Noncommissioned Officers and Mission Command p5
NCO 2020 p36
The Human Domain p81
Greetings, as the summer winds down and fall draws near, many are in the midst of moving, busy with back-to-school activities, or preparing for the cold months ahead. *Military Review* understands the challenges of finding spare time for activities such as reading, but we guarantee this edition is worth the read. Whether you peruse it online, read the journal found in your mailbox, or flip through a copy from one of the offices or stands across post, it is sure to pique your interest.

Despite work force and budget reductions, our Army is still focused on training and education at all levels. This is very evident in the submissions we received supporting our theme for this issue, soldier and noncommissioned officer development and leadership. We sent out requests across the Army for articles focused on the soldiers and NCOs, the backbone of the best Army in the world, and we were not disappointed.

In this edition, you will read Command Sgt. Maj. Dennis Eger’s insights on the NCO’s role in mission command and why it is important that NCOs at all levels understand and support this doctrinal concept. You will also find an article on how NCO self-paced learning can cut costs and enhance the quality of NCO educational experiences. In another, two fitness experts provide some recommendations on ways to improve physical training programs to better prepare soldiers for combat and reduce the number of injuries across the force.

One of the highlights of this issue is the announcement of the winners of the Gen. William E. DePuy writing competition. Thank you to all the brave authors who submitted their essays and to our judges; the competition was pretty stiff this year. Congratulations to the winners! You will find the announcement on page 43.

*Military Review* appreciates the tremendous support of our readers and authors. Although we receive many articles on a daily basis, we still encourage soldiers, NCOs, officers, and civilians—across the Army and all services—simply to write. The heightened operating tempo of the past 13 years took a toll on almost every facet of our military to include professional writing. Finding time to provide commentary on experiences and lessons learned was sometimes impossible.

With the drawdown of troop deployments and a return to a more stable and predictable operating tempo, now is an ideal time for leaders to reflect upon their experiences and revive their enthusiasm for writing for professional publications like *Military Review* to ensure we maintain a historic perspective and pass along our best practices.

As a courtesy to all our perspective authors, we now try to place article submissions in other Army, Department of Defense, or Center of Excellence publications if we cannot support them in ours due to space limitations or content. We also provide recommendations for manuscript revisions (if needed) before forwarding them to other publications to increase their potential for publication. In this way, we hope to encourage all those potential authors out there who might need assistance, and rekindle the love of writing in all our readers.

Themes for Future Editions

2014

November-December  Budget Constraints and Maintaining Readiness

2015

January-February  Training Management: Lost Art or Wave of the Future?

March-April  The Army and the Congress: Who Really Should Have Responsibility and Authority for Preventing and Responding to Sexual Harassment and Sexual Assault?

May-June  Ready and Resilient Campaign: Challenges, Issues, Programs / Officer Broadening

July-August  Inform and Influence Activities

September-October  Technology vs. Personal Leadership

Spc. Jeremy Goforth, a competitor in the 302nd Maneuver Enhancement Brigade’s Best Warrior Competition, fights through the pain as he sprints toward the finish line of the event’s 10-kilometer ruck march, 2 April 2014.

(U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Koster, 362nd MPAD)
About the Cover
Spc. Adam Christensen (left), the 2013 U.S. Army Soldier of the Year, stands with Sgt. 1st Class Jason Manella, the 2013 U.S. Army NCO of the Year, in front of the post flagpole, 23 November 2013, at Fort Lee, Va., where the 2013 Army Best Warrior Competition was held. (Photo by Meghan Portillo, NCO Journal)
The Role of Character in Effective Leadership
Col. Robert Gerard, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired
A veteran of the Korean and Vietnam Wars highlights the exploits of former senior Army leader Gen. Glenn K. Otis, relating the general’s personal as well as professional attributes.

Afghanistan Endgame
Lessons from Cambodia 1973-1975
Lt. Col. Kevin D. Stringer, U.S. Army Reserve
The author compares the current situation in Afghanistan with that in 1970s Cambodia and advocates continued U.S. support to ensure the survival of the Afghan regime.

Transformational Stories
How the Weekend Safety Brief Can Be a Forum for the Professional Military Ethic
Maj. Joel P. Gleason, U.S. Army
The author provides an alternate approach to the standard weekend safety briefing, espousing its use as a vehicle to instill professional ethical understanding and behavior in soldiers.

The Importance of Teaching Followership in Professional Military Education
Soldiers must be good followers as well as leaders. The author posits dynamic followership can be learned through the Professional Military Education System, and effective and courageous followers can prevent senior officers from making unethical decisions through professional dissent.

Macro-Ethics and Tactical Decision Making
Chaplain (Maj.) Robert C. Gresser, U.S. Army
An Army chaplain discusses strategic-level decision-making processes and the ethical implications of high-level decisions.

The Human Domain
The Army’s Necessary Push Toward Squishiness
Maj. Mark Herbert, U.S. Army
The social sciences can help us understand the human side of conflict and forecast human behavioral responses to military action. The concept of the human domain may assist us in understanding a situation and prevent escalation.
88 Retaining the Warrior Spirit
Maj. Andrew J. Knight, U.S. Army

The conclusion of combat operations will likely decrease the warrior spirit in the Army. The Army must seek out and retain officers with both heroic leadership and managerial skills to maintain this spirit.

101 The Morality of Intervention by Waging Irregular Warfare
Col. Daniel C. Hodne, U.S. Army

The author explores contemporary just war theory and introduces rationale to aid in determining how and when irregular warfare is morally justified. Understanding what constitutes moral justification for irregular warfare should be part of our joint and Army lexicon.

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How Psychology is Revolutionizing War

Maj. Andrew B. Stipp, U.S. Army

BOOK REVIEWS

111 Readers provide analyses of contemporary readings for the military professional
Noncommissioned Officers and Mission Command

Sgt. Maj. Dennis Eger, U.S. Army

Sgt. Maj. Dennis A. Eger is the senior enlisted advisor for the Mission Command Center of Excellence at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He holds a bachelor’s degree in behavioral science and a master’s degree in human resource management. His previous assignments include Fort Hood, Fort Huachuca, Korea, and Belgium. Sgt. Maj. Eger deployed twice to Iraq and once to Afghanistan.

Army leadership recognizes the importance of forces being grounded in doctrine; doctrine contains the fundamental guiding principles for conducting current operations. Soldiers, on the other hand, may feel that the ideas in doctrine are theoretical and not applicable to their everyday tasks. However, today doctrine is more accessible and relevant to soldiers than ever.

Since 2011, an effort known as Doctrine 2015 has been guiding a major reorganization and rewriting of Army doctrine to make it more useful to the force.¹ Not only has the content of doctrine been updated,
but a new publications hierarchy has led to the transfer of certain doctrinal subjects from field manuals to new publications categories known as Army doctrine publications (ADPs) and Army doctrine reference publications (ADRPs). Army mission command doctrine has moved to two new doctrinal publications that rightfully have garnered much attention since their release in 2012: ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0, both named Mission Command.²

Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Raymond Odierno has, on many occasions, emphasized the importance of integrating the ideas in mission command doctrine into how the Army conducts operations at all levels of leadership. This level of visibility has caused some to question their role within mission command because if, according to doctrine, only commanders exercise or apply mission command, how is mission command doctrine relevant to everyone else? One group in particular seems to be struggling: the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps. How is the Army’s idea of mission command relevant to NCOs? What is the NCO’s role?

All NCOs acknowledge that commanders command, and NCOs support them in the accomplishment of the mission. Given that thought process, many NCOs have difficulty envisioning their role in mission command. As I travel to camps, posts, and stations around the country, I continue to hear similar rumblings from our NCOs: “Mission command, that’s an officer thing,” or “That’s officer business.” This way of thinking can be no further from the truth. My response is always the same, “No, mission command is leader business.”

As NCOs, and senior NCOs in particular, we must change the way we think about mission command. To accomplish this, we need to understand the basics of mission command and gain an appreciation for our role as NCOs within it. Then we can show our subordinates their part helping commanders apply its principles.

Mission Command Defined

The Army’s approach to mission command incorporates three main concepts commanders apply to overcome the complex challenges of military operations.
NCOs have a direct role in supporting commanders’ application of these concepts, described in ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 as the exercise of mission command, the mission command philosophy, and the mission command warfighting function. The exercise of mission command refers to an overarching idea that unifies the philosophy of command and the warfighting function. The philosophy of command has six guiding principles, and the warfighting function is divided into tasks and systems.

The philosophy of mission command. Mission command (the philosophy) is “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”3 The principles of mission command are—

• Build cohesive teams through trust
• Create shared understanding
• Provide a clear commander’s intent
• Exercise disciplined initiative
• Use mission orders
• Accept prudent risk4

The mission command warfighting function. The mission command warfighting function is “the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.”5 A function is an ongoing group of actions that belong together because of their purpose; this means the mission command warfighting function is a structured way commanders arrange numerous processes and activities under a common purpose so the force can accomplish missions and training objectives.

The mission command system. Finally, a mission command system is “the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, facilities, and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations.”6 This means each mission command system is different because although its components are similar, each commander arranges them to support decision making and facilitate communication for a given mission. Mission command systems are not synonymous with information systems; an information system is only one part of a mission command system.

It is important to note that one of the components of a mission command system is personnel. Within the general doctrinal idea of a mission command system, the emphasis is that commanders systematically organize subordinate functions, starting with the people who perform them, so they can command and control forces effectively.

The next sections offer a practical interpretation of how NCOs function in support of mission command. To understand the role of NCOs in mission command, it is helpful to look at its principles as they apply at the levels of senior leaders, mid-grade leaders, and first-line leaders.

Noncommissioned Officers and the Philosophy of Mission Command

First, NCOs need to understand the practical application of the six principles of mission command. Those principles can help NCOs at all levels determine how to support commanders. Doctrine describes how the principles of mission command assist commanders
and staff; however, it specifies very little about how those principles apply to sergeants major. The doctrine says that command sergeants major are among the key personnel dedicated to mission command. According to doctrine, they carry out policies, enforce standards, give advice, and initiate recommendations about matters pertaining to soldiers. In operations, commanders employ command sergeants major, company first sergeants, and platoon sergeants to extend command influence, assess morale, and assist during critical events.7

**Cohesive teams and shared understanding.** Sergeants major can be the commanders’ confidants. They work to support commanders in developing a climate that fosters mutual trust and team building. Effective team building depends on fostering communication, understanding, and relationships. To that end, the sergeants major strive to ensure there is a shared understanding of the commander’s intent, at all levels, and they provide feedback to commanders to assist with unit assessment. In conjunction with this, sergeants major use their training, education, and experience to serve as the link between commanders and soldiers.

**Commander’s intent and disciplined initiative.** The commander provides the commander’s intent, and sergeants major ensure the purpose of the operation and the desired end state make sense to each soldier.8 On one hand, the sergeants major make sure each soldier understands how the commander’s intent is both feasible and achievable. In addition, they ensure that the right people are in the right place with the right equipment to achieve the commander’s desired results. This is at the heart of mission command—through disciplined initiative, soldiers who understand the purpose and desired end state can find ways to accomplish missions even when events unfold in unexpected ways.

**Mission orders and prudent risk.** Professional NCOs lead realistic, high-quality training that achieves unit cohesion and discipline. Each NCO cultivates in soldiers the habit of disciplined initiative, focused on achieving objectives under mission orders that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained rather than how to achieve them. This enables commanders to accept prudent risk as they establish objectives.

The principles of mission command apply in parallel at subordinate levels of command—senior NCOs, mid-grade NCOs, and first-line leaders. At their respective levels of organization and authority, they assist their commanders and platoon leaders in promoting understanding among soldiers of the commander’s intent, building cohesive teams based on mutual trust, and executing operations in a disciplined manner. The mission command philosophy will fail only if a commander’s
intent is not understood or if soldiers exercise undisciplined initiative. From this perspective, the critical role of NCOs becomes clear.

**Noncommissioned Officers and the Mission Command Warfighting Function**

Next, NCOs need to understand their part in supporting the tasks and subordinate systems of the mission command warfighting function. According to mission command doctrine, within the mission command warfighting function the main commander tasks are—

- Drive the operations process
- Develop teams within and outside the organization
- Inform and influence audiences within and outside the organization

The commander drives the operations process by understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.⁹

As commanders use the mission command warfighting function to integrate the other warfighting functions—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection—it is their sergeants major who provide sage advice on capabilities, outcomes, concerns, and friction points. They provide their commanders with constant assessments and feedback, so they can make well-informed decisions. Similarly, senior, mid-grade, and first-line leaders—through feedback, training, education, and experience—inform their commanders about approaches that have or have not worked in the past. They can discuss the effectiveness of various capabilities needed for any of the warfighting functions.

**Driving the operations process.** NCOs in all specialties and at all levels have a direct role in helping commanders drive the operations process. NCOs at the senior level help commanders organize soldiers with expertise in different specialties to support the appropriate warfighting function. Mid-grade leaders ensure those soldiers are trained, and they share knowledge with their commanders about the availability of or need for expertise to inform commanders’ decisions. First-line leaders execute the mission and perform subordinate tasks within the given intent.

In order for commanders to understand and visualize, they must have a reasonably accurate picture of the problem set or mission. Through their leadership and experience, the sergeants major or other NCOs provide key information to assist commanders in their process of understanding and visualizing.

Commanders describe and direct as NCOs execute. During execution, NCOs at each level feed their commanders information
about all aspects of the organization or mission, allowing commanders to see their organizations and make accurate assessments and adjustments as necessary. In this manner, NCOs enable mission command.

**Developing teams and informing and influencing audiences.** Sergeants major and other NCOs at all levels can help commanders develop teams and inform and influence audiences. As sergeants major circulate on the battlefield, they help develop teams and influence others by disseminating the commander’s message. Sergeants major and other NCOs communicate with soldiers and ensure the commander’s intent is fully understood. Many times, NCOs at the mid-grade and first-line leader level have daily interaction with personnel inside and outside their organizations. By distributing their commander’s message and creating a shared understanding of their commander’s intent, they are helping the commander develop teams and influence audiences.

In addition to supporting the commander tasks, NCOs at all levels have a large role in what doctrine calls the staff tasks and additional tasks (see ADRP 6-0 for a complete list of tasks). For example, NCOs are subject matter experts in cyber electromagnetic activities and knowledge management and in installing, operating, and maintaining the network.

**Noncommissioned Officers and Mission Command Systems**

The final piece of mission command that NCOs need to understand is the mission command system, consisting of personnel, networks, information systems, processes, procedures, facilities, and equipment. The key to each commander’s system is personnel—the human factor.

**Personnel.** For a mission command system to be successful, the right personnel with the right training must be in the right jobs. Commanders rely on subject matter experts for information they need to exercise mission command, and NCOs at every level share the responsibility to ensure the personnel in their organizations are properly trained and assigned.

Sergeants major and senior, mid-grade, and first-line leaders continuously assess the training, education, and experience of their soldiers to ensure they are employed to maximum effectiveness within their commanders’ mission command systems. Typically, sergeants major assess the backgrounds and skills of individuals entering the unit to determine how they can support the organization effectively. Periodic assessments by senior and mid-grade NCOs provide feedback to commanders on how individuals are performing and if they are meeting the standards of their assignments.

**Networks, information systems, processes, procedures, facilities, and equipment.** Among the remaining components of a mission command system, NCOs develop and execute the processes and procedures. They help maintain the networks, information systems, facilities, and equipment. Since sergeants major, NCOs, or subordinate leaders are at the forefront of the actions performed within the mission command system components, they are likely to be among the first to recognize what does or does not work. They play a key role in relaying that information to commanders so they can make adjustments.
Conclusion

Although mission command is commander-centric and commander-driven, on examination it is easy to see that NCOs at every level have a primary role in the success of mission command. The mission command philosophy, with its six principles, and the mission command warfighting function, with its tasks and systems, require significant NCO engagement. In fact, the only way commanders will be able to exercise mission command successfully is by having trained, educated, and experienced NCOs at the forefront of operations.

Notes

1. Doctrine 2015 refers to a major reorganization of doctrinal publications, begun in 2011 and expected to be complete in 2015. The purpose is to reduce their length and number, reduce development time, and enhance collaboration and accessibility through technology.


3. ADP 6-0, 1.

4. Ibid., 2.


6. ADP 6-0, 11.

7. ADRP 6-2, 3-9.

8. Commander’s intent is defined as “a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned.” Source: Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 11 August 2011).

MR We Recommend

Liberty Roads
Nicholas Aubin, Histoire & Collections - Casemate, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2014, 220 pages, $55.00

The Red Ball Express Highway is the nickname given to the supply route opened in August 1944 that stretched from the landing beaches to the American armies launched in an incredible pursuit throughout France. For three months, up to 6,000 trucks drove along this route. It symbolizes the opulence and power of American logistics. However, the generals complain in their memoirs about the lack of gasoline, ammunition, and even warm clothing and cigarettes. Patton thought that the rear echelon services led by General Lee had failed in their mission and delayed the end of the war. It is this paradox that led to the writing of this book. The investigation is more than just a detailed account of the campaign as seen from the rear; it is the first publication to cover in depth the American logistical effort during the Second World War in Europe. —From the Publisher
Capt. Nathan Showman, U.S. Army, and Phillip Henson, Ph.D.

Capt. Nathan E. Showman is a combatives and unit fitness instructor at the United States Military Academy. He earned an M.S. in kinesiology from Indiana University. Capt. Showman served a total of 27 months deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger, Airborne, and Air Assault Schools.

Dr. Phillip Henson is an assistant professor in the Kinesiology Department at Indiana University. He earned his Ph.D. in human performance from Indiana University. Dr. Henson has over 40 years of experience coaching, officiating, and researching the sport of track and field at the collegiate Division I and professional level.

Company-level leaders and above frequently discuss concerns about how to train soldiers physically for the rigors of combat. How should the U.S. Army conduct physical readiness training (PRT)? Common concerns include—

• The wide-ranging and often unpredictable physical tasks soldiers may be called on to perform.
• Overall low levels of fitness and perceived high rates of excess weight in new recruits.
PHYSICAL READINESS TRAINING

Injury rates from training for recruits and seasoned soldiers.

Perceived lack of effectiveness and efficiency of current U.S. Army PRT protocols.

Lack of applicability of the current Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) to combat.


Analysis

The road to the U.S. Army’s current PRT approach began in the late 1990s as Army leadership recognized the need to provide updated PRT and doctrinal guidance. Researchers from the U.S. Army Center for
Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine and trainers from the U.S. Army Physical Fitness School combined efforts to produce the first-generation PRT in the early 2000s. The new PRT was intended as an update to a traditional methodology of calisthenics, push-up and sit-up variations, and long-distance running in formation. The genesis of PRT “involved six different types of exercises: calisthenics, dumbbell drills, movement drills, interval training, long-distance running, and flexibility training.”

In October 2012, new doctrinal guidance was published in FM 7-22. The FM is like a 400-page, college-level textbook. The content is organized by PRT philosophy, strategy, and activities. The manual improves on outdated doctrine by including designs meant to decrease injuries resulting from sudden increases in running mileage; phased training (systematic planning of PRT) and specified rest and recovery points; a greater range of fitness needs applicable to combat, such as mobility, flexibility, and agility; and some limited accommodations for updated training guidelines from organizations such as the American College of Sports Medicine.

Unfortunately, the complexity and breadth of its approach can be overwhelming. I have heard from many soldiers who have found FM 7-22 difficult to understand, including sergeants and staff sergeants responsible for leading and guiding PRT. It attempts to engage audiences—from brigade command-level leadership, to rifle team leaders and combat arms units, to support units—but those audiences seem to be struggling with it.

Moreover, the FM does not provide metrics, definitions, or measurable standards (with the exception of some general movement execution standards). This leaves a dizzying amount of information for users to define for themselves.

The FM attempts to match PRT phases (initial conditioning phase, toughening phase, and sustaining phase) to the Army force generation (ARFORGEN) force pools (rotational phases known as RESET, train/ready, and available). However, the ARFORGEN...
phases mean very little to platoon-level leaders who plan and administer PRT sessions. The cycle is rarely executed to time standards even at the brigade level, and leader turnover throughout the process makes execution of similarly phased PRT impractical.

The Master Fitness Trainer Course (reconstituted in the last two years to teach PRT per FM 7-22) holds a great deal of potential. This four-week course develops PRT trainers at the noncommissioned officer (NCO) and junior officer level who then return to their units as PRT experts. However, the course needs to be more fully developed and given a much higher degree of emphasis and prestige to effect real change.

Most important, FM 7-22 and Army PRT programs have yet to empower and inspire soldiers with effective ways to become fit. Much of PRT’s unpopularity among soldiers comes from its exercise movements, which could be perceived as random or even silly by those who do not grasp their purpose. Lateral, medial, and bent-leg raises; single leg tucks; windmills; and half-squat laterals all could appear to 20-year-old men to be akin to the exercise videos their mothers did on Saturday. Soldiers see little carryover between these functional movements and real-life combat operations. That does not mean that such functional movements are not important; in fact, functional movements are very important.

**Discussion**

To improve the implementation of the Army’s PRT, soldiers need to master a common lexicon and a basic level of physiological understanding. This paper attempts to begin a discussion that will lead to establishing definitions of commonly bandied but poorly understood concepts of physiology, biomechanics, and sports technique principles.

Developing common understanding will enable pursuit of common goals.

**What is fitness?** Fitness definitions and taxonomies abound, but many (including dictionary definitions) are inadequate because they do not describe qualities that are easily measured. CrossFit founder Greg Glassman uses a definition that is quantifiable and appropriate for all applications of physical fitness. (CrossFit is a strength and conditioning program that has gained popularity among soldiers and athletes.) Fitness, Glassman asserts, is the ability to produce power across two broad domains: a time domain and a modal domain (sometimes called modalities).

Power is a quantifiable biomechanical phenomenon. It is defined as the rate at which work is performed. Power can be expressed algebraically as
\[ P = \frac{F \cdot d}{t} \]

In this equation—
- \( P \) = Power (energy)
- \( F \) = Force (cause of motion)
- \( d \) = Distance (of displacement)
- \( t \) = Time

Power output can be increased or attenuated through manipulation of any one of the three variables: force (the cause of motion, which is greater if the cause of motion is heavier), the distance that weight travels, and the time it takes to move the weight through that distance.

In terms of application, therefore, the goal should be to train soldiers to move large loads over long distances quickly. This concept can be expressed as intensity. Intensity is exactly equal to average power output as discussed above, and its presence or lack thereof in exercise programming should be defined as how large the load, how far the distance, and how much time it takes to perform the movement. Infantrymen are taught from their first day in the Army that their job is to close with and destroy the enemy; their job often requires hours of foot movement followed by short bursts of explosive energy. Intensity describes both physical modalities.

The time domain refers to various approaches to training that take into account the duration of tasks, such as tasks performed quickly using high force, or tasks that require endurance over time using less force. To be proficient and efficient, soldiers routinely need to perform short, explosive movements; intense movements lasting up to two minutes; and sustained exercise. Efficient recruitment of muscle fibers and metabolic pathways must be trained, within the domains that each muscle fiber type and pathway is the primary source of power.

Different muscle fiber types contract for different kinds of muscular power production over different durations. Moreover, the metabolic pathways that fuel muscles differ, depending on the intensity, duration, and type of physical activity. The fibers that make up the muscles of the body comprise at least three different types:
- Type I fibers have a high level of aerobic endurance but generate less peak power.
Type II<sub>A</sub> fibers have a much lower level of aerobic endurance but perform well anaerobically and generate higher levels of peak power.

Type II<sub>X</sub> fibers are activated predominantly for highly explosive, short-duration activities.

In addition, training the metabolic pathways that deliver adenosine triphosphate (ATP), which fuels the muscles, is essential for maximizing athletic potential for tasks of different duration:

- The ATP-phosphocreatine system delivers immediate but short-term (≤ 10 seconds) energy for explosive movements.
- The glycolytic system delivers energy more slowly but in a more sustained fashion, energizing movements up to two minutes.
- The oxidative system delivers the slowest but most sustained energy. This system can fuel exercise for hours when trained properly.

Glassman has adopted a taxonomy with 10 general fitness domains, based on the work of coaches Jim Cawley and Bruce Evans, in which physical skills and training adaptation can be defined and measured. These ten skills are shown in the table.

In the PRT taxonomy used by FM 7-22, the overlapping components of training are “strength, endurance, and mobility.” Qualitative performance factors for mobility are agility, balance, coordination, flexibility, posture, stability, speed, and power. The doctrine further develops the components as muscular strength and muscular endurance; anaerobic endurance and aerobic endurance; and the performance factors of mobility—agility, balance, coordination, flexibility, posture, stability, speed, and power. This taxonomy bears some similarity to Glassman’s, but since the nature of the model is qualitative, rather than quantitative, it provides little practical means for measurement. Glassman’s model facilitates quantifying athletic performance.

The idea of modal domains includes types of training most likely to result in desired physical performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General physical skills</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cardiovascular/respiratory endurance</td>
<td>The ability of body systems to gather, process, and deliver oxygen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamina</td>
<td>The ability of body systems to process, deliver, store, and utilize energy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>The ability of a muscular unit, or combination of muscular units, to apply force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>The ability to maximize the range of motion at a given joint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>The ability of a muscular unit, or combination of muscular units, to apply maximum force in minimum time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speed</td>
<td>The ability to minimize the time cycle of a repeated movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>The ability to combine several distinct movement patterns into a singular distinct movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agility</td>
<td>The ability to minimize transition time from one movement pattern to another.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>The ability to control the placement of the body’s center of gravity in relation to its support base.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>The ability to control movement in a given direction or at a given intensity.</td>
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</tbody>
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| Table. Ten general physical skills as used by Glassman

- Type II<sub>A</sub> fibers have a much lower level of aerobic endurance but perform well anaerobically and generate higher levels of peak power.
- Type II<sub>X</sub> fibers are activated predominantly for highly explosive, short-duration activities.

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adaptation, as well as those that exhibit a high degree of skill crossover from sport to sport. Modalities such as gymnastics, Olympic and power lifting, plyometrics (exercises involving repeated stretching and contraction), yoga, running, and rowing are examples of these modal domains. Therefore, we recognize that a soldier is fit insofar as he or she is able to produce power over different durations and in different modalities (referring to types of physical activities that are improved by exercise). For example, under this definition the soldier who practices weightlifting, trail running, and kayaking, and who demonstrates some gymnastic capability (the capability to perform a muscle-up, vault, or handstand, for example) is fitter and more combat-ready than a soldier who exclusively runs 50 miles per week and performs some push-ups. From an athletic perspective, a world-class decathlete (physically) is fitter and more combat-ready than a world-class triathlete.

What are functional movements? The term functional movement is another example of frequently used exercise terminology lacking a common definition. According to W. Larry Kenney, Jack Wilmore, and David Costill, functional movements—
• Incorporate combinations of joints and muscle systems for execution. They do not isolate single muscle groups.
• Begin proximally and culminate distally, from core (transverse abdominis, erector spinae, and associated musculature) to extremity.
• Stave off decrepitude (because regular functional movement through full range of motion is therapeutic).
• Are safe and within the ability of healthy human beings, when all points of performance are observed.
• Are replicated naturally and come from everyday human experience.¹⁰

Not teaching and learning how to perform functional movements correctly is to the detriment of a soldier’s quality of life and ability to perform his or her job.

Examples of functional movements include the squat (the equivalent of standing from seated position), dead lift (the equivalent of picking up an object from the ground), and press (the equivalent of taking an object from shoulder level and placing it or handing it overhead). Sporting experience teaches that when correct points of safety performance are observed and trained, it is possible to move large loads quickly while staying injury free. We do soldiers an injustice (fail to empower them) by not teaching them correct execution of these fundamental human operations.

What is the best method for training soldiers for the rigors of combat? Research has shown conclusively that desired physical adaptation is elicited to a higher degree through PRT that combines modalities (e.g., strength and endurance training combined rather than just strength or just endurance training).¹¹ Moreover, in a 2012 study, Heinrich et al. reported that an active duty population responded more favorably to a program consisting of functional movements executed with a high degree of intensity compared to a sample conducting traditional training.¹² Statistically significant favorable adaptation relative to the traditional group included increased APFT push-up performance, decreased APFT two-mile run time, increased one-repetition maximum bench press, and increased flexibility.

Recommendations

We therefore propose the following general guideline, consistent with Glassman: training that includes a wide variety of functional movements performed at a high degree of intensity across broad time and modal domains is the most effective way to increase a person’s capacity to generate power.¹³

Specific recommendations for improving Army PRT protocols are—
• Adopt the Functional Movement Systems screening tools.
• Empower master fitness trainers.
• Keep PRT in its current format for basic combat training.
• Develop additional Army publications that concisely discuss practical application of the principles in FM 7-22.
• Revise the APFT.

Adopt the Functional Movement Systems screening tools at the unit level. One of the primary arguments against implementing the type of training we advocate here is based on concerns about high rates of musculoskeletal injuries. In general, however, many injuries can be avoided by ensuring soldiers use proper functional movements.

A company known as Functional Movement Systems, founded by Gray Cook, has developed
effective tools for evaluating movement. A significant predictive factor for musculoskeletal injuries, as demonstrated by Mr. Cook, is poor movement patterns. For individuals with no current pain or musculoskeletal injury, fitness professionals can administer the Functional Movement Screen (FMS), described as—a ranking and grading system that documents movement patterns that are key to normal function. By screening these patterns, the FMS readily identifies functional limitations and asymmetries. These are issues that can reduce the effects of functional training and physical conditioning and distort body awareness. The FMS generates the Functional Movement Screen Score, which is used to target problems and track progress. This scoring system is directly linked to the most beneficial corrective exercises to restore mechanically sound movement patterns.14

For individuals with pain or injury, a healthcare provider can administer a tool known as the Selective Functional Movement Assessment. Scientific literature supporting the efficacy, accuracy, and reliability of these tools is large and continues to grow.15 They are used by organizations such as the National Football League, USA Track & Field (the national governing body for track and field, long-distance running, and race walking in the United States), and over 20 professional sports teams and U.S. government and military organizations.16 The FMS is inexpensive and easy to administer. It requires little more in terms of resources (time and personnel) than a standard unit-level APFT. Most important, it will provide commanders with quantifiable injury potential data that should result in better soldier care and outcomes.

The U.S. Army lacks a method for predicting the likelihood of injury even though the increased risk of musculoskeletal injuries is the leading argument against high-intensity workouts. In 2011, the Uniformed Services University Consortium for Health and Military Performance in collaboration with the American College of Sports Medicine released an executive summary detailing positive and negative characteristics of “extreme conditioning programs,” finishing with qualified recommendations for their continued use by military populations.17

The executive summary cited “an apparent disproportionate musculoskeletal injury risk from these demanding programs, particularly for novice participants, resulting in lost duty time, medical treatment and extensive rehabilitation.”

U.S. Army Maj. Roger Miranda with the 1st Cavalry Division lifts a barbell while doing thrusters during the CrossFit Open competition at Fort Hood, Texas, 5 April 2013. The exercise, repeated several times, works muscles in the upper and lower body.

The FMS could be part of the solution to mitigating these injury concerns. All soldiers should be tested biannually (as with the APFT) to identify new or chronic dysfunctional movement patterns. Soldiers who test high for potential injury should be limited in the functional movements and intensities of functional movements they perform until corrective exercise results in an improved FMS score.
**Empower master fitness trainers.** The Army should empower master fitness trainers with the same level of education, responsibility, autonomy, and professional reward as drill sergeants and recruiters. The master fitness trainer program holds much untapped potential. Structured properly, used consistently, and empowered with adequate resources, it could help streamline and improve U.S. Army PRT. It should not supplant current NCO and officer responsibilities for planning and administering PRT programs. Rather, it should empower leaders and soldiers with information, coaching skills, and injury prevention techniques. As evidenced by the popularity of extreme conditioning programs (which could include CrossFit) and the explosion of functional fitness-type equipment (such as bumper plates, lifting platforms, kettlebells, medicine balls, and large pull-up cages) in military gyms, many soldiers already perform a variety of functional movements at high intensity; the master fitness trainer program could help ensure they do so safely.

Drill sergeant and recruiting positions are benchmarks in an NCO’s career progression. They are considered a stepping stone for promotion, so those positions are highly desirable. Commanders must recommend an NCO for drill sergeant or recruiting school by name; without the commander’s recommendation, the NCO cannot compete for the position. Master fitness trainer positions should be elevated to similar status. The master fitness trainer course is four weeks long; it should be expanded to at least 12 weeks to adequately prepare NCOs for their future positions. At a minimum, basics of exercise physiology, sports psychology, and biomechanics should be covered. Master fitness trainers should receive training from USA Weightlifting (Olympic) coaches, strength and conditioning specialists certified through the National Strength and Conditioning Association, and other strength, conditioning, and coaching professionals on the fundamentals of functional movements. Examples of movements to study include the squat, dead lift, and press; their variations and progressions; and lifts of increasing complexity such as the clean, jerk, and snatch. Master fitness trainers should learn to teach a variety of plyometric, kettlebell, barbell, and gymnastic techniques. They should learn how to improve a soldier’s running or swimming form and learn how to scale back any workout for which a soldier is not ready. Master fitness trainers should receive FMS certification. They should leave their master fitness trainer course ready to act as athletic coaches, administering their unit’s PRT program. They should be empowered to recommend FMS training for members of their unit who could assist with screenings. Commanders should be viewed as athletic directors providing general guidance, but the PRT administrators should be the master fitness trainers.

Master fitness trainers should be supplied to units in sufficient numbers to implement a three- to four-week introductory program for soldiers newly arrived at their unit. They should provide FMS testing, teach functional movement techniques, instruct a gradual progression of exercise intensity, and evaluate soldier fitness levels. Master fitness trainers should be empowered to scale back intensity and complexity for soldiers who are not maintaining pace with the group, who are exhibiting poor movement techniques, or who are otherwise at risk for injury. In this way, novice soldier-athletes whose weak performance is due to undiagnosed injuries, poor functional movement, or insufficient fitness levels will be cared for instead of being pushed to the point of injury. They should feel less pressure to keep pace with the group before they are physically ready.

