Complete Edition

Complete Edition The complete edition as well as all articles are in pdf format. Complete issues may have large file sizes that may take some time to download. Individual articles can be accessed by clicking on the article title below. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art001.pdf

Front Cover /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art002.pdf

Preface /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art003.pdf

Table of Contents /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art004.pdf

SEP-OCT 2004 2 7 Winning the War of the Flea: Lessons from Guerrilla Warfare Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, U.S. Army America’s enemies use guerrilla tactics to protract the war in Iraq and to erode America’s will. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art005.pdf

MAY-JUNE 2005 8 12 Best Practices in Counterinsurgency Kalev I. Sepp, Ph.D. Studying the past century’s insurgent wars can help us discern “best practices” common to successful COIN operations. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art006.pdf

JULY-AUG 2005 13 26 Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army Major Patrick R. Michaelis, U.S. Army Task Force Baghdad’s campaign plan created the conditions to keep our soldiers safe and our homeland sound. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art007.pdf

NOV-DEC 2005 27 40 Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, British Army U.S. Army Transformation needs to focus less on its warfighting capability and more on developing a workforce that is genuinely adaptive. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art008.pdf

41 44 Operation Knockout: COIN in Iraq Colonel James K. Greer, U.S. Army In November 2005, coalition and Iraqi forces again demonstrated the flexibility and agility needed in successful COIN operations. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art009.pdf

JAN-FEB 2006 45 55 Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army The Army has gained a great deal of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan about COIN operations. Here, one of the Army’s most experienced commanders details 14 lessons learned. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art010.pdf

56 69 The Object Beyond War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition Montgomery McFate, Ph.D. Andrea V. Jackson Beating the opposition requires COIN forces to make it worthwhile for the civilian population to support the government. How? By providing security—or taking it away. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art011.pdf

MAR-APR 2006 70 76 So You Want to Be an Adviser Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army One of the Army’s top advisers in Iraq offers a vivid description of what it is like to train Iraqi security forces. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art012.pdf

77 91 CORDS: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future Dale Andrade Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D. Historians Andrade and Willbanks describe how the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development and Support (CORDS) program worked in Vietnam. A similar program might work in Iraq. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art013.pdf

92 102 Unity of Effort and Victory in Iraq Major Ross Coffey, U.S. Army An innovative solution to the unity of effort in Vietnam, CORDS offers a blueprint for realizing the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art014.pdf

MAY-JUNE 2006 103 113 Massing Effects in the Information Domain—A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, U.S. Army, et al. III Corps’s former commander in Iraq is “absolutely convinced that we must approach IO in a different way and turn it from a passive warfighting discipline to a very active one.” /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art015.pdf

114 133 The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations Colonel Ralph O. Baker, U.S. Army Based on his experiences in Baghdad, Baker tells us how the 1st Armored Division’s 2BCT improvised an effective tactical IO program. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art016.pdf

134 139 “Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, Ph.D., Australian Army Plain speaking from an experienced ally about how to do counterinsurgency at the tactical level. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art017.pdf

JUL-AUG 2006 140 149 Advising Iraqis: An Operating Philosophy for Working with the Iraqi Army Lieutenant Colonel Carl D. Grunow, U.S. Army A straight-from-the-field assessment of the current advisory effort and a prescription for what it takes to succeed in Iraq. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art018.pdf

150 158 Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, USMC, Retired Insurgency is a competition between human networks. We must understand that salient fact before we can develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art019.pdf

159 168 Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations Lieutenant Colonel Douglas A. Ollivant, U.S. Army First Lieutenant Eric D. Chewning, U.S. Army The combined arms maneuver battalion, partnering with indigenous security forces and living among the population it secures, should be the basic tactical unit of counterinsurgency warfare. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art020.pdf

169 179 Unit Immersion in Mosul: Establishing Stability in Transition Major Paul T. Stanton, U.S. Army Tactical units living and working with the population “provide the flexibility to gather and disseminate information, influence host-nation political development, and neutralize threat activity.” /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art021.pdf

SEP-OCT 2006 180 187 Networks: Terra Incognita and the Case for Ethnographic Intelligence Lieutenant Colonel Fred Renzi, U.S. Army To analyze dark networks like Al-Qaeda, we need more than cultural awareness. We need ethnographic intelligence. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art022.pdf

188 199 Intelligent Design: COIN and Intelligence Collection and Analysis Major Dan Zeytoonian, U.S. Army, et al. The methodology for IPB—intelligence preparation of the battlefield—has undergone a wholesale change since the cold war days. /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art023.pdf

200 203 Advertisments and Final Remarks Military Review Unit Subscriptions, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Combat Studies Institute, Galula on Adapting ROE to an Insurgency, Galula on Ideology and Propaganda /CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2006CR1031_art024.pdf