The Evolution of Mission Command in U.S. Army Doctrine, 1905 to the Present

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I N L A T E 2009, the then commander of Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Martin Dempsey, directed the Army to redesignate what had been the “command and control warfighting function” to the “mission command warfighting function.” This capped a long evolution of the concept of mission command within the U.S. Army. To understand this evolution, we must understand what mission command is.

Current doctrine sees mission command as both a philosophy and a warfighting function. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, Mission Command, explains the philosophy of mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, describes the mission command warfighting function as “the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.”

Important mission command principles found in ADP 6-0 include mission orders—“directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them.”

Two other essential principles found to help us understand mission command are disciplined initiative and commander’s intent, as described below:

Disciplined initiative is action in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. . . . Commanders rely on subordinates to act, and subordinates take action to develop the situation. . . .

The commander’s intent defines the limits within which subordinates may exercise initiative. It gives subordinates the confidence to apply their judgment in ambiguous and urgent situations because they know the mission’s purpose, key task, and desired end state. . . . Using disciplined initiative, subordinates . . . perform the necessary coordination and take appropriate action when existing orders no longer fit the situation.
These ideas are not new. No better example of this exists than General Grant’s guidance to General Sherman in 1864:

You, I propose to move against Johnston’s Army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their War resources. *I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of Campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute in your own way.* (emphasis added).5

**Mission Command in Early Manuals**

This article traces the evolution of mission command in doctrine primarily through the senior manuals governing combined arms operations. Until 1905, there were no true combined arms manuals, only branch manuals. (See Kretchick, *U.S. Army Doctrine*, for a discussion of the evolution of our senior manuals.)6

In 1905 the Army published *Field Service Regulations* (FSR), the first true combined arms manual approved by the War Department. This manual contained the following words that directly relate to current mission command:

An order should not trespass on the province of the subordinate. It should contain everything which is beyond the independent authority of the subordinate, but nothing more. When the transmission of orders involves a considerable period of time, during which the situation may change, detailed instructions are to be avoided. The same rule holds when orders may have to be carried out under circumstances which the originator of the order cannot completely forecast; in such cases *letters of guidance* is more appropriate. It should lay stress upon the object to be attained, and leave open the means to be employed.7

In another passage, it reads, “The commanders of large units to whom sections of the front and intermediate objectives have been assigned should be allowed to retain freedom of action and initiative in order to be able to take advantage of opportunities to make progress toward the enemy.”8

The first quotation above was repeated almost verbatim in every FSR from 1910 to 1949. This was further expanded upon in FSR 1914, in the introduction by then Army chief of staff Major General Leonard Wood:

Officers and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of the means.9

This is a clear invocation of one of the key ideas in mission command, that of individual initiative and the need to make decisions in the absence of information or orders. The 1914 FSR also states:

![U.S. Army Field Service Regulations, 1905.](image)
Commanders of subordinate units cannot plead absence of orders or the nonreceipt of orders as an excuse for inactivity in a situation where action on their part is desirable, or where a change in the situation upon which the orders issued were based renders such orders impracticable or impossible of execution. If the subordinate commander knows what the general plan—the end in view—is, lack of initiative on his part is inexcusable. Thus, understanding commander’s intent (the end in view) and the necessity to act when circumstances change, even in the absence of orders, was firmly established prior to our entry into World War I.

The 1923 FSR captured the lessons of World War I. The emphasis on the elements of mission command remained almost unchanged. All of the above quotations from 1905 and 1914 were repeated verbatim in 1923. The 1923 version also notes that some operations require more initiative and decentralization (the later term first used in 1923) when it stated: “Effective pursuit requires the impulsion of leadership and the exercise of initiative in all echelons of command in the highest degree . . . wide decentralization in the assignment of missions and the control of supporting artillery.”

Both the 1939 Interim FSR (which was dually designated Field Manual FM 100-5, Operations) and the 1941 FSR contained most of the relevant statements from the 1923 version, to include, “neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error of judgment in the action taken” and “a subordinate unit cannot plead absence of orders or the non-receipt of orders as an excuse for inactivity in a situation where action on his part is essential.” They also expanded on the necessity of initiative in several places, citing it as a desirable characteristic of leaders.

The 1944 version, produced during World War II, contained many of the same points raised earlier, but initiative played an even greater role. It was again mentioned with respect to the inculcation in individuals, but was also stressed in several different places in the manual, in paragraphs dealing with artillery support, offensive operations, pursuit, urban operations, and jungle operations. Probably the strongest support for initiative at that time was this statement: “When conditions limit the ability of the commander to exercise a timely and direct influence on the action, the initiative of subordinates must be relied upon to a great extent.”

