

MR BOOKREVIEWS

AMERICAN GENERAL: The Life and Times of William Tecumseh Sherman

John S.D. Eisenhower, *New American Library Caliber*, New York, 2014, 352 pages

The late John S.D. Eisenhower's conclusive biographic work centers on the life and times of arguably the first "modern general," Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman. Completed shortly before his December 2013 death, Eisenhower presents Sherman's life from his humble Ohio orphan beginnings, to his post-antebellum career as Army general-in-chief, and eventually to his days as a private citizen.

We learn how young "Cump" was raised by family and family friends after the untimely death of his father. We see a young Sherman enter into the United States Military Academy at West Point and earn high marks and an acceptable standing in class, only to be seen as "no soldier" by his peers and superiors. At West Point and during follow-on assignments throughout the southern United States, we see Sherman's early interactions with men who would later play pivotal parts in his Civil War career to include future Union Generals Halleck, Thomas, Rosecrans, and most importantly, Grant.

Eisenhower, as he has done in previous works, lets the subjects speak for themselves. Through the author's exhaustive research we read of Sherman's courtship of the future Ellen Sherman, and we get a sense of his thoughts and feelings on events of his day such as the California gold rush, the legislative Compromise of 1850, and ultimately, the key events leading up to the tragic Civil War. Eisenhower takes time to present Sherman not as the "beast" with an appetite for war that Southerners of his generation and their

descendants would long remember, but as a man who hoped that war could be avoided. The author then paints an effusive picture of Sherman as the nation goes to war and the general matures over the course of various battles, including Shiloh, Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and the notorious "march to the sea."

Between the narratives of the many battles Sherman participated in, we discern the intimacy Grant and Sherman share as they stand by one another through periods of both national adulation and tribulation. Eisenhower does not just collect and rehash various

battles, but takes great care to show the evolution and formulation of strategy through the participatory eyes of Sherman, and how that view was both right and wrong at times.

The only critique of the storied author I offer is his light treatment of Sherman's post-bellum tenure as general-in-chief, a period Eisenhower states "was not significant." I disagree that this time, 1869-1883, was insignificant, especially in the West where the Army fought a new form of warfare against a worthy adversary—the Native American. This book is worthwhile

for those in the security community wanting to learn more about the development of "the modern general" and those with a general interest in the Civil War.

Maj. Joshua B. Jordan, U.S. Army, Fort Lee, Va.

PROCEED TO PESHAWAR: The Story of a U.S. Navy Intelligence Mission on the Afghan Border, 1943

George J. Hill, *Naval Institute Press*, Annapolis, Maryland, 2013, 288 pages

Let Albert Zimmermann, U.S. Navy Reserve, was a young naval intelligence officer in 1943. By chance, he became a central figure in a moderately exotic, though not particularly consequential,

one-month mission to report on conditions along the border between Afghanistan and that part of British India that would become the state of Pakistan. Traveling by jeep with two other officers, one British and one American, Zimmermann observed life and conditions in one of the world's most remote and, for Americans at the time, least known regions. That the mission is the subject of a book owes much to two factors: first, the notes Zimmermann thoughtfully compiled during his trek, and second, that they inspired his son-in-law, George Hill, to assemble a complete account.

Beyond its easy readability, the book is interesting in several ways. The story unfolds a bit like a travelogue, interspersed with allusions to context and background profiles of various individuals who figured in the expedition. Hill allows Zimmermann's impressions to carry the story as he guides the reader through the protagonist's career path leading to his journey across an alien region. The result may not be entirely satisfying as history but captures rather well the sense of discovery that attended the mission.

Intellectually armed with little more than an extensive knowledge of Rudyard Kipling's novels and a ten-week intelligence training course, Zimmermann was selected for assignment as a naval liaison officer to Karachi. This posting was only slightly relevant to the war effort, but intriguing to a young man nurtured on stories about the "Great Game" (the competition between the British and Russian Empires for control of Central Asia to include Afghanistan). Discreet references in Zimmermann's notes suggest that while many of his encounters in Karachi were purely social, some were professional.

The work's principal drawbacks are the slim development of strategic context, notwithstanding some interesting nuggets provided here and there, and the tendency to recount every incidental meeting with any individual who had anything whatsoever to do with the mission. Indeed, hardly any detail of the trip, whether concerning train schedules, maps, bedbugs, or officers' spouses, passes without comment.

Although these distracting tidbits may occasionally enhance the "slice of life" dimension of the book, they do not advance the historical narrative. Yet, the tone remains true to Zimmermann's own

recollections. As the author notes, "Reading AZ's letters, it was hard to believe there was a war going on."


In the end, the book's title is slightly misleading. The reader will learn as much about etiquette and society among the British diplomatic and social circles in India, or even the naval intelligence training program at Dartmouth College, as about events in Afghanistan or Peshawar. Still, despite its occasional aimlessness, Hill's book adds to the literature on the unheralded exploits of those serving in peripheral regions during the war.

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: How Franklin D. Roosevelt and Five Extraordinary Men Took America into the War and into the World
Michael Fullilove, Penguin Press, New York, 2013,
480 pages

Recent years have seen a number of books reexamining President Franklin D. Roosevelt's role in America's entry into World War II. Michael Fullilove's *Rendezvous with Destiny* is a well-researched addition to that literature. Fullilove states that the period from 1939 to 1941, rather than the beginning of the Cold War, was the turning point of the twentieth century which brought the United States out of isolation and into the world. This emergence was helped, Fullilove argues, by Roosevelt sending five personal envoys to Europe before the United States entered World War II.

Roosevelt distrusted his State Department and preferred to rely on personal representatives in dealing with world leaders. The first of these envoys was the frigid undersecretary of state Summer Welles, who toured the warring capitals, including Berlin and Rome,



on a fact-finding mission. After the fall of France, Roosevelt dispatched Bill Donovan, future head of the OSS during World War II, to investigate Britain's military situation. Donovan reported that Britain could survive, but it needed U.S. aid. The president responded with Lend-Lease legislation, while at the same time attempting to rearm the United States and prepare a reluctant public for war. Along with Lend-Lease, he also sent his adviser Harry Hopkins to Britain and later, after Germany invaded Russia, to the Soviet Union. Not only was Hopkins vital in getting Lend-Lease aid extended to the Soviets, but also in forging the friendship between Winston Churchill and Roosevelt. The final two envoys were Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt's former Republican opponent in the 1940 election, and Averell Harriman, who oversaw Lend-Lease shipments to Britain, while at the same time having an affair with Churchill's daughter-in-law.

"FDR was a seductive figure," Fullilove writes about Roosevelt, and the author is not immune to his charms. "Roosevelt was the most important statesman of the twentieth century," the author states. "He saved American democracy from the Depression, [and] led the Allies to victory over fascism." Yet the book never really examines the moral dimension of a U.S. president attempting to involve his country in a war the majority of the population opposed. Months before the United States entered the war, Roosevelt secretly informed Churchill that he would "wage war, but not declare it," and the United States quickly became more belligerent toward Germany.

