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PHOTO: Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, from Fort Riley, Kan., with their Bradley Fighting Vehicles nearby, make a security halt during training at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif., 20 February 2013. (David Vergun, Army News Service)

In 1990, RETIRED Lt. Gen. (then Col.) L.D. Holder wrote an article for Military Review titled “Concept of the Operation—See Ops Overlay.” In the article, Holder voiced his concerns that the Army was drifting away from the standard field order and that leader focus had shifted away from what was required to win a combined arms fight. Holder argued that an over reliance on a rigid, methodical planning process and the relatively new doctrinal addition of commander’s intent had left many orders without an appropriate concept of operations paragraph and subsequently left subordinates without a clear understanding of the operation. In essence, leaders were losing the balance between the “art” and the “science” of writing effective mission orders.

Over the past decade of persistent conflict, many Army leaders have again distanced themselves from the “art” of effective orders production. Officers have learned to create expert multi-paged concept of operations (CONOPs) in electronic media as a tool to provide situational awareness to higher echelons and to assist in the allocation of resources. These CONOP slides rarely convey the actual concept of the operation and usually consist of poorly drawn intent symbols on satellite imagery and a task and purpose for each element. While the slides have some utility, they never were intended to be used as a briefing tool for company commanders and platoon leaders. Using these products, instead of doctrinally complete mission orders, could lead to a disjointed understanding of the concept of operations in a combined arms fight. The undesired effect of this process has created a generation of officers unfamiliar with the doctrinally correct way to write effective mission orders.

Multiple changes to doctrine over the last decade have contributed to a lack of understanding. Although current doctrine clearly defines the contents of the concept of operation paragraph, many leaders are guilty of relying on knowledge acquired during the Captain’s Career Course or the Command and
General Staff College (CGSC). Depending on how long ago the leader attended these courses, his or her doctrinal knowledge may be outdated. This article defines what current doctrine requires for production of effective mission orders, while focusing on what Holder argued in 1990 was the most important part of the order: the commander’s intent and the concept of operation.

To address this growing concern, we have to start with a common understanding of how our Army fights. Unified land operations are executed through decisive action by means of the Army’s core competencies and guided by mission command. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 defines unified land operations as the ability to—

“seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.”

Unified land operations are executed through decisive action.

Decisive Action

Decisive action is the “continuous, simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.” When conducting operations outside of the United States and its territories, the Army simultaneously combines three elements—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines the elements of defense support of civil authorities and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland security. Decisive action is conducted by means of the Army’s core competencies.

Army’s Core Competencies

The Army has two core competencies: combined arms maneuver and wide area security. Combined arms maneuver is “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to defeat enemy ground forces; to seize, occupy, and defend land areas; and to achieve physical, temporal, and psychological advantages over the enemy to seize and exploit the initiative.” Wide area security is “the application of the elements of combat power in unified action to protect populations, forces, infrastructure, and activities; to deny the enemy positions of advantage; and to consolidate gains to retain the initiative.”

These two core competencies provide a focus and construct for understanding how Army forces use combined arms to achieve success. As an Army, we are guided by mission command.

Mission Command

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command, defines “philosophy” as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders. It enables disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

To exercise authority and direction using mission orders, leaders must understand what a doctrinally correct mission order looks like. Holder stated, “Because tight centralized control of operations isn’t possible or desirable . . . all regimental leaders must train their juniors to do the right things and then trust them to act independently . . . Leaders must teach and practice mission orders.” To do this, we must understand and utilize the Army operations process.

Operations Process

For many, Field Manual (FM) 5-0, The Operations Process, Appendix E, “Army Operation Plan and Order Format” was the starting point for doctrinally correct order writing. Since the release of ADRP 5-0 in May of 2012, that appendix is now gone. Leaders and staff officers now must consult Army Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (ATTP) 5-0.1, Commander and Staff Officer Guide, Chapter 12, “Plans and Orders.” Luckily for those who committed Appendix E to memory, Chapter 12 is very similar. Although this document is the current doctrinal guide, it will soon be outdated with the release of Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organizations and Operations, which, as of 15 May 2013, was in signature draft development. After its eventual publication, FM 6-0 will be the one-stop location for commanders and staffs to reference doctrinally correct orders formats.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0 states that the “unit’s task organization, mission
statement, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, and control measures are the key components of a plan.” As we look at these components, task organization and mission are typically directed by what is available and the leader’s immediate higher headquarters. The commander and staff must create the commander’s intent and concept of operation through the operations process. The remaining elements—tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, and control measures—should follow naturally from well-developed commander’s intent and concept of the operation paragraphs. As a result, the development of the commander’s intent and the concept of operation are of paramount importance and must be well developed.

