next six to eight months take this manual and ask ourselves, do we, in fact, have the right structures existing within our army that allow us to adequately execute what's laid out in this piece of doctrinal manual that's been approved by General Casey, the chief of staff of the United States Army?

So we think a lot of it already exists today. This codifies it, ensures that it becomes enduring.

But there will be a very systematic relook, if you want us to have -- (they didn't call it ?) relook, but just a look that now will take place in this whole area of organization, materiel and equipment, training, leader development, personnel and facilities.

What I would also tell you -- what Steve was just talking about -- this idea of reconcilables and irreconcilables is very, very important. And when you look at DDR -- and this manual has a(n) aspect of -- I'm sorry -- you know, when you're talking about -- that whole process of bringing people to the table to have a dialogue and discussion is critical. And there are people who you could literally be fighting today that perhaps are reconcilable and identifying them, understanding who those may be, and figuring out what the situation and the terms are and the requirements to bring them back into the fold is something you have to look at very carefully.

When we had President Museveni out there at Fort Leavenworth two weeks ago, there was a very interesting comment he made. As he was leading the revolution that brought him to power, he said: Literally as we defeated battalions of forces that were pro-government, as we defeated them, we turned them as quickly as we could and brought them into the fold and made them a part of us. Today we were fighting them. Tomorrow they are fighting wit us.

Very interesting concept. I mean, this is nothing we're finding new in just Afghanistan and Iraq. It's something that occurred in Uganda. And you'll see it in many other rebellions, insurgencies that have occurred

in the past. It's the question of who is reconcilable and who is irreconcilable, the reconcilables trying to find the situations that allow you to bring them back into the fold and make them a part of the solution for that nation. And that's important, and that does take a lot discussion and dialogue.

I think part of the reason we're seeing such a significant change in Iraq today is because of the ongoing effort that was put forth about a year and a half ago to really build a(n) internal structure within the Multinational Force headquarters that allowed us specifically to look and make some hard decisions and go out to engage with folks that were not our friends at that time and were in fact in opposition to the Iraqi government, to find if there was a way to make them reconcilable and bring them back in.

Q (Off mike) -- how you make someone reconcilable or how you judge whether someone is reconcilable or irreconcilable? They were suggesting that you -- (off mike).

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah. I would --

COL. LEONARD: (Off mike.)

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, yeah, go ahead.

COL. LEONARD: What General Caldwell alluded to was in the DDR piece, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration -- something that we did here that we hadn't in any community tried before, which was to introduce the idea of reconciliation as necessary -- as a necessary part of reintegrating former combatants or dislocated civilians back into society. There's not a lot of detail there yet, because, as you probably well know, the whole concept of reconciliation is something that we're learning as we go on. It's very nuanced. It's something that I don't think we have as much experience with that as we'd like to think we do, and so there's a lot of study and a lot of analysis that needs to go into that.

But to answer, and I wanted to address your question directly about what you're going to see different in Afghanistan, for example, what kind of changes can you see as a result of this. Even though the manual focuses on the future, what it does do by codifying those lessons of the past is it puts a guidebook in somebody's hand that will help them make certain changes on the ground, establish a job market, reopen a local -- make changes to a local economy, empower certain local actors.

There's very detailed guidance on how you do those kinds of things, aimed for the future but has extreme practical value today, because that's something anybody can take, whether it's somebody in the Department of State or somebody in Commerce or Agriculture or somebody working within the European Union. Somebody from World Bank can pick up a piece of that manual and immediately apply the tenets that are there and make changes.

And so there's great possibility for change. And by putting it all into one book, what it saves somebody -- it has saved somebody from having to go back and read something written 40 years ago about what Robert Komer did with CORDS in Vietnam. They can read 12 volumes or they can

read 12 pages. And by condensing this down into the enduring lessons of the past, what you do then is you make it a lot easier on the guy on the ground who has to put this into action.

MODERATOR: Last question?

Q (Off mike) -- Interfax News Agency from Russia. Maybe I misunderstood something, but first of all, is there a chance to see the document itself? Do --

GEN. CALDWELL: We have an example on our website right now. You can in fact download a copy as soon as you walk out of here.