On hearing the news that Pearl Harbor had been bombed, Harriman and U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant, according to Churchill, "nearly danced for joy." America's entry into World War II was undoubtedly a good thing; however, if Roosevelt's name was replaced with another president's, perhaps William McKinley, it is unimaginable that he would have received such positive accolades.

Nevertheless, *Rendezvous with Destiny* is well researched and informative. Those interested in foreign affairs will find it a joy to read. One cannot help missing, however, the irony of Roosevelt's attempts to enter the war in Europe instead of Asia, from whence the war finally came. If anything, this is a reminder of the fickleness of international fate.

Alexander Lovelace, Pasadena, Md.

QATAR: Small State, Big Politics

Mehran Kamrava, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2013, 232 pages

In Qatar: Small State, Big Politics, Mehran Kamrava, a noted author and director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service in Qatar, delivers a persuasive and well-written monograph every U.S. military officer who is interested in Middle Eastern politics should read. From the outset, Kamrava declares Qatar a shrewd and influential country that is uniquely positioned—financially, regionally, and security-wise—to rub elbows with larger, dominant countries (like the United States) and strange bedfellows (like the Taliban and Iran), all the while shaping regional and global politics.

Qatar's ability to execute this diplomatic strategy spurns conventional wisdom and traditional international relations theory. Kamrava asserts it is Qatar's "subtle power" and "hedging strategy," where you simultaneously work with divergent parties (such as Hamas, Iran, Israel, and the United States), that have allowed it to gain a seat at the big-boy table. Conversely, this assertion may rankle the likes of hard- and soft-power acolytes.

To make the case, the book is structured around three interrelated arguments dispersed over six chapters. First, Kamrava identifies the waning influence of the traditional powers of the Middle East (i.e., Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Iran), which is no doubt obvious. Next, he discusses the changing nature of power in the international arena. This too is evident, especially with those waning powers mired in internal conflicts and civil wars.

Finally, he looks at Qatar's developmental capacity in the form of its government (a monarchy), a largely obedient population of indigenous Qataris and immigrants, and its contrived nationalism and cultural identity which, ironically, is largely influenced by Western standards. Kamrava insists that these factors contribute to the success Qatar is experiencing today. Based on the government's approval rating among the people, its profitable global

investments, and the absence of any internal conflicts, Qatar's success will probably continue for the foreseeable future.

Just over 200 pages, the book moves quickly through each of the arguments. Along the way, Kamrava delves deeply into supporting topics such as the nation's history; its political scene; internal Shia and Sunni relations; everyone's favorite media whipping boy, the Arabic-language media network Al-Jazeera; Qatar's role as a regional mediator; and the country's larger diplomatic efforts. Noticeably absent, however, is the outright declaration that the major player in the region is the United States, bar none, and Qatar's rise is largely hinged on U.S. acquiescence. Let us be honest for a moment: Qatar enjoys its global stature because the United States allows it, oil and natural gas reserves notwithstanding.

By and large, *Qatar* provides an in-depth look at this small nation's politics, power, and regional and global influence. Readers glean a thorough understanding of what makes Qatar operate. As an elite member on the international scene, Qatar's influence has been widely recognized among the global powerbrokers, but not so much by the general public. After reading it, you gain a better understanding of why it is hosting the 2022 *Fédération Internationale de Football Association* (FIFA) World Cup, why they accepted the Taliban Five, and why major U.S. universities are flocking to the country. Considering what is going on in the Middle East today, military practitioners of all stripes should read this book over a weekend.

Maj. John L. Hewitt III, U.S. Army, Sumter, S.C.

**CONFLICT AND COMMAND: Civil War History
Readers, Volume 1**

**Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 2012,
336 pages**

As a collection of Civil War History articles, this text is on time and on target. Owing a great deal to the generations that came before, this compilation of articles from the *Journal of Civil War History* provides the reader a true primary research source for accounts by those close to the actors in the drama that was the Civil War. Avid historians

provide much of the material and introduce concepts based on selected themes that both orient the reader and offer additional means to decipher the challenges of, and rationales for, actions taken during the course of the war and its immediate aftermath.

This is a compelling collection and the ideal approach to truly embracing the lessons of the most significant period of the nineteenth century in America. The current edition (Volume I) leaves the reviewer in great admiration of the different authors, and the quality of the individual pieces illuminates current understanding of the Civil War. Considering that we are in the midst of the 150th anniversary of some of the most bloody and savage fighting of the war (1864), the volume provides a timely and outstanding list of contributors.

One of the most compelling apparent misconceptions unraveled through the reprinting of original publication material pertains to Maj. Gen. George McClellan. It has become virtually axiomatic among Civil War historians that McClellan suffered from the "slows," a penchant for indecisiveness and inactivity during many vital actions of the war. A conventional accusation leveled against him to explain the alleged slowness is an overactive imagination that greatly expanded his perception of opposing enemy strength, which in turn led to continuous requests for reinforcements together with reluctance to act until such reinforcements were received. However, the material presented in this volume proposes an alternate explanation: he believed and was following the advice provided to him by the intelligence service supporting him that was supposed to be reliable.

The additional insight from this compilation contends that perhaps a famous intelligence collecting service, known as the Pinkerton Agency, was more of an Achilles' heel than his reputed overactive imagination, and therefore complicit in events for which he is now almost universally skewered. In fact, his estimates of enemy strength appear to have been in line with information provided to him by that agency, something that has, surprisingly, not been discussed in any literature I have reviewed previously. Consequently, in this one particular reprint, all the previous theories on McClellan's incentives are potentially turned on their heads.

This is but one example of the relevance of renewed consideration of material that applies to our current understanding of the events and leaders during that period. The compilation of these previous articles provides significant counterpoint to prevailing given wisdom that may change many philosophies and ideological positions on how the war was fought by the Union. This collection is truly worth a read.

Col. Thomas S. Bundt, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Fort Belvoir, Va.

COLUMNS OF VENGEANCE: Soldiers, Sioux and the Punitive Expeditions, 1863-1864

Paul N. Beck, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Oklahoma, 2013, 328 pages

Conventional wisdom holds the Plains Indian Wars and the United States Civil War were two separate, unrelated events. Historian Paul Beck's latest book, *Columns of Vengeance*, challenges this commonly held view. In his analysis, the Dakota War of 1862 and the U.S. expeditions of 1863-64 against the Plains Indians were not isolated campaigns, but part and parcel of the larger Civil War. Throughout the book, Beck routinely demonstrates the links between the two theaters and the impact of the Plains War upon both Grant's and Sherman's attacks into the Confederate South.

Beck opens with an extensive examination of the Sioux and Dakota peoples, cultures, intertribal relations, and desires for territorial expansion based upon population growth and competition for natural resources. Further, he explains the tribes' growing concern over white settlements on Indian land and failed attempts to broker treaties with the U.S. government. Indian frustration with unwanted encroachment, forced removal to reservations, and broken promises created a schism, with some tribes openly advocating for violence while others were opting for peace. Ultimately, this frustration led to attacks against individual homesteaders and settlements. Indian raids forced the abandonment of entire towns, potentially threatening the Union's war effort as Washington relied upon the Great Plains to provide critically needed manpower and material. In response, Secretary of War

Edwin Stanton created the military Department of the Northwest and ordered Maj. Gen. John Pope to take command of the offensive. Pope would spend the next three years pacifying the tribes through a campaign of revenge that still generates controversy today.

