Members of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the French army's Operation Sangaris force conduct security February 2016 in Bangui, Central African Republic (CAR). French soldiers initially were deployed to the CAR in December 2013 to prevent a humanitarian crisis; two thousand deployed by February 2014. As of July 2016, Sangaris had downsized to 350 French troops, and MINUSCA was the primary international security force in the CAR. (Photo by Staff of the Armed Forces of France)

Operation Sangaris

A Case Study in Limited Military Intervention

Maj. Rémy Hémez, French Army

On 5 December 2013, France launched Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic (CAR). In the days that followed, there were harsh debates about the operation's likely effectiveness. Critics pointed to the low numbers of French and multinational troops, given the complexity of the mission and the scale of the operational area. They also pointed out that, in terms of military effectiveness, Operation Sangaris appeared likely to be less effective than Operation Serval (2013–2014), despite their fundamentally different natures. Serval was launched in Mali eleven months prior, and "many French and foreign observers were surprised by both the swiftness of the deployment and the promptness of results."[1]

However, in Sangaris, French soldiers did have successes: they were able to adapt to the context and become militarily effective.[2] Indeed, Sangaris did not resolve the CAR's crisis, but it helped avoid genocide, it jump-started the disarmament process while fostering a nascent administrative structure, and it restored the supply of essential goods—all of this with relatively few casualties.[3] Above all, Sangaris managed to be a "bridging operation" to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, known as MINUSCA, and bridging to MINUSCA was the desired end state.[4]

Therefore, Sangaris shows how adapting at tactical and operational levels and accepting risk can ensure a limited military intervention achieves the desired end state. Nonetheless, questions about the sustainability of the end state conditions are warranted, and we address them here.

A Look at the Numbers

The number of international and French forces combined in the CAR increased from 4,500 in December 2013 to 11,700 in August 2015. France deployed 1,600 troops in December 2013, their number grew to 2,000 in February 2014, and French forces were reduced to 900 in June 2015. The Africa-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic, known as MISCA, provided 4,500 soldiers as of December 2013, later replaced by MINUSCA.[5] By August 2015, MINUSCA had 10,800 troops in the CAR. The European Union force, known as EUFOR-RCA, deployed 700 soldiers in June 2014. These numbers, depending on the period under examination, represent a 1.1 to 2.2 ratio of soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants—far lower than standard force recommendations for a stabilization operation.[6] Experts recommend 10–20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants.[7] Moreover, these contingents had to execute a complex mission in the midst of an ethnic-religious civil war, and in a country as vast as France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg combined—622,000 square kilometers with approximately 5.3 million inhabitants. This is a great example of the basic disconnect between Western doctrine that calls for large deployments in stabilization operations and current Western political views that seek to avoid large deployments.

This relatively low level of French troop deployment was the result of cyclical, structural, and cultural causes. In reality, in December 2013, the French army was already overstretched: 7,400 French soldiers were deployed in operations abroad and 11,640 were employed as presence and sovereignty forces.[8] One can add to this the reluctance of staff members and policy makers to embark on a new stabilization mission that promised to be long and difficult.

Structurally, the French army has drastically reduced its size since the end of the Cold War: from 669,904 in 1990 to 270,849 in 2014. According to the 2013 *French White Paper on Defence and National Security*, the French army must be able to deploy 15,000 soldiers for 6 months to a main theater and 7,000–8,000 soldiers to a secondary theater.[9] French armies are not designed for long-term stabilization missions involving high numbers of troops but rather are built for "strategic raid/expeditionary model" operations. Culturally, France is accustomed to "operational frugality." Since 1964, it has conducted more than 50 operations in 20 African countries. The operations, aside from Operation Licorne (2002–2015) in the Ivory Coast and Operation Serval in Mali, were almost always carried out with relatively few troops, usually between 1,000 and 3,000. This may have created the image of a French model of intervention in Africa able to produce results at a relatively low cost.

Military Effectiveness through Adaption

Does low-level troop deployment in a stabilization operation impair military effectiveness? Since the Vietnam War, we have known that numbers do not win a war, and that adaptations at the tactical and operational levels can allow a force to be effective despite low numbers. Let us have a look at the way the French army has adapted in the CAR.