To achieve this goal, Army leaders use three planning methods: Army design methodology, the military decision making process, and troop leading procedures. During the planning process, commanders must create intent and concept based upon their understanding of mission (task and purpose) and the higher concept one and two levels up. Tasks to subordinate units, coordinating instructions, and control measures are created from course of action development and a thorough, well-planned concept of the operation.

For the purpose of illustration, we will reference a fictitious battalion-level operations order used in a practical exercise at the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course. For the sake of brevity, the information provided below is a summary of the situation paragraph from that operations order.

**General Situation**

Recent success of 4ID combat operations led to the capitulation of the Iraqi V Corps Headquarters and regular army forces in and around LUSOM. Due to the V Corps’ surrender, the Nanda and Ramses divisions are currently repositioning to the south and east to establish defensive positions vic [vicinity of] BAYJI and KIRKUK. The two mechanized BDEs [brigades] of the Nanda Division have established a hasty defense vic BAYJI and have been in position for approximately 12 hours. The armor BDE of the Nanda Division is currently moving south along HWY 1. INTEL sources indicate that a BDE from the Ramses Division vic KIRKUK is preparing to move southwest towards BAYJI to reinforce the Nanda Division defenses. It is estimated that CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component Command] and division shaping operations have left the Nanda Division at 60-70% strength and the Ramses Division at 55% strength. The 4ID is preparing to attack east to destroy the remaining Nanda Division forces and fix the Ramses Division to prevent the disruption of the CFLCC DO [decisive operation](3ID vic Baghdad) from the north.

**Enemy Forces**

DISPOSITION: The 114th BDE currently has 3 BNs [battalions] deployed in a disruption zone defending key crossing sites along the Thar Thar wadi. Decisive to the Brigade Commander is the retention of the wadi crossing sites for up to 48 hours. This is decisive because it prevents the US from massing on the division DO (MDA vic BAYJI). He will accomplish this through a strongpoint defense. The BN in the north (BDE DO) will destroy enemy forces in order to prevent an organized ATK [attack] on the division DO. The BN in the middle will block enemy forces in order to prevent envelopment of the BDE DO. The BN to the south will fix in order to prevent bypass of the BDE DO. An armor company is the BNERES [battalion reserve]. Fedayeen forces will operate independently of Army and will be utilized as disruption forces throughout the AO [area of operation]. Indirect fires will be used to neutralize mounted forces then destroy dismounted infantry and engineer forces to prevent US forces massing on the BDE DO. The purpose of engineers is counter-mobility and then survivability. The purpose of air defense is to destroy enemy aircraft in order to prevent the massing of CAS [close air support] on the BN positions. Continued loss of combat power will result in a
withdrawal under pressure towards the MDA vic BAYJI. His desired endstate is to have pushed US forces south and west allowing time for the division DO to complete defensive preparations in BAYJI.

**1BCT MISSION**: 1ABCT attacks 182200NOVXX to seize crossing sites along the Thar Thar Wadi to pass the division DO (3ABCT) east to BAYJI (OBJ TIGER).

**1BCT COMMANDER’S INTENT:**

Expanded Purpose: Facilitate 3ABCT seizure of OBJ Tiger

Key Tasks:

- Breach obstacles.
- Integrate fires into the maneuver plan.
- Synchronize maneuver in order to maintain the tempo of the operation.
- Conduct FPOL with 3 ABCT.

Endstate: Key crossing sites seized, enemy forces neutralized, collateral damage minimized and the BCT prepared for future operations.

**Concept of the Operation**: 1ABCT will accomplish this by conducting a penetration along multiple axes with TF 1-22 (DO) attacking to the south and TF 1-66 attacking to the north. Decisive to this operation is the seizure of OBJ LION. This is decisive because it will allow the division DO to attack east to BAYJI along an improved highway with a fixed crossing site over the wadi. Critical to this operation is the destruction of enemy reconnaissance forces west of the wadi and rapid improvement of crossing sites and passage operations.

**Decisive Operation (DO)**: TF 1-22 attacks to seize OBJ [objective] LION in order to pass the division DO east to BAYJI.