Undoubtedly, *Columns*' greatest strength is Beck's extensive use of private letters, diaries, and personal accounts—to include those from the Indian perspective—to reveal a more complete understanding of the war. These individual accounts ensure *Columns* is more than just a dry retelling of the battles as much of the prose describes the soldiers' view of the operation. The men, mostly volunteers fresh from civilian life, wrote prolifically, and their words will sound eerily familiar to Iraq and Afghan veterans.

They vividly describe vague political objectives, campaigning on the open plains, the difficulty of identifying the enemy hidden within an unfamiliar civilian population, and their longing for home. Similarly, Pope and his senior commanders frequently fought Washington for resources required on the plains that were too often diverted to the Eastern and Southern campaigns of the Civil War.

The book suffers from two problems distracting from its narrative. First, Beck includes just two very simple pen-and-ink maps and a paltry six photographs to illustrate the story. Readers unfamiliar with the details of the campaign will have difficulty visualizing its conduct. More critically, Beck's writing in the latter half of the book appears heavily biased against the U.S. Army, leaving the reader to question the impartiality of his analysis. While this imbalance distracts from *Columns* overall value, Beck does reveal an often overlooked dimension of an important era of American history.

Lt. Col. Chris Heatherly, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

BEYOND WAR: Reimagining American Influence in a New Middle East

David Rohde, Viking, New York, 2013, 213 pages

In *Beyond War*, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist David Rohde critiques American nonmilitary strategies during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,

and in countries affected by the Arab Spring, positing solutions for future American engagement in the Middle East. The author begins by highlighting American strategic failures in Iraq and Afghanistan that indicate a lack of long-term thinking and inadequate support to nonmilitary efforts. A thread Rohde begins in his discussion of Iraq and Afghanistan and picks up with relish when continuing on to discuss American policy in Pakistan, Turkey, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt is an American tendency to give aid and fund projects receiving countries did not request and cannot sustain.

One dismaying consequence of this is the United States often spends vast amounts of money and yet is viewed negatively by local recipients. The author details problems inherent in Washington that prevent successful foreign aid policy, including a culture of risk aversion and noncollaboration that leads to fractious policy and serious understaffing.

Based on abundant examples, Rohde posits American aid should fit into the receiving country's plan and vision, and should depend on two policy requirements. First, the United States must listen to that country's concerns and desires. Second, it should provide generous, tailored, appealing incentives to address those issues along the lines of the European Union's accession program, rather than mandated spending, spending attached to a timeline, or aid with conditions attached. The author also calls for the United States to gear foreign aid towards harnessing American strengths like business, investment, and technology. He calls for the U.S. government to foster trade and educational exchanges, and to create a permissive environment for American businesses to interact in partner countries.

As the title *Beyond War* suggests, Rohde believes the United States needs to shift from military solutions towards equal investments in civilian institutions promoting diplomacy, development, and trade. He calls for a broad, long-term vision of American influence that is slow and deliberate, one that uses foreign aid efficiently to foster strong relationships and self-sustaining solutions to problems that matter to Middle Eastern countries.

The book does have flaws, notably a tendency towards lionizing or demonizing both individuals

and groups. For example, the author offers bountiful praise of Richard Holbrooke and no substantive criticism. Conversely, Rohde generally maligns contractors as a group, using anecdotes like those relating to Raymond Davis [a private security firm employee and former U.S. Army soldier who killed two reportedly armed men in Lahore, Pakistan] to paint them as hotheads. However, these flaws do not detract from the importance of the author's points or his conclusion. Ultimately, this book's value lies in pushing the reader to consider a question vital to American interests: how can the United States shape a stable, successful Middle East?

Capt. Justine M. Meberg, U.S. Army, El Paso, Texas

**VIETNAM LABYRINTH: Allies, Enemies,
and Why the U.S. Lost the War**

**Tran Ngoc Chau with Ken Fermoyale, Texas Tech
University Press, Lubbock, Texas, 2012, 480 pages**

For decades, the scholarship of the Vietnam War was almost entirely from an American view. Recent years have provided other perspectives from those who fought and lived through the Vietnam War. These other points of view have been invaluable in aiding in our understanding of a war which has been challenging to comprehend in many aspects. One recently published volume which unquestionably offers a unique perspective is Tran Ngoc Chau's superb volume, *Vietnam Labyrinth*.

What makes Chau's book so distinctive is the author's incredible life story. The twists and turns in his life and the life changes he made are unlike any you will read. Chau spent much of his childhood studying to be a monk. In 1945, he left school and joined Ho Chi Minh's forces to expel French forces from Vietnam.

After five years, he became disillusioned with their motives and changed sides to serve in positions with the South Vietnam government. Chau held many key positions in the government, but in 1970 was jailed on charges of collaborating with the North. Following his four-year confinement and the Communist takeover, he was sent to reeducation

camps. Finally, in 1979 he was able to escape with his family to the United States. It is a powerful account which Chau (with ample support from his co-author Ken Fermoyale) superbly articulates.

Vietnam Labyrinth is not entirely focused on Chau's extraordinary life. Chau also interweaves discussions of two other subject areas into the volume. First, he provides a superb historical narrative of Vietnam from 1945-1978. Because of his perspective and the positions he served, he is able to address events normally not discussed in other volumes tied to the history of Vietnam after World War II. The discussion prior to U.S. involvement is immensely beneficial. Clearly, to better understand the U.S. role and experience in the Vietnam War one must possess this kind of a foundation; *Vietnam Labyrinth* conclusively provides such a foundation for readers.

Second, and somewhat overshadowed by the other portions of the volume, is Chau's analysis (and opinions) of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. The author is blunt in his assessment of U.S. policy and decisions made concerning Vietnam. He concludes that U.S. ignorance of Vietnam's history and culture was instrumental in the final outcome of the Vietnam War. It is counsel he hopes America will heed in the future.

The account of how *Vietnam Labyrinth* came to print is a story in itself. Chau and Fermoyale met in the mid-1980s and in 1987 started a business venture together. A year later, they began collaboration on a book focused on Chau's life. As they expected, it was an extremely laborious process that included taping hours upon hours of Chau's recollections and translating hundreds upon hundreds of written notes and pages from Vietnamese to English. Some 25 years later, the results of their painstaking work are found in the pages of *Vietnam Labyrinth*.