At the operational level, the deployment of two thousand soldiers in so vast an area of operations necessarily means rethinking and limiting courses of action. This is true regarding French actions in CAR's capital city, Bangui, which proved difficult

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

(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 1. Operation Sangaris, First Phase

to control after the departure of Battlegroup Panther (about eight hundred to one thousand soldiers make up a battlegroup) in February 2014 to more remote areas. Battlegroup Amarante had to control Bangui, population over one million, with only two reinforced companies (about three hundred soldiers). Accordingly, some neighborhoods had to be left unsecured, and French troops had to focus on the center and south of the city. The four hundred additional troops that arrived in February 2014 were used to gain more freedom of action.

In the rest of the country, faced with the vastness of the territory, timing was important. To accomplish their missions, French forces had to be in the right place at the right time with the right amount of force. This means that they could only have a favorable strength ratio for an action that had been anticipated and planned, while retaining sufficient mobility. However, the lack of road infrastructure in the CAR made intratheater mobility challenging, to say the least, so freedom of movement at the operational level depended largely on the ability of the force to recognize, open, and maintain secondary airstrips in good condition.[10]

The fact that French units were equipped mainly with light vehicles facilitated mobility at the expense of protection—only 50 percent of French battlegroups were armored at the beginning of the operation. The use of the air proved crucial, even if the scarcity of the resources deployed (ten helicopters in June 2014) and the absence of heavy helicopters were limiting factors. Centralizing these assets at the operational level was essential for optimizing their use.

The maneuvers chosen at the operational level reflect the fact that Sangaris forces had a full range of capabilities, but their low numbers imposed successive actions. It was therefore decided that maneuvers would unfold in three phases. First, from December 2013 to January 2014, the focus was on Bangui—where the majority of the population and expatriates lived—in order to gain



(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 2. Operation Sangaris, Second Phase

an advantage over the enemy and implement confidence-building measures (see figure 1).

Operations in the second phase, January to March 2014, focused on the west. A major objective was to secure the CAR's main supply road, from Bouar to Bangui (see figure 2).

In the third phase, beginning March 2014, operations turned to the east. Forces sought to reestablish government authority and to maintain a unified CAR territory (see figure 3, next page).

This step-by-step approach, rendered necessary by low troop levels, echoes the course of action implemented by French army Gen. Joseph Gallieni in Tonkin, Vietnam, in the nineteenth century, known as the "oil spot" concept.[11] Faced with the refusal of his superiors to grant him more men despite being ordered to secure a vast area stretching from Lao Kay to Dien Bien Phu, Gallieni decided to proceed methodically and not to change sectors until the one he held was secured. Gallieni had opted for this course of action being fully aware that it would take a significant amount of time. Indeed, for a sector to be considered secure, economic improvements would need to be visible and occupation seen as definitive by the population.

However, in contrast to that distant inspiration, the operational tempo in the CAR was much faster. Sangaris had to maintain a high operational tempo to match political objectives and to stop massacres. As a result, areas were never really secured, even after MINUSCA was deployed in the wake of Sangaris.

The goal was to control only what was strictly necessary and to operate where the population was most at risk while seeking to hand over control of each location to international forces as soon as possible. In effect, tactical success was achieved by incessantly shifting efforts at the operational level. This highlights the question of the sustainability of military achievements. The triptych "Clear, Hold, Build" was not applied in its entirety

(Graphic by Simon Fauret, French Institute of International Relations [Ifri])

Figure 3. Operation Sangaris, Third Phase

by Sangaris. In this bridging operation, French forces had to focus on the "clear" while letting the "hold" and the "build" be taken up by multinational forces, international organizations, and local government.

The French army was well prepared for adapting to the tactical challenges of Sangaris. French forces possess valuable skills and insight gained from operations in Afghanistan and from Operation Serval in Mali. At the tactical level, the high commitment level of the French Armed Forces for more than twenty years makes them a good fit for a complex operation, as officers and noncommissioned officers nearly all have combat experience.