This manual also stressed the requirement for mutual understanding and decentralization, as demonstrated in these passages:

- “Personal conferences between the higher commander and his subordinates who are to execute his orders are usually advisable, that the latter may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of their superior . . . Better support or coordination frequently can be effected by decentralized control such as during marches or in rapidly changing situations.”

Five years later, in 1949, FM 100-5 was again updated, retaining much of the material from the 1944 version. Initiative again featured prominently. For example, the foreword read: “Set rules and methods must be avoided. They limit imagination and initiative, which are so vital in the successful prosecution of war. They provide the enemy a fixed pattern of operations which he can counter more easily.”

The importance of individual initiative was stressed in eight paragraphs, each dealing with a different situation in which initiative was the key to success. Finally, decentralization was addressed in a significant paragraph that laid out when it was desirable and necessary.

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The 1949 edition had an interesting appendix (repeated in 1954, but not thereafter), *The Lessons of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, the result of a congressional investigation. According to the appendix—

The Chief of Staff of the Army approved the simplicity, soundness, and applicability to the conduct of war . . . [and] directed that the 25 principles be studied throughout the Army and that they be explicitly enunciated in appropriate field manuals and other publications.  

The following series of quotes from the appendix directly relate to mission command:

**Orders issued to subordinates must be clear and explicit and as brief as is consistent with clarity . . . to make certain that the intentions of the commander are understood.** When it is necessary to place a subordinate in a position in which he must act on his own judgment, the object to be obtained must be made clear.

**Subordinate commanders must understand not only the orders of their superiors but also the intentions which inspire them.**

**Liaison officers, who are . . . fully informed of the situation and the intentions of the senior commander, should be employed to insure that the subordinate and the senior commander have . . . a mutual understanding of plans and orders.**

When the subordinate is close at hand, personal conferences between the higher commander and the subordinates . . . must be held in order that the subordinates may arrive at a correct understanding of the plans and intentions of the superior.

**Any procedure which limits the imagination or initiative of subordinate commanders should normally be avoided.**

ADM James O. Richardson, USN, takes the oath prior to giving testimony during a Congressional investigation of the 7 December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. ADM Richardson was the commander in chief, United States Fleet, from January 1940 until February 1941.
Every commander must make sure that he understands the wishes and intentions of his superiors. Not only must he understand his orders but he must be sure that he understands the intention which lies behind the orders.

The 1962 FM 100-5, while shorter than the previous two, had significant entries related to mission command. The concept of centralized planning and decentralized execution was specifically mentioned, with decentralization being favored in 12 paragraphs. Individual initiative was mentioned in seven paragraphs—to include a section headed “Initiative.” Most notable is the first use of the term “mission-type orders.” While the term was not defined, the manual stressed allowing subordinates maximum latitude, which was tied to individual initiative:

Orders must be timely, simple, clear and concise. Mission type orders are used to the greatest practicable extent, but should provide the commanders concept, or intent, to insure [sic] that subordinate commanders, acting on their own initiative, direct their efforts to the attainment of the overall objective.

The importance of decentralized execution and individual initiative was demonstrated in the lessons such as the following:

Modern warfare demands prompt action, decentralization, and a high degree of individual initiative. Detailed instructions must frequently give way to broad direction which subordinates can interpret and implement in accordance with the situation which prevails at the time of execution.

The appendix also included lessons learned regarding the fluidity of the battlefield and the necessity to allow subordinate commanders to make decisions.

The mission is usually stated in terms sufficiently broad to permit the commander considerable freedom in determining his course of action. As the battle progresses, modifications and changes in mission may be anticipated. As the situation becomes more fluid the mission may be correspondingly broadened with increased reliance placed on the initiative of subordinate commanders.

With respect to mission command, the 1968 edition was only a minor adjustment from 1962. Most of the discussion of individual initiative and decentralization was lifted verbatim from the 1962 manual. Mission orders were strongly reinforced in 1968:

Cold war operations normally entail mission-type orders. While the limits of the commander’s authority will be prescribed, particularly in relation to the responsibility of diplomatic officials, the commander will usually be given the necessary latitude to determine how best to accomplish his assigned mission.