The Army should designate several levels of the master fitness trainer program. Much as the Modern Army Combatives Program certifies soldiers in levels I through IV, the master fitness trainer program should provide advanced schooling, certifying soldiers in increasingly complex techniques and greater levels of scientific knowledge. For example, master fitness trainer levels I through III should be established, corresponding to the platoon, company, and battalion levels. The Army should form a partnership with the National Strength and Conditioning Association so that soldiers who complete level III training could concurrently become certified strength and conditioning specialists. In other words, the level III course should include the National Strength and Conditioning Association’s certification training and examination. If the master fitness trainer graduates were certified strength and conditioning specialists, they could correctly and confidently advise battalion commanders on PRT techniques and programs.
Soldiers should be recommended by their commanders to attend master fitness trainer level I much as they are recommended for drill sergeant and recruiter school. Selected soldiers should have high general technical scores, display a predisposition and passion for physical fitness, and be open minded and willing to learn.

Keep physical readiness training in its current format for basic combat training. The current PRT program is sufficient for basic combat training. Many soldiers enter the military with no background in physical training. The program provides a gentle, progressive stimulus that most new recruits can handle, and according to Knapik et al, it produces desired adaptation within the eight-week basic combat training period. It is appropriate for the time constraints of basic combat training, and in a repetitive environment such as basic, it is relatively simple for drill sergeants to administer. Upon completion of PRT at basic combat training, new soldiers can go to their units prepared to participate in appropriate advanced training, to improve fitness through their unit’s introductory program under a certified master fitness trainer.

Develop additional Army publications that concisely discuss practical application of the principles in FM 7-22. The Army needs to develop subordinate publications that explain specific techniques for conducting training. Those publications should define for soldiers and commanders the functional movements, their progressions, and increasing levels of complexity that result in the ability to express power across broad time and modal domains. The publications should provide more precise sample programming for NCOs and officers responsible for planning PRT sessions and give guidance on the relationship and responsibilities of the master fitness trainer and the unit leadership.

FM 7-22 ties progression and phasing of PRT to basic combat training in the ARFORGEN rotational...
cycle. As discussed earlier, this sometimes is impractical. Instead, basing unit PRT schedules around a five-month time span followed by a two-week break provides a reasonable period for training and improving, with a built-in rest and decompression period. Soldiers earn two and a half days of leave every month—this equals 30 days of leave at year’s end. Units routinely take two weeks of leave during the summer and two weeks of leave over the winter holiday. Granted, one unavoidable feature of military service is the occasionally unpredictable nature of day-to-day tasks. Sometimes training time or facilities simply are not available. Between these training breaks and numerous three- and four-day federal holidays, soldiers can find time for rest and recuperation, whether for soreness, injury, or general weariness.

**Revise the Army Physical Fitness Test.** One unresolved topic not updated by FM 7-22 in 2012, and currently under research, is the APFT. In 2012, the Army scrapped a new version of the APFT that had been the result of over two years of research and testing for a more combat-appropriate test. Testing soldiers’ ability to produce power across time and modal domains need not be difficult. Well-designed workouts such as a CrossFit workout known as “Helen” can serve as fitness tests. This workout calls for the athlete to complete three rounds of the following, in order, as fast as possible: 400-meter run, 21 repetitions of 55-pound kettlebell swing, and 12 pull-ups. Used as a test, it measures soldiers’ ability to move loads (their body weight and a 55-pound kettlebell) over various distances as fast as possible. It involves running, moving weight from the ground to overhead, and pull-ups. These activities are applicable to combat scenarios. The workout can be scaled in intensity to meet different needs. For instance, a soldier could increase or decrease the number of rounds, increase or decrease distance, decrease kettlebell weight, or decrease the number or type of pull-ups. This is simply one example; there are many workouts like this already developed that would adequately test soldiers’ power-generation capacity.

**Conclusion**

These recommendations stem from direct experience with military units and the profession of arms. They are not all-encompassing, nor are they complete as individual plans. They constitute, however, a starting point for discussing improvements in Army PRT. These principles are rooted in exercise physiology, biomechanics, and accepted professional physical training techniques. The Army teaches leaders to constantly ask the question, “Are we doing the best we can?” The new PRT doctrine was a good start. These recommendations could lead to the next evolution in the process of fielding the most well-trained, physically fit army in the world.

What has been lacking in the military fitness discussion is a bridge between the scientific and military communities that could help the Army define key physical fitness terms and propose methods for safe, effective PRT implementation by soldiers at the unit level. By providing analysis, discussion, and recommendations for these issues, this paper seeks to open doors to new possibilities for improving soldier battlefield physical readiness and quality of life.

Varied functional movements executed at high intensity best provide the required and desired stimulus to increase a soldier’s power production across broad time and modal domains. Implementation of the Functional Movement Systems is clinically proven to predict injury potential in soldiers. It would help leaders and master fitness trainers prevent unnecessary injuries and improve soldiers’ professional experience as well as unit readiness. The master fitness trainer program holds immense potential; it must be harnessed, appropriately structured, and properly empowered in order to fully exploit that potential.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Indiana University, the United States Military Academy, or the United States Army. They are solely the opinions and recommendations of the authors.

2. Field Manual (FM) 7-22, Physical Readiness Training, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], October 2012). For more information on the new APFT, see Lance M. Bacon, “When will we see the new PT test?”, Military Times (15 August 2012), http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20120815/NEWS/208150328/When-will-we-see-new-PT-test. In common Army usage, the term physical training (known as PT) is synonymous with PRT.


9. FM 7-22.


19. AR 350-1.

Building Partnership Capacity 101
The New Jordan Armed Forces Noncommissioned Officer Corps


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As war has become more complex over the span of military history, nations striving to build modern armies increasingly have recognized the need for highly trained and professional small-unit leaders. It was the need for small-unit leaders that gave birth to the noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps, and this necessity continues to demand NCO presence on the modern battlefield. Where the U.S. Army has striven to build partnership capacity among partner armies in complex multinational operating environments, the need to promote professional NCO development has been one of many key lessons. One significant example of an NCO development initiative emerged in 2010, through the U.S. Army’s partnership with the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) in Afghanistan.
The JAF, like most of the armies of its Arab neighbors, lacks a well-developed, professionally trained, and empowered NCO corps. This likely is attributable to cultural factors as well as the fact that the JAF still operates using a highly directive centralized command system dominated by officers down to the lowest level, rather than a mission command model.¹

Understanding why Middle Eastern armies such as Jordan’s lack a professional NCO corps would certainly make for a worthy study of itself. Among other intriguing questions is to what extent the deficiency of small-unit NCO leadership among front-line units has contributed to a shortage of significant military victories and decisive operations among Arab armies over the past century. This was especially so when they were operating against armies with well-developed NCO leadership.

Setting aside speculation as to the causes, this article focuses on describing steps the U.S. Army took from 2010 to 2013 to help its Jordanian partners build a functioning and empowered NCO corps. It describes each step taken and the thought process behind it. The authors hope these observations will be useful to others supporting partners who face similar cultural and organizational hurdles in professionalizing and modernizing their armed forces.

**Tasting Real Combat**

Combat was the impetus to change in the JAF. The son of one of Jordan’s first sergeants major trained by the British, Jordanian Lt. Gen. Mashal al Zaben, chairman of the Jordanian Joint Chiefs of the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) march outside at the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 21 September 2009. The JAF is working to strengthen their noncommissioned officer corps and make it the backbone of their forces. (Cpl. Jordan Johnson, 13th Public Affairs Detachment)
For years, junior officers in the JAF had been performing the functions that Western armies, including our own, normally designated as NCO duties. These ranged from accountability of equipment to training management. Such a broad span of responsibility for a junior officer might work adequately in a placid and routine-bound garrison environment but not for a force deployed thousands of miles from home facing an adaptive enemy in a dynamic, hostile environment.

In the caldron of wartime operations, JAF officers simply could not effectively oversee in person every aspect of the broad array of key activities units needed to perform in a combat environment. Difficulty in traveling between subordinate unit locations under dangerous conditions impeded their approach to commanding and controlling forces. Moreover, there simply was not time enough in the day to oversee every activity.

**Building a Noncommissioned Officer Corps**

In this context, al Zaben sought to build the kind of robust NCO corps that had disappeared from the JAF since its original establishment on a British model over 50 years ago. He initiated this by reprogramming the JAF’s foreign military financing program funds, which were designed to buy equipment and secure training slots in the United States. He earmarked money to support a new and significant NCO training initiative.

To support this initiative, Gen. George Casey, then chief of staff of the U.S. Army, enthusiastically agreed to host over one hundred Jordanian NCOs at the 2010 Fort Bliss Warrior Leader Course (WLC). These were more slots than any other country had ever sought or received. However, Jordanian leadership had consistently demonstrated its commitment to its partnership with the United States. For a country fighting and bleeding with the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, Casey would make the slots available. Clearly, a partnership of this caliber was worthy of our special attention and support.

Casey assigned then Sgt. Maj. of the Army Kenneth Preston and Sgt. Maj. Jeffrey Wells (of the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 [Operations]) the mission of traveling to Jordan to conduct an assessment and develop a plan to bolster the JAF NCO capabilities. The two sergeants major along with Sgt. Maj. Amanda Smith (assigned to the Military Assistance Program-Jordan) worked with senior JAF NCOs to develop a course of action for meeting the commander’s intent. The final plan laid out by the sergeants major, and approved by Casey and al Zaben, established a four-step process within a framework calculated to have immediate impact on JAF deploying units:

1. English language training for JAF NCOs.
2. Participation in the WLC at Fort Bliss.
3. Shadowing of U.S. NCOs at Fort Bliss (following and watching to learn how to do the job of an NCO).
4. Deployment to Afghanistan for combat operations.
Once the senior leadership established this framework, the U.S. country team in Jordan and the JAF proceeded to identify NCOs and turn the concept into reality.

**Language training.** One of the first challenges faced in sending NCO candidates for training in the United States was finding 100 Jordanian soldiers with adequate English language skills.

Ordinarily, in the JAF, advanced English language training is reserved for commissioned officers. Before JAF personnel can receive military training in the United States, a minimum score of 70 percent is required on the English Comprehension Level Test (the test normally used to measure the English language proficiency of international participants in U.S. military schools and exercises).

However, it quickly became apparent that for the NCO development initiative, this standard was unattainable. The pool of Jordanian NCOs with a working base of English language skills was very limited. Consequently, the standard was adjusted to allow for any NCO candidate scoring a minimum of 55 percent on the test to take training in the United States.

Implementation then proceeded by identification of the first 10 NCOs able to meet the minimum English requirement. They went to Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, to participate in advanced English language training for eight weeks. Although test scores did not increase dramatically after the eight weeks, the confidence level of the group was bolstered. This helped them communicate more effectively and motivated them to continue practicing English outside classroom training. Nine additional groups eventually followed.

**Warrior Leader Course at Fort Bliss.** Upon completion of the English language training, groups then would move to Fort Bliss, Texas, to attend the U.S. Army’s WLC. Though foreign students, the Jordanian NCOs participated in every aspect of the course with no special provisions made.

**Shadowing U.S. noncommissioned officers.** Upon completion of the WLC, the Jordanian graduates remained at Fort Bliss to be assigned to various units of the 1st Armored Division for two weeks. The intent was to have the Jordanian NCOs partner...
with and shadow U.S. NCOs. Basically, this was an opportunity for the Jordanian NCOs to observe to the best possible example of U.S. Army NCOs conducting their daily duties, interacting with the soldiers and officers of their units, and, most importantly, exercising small-unit NCO leadership.

**Deployment to Afghanistan.**
The final step in the plan called for all graduates of this program to deploy with JAF units to Afghanistan. Of 98 who graduated, 75 deployed to Afghanistan for a six-month tour and returned with combat experience. The graduates who did not deploy were assigned to JAF Headquarters or to the JAF Lessons Learned Center, both in Amman, Jordan.

**Overcoming Program Challenges**

Not surprisingly, there were challenges throughout the process of moving approximately one hundred NCOs through training whose English skills and exposure to Western armies were limited. Some of the key challenges experienced were that—

- The process took a long time—over two years.
- There were significant cultural differences to overcome between Jordanian and American soldiers.
- Jordanian NCOs were unable, or in some cases unwilling, to participate during the Ramadan period of fasting.

Despite these challenges, all connected to the program deemed it an overall success. It was clear that the NCOs who trained and subsequently deployed to Afghanistan were far better equipped than they otherwise would have been for their missions. Most returned from Afghanistan anxious to share their knowledge and experiences with the remainder of the JAF.

**Building a Jordanian Noncommissioned Officer Course**

After successfully training 98 NCOs in the United States, the logical next step was to support the JAF in building its own NCO leadership course within Jordan—along with an NCO development system that would sustain gains. Therefore, the country team decided to pursue the following steps in establishing the first JAF NCO leadership course:

1. Identify and train a Jordanian cadre of instructors for the new NCO course.
2. Support the JAF in writing the program of instruction (POI) for the course.
3. Identify a training facility for the new course and ensure it would be resourced.
4. Train and educate the JAF’s commissioned officers on how to empower newly trained NCOs.

**Identifying and training the cadre.** The most obvious candidates for becoming trainers at the new JAF NCO leadership course were those from the original pool of 98 graduates. Fortunately, the military assistance program office in Jordan still had on staff the U.S. sergeant major that had been instrumental in assessing the original 100 Jordanian candidates, preparing them before their departure to the United States, and advising them throughout their training cycle.

Subsequently, this sergeant major, along with the senior staff of the JAF Training and Doctrine Directorate, helped identify the top nine graduates of the original U.S. training who also had obtained combat experience in Afghanistan. These became the first instructor team of the new JAF NCO leadership course.

These nine Jordanian NCOs then returned to the United States to shadow the instructor cadre of the WLC at Fort Bliss for three weeks. Again, the intent of this shadowing was to expose the new Jordanian cadre to U.S. NCOs already skilled as trainers. This would give the Jordanians insight into developing their own POI and bolster their confidence for becoming instructors.

**Supporting development of the program of instruction.** Concurrently, Army officers of the International Affairs Program Directorate of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command worked with the Jordanian senior leadership and the Jordanian NCOs to develop a POI tailored to the JAF. Starting with the U.S. Army’s POI for the WLC as a model, classes were added, subtracted, or changed to accommodate Jordanian needs.

The final product resembled the U.S. model in that the course was divided into three sections: a week focused on leadership, a week focused on training, and two weeks focused on war-fighting skills. During planning sessions with the nine-man cadre,
classes were assigned to specific instructors with the requirement that each instructor resource the teaching material for his specific class.

**Identifying a facility.** In the summer of 2012, the JAF identified classroom space at the existing Noncommissioned Officer Corps Academy for use by the new NCO course. (The academy had been established to teach technical skills as opposed to NCO leadership.) Officials from the country team escorted by the nine-man cadre visited the proposed site, and the group assessed requirements jointly.

The facility allocated two large classrooms and one office space to the new instructor cadre. Concurrently, the team also determined that the field training facilities located at the school would suffice for field training exercises. Their use would be coordinated through Jordanian internal channels.

**Training the commissioned officers to empower NCOs.** At this point, support and encouragement from U.S. Army senior leadership became crucial in gaining the confidence of Jordanian senior leadership and commitment to the new concept of employing NCOs trained as true first-line leaders. Army-to-army staff talks, held annually, provided a venue for U.S. leaders to encourage the effort. In addition, the U.S. Army agreed to send a mobile training team to act as advisors for the duration of the first course.² The intent was to have U.S. subject matter experts available in a supporting role to answer questions, and lend credibility to the course material and the Jordanian instructors.

The greatest test the NCO leadership initiative faced was obtaining the acceptance and utilization of the course’s graduates by the Jordanian officer corps. There is little history of empowered NCOs in Jordan. (This problem was also faced in Afghanistan and Iraq as U.S. forces attempted to build up local security forces.)³ There was stubborn resistance among some, if not most, of the Jordanian senior officer leadership to empowering NCOs with responsibility and authority.

Several Jordanian officers reported privately that they wondered how they would retain control of their NCOs. They were reluctant about broadening the authority and initiative of NCOs because they felt they would lose authority or control over their units and their resources. Many commissioned officers were loathe to do what they felt would lead to losing control and prerogatives.

This feature of Jordanian military culture was and is the most difficult hurdle in the face of efforts to develop an empowered NCO corps in Jordan. If the officer corps could not overcome a leadership culture habituated to micromanaging every aspect of operations, then any investment in leadership training for their NCOs would be a waste. A fundamental change needed to take place in the JAF command philosophy and military culture.

However, it was also clear that a changed NCO role in the JAF could not be imposed from outside. Change, if it came, would have to come from within the JAF. First, the JAF leadership would have to accept the need for change, without U.S. pressure. Second, even if they did come to believe that their traditional approach was less than effective and that change was desirable, change would need to unfold in a manner and at a pace appropriate for Jordan’s culture and values.

In other words, it was not prudent or wise for U.S. Army leaders to believe that a command philosophy emphasizing delegation of authority to NCOs, which works so well in the United States and many other Western armies, was going to work similarly in an Arab army. Nor was it wise to believe that drastic change in that direction would occur in the near term. To effect change, a balanced approach had to be found that suited Jordan’s needs, but in a manner adapted to Jordan by Jordanians.

**Additional Recommendations to Promote Officer Acceptance**

In adjusting measures to promote acceptance by Jordanian officers, U.S. Army leaders recognized that acceptance of the relatively drastic change in the role of Jordanian NCOs would have to start at the highest levels and filter down. Additionally, the internal cultural change would only occur if efforts were sustained long term.

Based on this understanding, the country team decided to emphasize obtaining senior leadership support in the JAF, focusing efforts on joint training with one unit at a time, and habituating commissioned officers to NCOs as trainers.

**Senior leadership support.** The highest levels of JAF leadership would need to desire and support the
change in command philosophy. Therefore, change would need to be enforced through Jordanian directives and encouraged through active examples. The United States role would be to foster Jordanian-generated initiatives aimed at empowering NCOs; and, to provide concrete support to Jordanian leaders pursuing such initiatives.

**Focused efforts.** Efforts to train NCOs and officers would need to be conducted jointly and focused on one unit at time. This would help maximize the effects and minimize the stress.

**NCOs as trainers.** Qualified Jordanian NCOs would need to be assigned to JAF military schools, with a focus on the officer academy. This would acustom officers at the very outset of their careers to the presence and capabilities of NCO leaders.

Fortunately, the willing and visionary partner al Zaben took the lead in promoting such changes from the top down. Taking the initiative, al Zaben led by example, as he assigned the first Jordanian sergeant major of the army to act as the army’s senior enlisted member—Mohammad Ismail Mohammad al Samadi. Second, al Zaben issued directives to subordinates outlining his vision for the future JAF NCO corps. Finally, he initiated a campaign for empowering NCOs through training, lectures, and command example.

**Implementation by the Jordanian Armed Forces**

In execution of these initiatives, one assumption was that success would be its own best marketer. Therefore, a key decision was made by JAF officials and U.S. advisors to focus on first achieving and demonstrating success with a small group before attempting to expand the concept of empowered NCOs to the entire JAF.

Consequently, al Zaben and the U.S. senior defense official in Jordan agreed that only one Jordanian unit at a time would be selected to send its NCOs to the new NCO course for training, followed by closely monitored employment that emphasized officers empowering these newly trained NCOs within their assigned units. The thought process behind this decision was to move forward slowly, cautiously, and thoroughly to maximize the effects of the new concept in the JAF.

Such focus was necessary because, had the new course been offered to the Jordanian army as a whole, the effects likely would have been diluted. Having a few trained NCOs in a unit that had not made a cultural shift in officer attitudes regarding employment of NCOs would have had little effect on the unit as a whole; no real change would have taken place. In fact, such a situation probably would have been detrimental to efforts aimed at promoting NCO empowerment.

However, by focusing efforts on one unit and training most of its NCOs and officers together, the pace of change could be closely observed, managed, measured for results, adjusted, and then publicized as an example for other units to emulate.

Subsequently, the plan called for 30 NCOs from one brigade to attend the newly formed course. Simultaneously, the officers in the brigade would receive the directives and guidance from al-Zaben as to his intent for the future of the NCO corps. Furthermore, classes and lectures were organized by senior Jordanian and U.S. officers,
focusing on how to utilize and empower the newly trained NCOs.

In conjunction, company-grade officers were required to sit in on select classes at the new course to gain a better understanding of the skills their NCOs were being taught. The goal was to train an entire brigade’s worth of NCOs and officers in one year and make adjustments and changes as lessons learned presented themselves.

The Way Ahead: Recommendations of U.S. Advisors

To promote acceptance of NCO empowerment among a new generation of Jordanian officers, U.S. advisors recommended steps to the JAF leadership aimed at demonstrating the competency level of the newly trained NCOs.

First, placing more NCOs in the Jordanian Officer Academy as a cadre of respected trainers was recommended as a powerful way to teach the next generation of officers the value of the NCO corps. Furthermore, U.S. advisors also recommended that NCOs play a greater role in all JAF schools that teach officers, as well as enlisted personnel. This would foster the habit and spirit of officer and NCO cooperation that would benefit the entire JAF. Historically, when U.S. Army officers themselves have experienced the competence and professionalism of U.S. NCOs as trainers during officer commissioning and training, they have been profoundly affected. Therefore, U.S. advisors believed it would benefit the JAF to replicate such experiences.

The end state would be to incorporate qualified NCOs in as many leadership roles as possible so their value to the officer corps would become evident.

Conclusion

Even as the measures described were being formulated and accomplished, no one was under the illusion that the JAF would have a fully functioning NCO corps empowered by its officers in the near term. It was understood that such an endeavor would require time, patience, and long-term support. In fact, a brief review of the history of the U.S. Army’s NCO corps clearly demonstrates that growing a competent corps requires the attention and support of leaders at all levels for decades. For example, no formal education system existed for U.S. NCOs until 1972.

Moreover, numerous potential pitfalls could stunt the growth, or even reverse the successes, of this Jordanian initiative. One of the most pressing concerns was that as the JAF drew down operations in Afghanistan, it would lose the realization it had gained during its operations there that it had a profound need for an NCO corps.

If history is any indicator for future outcomes, then it is possible that Jordan could follow the example of the United States at the end of World War I. In 1918, Gen. John J. Pershing identified the need for trained small-unit leaders. He wrote, “It often happens that a sergeant or even a corporal may decide a battle by the boldness with which he seizes a bit of ground and holds it.” He requested and received an NCO training course for sergeants being assigned to his units, a first of its kind.

Unfortunately, due the U.S. government’s rapid downsizing and decommissioning of its military after the war, the course was discontinued. The U.S. Army would not see NCO training as a priority until the great losses of the Vietnam War, where it again became...
evident that small-unit leader training and a vibrant NCO corps were a necessity. This example shows that without the immediate need for trained small-unit leaders, hard-fought gains to develop such leaders easily can be reversed.

Therefore, the challenge likely will be for the JAF leadership to continue to recognize the essential need for small-unit leaders without operations in Afghanistan to reinforce this point. This challenge will be all the more difficult in an era of reduced budgets and limited resources, where the temptation to cut training is ever present.

On the other hand, violence is erupting in Libya, Egypt, and Syria, and international coalitions are forming to respond to such crises. Along with Jordan’s desire to build partnerships, these events could persuade Jordanian military leaders of the necessity to maintain the gains already made in modernizing the JAF through empowerment of its NCO corps. Time will tell.

Noncommissioned officer cadets conduct an after action review with NCO Basic Course senior cadre member 1st Sgt. Yousef Ahmad al-Hassan, a graduate of the U.S. Warrior Leader Course and a combat veteran of Jordanian operations in Afghanistan, March 2013. (Photo courtesy of Sgt. Maj. Amanda Smith, U.S. Army)
Notes


2. Significant effort was made to bring the WLC instructors from Fort Bliss who trained the first group of Jordanian NCOs to conduct instructor training in Jordan. The rapport that the NCOs had built among themselves was valuable in their continued tutelage.

3. Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 21 May 2010), 457. The authors describe similar challenges: “Because the Iraqi Army historically lacked the tradition of a professional NCO corps, it took some time for the American NCOs to earn the respect of Iraqi officers and further to convince them to give responsibility to their own NCOs.”

4. Command Sgt. Maj. Smadi was instrumental in selecting the cadre for the WLC, participated in writing the P0I, and was a general advocate for empowering NCOs.

NCO 2020
A Concept for Self-Paced Learning in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System

Dr. Liston W. Bailey and Ms. Tammy Bankus

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For Army noncommissioned officers (NCOs), attendance at each level of professional military education (PME) is a training requirement for career progression. Essentially, NCOs are required to attend schools and demonstrate professional acumen and mastery of a broad set of military skills to achieve promotion to the next higher grade. Historically, the Army has trained enlisted soldiers using an instructor-centric, group-paced instructional approach, where soldiers are assessed on their ability to master tasks under specific conditions using explicit standards of performance.

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) training centers and academies continue to offer training in what is, for the most part, a lock-step fashion, where the level of rigor and challenge is not tailored to the individual. Lock-step training can be beneficial for certain situations, but not all. For this reason, there is a need for innovation in the NCOES; it needs to change its approach to education. In spite of advances in educational technology, NCOES courses continue to train NCOs by relying too much on lock-step, instructor-led training, which is a dated approach to adult education.¹

Self-Paced Instruction in Army Courses

The Army has from time to time used and conducted research on the effectiveness of self-paced instruction, more commonly known as self-paced learning (SPL), for certain courses, but self-paced approaches have not been applied broadly in the NCOES. Unfortunately, much of the research is over 30 years old. One early study, by the Army Research Institute in 1975, was published as Analysis of a Self-Paced Instructional Program in the Clerical Field.² This study found that the use of self-paced instruction to train clerical personnel increased learner motivation and satisfaction among trainees. The study cited reductions in training time and required instructional support as benefits of self-paced instruction. Another Army Research Institute study, The Acquisition and Retention of Visual Aircraft Recognition Skills, published in 1976, concluded that self-pacing in training resulted in better trainee outcomes for higher aptitude trainees.³

If SPL was found to reduce overall training time while contributing to better training management in military schools in the 1970s, could this approach also work well in the distributed learning environment of the 21st century? Recent civilian and military studies of SPL suggest that self-paced NCOES courses could accelerate learning, provide tailored content to meet the needs of soldiers, and lower overall training costs.⁴ Innovative courses and instructional approaches could lead to improved learner satisfaction and value for the training received.⁵

The differences between SPL and group-paced instruction are well known and understood. In SPL, individuals have a degree of control over how quickly they move through the instructional material. In group-paced instruction, the instructor controls how fast trainees moves through instruction. The two approaches need not be mutually exclusive. An NCOES course that combined aspects of both approaches could retain some instructor-led portions while also allowing students to quickly move through content on concepts they had already mastered.

Design of Learning

For either approach to learning—self-paced or group-paced—it is important to consider factors that affect overall effectiveness with regard to how well a course meets the needs of learners.⁶ Designers of both SPL and group-paced courses should consider the following:

- Relevance of course content to the job requirements
- Motivation of trainees to learn
- Opportunities to practice the skills or tasks taught
- Supervisory support back on the job or at home station.
- Instructor skills to facilitate learning
- Evaluation and revision of the course as necessary to achieve objectives

The design of SPL courses should feature concept-oriented, scenario-driven, and project-based learning that supports increased levels of learner interest and engagement. In the NCOES, self-paced content development should focus on constructivist design features, where students are required to address real-world problems and situations.⁷ The term constructivist is used here to describe a learning experience characterized by an engaging
learner-centric focus in which students have the opportunity to apply their knowledge to solve problems, rather than mainly sit through lectures.8

While not all instruction within NCOES classes should be minimally instructor guided, self-pacing some course content is beneficial, especially where learners have some prior knowledge of the subject area or concept being studied. Additionally, SPL should be used to augment and enhance case studies, group discussions, role playing, and other instructional strategies in the classroom.

Another design consideration is that learners in NCOES courses now tend to be digital natives (persons who have used technology from an early age) or gamers who expect computers to provide applications, or apps, for quick learning and problem solving. Conceptually, apps, along with self-assessments, streaming media, and chunked instructional content, would be used within the framework of self-paced NCOES courses to supplement classroom instruction.

**Incorporating an Adaptive Training Model into NCO Professional Military Education**

The Army’s new concept of learning, contained in *The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015*, is based on a goal of creating a continuous adaptive learning model based on learner-centric principles.9 Learner-centric instruction in adult education also places the focus on learner outcomes associated with opportunities for individual reflection, problem-centered instruction, and self-assessments of progress.10

Within NCOES, SPL is just one of several training strategies that can be incorporated to promote the learner-centric instructional environment described in the Army’s learning concept. Other approaches could include the use of games and simulations, intelligent
(digital) tutors, or even personal response systems (clickers). Additionally, to effectuate its learning concept, the Army will require a cultural shift that moves it away from heavy emphasis on the use of traditional classrooms.11

Within a new learning framework, a truly adaptive model ideally would provide personalized content, learning paths based on pre-assessment, and resources suitable for the individual student.12 The main goals associated with adaptive systems are to maximize learner satisfaction, learning speed (efficiency), and educational effectiveness.13 In the very near future, intelligent tutoring systems and adaptive content presentation platforms will allow training institutions to tailor course content based on the use of pretests or personal assessments. It is possible that future NCOES courses might be able to leverage these kinds of educational technologies. This matters because soldiers are more likely to be engaged and focused on learning when they are not bored by the learning design, when they see the training as relevant to their job duties, and when the course content is at the appropriate level of challenge. Moreover, soldiers typically are not interested in repeating coursework on skills or concepts they have already mastered or used on the job before attending a course.

In addition, instructional design should avoid pitfalls such as the expertise reversal effect (an avoidable cognitive overload), which can occur when instructional content is not geared to the level of the learner.14 For example, a soldier attending the Advanced Leader Course within NCOES may already possess more operational experience or more of certain technical skills than a peer enrolled in the same course. Retraining that soldier on skills already mastered or used extensively in operations is not the best way to train or extend knowledge within NCOES and may interfere with additional learning. A pre-assessment of prior learning could support tiered instruction or allow for individually tailored content that either extends current knowledge or supports application of previously learned concepts within the framework of live or virtual scenario-based assessments.

Combining Self-Paced Instruction and Adaptive Learning in NCOES

As an instructional framework, SPL could be introduced into NCO PME using a purposive model of instruction that would allow learners to enter the course with tailored content and instructional activities based on pre-assessment of skills or knowledge. Pretests and assessments should measure soldiers’ understanding of technical or operational concepts within their career field, or of general military topics. Data taken from pre-assessments could be used in different ways to adjust the course content. One approach might be to use mean scores from stratified samples of soldiers across military components or career management fields to shape overall decisions on curriculum and the sequencing of topics taught to all soldiers attending a given course. Another way that pretest assessment results could be used is by having a cut-off score on the test that would serve as a screening mechanism or entry ticket to attend an NCOES PME course that focuses on applying skills. A more routine use of pre-assessment information is to identify gaps in learner understanding at the outset of training, as well as to gather evidence of learners’ readiness, interests, or learning profiles.15

Once enrolled in a course, learners would access materials on a secure learning management system (LMS) that would also track student progress. Many colleges and universities today are using such transformative approaches to enrich student learning experiences. Students attending a course would be issued a tablet or laptop to access and review course content in the form of apps, lectures, self-assessments, wikis, podcasts, videos, and other streaming content. By using a flipped classroom approach, the NCOES course should allow for SPL time during which learners review class lectures and other lesson materials.16

Within a technology-enhanced adaptive LMS, desirable features include instructor dashboards, learning object repositories, and the system’s ability to intelligently navigate the learner through the material.17 Ideally, as learners proceed at their own pace through course content, the instructor dashboard tracks their progress (including completion of tests or other learning assessments) in relation to timelines for course completion.18

A Growing Role for Learner Analytics

There is quite a bit of new research in civilian higher education regarding the use of learner analytics to track student activity within an LMS. Learner analytics is of great interest today because virtual
learning environments (referring to LMSs such as Desire2Learn, eCollege, Jenzabar, Blackboard, and Moodle) can capture transactional data on student behaviors related to a learner’s personal patterns, usage, and browsing time within the LMS. One example is the Social Networks Adapting Pedagogical Practice (SNAPP), which combines content analysis and a social network analysis tool within a course learning environment. The LMS known as Blackboard has developed an analytics solution called Blackboard Analytics for Blackboard Learn that monitors learner usage patterns and progress through courses and assesses online learning tools.

The goal of using such analytic tools is to provide information on students’ interactions with learning objects and on their virtual interaction with other students in a course. For self-paced NCOES courses, learner analytics could support continuous improvement of the instruction by providing real-time information on the overall effectiveness of the course structure, the instructional content within it, and student accomplishment of learning objectives. Finally, evaluation of learning can also be enhanced by using other forms of data to improve the SPL. This may include data from commanders regarding graduates’ performance on the job following graduation and interviews or focus groups with students or faculty to gather feedback about the overall learning experience.

**A Proposed NCOES Self-Paced Learning Model**

Learners enrolled in an NCOES SPL course could continue to meet daily with their learning peers and course facilitators to participate in group discussions, problem-centered exercises, or targeted feedback sessions, or to attend guest lectures. Flexible grouping should be used throughout an SPL course to have students with varying levels of experience and skills socially sharing knowledge and exchanging understanding.

Many of today’s LMSs can support a combination of discussion boards, journals, or social media during a
course. Group learning and interaction, live or virtual, remain key features within SPL courses because social learning still has tremendous power to impart both explicit and tacit knowledge through interactions among learners.

More important, learning is, fundamentally, a human endeavor, so course design remains an important role for the course facilitator, who guides the learners’ experiences through positive and constructive feedback.

Finally, all learners should take an exit exam or participate in a capstone activity at the end of a course as a summative assessment of learning and skill development before attending a completion ceremony. The figure above provides a rudimentary conceptual illustration of the flow of activities within a self-paced NCOES course.

**Conclusion**

In NCOES, SPL is an effective way to apply the learner-centric and adaptive learning principles associated with the Army Learning Concept 2015. As the Army looks to better manage training resources, SPL can provide some cost efficiencies, streamline courses, and ensure higher-quality educational experiences for all NCOs.