To maximize effectiveness, small combined-arms tactical teams known as *sous-groupement tactique interarmes* (SGTIAs, about one hundred men) were spread all over the CAR. Since French forces had been employing SGTIAs in recent years, the soldiers who make up these units were fully trained and accustomed to combined-arms combat. At the beginning of the operation, individual SGTIAs were often divided into two parts that operated autonomously. This raised the question of how small an independent unit could be while remaining tactically maneuverable and survivable. This question was especially pertinent since the enemy was polymorphic.

One enemy group called the Sélékas usually fights in thirty-person groups around a 14.5 mm machine gun, maneuvering almost like a regular army. Another called the anti-balakas behaves more irrationally; this group often acts under the influence of drugs and alcohol, equipped with Kalashnikovs at best. Anti-balakas prefer guerilla-style hit-and-run action.[12] Battlegroups were forced to continuously review their task organization and to deploy into vast expanses, in a manner well outside doctrinal norms. For instance, Battlegroup Panther, operating in western CAR from February to March 2014, had units deployed over more than three hundred kilometers, with platoon-level units operating

more than one hundred kilometers from their company commander (more than five hours by tracked vehicle). From March to July 2014, Battlegroup Scorpion had an area of operations that ran from Sibut to Bria, a distance of approximately 350 kilometers, for an area of sixty thousand square kilometers.[13]

It is difficult in these cases to consider reaction maneuvers and rapid reinforcement. This is why rotary-wing support was crucial, especially given its psychological effects for enemy forces. Some areas had to be left uncontrolled or monitored by mobile surveillance at intervals. Then there was the issue of radio links: VHF (very high frequency) radio waves do not effectively cover these distances, and SGTIAs are not normally equipped with high frequency or satellite radios. The immense distances made command more complex, since it is difficult for a battlegroup command post to deploy more than one tactical command post. To be able to control its area of operations, Battlegroup Scorpion, from a ten-officer command post, deployed one main command post and three tactical command posts (composed of one signal team and one or two officers) permanently for four months. Of course,

Two women share a laugh in Gulu, Uganda. Both have had their lips cut off by the Lord's Resistance Army rebels—a punishment commonly inflicted on women who are washing clothes, looking for firewood or food, or doing other chores in the vicinity of the camps. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

Specially Designated Global Terrorist: Joseph Kony

In March 2016, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions against the "specially designated global terrorist" Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). According to the Department of the Treasury, since its beginnings in northern Uganda in the 1980s,

"the LRA engaged in the abduction and mutilation of thousands of civilians across central Africa. [Instead of recruiting, the LRA, which considers itself Christian, abducts children and turns them into fighters.] Under increasing military pressure [from the United States and other nations], Kony ordered the LRA to withdraw from Uganda in 2005 and 2006 [after it had displaced nearly two million people, according to the U.S. Department of State]. Since then, the LRA has been concentrated in eastern Central African Republic (CAR) and … on the border of Sudan and South Sudan …, while also operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan.

"Since December 2013, the LRA has kidnapped, displaced, committed sexual violence against, and killed hundreds of individuals across the CAR, as well as looted and destroyed civilian property … .

"LRA cells are frequently accompanied by captives who are forced to work as porters, cooks, and sex slaves. The LRA engages in a high prevalence of gender-based violence including rapes of women and young girls … . In southeastern CAR, … approximately 21,000 Central Africans and 3,200 refugees from the DRC have been displaced as a result of LRA violence.

The Lord's Resistance Army leader, Joseph Kony, in 2012. (Photo courtesy of Wikimedia Commons)

"In addition to its attacks on civilians, the LRA has engaged in illicit diamonds trade, elephant poaching, and ivory trafficking for revenue generation since at least 2014."[1]

In "How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa," National Geographic online, Bryan Christy narrates how an expert taxidermist created an artificial tusk that could contain a tracking system and then be placed with poached tusks to trace their illegal trade route, which passes through the Central African Republic. African tusks eventually sell in China for thousands of dollars.[2]

Notes

1. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Sanctions the Lord's Resistance Army and Founder Joseph Kony," Department of the Treasury Press Center website, 8 March 2016, accessed 17 March 2016, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jjl0376.aspx.; see also Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, "The Lord's Resistance Army: Fact Sheet," Department of State website, 23 March 2012, accessed 29 February 2016, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186734.htm.