To label *Vietnam Labyrinth* as simply another book on the Vietnam War is clearly an injustice. It is far more than that. Certainly, it is a significant volume in aiding in our understanding of the Vietnam War and the history of Vietnam from 1945 to 1978. Moreover, I believe its ability to detail the incredible life of a man who loved his country is gripping. These in combination make *Vietnam Labyrinth* a must for readers of varying interests.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

LAST STAND AT KHE SANH: The U.S. Marines' Finest Hour in Vietnam


Gregg Jones, Da Capo Press, Boston, Mass., 400 pages

In late 1967, the 26th Marine Regiment moved into a remote area of Vietnam near the village of Khe Sanh to disrupt traffic along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The North Vietnamese quickly countered this move and in a few weeks had managed to surround the 6,000 Marines with nearly 40,000 soldiers. What followed from January to April 1968 were 77 days of both horrific and heroic fighting that Gregg Jones captures in his book *Last Stand at Khe Sanh*.

As the title implies, part of purpose for this work is to determine what happened at Khe Sanh, but the author is clearly more focused on understanding what it was like for those Americans who fought there and how it impacted their lives. In particular,

he wanted to see the battle through the eyes of those young Americans who fought at Khe Sanh. The reader will quickly discover that it is in the achievement of the latter goal that this book excels. Jones has done an incredible job gathering the firsthand accounts from those who served and weaving them into a seamless narrative that flows across both time and space.

The author vividly re-creates for the reader the incredible amount of stress these young Marines dealt with on a daily basis. Their personal narratives recount the constant threat of death from incoming artillery fire and nightly enemy probes of their positions, with everything compounded by long night watches and the ever-present shortage of food and water. However, despite being "hollow-eyed and exhausted," they continued to show amazing levels of dedication and discipline. In modern Army terms, they displayed the essence and importance of mission command at all



levels. In the absence of orders and communications, and even with the death of key leaders, young leaders at the squad and team level continued to function and display initiative and bravery in accomplishing their mission and taking care of their Marines.

In addition to capturing the stress, chaos, and confusion of siege warfare, this work also relays extraordinary acts of individual bravery. Examples include the story of Army Special Forces Sgt. 1st Class Eugene Ashley Jr., who saved a Special Forces detachment from certain annihilation. He would be the only recipient of the Medal of Honor (posthumously) for actions at Khe Sanh. Almost as heroic were the efforts of the pilots and air crews who supported Khe Sanh. Fighting limited visibility and constant artillery and small-arms fires, these aviators regularly risked their lives to evacuate the wounded and bring in follow-on troops and supplies.

As stated above, one of the intents for this work was to examine how the battle at Khe Sanh affected the lives of those Marines who fought there. The author uses the epilogue of this work to accomplish this final task. As can be imagined, some of the terrible mental and physical wounds of such a battle healed slowly, if at all. The reader will discover that some of these stories ended in triumph while others ended in unfortunate tragedy. However, what is reinforced in the epilogue and makes this book worth reading is that it shows the incredible valor and sacrifice the Marines at Khe Sanh made for their mission and each other.

**Lt. Col. Wm. Kenna McCurry, U.S. Army,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.**

VANISHED: The Sixty-Year Search for the Missing Men of World War II

**Wil S. Hylton, Riverhead Books, New York, 2013,
288 pages**

Wil Hylton's *Vanished* is a mystery story replete with many classic mystery elements, including a troubled and eccentric, yet brilliant, sleuth as the lead protagonist. There are innocent victims, illusory clues that lead to dead ends, and other clues that may only be understood long after they are first discovered. There is even pirates' gold, or at

least "Yamashati's Gold," involved. The antagonists are the most difficult of all for they are time, the elements, and human intervention.

In short, *Vanished* has all the components of any spellbinding piece of fiction. Hylton's narrative moves at speed without regard to chronology, focusing instead on bringing together past and present. However, *Vanished* is much more; it is a compelling human story of courage, fear, loss, hope, persistence, and dedication spanning some 60 years. It is also a tribute to the human spirit of those who were lost and those who sought them.

So who were the victims? They were young airmen who died on bombing missions mounted in the late summer of 1944 that aimed to "soften" up the Japanese defenders of the Palau Islands, including Pelelieu. The campaign in the Palau Islands lasted some 18 months. All told, B-24 Liberator bombers dumped more than a million pounds of bombs on the islands. However, the Marines who fought at Pelelieu could attest that the effort fell short. *Vanished* is about three B-24s and their crews that were shot down during three of the many missions carried out by Liberators assigned to the "Long Rangers," more formally known as the 307th Bombardment Group. The three Liberators went down in and around the waters and the Islands of Koror and Babeldaob. To be specific, some pieces wound up in the sea and others landed on the shore.

Vanished is a fascinating account of one man's conviction that these men deserved better than missing-in-action status more than 50 years after they were last seen. This conviction that they had to be found and brought home led ultimately to the families of one crew in particular learning the fate of their young men.

Pat Scannon is in some ways an unlikely sleuth of *affaires militaire*. A successful medical researcher with a Ph.D. in chemistry to hang alongside his medical degree, Scannon founded the company for which he worked. Although the son of a soldier, the Army (or any other service for that matter) never appealed to Scannon, whose life as an Army brat left him cold toward what he perceived soldiers were all about. Nevertheless, Scannon more or less stumbled onto the mystery that captivated him for the better part of 20 years. He began by initially becoming interested in a project conceived by a coworker to find Japanese gold alleged to have been buried in the Palau Island Group.

As a first step, Scannon's associate proposed they locate and dive on the wreck of Japanese ship supposedly sunk by a young U.S. Navy pilot named George H. W. Bush.

The plan was they would produce a documentary film to raise money to search for the gold, an odyssey that began in 1993 and finally concluded in 2010 with burial of the remains of five airmen that called themselves the "Big Stoop" crew. On that first trip, Scannon, who was not an experienced diver, was of little use to the "documentary crew." However, when his wife joined him, he made the discovery that changed his life and the lives of a great many others.

On a tour of World War II wrecks, a guide showed him the wing of an aircraft shot down in the shoal waters of the archipelago. Scannon would later identify that wing as belonging to a Liberator flown by William Dixon and nine other airmen, who were shot down two weeks before the Marines landed in Pelelieu. Identifying the Dixon crash site was fairly easy; for Scannon it was also an epiphany. He went on to find clues to the fate of two other aircraft that he then felt compelled to follow up on. Subsequently, he found and identified a second wreck flown by a crew led by Glenn Custer that was shot down eight months after the Marine Corps landing. Still later, the most compelling discovery came from finding a Liberator tail bearing the number 453, which had flown with the "Big Stoop" crew on 1 September 1944 and then vanished. The least was known about this last plane's fate.

Hylton traces at a dizzying pace how Scannon's fascination with these three airplanes grew. He researched archives, he attended reunions of the 307th where he interviewed old soldiers and their families, he became a certified diver, and he founded a nonprofit called the BentProp Project devoted to supporting the efforts to locate "missing" downed aircraft in Palau. He apparently went to Palau every year from 1993 through at least 2007, where he interviewed islanders, rented aircraft and boats to search, and finally mounted expeditions that ultimately located 453. He even made it possible for the son of one of 453's crewmembers to dive on the wreck. All of this he did while coping with the legitimate bureaucratic rules associated with these wrecks, including dealing with the joint service organization in Hawaii that recovers remains. As his research expanded, he tracked down what happened to several airmen who apparently were able to parachute safely from

the plane but later died at the hands of the Japanese. During this period he went down blind alleys, but persisted and ultimately helped return some of these soldiers to their families.