Courses using SPL can tailor and adapt instruction to fit the needs of students while making better use of classroom time for meaningful discussion, exercises, and peer-to-peer interactions based on course objectives and learning goals. In addition, SPL can yield higher levels of satisfaction among NCOs by providing the appropriate level of challenge and dynamism that are characteristic of a learner-centric educational environment.

**NOTES**


7. Learning occurs as students engage in problem solving and social negotiation within a real world context.


11. Raymond A. Kimball and Joseph M. Byerly, "To Make Army PME Distance Learning Work, Make It Social," *Military Review*, 93(3) (May-June 2013): 30-38. This article looked at the need to incorporate aspects of social learning into PME. The Army's distance learning courses are often focused on more on content delivery than on true learning experiences.


16. A flipped classroom is a technique where traditional classroom instruction and homework are flipped, or reversed. Students view lectures on their own time and conduct practical exercises during class, allowing for more interaction between the students and teacher, and each other, during hands-on learning.

17. In adaptive educational hypermedia systems we expect that the learning content presentation should be appropriately retrieved from learning object repositories and dynamically tailored to each learner’s needs.

18. Candace Thille and Joel Smith, "Cold Rolled Steel and Knowledge: What Can Higher Education Learn About Productivity?" *Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning* (March/April 2011). Dashboards may provide additional detailed information, such as the class's learning of sub-objectives, the learning of individual students, and the types of tasks students struggle with the most.


20. Laurie P. Dringus, "Learning Analytics Considered Harmful," *Journal of Asynchronous Learning Networks*, 16(3)(June 2012): 87-100. Visualization and log data capabilities are limited in many of today's LMSs. SNAPP supports Blackboard, WebCT and Moodle and is compatible with Internet Explorer, Firefox and Safari on Windows and Macintosh platforms.

21. Stephanie J. Jones, "Technology Review: The Possibilities of Learning Analytics to Improve Learner-Centered Decision-Making," *Community College Enterprise*, 18(1)(Spring 2012): 89-92. As more organizations engage in research on the use of learning analytics, it will be possible to use this type of information to make improved learner-centered decisions.


How can the Army maintain its adaptability and agility, and find innovative solutions to face future threats during this time of work force reductions and budget cuts?

1st Place
Col. (R) John Culclasure, “No Shortage of Campfires Keeping the Army Adaptable, Agile, and Innovative in the Austere Times”

2nd Place
Tommy Tracy, “Considering NATO’s Response Force as a Possible Framework for the Future Operational Joint Employment of U.S. Army Forces”

3rd Place
Capt. Hassan Kamara, “Post-War Transformation: How the German Army Interwar Reforms from 1919-1933 Can Help the U.S. Army”
The Role of Character in

Col. Robert Gerard, Ph.D.,
U.S. Army, Retired

Col. Robert Gerard, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired, holds a B.S. from the University of Southern Mississippi; M.S. degrees in education and counseling from Monmouth University and Shippensburg University; and a Ph.D. in public administration from Penn State University. He served in the Army during the Korean War and had two additional combat tours in Vietnam.

Character, comprised of a person’s moral and ethical qualities, helps determine what is right and gives a leader motivation to do what is appropriate, regardless of the circumstances or consequences.

–Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership (2012)

Great Army leaders are humble soldiers who attribute their success to the men and women who work for them. They step aside while their officers and soldiers receive the awards and accolades they deserve. Their character enhances their leadership.

One of the Army’s great leaders of character was Glenn K. Otis. Among his many command assignments during war and peace, he commanded the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army/Central Army Group. Gen. Otis spent the last four years of his life in Carlisle, Pennsylvania—maintaining a low profile as a quiet, unassuming retired officer. If you met him casually, you would never know of his impressive career, much less his heroic actions during the Vietnam War.

A Retired Officer

I first met retired Gen. Otis at a military social function shortly after he moved to Carlisle. I attended alone and saw him standing by himself in a large, noisy room full of talkative guests. I thought I recognized him, but I was not sure. I introduced myself as Bob Gerard, and he replied casually that he was Glenn Otis. Although I had not been able to recognize the face, I recognized the name immediately. Had I not recognized his name, I doubt he would have tried to tell me about his former rank or his achievements. We talked for a good while, and I told him about a local breakfast club to which I belonged—a small group of Army retirees who met each Saturday morning to solve the world’s problems. Soon, he was a regular member.

At our first breakfast meeting, he made a point of saying he preferred to be called “Glenn” rather than “General Otis.” However, we would never be able to refrain

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from calling him “Sir.” Otis did not talk about his accomplishments in the service although they were many. Instead, he would talk with pride about the great troopers he commanded over the years.

A Combat Commander

Otis enlisted in the Army in 1945 and spent three years as an enlisted man before attending West Point. I am certain his experience as an enlisted man instilled in him an excellent sense of basic soldiering—along with all its hardships. The facts are easy enough to find about his progression in the Army—schools, promotions and awards, and the positions of great responsibility he held as he moved up in rank from private to
four-star general. Beyond all that, there was something very special and down-to-earth about Glenn Otis; hence, my quest to find out more about this great soldier whose character seemed so exceptional.

I found proof of Otis’ character in his service as a combat commander in 1967 and 1968 in Vietnam. In my view, nothing exemplifies the personal attributes of Glenn Otis more than his combat experiences in Vietnam, where he commanded the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, and where he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry in action during the Tet Offensive in 1968.

25th Division Cavalry Squadron. Otis took command of the squadron in December 1967. The 25th Division’s cavalry squadron was a mobile force consisting mostly of tanks and armored personnel carriers. Each M48 tank had a powerful 90 mm gun, a .50-caliber machine gun mounted on top of the turret, and an M60 machine gun mounted near the main gun. The M113 armored personnel carriers carried troops, and each carrier included a mounted .50-caliber machine gun and one M60 machine gun mounted on each side of the vehicle. The tank commander reported that as part of the road security mission, there were places where the main supply route passed through local villages. In those cases, at night the infantry squads would dismount from their carriers and provide flank security.

In their book A Hundred Miles of Bad Road, authors Dwight W. Birdwell and Keith William Nolan narrate several stories that illustrate Otis’ leadership style. Author Birdwell served in the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, under Otis. Some of the stories recounted here come from Birdwell’s book and some from interviews and correspondence with veterans of the squadron. Some information comes from Otis’ account, recorded when he was a student at the Army War College.

Early in his assignment, it seemed Otis made a personal impression on all the members of the squadron. A tank commander reported that he could not remember the squadron commander they had before Otis arrived. In fact, he could no longer picture the former commander, but he said everyone knew and remembered Otis because he was nearly always with the soldiers checking to see how they were doing and what they needed.

To secure the highway, the squadron was spread out in smaller units at key points on the long, dangerous road. Otis would cruise up to their location in his command track, without an escort, just to be sure they were alert and okay. Otis’ frequent presence was unlike that of a micromanager; he trusted his subordinates and made sure they had what they needed to perform their tasks.

The tank commander reported that as part of the road security mission, there were places where the main supply route passed through local villages. In those cases, at night the infantry squads would dismount from their carriers and provide flank security.
as the armored vehicles moved through the village. The soldiers did not like doing that because it was so dangerous. On occasion, Otis would dismount and go out on flank security with an infantry squad. One of the troopers who hated those missions said that when he saw Otis dismounted with them, he felt he could not complain about his duties.

One of the troublesome areas along the highway was near the village of An Duc, north of Cu Chi where the Viet Cong repeatedly placed mines in a culvert under the road. Birdwell and Nolan describe an incident in which Birdwell's section in Charlie Troop was assigned the mission of overseeing the culvert area during the hours of darkness. The small unit was carefully concealed in a location near the culvert, waiting patiently and watching for signs of any enemy movement.

Suddenly, Birdwell said he heard a low, rumbling noise. It came closer and closer from behind his location. Finally, in the darkness, he could make out a command track vehicle and the silhouette of Otis on top. The vehicle stopped. After several minutes, Otis quietly contacted him by radio. From his location, Otis, using a night-vision scope, could see a group of Viet Cong moving quietly toward the road and the culvert. He directed Birdwell's troops to a position where they could engage the enemy soldiers. The enemy never knew what hit them. The next day, Otis congratulated and praised the soldiers of Charlie Troop but never took credit for his part.

The exercise of mission command. Otis' leadership style made a lasting impression on a commander of B Troop. On occasion, Otis would ride with the troop while they were securing the main highway between Saigon and Tay Ninh. Before they moved from one location to another, the new troop commander intended to brief Otis on their plans and progress. Otis listened to the new troop commander's first briefing. The second or third time the commander began a briefing, he says Otis interrupted. Otis explained that he had given the troop commander a mission to carry out as he saw fit. He said he did not need to know all the details. He was there in case they needed additional squadron and division assets to help them in an expanded fight. In fact, Otis said each of the cavalry troops conducted night operations in different ways. He viewed this as a good thing because it presented the enemy with a problem of unpredictability.

In 1967, the Army had pulled a young signal officer out of school and assigned him as the squadron signal officer under Otis. The lieutenant confessed his fear of failing to his new leader. Otis sat beside him, looked him squarely in the eyes, and tapped him on the knee. Otis encouraged the lieutenant, saying he only needed to follow him—and the lieutenant would be fine. The young officer believed Otis. Eventually, that lieutenant forgot the name of every other officer he knew in Vietnam, but he remembered Glenn Otis all his life because he was a man first, and a colonel second.

Otis had a great sense of humor. During a contact with North Vietnamese Army forces in Hoc Mon in 1968, shortly after taking command of the squadron, he landed near one of the C Troop tanks. The tank commander kept a pet monkey tied to the cupola on a leash. When Otis arrived, the commander was
standing next to the tank, and the monkey was perched on the cupola. Otis looked at the commander and then the monkey. He asked jokingly if the monkey was in command of the tank. The commander said it was not, and he wondered why Otis had asked. Otis said he heard a lot of squeaking when he listened to talk from this tank on the C Troop net. Now that he had seen the monkey near the cupola, he assumed it was the tank commander, and the squeaking on the net must have come from it.

The Tet Offensive. Except for a few keen observers, the Tet Offensive came as a surprise to U.S. forces. At first, it was thought to be a diversionary action before a major North Vietnamese offensive in the Khe Sanh area along the demilitarized zone. Instead, the action was a carefully planned country-wide offensive including both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units. When Otis was ordered to respond to enemy contact near the southwest corner of Tan Son Nhut Air Base, he had no idea of the magnitude of the carefully planned North Vietnamese attack, nor did the major U.S. and Vietnamese commands. The air base was one of five major facilities targeted in the Saigon area. In their road security mission, elements of Otis’ cavalry squadron still were distributed at key points along the 50 miles from the southwest portion of Saigon north to Tay Ninh.

When Otis received the order to deploy the squadron south, only two platoons of C Troop along with D Troop (the air cavalry unit) were available at Cu Chi, but there was initially nothing to indicate the attack on the air base was anything more than a hit-and-run raid by a small guerrilla unit. However, the enemy force attacking Tan Son Nhut numbered some 2,665 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army soldiers. The small but powerful force from 3-4 Cavalry charged head-on into the lead elements of a major offensive.

The battle that followed remains a testament to the bravery and courage of Otis and the troops assigned to 3-4 Cavalry. The commander of C Troop led the way. Many awards for valor were presented afterward. C Troop took the heaviest toll as thousands of green tracers, along with a multitude of rocket-propelled grenades, hit the men and armored vehicles making contact at the point of the penetration at the air base. Otis quickly took command of the entire battle in the Tan Son Nhut area.

As B Troop joined the fight at a critical time of the engagement, Otis recommended to its commander that he maneuver the troop to hit the attacking enemy from the flank. In his notes, the troop commander recounted that Otis routinely would tell subordinate commanders that he recommended certain actions—rather than directed them. Otis left the detailed decisions to his subordinate commanders, allowing them the flexibility to modify the plans on the fly if they found it necessary.

According to verbal accounts of soldiers who were in the combat zone, Otis’ helicopters were shot down as many as seven times. A specialist who was with him when a helicopter crash landed tells of Otis stepping out of the broken aircraft in the midst of the ongoing battle with bullets flying left and right. He walked a few yards away and waited for the next bird to pick him up. He remained cool and calm, as if he was in New York City waiting for a taxi. Miraculously, he was able to walk away from these damaged aircraft without serious injuries.

During the Tet Offensive, Otis often was flying a few hundred feet above his troops. He arranged resupply of ammunition to the embattled C Troop and evacuated the wounded in his helicopter. He stayed in the midst of the battle from the beginning to the end. Four of his aircraft were downed during the battle for Saigon. A private seriously wounded during the battle referred to Otis as a problem-solving, decision-making, loyal, and brawling lieutenant colonel.

Despite his genuine concern for individual soldiers, Otis was no pushover. An event during the battle for Tan Son Nhut Air Base illustrates how assertive he could be. The battle was growing larger, and reinforcements began to arrive. The senior commander, a full colonel, called by radio to say that he was an O-6, Otis was only an O-5, and that Otis had to provide a situation report so the colonel could take control of the field. Otis replied that he would not relinquish control of the field until the battle was over. He said the colonel was in support of his unit. The colonel hesitated and then agreed, asking where Otis wanted the incoming troops.

A farewell. Glenn Otis first was wounded 31 January 1968 during the Tet Offensive. He was wounded again in May and medically evacuated. He wrote a farewell letter to the members of the squadron in June. Although he claimed he did not want the letter to drip
with sentiment and nostalgia, a certain amount of sentiment was apparent. He expressed the great respect he had for his troops. He wrote that a piece of him always would be with the “3-4 horse,” and not the piece that Charlie got. He said he never would forget some of the battles and the hard times they went through together.

Enduring Character

After the war, the squadron held reunions every two years. Otis attended when he could, even after being promoted to general officer. The troopers found him a fascinating storyteller as well as a good listener. Otis seemed to remember every one of his soldiers, living or dead. He corresponded with several and helped them and their families when he could. For instance, he wrote a letter to support the application of a former soldier’s son to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. In later years, Otis continued to pursue the award of the Medal of Honor to Dwight Birdwell, a Native American who had played a heroic role in the battle for Tan Son Nhut.

Mutual respect. Throughout his life, Otis was known to respect the whole person and overlook differences. For example, a junior officer who fought alongside Otis during the battle for Saigon later became an avid antiwar demonstrator. Their friendship and mutual respect endured nonetheless. One of his former captains said that to serve under his command was a once-in-a-lifetime privilege.

As a soldier and in retirement, Glenn Otis needed no special paraphernalia, no grenades hanging from his belt, no crushed hat, no pearl-handled pistols, no dog on a leash, no smoking pipe, no dangling cigar. People who met him could tell he was a giant of a man, a true leader of men. Glenn Otis was a person of character.

Timeless leadership. As I reflected upon my quest to find out what was so special about Glenn Otis as a leader, it brought me back to my first meeting with him. The answer was right there in front of me. There he was, standing quietly alone; a humble and thoughtful man, openly friendly to a complete stranger. He connected with his officers and soldiers similarly. His soldiers did not feel they worked for him but that they worked with him. They felt Otis talked with them rather than to them. His sincerity, humility, and a real caring for his subordinates were the qualities that set Glenn Otis far above his contemporaries. His example of effective leadership is timeless.

Conclusion

Many leaders are respected. There is a distinction, however, between respect and reverence. In the Army, showing respect to leaders is a matter of obligation. Soldiers show respect by deference, courtesy, and obedience. Reverence, on the other hand, is respect earned. Soldiers who come to revere a leader show their respect through veneration. Glenn Otis was, and still is, revered by his troopers.

When I contacted the surviving members of the 3-4 Cavalry, I was surprised how often they said they loved their commander. This is rather unusual coming from a diverse bunch of rough, tough men, many of whom grew up during the 1960s in run-down neighborhoods or in poor, backcountry towns where survival was a challenge and authority was not well received.

Character does far more than help a leader “determine what is right” and “do what is appropriate,” as written in ADRP 6-22. The story of Glenn Otis shows how a leader of character can inspire men not only on the battlefield, but throughout their lives.

NOTES


2. I want to thank members of 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, without whose help I could not have written this paper: Dwight W. Birdwell, Thomas Fleming, Rolland Fletcher, Jimmy Greer, Jerry Headley, Oliver Jones, Ralph Martinez, Malcom Otis, Jim Ross, William E. Shaffer, and Robert Sevene. The surviving members of 3-4 Cavalry who contributed information consistently expressed their reverence and love for their former commander.

Lt. Col. Kevin D. Stringer, U.S. Army Reserve

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History has limitations as a guiding signpost, however, for although it can show us the right direction, it does not give detailed information about the road conditions. But its negative value as a warning sign is more definite. History can show us what to avoid, even if it does not teach us what to do by showing the most common mistakes that mankind is apt to make and to repeat.

–Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Nathaniel Young (standing), a military intelligence advisor, conducts an after-action review following low-level voice intercept training with Afghan National Army soldiers near Forward Operating Base Lightning, Paktia Province, Afghanistan, 9 December 2012. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Aaron Ricca, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)
Questions about the long-term viability of the Afghan government and its ability to resist Taliban incursions are becoming more serious in light of the quickly declining number of U.S. and international troops in that country. Insecurity in Afghanistan stems from numerous factors, including the future of the bilateral security agreement with the United States, the results of the April 2014 presidential election, and potential foreign policy actions of states such as Pakistan, India, China, and Iran in 2015 and beyond. American policymakers and senior military officers are united in their wish to ensure the survival of the Afghan regime beyond 2014. Yet, there is currently no consensus on the policies that would help achieve success.

To develop guidance and to identify actions U.S. strategy should avoid, academics, experts, and policymakers sometimes compare the drawdown in Afghanistan to the U.S. withdrawals from Iraq and Vietnam. This article offers the view that a more helpful analogy for Afghanistan would be the U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia in the 1970s.

Although the situation and the cultural context in Cambodia in the 1970s and those in Afghanistan today are not identical, there are certain key similarities. A careful analysis of Cambodia’s five-year civil war and eventual collapse—focusing on 1973 to 1975, when the United States drastically reduced its support—illustrates what may be a sure path to failure in Afghanistan. Conversely, a study of Vietnam-era policy toward Cambodia may help inform policies to make Afghanistan succeed.

In short, the circumstances contributing to the collapse of the Cambodian regime in 1975 suggest that U.S. policy for Afghanistan should avoid a complete withdrawal of U.S. military advisors and troops (known as the zero option), as well as a reduction to little or no U.S. funding and advising for the Afghanistan government or military. Without sustained U.S. aid and military advising, Afghanistan is likely to go the way of Cambodia. Therefore, if the United States settles upon a policy intended to enable the resilience, stability, and long-term survival of Afghanistan’s regime after 2014, that policy must include, at a minimum, a strong commitment to provide U.S. military advisors and funding for its government and military for the next decade.

A general similarity between the situations in Cambodia and Afghanistan is the continued, but declining, provision of U.S. military and financial support to a fragile central government after a major inflection point (a turning point that results in a dramatic change). For the Cambodians, this inflection point was the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. For the Afghans, the change began with the ongoing drawdown in 2014.

In the case of Cambodia, the central government faced a highly motivated, ideologically based enemy
that had sanctuary and refitting opportunities in neighboring Vietnam. The government in Phnom Penh (the capital city of Cambodia) controlled the major population centers, but large swaths of Cambodia fell under insurgent control. In fact, as Cambodia’s Khmer Republic lost more and more territory, citizens jokingly referred to Prime Minister Lon Nol as the mayor of Phnom Penh.2

Similarly, the Afghan government confronts the religiously motivated Taliban insurgency that uses sanctuaries in Pakistan. This refuge gives them a place to regenerate, resupply, and recruit. According to Robert M. Cassidy, Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan allow the Taliban to protect its “senior leadership and the insurgency’s regenerative potential—thus protracting the war to exhaust the political will of the coalition.”3 Additionally, while Afghan forces currently retain control of most major cities and critical areas, the insurgency persists in several regions, and Taliban control has the potential to expand. Moreover, in similarity to Lon Nol, opponents deride President Hamid Karzai as the mayor of Kabul; his successor could well inherit this title if the situation were to deteriorate post-2014.

In the next section, this article sketches the historical features of the Cambodian conflict in the early 1970s that are relevant to the current situation in Afghanistan. Then, it discusses the capabilities and weaknesses of the Cambodian army (Forces Armées Nationales Khmères, known as FANK) that were similar to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) today—including the role of U.S. aid and advising. Finally, it offers some thoughts on the application of the Cambodian historical case study to the situation in Afghanistan.

Cambodia in the Early 1970s

Unrest among the Khmer people led to a coup that placed Lt. Gen. Lon Nol as head of the Cambodian government in 1970. The next five years saw a full-scale civil war accompanied by massive U.S. bombing. Writer Ira A. Hunt Jr. describes how the conflict in Vietnam fueled the war in Cambodia.4 In 1970, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had been violating Cambodian territory at will. It then created Khmer communist forces to overthrow the Lon Nol regime. The war ended with the defeat of Lon Nol’s Khmer Republic, which had been supported by the United States, in 1975.5

After assuming power, Lon Nol pledged to pursue a neutral course in Southeast Asia as long as the Vietnamese communists withdrew from Cambodian territory. To implement this policy, he closed off a critical port and several supply routes that imperiled North Vietnamese sanctuaries in the Cambodia-South Vietnam border region. The NVA countered and advanced toward Phnom Penh.6

Saving the endangered Lon Nol regime became one of President Richard Nixon’s motivations for ordering the invasion of Cambodia on 30 April 1970. Nixon also hoped to destroy the communist military headquarters for South Vietnam, thought to be located inside Cambodia, and to neutralize the Vietnamese sanctuaries so the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam could proceed without threatening the stability of the Saigon regime. However, the introduction...
of 31,000 U.S. and 43,000 South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia quickly stripped the Lon Nol regime of its neutralist veneer. The initial consequences of the Cambodian incursion were favorable. Overall enemy offensive plans were set back, Cambodian supply lines were denied to Hanoi, and Phnom Penh and the Lon Nol regime appeared safe for the time being. Yet, while the NVA retreated, abandoned huge base areas, and decreased its pressure on the FANK, the success was short-lived.

Fearing further widening of U.S. involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict, the U.S. Congress refused to authorize retaining U.S. ground forces in Cambodia, forbade the use of combat advisors, limited U.S. military aid, and in 1972 placed severe restrictions on the number of U.S. in-country military personnel. The Khmer Republic had become, by the completion of the Peace Accords in neighboring Vietnam in 1973, a sickly dependent of the United States. In 1974, U.S. financial aid exceeded the total Cambodian national budget for 1969. Unfortunately, this policy did not permit sufficient U.S. personnel to ensure the money would be well spent.

**Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) Leadership, Logistics, and Airpower Capabilities**

Operationally, the condition of officer leadership, logistics, and airpower within the FANK led to disastrous consequences—themes that are similar to the current criticism of the ANSF. The insurgent Khmer Communist force had a much higher quality of combat leadership than the FANK. The Khmer peasant soldiers fighting for the communists were sturdy individuals who performed well and even heroically when properly led. In contrast, poor officer leadership, low morale, and high levels of troop desertion hampered the FANK’s combat performance. Additionally, the officer corps was corrupt and cronyism endemic to the force. Furthermore, differences in the effectiveness between territorial and intervention battalions plagued combat readiness.

While the FANK’s performance was certainly disconcerting, the few U.S. military personnel assigned did make some progress in training them. However, the shortage of advisors precluded significant improvements in FANK capabilities. While the U.S. Congress was relatively generous with military advisors to the U.S. defense attaché in Saigon, it provided few advisors for Cambodia. The organization known as the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, was limited to 74 advisory and program personnel in Cambodia and 15 in Thailand. The defense attaché in Phnom Penh supplemented this effort with 17 personnel. These were meager numbers to improve a Cambodian army that had 224,000 personnel.

By mid-1972, U.S. aid to the Cambodian military had reached about $400 million—equal to $2,000 for every soldier, if the official personnel counts were accurate. Nonetheless, the support had done little apparent good. Logistical support continued to be hampered by inefficiencies in the FANK system and by insufficient advising. By 1975, despite $1 billion in U.S. aid and the efforts of the few U.S. military officers attached to the
American embassy, the FANK still had not remedied its fundamental logistical weaknesses.\(^{15}\) The army remained road-bound because it had no ration system and could not operate away from village markets.\(^{16}\) While its tactics had improved slightly, a proper supply system still was lacking.

One example of this supply issue was ammunition. The FANK fired about as much artillery ammunition as the entire South Vietnamese army—which was at least five times as large and was defending a much larger territory against an enemy that was better armed and several times bigger than the Khmer Communist army. Even an inexpert correspondent could see that the Cambodian commanders habitually used firepower to compensate for tactical and leadership deficiencies. As an official assessment by U.S. officers in Phnom Penh early in 1975 stated, “The Khmer Armed Forces [FANK] depend on firepower to win.”\(^ {17}\) Yet, the FANK’s logistical system for feeding this demand was inadequate.

The U.S. investment in Cambodia from 1970 to 1975 was unsuccessful for several reasons that included poor policies and administration as well as terminating support when Cambodian forces were not yet ready to defend their nation. If the United States had provided adequately funded, staffed, designed, and administered U.S. military aid programs starting in 1973 and continued these over the necessary duration, perhaps it could have enabled the FANK’s—and the government’s—survival after the Paris Peace Accords. However, the U.S. Congress progressively closed the aid spigot that funded the ammunition and other supplies.

In December 1974, Congress enacted an effective ceiling of $275 million on military aid for 1975, which included $200 million in appropriated funds and authority to use up to $75 million worth of materiel already in Defense Department stocks. This represented about $75 million less than the previous year’s program.\(^ {18}\) By spring 1975, U.S. funding dried up; in April the FANK succumbed as it used its last rounds and flight hours in fighting the Khmer communists.

A bright spot for Cambodia was the Khmer National Air Force. From its almost virtual destruction on the ground by an NVA sapper attack in January 1971, the resurrected air force grew in competence and capability until its demise in 1975.\(^ {19}\) The U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia, designed the force structure of the Khmer National Air Force mainly for counterinsurgency missions: close air support, resupply, and command and control. With an operational strength of 10,000 in January 1975, the Khmer National Air Force had 131 aircraft, of which 101 were operationally ready. That month it flew a remarkable 7,208 sorties, as compared to 5,134 sorties in January 1974. Its operational ready rate for the T-28 aircraft was 79 percent, compared to the U.S. Air Force standard of 71 percent.\(^ {20}\)

Reports from the U.S. defense attaché judged the caliber of the Cambodian pilots as quickly approaching the skill level of their Thai and South Vietnamese counterparts.\(^ {21}\) When its end came on 17 April 1975, the Khmer National Air Force was the last effective fighting force in Cambodia, and its determined resistance contrasted sharply with the South Vietnamese air force’s almost total capitulation. Reasons for its effectiveness included good leadership and greater access to U.S.
advisory and support efforts based out of Thailand.  

**Afghanistan After 2014**

The history of Cambodia provides a case study in the adverse effect a similar zero option might have in Afghanistan. Comparative analysis lends credence to the argument for a vigorous post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission, with continued funding for the ANSF through a bilateral security agreement with the United States, and the sustained financial support of the U.S. Congress for several years.  

Cassidy reports that as of Spring 2014, qualitatively and quantitatively, the Afghan security forces have improved; they have taken a genuine lead for combat operations. However, the work remains unfinished, and it is unlikely that Afghanistan can complete its development without help. According to International Security Assistance Force commander Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr., “they still need assistance in maturing the systems, the processes and the institutions necessary to support a modern national army and police force.” The U.S. commitment to funding and advisors should aim at strengthening the Afghan ministries and corps that can sustain the military and police in the long term.

As did the FANK in the 1970s, the ANSF still needs support for developing officer leadership, operational-strategic logistics, and aviation capabilities. Developing the logistics capability of the ANSF remains of critical importance. Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson, commander of the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, stated in a 20 March 2014 phone interview with the *Army Times*, “The real issue [in Afghanistan] is getting a supply system in place where they generate requirements based on what happens to their vehicles, their weapons, their radios. That system doesn’t exist. Right now things are bought on a bulk predictive model.”

Similarly, during a 12 March 2014 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Dunford warned of inevitable deterioration in Afghanistan without continued support, saying that ANSF units would run out of fuel, base systems would become less operable, spare parts for vehicles would become unavailable, and readiness and operational reach would decrease. Moreover, the International Security Assistance Force would not be able to complete its work with the land or air forces; work with the air force needs two years or more.

When asked by the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 March 2014 about the likely effects of a zero option in Afghanistan, head of U.S. Central Command Gen. Lloyd Austin said, “I think it [a zero option] would be problematic. It would be bad for the country of Afghanistan, as a whole. I think that, without our fiscal support, and certainly without our mentorship, we would see, immediately, a much less effective Afghan National Security Force. Over the long term, we could possibly see a fracturing of that force.”

**Conclusion**

To say the failure in Cambodia was due only to a withdrawal of financial support would be an oversimplification. Success in Cambodia would have required much more than just money—for much longer than
just five years. To some extent, the United States appears to have learned from its mistakes; its policy in Afghanistan has been more effective and better implemented than policy in Cambodia between 1970 and 1975.

Moreover, in contrast to the FANK in 1975, the ANSF has been able to stand up to the insurgency throughout most of Afghanistan’s sovereign territory. However, as Cambodia did in 1975, the ANSF will need continued advising as well as financial support for several more years if it is to create sustainable and sufficient leadership, logistics, and air force capabilities.

Without the right kind of support from the United States, for the right length of time, Afghanistan after 2014 could meet the same fate as Cambodia in 1975. After the United States ceased supporting Cambodia, the central government first lost the countryside, then the supply routes, and finally the strategic urban centers. The ultimate outcome was regime collapse and national tragedy. This does not have to happen in Afghanistan.

Notes


5. Ablin and Hood, xv.


7. Ablin and Hood, xv, xxv.


9. Ibid., 172-173.

10. Ablin and Hood, xxxi.


15. Ibid., 247.

16. Ibid., 208.

17. Ibid., 247, 255.

18. Ibid.


Transformational Stories

How the Weekend Safety Brief Can Be a Forum for the Professional Military Ethic

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Now all you recruits [sic] what’s drafted to-day,
You shut up your rag-box an’ ’ark to my lay,
An’ I’ll sing you a soldier as far as I may:
A soldier what’s fit for a soldier.
—Rudyard Kipling

Today’s Army is well on its way to codifying a professional military ethic (PME) that will define our service and ensure that we retain our nation’s trust, but a difficulty remains in translating this high ideal to the individual soldier.\(^1\) Discussions in the past have often highlighted a need to successfully articulate and decipher the PME from our learning institutions to the frontline “strategic corporal” in order to have an impact on our organizational success.\(^2\) The implied transformation from citizens into soldiers into ethical leaders will take place in a multitude of forums from institutional settings to professional mentorship, and this article cannot cover them all. Instead, let us turn our focus to one of the most readily adapted rituals we have in our service.

Friday afternoons across the Army, commanders and their senior NCOs face their formations in the perfect setting for a discussion of the PME—the weekend safety brief. Sadly, because of a long-standing practice, the large majority of these opportunities end up wasted as leaders attempt to check the block with unmemorable maxims for soldiers’ immediate behavior. This usually comes in the form of a list of things soldiers should do and things soldiers should avoid. This custom could accomplish much more if we designed it to focus beyond this simple formality and began to shift soldiers closer to a commitment to the Army values using memorable engagement.

Adopting a model of transformational stories from recent business literature will provide leaders with a method that allows them to truly engage soldiers in discussions about the PME while continuing to attack the immediate concerns that the weekend safety brief should address. In lieu of the customary mode for these safety briefings, this article details a better technique for ensuring a lasting impact on our soldiers. That method is to communicate a vision through memorable stories.
Articulating a Professional Military Ethic

Before we look at how to go about retooling the weekend safety brief, it is vital to show that a change will not be adverse to good order and discipline in the short term. To accomplish this reassurance, it is first necessary to determine that there is a genuine imperative to instill in our soldiers a PME and that the Army values are an acceptable tool for the job. Second, it is relevant to demonstrate that shifting to an Army values focus will build stronger soldiers who are more able to handle the stresses of combat and day-to-day life. Finally, we will show that shifting soldiers from compliance to Army values-commitment is a realistic framework for modifying the originally targeted unsafe behavior. In the end, leaders must still effect improved off-duty judgment within their formations.

Consider for a moment an expansion on the definition of leadership from ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Under the heading of “Improve the Organization,” the publication expounds, “Improving is an act of stewardship, striving to create effective, efficient organizations.”3 Leaders have a responsibility as stewards of the military service to impart upon their soldiers the established values of our service. This challenge is not merely a matter of moving soldiers from compliance to commitment, but of ensuring that they understand the values to which they are committed.4 Researchers have demonstrated that leaders cannot fully accomplish an improvement of the ethics of subordinates by simply demonstrating ethical leadership. These principles must additionally be actively promoted through an ongoing dialogue in public and private settings.5

Likewise, in developing “soldiers with military competence and moral character,” leaders need to have at their disposal a standard set of principles-in-virtue from which to draw their lessons.6 The literature on the PME provides a broad set of creedal and philosophical starting points.7 Although legitimate recommendations for expansion of the Army values exist, the list represented by the acronym LDRSHIP (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage) has significant value as a starting point for expressing a PME to our soldiers.8 The seven values taught to every soldier at basic training capture “important elements of the Army ethic” and provide talking points for leaders initially engaging soldiers’ moral stance.9

Engaging soldiers on ethics goes much further than a simple indoctrination into the profession or behavior modification on and off duty. Changes to Warrior Resiliency Training developed to aid soldiers in post-traumatic growth indicate “Army values, warrior ethos, and leadership are critical foundations of Army resiliency training that can be skillfully integrated into a model promoting internal combat stress control.”10 This kind of development indicates that the greater the foundation a soldier has in moral understanding, the more likely they are to be able to handle combat stress. Likewise, an individual with a stronger moral compass is less likely to engage in behaviors that result in psychologically damaging guilt and regret. Overall, this is an area that deserves more research but leaders cannot dismiss the demonstrated benefits that the Army values have had as an ingredient in our warrior resiliency training.