2. Bryan Christy, "How Killing Elephants Finances Terror in Africa," National Geographic website, 12 August 2015, accessed 17 March 2016, http://www.nationalgeographic.com/tracking-ivory/article.html.

staff constraints were significant, but units were still able to maintain communications and a suitable level of contact with local authorities.

This necessary spreading out of units on the ground was also a challenge in terms of logistics. A combined-arms company team required seven tons of supplies per week (other than ammunition). This meant delivery by C-130 aircraft was not enough. However, a road convoy required four days for a Bangui–Bouar round trip. During the rainy season (June to September), forty-eight hours were needed to reach the border with Chad from Bangui (350 kilometers).[14] Moreover, these convoys took soldiers away from other operational tasks. All this led to considering airdrop delivery operations in case of emergencies for isolated units. The issue was similar regarding helicopters. Within one hour, one Gazelle light-attack helicopter or two Puma medium-transport helicopters consume two cubic meters of fuel, so long-distance flights required refueling on the move. Logistics was a real constraint for operations, and this situation necessitated the application of a "strict-sufficiency" logic. This was especially true since the Sangaris "tooth-to-tail" ratio was between 20 and 25 percent, which is considered a low level.[15]

Beyond these tactical adjustments, the Sangaris operation was militarily effective because down to the lowest levels, military leaders were able to implement a "comprehensive approach." Indeed, company commanders in remote areas, and sometimes even platoon leaders, found themselves coordinating or involved in administrative tasks, and they had to manage without a court system.[16] They improvised and innovated. Battlegroup Scorpion established local restoration and integration projects (*chantiers de rehabilitation et d'intégration locale*), with the aim to unite voluntary ex-combatants around a common project while providing vocational training to help with their reintegration into society.[17] This was done knowing there was no way to fully control such a vast operational area, and so persuasion rather than force was necessary.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Make sustainable actions to avoid having to come back. Act swiftly to leave quickly.[18]

—Gen. Bellot des Minières

The French army's current expeditionary model implies that France will deploy only modest contingents if the vital interests of France are not at stake. However, if some risks are accepted, using modest contingents does not necessarily make the model inefficient. The problem is that in the context of a modest commitment, it is difficult to transform military achievements into lasting results. The French are far from being able to claim victory, the roots of the Central African crisis are deep, and normality in the CAR can only be considered from a very long-term perspective. Sangaris's desired end state was to be able to hand over operations (in suitable condition) to an international force but not to create lasting peace. Events in Mali and a new resolutely multilateral and indirect French African policy have led to coordination between French operations abroad and UN peacekeeping operations.[19] This division of tasks is not unique to France and has become commonplace in the past ten years. As a result, in the CAR, France intervened in support of MISCA, and this cooperation is but one example of French determination to implement confidence-building measures. The replacement of MISCA by MINUSCA in September 2014 and the gradual increase of MINUSCA's troop level enabled Sangaris to change its mission gradually. It became a reaction and reinsurance force in support of MINUSCA, downsized to nine hundred troops in June 2015.

Surely, this outcome creates ambiguities when addressing the issue of how to evaluate the results. Nevertheless, for France the main issue in such operations becomes the transfer of responsibility to partner forces, and, in particular, to a UN peacekeeping mission that may offer the "critical mass" and operate with a long-term perspective "where no one is willing to keep troops."[20] This creates a real coordination challenge to ensure unity of effort among all these forces, and it requires a significant investment in liaison officers. Another issue is the questionable quality of the troops that relieve the French forces.