What emerges from Hylton's narrative goes beyond Scannon's compulsion. Hylton reveals insight into the suffering of the families, and how this little known backwater campaign touched the lives of so many. However, the very best way to understand why this was important is best left to Scannon. He was touched by the sacrifice of these young, half-trained men who died in support of an effort some later claimed was unnecessary. As Scannon put it, for those young men, "it made no difference that they died in a backwater campaign. They died young and violently. They deserve to be remembered." All should read this book and remember.


**Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired,
Lansing, Kan.**

THE TRUE GERMAN: The Diary of a World War II Military Judge

Werner Otto Müller-Hill, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2013, 240 pages

This is an odd book. It purports to be the contemporary diary of a Wehrmacht military judge, Major Werner Otto Müller-Hill, from 1944-45.

Anyone expecting to learn more about the Wehrmacht judiciary or military justice system will be disappointed, as there is nothing of substance about those institutions at all. Instead, almost every page is taken up with a series of never-ending, withering, and contemptuous comments directed at Adolf Hitler, Josef Goebbels, the Wehrmacht high command, Major Müller-Hill's superior officers, and fellow judges. The comments are uniformly strident. For example, "It's not possible for



us small-time soldiers to do more—for instance, by removing this unfortunate regime.” Even more inflammatory: “The man responsible for all the mistakes, Hitler himself ... should have been eliminated by his generals.”

Keeping a diary written in this form, or making any of the statements that Major Müller-Hill claims he made at the time, would be *Landesverrat* (treason) and *Wehrkraftzersetzung* (undermining the war effort), both punishable by death—particularly as Germany rapidly deteriorated and defeat was all but certain. What motive, then, would the author have had to keep a running tally of self-incriminatory evidence, whose only use would be to hang the scribe? The short answer is that he would not have done so. The author was evidentially intelligent and critical, not a suicidal social renegade.

Major Müller-Hill spent most of the war in Strasbourg with Division z.b.V. 405, later transferring to Freiburg and Tübingen. In military law parlance, his duties seem to have consisted mostly of administrative law matters—although this is not certain due to his reluctance to discuss his cases—and his principle source of information about the wider war came from the radio, newspapers, and periodic letters he exchanged with colleagues.

On balance, it seems more likely that the truth is somewhere in between: Major Müller-Hill kept a war-time diary—but not the political and acerbic published version—and then enhanced it after the war. He died in 1977. Accordingly, if it is not contemporary, its value as a historical testament is lessened. There are no surprising revelations in the text, other than one short passage from a 23 September 1944 entry where he admits to hearing about a freight train with “50 cars full of Jews who were gassed and burned,” as well as other crimes.

Because the book only covers the period from 1944-45, it is impossible to determine how the author’s viewpoint was shaped and why. Was he always a dedicated opponent of the regime or did he come by it gradually? Why did he volunteer to serve a system that he believed embodied stupidity and criminality?

The editors, though, have done a remarkable job—the explanatory footnotes are a model to anyone who uses them in the future—and they should be commended for the decision to let the author speak his piece, whether or not that piece is entirely what it claims to be.

Mark M. Hull, Ph.D., J.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

THE ARIADNE OBJECTIVE: The Underground War to Rescue Crete from the Nazis

Wes Davis, Crown Publishing Group, New York, 2013, 352 pages

Ariadne, or “most holy” in Cretan Greek, was the mythological daughter of Minos, King of Crete, and his queen, Pasiphae. She is most often linked to the mazes and labyrinths of Crete, and in particular with the Minotaur and Theseus. Reading Wes Davis’ book *The Ariadne Objective: The Underground War to Rescue Crete from the Nazis*, I cannot imagine a more fitting character to use as a symbolic backdrop to the action in his fast-paced story. Crete represented an important strategic objective to Nazi Germany early in World War II, and on 20 May 1941, the Germans launched the first ever large-scale airborne assault against the island’s Allied defenders. After sustaining crippling losses early on, the German airborne troops eventually gained control of the island’s main airfield and as a result were able to bring in massive reinforcements, ultimately securing the island in 10 days.

Wes Davis, an archeologist by profession, has spent many years studying the unique history of Crete. Crete is a mountainous island pocked with thousands of caves, many of which are linked to characters from Greek mythology. During one of his many trips to the island, Davis learned of an interesting story about a swashbuckling British intelligence agent named Patrick Leah Fermor and his role in fighting the Nazi occupiers of Crete. Davis does a nice job painting a picture of Fermor, describing how his mischievous curiosity caused him to have trouble adjusting to mainstream British society. During the 1930s, Fermor spent much of his early adulthood exploring Europe and Eurasia on foot. He was particularly fascinated by the culture and history of Greece and Turkey.

During these adventures, Fermor saw firsthand the impact of the rising tide of Fascism in Nazi Germany—something that influenced his decision to join the British Army at the beginning of World War II. Due to his previous experiences, it did not take long for the British military establishment to realize Fermor’s value, and as a result, he was recruited as one of the early

members of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), roughly equivalent to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in the United States.

Subsequently, Fermor spent several years in Crete aiding the Cretan partisans in reclaiming their beloved island from the Nazis. Davis' story builds to an exciting climax as Fermor and his band of SOE irregulars hatch a plot to turn the Nazi occupiers on their heads. The success of this plot seems constantly in doubt as the story progresses. By the end you feel like you have just gotten off a roller coaster ride.

Partisan warfare was very important to the Allies in many of the territories occupied by the Nazis. *The Ariadne Objective* is an important narrative of this part of World War II that is often overlooked, and Fermor's small piece of this irregular fight is interesting to say the least. The mythological character Ariadne makes frequent appearances symbolically throughout Davis' fast-paced narrative and is an important detail that helps provide insight into the character and personality of the Cretan people. Adriadne ultimately helps Theseus destroy the Minotaur, and clearly the stories of Fermor's exploits in Crete closely mirror this centuries old mythological tale. I think this is a great read and recommend it to anyone interested in World War II history.

**Lt. Col. Jeffrey W. Kilgo, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.**

**THEY CALLED THEM SOLDIER BOYS:
A Texas Infantry Regiment in World War I**

**Gregory W. Ball, University of North Texas Press,
Denton, Texas, 2013, 352 pages**

They Called Them Soldier Boys is an excellent social and military history of the 7th Texas Regiment. The book describes in detail the story of the unit from its inception, through its training, to its deployment to France in World War I. Then the author traces aspects of the soldiers after their return to postwar life.

As the United States entered World War I, many young men in Texas were encouraged to volunteer for the 7th Texas Regiment on the assumption they would be able to fight alongside their neighbors and not be

drafted into the Regular Army. Like many other tales from recruiters, this turned out to be not entirely true. As the 7th Texas soldiers became part of the U.S. Army prior to deployment to France, they were combined with the 1st Oklahoma and reflagged as the 142nd Infantry Regiment (in the 71st Brigade of the 36th Division). Ball describes in detail the rural backgrounds and social lives of the young men who volunteered for the regiment. He presents many demographic statistics, including ages, educational backgrounds, the number of soldiers with dependents, and their occupations.