Of course, no leader should accept a recommendation to change the weekend safety brief to a new form if the originally targeted behavior is not being addressed and corrected. Weekend safety briefs, after all, are implemented to remind soldiers not to “embarrass the regiment,” as the expression goes. These concerns are not unreasonable, but a deeper examination of theories of leadership influence might demonstrate that the goal to develop soldiers who understand the PME and the goal to keep them off Monday morning’s blotter report are not mutually exclusive.

In Dr. Gene Klann’s essay, “The Application of Power and Influence in Organizational Leadership,” a central theme is the leader’s responsibility to shift subordinates from a point of mere compliance to a point of core commitment.11 These ideas are usually displayed in diagrams with compliance on the left and commitment on the right so we might say for our discussion that we are “shifting soldiers to the right on the values spectrum.”12 The implication of successfully shifting soldiers to the right is that the foundation of their behavior will move away from requiring “hard power” motivation. Instead, soldiers committed to their own standing in a profession will be motivated by an “affiliation” with the Army and the organization.

Under a framework in which soldiers become more interested in their own role as members of the profession, the logical consequence is that the originally targeted immature and negative behavior will become less
appealing or relevant. This shift meets leadership expectations of "millennials." Research has shown, "one of the best ways to keep them [millennials] engaged is to communicate a large vision, worthy of their devotion, and then set high expectations." Communicating a PME, instead of a series of rules for your weekend, would appeal to millennials.

The weekend safety brief is a valid forum for discussions about the PME. Shifting to that topic is likely to have a positive impact on the good order and discipline of the organizations that make such a change. We also need a better method of delivery to make such a safety briefing stick with the target audience.

The New Weekend Safety Brief

This conversation begins by describing what we have been doing and why that is generally an ineffective method. The next objective is to identify exactly what we want to accomplish through the weekend safety brief. To close, we will examine a new method for making soldiers more likely to do the right thing. In their 2007 book, Made to Stick: Why Some Ideas Survive and Others Die, authors Chip and Dan Heath offer a helpful model with which we will be able to improve our organizations.

To be intellectually honest, proving that the current mode of weekend safety brief is a failed method runs into a small challenge since there is no body of literature documenting the topics and formats of weekend safety briefs or any scientific data available with which to measure their effectiveness. That said, most leaders in the Army can turn to their own anecdotal evidence and experience to inform a discussion about the value of current techniques. Essentially, the reader is asked to accept this argument even though a lack of available records places it in the category of a planning assumption.

Chip and Dan Heath, in a later book, Switch: How to Change Things When Change is Hard, describe a common human situation where the obstacle to change can best be described by the confession, “I know what I should be doing, but I’m not doing it.” The Heath brothers, consider this a problem that deals with conscious awareness, but a lack of drive on the emotional side. Our subordinates often know what to do and may even believe that they should do it. The problem is that they are not motivated enough to do it. The weekend safety brief that consists of a list of do’s and don’ts speaks only to the part of the human brain that already knows not to drink and drive or commit domestic violence. The problem is that it fails to address the part of the brain that is going to do something about it. In order to motivate soldiers on that level, we must transform the weekend safety brief into something else entirely.

Today’s target recruit is a fairly well-adjusted member of society between the ages of 17 and 24. The drinking age has been 21 in all 50 states longer than anyone in the target range has been alive. For the entire lives of this demographic, driving drunk has also been against the law, and it was never legal to skip wearing a seatbelt in any U.S. state. A Friday afternoon reminder of what is illegal in our society is not going to be a surprise to any of our soldiers. They do not need a weekly reminder of what the rules are. Instead, leaders need to broaden soldiers’ interest in the problem and involve them in the solution.

Additionally, the topics leaders address in these settings often represent a laundry list of the problems the organization has most recently suffered. Educators will confess they succumb to a similar problem. Frequent education gaps are being revealed as “pressure around state-mandated exams pushes some teachers to ‘teach to the test.’” When leaders simply chastise their soldiers to avoid a set of behaviors that those soldiers already know they should be avoiding, those leaders are in essence “teaching to the test” and failing to provide any leadership that will result in a lasting improvement in the organization. Transforming the weekend safety brief shifts the topic from a lecture aimed at behaviors soldiers already know are undesirable to a discussion that motivates them to act in a positive manner on that knowledge.

In order to motivate soldiers to live by the Army values, we must renovate our method and change our topic for the weekend safety brief. This brings us to the model of transformational stories. The Heath brothers’ book Made to Stick offers a framework for engaging and motivating people in a manner that is more likely to endure. The model they propose is built around the acronym SUCCESs. Their mnemonic for an idea that is “made to stick” describes “a simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional story” which will be more memorable and more readily applied.
Simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional stories; Heath and Heath recommend them for everything from organizational change, to advertising, to going viral on the internet. Our purpose here is a narrow slice of organizational change aimed at transforming our soldiers by shifting them to the right on the values spectrum. In order to communicate all of these concepts more expediently, we will use the name transformational stories. These transformational stories designed to specifically engage our soldiers and shift their values will educate the formation in what it means to live the Army values as well as cover the need to make junior soldiers think about personal responsibility in their off-duty environment.

“Simple” stories work with human memory because our soldiers are more likely to pay attention to the things they understand. Focus groups organized to develop children’s programming have discovered that, despite common assumptions, children stop listening when they stop understanding. Kids tune in, even to boring portions of educational television, when they understand the message.23 This is not to say that our soldiers are children but rather that keeping our messages understandable, even as we delve into the PME, is critical to ensuring that soldiers remain engaged in the discussion.

The next principle from Heath and Heath is “unexpected” because a degree of surprise captures the attention of the audience. The Heath brothers further illustrate that an identified gap in knowledge causes the human brain to retain interest long after the discussion ends.24 This is why the teaser keeps some people from flipping the channel during television commercials. This does not mean that every transformational story has to contain a twist or a shocker, but when it is possible to add an element of surprise, leaders will do a better job of engaging subordinates.

“Concreteness” has long been a proven method for clarifying ideas to the audience. In this regard, we should seek out visual aids and hands-on demonstrations of the PME. The idea of an object lesson in a sermon is incredibly popular for this same made-to-stick reason. A Google search for the phrase “object lesson” or “concrete example” will yield hundreds of results.25

The topic of PME does not automatically make a weekend safety brief credible. Bear in mind that defining exactly what PME means is an ongoing discussion across the Army. Credibility in the realms of ethics and morality may be one of our greater challenges in the current environment of ethical diversity.26 Additionally, the speaker’s credibility in both personal and professional life affects the message. The Army values, because of their pervasive acceptance, make the best platform for a credible discussion of PME, while the credibility of the speaker is a much larger topic best left for another leadership article.

Continuing with the SUCCESs mnemonic, “emotions” are a key link to memory and lasting behavioral change.27 (If emotional displays in front of a formation do not sound like your strong point, bear in mind that stoicism and the warrior ethos are also displays of emotion.)28 A main point the Heath brothers convey in both of their books is that there is a strong connection between emotions and willingness to act.29 Additionally, the chemical and physiological connection between emotion and memory is fairly well established.30 Accessing the endorphin-memory link may be
as easy as holding your brief immediately following an esprit-de-corps unit run.

Simple, unexpected, concrete, credible, emotional, and finally, "stories"—we were born to remember a narrative, but humans must work to remember a list.31 Professional competitive "memory champions" actually convert anything they want to remember (even random lists of numbers or decks of playing cards) into a "memory palace," a kind of story, in order to remember so many inane details.32 When we hear a well-told narrative, there is a part of our brain that walks through the story with the teller, and doing that aids understanding and retention.33

It is through this last point, through the telling of stories, that we are making the major success-driving change in our weekend safety brief format. The story and the object lesson become our starting point for engaging subordinates in a common vision of the Army values.

**Telling Transformational Stories**

Going back to the beginning of this article, imagine a new Friday. The unit finishes a motivational morning run and while soldiers' hearts are still pumping hard the commander calls them all into an informal "horseshoe" formation. He tells them he is not going to insult their intelligence by lecturing them to do the right thing over the weekend. They already know what the right thing is, and he expects them to do it.

Instead, he wants to talk to them about respect. It is simple because they already have a foundation for what respect is. Discussing respect is also credible because it is an Army value. He tells them about his neighbor who is a blind man with a service dog. That is unexpected, and because the soldiers realize there is a gap in their knowledge, their natural curiosity is piqued.

"The other day I saw him leave home to go for a walk, and when he got about 100 meters from his house, there was a car parked across the sidewalk in someone's driveway." He is drawing them in to the challenge his neighbor is about to face. "The dog stopped him short of the car but, having no idea why, my neighbor tried to keep the dog moving. The dog stopped him three times and he ended up yelling at the poor dog before running into the car himself."34

Soldiers might be wondering where this is going, but none of them have tuned out. The commander continues, "I think there's a lesson about respect we can learn from what happened to my neighbor." He goes on to make a connection between the lack of trust the blind man had for his service dog when something unexpected happened and a young soldier who disregards the advice of a wise friend or an NCO.

"I want you to imagine your friend is trying to steer you clear from a bad decision this weekend. What are you going to do? Are you going to do the right thing? Or are you going to walk smack-dab into a parked car?" He has placed them inside the narrative now, and he starts to shift them toward commitment. "If you think respect is simply giving your NCOs what's due, you are just beginning to uncover the Army values … ."

This commander has successfully initiated a dialogue through a transformational story. When he finishes the discussion after a few more points about respect, he has not told them not to drink and drive because they already know not to. On a very personal level, he has reminded them that their off-duty behavior is part of who they are and that he has high expectations of that behavior.35

Every soldier will not walk away from that formation instantly transformed and completely committed to the Army values, but they will walk away shifted a little bit more to the right on the spectrum from compliance to commitment. Soldiers who are engaged through a SUCCEs-based series of transformational stories may still occasionally hit the blotter report, but, despite that, leaders will instill in their soldiers something the old-style weekend safety brief does not: the emotionally based personal drive to act. Those soldiers will be more likely to become committed to the professional military ethic sooner in their careers than others will.

The simplest thing about this concept is that leaders who have themselves shifted from compliance to commitment to the PME carry with them the stories that brought them to that point. Without seeking out a cleverly contrived anecdote or object lesson, most leaders are capable of relaying to soldiers what it means to be a practitioner of the Army values from their own experience and the experiences of those around them. Additionally, leaders who choose to adopt this method will find themselves approached by soldiers who are in the process of shifting to the right with their own stories to tell.

Changing the weekend safety brief into a weekly forum to discuss the PME will build the organization
we have been seeking through the previous format by targeting the root cause of a need to shift soldiers from compliance to commitment. Redesigning the format of what is said from the notorious list of do’s and don’ts into transformational stories will improve the organization because leaders will be using researched methods to ensure that these ideas stick with our soldiers once they get past the parking lot. The following two examples illustrate the type of transformational stories discussed in this article.

**Comparing Apples to Oranges: An Object Lesson in Integrity**

We often hear the phrase, “you’re comparing apples to oranges,” as if it cannot be done; but have you ever tried it? On the outside, apples and oranges are both baseball-sized round fruit. Apples are smooth and shiny while oranges are bumpy. However, cut them open and they are very different. The apple is consistent, while the orange is segmented into several pieces. Looking further, we discover that the apple has a core while each orange segment is focused on one or two seeds.

Do you find that your life is segmented or is it consistent? Do you do the right thing all day while you are in uniform but put on a different personality when you are at home? Do you act right at work and then act out when you are at the club? You might be segmented like the orange. In this analogy, we would be more professional in our lives if we were consistent.

The Army value integrity is about more than just honesty. It is about being consistent between our professional selves and our personal selves. The word integrity comes from the same root word as the word “integer,” the word for a whole number. So if we think about it, integrity has something to do with your whole life, being a whole person. Changing your behavior depending on your setting might be an indicator of poor integrity.

The main difference between the apple and the orange is that the apple has a core to focus on so it is consistent, while the orange has several separate seeds. We have a core—we have the Army values to provide a point of focus and make us more consistent like the apple.\(^36\)

**It Is the Soldier: Loyalty and the Emotions of a Patriot**

Transformational stories do not have to be incredibly complicated, or even always stories in the strictest sense. One of the quietest weekends I ever had while commanding in Korea was after reading this poem to the formation:

**It Is The Soldier**

It is the Soldier, not the minister
Who has given us freedom of religion.

It is the Soldier, not the reporter
Who has given us freedom of the press.

It is the Soldier, not the poet,
Who has given us freedom of speech.

It is the Soldier, not the campus organizer,
Who has given us freedom to protest.

It is the soldier, not the lawyer,
Who has given us the right to a fair trial.

It is the Soldier, not the politician,
Who has given us the right to vote.

It is the Soldier who salutes the flag,
Who serves beneath the flag,
And whose coffin is draped by the flag,
Who allows the protester the right to burn the flag.

*(Reproduced with permission of Charles M. Province, copyright 1970, 2010.)*

After reading this poem I pulled my American flag from the right shoulder of my ACUs and held it aloft to the formation. I said, “This is an inspectable item this weekend. Stick it in your pocket before you go out, and every time you are about to do something questionable, look at that flag and ponder whether someone died so you could be free to do that.” My first sergeant followed up with a brief discussion about loyalty, and everyone left with something memorable.
Notes

**Epigraph.** Rudyard Kipling, *Barrack-Room Ballads, Departmental Ditties, and Other Ballads and Verses: Two Volumes in One with Glossary* (New York: Alex Grosset and Company, 1899), 133.


7. A recommended starting point for the interested leader would be this publication. *Military Review* regularly publishes quality articles addressing the realm of leadership including a 2010 Special Edition on the *Center for the Army Profession and Ethic*, which includes many of the sources for this article.

8. Peter D. Fromm, “Warriors, the Army Ethos, and the Sacred Trust of Soldiers,” *Military Review, Special Edition: Center for the Army Profession and Ethic* (September 2010): 23. This article represents one of many authors considering changes to the Army values and the warrior ethos. In addition to asking some thought-provoking questions, this article contains several historical examples that could be used to design a more engaging weekend safety brief. See also Imiola and Cazier, 15.


11. Klann, 61-72. See also ADRP 6-22, chap. 6.

12. I must credit this phrase to my former commander and mentor in leadership, Col. (P) Bernie B. Banks. The word “right” is not intended to have any sort of political connotation.

13. “Millennials” is a name used by the popular media to identify persons born in the 1980s and 1990s, reaching young adulthood around the year 2000.


19. For a more robust list of facts that have always or never been true during millennials’ lives, it is worth occasionally perusing the Beloit College Mindset List. Beloit College publishes a list annually to help their professors understand the incoming freshmen class. Beloit College, *The Mindset List* (6 September 2012), http://www.beloit.edu/mindset/.


25. *Made to Stick* has a similarly accessible set of examples.


28. Jarrett, 34-35. Also see the Fromm article in *Military Review* referenced in note 9 to expand the reader’s understanding of the nuances found within many of the emotional and creedal charters we indicate here.


31. “Story” could easily be replaced with “narrative” since the point is less “once upon a time,” and more to draw the listener in to the message.


35. The reader may have noticed some of the principles of SUCCESs in this story about a commander and her organization. It was simple, concrete, and perhaps even unexpected. It may not be possible to hit all six points in every transformational story, but each one adds a layer of “stickiness.”

36. Although I have been using this object lesson in front of formations so long I have made it my own, I recall first hearing it at Flamingo Road Church in Cooper City, FL, around 2005 and will place the credit there.

**Acknowledgment:** I would like to thank Charles M. Province for permitting reproduction of his poem, “It Is The Soldier.”
The Importance of Teaching Followership in Professional Military Education


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Danny Miller coined the phrase *Icarus paradox* to describe how having a competitive advantage and superiority status can lead to an unforeseen failure of organizations and individuals that do not maintain situational awareness. Miller argues that people and organizations get caught in a vicious circle whereby “their victories and strengths so often seduce them into the excesses that cause their downfall.”

Miller describes how Icarus, according to Greek mythology, flew with a great pair of artificial wings made from wax and feathers by his father. Ignoring his father’s warning, he tried to fly close to the sun. As he neared the sun, his wings melted, causing him to fall to his death. The story of Icarus demonstrates that power and an overinflated sense of self-importance can blind people and organizations to their weaknesses and ultimately lead to their downfall.

Could a loyal subordinate have convinced Icarus to heed his father’s warning and fly at a safe level?

Subordinates must try to prevent their leaders from making wrong or unethical decisions that will cause them to fail. Effective and courageous followers will use *professional dissent* to challenge their leaders’ poor decisions. By understanding dynamic followership, military organizations can treat followership like a discipline and improve leader-follower culture.

**Army Senior Leader Issues**

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership*, describes a leadership and followership framework by saying that, “Effective organizations depend on the competence of respectful leaders and loyal followers. … Learning to be a good leader also needs to be associated with learning to be a good follower—learning loyalty, subordination, respect for superiors, and even when and how to lodge candid disagreement.” This statement emphasizes that everyone serves on a team as either a leader or a subordinate, and effective teams develop mutual trust and respect, recognize existing talents, and willingly contribute for the common good of the organization. Unfortunately, several senior-level Army officers who were on the fast-track to the top organizational jobs have violated the Army’s and the Nation’s trust. They failed in their careers by engaging in unethical or immoral behavior such as gross abuse of power, bigamy, extreme toxic leadership, and criminal acts.

These officers serve as fitting examples of the Icarus paradox: their successes as military officers led them to believe they were above reproach—a weakness that led to their downfall. The challenge for our Army is correcting our moral compass and eliminating this type of behavior to maintain the trust of the American people.

Army leadership cannot allow moral decrepitude to impair the profession. Senior leaders are exploring new methods and strategies to help all Army leaders recognize vulnerabilities and prevent missteps in order to maintain public respect and trust. The U.S. Army achieves credibility and legitimacy as a profession through trust from our society. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1, *The Army Profession*, states, “Professions earn and maintain their clients’ trust through effective and ethical application of expertise on behalf of the society they serve. Society determines whether the profession has earned the status of a noble profession.”
Importance of Followership

Calling and the autonomy that goes along with this status. ADRP 1 identifies five characteristics that leaders must uphold to maintain public trust: trust, military expertise, honorable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship of the profession. When senior officers fail in one of these areas, society’s trust in our Army erodes.

Another larger institutional challenge is apparent. If subordinates knew about the unethical decisions made by their leaders in recent events, why did they not counsel and guide their bosses to prevent them from failing? The Army must incorporate followership classes into professional military education courses to develop effective subordinates who are better prepared to prevent senior officers from making unethical decisions. Education accompanied by a culture shift will lead to informed, effective followership.

Characteristics of Military Service Education

In 1867, Gen. William Tecumsah Sherman, who assisted in founding the forerunner of the Command and General Staff College, described subordinate leadership by saying, “we have good corporals, some good sergeants, some good lieutenants and captains, and those are far more important than good generals.” Lt. Col. Sharon M. Latour and Lt. Col. Vicki J. Rast describe soldiers as simultaneously both leaders and followers from the day they enter military service, throughout their careers, and into retirement. Latour and Rast state that all Department of Defense educational curricula focus on teaching and developing leaders, but few of the military schools spend time developing effective follower cultures and skills. They claim the dominant military organizational culture encourages subordinates to adopt a follow me behavior through discipline and lawful orders. The research findings of Latour and Rast show that most teaching philosophies devalue followership in its contribution to warfighting. Latour and Rast conclude that the military services expend most of their resources educating a small fraction of their service members, communicating their value to the military institution,
and establishing career paths for a select few while ignoring the vast majority of subordinates in the military service. In the Department of the Army Fiscal Year 2015 Lieutenant Colonel Centralized Selection List-Command and Key Billet, published 30 April 2014, only 13 percent of lieutenant colonels were selected for battalion commands, which meant the other 87 percent would remain in subordinate staff positions. This promotion rate supports Latour and Rast’s thesis that the majority of military leadership educational classes are useful to only a small percentage of the force.

Moreover, the Army educational philosophy in entry-level officer and enlisted courses implies that by teaching soldiers to follow orders completely, they also learn how to become effective leaders. However, some challenges arise when some of those soldiers and junior officers become senior enlisted and field grade officers, and just following orders no longer is acceptable behavior. Further followership development must be implemented into the organizational culture to develop effective followers at those levels.

Followership Importance in Relation to Ethics

James McGregor Burns in 1979 wrote that “leadership is one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth.” Leadership and followership are complex fields of study. They are dependent on each other. There cannot be leaders without followers, and followers need a leader. If leaders fail because of unethical decisions, the subordinate staff officers should also be held responsible because they have a duty to be effective followers.

One of the most recognized authors on the topic of followership, Robert Earl Kelley, defines followership not as a subset of leadership but as an equal component to leadership. In his book, The Power of Followership, Kelley introduces a new followership model to describe different followership styles in relation to leadership models. According to Kelley, “the primary traits that produced the most effective followers in an organization were critical thinking and active participation.” Kelley proposes that an exemplary follower is an independent critical thinker who has learned to be a critical thinker through education and development. The exemplary follower is motivated, has intellect, is self-reliant, and is dedicated to achieving the mission of the organization. Critical thinking is learned behavior that must be accompanied with adequate reflection time. With this concept, the follower, or subordinate, must, as Kelley says, truly “not just follow orders without critical analysis and must participate with the superior for the good of the institution.”

Ira Chaleff, author of The Courageous Follower, is another key followership researcher. He uses the military to provide examples in his book of virtue ethics—examples such as German guards in concentration camps during World War II, and Lt. Calley and his platoon during the My Lai incident in Vietnam—to explain different levels of the leader-follower relationship.

Chaleff’s followership model emphasizes that selective rule breaking is a key attribute of a courageous follower. “It is not ethical to break rules for simple convenience or personal gain, but neither
is it ethical to comply with or enforce rules if they impede the accomplishment of the organization’s purpose, the organization’s values, or basic human decency." Followers must have the courage to oppose the boss when events require dissent for the good of the organization. Chaleff also emphasizes that organizations that have courageous followers will have no need for whistle blowers because the followers do their duty to prevent leaders from making unethical decisions. One of the key statements Chaleff makes is that, “proximity and courage are the critical variables in the prevention of the abuse of power.”

**Dissent in Followership**

The challenge for followers is approaching their superiors, looking them in the eye, and telling them that they disagree with a decision. The Army has some superiors who do not appreciate, acknowledge, or want to have anyone challenge their authority. They perceive questions on their decision making as sharpshooting instead of analyzed dissent. However, morality and ethics require good followers to provide opinions, recommendations, and judgments to their superiors, using critical and effective reasoning.

Lt. Col. Mark Cantrell (U.S. Marine Corps) wrote an article about military dissent in which he says followers should make sure they have their facts straight, and they are certain the boss is wrong, before they call attention to the issue and bring the correct information and guidance to the boss for his or her own good and future perspective. Military forces work under a distinct chain of command for daily operations, and the military culture promotes working with one’s boss before going over the boss’ head in that chain. Loyal dissent is expected to follow an ethical guideline to maintain an effective chain of command. Going around one’s command
is almost always discouraged. This can result in few courageous followers.

**Military Education Opportunities**

There could be many opportunities to teach ethics and followership at all levels of professional military education. Entry-level officer basic courses include leadership classes, but almost no formal academic classes discuss followership concepts. There are few lessons on how to provide negative feedback to one’s boss when the boss might be wrong.

Due to many recent senior military leader investigations, ethics is becoming mandatory training, especially for field grade officers. In 2013, ethics classes were introduced into the Command and General Staff College curriculum by directive from the Department of the Army. This provides an excellent opportunity to address unethical decisions by senior leaders and the actions their staffs could have taken to prevent them. In the next few years, ethics training will also become prevalent in junior officer courses. For now, however, followership still remains an unpopular topic within Army academic circles.

**Organizational Culture as Organizational Life**

Many references to bureaucracy relate to how the employee becomes a part of the organization (or machine), and the employee’s life is the job. The Army does this to soldiers by providing for every facet of life: medical care, housing, social events, and the work place. A bureaucratic culture in any organization can stifle creativity, honesty, and constructive criticism.

There are always asymmetric power relations in an army, a multinational corporation, or a family business, that result in the vast majority working for the interest of a select few. The Army has a history of military prodigies who were chosen by current generals to rule in the future because of their connections, family lineages, and perceived entitlement of authority. The theory of the “iron law of oligarchy” is reflected in the
By understanding dynamic followership, military organizations can treat followership like a discipline and improve leader-follower cultures. Through education, soldiers and officers can learn how to be effective and courageous followers as well as good leaders, potentially preventing future unethical decisions.

In a cultural change, many retired Army officers are now addressing senior-leader ethical issues as problems of needing followership dissent. In his presentation at the International Leadership Association annual conference in Denver on 25 October 2012, Dr. George Reed described leadership through an ethical lens, where “well-meaning followers face conflicting loyalties as they balance their own sense of right and wrong with desires of leaders and the best interest of the organizations they ultimately serve.”22 This statement suggests responsible subordinates must find a method to candidly voice their concerns to their bosses for the good of the organization.

Notes

2. Ibid., 24.
5. Ibid., 1-2.
6. Ibid., 1-5.
9. Ibid., 102.
10. Ibid., 103.
13. Ibid., 92.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid., xi.
18. Ibid., 45.
21. Ibid., 296.
commanders and leaders must often make decisions the moral correctness and strategic outcome of which are difficult to calculate. Consider the strategic corporal, a relatively new and inexperienced noncommissioned officer, in contrast to the tactical general, an experienced leader who through technology can control, or even micromanage, events on the battlefield that traditionally were left to leaders much closer to the action. Inherent in both positions, as they have evolved, is great strategic risk.

Strategic corporals make tactical decisions that can have far-reaching strategic consequences. On the other hand, high-level leaders, through technology, can directly affect tactical situations without sufficient consideration of the strategic implications of these actions.

At any level, as Army leaders we cannot let our strategic acumen atrophy. Instead, we must become more sophisticated in our decision-making processes, especially when it comes to incorporating strategic-level ethics that directly impact mission success or failure.

Strategic-level ethics—or macro-ethics—takes into account the structure of ethical decision making as a whole. Macro-ethics, like macroeconomics, looks not at the individual agent but at the overall effect of ethical decisions. In other words, macro-ethics looks beyond relatively black-and-white ethics of specific situations or individual decisions and takes into consideration the overall strategic-level ethical climate.

Granted, it is important for individuals to make ethical decisions in their personal situations because little good can come from immoral behavior at any level. However, high-level leaders also need to make morally
driven macro-ethical decisions because the American people expect, and our military profession demands, that military professionals make military decisions based on proper moral judgment, taking into consideration the overall end state desired at tactical and strategic levels. As ethicist Don Snider writes,

To be sure, all of our forces use billions of dollars of technology, but it is all at the beck and call of a human operator or commander who uses discretionary moral judgments to apply that military power. That is the art of being a military professional, making repetitive discretionary judgments often scores of times a day that are both effective militarily and within the moral norms expected by the military’s client—the American people.1

In making these discretionary moral judgments, Army leaders must take into consideration complexity since understanding and visualizing the complex environment—all the conditions, circumstances, and influences that bear on a commander’s decisions—are essential to proper macro-ethical decisions.

In a decision process guided by macro-ethical concerns, actions at any level can be considered morally prohibited, morally permissible, or morally dubious. Morally prohibited actions are always unethical and wrong; they should be considered unacceptable. However, the moral implications of actions resulting from military decisions are harder to analyze because their effects can cross the levels of war. Sometimes morally permissible actions on the tactical level have morally prohibited or morally dubious outcomes on a complex strategic level. This means morally permissible tactical actions that have morally prohibited strategic outcomes should be considered unacceptable. Additionally, sometimes morally dubious actions on the tactical level produce desired strategic outcomes that are morally permissible. Actions contemplated from an ethical standpoint require careful consideration and perhaps new analytical tools to guide the process.

One helpful tool for guiding macro-ethical decision making is known as the Cynefin Framework, a problem-solving tool developed by David J. Snowden and others for business. Understanding complexity through the Cynefin Framework is not the only way to make macro-ethical decisions. It is, however, a way.

This paper will examine the Cynefin Framework and its usefulness to ethical decision making for military leaders. It will then examine two historical military situations in which understanding or misunderstanding a complex environment led to good or poor tactical decisions with subsequent good or poor strategic outcomes. Then it will apply these insights to analyze the macro-ethics of the tactical use of drones in current operations. These case studies will illuminate the fact that morally dubious actions may produce desired strategic effects that are morally permissible. They will also show how morally permissible actions at the tactical level can have morally undesirable effects on a complex strategic level.

A Sense-Making Framework for Morally Complex Decisions

According to David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, in their 2007 article “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” the Cynefin Framework “helps leaders determine the prevailing operative context so that they can make appropriate choices.” This framework strives to make sense of the prevailing environment. In a 2011 video posted at a website called Cognitive Edge Network, Snowden places decision-making models in two groups: categorization models and sense-making models. According to Snowden, in a categorization model, the framework precedes the data. In a sense-making model, the data precedes the framework.

This distinction is useful for ethical decision making. Many accuse moral analytical systems of being too narrow in that they do not account for varied and new situations. This is because the analytical frameworks seem to precede the data, or in the case of ethics, the new and unique situations. In complex situations, it may be better to adopt an ethical framework to meet the situation.

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that this is not situational ethics *per se*. Morally prohibited actions...
remain prohibited and unacceptable regardless of the situation or the outcome. The idea behind macro-ethics is to determine whether a morally permissible or even a morally dubious action will produce a morally permissible outcome on a strategic level.

To help clarify the distinction between morally permissible and morally dubious actions, we should establish the meaning of dubious. Merriam-Webster.com provides two definitions. For the purposes of this paper, the second definition, “unsettled in opinion,” is useful since it highlights that not all actions can or should be considered prima facie moral or immoral. That is, there are differences of opinion on the morality of many matters; these we call “grey areas.”

For example, there are differences of opinion regarding strategic bombing in disputing whether it is ever morally permissible to bomb cities where one is certain there will be civilian casualties. During the period between World War I and World War II, many considered the bombing of cities permissible. Everything that added to a nation’s capacity to wage war was considered a legitimate target, much of which was often located in large urban and industrialized areas. The bombing of these targets would result in a shorter war, the argument went, which was a desired, and morally permissible, strategic outcome. In some camps, this idea remained widely accepted beyond World War II. Nevertheless, there was, and remains, considerable disagreement as to the moral permissibility of bombing cities. It is a morally dubious tactic. Notwithstanding, a shorter war still is considered a desirable, and morally acceptable, outcome.

**Application to the ethics of tactical decisions.** The Cynefin Framework can give high-level military leaders a tool for deciding when or whether a tactic—such as the bombing of cities for strategic purposes—is morally permissible, morally dubious, or morally prohibited. Using this framework can help leaders make a morally acceptable decision.

The Cynefin Framework was developed to help executives make decisions in complex business situations. In this paper, I propose applying the model for ethical decision making in military operations.

**Contexts for decision making.** Snowden defines the Cynefin Framework using five contexts, also called domains: obvious (originally called simple in the 2007 article), complicated, complex, chaotic, and disorder. (In the Cynefin Framework, complicated and complex are used differently; they are not synonyms.)

According to Snowden and Boone, obvious and complicated contexts, “assume an ordered universe, where cause-and-effect relationships are perceptible, and right answers can be determined based on the facts.” An obvious context is relatively simple; things are as they appear. To make decisions in an obvious context, a leader’s job is to sense, categorize, and then respond. There is a right answer.

Many ethical decisions fall under an obvious context. For example, the decision whether to kill enemy prisoners is an ethical decision in an obvious context. Killing unarmed prisoners violates any number of laws and moral codes. It is a morally prohibited act. The decision to kill in self-defense, however, is morally permissible. Again, the decision is simple. One senses the situation, categorizes it (based on the rule that killing is permissible in self-defense), and responds appropriately.

Within a complicated context, the situation is slightly different. There may be more than one right answer. To make decisions in a complicated context, leaders sense, analyze, and then respond. In this context, leaders use personal knowledge and experience as well as subject matter expertise to analyze the situation and come to a decision. For example, military decisions in a complicated context may involve obtaining legal analysis, whereupon leaders base their decisions on interpretation of laws. By way of illustration, the decision to target a religious site may be a legal decision based on the rules of engagement (ROE). If an enemy operates from a religious site, under the prevailing ROE that site may lose its status and becomes a legal, and morally permissible, target. Conducting operations against the target would be thus legally acceptable. However, the decision is not simple; it involves analysis. It is complicated. The decision to treat such a site as a target may not be straightforward. Other factors may emerge, after careful consideration, that outweigh on moral grounds purely legal justification for attacking the site.

This illustrates that not all legal acts are morally permissible, which means decision makers should not regard the results of some legal acts as being acceptable. Legality and morality get tangled.

In the article “Law and Ethics in Command Decision-Making,” A. Edward Major discusses the
complex ethical dimensions behind a decision to conduct the mission to kill Osama bin Laden:

Many question whether the special mission for Osama bin-Laden into Abbottabad, Pakistan, was legal under international law. Yet Americans largely agree it was morally right, whether or not it met the standards of international law. The law on the subject is conflicted, depending on whether one focuses on violations of sovereign territory or the significance of Osama bin-Laden and his finding sanctuary in Pakistan. From the standpoint of law, both arguments are compelling—but the majority of Americans, to put it simply, do not care; the morally right necessity of eliminating bin-Laden trumped any esoteric question of legality.9

However, setting aside the bin Laden example, Major also concludes that what is legally permissible is not always morally permissible: “The consideration of what may lawfully be done does not consider other relevancies of morality, diplomacy, politics, our own public opinion, and relations with the host population.”10

These points raise concerns for the unknown or unanticipated perils that arise from the adverse consequences of macro-ethical decisions. For example, what if the legally questionable mission to capture bin Laden had failed? What if it had been a catastrophic failure involving significant friendly casualties, as did the 1979 “Desert One” hostage rescue mission in Iran during the Carter Administration?

Also, obvious and complicated contexts (which are considered ordered), tend to gravitate toward complexity (which is unordered, but not chaotic), especially when applied to war, national security, and international relations. Consequently, there is an inherent danger for decision makers to oversimplify situations and contemplated solutions.