We should not draw broad conclusions from the Sangaris experience. As Marshal Lyautey wrote, "There is no method .... There are ten, there are twenty, or rather if there is a method, it is called flexibility, elasticity, compliance to places, times, circumstances."[21] However, adaptation measures taken by units during this operation allow us to identify—beyond the question of troop level—some effectiveness

criteria in stabilization operations under the constraint of available forces:

- Be able to quickly deploy battle-hardened and well-trained troops.[22]
- Do not refrain from deploying both heavy and mobile means.
- Be capable of reversing course.
- Show restraint and discrimination in the use of force while being able to use force brutally if needed to establish credibility.
- Be able to operate with frequent effort shifts over long distances.
- Be able to rapidly concentrate efforts following intelligence to create a sense of ubiquity.
- Dedicate specialized resources to monitor holes on the map.
- Adapt the structure of the units and their command continuously to better match the requirements of the mission.
- Have units capable of operating independently down to the reinforced platoon level.
- Implement a comprehensive approach down to lower levels.
- Reform, train, and equip local forces from the beginning of the operation, and do not rely on them in the planning phase. ■

This article is adapted and translated from Rémy Hémez and Aline Leboeuf, "Retours sur Sangaris: Entre Stabilisation et Protection des Civils," Focus Stratégique *67 (April 2016), accessed 23 August 2016,* http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/fs67hemez_leboeuf.pdf. Focus Stratégique *is a publication of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (French Institute of International Relations, or Ifri). Maps are from Ifri and the Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des Forces (CDEF), used by permission.*

The views expressed here are the author's own and do not reflect those of the French army.

Military Review

A DIFFERENT VIEWPOINT

Ghanian troops practice individual squad movements 17 June 2014 with soldiers from Company A, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, during Exercise Western Accord 14. The exercise, a partnership between the United States and the Economic Community of West African States, is sponsored by U.S. Africa Command and hosted by U.S. Army Africa. The purpose is to increase interoperability of military forces and ensure the common ability to conduct peace operations throughout West Africa.

Photo by Sgt. William Cox, 4th Public Affairs Detachment

The First Regionally Aligned Force

Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead

Capt. Cory R. Scharbo, U.S. Army

84 July-August 2015 MILITARY REVIEW

In April 2013, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) designated the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (2nd ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, based at Fort Riley, Kansas, as the first regionally aligned force to support United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), the unified command responsible for engaging with nations on the continent of Africa. The 2nd ABCT performed the mission for one year, supporting myriad tasking under policies established by the U.S. Congress, the Departments of State and Defense, and USAFRICOM. It operated directly under U.S. Army Africa/Southern European Task Force (USARAF/SETAF), the Army Service component command of USAFRICOM, to support U.S. national commitments aimed at developing theater security cooperation bilateral and multilateral relationships. Tasks included numerous military training engagements with diverse African states.

The 2nd ABCT supported USAFRICOM objectives by strengthening relationships with its key allies and training its partnered nations. Small-unit leadership adapted to changing conditions across a broad range of military operations, enabling the first regionally aligned force to achieve success.

The unit, together with the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Asymmetric Warfare Group at Fort Meade, Maryland, captured many of the ABCT's achievements, helping to lay a knowledge base for future regionally aligned force operations. This article offers some of the most salient lessons learned to assist other commands preparing for similar missions and to recommend improvements to the overall process for supporting regionally aligned force deployments to Africa. These lessons are intended to contribute to the future success of both the operating force and the generating force when preparing for similar regionally aligned missions.

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Rémy Hémez recommends a comprehensive approach and adaptability as the keys to successful limited interventions while acknowledging that success is difficult to assess. Lessons learned by French forces in the Central African Republic included the need "to operate with frequent effort shifts over long distances" and to have "units capable of operating independently down to the reinforced platoon level." Operating over long distances poses challenges for providing support to units.

In "The First Regionally Aligned Force: Lessons Learned and the Way Ahead," *Military Review*, July-August 2015, pages 84–93, Capt. Cory R. Scharbo, U.S. Army, describes infrastructure challenges the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, faced while operating in Africa from 2013–2014.

Scharbo's unit conducted security cooperation and partnership efforts rather than combat operations, but like Hémez, he attributes success to adaptability. Scharbo also finds that the U.S. Army lacks objective, valid measures for assessing the success of regionally aligned force missions.