On their arrival in France, the regiment was not incorporated into the American Expeditionary Forces under then Maj. Gen. John J. Pershing but instead was placed under the command of the French Army. Subsequently, the regiment participated in the 1918 offensive in the Champagne region. It conducted two major attacks, one at St. Etienne and one at Forest Farm, near Roche on the Aisne River. At St. Etienne, the Texans and Oklahomans displayed courage, but the operation was poorly coordinated and they suffered excessive casualties.

By their second attack, at Forest Farm, the regiment had learned from its mistakes and performed very well. The regiment was innovative. For example, when the officers of the 142nd believed that Germans had intercepted messages on their field telephone system, they used Choctaw Indian code talkers (from Oklahoma) to maintain secret communications. Ball continues to follow the regiment after the war is over, discussing how the stories of the soldiers' exploits grew as time passed and they moved on with their lives.

They Called Them Soldier Boys was thoroughly researched. Ball's 28 pages of endnotes and 18 pages of sources show that he has done his homework. His sources include draft registration cards, personal accounts, letters, newspaper articles, and official works. He presents plenty of period photographs as well. The historical tidbits and human interest stories set this work apart from other more general histories. The reader feels the regiment's pain as Ball names and recounts the individual fates of many of the men lost in battle.

There are lighter moments as well. For example, during the battle at St. Etienne, a mess wagon was unable to bring up food because during an artillery barrage a cook named Perkins had dived under his

mess wagon and set his pants on fire. Ball chronicles the meals of cold beans and cold coffee, putting the reader in the trenches with the men from Texas and Oklahoma.

They Called Them Soldier Boys is good reading. Ball's tone is objective and his prose is clear and direct. Those interested in infantry organizations, National Guard integration, and especially those interested in Texas history, should find the book interesting and enjoyable.

Michael L. Waller, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

WOUNDED: A New History of the Western Front

**Emily Mayhew, Oxford University Press,
New York, 2013, 288 pages**

The Great War centennial is here, and so is the usual onrush of mass market histories bred by such anniversaries. Many consist of the usual cast of czars, kaisers, generals, or doughboys, and are illustrated with the typical stock photos and symbol-saturated maps. Emily Mayhew's *Wounded: A New History of the Western Front* breaks rank from this lockstep approach to the war and provides one of the most gripping, humanized histories in recent scholarship. Her history of the war ignores the political elite and military hierarchy in favor of telling the story of the most common yet least understood way of experiencing the war—that of being wounded.

While roughly 8.5 million soldiers died in the war, their suffering did end and their memory was enshrined in national glory. Civilians tried to forget the war and resumed their lives. Yet over 21 million men suffered wounds during the conflict, beginning a searing, painful journey that often began in no-man's land and continued throughout the rest of their lives as they sought healing for both body and soul. Their story has largely gone untold until now.

Mayhew focuses on the British experience along the Western Front, examining the lives of wounded soldiers, chaplains, stretcher-bearers, nurses, medics, surgeons, and other medical auxiliaries. Even though the British medical system processed millions of wounded men, later government workers disposed of much of the documentation, leaving Mayhew to piece together this story from personal journals and letters combined

with remaining official papers. While that is a regrettable loss of historical knowledge, the sources ensure that the story is told with the voice of the wounded man and not that of the government statistician.

Mayhew's storytelling is compelling and powerful, bringing images of both the characters and the battlefields to the reader's mind. While geography and campaigns are referenced, they do not serve as part of grand strategy discussions; instead, they are described as the soldier would have known them—an unfamiliar foreign town where his life changed forever. The reader quickly becomes invested in each character's story, rooting for the soldier, nurse, or chaplain to come through the experience alive. Yet all too often, the narratives abruptly end as those trying to save the lives and souls of others met death themselves.

Like Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front*, Mayhew's work places war in its full human context and shows the depth of pain that conflict can bring. While the emotional and physical suffering are not gratuitously described, the experiences Mayhew highlights are so intensely sobering and emotionally draining that the reviewer could only read a few chapters at a time. These realities of pain and suffering are the true legacy of the Great War and should temper all future cries for a rush to arms. Mayhew has done a truly remarkable service by ensuring that we can still hear the stories of these soldiers one hundred years later. In this way, the book's material is timeless, providing a much needed reminder that the call to war will require a generation of a nation's young men and women to bear irreparable scars from the battlefield through the rest of their lives.

Jonathan Newell, Hill, N.H.

SOUTH PACIFIC CAULDRON: World War II's Great Forgotten Battlegrounds

**Allan Rems, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
Maryland, 2014, 312 pages**

Allan Rems adds breadth and context to our understanding of World War II's South Pacific campaigns in an accessible, highly readable and well-packaged new book that is especially timely given the approach of the 70th anniversary of VJ (Victory over Japan) Day. While others have

written extensively on specific campaigns or battles in the South Pacific area of operations, Rems tackles its entirety in one fell swoop—encompassing the Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, Eastern New Guinea, and numerous smaller islands critical to the Allied cause.

In straightforward, concise prose, the author does justice to his expansive topic, beginning with Guadalcanal in the Eastern Solomon Islands in August 1942, and culminating with Australian combat operations in the Solomon Islands, New Britain, and New Guinea just prior to Japan's capitulation in September 1945. How does Rems pull this off? By seamlessly interweaving the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, and deftly covering the key decisions and their subsequent actions and consequences, the author intricately narrates a compelling narrative.

Similar in scope to Eric Bergerud's excellent treatment of ground combat in *Touched With Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific*, Rems makes his finest contribution by making sense of the South Pacific campaigns given their intimidating geographic context—the complex islands, cultures, bewildering place names, and time-distance factors—that framed Allied strategy. Thus, one readily obtains a sense of what key leaders were trying to do, from the perspective of the Allies (Nimitz, MacArthur, Halsey, Blamey), as well as the Japanese (Yamamoto, Koga, Imamura, Hyakutake). The author effectively describes critical decisions facing each side: how and when to employ spare forces and resources; whether to attack or bypass enemy strong points; and whether to press or withdraw. Rems relates how such decisions were rendered hopelessly complex by faulty intelligence, inter-service rivalries, and national political considerations.


Like any good book on the Pacific War, the author never lets one forget the human element. Each of his chapters is titled with an excerpt or quotation from a key leader (e.g., "The Closest Thing to a Living Hell") to help frame the individual events or battles being covered. The entire South Pacific panorama is thus uniformly covered, from events such as the death of Japanese Adm. Yamamoto, to key battles ranging from

Guadalcanal and Bougainville, and the encirclement of the great Japanese hub at Rabaul. Rems also pays tribute to the more obscure, but no less important, contributions made by the Australian and New Zealand forces, which went far beyond just "mopping up" isolated Japanese forces upon withdrawal of U.S. forces to continue the drive towards mainland Japan.