The Cynefin Framework addresses these difficulties. Snowden says failure to recognize a situation’s context may result in disorder.11 He refers to disorder as “not knowing which space you are in.”12 He goes on to state that this is the place “where we are most of the time” because people “interpret each situation according to their preference for action.”13 Typically, a certain blindness is caused by our preferences and our experiences.

The cliff between order and chaos. Therein lies a danger because according to Snowden, there is a “cliff” between the ordered domains (including obvious and complicated) and chaos.14 Chaos may result from either deliberate unethical behavior or failure to recognize complicated or complex situations. In the latter cause, complacency may cause one to oversimplify and misinterpret a problem causing an already complicated situation to become chaotic. Thus, failure to understand how complicated a military problem is may lead to chaos and moral failure.

Irrespective, Snowden warns, once one falls into chaos, it is difficult to recover. He concludes “One should, therefore, manage in the complicated and complex spaces to avoid the cliff.”15

Morally permissible strategic outcomes. Although moral chaos is bad, moral complexity is not necessarily bad as long as military leaders understand the situation and apply an acceptable macro-ethical solution. This is where macro-ethics can use the Cynefin Framework for making ethical military decisions leading to desirable strategic outcomes that are morally acceptable.

Within the Cynefin Framework, Snowden considers complex and chaotic contexts unordered: “there is no immediate apparent relationship between cause and effect.”16 Snowden defines a complex context as a place where “cause and effect are only obvious in hindsight, with unpredictable emergent outcomes.”17

Making decisions in a complex context calls for leaders to probe, sense, and respond in order to discover an emergent practice.18 Of these three actions, the key to success in a complex context is effective probing, Snowden asserts.19 He defines probing as conducting “safe-to-fail experiments” (not fail-safe experiments).20 If a solution does not work, leaders should get rid of it. If it succeeds, they should amplify it.

This approach may be fine for business decision making. Nevertheless, how can military leaders apply it to ethics? How do leaders conduct probing ethically?

Before military leaders probe a situation to discover solutions, they must determine what is morally required. They must ask what the next step should be. The actions of then Maj. Gen. David H. Petraeus in Mosul, Iraq from 2003 to 2004 illustrate how effective probing of a complex situation led to an acceptable solution. Kirsten Lundberg reports that as commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Petraeus determined that he had a
moral obligation based on the Geneva Convention to establish the “security and well-being of the Iraqi people in his area of responsibility.” He based his actions—some of which could have been considered morally dubious—on this moral obligation, and he succeeded in establishing security in a city torn by violence.

After probing, a leader should ask what is morally permissible and determine based on emergent data whether the morally permissible actions identified will lead to the strategic goal. This may require some trial and error.

Incidents from Iraq in 2004 provide more examples. Then Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman used high-handed methods such as physical coercion and intimidation to extract information from or to punish Iraqi detainees. Soldiers under Sassaman’s command forced two Iraqi civilian detainees off a bridge, which led to one’s death by drowning. New York Times writer Dexter Filkins describes how Sassaman established a very aggressive and abusive command environment with regard to the treatment of prisoners that, once exposed by the news media, proved counterproductive to the strategic objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Compare these actions with the methods employed by then Col. Dana Pittard. As commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, in Iraq in 2004, Pittard determined that U.S. forces could not kill their way out of difficult situations. Although his troops had permission to use high-handed methods, Pittard determined that those methods, although morally permissible on a tactical level, would have an adverse effect strategically. He used a forceful but less lethal and less threatening approach with civilians, which proved effective in supporting strategic goals.

The objective of using a framework for ethical decision making. The bottom line is that leaders should use a framework to assess what strategic effects tactical actions are having, including the second- and third-order effects of morally permissible or morally dubious actions. Once a leader commits to a morally permissible or morally dubious action, and that action produces desired strategic results, the leader should amplify the results. If it does not, stop it. Try a different probe.

This is not situational or utilitarian ethics. Actions that are morally prohibited remain prohibited regardless of the situation or the strategic outcome. Instead, macro-ethics can use the Cynefin Framework to focus on attempting to make a decision within the boundaries of morally permissible or morally dubious actions. Moreover, the only acceptable decisions are those whose actions produce a desired and morally permissible strategic outcome.

Strategic-level ethics, at the highest decision-making levels, have a broad scope. Ending hostilities in an honorable, just, and timely manner is a broad strategic goal. Leaders must avoid morally permissible or morally dubious actions that, on a strategic level, would prolong the conflict or delegitimize our narrative (honor and justice). Conversely, it would be acceptable for leaders to employ morally dubious tactical actions in addition to morally permissible actions if they would result in an honorable, just, and timely cessation of hostilities.

First Case Study: Operation Linebacker

An example of a morally dubious tactical decision having morally desirable strategic results that occurred during the Vietnam War is Operation Linebacker II. To force the North Vietnamese back to the Paris peace talks and convince the South Vietnamese government of U.S. resolve, in December 1972, President Nixon ordered the largest bombing of North Vietnam since the beginning of the Vietnam War. According to David L. Anderson, it was a morally dubious tactical action that remains as controversial now as it was then. Yet, Nixon desired a morally permissible strategic outcome. He wanted to conclude the war with honor and justice, and in a timely manner. Anderson describes the situation:

The Nixon administration was exasperated with both Hanoi and Saigon, and the bombing can be seen as a message to both. Washington wanted the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the communist North, with its capital in Hanoi] to sign the October agreement
and wanted the RVN [Republic of Vietnam, the South, with its capital in Saigon] to cease being obstructionist. To both sides Nixon was saying that the United States remained strong and willing to use forceful action even as it was showing a readiness to compromise.25

It worked. Unlike previous bombing campaigns on limited and highly restricted targets, which had little effect on the North Vietnamese, Operation Linebacker II compelled them to return to the talks and sign a cease-fire.

One can view the earlier limited bombing campaigns from a Cynefin Framework perspective as ineffective probes. The expanded bombing can be considered another probe, which proved effective even when the bombing involved morally dubious, but not prohibited, targeting. The action had a morally acceptable strategic result: peace talks. Whether the final peace agreement held for more than a few years is moot. The reluctance of the parties involved to adhere to their ends of the agreement (nonaggression by the North and military support for the South by the United States) does not negate the fact that the bombing campaign had the desired strategic effect. The desired strategic outcome, peace talks, was a morally acceptable and desirable goal. It was in accord with the wishes of the American people. In this instance, Nixon fulfilled his moral obligation as a leader.

Second Case Study: The Atomic Bombing of Japan

The Cynefin Framework is useful to analyze another complex case study that involves macro-ethics: the use of atomic weapons against Japan during World War II. In contrast to Operation Linebacker II, this case study results in remarkably different conclusions.

The use of atomic weapons against largely civilian targets is a morally dubious action at best. Many consider it morally prohibited. For the sake of argument in this article, let us consider it morally dubious. Moral considerations aside, the Truman Administration seemed to base its decision in what the Cynefin Framework would call an ordered-obvious domain. Consequently, as a world, we almost fell over a cliff into chaos.

In Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: August 1945, Dennis Wainstock writes, “The loss of Japanese lives and the morality of dropping the atomic bombs apparently did not enter into Truman’s decision.”26 According to Wainstock, Americans were desensitized by previous bombing campaigns against German and Japanese cities and provoked by racist propaganda. One result was Truman’s decision to drop the bombs had little ethical consideration either tactically or strategically. 27 Truman also apparently assumed that the only way to avert a bloody invasion was by using atomic weapons. Wainstock asserts that this proved to be a false assumption and a convenient denial of facts. 28 If the above is true, Truman decided to use atomic weapons based on the simple assumption that killing the enemy, whether civilian or not, was the shortest and best way to victory.

Truman’s moral judgment also may have been clouded by concern over the possibility of a Soviet entry into the war. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa writes, “Truman was in a hurry. He was aware that the race was on between the atomic bomb and Soviet entry into the war. That was why he concocted the story of Japan’s ‘prompt rejection’ of the Potsdam Proclamation as the justification for the atomic bomb … ”29

Considerable debate continues to surround this interpretation of events in World War II. However, according to some historians, Japan already was beaten before the United States used the atomic bombs. According to Wainstock, “Long before the dropping of the bombs, Japan’s leaders had decided to surrender and were taking preliminary steps to that end, as U.S. leaders knew from naval intelligence interception of Japan’s top-secret codes.”30 Wainstock concludes,

If the United States had given Japan conditional surrender terms, including retention of the emperor, at the war’s outset, Japan would probably have surrendered sometime in the spring or early summer of 1945, if not sooner. This would have saved countless lives, avoided the horrible destruction of many of Japan’s cities, and prevented Soviet expansion in East Asia. Most important, it would have avoided the need to plan for an invasion or to drop the atomic bombs. As it was, the dropping of the bombs only hastened the surrender of an already defeated enemy.31

This is a startling analysis. If accurate, the world’s leaders, especially members of the Truman Administration, failed to consider the overarching strategic effects of several morally dubious actions. By
ignoring several indicators of likely negative second- and third-order effects, such as the proliferation of atomic weapons, the dehumanization of the Japanese people, and the expansion of the Soviet Union into East Asia, the Truman Administration pushed a complex situation over the cliff into chaos.

Contemporary Macro-ethical Analysis: Drones

Are we falling into a similar trap as we prosecute the war on terrorism? Are we attempting to answer complex questions with simple answers? In our just endeavor to defeat global terrorism, are we failing to see adverse second- and third-order effects of our tactical actions? Consider our use of drones.

Use of drones is an example of a morally permissible tactical action that is producing a morally undesirable strategic outcome. Once again, it seems as if we are attempting to make decisions in an ordered-obvious domain while not grasping the complexity of the operational environment.

The logic is deceptively simple, but seriously flawed: killing a legitimate target during war is a morally permissible act; killing a legitimate target, while safeguarding a nation’s forces, is morally permissible and fulfills a leader’s obligation to care for the troops; known terrorists are legitimate targets. It is simple: so, what is the problem?

In response, if the object is to reduce the number of terrorists, what if the use of drones as a tactic is actually resulting in the producing of more terrorists while also delegitimating our global narrative with regard to holding the moral high ground? More terrorists would mean a longer war and more killing. Delegitimating our narrative would go against strategic counterinsurgency goals by producing international and domestic outrage. Consequently, an action we might consider morally permissible at the tactical level would be producing results that ran counter to our overall strategic goals. If such are the actual results, the outcome would not be considered acceptable. Moreover, when taking into account perspectives of others, the action would be considered morally dubious.

During the 2012 Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium, Dr. Daniel M. Bell addressed such issues in what he called the problems of distance as related to drones. He expressed concern that use of drones dehumanizes our enemies in the minds of our soldiers by creating what he termed “a PlayStation mentality.” Also, he said that drones may convey an impression of cowardice to those sympathizing with our enemies. Therefore, if killing is no more than a video game, we find ourselves in the middle of a slippery ethical slope.

Bell discussed a topic he called “character and the profession of arms.” His thought-provoking conclusion was that by using drones, we are in danger of “technology replacing character.” According to Bell, technology is only as good as the people employing it. Furthermore, he said we (U.S. military leaders) stand in danger of becoming mere button pushers in a military led by “tactical generals and presidents.” He asked, “Who is thinking strategically?”

Furthermore, Bell questioned whether technology has “economized our virtues.” He said that drones create “less room for profession, for judgment and virtues of professional soldiers.” He said we are at “risk of becoming mere technicians.”

With these ideas in mind, does the use of drones atrophy our strategic judgment? What is the long-term strategic goal behind the long-distance killing of what are considered legitimate targets? Does this type of tactical action lead to achieving the strategic goal? Are we becoming complacent, using techniques suited for an obvious context while ignoring the complexity of the situation? Are we in danger of “falling over the cliff” into chaos?

Understanding this problem within a complex domain, we need to return to the Cynefin Framework’s
idea of probe-sense-respond in order to discover emerging practices. For argument’s sake, let us assume that the current use of drones is an example of probing. Should we amplify it?

To answer these questions, let us consider the views of Lt. Col. Douglas A. Pryer, as presented in a paper in Military Review in 2013. Pryer maintains that drones tend to perpetuate war and endanger our nation. He states that using drones to wage war by proxy may not be unethical (morally prohibited), but it is unwise. According to Pryer, waging war in this way may be good tactics, but it is bad strategy because it can destroy the possibility of a lasting peace by creating undue fear and trauma in enemy territory. At first glance, this may appear to be a good outcome; we want our enemies to fear us. Nevertheless, it may have unforeseen strategic consequences.

For example, Pryer asserts that drones may create more terrorists. He cites a 2012 Pew Research Center publication saying that from 2009 to 2012, the number of Pakistanis who considered the United States to be the enemy rose sharply, to 74 percent. According to Pryer, this period corresponded with increased drone strikes. He cites data showing a similar correlation in Yemen.

Pryer concludes that fighting remotely may, on the surface, appear to save lives. However, in reality, using drones fuels terrorist attacks that cost more lives in the end.

If we consider our use of drones as an example of probing to find effective tactics that are ethically permissible, or at least ethically dubious, then we can conclude this probing is producing an undesirable strategic outcome. Should we abandon it?

Additionally, as noted, the use of drones delegitimizes our narrative and undermines our counterinsurgency goals by producing international and domestic outrage due to the collateral damage drones cause in terms of dead civilians. Moreover, with regard to propaganda generated by our enemies’ global sympathizers, the use of drones in general is used to depict Americans as cowards who kill from afar, which feeds the general anti-American and anti-Western narrative.

Consequently, a morally permissible action we are using at the tactical level is producing results that run counter to our overall strategic goals and to a morally acceptable outcome—because it is not shortening the conflict.

Another consequence is that the use of drones is atrophying our strategic and moral judgment. Who among our leaders is thinking strategically and therefore macro-ethically? For example, what is the long-term strategic goal behind the long-distance killing of what are currently regarded as legitimate targets? Does this tactical decision lead to that goal? Or, are we becoming complacent, using an analysis suited for making decisions in an obvious domain but not for a complex domain? In using drones, are we, therefore, in danger of falling over the cliff into moral as well as operational chaos with regard to our fight against terrorists in areas where we are using drones?

Conclusion

Complexity is at the heart of many, if not most, strategic-level decisions. Like the strategic corporal example, seemingly small tactical actions can have far-reaching strategic implications. Conversely, through technology, generals and presidents can make tactical decisions at the risk of ignoring the likely strategic outcome.

This highlights that our profession of arms requires leaders at all levels to understand and visualize their operational environments—the higher the level, the larger the environment. Hence, the need for macro-ethics. As our environments grow ever larger and more complex, leaders need to understand, visualize, and more closely consider the strategic outcomes of their tactical decisions using macro-ethics as a guide.

Leaders need to acknowledge that certain otherwise morally permissible acts on the tactical level could have grave moral consequences on the strategic level. Conversely, morally dubious acts on the tactical level may produce morally desirable consequences on the strategic level. A useful tool to navigate this complex situation is the Cynefin Framework which helps frame complex macro-ethical considerations. By using ethical probes, leaders can determine whether tactical decisions are producing morally acceptable strategic outcomes.

In our current struggle against terrorism, especially in a fiscally constrained environment, we cannot afford many strategic failures. We need to get it right and get it right quickly with minimal expenditure financially and with regard to minimizing casualties. As stewards of the profession, our leaders, both military and political, owe the American people due diligence concerning the blood and treasure of the nation. We
have a moral obligation to facilitate as rapidly as possible the coming of an honorable and just peace, not just for the United States, but also throughout the world. While hastening the defeat of global terrorism and pursuing the goal of a just peace, leaders must analyze ethical decisions carefully, prudently, and with an eye to their second and third order effects on the final prize.

Notes


5. Snowden and Boone. Note that in 2013, the context (or domain) Snowden and Boone originally called simple was changed to obvious.


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Snowden and Boone.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


23. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.


30. Wainstock, 166.

31. Ibid., 178.

32. Dr. Daniel M. Bell, Jr., “The Ethics of Vicarious Warfare: Debating Drones,” lecture given at the Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 December, 2012.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.


45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.


49. Pryer.


51. Pryer.

52. Ibid.
The Human Domain
The Army’s Necessary Push Toward Squishiness

Maj. Mark Herbert, U.S. Army

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Man, the molecule of society, is the subject of social science.
- Henry Charles Carey, 19th century economist

The current fiscal challenges facing the Department of Defense have forced the services to reinvent themselves
and develop innovative concepts, while also scrambling to ensure they define themselves by one simple word: relevance.

To this end, the U.S. Navy and Air Force have developed their future trajectory for policy makers and strategists in relation to Air Sea Battle, positing deep strike and control of the sea commons as the arbiter of future conflict. It is worth noting that these rely primarily on technological measures to achieve.

In contrast, the land components of the Department of Defense have begun to collaborate on their conceptual frame of reference for relevance in an era of austere resources, but one looking to sell an old idea in a new package. Their answer is neither a call for a complicated campaign concept, nor another set of expensive weapons or vehicle programs. Instead, the idea is to focus on the humanness of warfare and how, historically, warfare remains fundamentally a human endeavor fought among people, usually of different cultures, with complicated sets of complex idiosyncrasies.

One outgrowth of such an approach is that it reveals the need for expanding the intellectual paradigms used to research and analyze the human endeavor of war in order to better formulate the tools necessary to prevail in conflict. For example, while history is a great teacher, it is not the only avenue of approach that should be used for clarity on this concept. Relying on history alone will not suffice as a guide to reveal the underlying motivations nor mitigating solutions common to war. Instead, expanding the conceptual tools to more fully analyze warfare must include use of the social sciences. This is a key step to help us unravel the mystery that is human violence, understand the human side of a given conflict, and forecast human behavioral responses to various courses of action contemplated that involve employing military action in such a conflict.

The concept of the human domain, as the Army is currently terming it, is not new. Historians of warfare have returned ad infinitum to the idea that warfare is inherently a human endeavor. Conflict takes place in many areas and domains: on the ground, at sea, in the air, in space, and now in cyberspace. But as the figure indicates, the one overarching and all encompassing domain is that of the human domain.

The Army’s simple all-purpose solution to problems in the past has often been mainly a recourse of destructive violence; killing is sometimes what we do when we do not understand the problem. In contrast, efforts to understand the human domain at a much more sophisticated level may assist us in understanding a situation, preventing escalation, and limiting the amount of violence required to mitigate the situation.

As the Army and Marine Corps are, in the main, ground forces, it stands to reason that they push an idea of future warfare that includes human interaction as the overarching concept and indispensable component linking all lines of operation/lines of effort.

To develop this idea the Army, the Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) have begun a cooperative effort under the strategic land-power initiative to establish a Strategic Landpower Task Force to gather lessons learned from the past decade or more of war, incorporate “historic, contemporary, and emerging military, human, and strategic considerations, as well as the enduring relationship between the land domain and the human domain” into doctrine, and postulate what the operating environment will look like in the future.

As part of this effort, Army senior leaders have pushed the idea that history gives credence to and justification for the idea of the human domain. There are, in fact, thousands of volumes of historical writings replete with analyses claiming to explain just how human
warfare is, from ancient battles of note to those occurring today in Afghanistan, Syria, and elsewhere.

However, most of this writing appears to be mainly concerned with details of tactics and strategy (and sometimes logistics), not the study of warfare from a social science perspective, the underlying factors of which would be better explained by intellectual constructs relying upon cultural anthropology, psychology, and sociology.

Consequently, if we are to invest in the idea of the human domain, a vast idea in and of itself, then the scope of research and scholarship that the Army uses must expand concurrently to encompass the vastness to some degree. Consonant with the above, the incorporation of fields other than history—psychology, anthropology, sociology, and the like—will open myriad new and insightful doors to ideas about warfare and the human domain.

We must break away from the familiar think tanks and perfunctory advice from complacent experts regurgitating thread-worn theories and statistics. Instead, we must bring new fields of knowledge and information that draw upon diverse experiences and data sets.

In short, if the Army is truly serious about understanding human interaction and its relationship with warfare then there has to be a concerted effort to reach out to these other fields of study that specialize in humanness in a more hands-on way.

This process can be expected not only to introduce the new, but also revitalize the old by enhancing and broadening research done in traditional fields such as history. The combination of such will build deeper, broader, and more sophisticated understanding to problem sets associated with the causes and resolutions of war.

While this concept appears sound, the problem arises when the Army, Marine Corps, and USSOCOM attempt to sell this idea to those who determine strategy and ultimately funding. Relatively cheap social science research does not have the same sexy allure as building billion-dollar planes in congressional districts. Help is most sorely needed, but the Army has not helped itself persuading policy makers of social science value to the military.

Therein lies the squishy part. Neither the Department of Defense, nor the rest of the national security establishment, has had a good track record...
employing the social sciences in any of its analyses; they have been historically either completely absent or horribly misused. Additionally, when it comes to formulating strategy, warfare, or diplomacy, credible representatives of the social sciences have been underrepresented at roundtable discussions, strategy sessions, or on the staffs of decision makers. This seems to validate what the Strategic Landpower White Paper notes: the use of any of the social sciences in the study of warfare and the idea that conflict is about people have “not received the central emphasis that it should in U.S. military deliberation.”

While the Army has attempted to utilize aspects of the social sciences over the past few years with the development of its counterinsurgency doctrine and its proponents, the chasm is still wide. This gap has hindered, and will continue to hinder, understanding of the human domain. So, how do we close the gap?

Closing the Gap

There are two things that the Army must do to understand the gap and come up with solutions in an attempt to bridge it. First, we must understand the history of the interaction between ourselves and the social sciences and recognize the reasons for the divide. Applying lessons learned from the past may prevent us from making the same mistakes again.

Second, the Army must incorporate and internalize all the information that the social sciences can offer in a serious effort to understand what warfare is. Every avenue of approach should be used and all fields of the soft sciences should be explored to find help in understanding the human domain in conditions of war.

History of the Army and Social Sciences

The military has made forays into the realm of the social sciences in the past. As far back as World War I, both sides of that conflict hired anthropologists and psychologists to help in the war effort. Their perceived misuse through the Great War and into World War II caused fervent disagreements in the academic community, calling into question the use of scientists by the military.

The Cold War further intensified the feelings of conflict concerning the role of science and its use by the government for political and military gain. For example, the Army’s use of academic analysts to research the cause of insurgencies in Latin America during Project Camelot caused unease and protest about the ethics of such practices.

At about the same time the FBI was involved in compiling information regarding professors and other academics in the country’s colleges and universities. This was at the height of the Cold War, the era of the Red Scare, when communism was seen as an internal threat to the nation. The FBI, with the consent and covert support of the schools, began a blacklist of those professors whom they believed to be involved with nefarious and “un-American” organizations and whom were thought to be “subversives.” This has resulted in a lingering legacy of suspicion and mistrust between the government and many in academia.

The use of sociologists to support the use of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support teams in Vietnam and later the Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan further alienated the academic world from the military and its operations. Many in the academic community saw these programs as using scientists as political or military assets and not in their true capacity as scholars and educators.

In October of 2007 the American Anthropological Association Executive Board released a statement regarding the Army’s Human Terrain System Project. In it, the board voiced its disapproval of the program based on ethical grounds and concern that it would put their members in danger. To this group, the Army was simplifying a very complex subject. David Price, anthropologist from Saint Martin’s University, notes that when the Army or the military as a whole “wants to embrace something as potentially soft as anthropology, it is often drawn to fantasies of hard science.”

These examples illustrate the chasm as it exists between much of the social science community and the military today. Driven mainly by a history of the military’s perceived immoral use of social scientists and their unique fields, further widened by political stances or by disagreements in policy, many academics and researchers have become antagonistic to any attempts to span the gap. Opposition to the latest wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the confinement of foreign fighters in Guantanamo Bay, and the use of so-called enhanced interrogation techniques have muddied the water still
further. Any relationship that we attempt to build with the academic world to expand the dialogue between the two must take these factors into account.

Given this torrid history, it may seem impossible for us to effect any change in our association with academia. However, like any relationship, success depends on the work put into it.

Incorporating the Social Sciences

The Army has taken the first step by realizing the importance of understanding the humanness of warfare, but more steps must be taken in the correct direction to build credibility and be successful with the concept of the human domain.

First, Army leadership must make the human domain concept a priority. Establishing a working group or small research team is not enough. While perhaps not on the magnitude of an Army Center of Excellence, there needs to be an office or center that can do the heavy lifting that is required to develop and push the ideas. The office must be the central hub of research and synthesis on the human domain and have the strong backing of senior Army leaders.

Along with the office, a proponent must be nominated to lead concept development and implementation. Who leads the way on the human domain is just as important as how it functions and impacts the services. Currently there is a collaborative effort between the Army, Marine Corps, and USSOCOM. While all three have experience with the concept of the human domain, there must be a main actor to provide guidance and leadership. As the largest of the land components, the Army must take that role.

Second, the Army must get outside of its comfort zone in regard to its farming of ideas and information. If there is to be a synthesis of knowledge and understanding of what encompasses the human domain as it relates to warfare, then who better to glean that knowledge from than those who study, teach, and write about it?
Currently, the Army pulls a certain core group of academics, scientists, business people, and theorists for its policy and strategy discussions. They are trusted confidants who collectively bring a broad wealth of knowledge to the table. The same must be done with experts and academics from the social science community. Inviting more psychologists, anthropologists, primatologists, and others to Army conferences and forums will add a great deal of information on the human aspects of strategy and warfare. Along with establishing such a group of core social science advisors, the Army should conduct a human-domain-specific conference, inviting academics from all the social science fields. This forum might provide the Army with additional knowledge on topics it missed or previously ignored.

In short, to actually accomplish the implied objectives of the strategic landpower strategy, we must begin to build a network of contacts with key educators and specialists if we are serious about learning about the human domain of warfare. We must look more toward institutions like the University of New Mexico’s Evolutionary Psychology Department and less toward the John F. Kennedy’s School of Government in our development of the human domain.

The same intimate relationship of trust that the Army has with businesses, industry, and government entities must be built with the academic world of related social sciences if the human domain concept is to be successful. However, the Army must be careful to avoid its previous mistakes of using social scientists for what has been dubbed less than moral reasons by those in the academic arena. Any attempt by the Army to co-opt or use the work of social scientists for political or military operational reasons may be seen as another attempt to misuse or exploit them, widening the existing chasm and ruining any attempt we may try to close it.

Focusing efforts in this area has the additional practical effect of providing a strong fiduciary argument for the Army as we compete for relevance against a tide of budget cuts and fiscal constraints that can be expected to continue. More importantly, it provides a conceptual framework for dealing with the real world as it is evolving and the actual threats we are likely to face in the foreseeable future. Thus it must be taken seriously as the help of experts from fields like psychology, anthropology, sociology, and other social sciences promises real return on investment which will stand up to outside criticism.

In contrast, if the Army instead falls back—as it traditionally does—on relying upon ill-informed advice from a regular list of current and former politicians, and continues to spend its money funding research contracts with crony for-profit think tanks and retired officers turned lobbyists, the Army’s strategic landpower initiative will fail.

**Conclusion**

The Army’s current lack of institutional commitment to expanding its intellectual field of discussion is evident in its professional reading list. Only one book with a subject other than political or military theory appears: Lt. Col. David Grossman’s *On Killing*.

The Army must promote expansion of its educational frame of reference and adopt what biologist E. O. Wilson called his theory of consilience, the bringing together of all the different fields of study into one great synthesis of knowledge.

This includes exploring the relevance of previously untapped resources in the academic world and fields of study that may seem innocuous or unrelated but may still add depth or breadth in unexpected ways. Similarly, we as an institution have to attempt to forge
new and wide-ranging relationships in the academic world among disciplines that may at first blush seem irrelevant. The Army and its strategic analysts must not be afraid to get a little squishy. There is a vast array of fields of study that could contribute to the understanding of the human domain of conflict, but have yet to be contacted or explored.

We must also understand that in our quest for knowledge the bridge may be blocked by ideological opponents in the political and academic worlds; that there may be pushback by some who have disdain for the military and will attempt to stigmatize contact among their colleagues. Learning from history gives us pause; the history between the academic world and the Army is not something that resonates with a great deal of hope. However, the Army leadership should realize that we need academia if new concepts largely drawn from social science research and expertise are to succeed.

A way to bridge the gap is to continuously engage such communities by attending social science symposiums and lectures, or even sending students for social science degrees at a wider range of civilian universities in order to both acquire some expertise in narrow disciplines as well as make valuable contacts. Similarly, inviting more diverse and more numerous academics to participate in Army learning events can potentially create mutually beneficial relationships.

To succeed, efforts to reach out to academia must turn into bridges, and the building must begin soon. The animosity and mistrust that some sectors of academia have had for assisting the military must be challenged with honesty and a true quest for understanding by those of us in the Army. However, there cannot be prolonged skepticism on either side or the endeavor is doomed from the start.

Incorporating the study of the social sciences into the concept of the human domain will lead to profound change in the way the Army deals with conflict through a deeper synthesis of knowledge about ourselves and our social behavior. Conversely, academia could greatly benefit in its study of the sociological dimensions of human violence by professional association with those who conduct war first hand and have an intimate familiarity with it.

It is this deeper understanding in both communities that together could lead to possibly foreseeing or even preventing conflict as long-term integration of social sciences into the decision process gains credibility and influence that affects the policy level. Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Raymond Odierno has said “preventing conflict is better than reacting to it.”

Understanding conflict through the idea of the human domain may help the Army do exactly that. We have to get squishy.

Notes


Retaining the Warrior Spirit

Maj. Andrew J. Knight, U.S. Army

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The transition out of current combat operations is unique for the United States Army because it ends the longest duration of warfare by an all-volunteer force in U.S. history. This transition, along with the current fiscal constraints, brings a number of challenges. The reduction in the size of the Army and the squeeze of a tighter defense budget are the most publicized issues that senior Army leaders are facing. However, another concern that gets little attention outside of the military is the potential flight of talented and experienced junior leaders after the excitement of combat is no longer available. Related to this is another less visible, yet significant issue, namely, the possible loss of the warrior spirit that currently pervades the Army and contributed so much to its success in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Many criticisms of military leadership practices and the Army’s preparedness for war rose in the peacetime environment of the late 1980’s and 1990’s which downplayed the importance of a warrior mentality as a necessity for dealing with the stress of close quarters combat.

With the advent of prolonged conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001, and as a means of realigning the Army with the basic tenets of warrior heritage, then Army Chief of Staff Gen. Erik Shinseki introduced the Soldier’s Creed in 2003.1 The purpose of the creed was to infuse a common code within the Army to help produce victory on the battlefield. The Soldier’s Creed (which contains the four lines dubbed the Warrior Ethos) was intended to instill a certain spirit amongst professional soldiers. Internalizing the published ethos took little time, given the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As the Army returns to a peacetime posture, while the spoken ethos endures as part of the officially published creed, the spirit of the individual warrior that provided true meaning to the ethos is in danger of diminishing as combat becomes more remote as a normal part of organizational culture.

Fortunately, though evolutionary changes in the military are rapid in wartime, they are much slower during peacetime.2 This condition affords senior Army leaders a window of opportunity for maintaining the spirit and preventing the published warrior ethos from degrading to nothing more than a few lines.
Nevertheless, if senior leaders do not aggressively create a command climate in peacetime that fosters risk taking, trust, and leader accountability, the warrior spirit is likely to dissipate altogether soon after complete cessation of combat operations in Afghanistan.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed concern for such inherent problems associated with a drawdown prior to his departure from office in 2011, saying, "Men and women in the prime of their professional lives, who may have been responsible for the lives of scores or hundreds of troops, or millions of dollars in assistance, or engaging..."
or reconciling warring tribes, may find themselves in a cube all day re-formatting PowerPoint slides, preparing quarterly training briefs, or assigned an ever-expanding array of clerical duties….The consequences of this terrify me.3

While Gates may have been referring mainly to potential issues related to retaining proven warriors that find themselves in an unchallenging and boring peacetime environment, it is the loss of the warrior spirit that these leaders shared within the Army that is the greatest cause for concern.

The Warrior Spirit and the Warrior Ethos

To properly define the warrior spirit it is necessary to break the term apart and define its individual components. Warrior is a term synonymous with soldier in contemporary times. Military professionals are comfortable with this definition of warrior while spirit may be defined in several different ways.

The Google definition of spirit is “the nonphysical part of a person that is the seat of emotions and character.”4 A further definition of spirit is “the principle of conscious life.”5 Combining these two definitions provides an understanding of spirit as the nonphysical principle that guides emotions and character.

When packaging these two individual components of the warrior spirit, the definition produced is as follows: a soldier guided by nonphysical principles of emotions and character. The nonphysical principles alluded to, embodied in the Army’s
Warrior Ethos, are subject to adjustment based on the environment in which the soldier operates. However, when a warrior spirit is common amongst the members of the military, sets of martial principles become the foundation of the culture and identity they share.

Unlike previous wars in which the warrior spirit emerged in only those soldiers who fought directly against the enemy across demarcated lines, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan saw the removal of barriers that separated combat functions from administrative and logistics functions. In those wars, the concept of battle lines ceased to exist, resulting in almost every member of a deployed force being exposed to direct enemy attack. Consequently, the common threat of enemy action against nearly all deployed members of the Army resulted in the spontaneous development and expanded relevance of a common warrior ethos.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies bridges the gap between spirit, culture, and ethos by defining the warrior ethos as—

...a code that expects individuals to aggressively engage and defeat an armed enemy in battle, promoting and valuing traits of moral and physical courage, tactical skills, emotional and physical stamina, loyalty to comrades and determination to accomplish the tactical mission regardless of personal risk.6

Recognizing the benefits that would result from an Army infused with a common warrior ethos caused the Army to codify a description of desired qualities in an officially sanctioned document. The Army’s Warrior Ethos was subsequently distilled into four lines within what was titled the Soldier’s Creed. These lines are: “I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat; I will never quit; I will never leave a fallen comrade.”7

After introducing the concept in 2003, Shinseki included the Soldier’s Creed in the 2004 Army Posture Statement.8 With the U.S. Army simultaneously fighting two wars that consumed nearly half of the available force at any given time, the official pronouncement of the ethos aimed to promote unity, solidarity, and endurance within an overburdened force in the face of shared hardships.