Shaping Operations: TF 1-66 attacks to seize OBJ WOLF to prevent the disruption of the 1ABCT DO in the south and provide an additional crossing site for 3ABCT. 7/10CAV initially follows TF 1-22 then guards south of PL [phase line] FLORIDA to prevent disruption of the 3ABCT attack from the south. CAS will destroy the 114th ADA [air defense artillery] and FA [field artillery] assets to prevent them from interfering with the DO. Fires will suppress enemy armor and destroy enemy infantry forces to assist breaching operations. Engineers will provide mobility by breaching obstacles to pass the ABCT DO. Reconnaissance and security operations will focus on identifying the disposition of 1st echelon forces and locating the 114th BDE FA BN.

**The deception objective is**: The commander of the 114th BDE commits his reserve in the north vic OBJ WOLF. The deception story is that the 1ABCT DO is in the north with the following indicators: TF 1-66 attacks in the north at H-1, and an initial focus of CAS and early commitment of an Attack AVN [aviation] BN to destroy enemy force vic OBJ WOLF. The desired deception result is that the 114th BDE reserve is unable to influence the ABCT DO on OBJ LION.

**Tactical Risk**: is assumed by the limited use of the ABCT reconnaissance battalion prior to the DO. This will be mitigated by additional CAS providing armed reconnaissance, additional fire support, and additional attack AVN support provided to each Task Force during the DO.

**Endstate**: TF 1-66 has seized OBJ WOLF, TF 1-22 has seized OBJ LION, 7/10 CAV has been passed and is conducting a guard south of PL FLORIDA, the ABCT is prepared to pass the division DO east along RTE [route] T-BIRD and/or RTE CAMARO (TF 1-66 AR) and enemy forces are unable to influence the passage of 3ABCT, the division DO.

**2. MISSION.** TF 1-22 attacks 182200NOVXX to seize OBJ LION in order to pass the DIV DO (3ABCT) east to BAYJI (OBJ TIGER)⁹
Commander’s Intent

As described in ADRP 5-0, the commander’s intent “succinctly describes what constitutes success for the operation. It includes the operation’s purpose, key tasks, and the conditions that define the end state. It links the mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment.”

Commander’s intent, when used properly, should bridge the gap between the mission and the concept of operations. A clear commander’s intent enables a shared understanding and focuses on the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent spurs disciplined initiative. Notice that in the illustration below, the TF 1-22 commander provides the expanded purpose that is broader in scope than the purpose in the mission statement. Since his battalion is the decisive operation for the brigade, and the brigade is a shaping operation for the division, it is appropriate for the TF 1-22 expanded purpose to be broader than the brigade’s purpose, but more narrow than the division purpose. The commander has also identified key tasks that his unit must accomplish. These key tasks are incorporated into every course of action that his staff develops. Finally, the conditions that represent the end state are broad in nature and represent the conditions that must be set in terms of terrain, civil, and enemy forces in relationship to TF 1-22. Again, all of these conditions must be set by any course of action that is developed for consideration.

Commander’s intent, however, is not a comprehensive statement that leads to mission success. If subordinates do not have a clear understanding of the concept of the operation, leaders will simply execute at the whim or the initiative of whoever is in the lead. When discussing an overreliance on intent, Holder stated, “When we do this, however, we omit the unifying element of the plan, the idea that pulls everything together, which is the commander’s concept of what he wants to make happen and how he plans to accomplish his goal.”

In preparation for 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment’s deployment to Iraq, Maj. Gen. McMaster echoed Holder’s words in a letter to his regimental leaders dated 25 January 2005. Then-Col. McMaster stated the following:

The concept of operation is the most important part of the order and, since the 1990s, most of our Army has not done this well. The result is that we tend to overwrite intent and then go immediately into a detailed scheme of maneuver. It is one of the reasons why we often tend to fall out of plans prematurely. The concept is the only element of an order...
in which commanders communicate how all of their forces will combine efforts to accomplish the mission. It should cover the type of offensive, defensive, reconnaissance, or security operation; describe forms of maneuver; identify formations; describe actions on contact; describe the timing of the operation; define the cooperation between maneuver forces at critical points in the fight; and describe how all arms will be coordinated. In short, the concept is important because it explains how the commander visualizes the operation—it tells the story of the operation or battle. A good concept permits units to take initiative within the intent and assists subordinate commanders in nesting their efforts with their higher headquarters and adjacent units.”

**Concept of the Operation**

As stated in ADRP 5-0, the concept of the operation is a “statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state.” The concept of the operation expands the commander’s intent by describing how the commander wants the force to accomplish the mission. It states the principal tasks required, the responsible subordinate units, and how the principal tasks complement one another.

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. An established operational framework and associated vocabulary can assist tremendously in this task. Army leaders are not bound by any specific framework for conceptually organizing operations, but three operational frameworks have proven valuable in the past.