With extensive notes, excellent photographs, and a very useful chronology, Allan Rems' new book serves as an excellent and concise introduction to Allied operations in the South Pacific. Effectively interweaving the levels of war and linking the ground, sea, and air campaigns, rather than treating them in isolation, he makes an effective case for

the enduring importance of the region to the Pacific theater, and for continuing to honor those who fought there.

**Col. Mark Montesclaros, U.S. Army, Retired,
Fort Gordon, Ga.**



THE PHYSICS OF WAR: From Arrows to Atoms

Barry Parker, Prometheus Books, Amherst, New York, 2014, 320 pages

For many, reading a text on physics may not sound like the best way to spend free time. Without a background in the subject, one conjures obscure formulae, levers, ramps, and Galileo dropping weights from atop the Tower of Pisa. Nonetheless, one must appreciate that physical science underpins how the world works regarding motion, force, and energy, and serves as the starting point for nearly all technological advancements. It is a subject so expansive that many of its laws and implications may be taken for granted.

Dr. Barry Parker's *The Physics of War* attempts to focus our appreciation of the science by comparing the history of man's scientific understanding of physical science and man's quest for the next wonder weapon. The book is primarily a work on the history of science and an introductory text on physics. Warfare

and weapons serve merely as a backdrop to explain the former through a wide survey of military history, mostly of the Western tradition. The reader, particularly if a student of military history, must keep this in mind while reading, as the historical assertions can be general and somewhat anecdotal. From the onset, the author is clearly a physics professor, ostensibly a fine one, but no historian. Despite allowing for easier understanding of difficult scientific concepts, the folksy and conversational language sets an unauthoritative tone. Too often, he reaches out to less-than-august academic sources on the web such as Wikipedia, How Stuff Works, and About.com.

When *The Physics of War* hits on an interesting, important, and well-explained topic, the book soars. For instance, the author's explanation on the application of rifling and ballistics is fascinating. The pieces devoted to the development of gunnery would make any artilleryman proud. Other sections on the long bow, radar, and atomic bomb may not be ground breaking or revelatory, but are nevertheless insightful. If anything, the reader gains confidence in finding confirmation in what he or she already knows about the world.

Despite all that is right with it, the work is often so broad in its treatment of war's history, from chariot to drone, that it often suffers from a lack of focus. The few gems in it are sparsely separated by muddled, easily contestable topics that fall flat. The author claims outright that the Romans had disdain for science.

The Roman arches and aqueducts that function after thousands of years may silently confute such an assertion. Also, he claims that few advances in science occurred in the medieval period despite the numerous discoveries in natural science and mathematics that actually occurred during that millennium of human history. Moreover, the book's decidedly Western focus on wars and weapons prevents all but the slightest nods of acknowledgment toward such non-Western technological advances as, say, the Chinese development of gunpowder.

If the author would have focused less on the history and more on the major leaps in technological advancements it explains well, this book would have been much more successful. As a physics text, which is what the author mainly appears to have intended

it to be, the work succeeds. Unfortunately, *The Physics of War* falls short of making the must-read recommendation list for the military reader.

Maj. Bradley J. Hardy, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

FIGHTING THE MAU MAU: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency

Huw Bennett, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2013, 317 pages

Kenya was the scene of one of Britain's last colonial wars. There, between 1952 and 1956, the British Army and local security forces fought a bitter, but successful, campaign against the Mau Mau, insurgents from the Meru, Emru, and Kikuyu tribes. When the "Emergency" was over, counterinsurgency experts like Frank Kitson pointed to the victory as vindication of the British Army's principles of minimum force, rule of law, and civil-military cooperation. The reputed success added to an enduring narrative that celebrated the British as the masters of "population-centric COIN" (counterinsurgency).

That narrative has been shaken by the more recent British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and historians have been inspired to take a more critical look at the British record in places like Palestine, Northern Ireland, Malaya, and elsewhere. In his book, *Fighting the Mau Mau*, Huw Bennett uses newly released government documents to challenge the received view about the Kenya Emergency. Examining the British colonial experience, he finds that, stretched across a vast empire, the British Army's "thin red line" could rarely afford a "hearts and mind" approach to counterinsurgency.

Instead, what the army's staff college taught about counterinsurgency was trumped by a more practical and long-term tradition of using exemplary brutality to quell uprisings before they could spread. Rebellions had to be "nipped in the bud." That was the actual policy that guided the Kenyan Emergency. In crushing the Mau Mau, the army, the police, and the tribal Home Guards never succeeded in separating the tribes from the insurgents

and, instead, used collective punishment, forced resettlement, prisoner abuse, and arbitrary execution to cow the target population into submission.

Gen. George Erskine is typically cast as the hero of the Kenyan campaign. He arrived to lead East Africa Command in June of 1953 and is usually credited with giving the counterinsurgency effort a badly needed strategic vision while, at the same time, eliminating the worst excesses among the security forces.

Bennett asserts that Erskine did indeed initially seek to moderate the violence but quickly realized that investigating and prosecuting those officers and men who operated outside the law would lose him support of his own chain of command and might even risk mutiny among his soldiers. Erskine, Bennett claims, thus compromised by turning a “blind eye” to the brutal methods his men used to suppress the Mau Mau while investigating only the most egregious abuses. In doing so, the general apparently acted to shield his troops from the intrusion of civil oversight.

The resulting campaign saw atrocities on both sides. While Bennett believes that most British soldiers acted honorably in fighting the Mau Mau, he finds that the British Army’s experience in Kenya is hardly a ringing endorsement of the kind of progressive techniques espoused in the U.S. Army’s FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*. In fact, Bennett concludes there is no such thing as “soft COIN.”

His disturbing conclusion: “Because intelligence about who insurgents are and [because] shifting political loyalties cannot be surmounted, it may be that counter-insurgencies will always be brutal.”

Fighting the Mau Mau is recommended although it is hardly a smooth read. The author chooses a thematic chapter structure rather than a chronological account, and that, along with his close adherence to the documentary record, sometimes makes for a choppy narrative. Nevertheless, his book is significant both for what it tells us about the British “small wars” experience and how it might shape the U.S. Army’s ongoing debate on counterinsurgency.

Scott Stephenson, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

WARRIOR GEEKS: How 21st Century Technology is Changing the Way We Fight and Think about War
 Christopher Coker, Columbia University Press, New York, 2013, 384 pages

In this book, Professor Coker, head of the Department for International Relations at the London School of Economics, explores the human dimension of war and warfare and the changes that may occur in the future if technological advances separate man from the West’s morals and ethics. He examines war’s changes from possible technological and medical advances that alter the human warrior, or by using surrogate warriors such as autonomous systems (SKYNET), or some combination of both in the post-human environment. Describing his own intent, the author says—

What I have tried to do in this book is to examine the likely impact of early 21st century technologies—digital, cybernetic, and bio-medical—upon our understanding of how war and our humanity will continue to co-evolve.