The 1976 manual, produced following both the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, reflected a significant departure from past manuals. It took many lessons from the Israeli experience and was much more focused on technology than previous manuals. The centerpiece of the manual, “Active Defense,” was seen to require much tighter control of operations than in the past. For example, one excerpt reads, “The battle must be controlled and directed so that the maximum effect of fire and maneuver is concentrated at decisive locations.”

Another paragraph includes the following:

The prime requirement is for commanders to be forward where they can see, feel, and control the battle. . . . Not since the war between the North and the South, will commanders of brigades and divisions as well as battalions be so personally and closely involved in the battlefield direction of combat elements.

These passages would indicate a preference for much closer control of the fight than seen in previous manuals. The phrase “centralized planning and decentralized execution” is not in the 1976 manual, and there was little carryover of ideas related to mission command from previous manuals. Contrast the above paragraphs with the only paragraph in the manual that addresses mission orders specifically:

The strength of our Army lies in the decentralization of responsibility and authority to the commander on the ground. We cannot afford to lose that additional combat effectiveness which derives from the intelligent actions of trained leaders operating under a
flexible system of mission-type orders. Thus, each officer must be imbued with the idea that success will depend upon the skill, initiative, and imagination with which he seeks to accomplish the assigned mission within the intent and concept of his commander.29

With respect to mission command, the 1976 manual represented a step backwards. With the exception of the one paragraph above, the mission command elements got little attention, and countervailing ideas seemed to be more in evidence and favor.

The 1982 FM 100-5 represents a significant milestone in the evolution of mission command. All of the components of mission command are in place—a significant step up from 1976, and indeed from all previous manuals. With the adoption of AirLand Battle, the manual also laid heavy emphasis on the key elements of mission command and made it clear that these elements were central to successful AirLand Battle. For example, one of the four tenets of AirLand Battle was initiative:

Initiative implies an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations. The underlying purpose of every encounter with the enemy is to seize or to retain independence of action. To do this we must make decisions and act more quickly than the enemy to disorganize his forces and to keep him off balance. To preserve the initiative, subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan. . . . They must deviate from the expected course of battle without hesitation when opportunities arise to expedite the overall mission of the higher force. . . . Improvisation, initiative, and aggressiveness—the traits that have historically distinguished the American soldier—must be particularly strong in our leaders.30

Here again are two key elements of mission command, disciplined initiative (subordinates must act independently within the context of an overall plan) within commander’s intent (to expedite the overall mission of the higher force). There are ten other paragraphs that highlight the central importance of individual initiative for the success of AirLand Battle.31 Another major advance in 1982 was a more robust discussion of mission orders, again linking commander’s intent and individual initiative.
Mission orders require commanders to determine intent—what they want to happen to the enemy. Their intent must be consistent with their superiors’ and must be communicated clearly to their subordinates. . . . While detailed orders may be necessary at times, commanders must trust their subordinates to make correct on-the-spot decisions within the mission framework. Such decentralization converts initiative into agility, allowing rapid reaction to capture fleeting opportunities. . . . The subordinate commander must fully understand his commander’s intent and the overall mission of the force. If the battle develops so that previously issued orders no longer fit the new circumstances, the subordinate must inform his commander and propose appropriate alternatives. If this is not possible, he must act as he knows his commander would and make a report as soon as possible.\(^32\)

The 1982 manual also strongly advocated decentralization. Whereas it had been deemphasized in 1976, it became an important component of AirLand Battle. There are a dozen paragraphs that emphasize the necessity of decentralization.\(^33\) The one below emphasizes the linkage between mission orders, initiative, and decentralization:

> The chaos of battle will not allow absolute control. \textit{As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, decision making must become more decentralized.} Thus, all echelons of command will have to issue mission orders. Doing so will require leaders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination—and to take risks.\(^34\)

It is generally recognized that the 1986 edition was an evolution of AirLand Battle which refined the operational concept and basic ideas set forth in the 1982 manual, to include those of mission command. The preface to the 1986 manual essentially repeats the same statement found in the 1982 edition: “FM 100-5 emphasizes flexibility and speed, mission type orders, initiative among commanders at all levels, and the spirit of the offense.”\(^35\) The two following quotations, unique to the 1986 version, clearly reinforce the basic ideas of mission orders, decentralization, individual initiative and working within the commander’s intent:

> In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because overcentralization slows action and leads to inertia. . . . Decentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to take risks and superiors who nurture that willingness and ability in their subordinates. If subordinates are to exercise initiative without endangering the overall success of the force, they must thoroughly understand the commander’s intent. . . . In turn, the force commander must encourage subordinates to focus their operations on the overall mission, and give them the freedom and responsibility to develop opportunities which the force as a whole can exploit to accomplish the mission more effectively.\(^36\)