For online access to Scharbo's article, visit: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20150831_art016.pdf.

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

Notes

1. Antoine d'Evry, *L'opération Serval à l'épreuve du doute*, *Focus Stratégique* 59 (July 2015): 1. Editor's note: for more on Operation Serval, see Olivier Tramond and Philippe Seigneur, "Operation Serval: Another Beau Geste in Sub-Saharan Africa?" *Military Review* 94, no. 6 (November-December 2014): 76–86.

2. *Military effectiveness* is classically defined as "the process by which armed forces convert resources into fighting power. A fully effective military is one that derives maximum combat power from the resources physically and politically available." Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 2.

3. In Operation Sangaris, three French soldiers have been killed in action, one accidentally, and 120 were wounded in action.

4. MINUSCA stands for *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique*, or United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic.

5. MISCA stands for *Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine*, or Africa-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic. See the MISCA website for more information, accessed 21 September 2016, http://misca.peaceau.org/en/page/110-about-misca.

6. Sangaris is not considered officially as a stabilization operation but as a bridging operation. However, the missions accomplished by the units were clearly stabilization focused.

7. James T. Quinlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters* 23 (Winter 1995-1996): 59–69; Quinlivan, "Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations," *Rand Review* 27 (Summer 2003): 28–29; John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground, Troop Density in Contingency Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).

8. Sangaris updates are posted at the French joint headquarters (Etat-major des armées [EMA]) website, accessed 21 September 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/centrafrique/actualites.

9. French Ministry of Defense, *French White Paper on Defence and National Security: 2013* (France: Ministry of Defense, 2013), accessed 23 August 2016, http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/mediatheque/publications/livre-blanc-2013.

10. "RETEX Sangaris," *Sapeur la Revue du Génie*, no. 16, June 2015, 19. Editor's note: *RETEX* is short for *retour d'expérience*, which refers to analyzing experiences to develop feedback that will lead to improvement or after-action analysis.

11. Joseph Gallieni, "Rapport sur la conquête de Madagascar," in *Anthologie Mondiale de la Stratégie* (Paris: Robert Laffont Collection Bouquins, 1990) 1016–25.

12. For more about the insurgent groups in the Central African Republic, see Yannick Weyns et al., "Mapping Conflict Motives: The Central African Republic," International Peace Information Service report, November 2014, accessed 21 September 2016, http://ipisresearch.be/publication/mapping-conflict-motives-central-african-republic-2/.

13. Lt. Col. Philippe, "RETEX du GTIA 5e RIAOM/Scorpion sur l'opération Sangaris," Lettre du RETEX-Témoignages no. 26, CDEF [*Centre du Doctrine et d'Enseignement du Commandement*], December 2015.

14. "RETEX opérations Sangaris," *Fantassins* 32 (Summer 2014): 93–105.

15. John J. McGrath, *The Other End of the Spear: the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations*, Long War Series Occasional Papers 23 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007).

16. "RETEX opérations Sangaris," 93–105.

17. Philippe, "RETEX du GTIA 5e RIAOM/Scorpion sur l'opération Sangaris."

18. Gen. Bellot des Minières, *Journées de la Cavalerie* (annual armor conference), Paris, 12 October 2015, translated from French by the author.

19. Aline Leboeuf et Héléne-Quenot Suarez, "La politique Africaine de la France sous François Hollande," Etudes de l'Ifri, 2014, accessed 26 August 2016, https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/etudes-de-lifri/politique-africaine-de-france-francois-hollande-renouvellement-impense.

20. Michel Liégeois, "Quel Avenir pour les Casques Bleus et le Maintien de la Paix?" *Politique Etrangère*, Fall 2013, 65–78.

21. Hubert Lyautey, *Lettres du Tonkin et de Madagascar (1894-1899)*, vol. II (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin,1920), 129.

22. Stephen Watts and Stephanie Pezard, "Rethinking Small-Footprint Interventions," *Parameters* 44 (Spring 2014): 23–36. Author's note: A quick deployment can prevent the situation from escalating, and French forces were able to deploy quickly to the CAR thanks to predeployed forces in Africa.