These are—
- Deep-close security (typically used in operational or strategic level plans only).
- Decisive, shaping, sustaining (always used in tactical and operational level plans).
- Main and supporting efforts (used to allocate resources and support by phase).

Although the designation of decisive, shaping, or sustaining operations does not change throughout the mission, the designation of main effort and supporting effort will typically change from one phase to another throughout the course of the operation. The main effort is defined as a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. The supporting effort is defined as a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. While this may appear confusing at first, it is actually quite simple. The designation of main effort and supporting effort assists in allocating resources by phase of the operation and determines priorities of support. It stands to reason that a shaping operation would be the main effort during the initial phases of the operation as it is creating or preserving favorable conditions for the decisive operation. Therefore, it also stands to reason that, during the phase that includes the decisive point of the operation, the decisive operation is the main effort and will be allocated a significant portion of the available resources and support.

ADRP 5-0 defines the Concept of Operation as “a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force will use to achieve the end state.”
3B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

Concept of the Operation. We will accomplish this by conducting a penetration. Decisive to the operation is the seizure of OBJ LION EAST. This is decisive because it controls the crossing sites over the Thar Thar Wadi to pass the DIV DO east to BAYJI. Critical to this operation is the destruction of enemy forces in the disruption zone west of PL ALABAMA, passage of the TF DO onto OBJ LION EAST, and rapidly setting the conditions for passage of the DIV DO.

Decisive Operation: TM D seizes OBJ LION EAST in order to pass the DIV DO east to BAYJI and establishes BP 4.

Shaping Operations: TM C moves along AXIS SAW and establishes ABF PSN #3 in order to fix the enemy on OBJ COUGAR (O/O seize and establish BP 3) to prevent the enemy from repositioning against the TF DO. A/1-4 AVN attacks to destroy enemy reconnaissance forces in the disruption zone in support of TM C. The TF MB will move along AXIS HAMMER and AXIS NAIL with TM B and TM A forward followed by TM D (DO) and the TF RES. TM B destroys enemy forces on OBJ BEAR in order to prevent the enemy from disrupting the TF DO and establishes BP 1. TM A seizes OBJ LION WEST in order to pass the TF DO onto OBJ LION EAST and establishes BP 2. A/1-4 AV destroys enemy forces on OBJ LION WEST in order to prevent enemy forces from disrupting TM A breaching operations; and then destroys enemy forces on OBJ LION EAST in support of TM D. The purpose of fires is to disrupt enemy reconnaissance assets in the disruption zone, then to disrupt enemy armor on OBJs COUGAR and LION to prevent massing of direct fires against the TF DO. The purpose of CAS is to destroy enemy armor and indirect fire assets. The purpose of engineers initially is to provide mobility by breaching obstacles and improving crossing sites, then provide counter-mobility.

Tactical Risk is assumed by the use of limited combat power for the deception operation. This will be mitigated by additional fires support during PH I, phased CCA support until the TF MB crosses PL ALABAMA, and use of CAS on OBJs LION EAST and COUGAR during PH II and PH III. Additionally, the TF FAS and MCP will be in close proximity of TM C throughout the operation.

TF Reconnaissance and Security operations will focus on identifying the location and disposition of the 114th BN within the disruption zone.

Sustaining Operations: The FSC will establish vic AA REGULAR with MSR FORD as the primary route used to sustain combat power during the attack and MSR CHEVY as the primary route after the attack.

The deception objective is: The Enemy BN CDR commits his Reserve to OBJ COUGAR. The deception is that the TF DO is in the north vic OBJ COUGAR with the following indicators: TF Scouts operating initially in the northern portion of the enemy’s disruption zone, FA Fires initially focused in the north, early commitment of A/1-4 AV in the north along AXIS SAW and TM C attacking east along AXIS SAW prior to TF MB LD.