In 2007, the Army promoted further this concept by providing links to information papers associated with the annual posture statement, giving access to clearer explanation of the Soldier’s Creed and Warrior Ethos. Still later, in 2008, the information paper on the Warrior Ethos defined it, discussed current and future Army initiatives to instill the ethos, and outlined why it was important to the Army.9 That paper demonstrated that the Army recognized both the cultural shift occurring in a combat-hardened organization, and also that the spirit embodied in the ethos increased the effectiveness of the Army and a willingness of soldiers to embrace personal sacrifice in order to fight and win.

The Army posture on the Warrior Ethos as discussed in subsequent official pronouncements has not significantly changed since the original paper published in 2008. This suggests that senior Army leaders assumed that the spirit embodied by the current force was sustainable indefinitely without adjusting the approach to account for a lack of actual combat operations.

However, it is noteworthy that while the 2012 Army Posture Statement includes a link to the Warrior Ethos information paper, neither the terms warrior ethos nor warrior spirit are used in the latest document.10 The Posture Statement instead focuses on technological innovation, networked forces, and transition to a leaner, more efficient and adaptive force.

Theoretical Leadership

Leading an Army in transition from combat operations to a garrison environment is not a new problem, and the contemporary transition is less problematic than at any other time in history. Not only is the force comprised of volunteers, but the current military culture is habituated to the constant introduction of new technologies to the contemporary battlefield. This decreases the need of the current class of warriors for drastic educational leaps to add technological solutions into the military arsenal.

By comparison, the Army transition following the draw down after Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991) appears to have been easier than what the Army faces today because of the short duration of combat operations. However, despite the seeming advantage of short duration, it is important to note that manpower cuts of over 100,000 within a year of the troops returning home from Desert Storm crippled the force structure that existed in the immediate aftermath of the conflict through the early 1990’s.11
In a different example, the period of transition at the conclusion of the Vietnam War was more complex because of the suddenly increased pace of technological change due to the advent of computers, military culture shock due to a transition from a draft army to the all-volunteer Army, and pervasive negative views of the armed forces in general held by many in the civilian society. Though the domestic environment and internal military culture are very different than today, studies on leadership from the Vietnam era nevertheless remain pertinent to the discussion of the ongoing changes in the current Army.

Sociologist Dr. Morris Janowitz conducted extensive studies of the military before and during the Vietnam War and published several books on the military in transition. His analysis and findings are as relevant today as when first published.

One of his works, titled *The Professional Soldier*, presented a timeless characterization of the military professional. Janowitz conducted his research amid concerns that the rapid advancement of technology, to include the introduction of nuclear weapons during World War II, would deplete what Janowitz categorized as the “fighter spirit.” Admitting that this spirit was difficult to define, he offered that “it is based on a psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety.” This definition reflects the intent of the Army’s current formulation of its warrior ethos.

Janowitz studied the warrior (fighter) spirit in combat and concluded that “under these conditions [combat] authority is based less on formal rank and legal authority and more on personal leadership and the ability to create primary group solidarity and small unit effectiveness.” His studies also concluded that different leadership characteristics exist, and that increasing technology would transform military leadership toward management and away from the heroic, inspirational leader that united units in combat. Of special note, he observed that the application of managerial leadership, necessary to deal with rapid technological change, threatened to decrease the warrior spirit and carry the Army away from the values that historically had won the nation’s wars.

Comparing leadership styles, he observes that a positive characteristic associated with managerial leaders, besides a facility for effectively introducing technological change, is the ability to innovate common practices to increase effectiveness and efficiency.

In contrast, “the heroic leader is a perpetuation of the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.” The downside to heroic leadership, according to Janowitz, is a reliance on traditionalism that forces ahead in face of the enemy without embracing technological innovation.

The truth of the matter is that the Army needs both kinds of leaders to succeed. The reemergence of the warrior spirit in Iraq and Afghanistan would not have occurred without the presence of heroic leadership, but the presence of military managers maintained the fighting force by forcing technological change that ultimately decreased stress on the soldier.

From the improvement of basic Army system processes, through networked communications to the introduction of vehicles that better survive an explosive blast, the managerial leader enables the heroic leader the opportunity to better lead soldiers in direct combat with the enemy. Not only does the Army require both kinds of leaders, but the leaders who can exercise both managerial and heroic leadership have the capacity to maintain the warrior spirit at the conclusion of combat operations.

Retired Army Lt. Gen. Walter F. Ulmer Jr. contests the notion that heroes and managers come together to form the nucleus of elite leaders, and that “It is the enlightened integration of leadership and management which is essential to creating the climates from which high-performing units emerge.” This combination of tangible and intangible skills is the ultimate measure of talent in an officer, and the key to fostering the climate necessary for the warrior spirit to survive.

The timelessness of Janowitz and criticisms of the military during the 1980’s and 1990’s suggests that the Army is not always filled with talented leaders from top to bottom. A review of Janowitz’s leadership model in 1985 led Air Force Lt. Col. Richard Baucom to conclude that the elevated status of the military manager superseded the military’s appreciation for the heroic leader. “The balance is being disrupted by several factors that are eroding the respect traditionally accorded the heroic leader within the military profession; with his decline comes a deterioration of the warrior spirit he embodies.”
Baucom concluded that these factors included an overemphasis on management and a fascination with technology which produced an imbalance between manager and hero brought about detrimental effects on the warrior spirit.

Similarly, at the conclusion of the Gulf War many senior military leaders questioned the presence of heroic leadership and the warrior spirit that it produces. Based on external social pressures the military strayed from accepting the warrior as a special and unique individual, focusing more on the standardization of all military forces who were heavily reliant on technological solutions to win wars.

Retired Army Gen. William C. Moore showed concern about a departure from the warrior spirit as reflected by a softening of military training standards and prevailing attitudes regarding a widening separation of military and societal values. He wrote, “The ethos of being a warrior is disappearing—unit esprit built around ‘bonding’ between warriors is now disparaged as an irrelevant concept and one that only serves to rationalize politically incorrect behavior and policies.”

Abandoning the warrior ethos in order to conform to societal expectations is not a major factor in a post-Afghanistan Army, but a return to bureaucratic routine with a reversion to reliance on easily measurable statistics as indicators of leadership may have the same effect.

Managerial Routine and Risk Aversion

Prior to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of Army life consisted of highly routine tasks and mundane responsibilities. Unit staffs focused their energy on creating the quarterly training brief by building...
lengthy slide presentations and managing resources to execute the approved training events. With a unit’s final assessment consisting of an external evaluation at an Army training center, the evaluation of the unit’s leaders rested almost entirely on a two-week training exercise. In effect, much of the preparation time of the unit was not controlled by the leadership as various tasks and color-coded training cycles required manpower to support installation maintenance.

The advent of conflict in 2001 changed unit dynamics and priorities significantly as they adjusted to the challenges and rigors of managing deployment cycles and combat operations. However, in anticipation of a reversion to peacetime after more than a decade of conflict, the Army published Army Regulation 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development. It “prescribes policies, procedures, and responsibilities for developing, managing, and conducting Army training and leader development.”

Revised in 2011, AR 350-1 prescribes the official methodology for managing training and developing leaders within the Army. It outlines 24 different tasks that units are required to perform in an annual training cycle together with the majority of legally required training events for Army personnel. The number of tasks as written is not overwhelming, and some of them are completed as a by-product of larger training events, but if combined with other (excessive) assigned tasks imposed by sources who bill them as ‘other requirements’, a pattern could emerge similar to that of the pre-combat era which would serve to detract from mission readiness and erode the warrior ethos.

For example, reverting to a checklist of mandatory training that consumes training resources and available time can limit energy expenditure on achieving more than the minimum standards. Warriors who are deployed do not necessarily have the constraints of an extensive training checklist placed on them by a higher headquarters, allowing most deployed leaders to address only those training requirements that they identify as valuable. However, as the Army transitions to a peacetime environment, exhaustive managerial routine produced by the burden of checklists and excessive training requirements has great potential for stifling leader creativity to plan and execute valuable combat training that produces a high level of readiness.

Building Talented Leaders

Fortunately, a road map to preserve and continue building heroic leadership is part of the Army’s doctrine. Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 6-22 Army Leadership defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.” ADP 6-22 describes both attributes and competencies for leaders who are in line with the description of the heroic leader provided by Janowitz. The attributes that a leader needs to have are specified as character, presence, and intellect. Within these attributes, the qualities that enable the retention of the warrior ethos in subordinates consist of possessing the warrior ethos and confidence, using sound judgment, and exercising interpersonal tact. Additionally, leaders are defined as those who

U.S. Army Pvt. 1st Class Jo Marie Rivera, left, a human resource specialist, and Sgt. 1st Class Rebecca Hamby, a military police officer, both with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, maintain security for a female engagement team chief during a consultation at a clinic in Tarnak wa Jaldak District, Zabul Province, Afghanistan, 18 September 2013. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Kandi Huggins, 3rd BCT, 1st Infantry Division)
display competencies by doing. The competencies that a leader displays are lead, develop, and achieve results. The critical sub-competencies to fostering the warrior spirit are building trust, communicating, creating a positive environment, and becoming a steward of the profession.

With respect to the above, the company-level leader is the Army's foremost steward of the warrior spirit. Company or battery command is the lowest level where legal authorities and command responsibilities are present. This is also the only level of command where almost all subordinates come in contact with their commander on a daily basis. As the commander increases in rank and organizational size the percentage of subordinates he or she interacts with on a personal level decreases. Therefore, the most effective way for senior leaders to maintain the warrior spirit within the Army during peacetime is to enable the company commanders to take aggressive, calculated risks in training.

In order to enable company-level leaders to engender the trust and confidence of multiple command echelons above them, additional training and education are necessary. To this end, adjustments within the institutional Army military education programs would create a common experience regardless of branch specialty. Attempts at creating such a program formerly existed when all officers attended a common Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC II) before completing branch-specific BOLC III. The program ceased when wartime requirements exceeded the supply of lieutenants graduating from BOLC III. The Army needed officers on a shorter timeline than BOLC II plus BOLC III could produce them. Reintroducing BOLC II to the training regimen for newly commissioned lieutenants would again provide officers the necessary common experience at the outset of their careers.

Irrespective to changes away from BOLC II, adjustments to the Captains Career Course (CCC) since the beginning of the war have endured and demonstrate that the Army values leadership instruction at the highest level, and equally values a baseline of leadership training in all branches of service. Every captain begins their CCC instruction with a common block of instruction. This adjustment of CCC curriculum across all Army branches is stipulated in AR 350-1. While branch courses still contain specific tactical, technical, and staff instruction there is a separate, common-core portion of each course that is identical across the Army. A review of the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, the precursor to the CCC program of instruction from 1978, reveals 39.7 hours of instruction directly related to leadership in a 26-week curriculum. The common-core instruction in 2010 provided students with 44 hours of leadership in only an eight-week curriculum.

In the case of the 2010 Field Artillery CCC, consisting of 24 weeks of instruction, another 119.9 hours in the classroom are dedicated to battery commander-specific leadership training. This serves as a concrete example of the importance that the Army places on leadership development. More importantly, the increased emphasis on leader development is meant to perpetuate the warrior spirit.
Combat allows company-level leaders to put instruction into practice. As the requirements outlined in AR 350-1 receive less emphasis during combat operations, the oversight on managerial-type tasks decreases as well. As Janowitz observed with regard to the Vietnam conflict, even in the late 1960’s “the elaborate regulations and procedures of the military are attenuated during operational assignments.”

By equipping the commanders with sufficient leadership education, and providing a laboratory for experimentation, the company-level leader can build and maintain the warrior ethos in his subordinates. Senior Army leaders must replicate combat conditions through realistic training that encourages critical thinking and risk taking over an extended training period. A two-month collective training period conducted only two to three times per year is not good enough. Even if the level of leadership education continues, a time-constrained environment where leadership is measured in a two-week external evaluation limits experimentation and risk-taking. This does not allow for experimentation on the part of the leader and can negatively impact the spirit of the soldier.

**Leader Evaluation and Risk Management**

In the absence of combat operations the retention of the warrior spirit requires rigorous and realistic training. Unfortunately, assessing the quality of a training event is subjective and particularly problematic for a senior commander who does not have the available time to closely observe the training of all subordinate elements.

On top of the difficult assessment process, the senior commander needs a rehabilitation mechanism which can correct subordinate commander deficiencies as identified. In a situation where a commander identifies an honest mistake in combat, a correction can be put in place in short order to remedy the situation. This allows the subordinate to improve and not make that mistake again.

However, in a training environment the commander is much more likely to hold a single mistake against a subordinate, not allowing him to recover from the incident. This reality stifles risk-taking and individual initiative in training that would allow company-level commanders to learn what works and what does not work. In a zero-defects training environment, subordinate commanders with fewer training opportunities may very well cease experimentation and adopt only proven perfunctory training processes in order to make fewer mistakes. This not only threatens to create less capable leaders, but also force commanders to compare their subordinates using narrow and superficial objective measures.

Objective measures of commander performance are problematic. At least one senior officer has observed that they are at the same time both easily collected and the least valuable indicators of heroic leadership. Yet, these objective measures were the basis for many superior performance reviews prior to immersion in contemporary combat operations. Some experienced senior leaders have warned about basing leadership assessments only on superficial and misleading, but easily quantifiable, data.

For instance, the operation readiness rate, historically a measure of command competence, provides no real check on leadership. Rather, it is a measure of management performance. Recognizing this, if a
subordinate knows that a performance evaluation relies on one quantifiable measure valued by the boss, enormous incentive is created to inflate the measure by resorting to misleading means.

For example, leaders can cease using certain pieces of reportable equipment in training for fear of breaking them in order to create the appearance of operational readiness in certain categories. Not using equipment raises ratings artificially by assuring that equipment is reported as operational on rating reports but in reality reduces operator—as well as unit—readiness by eliminating the ability to train on the equipment. Ambitious but short-sighted and ineffective leaders, who see only the next evaluation or reporting period, may resort to such a strategy to enhance individual chances for promotion. Subordinates to such leaders see such actions too, which can cause them to either lose trust in their leader and the system, emulate their leader’s behavior, or both, especially if such leaders are in the end rewarded by the system. Obviously, people and systems that reward superficial and unethical behavior eventually will be exposed as incapable and untrustworthy—hopefully, not in combat.

**Trust in the Organization**

Trust is the cornerstone of an effective organization as well as a component of a leader’s competency. It is critical that trust exists in an organization because it is the “one specific component of the morale and cohesiveness mosaic which appears crucial, and whose absence or dilution is particularly detrimental to effectiveness over time and under stress.”

Leaders who fail to build trust in their organizations, both up and down the chain of command, create an environment of suspicion that stifles individual initiative. Trust creates transparency in a unit, allowing subordinates to provide constructive feedback on command decisions. In conjunction, seeking feedback or opinions from subordinates prior to an official decision is a greater builder of trust, as it creates buy-in to the direction of the organization.

Moreover, trust is the cornerstone of the concept of mission command. It requires commanders to know the character and traits of subordinates and trust that each can achieve the intent of the operation.

Such trust tends to develop quickly in a combat environment because of the amount of time leaders and soldiers spend together and the stress under which they operate. In contrast, in the absence of a combat environment, trust takes longer to develop. This is problematic given the relatively short time frames that govern officer moves.

Unfortunately, the vital importance of trust to an organization is sometime highlighted by the actions of the untrustworthy. The presence of an ineffective or incompetent leader anywhere in the organization has detrimental effects that are often quickly observable and which undermine the trust required to build effective units.

The Army strives to identify such poor leaders and rehabilitate them by training and mentorship, or, in extreme cases, by dismissing them for the good of the service. The acute problem with this methodology is that subordinates must suffer through the training and rehabilitation periods of leaders who are not performing at an acceptable level.

As the Army transitions to “a leaner, adaptive, flexible and integrated force” it may be necessary to remove poor leaders more quickly in order to maintain the necessary trust within the institution. The removal of poor leaders is a matter of both institutional and personal accountability. Tolerating continued employment of poor leaders violates the trust that “is the bedrock of our honored profession.” Whether it is the bureaucratic nature of the organization that does not allow the rapid departure of poor leaders, or an inability to identify poor leaders, the Army needs to improve in this area.

One way to achieve early identification of deficient leaders would be an improved evaluation system. The current officer and noncommissioned officer evaluation systems are tiered to take into account the perspective of the rater and senior raters only. This method is inherently flawed because it gives no input to those personnel most intimately knowledgeable of the leadership of the rated individual. Subordinate feedback is not included in the evaluation systems and it is against current Army standards of conduct to seek subordinate feedback when completing a performance evaluation.

Though a 360-Degree Leader Assessment is now required by Army regulation for all field grade officers, this assessment is not yet incorporated into the evaluation process. In fact, the results of this requirement are seldom used for any purpose other
than personal reflection. As a result, at present, the sum-total of input of subordinates to a leadership assessment is a rater asking subordinate officers if they have completed the requirement, and many times the question is not even asked.

Nevertheless, implementing a subordinate leader assessment to determine leadership capacity may be fraught with problems, the largest of which is that it potentially could turn selection for leadership positions into popularity contests. One obvious problem is that a popular leader may not necessarily be the most effective in terms of mission accomplishment. Therefore, whether an effective subordinate leader assessment concept works or not again boils down to trust. If trust exists throughout the organization then we can trust the judgment of our subordinates concerning the competence and quality of the leadership that potentially would lead them into harm’s way. A proposal for both capturing subordinate feedback and determining the authenticity of the remarks pertaining to the quality of leadership of the individual being evaluated is therefore necessary.

In a related issue, determining what level of subordinates gain input to the leader assessment may be difficult. But, for example, assume that only immediate subordinates would provide input. One avenue for collecting evaluation would be providing subordinates access to a survey on their leaders through Army Knowledge Online.

The exact series of such a battery of questions would require the involvement of experts in psychology, military leadership, and survey techniques and not just the opinions of the author. That said, under the concept, the first question in the survey might ask, “Is this person an effective leader?” If the subordinate answers ‘yes’ then the survey continues with questions to quantify the leader’s positive attributes. If the subordinate answers ‘no’ then further questioning is required to peel back the reasons behind the negative opinion.

Once the feedback is compiled, a copy is furnished to the rated officer, as well as to the senior rater. Given that senior raters are the most experienced leaders in the chain of command, they could either incorporate the feedback into their portion of the evaluation or discard the results. To complete the feedback loop the senior rater would have to state that the rated officer was counseled on the subordinate feedback regardless of whether or not it affects the officer’s evaluation. Despite potential problems, such a system has great potential for weeding out toxic leaders early, and promoting those who have the greatest ability to engender confidence in both their superiors and subordinates. This could greatly enhance the overall command climate of Army units.

**Command Climate**

The Army understands the importance of a positive command climate. Members of every company-sized unit are required to complete surveys that provide the commander feedback on factors such as leadership, morale, and unit cohesion. While the feedback from these surveys often reinforces a commander’s assessment of the status of the unit, it can also highlight specific leadership failures within the chain of command. The in-vogue label for organizationally destructive leadership personalities is toxic leadership. Although no exact definition exists, it is accepted that “toxic leaders are individuals whose behavior appears driven by self-centered careerism at the expense of their subordinates and unit, and whose style is characterized by abusive and dictatorial behavior that promotes an unhealthy organizational climate.”

Removing leaders that fit this description is an important step to maintaining a command climate that allows the warrior spirit to thrive.

In contrast, if senior leaders do not create the conditions for effective leaders to produce positive command climates, then the warrior spirit will fall victim to risk aversion, distrust, and poor leadership in the Army. Apart from active measures to eliminate toxic leaders, increasing leadership education among company-grade officers to enhance leadership skills, ethics, and technical competence is an excellent step towards building the command climates required to sustain the warrior spirit in soldiers.

Additionally, having transparent conversations about the negative effects of toxic leadership on the Army as an entire organization is also critical. This will demonstrate that the Army’s senior leaders are aware that toxic leaders exist in the ranks. However, measures to identify them and remove such toxic leaders from service are as yet inadequate. Such leaders, if identified at all, are currently shuffled to different assignments.
instead of being pushed out of the Army, simply allowing them to be toxic someplace else.

Actions are necessary to weed out those leaders who are detrimental to the overall cohesion and morale in individual units. It is not enough to discuss the dangers of poor leadership. The Army must make a concerted effort to dismiss these leaders in order to gain the trust of the talented leaders who combine skilled management with heroic leadership.

Conclusion

The warrior spirit currently exists in the Army, and it is a critical factor in our combat success. As the Army reverts back to a peacetime environment, special efforts must be made to promote an Army-wide command climate that nurtures and preserves the warrior ethos. Otherwise, talented officers and NCOs that are both heroic leaders and expert managers will find another line of work as they lose faith that the Army is serious about remaining a combat-focused institution dedicated to retaining the warrior spirit.

Senior leaders must underwrite subordinate risk-taking and evaluate subordinates on the command climate that they foster at the company level. Also, as the Army transitions to a leaner force there is an opportunity to identify poor leaders, thank them for their service, and force them to find a new line of work. By taking this step, the warrior spirit can remain part of the organizational culture, and the Army can remain capable of accomplishing the mission.

Notes

12. Janowitz, 32.
13. Ibid., xix.
15. Ibid., 21.
21. Ibid., 5.
22. Ibid.
23. AR 350-1, 70.
25. Frank J. Siltman, Field Artillery Captains Career Course Program of Instruction, 1 February 2010, 3-1.
27. Christopher Cavoli, 1 December 2012, in discussion with the author.
28. Cavoli.
30. Ulmer, 54.

REMEMBERING FALLUJAH, 2004

In commemorating the 10th anniversary of Operation Al Fajr, the second battle of Fallujah, the Combat Studies Institute continues to offer its Fallujah collection of publications and its Fallujah, 2004 virtual staff ride in support of Army and Marine Corps leader development and education.

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The Morality of Intervention by Waging Irregular Warfare

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United States defense strategic guidance issued in 2012 establishes defense priorities to support U.S. security objectives.1 Among the ten primary missions of the U.S. Armed Forces, the strategic guidance calls for capabilities to wage irregular warfare—defined as “a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).”2 While the United States wages irregular warfare against enemies such as al-Qaeda, policy options to achieve U.S. security goals may entail projecting U.S. landpower among other nonstate and state actors in volatile, complex, and ambiguous environments.3

Depending on the context, coming to the aid of nonstate actors, such as a group resisting oppression at the hands of its government, may be deemed prudent to advance, secure, or protect U.S. national interests. Where committing conventional forces may not be appropriate, policymakers still may decide to intervene with special operations forces; this decision would amount to choosing war by supporting a revolt. The intervention would be an initial strategic offensive.

Before the United States decides to initiate such an offensive, it must know how and when the intervention may be considered morally just, legal, and prudent. Establishing moral and legal justification is necessary because strategic goals, and the actions taken to achieve them, must meet the standard of legitimacy. The nature of irregular warfare could seem at first glance to counter principles of justice of war (jus ad bellum) and justice in war (jus in bello). For example, the character of resistance movements, insurgencies, and revolutions varies considerably; sometimes a nonstate entity, such as al-Qaeda, is seeking unjust ends using criminal and terrorist means.

Considering the just war principle that only a proper authority, usually interpreted as a nation-state, can wage a just war, how could the use of violence by any nonstate entity against a state be considered just? Moreover, how can one nation supporting—or fighting against—an insurgency or revolt within another sovereign nation be considered just war?

The respected theorist Michael Walzer, in his book Just and Unjust Wars, originally published in 1977, discusses just war theory from a 20th-century perspective.4 He makes what can be considered a logical case for the legitimacy of certain kinds of violent movements and for intervening to support them. Walzer’s ideas do not represent the only possible point of view on the morality of war. They can, however, provide a baseline for examining arguments justifying insurgencies and other violent movements against a government, and outside military support for them. This paper outlines some of Walzer’s key ideas and then goes further by proposing a model for deciding whether military support to a violent movement in another nation could be considered morally justifiable and prudent. The discussion focuses on the
moral justification for an initial strategic offensive in support of an organized violent movement. It is assumed that U.S. strategic policymakers can assess if military actions are likely to support the nation's strategic goals. Nonetheless, they would not make decisions to intervene in another country based on national interest alone. Among other considerations, they need to understand the moral issues. They need a decision-making model that could help them determine if military intervention would constitute just war; this paper proposes such a model. In addition, military leaders need to understand both practical and moral issues from a military standpoint so they can advise policy makers.

Irregular Warfare and Unconventional Warfare

The dissimilar nature of the strategic purpose and character of the adversaries makes irregular warfare very different than traditional (or conventional) warfare. Joint doctrine describes traditional warfare as “a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states.” When U.S. special operations forces organize, train, and support a nonstate group, it is known as unconventional warfare: “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” Special operations forces, rather than conventional forces, conduct unconventional warfare because they are organized, trained, and equipped to do so; and its activities are likely to occur when and where use of conventional forces would not be appropriate. As unconventional warfare is a core task of U.S. Army Special Forces, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command takes the lead in preparing its special operations forces to conduct unconventional warfare.

When U.S. special operations forces conduct this type of action offensively, the United States violates the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of another nation. The perceived need to protect U.S. interests does not appear to justify the action morally. Nevertheless, other circumstances may justify going to war in this manner. The next three sections analyze traditional justifications for war articulated by Walzer as a legalist paradigm, key concepts of legitimacy, and a theoretical moral basis for nonstate groups to use violence against their government and for other nations to intervene. Then, the discussion uses the proposed moral basis for intervention to develop a decision-making model designed to help U.S. policy makers integrate a timely moral analysis with policy decisions.

Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm

Any list of just war principles contains the foundational idea that nation-states hold a monopoly on the use of force. According to joint doctrine, nation-states choose to wage war against other nation-states to satisfy a wide range of national interests. Walzer guides a nation-state’s decision making when considering war as a policy option—up to a point.

While aggression is never justifiable, according to Walzer, two types of force can be justified morally: defense from state aggression, and support to another state that becomes a victim of aggression. Walzer describes a theory of aggression he refers to as the legalist paradigm, in which he assembles six propositions he considers widely accepted—if not always articulated—by the international community. Walzer’s six propositions are excerpted here (minus the intervening paragraphs):

1. There exists an international society of independent states.
2. This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members—above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
3. Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act.
4. Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defense by the victim; and, a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society.
5. Nothing but aggression can justify war.
6. Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished.

Finding moral justification for nonstate groups waging war—and especially for nations supporting them by waging war within another nation-state’s boundaries—under this framework may seem difficult if not impossible. However, Walzer makes the case for several
exceptions he calls revisions. In addition to sovereign nation-states, Walzer recognizes that international society contains independent political communities, nonstate entities, and geopolitical conditions that at times may legitimately counter state or international order. His justifications for intervention can be paraphrased as—

- responding to imminent threat,
- assisting secessionist movements of legitimate political communities,
- balancing prior nation-state interventions in civil wars,
- rescuing those threatened by massacre, and
- applying prudence by limiting war aims.  

Beyond these exceptions, Walzer discusses the exception of *supreme emergency*, but only under strict criteria of a danger's imminence and the nature of the threat.

**Concepts of Legitimacy**

In addition to terms such as the legalist paradigm and its revisions, defining ideas such as *legitimate political community* and *self-help* helps clarify how concepts of legitimacy relate to the morality of war.

**Legitimate communities and self-help.**

According to Walzer, understanding what constitutes a legitimate political community within a nation-state can help another state determine when an intervention on a community’s behalf is morally justified. According to his theory, a legitimate community passes what he calls the *self-help test*: “a community actually exists whose members are committed to independence and ready and able to determine the conditions of their own existence.”  

For example, Walzer argues that intervening on behalf of a secessionist movement under the second revision of the legalist paradigm requires sufficient evidence that the movement has demonstrated forward progress in its “arduous struggle” for independence.

**Acceptable purposes for intervention.** Just war theory prescribes that deciding when to intervene also requires knowing the *ends* for which a state has a moral right to intervene. The purpose of establishing democracies or liberal political communities does not meet just war theory’s acceptable ends; only the establishment of independent communities does. Intervening states do not have the moral authority to carry out their own political goals with respect to a political community they might be aiding. Moreover, Walzer says that “domestic tyrants are safe [from offensive action],” so long as they have no intent or designs on posing an immediate threat of aggression against another state in the international system. 

While domestic tyrants may be considered safe, from a moral standpoint, from other nations waging war to overthrow them, when communities within their states decide to revolt, and the revolt meets certain threshold conditions, then intervention by another state on behalf of that community may be justified.

**Legitimacy of a political group as an acceptable strategic purpose for irregular warfare.** I believe the threshold conditions set by Walzer’s self-help test are too high. For instance, a resistance movement that represents a legitimate community committed to the cause of independence might not pass this test because it is not capable of carrying out its intent.

Attempting to morally justify resistance movements and insurgencies must begin with understanding their strategic purpose. State and nonstate actors wage irregular warfare “for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population.” Policy makers should consider the movement’s strategic purpose in any moral analysis.

**A Moral Basis for Revolt and Intervention**

Walzer’s first four revisions to the legalist paradigm weigh the relationship between a nation-state and the rights of its people. These revisions allow that conditions within a state may provide moral grounds for insurgency, guerrilla war, and intervention by an outside entity.

**Conditions within a state—a contract and protected common life.** Walzer views the rights of nation-states as originating from the individual rights of their citizens. The state, therefore, has obligations to defend its citizens from outside state aggression and to protect their rights, lives, and liberties, or “common life.”  

A state’s failure to meet these obligations means relinquishing the moral justification for its own defense. This assertion lays a foundation for justifying revolt and intervention. By governing responsibly and protecting individual rights, states derive their legitimacy from their people. This represents a functioning
contract and a protected common life. In contrast, governing oppressively causes a state to lose legitimacy in the eyes of its population; however, the state’s ability to wield power and influence still enables it to enforce the contract, albeit without any guarantee that it will safeguard the common life of its citizens.

Such a circumstance may leave no recourse for the population other than forcibly changing the government or its policies. When a state becomes tyrannical and oppressive, a population’s violent struggle against the state should be considered morally justifiable. In just war terms, a state’s deliberate efforts to oppress and harm its citizens constitute a form of aggression that should justify an internal response to it.

Coercion as a form of state aggression. A prominent just war theorist named Brian Orend, author of The Morality of War, recognizes violation of human rights using coercion as a form of aggression. He concludes, “either states or nonstate actors can commit aggression, which we have seen is what roots a morally justified resort to war.”\(^1\) Tyrannical governments might confront their citizens with a choice equivalent to state aggression: “your rights or your lives.”\(^2\) The citizens’ attempt to compel a government to alter its policies through the use of force, even if it means overthrowing the government, is arguably a kind of independence movement.

A proposed sixth revision to the legalist paradigm. As our own nation arose from revolution, our values “give us the credibility to stand up to tyranny.”\(^3\) Therefore, I believe there is room for exception in just war theory’s treatment of domestic tyrants and suggest adding one more revision to the legalist paradigm.

This revision should allow for aiding violent resistance movements of peoples victimized by government harm and persecution, even if their political community has yet to fully gain the ability to determine its own existence. This means that intervention in a nation-state to stop its oppression of, or deliberate harm to, its citizens may be a morally prudent and justified policy choice.

Decision-Making Models for Choosing Just War

Walzer navigates between two moral extremes for choosing to wage war, either when it is never justified or when survival is at stake. The latter refers to responding to aggression or helping another state in its response to it, which are both the only morally justified reasons under the strict conditions of the legalist paradigm.

A decision-making model under Walzer’s legalist paradigm. The decision model under the principles in the legalist paradigm may look like figure 1. The moral decision point for war becomes absolute under a national interest of survival or when coming to the aid of another state in its struggle for survival.

Walzer’s first four revisions to the legalist paradigm allow some room between these two poles. For example, Walzer describes cases that justify outside intervention, such as when a state’s violation of the rights of its citizens stands out as “so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination or ‘arduous struggle’ seem cynical and irrelevant.”\(^4\) He also allows for humanitarian intervention and rescuing people from massacre where the goal is limited solely to rescue without any additional political objectives.\(^5\)
Decision making under Walzer’s revisions to the legalist paradigm. These kinds of cases for intervention are consistent with the core principles of *The Responsibility to Protect* as laid out by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). Depicted graphically, the scale might look something like figure 2. The decision point becomes less absolute. While intervention may be morally justified and legal, national interests will determine whether or not intervention may be deemed prudent.

When a guerrilla war is considered just for reasons such as government tyranny, oppression, and deliberate harm to citizens, and when considering state-sponsored intervention in support of such a revolt, even with Walzer’s revisions the moral decision point comes too late. I propose a sixth revision that would establish a new decision point: Should one nation find it morally just, legal, and prudent (in that order) to intervene by coming to the aid of a violent resistance movement or guerrilla war in another nation, intervention may tip the scales towards that political community’s achievement of self-help status, thereby earning its legitimate political community rights.

A temporal decision-making model under the proposed sixth revision to the legalist paradigm. Wars of self-determination, civil wars, and guerrilla wars pose especially complex moral issues. From Walzer’s point of view, guerrilla war might only be considered justified if it passed a high threshold. Walzer refers to this as a “continuum of increasing difficulty.” Within this continuum, at some point guerrillas may acquire war rights. Conversely, at a later point, the government attempting to counter them may ultimately lose its war rights. Moreover, Walzer says that some of these endeavors will reach a tipping point, specifically when they garner the overwhelming majority of popular support and achieve the condition of *levée en masse*, or mass mobilization. He asserts that when guerrilla war achieves that degree of backing, an antiguerrella war can no longer be won; therefore, waging war against the guerrillas can no longer be morally justified.

Logically, Walzer’s tipping point appears synonymous with an insurgency or guerrilla war passing the self-help test. When insurgencies, resistance movements, and guerrilla activities emerge in response to government oppression and deliberate harm of its subjects, an outside state-sponsored intervention in support of these activities enables Walzer’s tipping point to be reached earlier. Therefore, should U.S. policy makers believe an intervention on behalf of an internal community waging war against a tyrant is morally just and in the U.S. national interest, deciding when to intervene may differ from deciding to intervene under Walzer’s first four revisions, primarily due to the requirements of the self-help test.

The proposed sixth revision accounts for the gap. Moreover, it seems consonant with Walzer’s “continuum of increasing difficulty.” The sixth revision also provides a moral basis for responding to an internal community’s suffering due to “deliberate state action” when there is not a “large scale loss of life” to trigger “the just cause threshold” described in *The
Responsibility to Protect. Decision making under this proposal might appear as Figure 3.