Coker begins with a discussion of warfare as understood by the ancient Greek philosophers as the “human thing.” As contrast, he blends in a view of the digital world that produces impersonal relations and interaction. He then effectively incorporates expert opinion from a vast array of multiple disciplines, from the time of the ancient Greeks until today, in examining the subject as he predicts the future. These disciplines are not limited to social scientists and moral philosophers; they also include science fiction writers, bio- and neuroscientists, genetic engineers, post humanists, cyberneticists, and many others.

Will warfare change with these possible advances? What happens if war becomes the normal way of resolving issues? With no citizens at risk but only machines, will societies change? Will the decision to go to war have no more importance than a shopping trip to the local grocery? As we have seen over history, if man can envision it, man can achieve it. This book is one more voice in the ongoing discussion of what the future could look like and the possible pitfalls along the way.

This book is well written, follows logical paths, and does not require the reader to be an expert in future technologies, history, or philosophy—though these could be helpful—to understand the issues raised by the author.

Nevertheless, I found this a challenging read because this topic is dealt with in such vast breadth and depth by the author. He brings so many issues into the discussion that I found this book to be a study. It quickly caught my attention and, from this reading, I gained a better insight into the national, and possibly global, discussion of the future directions of war and warfare. This book is for military professionals, futurists, policy formulators, and the scientific community who are developing these new technologies and capabilities.

Lt. Col. Terrance M. Portman, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

AN INOFFENSIVE REARMAMENT: The Making of the Postwar Japanese Army

Frank Kowalski, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 2013, 224 pages

A reader that experienced the occupations of Iraq or Afghanistan will appreciate *An Inoffensive Rearmament*. Written by a key leader charged to develop the National Police Reserve (later the Self-Defense Forces) in post-World War II Japan, the work provides remarkable insights into how the United States handled a partner nation that was once an enemy. Translated from the original Japanese, the work balances the political scene and mercurial relationship between post-World War II Japan and pre-Korean War United States.

Japan, the book's hero, once a great nation, was burned physically and spiritually by the worst of war but was seeking to build a utopia from the ashes. The United States, a proven international power and Japan's dramatic foil, sought to enable this utopian dream through occupation. One soon realizes that U.S. occupation policy has remained largely unchanged from 1945 through current operations by always forcing the defeated nation into serving as a weakened, pro-American client.

Following the war, Japan sought to reestablish sovereign legitimacy by shifting its governance from the whims of an emperor and military elite to a constitution which merely limited self-defense capability. Japan hoped that a new U.S.-led international world order would prevent future conflict by honoring Japanese passive "higher ideals." Squashing future imperial ambitions, Japan would never seek conflict beyond its borders again.

The United States, in contrast, occupied Japan to establish an impotent, American-modeled client state. In a punitive sense, and under United Nations directive, MacArthur prohibited a new Japanese Army due to its history, not its future. What nation would dare reconsider war after suffering global conflict and the atom bomb? The Japanese Diet (national legislature) staunchly resisted an American-made constitution banning the right to self-defense until Hirohito ordered acquiescence.

Consequently, Japan would depend on U.S. power for security through four U.S. divisions stationed throughout the islands. This situation worked only until the outbreak of war in Korea which forced the divisions' departure. With no U.S. troops, an imminent communist threat from China, and no legal means to stand up a response, Japan was left defenseless. The American occupiers scrambled to organize a new host-nation defense force by scraping together raw recruits and leadership using enough political sleight of hand to keep many from questioning the clear violation of the Japanese constitution and U.N. mandate.

Here, the reader senses a trend in U.S. occupation policy that echoes policies dealing with Iraq and Afghanistan. In all cases, the United States destroys the enemy military and purges its remaining leadership, only to stumble on a self-induced defense vacuum. Peace treaties constrain who can fill this gap and how it can be done.

The U.S. military, seeking a reduced commitment, is then forced to cobble together a force of unskilled soldiers and inadequate leadership. Former enemies are turned into crippled friends who must depend on U.S. collaboration as the only path to international esteem, security, and regional influence. Further, the United States leveraged the staunchly democratic and fairly stable islands of

Japan to withstand the powerful tide of communism in Asia.

Today, in a similar pattern, the United States attempts to create compatible islands of stability in Southwest Asia to deter Islamic extremism and Iranian influence.

The book's lessons indicate that post-war American occupation may be messy and somewhat duplicitous. However, this duplicity may be the only method to ensure security and liberal ideals are maintained at home. The reader's heart may be troubled and hands feel a little dirty after reading this history, but the reader's eyes will surely be opened.

Maj. Brad Hardy, U.S. Army, Fort Sam Houston, Texas

IMPERIAL DESIGNS: War, Humiliation & the Making of History

Deepak Tripathi, Potomac Books, Washington, D.C., 2013, 208 pages

In *Imperial Designs*, former British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent Deepak Tripathi discusses how external military and political influences impact the perceptions of a people. He explains that as imperial powers expand, they invariably attempt to seat elements of influence in a foreign body politic over which they have gained control in order to ensure continued control and security over it. In previous generations, this meant military occupation, but with globalization, political changeover and economic reliance have become the norm.

The nature of this type of foreign policy, the author discusses, eventually sows the seeds of future conflict as the people who have been humiliated and made impotent by the imperial power attempt to correct a perceived wrong. To prevent the emergence of domestic resistance in foreign states under the hegemony of imperial powers, effort is made by imperial powers to weaken such resistance, which leads to a further sense of haplessness that exacerbates the initial resentments until such boil over in outright revolt.

In the author's opinion, war (and other intrusive forms of foreign involvement) brings with it only

short-term success at the expense of long-term goals. There is little acknowledgement of the impact that these actions have upon the psyche of a people who then seek retribution later when they are capable. For example, during the Cold War, such a dichotomy was unintentionally created among Iranians, as the United States and United Kingdom attempted to leverage Iran to offset the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. British and U.S. influence over Iranian domestic affairs and political policies created the sense of mass public resentment against foreign domination that eventually led to the Islamic Revolution, creating an insurmountable divide between the Anglo-American and Iranian parties that exists to this day.

The bulk of Tripathi's book is inherently very critical of U.S. foreign policy. While his assessments and examples are not incorrect, his selection of miscalculations and failures does paint the entire U.S. foreign effort in a bad light. It is understandable that, in order to support his argument, the author would only focus on events that highlight his hypothesis. However, his approach may alienate many readers who think his objectivity in treating the material was compromised by anti-American sentiments. If the reader can look past the author's display of emotion, there is indeed a perspective which can be useful.

Much like the intent of our Founding Fathers when they drafted the Constitution, or the crucible of the American Civil War, the specter of our shared history impacts the decisions we make today. Lessons we have learned, wrongs we have experienced, and successes that we have had embodied in our U.S. history exert a powerful national narrative force on the U.S. population that outsiders find difficult to fully fathom. Just as the patterns and narrative of our history impact us, so do the histories of other peoples impact them, and thus with any course of action we take toward other nations, we must be cognizant of that fact. That is what *Imperial Designs* mainly offers: a realization that the history of other cultures can, and will, impact the result of our actions toward them as much as the employment of any other means of influence, including our most powerful and destructive foreign policy tools.

Capt. Colin Marcum, U.S. Army, Fort Sill, Okla.