Q Okay.

GEN. CALDWELL: We'll make sure we give you that website address.

Q Okay, okay. Thank you. And my second question: Can you give any specific examples of lessons learned that you used for the -- for this manual from your practice in Afghanistan or in Iraq, that helped you to work out the practical guidances for this document?

Thank you.

GEN. CALDWELL: You want to start off? Go ahead.

COL. LEONARD: Well, what comes to mind immediately -- I saw things on the ground in Iraq -- I've been to Iraq twice. I've seen things that worked really well and things that didn't work really well. But there's a -- there's an anecdote about building a school that always comes to mind that everybody seems to turn to and the bloggers especially are really good about saying, hey, this is good stuff. Now we'll build even more schools.

But that highlights another issue altogether, is that initially in Afghanistan there were a lot of great efforts made, and in Iraq, too, to build certain things that we thought -- as an international community, we thought somebody would need. We thought somebody would need a school. We thought somebody would need a market built somewhere. But we didn't consult the locals. We didn't bring the local populace in. They didn't have ownership. They didn't feel like they were part of the process.

A great lesson learned that is inculcated throughout the entire document is that enduring success is achieved through local actors, but that the local populace, wherever you're at in the world, has to have a vested interest in what you do, that they have to be a part. They can help. They decide where things go. It has to -- it has to meet their needs in the long term.

Q If you can just explain -- for instance, you have the happening in Haditha where -- (off mike) -- all your good work.

GEN. CALDWELL: Yeah, I'd say another thing is our appreciation and knowledge that you have to operate among the people, you know, that we had to get out of our big bases. I mean, that -- if you're looking for one thing that clearly demonstrates how critical it is to be --

Q (Off mike) -- school in the Serbian village and that it's quite clear to me what kinds of things you can do. But maybe you could give any other specific examples, besides building a school. Something else.

GEN. CALDWELL: It's everything from -- I mean, again, during my 13 months I was there, every week I went out and visited a different location within Iraq so that I had an appreciation for what everybody was doing in the multinational force. And I can tell you, some places you would go into and it was a matter of getting Sunni and Shi'as to sit down at a table and have a dialogue and discussion we were help facilitating.

In other areas we were going into and it was the sanitation issue, the fact that they didn't have any clean water because it was just a half a mile of a connector pipe that didn't exist and they couldn't get it through the government of Iraq bureaucracy to get somebody to agree that they needed to build this pipe system. We were building a pipe system.

In other locations, it was they needed -- I mean, I still remember one just north of Baghdad. This town desperately needed a baby clinic, a place where women could go and have babies, because otherwise, if there was any complications, they had to go all the way to Baghdad, which was over a three to four hour drive through some very difficult and not hospitable areas. And so they needed a clinic there. And then once the clinic was built, they need at least one or two practitioners, Iraqis who understood basic medical things, that we went out then and ensured were properly trained and then they needed the medicines and then we gave them the medicines. We empowered them to take care of their own people by giving them those kind of assets they needed so that the Iraqi people were sustained.

It was like the spraying of date palms and again, you know, we just couldn't get the spraying done through the bureaucracy there. So this year, the Iraqis did it themselves, after three years of the U.S. -- the multinational force being really in charge and helping them make it happen, the Iraqis were able to become self-sustaining and execute the spraying of the date palms, leading to greater production and, you know, economic growth within their own country.

I mean, the examples go on time and time again. And again, it's like Steve said. Every time we do something, it should be how do we empower the people to do it themselves, to be self-sustaining, so that it can endure and last, understanding first that they need it, that it's something they have identified as a requirement for them, which means having a dialogue, which means being in there among the people and having appreciation for what their needs are.

So it's those kind of understandings that we really have taken as lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and have tried to capture into this manual.

Listen, what I would just tell you all, thanks. We appreciate you all being here today. We hope -- again, if you want a copy of the manual, it is on our website. You can download it for free. Again, open to access to anybody who wants to get onto the website. There's nothing

closed or restricted about it. And please go there and take a look at whatever you want. Or any of the people we talked about today, we have all their archived information. You can hear what they said or did while they were there at Fort Leavenworth.

Thank you very much