It is within this space where I suggest that moral justification for state-sponsored unconventional warfare emerges. Of note, understanding how and when to determine moral justification for this type of irregular warfare policy option still requires adherence to strict just war theory criteria to sustain this validation and ultimately, legitimacy. The purpose of the unconventional warfare operation must be limited to defeating the military capabilities of the oppressive state, not imposing new political systems. After a political community rises from oppression through achieving military victory, its struggle for legitimacy is not complete, but it must build its own sovereign political identity.

The intervening nation would find no moral basis for pushing its own political agenda during this process. Doing so delegitimizes the key element of independent self-help and, consequently, places the legitimacy of the entire effort in jeopardy.

Choosing to assist a resistance movement requires a distinct decision-making process. Moral reasons alone do not justify intervention. The culture of the oppressed group and a practical assessment of its ability (with assistance) to carry out its intent to become independent must be considered. In addition, the joint force must be prepared to help assess the group’s military capabilities so senior defense leaders can make informed recommendations to policy makers.

Opposing views. Critics might argue that a sixth revision to the legalist paradigm is a convenient way to justify interventions meant only to achieve national interests—or even to mask their intent behind a façade of morally just language. They might insist that the proposed revision serves to justify preemptive wars and forcible regime change. Opponents might also say that the clandestine nature of unconventional warfare makes it morally suspect from the outset.

My response to these arguments rests on the legalist paradigm. Unconventional warfare is a means to support what should be regarded as legitimate communities in their violent struggles against government oppression and deliberate harm. The overarching moral intent is to foster a better future environment and better peace for them, and possibly for us.

Additionally, unconventional warfare methods emphasize economy of force with small special forces operational detachments helping indigenous resistance movements. In contrast, the larger scale of operations to be conducted by conventional forces to support such an undertaking would raise doubts about U.S. goals as well as the legitimacy of the resistance movement. Any resistance movement needs to struggle and achieve its own ends—legitimacy and influence—rather than having an outside military force do the fighting on its behalf.

The initial campaign in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 attacks is an example of unconventional warfare. This campaign enabled the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government. It demonstrated the effectiveness of conducting unconventional warfare as an initial strategic offensive through the specialized landpower capabilities of the U.S. military.
Conclusion

National interests guide the choices of U.S. policy makers. When contemplating the use of the military instrument of national power to achieve policy objectives through war, either traditional or irregular, three considerations should remain at the forefront: moral, legal, and prudential. The questions resulting from these deliberations should be sequenced as follows:

- Are we justified?
- Are we following the law?
- Can we actually do what is proposed?

Reflecting on these questions also contributes to the moral, ethical, and intellectual development of the members of the profession of arms.

Moving forward in accordance with defense strategic guidance, the Army will continue to play a major role in the joint force’s robust foreign internal defense, theater security cooperation, and theater engagement efforts. It should find itself well-suited for this effort. These capabilities should be augmented by maintaining the Army’s unconventional warfare competency.

Ultimately, intervening by waging irregular warfare alongside an insurgency within and against another country would come with moral dilemmas for the United States and its military forces. As the Department of Defense builds its capacity to perform this primary mission against enemies such as al-Qa’ida, understanding what constitutes moral justification for irregular and unconventional warfare should be part of our joint and Army discourse. To be grounded in irregular warfare principles to the same degree as traditional warfare requires deeper understanding of irregular warfare’s purpose and moral standing. Before establishing a policy of intervention or ordering the military to take action, U.S. policy makers would need to weigh the moral implications of intervention to ensure their rationale and the military’s actions were legitimate. Otherwise, the United States could be violating the principles that help determine when an entity has a legitimate right to wage war.

Notes

3. In Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, May 2012), Army doctrine defines landpower as, “the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.”
5. See JP 1.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Walzer, 62. According to the legalist paradigm, “aggression justifies two kinds of violent responses: a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society.”
10. Ibid., 61-62.
11. Ibid.
12. JP 1, 252.
13. Walzer, 93.
The need to understand and anticipate human behavior has been an integral part of war since the very inception of armed conflict between organized groups, dating back to (and most likely before) Sun Tzu. He contended that knowing yourself as well as your enemy was vital to consistent success in battle, while not understanding either force was certain to result in peril.¹

Notwithstanding, the science of psychology as a formal tool for refining the necessary understanding of human behavior as it relates to war is relatively new within the scientific community. As such, when compared to the longer histories of other fields of applied science, psychology has only been defined and formally organized for research relatively recently.

Despite its relatively short history as a formal discipline, modern psychological research has evolved as modern warfare has evolved, expanding its influence on measures taken to shape a war’s onset, conduct, and outcome.

Dr. Michael D. Matthews captures this progression in his book Head Strong: How Psychology is Revolutionizing War, effectively arguing that current...
and forthcoming changes in psychological research and development will be vital to the composition, training, equipping, and employment of the military of 2030 and beyond. Matthews served as a professor of engineering psychology and deputy head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy. His background as a former service member and psychologist provides the requisite knowledge and expertise to address current and future impacts of psychology on the military.

The book begins by addressing the impacts of psychology on recruiting and training soldiers. Matthews predicts that the use of advanced personality testing will help identify the qualities needed for success as a service member, while modernized neuroscience mapping may potentially identify individual susceptibility to disorders such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. Next he addresses the criticality of building soldier resilience. Matthews lauds the implementation of the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness Program and predicts that the program will continue to evolve in both efficiency and application to different services.

Matthews places strong emphasis on highlighting cultural awareness (or competence) as key to understanding human behavior. He illustrates that language training by itself is inadequate as cultural training, and predicts that success in future conflicts will be greatly influenced by the understanding of the indigenous culture in and around which the military operates. Overall, the future force will be more thoroughly selected, vetted, and trained to conduct its assigned missions.

Matthews also tackles the contentious topics of diversity and generational differences in the military. He identifies the racial desegregation of military units, as well as the integration of women and homosexual service members, as significant developments of the past 70 years. Matthews predicts that the military of 2030 and beyond will be comprised of more minority races, females, and members of alternate sexual orientation.

An undertone of social change is present in each of his topics and predictions. As the military is currently comprised of three to four different generational types (e.g., X, Y, Millennials), the predictions indicate paradigm shifts that many mid-to-senior-level leaders may not fully understand or personally support. The author highlights the evolving requirements for future leaders. He believes the proficiency of the new generation’s leaders must extend beyond technical skills and knowledge of systems to include political, social, and cultural competencies. Additionally, future leaders will be more successful using an egalitarian personality or approach more than an authoritarian one. Matthews does not believe that a leader like Gen. George S. Patton would be successful in the 21st century.

The book concludes by addressing the use of technology and its psychological implications to develop better soldiers, which will help build a more efficient and capable future force. Matthews believes psychologists will work in partnership with engineers and physical scientists to advance soldier and system performance. He clearly articulates a major theme: technology and physical advances are not the only means to improve the force. The armed forces of 2030 and beyond must have soldiers who are psychologically capable, resilient, and highly trained to effectively take advantage of technological advances. The author states, “to get the most out of its soldiers and systems, the military must aggressively incorporate state-of-the-art psychology into all aspects of its missions.” He also discusses the possibility of psychology helping to improve diplomatic and international relations to (hopefully) prevent unnecessary war.

Head Strong is a fascinating and insightful text; however, there are some minor shortcomings worth mentioning. The first is the author’s inherent bias toward the “softer” science of psychology and related fields that permeates the text. Even so, this bias does not undermine the credibility of the issues, predictions, and the majority of contentions that Matthews presents.

Another minor flaw involves the citation of Army doctrine, specifically references to field manuals (e.g., FM 6-22) which have since been replaced by Army doctrine publications (e.g., ADP 6-22). This second issue is indicative of the timing of publication, as the manuscript was most likely published before the Army introduced Doctrine 2015, its current doctrinal reference structure.

A third shortcoming is Matthews’ occasional use of absolute terminology to support future predictions. He sporadically structures his claims in such a way as to negate the possibility of the other outcomes. One example concerning resilience is his statement that, in the future, “all soldiers will want to improve their
resilience.” The general point the author intended to make is clear, but the verbiage used creates an absolute postulation and does not account for an inevitable standard deviation. A different example concerns the use of aptitude test results to select soldiers for the most appropriate jobs. He states that soldiers “placed into optimal jobs will work together better as teams.” The overall argument is accurate, but similar technical aptitudes may not be an infallible predictor of enhanced teamwork and productivity.

A final deficiency is Matthews’ perspective on baseline physical fitness standards. His discussion on the topic implies disagreement with standardized assessments of physical fitness. Although he clearly highlights the positive psychological benefits of physical fitness for overcoming obstacles, Matthews also argues that new technologies require enhanced cognitive skills. His implicit argument that technical skills may be of more importance than physical attributes results in a claim that “the relevance of a one-size-fits-all physical training standard may be called into question.”

This premise is false; the Army physical fitness standards are not currently one-size-fits-all. Alternate events and standards exist for individuals with legitimate physical limitations such as injuries. For those who do not possess physical limitations, the baseline standard exists as a measure of performance and a degree of separation from the average U.S. citizen. I predict that the military of 2030 and beyond will not want average U.S. citizens, but those who can be molded to become above average in all dimensions (to include the physical).

Overall, Matthews presents a well-structured, relevant, and multidimensional argument about the future impacts of psychological research and development for the armed forces. He discusses current trends in recruiting, training, and developing soldiers, and provides predictions on every topic. Matthews broaches the contentious topic of diversity within the ranks; his current assessment of the impact to the force is credible, and his thoughts on projected changes are certainly feasible.

Despite the previously discussed issues, Head Strong is certainly a worthwhile read for all officers. I also recommend this book for mid- to senior-level noncommissioned officers across all branches of the military. These audiences comprise key populations currently leading soldiers in the midst of changes driven by psychology. They will be influential as future changes come to fruition. If understanding ourselves and our adversaries is essential to success in warfare, then the significance of psychological developments on our future military force cannot be understated.

NOTES

3. Ibid., 29.
4. Ibid., 90.
5. Ibid., 106.
6. Ibid., 123.
7. Ibid., 163.
8. Ibid., 169.
9. Ibid., 174.
10. Ibid., 193.
11. Ibid., 215.
12. Ibid., 86.
13. Ibid., 30.
14. Ibid., 49.
Forty years ago, Jeffrey Race published a book about the conflict in Vietnam called *War Comes to Long An*. Now considered a classic, the book offered a sophisticated microhistory of the Vietnam War from the perspective of a single district, one where Race had served as a district advisor. The strength of the book came from insights lost in the more macro and strategic accounts of that complex war.

In his new book *War Comes to Garmser*, historian Carter Malkasian seeks the same kind of local analysis for one of the small places of the war in Afghanistan. He focuses on Garmser District, a slice of Helmand Province located close to the southern border with Pakistan. Malkasian bases his work on his own experience serving in Garmser as the political officer for a district reconstruction team from 2009 to 2011. What results is one of the most important books written on our long war in Afghanistan.

Malkasian uses the perspective of a historian to seek the deep roots of conflict in Garmser and he finds them, among other places, in the well-intentioned and ambitious irrigation project launched by the United States in Helmand Province in the 1950s. The project opened large areas of land to agriculture and inspired the Afghan government to encourage small, landless tribes from outside the district to settle in Garmser. The larger tribes with a longer history in the region resented the newcomers and did what they could to marginalize them, creating an enduring rift in the social fabric of the district. In a classic example of unintended consequences, when the Taliban originally emerged in Garmser in the mid-90s, they found their earliest adherents among the immigrant tribes.

The Taliban also worked hard to build support among a class of notables who, until then, had limited political power: the mullahs. Between the mullahs and the immigrant tribes, the Taliban built a base of support that outlasted their original overthrow in 2001. These same constituencies helped to restore Taliban rule to Garmser in 2006.

In reviewing the 30 years of conflict in Garmser, Malkasian seeks to answer the question of whether U.S. efforts to build peace and effective governance in this strange and remote land—“the graveyard of empires”—were doomed from the start. He concludes they were not, and the last half of his book considers the U.S. Army surge in Afghanistan and the protracted campaign to take Garmser back from the Taliban. It is the story of missed opportunities and little victories that ultimately resulted in a hard-won and fragile success. Malkasian concludes with the key to success: “In war: resolution.”

One possible criticism of the book is that Malkasian has largely written himself out of this story. In this, he has been too modest. Others judged him to be one of the most effective civilian advisors to serve in Afghanistan. In his book, *Little America*, Rajiv Chandrasekaran writes, “He won the trust of skeptical residents through countless meetings and roadside conversations, pressing them to reject the insurgency and support their government.” By mastering the Pashto language and immersing himself in the nuanced elements of tribal culture, Malkasian came to be referred by the natives of Garmser as *sahib*, an Urdu title of special respect. The local Marine Corps commander believed winning the war against the Taliban meant that every district needed someone with Malkasian’s skills. Sadly, Chandrasekaran found him to be the outlier among the U.S. civilians serving in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, along with a clear writing style, the strengths of this book are Malkasian’s deep understanding of both sides of the insurgency, and his willingness to draw larger conclusions from his experience in Garmser. It is not too soon to consider this a classic. War Comes to Garmser is very highly recommended. 

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No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad


In his 2010 book My Life with the Taliban, Abdul Salam Zaeef, a senior founding member of the Taliban and former ambassador to Pakistan, notes that—

Pakistan ... is so famous for treachery that it is said they can get milk from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head so they can speak everyone’s language; they use everybody, deceive everybody.” But Pakistan is not alone in its alleged duplicity. America has been equally fickle and calculating with its relationships too.

No Exit from Pakistan highlights two contradictory nations with two fundamentally differing perspectives. Deception, torment, newsworthy misdeeds, and abandonments are claimed on both sides, and contradictory versions of shared history are pervasive. It is little wonder that the book’s author, Daniel S. Markey, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and former State Department policy planner, highlights that relations between Washington and Islamabad have often run from maddening to exasperating—and will probably continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

No Exit from Pakistan is a deeply impressive and compelling study. Markey dexterously articulates the intricate and evolving United States-Pakistan relationship from 1947 onwards, noting that when Pakistan was accommodating, it enjoyed big-hearted American assistance and attention. However, when Pakistan was uncooperative, the tap of support was quickly turned off. It is little wonder that the author posits that, “Washington has viewed the country [Pakistan] as a means to other ends, whether that meant fighting communism or terrorism.” But Pakistan has also played a clever cat-and-mouse game in this regard, regularly dipping into the deep pockets of the United States to serve its purposes—occasionally crooked but more often driven by the perceived steady menace of its neighbor, India.

Dependence on U.S. assistance dollars, weapons, and protection is a convincing argument well made. More recently, Pakistan’s internal troubles have threatened the safety and international peace of the United States, and its burgeoning population, nuclear program, and relationships with China and India (Washington cannot afford to deal with Islamabad in a vacuum) underscore that Pakistan will figure highly in U.S. foreign policy. All told, Pakistan’s collapse or breakup would be disastrous—and not just for the West. It is hardly surprising that the author concludes that it would be little more than wishful thinking to believe that neglecting the challenges posed by Pakistan will make them go away.

Over seven compelling chapters, the author helps the reader understand Pakistan on its own terms, highlighting that the United States has stumbled in its dealings with Pakistan because policymakers made mistaken assumptions about how Pakistan works. He describes United States-Pakistan relations during and after the Musharraf era, including Pakistan’s drone debate, and provides a regional perspective of the United States-Pakistan association. The study concludes with three options for a future U.S. strategy: defensive insulation, military-first cooperation, and comprehensive cooperation.

The author notes, “To be clear, these options are in fact points along a spectrum of U.S. policy choices and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The real skill, assuming that such a strategy could be adopted, will be how best to balance—and re-balance—between the three in order to advance America’s short, mid, and long-term goals.” Markey is wise to note that progress, of any sort, will only be achieved through a patient, sustained effort, not by way of quick fixes, smoke and mirrors, or abandonment.

In-depth, balanced, and insightful, No Exit from Pakistan is a must-read study. It will appeal to academics, diplomats, policy formers, strategists, and laymen.
alike—i.e., anyone concerned with the fate of the region. Few will be let down by its well-researched narrative, comprehensive analysis, and convincing recommendations; it pulls no punches and stands out from the growing crowd of manuscripts on the topic. This is without doubt the best book I have read on the subject and I recommend it most strongly. Despite historical and ever-present everyday challenges, *No Exit from Pakistan* makes clear why neither side can afford to let the U.S.-Pakistan relationship fold and, uncomfortably, why a close partnership is probably unattainable in the short term. The United States is trapped in its relationship with Pakistan; at least in the short term there is absolutely no exit.

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**PIRATE ALLEY:**
**Commanding Task Force 151 Off Somalia**
Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, U.S. Navy, Retired, and Michael Hirsh, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 2012, 272 pages, $29.95

...provides a good look inside the piracy occurring off the coast of Somalia. It is co-authored by retired Rear Adm. Terry McKnight, former commanding officer of Anti-Piracy Combined Task Force 151, which operates in the Gulf of Aden area. To the average reader the problem of piracy appears to be one of numbers—not having enough naval vessels to guard the passage of ships as they transit through the shipping lanes along the coast of Somalia.

McKnight explains in extraordinary detail the multitude of problems associated with patrolling this area. From the sheer size of the area (2.6 million square miles), to the endless legal issues (such as who has jurisdiction over captured Somalia pirates operating a hijacked boat from Yemen that attacked a Panamanian flagged shipped crewed by Filipinos that set sail from Dubai going to Kenya carrying food for a UN food program), when Somalia does not have laws against piracy or a functioning government.

McKnight describes the nature and character of the so-called pirates not as fisherman at all, but rather as front-line (non-swimming) soldiers from inland areas of organized crime looking to make fast money in order to leave Somalia. He also addresses the pros and cons of paying ransoms for the return of the ship and sailors. This is just the tip of a complex business network: financiers, negotiators, suppliers, soldiers, and high-ranking government officials all vie for their cut of the ransom money.

He also devotes several chapters to explain the evolution of maritime operations, military and commercial, necessitated to reduce the risk of hijackings. These include military intervention as well as arming commercial vessels with professional contracted security teams; both of these have myriad second and third order problems that are not easily solved. He also includes other details about the rescue of Captain Richard Phillips from the CTF 151 perspective that were not addressed in Richard Phillips’ book or the recently released Tom Hanks movie, *Captain Phillips*. The last two chapters look at strategies, tactics, and possible future options.

Why read this book? To take a quote from page 202, "With more than 90 percent of the goods that fill the shelves of your local Walmart and 50 percent of the globe’s petroleum passing through the high-risk area, including the Gulf of Aden and far out into the Indian Ocean, how could it not be a national security issue?" A must read for military and national strategists.

**Lt. Col. George Hodge, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

**ALVIN YORK:**
**A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne**

Douglas Mastriano’s book *Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne* takes the reader through the life of Alvin York. The author begins with a brief coverage of York’s early development as a simple backwoodsman and then his experiences as a soldier leading up to 8 October 1918. Fittingly, one entire chapter focuses on York’s action in the engagement in which he
Alvin York was born into a typical hard-scrabble existence common to many Americans raised in the backwoods areas of the country in the late 1880s. The Cumberland Valley of Tennessee was in many respects a good representation of the predominantly rural America of that time. Families scratched out a living from the land with subsistence farming, augmented by hunting and fishing. There was a strong religious element within rural communities as well as a brawling, moonshine-drinking element that took to the bars on weekends. Alvin York was intimately familiar with both elements before he took his place at the “mourners’ bench” on New Year’s Day, 1915, when he accepted the Lord as his savior.

Alvin’s relatively strict brand of religion led him to request status as a conscientious objector and, despite numerous appeals his request was never accepted. Alvin was lucky that some of early military leaders were also men of strong religious convictions. They had many discussions that eventually enabled Alvin to reconcile fighting for his country with his religious views. Like many new soldiers from rural backgrounds, Alvin had little difficulty with the physical rigors and discomforts of soldier training; in fact, his exposure to men from different parts of the country and recent immigrants was probably the greater challenge.

Many rural soldiers had difficulty with sea sickness while traveling to first England and then on to France. Once in France, his unit had experiences typical of most American expeditionary forces as they moved from the coast of France into training areas where they learned tactics, techniques, and procedures from French and British veterans. Alvin’s unit, the 328th Regiment of the 82nd Division, was eased into the lines of a “quiet sector” east of Verdun. Known as the Woëvre Front, Lagny Sector, this quiet sector nonetheless afforded York’s 328th Regiment the complete laundry list of experiences to be expected in the coming battles. They patrolled in no-man’s land, endured artillery barrages and gas attacks, and both conducted and defended against trench line raids.

After its baptism by fire, York’s unit moved to the vicinity of Châtel Chéhéry to play their role in the Argonne Offensive. York’s unit attacked on 8 October 1918 and he took his place among the great warriors in American history. Mastriano takes the reader step by step, rush by rush, through York’s actions in the fight. York used his hunting skills, honed by placing food on his family’s table, and his faith in God to take him through the fighting—to accomplish one of the greatest recorded feats on a battlefield in American military history. With source materials from both German and U.S. historical files, Mastriano provided details of the fight such that readers will feel they are part of the battle. When York marches his 132 captives back into friendly lines he is asked if has captured the whole German army.

Mastriano takes the reader through the remainder of York’s service until his return to the United States on 22 May 1919. Mastriano details how York’s fame grows—despite York’s incredible personal humbleness and refusal to make any fuss over his actions. The story of York’s homecoming—complete with ticker tape parade in New York City—is almost comical. The simple soldier York only wanted to go home and resume his life but he was tugged in various directions by many looking to take advantage of his fame. Upon his return home York continues to refuse offers that would have made him a rich man and Mastriano details York’s efforts to bring education and opportunity to the young people of his rural community as well as his efforts to warn of the dangers posed by Hitler prior to World War II.

The final brief chapter tells of Mastriano’s efforts to accurately locate the specific location of York’s Medal of Honor fight. Though detailed—and convincing to this reader—this chapter detracts slightly from an otherwise excellent book’s focus not only of a true hero of the Argonne, but also a true American civic hero. I believe all readers will find Mastriano’s book to be an easy, informative, and enjoyable read.

MACARTHUR’S WAR: The Flawed Genius Who Challenged the American Political System
Bevin Alexander, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2014, 248 pages, $25.95

An accomplished military historian, Bevin Alexander provides civil and military leaders another stark historical reminder of the imperative of effective civil-military relations in war. He provides a fair, balanced, and often critical narrative of decisions and actions of two major antagonists, President Harry Truman and Gen. Douglas MacArthur, before and during the Korean War. Alexander provides three major themes that contributed to his designation of MacArthur as a “flawed genius”: MacArthur’s larger than life ego; high-stakes political infighting; and a near complete lack of situational understanding concerning Far Eastern affairs, especially Chinese motives and intentions related to Korea. Alexander’s narrative expertly weaves critical connections between the themes, providing readers with a keen insight of the rationale and necessity for Truman’s relief of MacArthur as the U.S. senior commander of the Far Eastern Command.

The book’s opening paragraphs effectively establish the decision-making dilemmas faced by U.S. civilian and military leaders during past and present wars, and the tenuous balance between civilian supremacy in decision making and professional military expertise. Although controversial civil-military relations are not new topics in American military history, the relationship was severely tested on the Korean Peninsula in 1950 where problems were compounded by an international, political, and military environment where leader decisions and actions were frequently wrong.

While MacArthur’s hubris is well documented, the author reiterated his larger than life reputation as an intellectual five-star general who exited World War II as a hero of the Pacific theater. As a highly successful military proconsul credited with the reconstruction of post-war Japan, he was an imposing figure ostensibly well-suited for supreme military leadership in the Far East at the outbreak of the Korean War. However, along with his substantial credentials spanning five decades came an unbearable ego, unbending support for the overthrown Nationalist Chinese government, and an entrenched belief that World War III was not a matter of if, but when, and anything short of total victory, regardless of costs, in any war was anathema to U.S. interests.

With this understanding of MacArthur, Alexander effectively addressed the politics surrounding the relations between Truman and the “flawed genius.” He paints the Truman administration as one highly criticized by political opponents, that struggled mightily to maintain international credibility, and was considered by most as neophytes of the geopolitical climate in the Far East due to an unwavering focus on Europe and the Soviet Union. These, combined with having to deal with an ego-driven MacArthur with presidential aspirations, made dealing with Korean affairs especially contentious, and underscored the multi-faceted complexities faced by U.S. presidents during war.

Although often critical of Truman, Alexander rightfully credits the president with a keen understanding of the realities and horrors of a potential nuclear World War III, an understanding of the importance of relationships within the United Nations and traditional allies, and the courage to recognize and act upon MacArthur’s insubordinate activities and actions even in the face of intense political fallout.

Treating all participants objectively, Alexander is equally critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and their approach to Far Eastern affairs, their total unpreparedness and surprise by the invasion of North Korea, and their initial unwillingness to confront MacArthur’s supreme persona, especially after Inchon’s success. However, Alexander credits the JCS for finally standing up to the realities of the “flawed genius” in congressional hearings, eventually swaying public opinion and thwarting political intent to use MacArthur as a means of denigrating the president.

Given the contentious relationship between MacArthur and Truman, manifest in MacArthur’s public statements causing consternation among allies and blatant disregard for presidential orders, Alexander provides overwhelming evidence as to why MacArthur’s relief was essential. This book provides readers with a valuable narrative of the variables that placed an American president and an insubordinate general on a colliding trajectory the outcome of which affected the geopolitical landscape of the Far East and
fundamental American beliefs of civilian-military relations in ways that still exist today.

Bill McCollum, Ed.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN AMERICA: The Making of Douglas MacArthur

Mark Perry’s efforts as an author reflect eclectic interests ranging from accounts of terrorism and the collection of intelligence to the remarkable account of Mark Twain’s assistance to Ulysses S. Grant as the ailing president wrote his autobiography. The Most Dangerous Man in America is his ninth book. It is a first-rate account of complex relationships between the men who waged war in the Pacific and the key policy makers at the top in Washington. However, it is not truly a biography of MacArthur as the title implies.

The Most Dangerous Man begins with a vignette in which Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in a conversation with an associate, describes Huey Long as the second most dangerous man in America. When asked if Long was second, who then was the most dangerous, Roosevelt responded, “Huey is only second. The first is Douglas MacArthur.”

Perry’s book is not about MacArthur as much as it is about Roosevelt and MacArthur. The careers of these two great men ran together beginning in the 1930s when MacArthur served as chief of staff of the Army and beyond Roosevelt’s death. (MacArthur presided over Japan’s surrender, served as proconsul in Japan, and led U.S. forces in Korea because Roosevelt had made it so.)

They were closely involved but not close. Roosevelt and MacArthur thrust, parried, and counterthrust at each other for more than a dozen years. In fact, they needed and warily respected each other even if their outward cordiality was just for show. The relationship was uneven. Roosevelt stuck by MacArthur who never rewarded the President with any genuine personal loyalty. For his part, MacArthur seems to have understood that in FDR he had met his match.

Perry, to his credit, stays out of the story. He is more circumspect about MacArthur than some other biographers. Clearly he respects the general’s achievements but sees MacArthur’s dark side. Capable of petty complaints and bitter personal enmity, MacArthur also proved susceptible to sycophants. Perry sees this but illustrates that all of the protagonists who made national security policy in Washington and waged war in the Pacific had their foibles. He believes that Douglas MacArthur deserves to be remembered as a brilliant operational commander capable, despite his many shortcomings, of forming effective teams of diverse partners. In many ways, MacArthur set the standard in World War II for mounting truly effective joint operations. He found ways, despite bickering with Nimitz and King, to work effectively with the Navy and with the sometimes fractious Army Air Force.

In the end, he worked well with Adm. Nimitz, Adm. Spruance, Adm. Halsey, and Adm. Kinkaid. Kinkaid, who served as MacArthur’s maritime component commander, became an admirer. MacArthur had an equally close relationship with then Maj. Gen. George Kenney, who commanded his air component. Apparently shocked into indolence, MacArthur’s performance in the early days of World War II could well have led to his relief. Instead Roosevelt and Marshal, both derided by MacArthur in private, stood by him. MacArthur’s subsequent actions justified their support.

Perry is at his best when discussing strategic decision making in the Pacific. The intense debate at the top over priorities that drove resources shows the many protagonists both at their worst and best. MacArthur proved effective in working even with those he disagreed with. Those who expected to dislike him, including Halsey, found working with him surprisingly easy. MacArthur both goaded and rewarded those who worked for him. Dour, competent, and courageous Gen. Walter Krueger often pushed back successfully. MacArthur sometimes “encouraged” Krueger by comparing him unfavorably to Gen. Robert Eichelberger. Eichelberger, who had the thinnest skin among a group of very thin-skinned men, required praise far more than did Krueger. MacArthur knew how to manage most men. But Perry shows that the general often was not as effective with those closest to him including his chief of staff, then Lt. Col. Richard Sutherland.
Perry’s assessment of MacArthur’s generalship rests quite accurately on MacArthur’s concept and execution of Operation Cartwheel and on the debate over whether to make the final approach to the Japanese home islands through the Philippines or Formosa. During Operation Cartwheel, MacArthur’s forces combined with those of Halsey to adroitly maneuver the Japanese out of Rabaul. Cartwheel is a textbook illustration of effective joint and combined operations. With respect to the Philippines, MacArthur made the case for advancing on Japan via the Philippines instead of Formosa on two grounds—both of which were compelling.

First and foremost, the United States had a vital strategic interest in minimizing the suffering of the Filipinos who after all were U.S. citizens and had a right to expect succor at the first possible instance. Second, and equally important, in 1944, Japanese counteroffensive operations overran a number of Chinese airfields essentially denying eastern and southern China bases to the Allies. Accordingly, the Philippines and the lesser Japanese Islands such as Iwo Jima provided better alternatives to an assault on Formosa which the Japanese were defending more heavily. Spruance and Halsey agreed with MacArthur’s view thus winning over Nimitz. In the end, Roosevelt, the consummate politician and commander-in-chief sided with MacArthur over the chief of naval operations, Adm. King, and the rest is history.

This is a very good book with clear insight not only into MacArthur but the very real human endeavor of making policy and war. Both are blood sports and not for the faint hearted. This is a must read for young officers who may someday find themselves confronted with difficult operational and even strategic dilemmas. There is no doctrine for this work. Learning to do it requires the approach suggested by Frederick the Great. Frederick believed we are able to learn both from our own experience and that of others. As he put it, “what good is experience if it is not directed by reflection?” Thinking critically about what we do and what others have done before us is part of our preparation for leadership and possibly high command.

Col. Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired, Lansing, Kansas

GLOBAL CRISIS: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century
Geoffrey Parker, Yale University, New Haven, 2013, 904 pages, $45.00

Professor Geoffrey Parker’s latest work is a broad synthesis of global strife in the seventeenth century. Global Crisis is in the main a treatise on the causes of war, a great variety of which are well-illustrated during the period in question. The 1600s serve this purpose well not only due to the frequency of wars but because of the availability of histories, memoirs, and travelogues relative to preceding centuries. Nevertheless, it is a daunting challenge to address so many cases and issues in a single volume. Only Parker’s unsurpassed mastery of the social foundations of early modern warfare makes this a realistic endeavor.

A key element of intrigue and originality in Parker’s exhaustive treatment is the consideration of the influence of global climatic patterns on the surge of violence that marks the seventeenth century. Throughout the work, the author carefully explains the context of struggle and the myriad factors from the seemingly endless religious and sectarian hostilities to ever-present disputes over succession and territorial claims. Along the way, Parker regularly notes ways in which bad weather, and more broadly the pattern of agricultural disruption inflicted by a global climatic shift, exacerbated one situation after another, thus making conflicts more frequent, prolonged, and destructive.

Moreover, he documents each instance with the recorded observations of participants and observers, many of whom noticed that nature or the hand of God had somehow created desperate times. Parker is cautious not to exaggerate the impact of natural calamities and generally steers clear of mono-causal explanations. Rather, he describes at length how fine the margin between prosperity and famine was for most of the world’s population. When economies faltered or famine beckoned, wars that in better times might have been preventable or limited, could be sparked by frantic competition for resources and often assumed deadly proportions.

Parker also ponders sweeping demographic trends, such as the Malthusian implications of formerly
growing populations suddenly facing acute scarcities. Data from diverse regions were highly suggestive. As Parker reports, the seventeenth century was marked by a one-third decrease in cultivated land in China, a twenty percent population decline in Ireland, the loss of 30 percent of the population in Germany between 1618 and 1648, as well as comparably sharp population drops in Poland, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire. He concludes, “These staggering losses were not caused by the Little Ice Age alone, however; it required the misguided policies by religious and political leaders to turn the crisis caused by sudden climate change into catastrophe.”

Overall, this work is compelling both as a historical study and as a cautionary tale about the fate of civilizations in general. To be sure, Parker scrupulously avoids any explicit suggestions about climate and the twenty-first century. Indeed, if anything, the reader might wish for a lengthier and more focused examination of climate in the seventeenth century. Much of the evidence presented is necessarily fragmentary and in many chapters weather and climate appear only fleetingly as factors of interest. Of course, the fact that weather plays a role in shaping human events is hardly startling. Thus, the reader might hope that the author would say even more about the way broad climatic trends can shape the course of global civilization.

Despite its many strengths, this excellent survey of the seventeenth century feels vaguely incomplete. Even so, Parker is to be applauded for yet another superb contribution to the historical literature.

Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LIEUTENANT DON’T KNOW:
One Marine’s Story of Warfare and Combat Logistics in Afghanistan
Jeff Clement, Casemate, Havertown, Pennsylvania, 2014, 264 pages, $32.95

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have produced many superb memoirs. The overwhelming majority of these volumes have focused on the perspectives of infantrymen or special operators. One view which has been essentially missing is that of the logistician. As is normally the case, anything logistics oriented tends to be neglected. As Nathaniel Greene said in a letter to George Washington in 1778, “Nobody ever heard of a quartermaster in history.”

