Complete Edition

2 7 America’s Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts Congressman Ike Skelton Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear’s battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow’s conflicts. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art004.pdf

8 10 Developing a National Counterinsurgency Capability for the War on Terror John Hillen Ph.D. The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, Dr. Hillen calls for a COIN strategic framework that incorporates all the instruments of national power. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art005.pdf

11 20 Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won Lieutenant Colonel Conrad C. Crane U.S. Army Ph.D. Retired The United States has rarely accomplished long-term policy goals after any conflict without an extended U.S. military presence to ensure proper results from the peace. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art006.pdf

21 27 Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis Colonel Peter R. Mansoor U.S. Army Major Mark S. Ulrich U.S. Army A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art007.pdf

28 37 Using Occam’s Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba’ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar Captain Travis Patriquin U.S. Army Long ago, Saddam Hussein positioned loyal Ba’athists in Tal Afar to neutralize political and ethnic enclaves, and they now support the insurgent forces in the city. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art008.pdf

38 48 Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach Colonel Gregory Wilson U.S. Army Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines offers a template for how to succeed in counterinsurgency. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art009.pdf

49 64 A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006) versus FARC Thomas A. Marks Ph.D. The former pupil has eclipsed its teacher. Under President Uribe and a dynamic cast of military reformers, Colombia has now neutralized its longstanding insurgency. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art010.pdf

65 76 Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point Major Niel Smith U.S. Army Colonel Sean MacFarland U.S. Army The “Anbar Awakening”—what some have called the “Gettysburg of Iraq”—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art011.pdf

77 78 Addendum: Anbar Awakens Colonel Sean MacFarland U.S. Army A major player in the Anbar Awakening recalls how joint-force cooperation led to the turnaround in Ramadi. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art012.pdf

79 86 Commander’s Assessment: South Baghdad Lieutenant Colonel Ross A. Brown U.S. Army A former squadron commander discusses his unit’s year in Iraq and lists his 11 commandants for winning the COIN war in South Baghdad. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art013.pdf

87 99 Fighting “The Other War”: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003–2005 Lieutenant General David W. Barno U.S. Army Retired The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art014.pdf

100 115 Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel U.S. Army Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art015.pdf

116 125 HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment Colonel Ralph O. Baker U.S. Army In a companion piece to an earlier article on information operations, a successful BCT commander describes how he revamped his intelligence approach for COIN. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art016.pdf

126 132 Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr U.S. Army Major John Cushing U.S. Army Major Brandon Garner U.S. Army Captain Richard Thompson U.S. Army Human terrain mapping offers a systematic method to obtain the information Soldiers need to succeed in counterinsurgency. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art017.pdf

133 137 Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy’s Documents Major Vernie Liebl U.S. Marince Corps Retired We are ignoring a valuable source of intelligence by failing to search documents, hard drives, and other exploitable detritus found in the course of operations. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art018.pdf

138 144 Everything Old is New Again: Task Force Phantom in the Iraq War Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Whalen U.S. Army Jr. Using cold war doctrine, long-range surveillance (LRS) companies are meeting an urgent, enduring need in Iraq. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art019.pdf

145 147 A Synchronized Approach to Population Control Brigadier General Joseph Anderson U.S. Army Colonel Gary Volesky U.S. Army Population control measures are an important part of the current plan to stabilize Baghdad. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art020.pdf

148 156 The Art and Aggravation of Vetting in Post-Conflict Environments Sean McFate U.S. Army Creating a professional indigenous security force depends on the competent vetting of candidates for that force. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art021.pdf

157 160 Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs Montgomery McFate J.D. Ph.D. To defeat the insurgents who employ improvised explosive devices, commanders should focus less on the bomb than on the bomb maker. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art022.pdf

161 176 Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt U.S. Army Reserve As the “Anbar Awakening” suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art023.pdf

177 184 Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN Lieutenant Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci U.S. Marine Corps Reserve During the second battle of Fallujah, civil affairs teams in Marine Regimental Combat Team 1 wielded money to shape the battlespace. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art024.pdf

185 191 Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability James E. Shircliffe Jr. Micro-financial services that offer very small loans and savings accounts to the less affluent should be part of all U.S. stability operations. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art025.pdf

192 202 From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines Major Gary J. Morea U.S. Army Islamic separatists in the Mindanao island group are slowly being assimilated back into Philippine society through a process of amnesty, reintegration, and reconciliation. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art026.pdf

203 209 Protection of Arts and Antiquities during Wartime: Examining the Past and Preparing for the Future Major James B. Cogbill U.S. Army Well before D-Day, America planned to protect European art and cultural treasures. Failure to do the same in Iraq suggests we need a permanent DOD structure to ensure we don’t repeat our mistake. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art027.pdf

210 214 Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance General David H. Petraeus U.S. Army General Petraeus talks on the essential tasks necessary for successful COIN. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2008CRII0831_art028.pdf