Endstate is: the TF is prepared to pass 7/10 CAV and 3ABCT from CP 1 to CP 6 with TM C securing OBJ COUGAR and occupying BP 3, TM B securing OBJ BEAR and occupying BP 1, TM A securing OBJ LION WEST and occupying BP 2 and TM D securing OBJ LION EAST and occupying BP 4 postured to defeat ENY CATKs from PL CAROLINA to PL VIRGINIA.18
The concept of the operation paragraph is more specific than the commander’s intent. Its purpose is to assist the subordinate leader’s visualization of the plan. A successful concept of the operation paragraph will clearly define the decisive point, the tactical risk and how to mitigate it, and the essential task and purpose for each element. Most importantly, the paragraph explains where the decisive point is, how the decisive operation will achieve the decisive point, and how each shaping operation’s purpose is nested to create conditions for the decisive operation. The task and purpose from the concept of the operation paragraph is the essential task and purpose for each subordinate element, and therefore it will be the task and purpose in their mission statements. If each subordinate element clearly understands the commander’s intent and how its task and purpose relates to the other elements, subordinate leaders will be able to exercise disciplined initiative in the face of changing conditions or when the scheme of maneuver no longer applies. The quality of the concept of the operation paragraph and the clarity with which it is communicated to subordinate leaders can mean the difference between success or failure in combat. The concept should expand upon the commander’s intent, describing how he wants the force to accomplish the mission. The concept of operation describes the combined arms fight from the line of departure to the limit of advance, while succinctly defining what each subordinate unit will accomplish. It should be a well-written paragraph that enables subordinates to visualize how, when, and where their unit will contribute to mission accomplishment.

See the example of the TF 1-22 (3B. Concept of the Operation). This is a good written example that clearly describes the essential task of each of the subordinate units and how their purposes are nested to accomplish the task force mission. It also clearly describes how artillery, close air support, and close combat attack aviation will be used to set conditions for success.

At the Maneuver Captains Career Course, common tactics, techniques, and procedures shared with the captains to brief concept of operation effectively is using the course of action (COA) statement using the COA Sketch. Students brief the following:

- Form of maneuver or defense.
- Decisive point of the operation and why it is decisive. This is not simply repeating the purpose of the operation, this is a specific justification of the decisive point that is correctly nested with the essential task (e.g., terrain or enemy focused).
- Operational risk and how it will be mitigated (operational risk is based upon a conscious decision to accept risk in the course of action. It is not an inherent risk).
- Task and purpose of the decisive operation (vertically nested in support of the higher echelon’s essential task and overall purpose) and shaping operations (horizontally nested to support the decisive operation). Finally, the purpose of key enablers (e.g., air defense artillery, field artillery engineers, combat aviation, and others).
- Endstate (This is not the same as the commander’s intent endstate. It should be specific with respect to the selected COA, whereas the commander’s intent endstate is not tied to any one COA. The endstate should define what the organization has accomplished with respect to its task[s] and purpose[s], where the force is located, and what the force is prepared to do.)

After briefing these items from the COA statement, the full description of the concept is briefed from start to finish using the COA sketch. The concept should read like a story and provide clarity. The story must include all of the phases, when they begin and end, any critical events, and any essential tasks. The story must describe the actions of all enablers to better understand the combined arms fight. As Holder stated in 1990:

A clear, specific concept of operations does not automatically commit a commander to micromanagement. As he writes his concept, the commander should observe our established operational guideline that calls for subordinates to get the greatest possible freedom of action consistent with accomplishing the mission. If, however, the force is to be used in any coordinated fashion, it cannot be expected to succeed by “swanning about,” following the unguided initiative of whoever is in the lead. Some directed cooperation will have to take place. This is
not excessive or unnecessary interference with a subordinate’s initiative. It is simply the way combined arms operations work. 19

**Conclusion**

In recent combat operations, many offensive missions have been hastily planned in reaction to an enemy attack or sudden change in the operational environment. When conducting hasty planning, many leaders may “hand wave” the concept of the operation paragraph, failing to realize that it is where they need to spend the most effort. The quality of the concept of the operation paragraph and the clarity with which it is communicated to subordinate leaders can mean the difference between success or failure in combat. To communicate a clear concept of the operation, leaders must understand doctrine and practice the art of mission command.

As we transition out of Afghanistan and focus our attention on training and preparing for the next fight, we must use this opportunity to train the next generation of Army leaders to write proper mission orders. The decisive action training environment will provide an excellent environment in which to train this task to standard. An environment with uncertain conditions and a hybrid threat in one of the combat training centers will necessitate the use of clear commander’s intent and concept of the operation, thereby enabling effective mission command. Holder’s admonition of a clearly written concept of the operation paragraph is as relevant today, if not more so, than when he expressed it in *Military Review* over 20 years ago. *MR*

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**NOTES**

2. Ibid., 2-2.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 2-9.
5. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 2-4.
10. ADRP 5-0, 2-19.
13. ADRP 5-0, 2-19.
14. ADRP 3-0, 2-9.
15. Ibid., Glossary-4.
16. Ibid., Glossary-6.
17. ADRP 5-0, 2-19.
18. Maneuver Center of Excellence, Block A2: ABCT Offense Operations Order.