Marine Jeff Clement provides the seemingly overlooked perspective of the logistician in his outstanding memoir, The Lieutenant Don’t Know. In it, he primarily focuses on his experience as a truck platoon commander for Alpha Company, Combat Logistics Battalion 6 (CLB-6) in 2010. During that year, his unit was deployed in Southern Afghanistan operating principally in the Helmand Province. Its extremely difficult mission was to provide logistical support to the combat units in the most demanding of environments.

For those unfamiliar with the role of the logistics units in Afghanistan; Clement’s memoir will unquestionably be an eye-opener. Clement details the day-to-day challenges he and his marines faced in providing logistical support. In the quest to deliver food, water, ammunition, fuel, and recover vehicles, the logistical convoys had to deal with the constant threat of emplaced improvised explosive devices and ambushes along their movement routes. As the author mentions numerous times, it was never a question of if they would get hit, but when it would occur.

Tied to the above is the author’s discussion on how he personally dealt with the challenges he faced. Throughout the volume, he is candid with his thoughts on decisions he made and just as importantly, ones that were not made. If he felt mistakes were made, he takes responsibility for them. He also addresses the personal and professional relationships he had with his superiors, peers, and the marines he led. Clement’s frankness and level of detail provide readers with a superb snapshot of the life of a young lieutenant in combat.

In his book’s conclusion, Clement states, My story is not glamorous. Combat logistics battalions do not have a sexy mission, and logistics units are rarely the feature of a Hollywood blockbuster. No logistician’s memoir can hope to be as exciting as that of a Green Beret or an operator from Seal Team Six. After the first draft was mostly written, I despaired on that last fact. Who would ever want to read this? My story was that of a regular guy, in a regular unit, not even a front-line combat unit.
In reference to the above paragraph (and to play on the book’s title), I believe “the lieutenant [clearly] don’t know.” Clement has crafted a memoir which may not be glamorous as some, but is highly readable and informative. His angst that his volume may not appeal to readers is clearly unfounded. Without question, this is a volume which will be read and valued by many. In the following years, this will be a book sought out by those seeking an understanding the critical role of logistics in the war in Afghanistan and how the combat loggie adapted and met the incredible challenges the war presented.

Rick Baillergeon, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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GREAT POWERS, SMALL WARS: Asymmetric Conflict Since 1945

Great Powers, Small Wars is a well-researched, quantitative book that attempts to identify basic characteristics and variables between great powers and adversaries of lesser power to determine why the stronger power is defeated in war. The book utilizes various databases to determine the characteristics and variables used in the conflicts. The author provides two case studies: the dissolution of the British Empire after World War II and the U.S. War in Iraq, 2003-2011, to support her findings. The case study on Iraq will conjure up many thoughts among U.S. military professionals.

Deriglazova is an associate professor of history and the chair of world politics at Tomsk State University in Siberia as well as a member of the International Relations Department and a former scholar in the Kennan-Fulbright Scholarship program at the Wilson Center in 2009. Deriglazova’s expertise lies in the field of Russian and Eurasian studies.

The book focuses on systematically studying asymmetric conflicts using quantitative methods to explore reoccurring elements found in such conflicts. The underlying theme of the book is a critical analysis on how great powers lose their power by having to come to agreements with lesser powers on terms contrary to their interests at the start of conflicts. The findings are not new, but the statistics associated with the findings are relevant. For example, between 1800-2003, the stronger nation won these types of conflicts 71.5 percent of the time, between 1900-1949 the stronger nation won 65.1 percent of the time, and from 1950-1999 the stronger nation won 48.8 percent of the time.

Statistics for the post-World War II period indicate that the great powers were willing to engage in asymmetric conflicts—the United Kingdom engaged in 14 conflicts, China in 11, the Soviet Union in eight, and the United States in 33—but the data also illustrate the inability of the great powers to achieve their stated goals and interest in over half the conflicts. Deriglazova identifies seven factors for the difficulty great powers had in achieving victory: loss of will by the great power, fatigue or unwillingness to expend more resources to achieve victory, inability to counter asymmetric tactics, public opinion turns against the greater power, political elections in the great power elect representatives who are unwilling to pursue the conflict, interference from outside or external nations or forces, and international condemnation of the conflict.

The case studies are interesting and clearly articulate reasons why great powers have such great difficulty in achieving their desired end states. Money or cost of the war versus the benefit plays a significant role, as do domestic politics, and international attention on the war. The data provided by the author and the variables studied are relevant to the book and the methodology is sound.

The problem for great powers will continue to be ways to achieve success in limited wars against unequal opponents to achieve their national interest. This book goes a long way toward identifying the problems associated with winning asymmetric conflicts, but it will be up to military planners to discover doctrine and practices to win these asymmetric conflicts in the future.

Ken Miller, Platte City, Missouri
THE SOCIOLOGY OF MILITARY SCIENCE: Prospects for Postinstitutional Military Design
Dr. Chris Paparone, Bloomsbury, New York, 2013, 232 pages, $29.95

Paparone built on his earlier works to produce a monograph that is described in several book advertisements as offering “fresh sociological avenues to become more institutionally reflexive.” The premise of the monograph is that military knowledge has been institutionalized to the point that the military community is blind to viable alternative military design methodologies. The monograph treats military organizations and military interventions as complex social phenomena and uses sociology as the basis for further inquiry with the purpose of answering the question: “Can there be a variety of ontological, epistemological, and methodological frames of reference for the design of militaries and their interventions?”

Readers familiar with the works of Karl Mannheim, Kurt Wolff, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, Nicholas Rescher, Thomas Kuhn, Alfred Schutz, Karl Weick, and Max Weber will enjoy the mental dissection of the current modernist view of military design and the reframing Paparone describes using various social constructs. For readers who are unfamiliar with the professional, academic terms of the social sciences, have a dictionary on hand and start with chapter 5, The Reconstruction of Military Profession. I recommend this chapter as a starting point for a reader familiar with the military but unfamiliar with the social sciences because it relates concepts of social science to known terms and situations in the military.

This link will help bring clarity to the sociology-based discussions in chapters 1-4. Chapter 5 begins by explaining some important postulates of social construction theory as developed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The author then employs their theory to attempt to describe the modernist social construction of the current military profession to get the reader to think reflexively about that construction. This chapter is especially relevant to professional military education instructors and others looking for a new approach to military design. Paparone examines the claim that the military has become too bureaucratized and then uses a comparison of theories on profession and on bureaucracy to show a closer link between the two than we might want to admit.

With this monograph, Paparone provides viable, alternative thought processes, approaches, and lenses to view the foundational concepts that have and continue to shape how we as a military are organized, trained, equipped, and employed. As such, it is a worthwhile read for those who want to understand how we developed the thought processes that created the institution we have today, and new ways of thinking to change it for the future.

Lt. Col. Michelle Garcia, U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BURNING SHORE: How Hitler’s U-Boats Brought World War II to America

It is difficult to imagine that the United States was on the verge of defeat in 1942. The U.S. Navy was reeling from the devastating blow it had experienced at Pearl Harbor. The U.S. Army in the Philippines was weeks away from surrender to Japanese forces when Germany decided to launch Operation Drumbeat, a submarine offense against America’s Atlantic Coast. Operation Drumbeat caught America completely unprepared when German submarines struck in early January 1942.

Within three weeks, 15 German submarines destroyed 35 Allied merchant ships and a British destroyer totaling 181,456 gross registered tons, killing 1,219 crewman and passengers, all without the loss of one German submarine. By June 1942, German submarines would operate almost unopposed along our East Coast sinking 226 Allied merchant ships totaling 1,251,650 gross registered tons.

In The Burning Shore, Offley provides a broad historical review of the Battle of the Atlantic, clearly demonstrating how U.S. unpreparedness, incompetency of policy makers, and parochial interservice rivalry proved almost a bigger threat than German submarines in undermining the war effort. Central to Offley’s account is the encounter between a U.S. Army Air
Force pilot, 2nd Lt. Harry J. Kane, and Kapitänleutnant Horst Degen, the captain of German U-boat 701. The encounter reaches a climax on July 7, 1942 when Lt. Kane and his aircrew spot and sink Degen’s U-701. The event signals a turning point in the war against German submarines and sets the stage for a lifetime friendship between two former foes.

America’s fortunes change through a variety of counter measures including escorting convoys, arming merchant ships, patrolling, and cracking German naval code. The stunning Allied turnaround against German U-boats culminated in a series of convoy battle victories in May 1943, which destroyed forty U-boats and forced the German navy to withdraw their forces from the North Atlantic.

The author’s research is extensive and includes firsthand accounts that convey the harsh reality of life serving aboard a German U-boat. This book is best read by those interested in a broad historical overview of the Battle of the Atlantic and just how close the United States came to military defeat in early 1942.

Jesse McIntyre III, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LUCKY FEW: The Fall of Saigon and the Rescue Mission of the USS Kirk
Jan K. Herman, U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2013, 192 pages, $39.95

Two years after the United States withdrew from Vietnam under the auspices of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, Saigon fell to the communists and the Republic of Vietnam ceased to exist. The images of the chaos that reigned as the North Vietnamese tanks surrounded and then stormed into the South Vietnamese capital city were seared into the memories of those who watched. Some of the most vivid of these images depicted panicked South Vietnamese citizens fleeing the North Vietnamese onslaught by sea to U.S. ships waiting offshore in the Tonkin Gulf. This group included the remnants of the South Vietnamese Navy and others who took to the sea in whatever vessels were available, as well as those who commandeered helicopters and flew out to meet the U.S. fleet.

The Lucky Few tells the unique story of the crew of the USS Kirk, a destroyer that played a major role in the 7th Fleet effort to assist people caught up in the fall of South Vietnam. Trained for war and expecting to be involved in combat, the crew of the Kirk found themselves involved in a massive humanitarian operation to save those who had managed to escape their dying nation. In the process, the Kirk played a major role in the rescue of 32,000 refugees and the escape of thirty-two vessels from the South Vietnamese fleet to sanctuary in the Philippines. The refugees were first taken to refugee camps on Guam, then to refugee camps in California, Arkansas, Florida, and Pennsylvania before finally resettling all over their new country.

This heart-rending story gives a detailed account in very personal terms, from the sailors’ perspective as well as from those who were rescued. It is a sad tale that addresses the human toll of defeat, but it is also a story about the triumph of the human spirit. The epilogue to the book discusses how those rescued from the chaos in South Vietnam, through hard work and determination, earned their rightful place as Americans in their adopted homeland. There is also a discussion of the many moving reunions between rescuers and those who they rescued that took place many years later.

This is an important book that addresses the little-known details of the final days of South Vietnam and the human drama of those who chose to flee their native homeland. It is an invaluable addition to the history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and the war in Vietnam.

Lt. Col. James H. Willbanks, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BROTHERS: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War

During the 1950s and 1960s, many Americans viewed the Cold War as a matter of absolutes, a struggle between the Western forces of goodness and the aggressive expansionists of the evil Communist bloc. For these people, there was no middle ground—neutralist rulers such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Patrice Lumumba in the Congo might be naive or deceptive, but their actions aided the Soviet
enemy. In this view of the world, the United States was justified in using any measures to prevent other nations from falling under communism. Two of the men most associated with this activist American foreign policy were brothers who formed an unprecedented team during the Eisenhower Administration: Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles.

Stephen Kinzer, journalist and author of previous studies concerning American interventions in the 1950s, has undertaken a dual biography to explore the careers, motivations, and actions of these two remarkable men. The two had much in common. They came from a distinguished family that already included two secretaries of state, they both attended Princeton University, and they both worked for and eventually directed the Wall Street law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, which lobbied the U.S. government on behalf of the worldwide business interests of its clients.

The author is careful, however, to differentiate between the two men. The elder brother, always known as “Foster,” was a rigid, almost humorless authority figure who was so blind to moral issues that he saw nothing wrong in business dealings with Adolf Hitler and other dictators. Despite this myopia, Foster defined the world in conservative religious terms that prompted him to resist any diplomatic compromises with the Soviet Union. Kinzer treads well-worn ground in this regard, arguing that Foster’s narrow viewpoint contributed to American fears and provoked Nasser into seizing the Suez Canal in 1956.

Allen, by contrast, was much more flexible and personable, a man of great charm who regularly committed adultery and boasted of the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency. Having served as an intelligence officer in Switzerland during both world wars, Allen was entranced by the romantic image of espionage and therefore, according to Kinzer, frequently lost his objectivity concerning international affairs.

For decades, observers portrayed the Dulles brothers as the prime movers in U.S. efforts to overthrow the non-aligned governments of Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia, and the Congo, as well as the Marxist regimes in North Vietnam and Cuba. Allen Dulles went beyond arming the opponents of legitimate governments going further to create phantom rebel armies staffed by mercenaries and to manipulate American publishers to suppress and distort the news of these conspiracies. Kinzer, however, emphasizes the more recent interpretation that President Eisenhower was the actual decision maker who directed and supported all such actions.

In his focus on these two protagonists, the author occasionally engages in over-simplifications about other actors. For example, Gen. Lucius Clay, the influential governor of the American sector of occupied Germany during the later 1940s, appears as “the Allied commander in Europe.” Kinzer also states that Allen Dulles assembled a team, led by James Killian, which developed the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Although Killian did indeed recommend development of that plane, he was not just a recruit of Dulles but rather president of MIT and scientific advisor to Eisenhower, and as such was responsible for numerous other government programs including improved science education and guided missiles.

Moreover, a book such as this, intended for the general public, needs maps to help the reader find the many locations described in such a wide-ranging account. Despite such minor discrepancies, however, The Brothers is a well-researched and entertaining account of a now-forgotten era of American foreign policy.

Col. Jonathan M. House, U.S. Army, Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE DESERTERS:
A Hidden History of World War II
Charles Glass, Penguin Group USA, New York, 2013, 400 pages, $27.95

From the American Revolution into the 20th century, American wars have had their heroic elements, the battles and heroes that have reached near-mythical status. They have also had a dark side that tends to be neglected if not buried. Not all who go to war are able to handle its pressures—some suffer what has been called shell shock, battle fatigue, or post-traumatic stress disorder. Others decide that they have reached their limits and abandon their posts, their comrades, and their obligations. The latter
are the deserters, and desertion is an element of all American wars. World War II was no exception, as *The Deserters* so ably shows.

Fifty thousand American soldiers deserted in World War II. As Glass notes, the percentage of the total force is quite small. However, Glass contends, only 10 percent or less of the military actually went into combat. There was no one-year tour, no 50-mission crush. The same men fought again and again; their only hope of relief was the ‘million-dollar wound’. Eventually, some of those who survived the constant threat of death broke down under the strain.

This work is not a historical, sociological, or political exploration of the phenomenon with data sets and heavy discussion of military and governmental policies. Rather, it approaches the broad and previously neglected topic of desertion through examination of the lives, particularly in the war, of three men who at one time or more deserted. Two are Americans and the third is British, and their backgrounds and military experiences differ widely. All served in combat, and all reached their limits. One was a decorated hero. Another deserted several times, returning and leaving three times as the pressures became too intense. One of the three even became active in the resistance during one period of absence from his unit.

Glass writes as a journalist rather than as an academic historian. His highly readable work provides much description of the horrors and difficulties of the combat environment, the unfairness of a military system that forced only a small percent to bear the burden of combat while the bulk of the forces remain behind the lines in relative comfort, the hardships of the military prison system, and so on. Although this is not a broad survey, it provides a depth of detail more common to a biography than to a monograph. When appropriate, the author steps back and tosses in context and numbers, but keeps the focus on the three men and their reasons for deserting.

Desertion has long been understood as a shameful betrayal of the mission and one’s comrades. Only recently has a more nuanced reading made allowances for the human frailty of the warrior. *The Deserters* is a sympathetic but realistic exploration of the pressures of warfare and the toll it takes on even the unwounded. Reading it is time well spent.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D., Houston, Texas**

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**FIGHTING FOX COMPANY:**

The Battling Flank of the Band of Brothers

Terry Poyser and Bill Brown, Casemate, Havertown, PA, 2013, 344 pages, $32.95

The book and miniseries *Band of Brothers* practically made Easy Company, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, a household term. But while Easy Company fought its way through the Normandy countryside, the dikes of Holland, the forests of Bastogne, and into the heart of Germany during World War II, Fox Company fought equally hard on Easy’s flank.

Through careful research and interviews with veterans, Terry Poyser and Bill Brown have created a unit history for Fox Company, with all its training, fighting, and comradeship. While *Fighting Fox Company* parallels the experience of *Band of Brothers*, it follows a different narrative. Historian Stephen Ambrose created leaders, heroes, and villains in *Band of Brothers*, particularly in the officer corps. *Fighting Fox Company* is mostly the story of the enlisted men, often using entire letters written to loved ones or whole pages of first-person accounts to tell its story. The only officer truly fleshed out is Lt. Andrew Tuck, who commanded a platoon, then the company at the end of the war.

Fox Company trained at Toccoa and Fort Benning, Ga., before shipping off to England to prepare for the invasion of Normandy. Parachuting behind Utah Beach on June 6, the men were scattered and fought separate battles until they were able to find their units. Two members of Fox Company helped capture a German battery and Brecourt Manor, and one was the last Americans to leave the battlefield. In the battle for Carantan, which united the Utah and Omaha beachheads, a German armor unit struck Fox Company. The unit bent, but did not break, under the force of German tanks and infantry, and the paratroopers of Fox Company knocked out two German tanks before American armor arrived to turn the tide. The action continued through Holland, the siege of Bastogne, and the drive into Germany.

Capt. Dick Winters, who eventually becomes the battalion executive officer, makes a few appearances in the text. When a squad returned from a patrol in
Waldhambach, France, and reported to Winters that they had left a man behind in a German ambush, he refused to let the men retrieve him; it was just too risky. The men were furious, but as one recalled, “Looking back on it later I am sure he [Winters] saved more lives by refusing to let us go.”

The book is at its best when the authors describe Fox Company’s combat actions. The writing is fresh and intense and paints a good picture of World War II front-line combat. The small anecdotes delivered by the veterans make for interesting reading. The book’s weakness is the excessive detail it provides in explaining training jumps; there is just too much information for the casual reader. The letters home could have also been edited to include only the most relevant information.

This is an excellent book for anyone who wants to understand the bigger picture of company-level combat within the 101st Airborne Division in World War II. Also, anyone familiar with the Band of Brothers’ story will want to read this book.

Kevin M. Hymel, Silver Spring, Maryland

THE DEAD AND THOSE ABOUT TO DIE: D-Day: The Big Red One at Omaha Beach
John C. McManus, New American Library / Caliber, New York, 2014, 384 pages, $27.95

The title of this book refers to the often-quoted statement uttered by Col. George Taylor, commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, who, after landing on Omaha Beach, tried to convince his men to move off the shingle beach and save the landing. Taylor and his heroic action is only one of the events author John McManus chronicles in The Dead and Those About to Die. This book is the latest work by McManus, who has previously written a number of notable works on World War II. Widely considered an authority on the Normandy invasion, McManus has a gift for telling history through the eyes of the participants; this work is no exception.

The author states “Omaha Beach is better known than it is understood” and believes that despite the vast amount of material written about it, much can still be learned. He goes on further to state that the 1st Infantry Division’s role has been largely overshadowed by the much more documented fighting on the western half of Omaha Beach. Yet, in his view the 1st Infantry Division holds the key to new insights about Omaha Beach. McManus’ goal is not to eclipse other histories but to build on the foundations they established and improve upon the knowledge and understanding of the battle. He has eight questions which he feels are still unanswered and, through his research and analysis, this book provides answers for each.

A gifted storyteller, McManus provides more than just a rehashing of the chaos and carnage. Through extensive research he tells the story of the Big Red One, puts it in context, and explains why it mattered. He weaves in many first-person accounts—German as well as American—giving the reader a sense of what it was like to be on the beach that day. McManus’ understanding of military tactics shows in his analysis of what went wrong, the problems in the plan, and the motivations of the soldiers.

McManus discusses each assault wave, what happened, and why, without getting bogged down in the details. Through his research he corrects some misconceptions about events. He also discusses the actions of individuals that made the difference between success and failure. In his analysis of Col. George Taylor, he states, “Taylor made two major contributions: he saved the lives of many men by motivating them to get off the beach where they were vulnerable and helpless and in so doing he reinforced the groups that were already infiltrating the draws and bluffs.”

In addition, the author is forthright in his criticism where he feels his evidence supports it. For example, when discussing the failure of medical evacuation he writes, “Given the laudable commitment of the World War II U.S. armed forces to provide excellent medical care to servicemen, this failure in concept, planning, and sheer humanitarianism is rather stunning.”

McManus succeeds in achieving his goal of increasing our understanding of Omaha Beach and answers his eight questions. He adds to his list of World War II histories with another superb work. Well written and extensively researched, The Dead and Those About to Die will be a great addition to readers’ libraries. I highly recommend this book to all readers, especially those interested in World War II. You will find it well worth your time.

Bob Rielly, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The story of Japanese American soldiers of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, 100th Infantry Battalion (Separate), and 522nd Field Artillery Battalion in the European theater is now a standard part of the history of the American experience in World War II. It would seem another account would be superfluous, but McCaffrey justifies his account as an approach that combines operational military and social history.

He works, as he has done in several other books, to describe the wartime experience from the individual soldier’s point of view. His major sources are two large oral history collections, one at University of Hawaii and the other at the Japanese American National Museum in Los Angeles.

He skillfully exploits these two collections as he follows the soldiers from recruitment or induction to their discharge and return to civilian life. The book is divided into 10 chapters; two detail the War Department’s rationale and how the separate infantry battalion and the regiment were formed. The battalion was formed from soldiers in the federalized National Guard units, and the regiment from volunteers already serving in the Army and conscripts from the internment or concentration camps. Two chapters then describe the soldiers’ training in the upper Midwest and the South (depicting the racism they experienced) and their subsequent trip across the Atlantic to the Mediterranean on a troop transport.

Five chapters describe operations in Italy, France, and Germany, relating the Japanese-American soldiers’ role in these campaigns. These chapters have an abundance of operational details and individual experiences, but this book does not have a single map that would orient the reader. As a result, unless one has a good mental picture of Italian, French, and German topography and geography, it is difficult to follow the battle narrative. The final chapter deals with the Nisei soldiers’ experience as occupiers in Germany and Italy, their long wait to go home, and their subsequent discharge from the Army.

Beside the lack of maps, I found the book disappointing because of the author’s failure to provide details of the soldiers as individuals. McCaffrey richly recounts their collective experiences in great detail, but given the resources at his disposal as well as his experience writing social and military history, one wishes for a group biography of the men of the regiment. The author could have provided more details on where they came from; their experiences growing up and the ways those experiences did or did not affect them in the Army; how their wartime experiences affected them; as well as their thoughts of postwar efforts to recognize their service and the ways others have used their actions to form and shape the broad national memory of the World War II.

Lewis Bernstein, Seoul, Republic of Korea

VERDUN: The Lost History of the Most Important Battle of World War I, 1914-1918
John Mosier, New American Library/Penguin Group, New York, 2013, 400 pages, $26.95

As the centennial of the Great War approaches, historians have been hard at work revising conventional understandings of the war, its processes, and its significance. John Mosier is no stranger to revisionist history, and though occasionally overstated, his Verdur is an excellent examination of the battle and its broader context. Mosier argues that the battle is largely misunderstood, thanks to geographical ignorance of this part of the French frontier, as well as propagandistic myths made by the French high command to cover for their distressing battlefield performance in 1914 and on.

Though Mosier focuses on Verdun, he has much to say about the French high command and government, which utterly failed to provide strategic leadership or tactical and technical innovation before and during the war. They did succeed on the information and public perception front and managed to hide the extent of casualties and other failures from the French people for years. As often happens, wishful thinking was compounded into an article of faith that the Germans were losing more men than the French, and thus the French army was actually succeeding. Mosier argues that this belief explains much of French (and British) behavior during the war.
Perhaps Mosier’s most significant revision is his reevaluation of German Gen. Falkenhayn’s goal for Verdun. He is remembered as wanting to “bleed France white” at Verdun, but Mosier, a Falkenhayn apologist, makes a good case for a more subtle goal. Falkenhayn planned to take Verdun before French Gen. Joffre’s anticipated summer 1916 summer offensive in order to break French morale. This could occur either by piercing the line at Verdun, or by eliciting a sadly typical French counter attack which could only lead to staggering French casualties and failure. In either case, the objective was to “Frankreichs Kräfte verbluten,” i.e. to bleed France’s will and strength white. Though Falkenhayn lacked an understanding of how the French political system worked, this objective was far less tactically bankrupt than is generally understood.

Though the 1916 offensive at Verdun did not immediately break French morale, Mosier argues that the battle led indirectly to the French army’s mutinies of 1917. As Verdun’s position became increasingly threatened, despite Petain’s effective defensive schemes, the ever-fragile French government was threatened with removal. It in turn threatened Joffre with removal. He in turn placed Gen. Nievelle in command of the Verdun defense. Nievelle immediately launched the bloody and futile infantry attacks Verdun is remembered for, which were heralded throughout France as victories. Once Joffre was finally removed, Nievelle was placed in command of the disastrous Champagne offensives at Chemin des Dames in April 1917, which prompted the mutinies.

Mosier offers an important corrective to the battle of Verdun, reexamining the tactical significance of various points, incorporating fighting in the near and not-so-near vicinity of the forts, and directly attacking mistakes that have grown up in the common perception of the battle. It is a must read for World War I enthusiasts.

John E. Fahey, Ph.D. candidate, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana

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**BATTLE FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC: The Strategic Naval Campaign that Won World War II in Europe**

John R. Bruning, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, 2013, 300 pages, $40.00

There are no flowers on sailor’s graves,
No lilies on the ocean waves,
The only tributes are seagull sweeps,
And the teardrops that his sweetheart weeps.

–Anonymous

John Bruning dedicates this book to the compelling sacrifices made by tens of thousands of civilian merchant marine sailors who gave their lives at sea in the Atlantic Ocean to win the war in Europe. The losses taken by these civilians in World War II are rarely acknowledged and it was satisfying to see the honor paid to them. The author points out the merchant mariners lost about 80,000 people in the war, affirming that it may have been safer to join the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II since the loss rate for merchant mariners was higher than that of the marines.

The book is a well-written chronological walkthrough of the unfolding of the war in the North Atlantic. It begins with the Kriegsmarine building up force in 1939, and carries us through the war chapter by chapter, highlighting some of the major turning points that alter the course of the battle in the Atlantic. The events covered extend across all levels of war to create a compelling narrative. At the highest level he draws attention to significant Allied events including the meeting of Churchill and FDR to create the Atlantic Charter, and strategic decisions like the commitment of the United States and Britain to supply Stalin in his war effort.

Operational-level details emerge too. The changes to convoy operations are discussed as are the German operation plans as they evolved to press for German dominance of the Allied supply lines. The German navy’s Operation Drum Roll (aka “The Happy Time”) is recounted in which America learns harsh lessons while shifting from peacetime merchant operations to wartime. The narrative is kept lively and engaging through
the telling of numerous tactical sea engagements in detail. The author does a good job hitting the high points of these sea battles to show the difficult circumstances of the North Atlantic sailor on both sides of the war.

This book is not designed, however, to be a definitive history textbook and has little documentation of the sources for the historical vignettes. What really makes this a book to enjoy is the visual expanse of the imagery. The book has 384 photographs, 12 illustrations, and four maps. The photographs are what make this book so compelling to pick up and read. They show everything from daily life for sailors, for example standing in line on the mess deck to get immunizations, to ships in the death throes of burning and sinking.

If there is one element missing from the book it is more narratives of the merchant marine sailors themselves. The book opens and closes with dedications to the sacrifices of these men, but very little is written in the book from their perspective. A more complete picture of the battle in the Atlantic would have emerged if the author could have spoken directly with some of these men and told the story of the battle for the Atlantic from their point of view.


SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN STATE ACTION: Understanding Post-Cold War Crisis Interactions
Taryn Shepperd, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2013, 232 pages, $100.00

“Understanding emotion is central to understanding human nature, and thus by extension, politics,” concludes Taryn Shepperd in her analysis of the role of emotion and identity in Sino-U.S. post-Cold War international relations. To Shepperd, political relations have traditionally focused on the material interests of each actor, generally ignoring the social interests that play a sizable role in national decision making. In contrast, while military and economic interests shape international interactions, she asserts that the way a nation seeks to define itself, its adversary, and its subsequent emotions often supersedes such material considerations.

To highlight this dynamic, Shepperd focuses on the three major Sino-U.S. crises since the Cold War: the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1995-96), the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (1999), and the Spy Plane Incident (2001). Such an approach combines the material interests of both realists and neo-liberals, international competition and cooperation respectively, with the social interests of constructivism. In doing so, the author seeks to combine mono-disciplinary methods in a “more insightful, comprehensive, and critical” way in understanding post-Cold War Sino-U.S. relations.

Within the boundaries of each crisis Shepperd demonstrates that when “the rules of the game were broken,” both actors retreated from material interests, becoming heavily influenced by emotion and identity. These rules, laid out by three major bi-lateral communique during the détente of the 1970s, now form the basis of Sino-U.S. relations and any change to the status-quo convulses the entire system. During such periods, policy makers from both nations utilize language in an effort to define themselves and their adversary. Thus, the U.S. seeks to portray itself as “democratic” and “just” while depicting China as “communist” and “belligerent.”

Attempting to define identity through such language often draws on historical memories as “repositories of emotion.” China’s national perception of the “century of humiliation” permits the depiction of the U.S. as a hegemonic aggressor. Conversely, language and identity serve to quell emotion after confrontation shifts to cooperation, particularly when one side sufficiently apologizes to the other.

While intriguing, the constructivist approach which Shepperd employs is not revolutionary. Nations and their policy makers seek to portray themselves in the right, thus a war of words and the depiction of the “other” in antithetical terminology is to be expected. Furthermore, social interests are often tied to perceptions of real material vulnerability, a point not readily acknowledged by the author. A nation which apologizes to end an emotional conflict may be portrayed as feeble, inviting further material threats to its sovereignty, as the “Scramble for China” of the late nineteenth century demonstrates.

Shepperd’s work provides a basis in which to evaluate Sino-U.S. relations and also the interactions of any competing powers. While realist and neo-liberal
perspectives based on material interests often govern policy analysis, Shepperd demonstrates that social interests cannot be neglected. Anyone involved in Sino-U.S. military, economic, or political policy analysis would certainly benefit from Shepperd’s approach. The author’s analysis illuminates the need to incorporate social interests in analyzing international interactions within this appealing, theoretical work on Sino-U.S. relations.

**Viktor M. Stoll, King’s College, London**

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**THE CIVIL WAR IN POPULAR CULTURE: Memory and Meaning**


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The Civil War was the bloodiest and most substantial war in American history. The country, fiercely divided by opposing political and moral conventions, embarked upon a war that would reap death and destruction for four lingering years. The war occurred 150 years ago, yet still has the ability to ignite conflict among some Americans.

*The Civil War in Popular Culture* is a collection of thought provoking essays that analyze how public memory and popular culture have preserved modern day perceptions of the Civil War. Editors Lawrence Kreiser and Randal Allred have drawn upon authors with various academic backgrounds to demonstrate that public memory of the war varies considerably.

The editors have focused on five major themes to represent the scholarship of the Civil War and popular culture. The themes are the aftermath of battle, reunions and battlefield preservation, remembrance over time, the Civil War in fiction and film, and the war as a modern-day hobby. The book opens with an interesting discussion of the effects of post-traumatic stress disorder on Civil War soldiers. Equally fascinating is an essay discussing Confederate amputees and the crisis they faced in defining their own manhood.

A particularly controversial essay in *The Civil War in Popular Culture* argues that Gettysburg, the nation’s most famous Civil War battlefield, has provided the public with a historically inaccurate perception of the Civil War for years. Until recently, the battlefield was completely void of any information or teachings regarding an African-American presence at Gettysburg. The author stresses that by the late 1800s, public memory began to remember the Civil War as a war between brothers. Due to reconciliation, later generations were taught that the war had little to do with slavery. Such attitudes temporarily dispelled African-Americans from public memory.

Film is one of the most instrumental methods through which popular culture influences the population. Author Paul Haspel has written an engaging account of the film *Glory*. This captivating motion picture tells the story of the 54th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, the first Union African-American regiment of the Civil War. While somewhat historically inaccurate at times, the movie proved enormously successful in awakening the public interest of the Civil War in viewers while simultaneously educating the public about African-American participation in the war.

*The Civil War in Popular Culture* effectively examines the way Americans have used memory and popular culture to remember the Civil War. The book raises the awareness of the reader to the rich history of the Civil War and its powerful influence in present day society. The editors of this volume successfully provide a collection of articulate essays that open new dialogue on the Civil War in relation to popular culture. I highly recommend this book for military professionals interested in the Civil War and to anyone hoping to gain a better understanding of how popular culture has influenced our nation’s interpretation of history.

**Ms. Siobhan Blevins, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.**
Former Staff Sgt. Ryan M. Pitts was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Barack Obama in a 21 July White House ceremony for his actions at Wanat Village, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2008.

Pitts and eight other paratroopers had occupied Observation Post Topside overlooking Vehicle Patrol Base Kahler, adjacent to Wanat. About 200 enemy fighters attacked the base just after 4 a.m., focusing on key weapons systems and positions, including Topside. Two soldiers at the observation post were killed during the initial attack. The remaining seven were wounded.

With shrapnel wounds to his legs and his left arm, Pitts continued to fight for more than an hour, repelling the insurgents first with hand grenades, then with a machine gun, and then with a grenade launcher. Maintaining radio contact, he directed artillery fire on targets around the base and later directed attack helicopters sent to provide close air support.

At one point in the fight Pitts found himself alone in the observation post, but he never gave up. Eventually reinforcements arrived and the critically wounded Pitts was medically evacuated.

Pitts’ actions prevented the enemy from gaining control of the high ground and inflicting significantly more casualties on the forces defending Vehicle Patrol Base Kahler.

President Obama said during the award ceremony, “In Ryan Pitts you see the humility and the loyalty that define America’s men and women in uniform.”

Pitts later told reporters, “The real heroes are the nine men who made the ultimate sacrifice so the rest of us could return home. It is their names, not mine that I want people to know.”


Pitts, a native of Nashua, N.H., is the ninth living recipient of the nation’s highest military honor from the Afghan War. He was inducted into the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes on 22 July.