Another passage notes, “Mission orders that specify what must be done without prescribing how it must be done should be used in most cases.”\(^37\)

The 1993 edition continued the emphasis on individual initiative (\textit{willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander’s intent}), decentralization (\textit{initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest practical level}), and mission orders (\textit{specify what the subordinate commands are to do without prescribing how they must do it}).\(^38\) This manual was the first with a clear definition of commander’s intent. While the term had been used before, it had not been defined or discussed as a separate topic:

> The commander’s intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation and must be understood two echelons below the issuing commander. It must clearly state the purpose of the mission. It is the single unifying focus for all subordinate elements. . . . Its utility is to focus subordinates on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success, even when the plan and concept of operations no longer apply, and to discipline their efforts toward that end. . . . It should be concise and clear; long, narrative descriptions of how the commander sees the fight tend to inhibit the initiative of subordinates.\(^39\)
The 2001 manual stressed individual initiative to an even greater extent than previous manuals. Almost 30 paragraphs contained mentions of individual initiative, several of which tied individual initiative directly to commander’s intent and mission orders. For the first time, the specific wording “disciplined initiative within commander’s intent” made its appearance—the linkage stated several times in the manual. The 2001 manual continued to foster the use of mission orders and decentralization, and highlighted the need for trust as a critical component of this concept:

Initiative requires delegating decision making authority to the lowest practical level. Commanders give subordinates the greatest possible freedom to act. They encourage aggressive action within the commander’s intent by issuing mission-type orders. Mission-type orders assign tasks to subordinates without specifying how to accomplish them.

By 2001 all of the elements of mission command had now been discussed and defined in one of the senior manuals, and every senior manual had contained some elements of mission command.

...Such decentralization frees commanders to focus on the critical aspects of the overall operation. Using mission-type orders requires individual initiative exercised by well trained, determined, disciplined soldiers. It also requires leaders who trust their subordinates and are willing to take and underwrite risks.

By 2001 all of the elements of mission command had now been discussed and defined in one of the senior manuals, and every senior manual had contained some elements of mission command. What remained was to bring these all together into a complete discussion under the title “mission command.”

Mission Command became official Army doctrine with the 2003 publication of Field Manual (FM) 6-0. Originally titled Command and Control, at the direction of Lieutenant General James C. Riley, commanding general of the Combined Arms Center and an ardent supporter of mission command, the title was changed to Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. In the introduction it states: “It [FM 6-0] establishes mission command as the Army’s preferred concept of C2 [command and control].” It further lays out mission command succinctly in this paragraph:

Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. Successful mission command rests on the following four elements:

- Commander’s intent.
- Subordinates’ initiative.
- Mission orders.
- Resource allocation.

FM 6-0 describes and defines each of the components of mission command, focusing significantly on commander’s intent and mission orders: “Mission orders is a technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action in accomplishing missions and leaves the ‘how’ of mission accomplishment to subordinates.”

The manual devotes over eight pages specifically to mission command, to include a discussion of digitization and mission command. This manual culminated the long evolution of the philosophy of mission command within the U.S. Army. While several subsequent versions of FM 3-0 (now ADP 3-0) have been published since the 2003 FM 6-0, and there have been other editions of FM 6-0, and now ADP and ADRP 6-0, none have changed the basic ideas contained in the 2003 manual.

Evolving Doctrine and Functions

The next step in the evolution of mission command was the designation of the command and control warfighting function as the mission command warfighting function. No longer solely an approach to command, it now subsumed the entirety of what was in early doctrine simply “command,” and then became “command and control.”

Field service regulations from 1905 through 1923 do not use the term “command and control.”
The 1914 FSR does have one mention of “command and control,” but only in a graphic. Field Service Regulation 1939 uses the term “command and control” once, and the 1941 and 1944 versions use it twice. The 1949, 1954, and 1962 FSRs use “command and control,” “command control,” and “command, control.” The 1962 FM 100-1 has a paragraph devoted to “techniques of control.” The 1968 manual uses “command and control” over a dozen times and has sections titled “command, control, and communications.” The 1976 version uses “intelligence, command, and control;” “command and control;” “command and control communications;” and “command-control.” Additionally, it has several sections titled “command and control and communications (C3).” Both the 1982 and 1986 manuals used the term “command and control” almost exclusively for these functions and frequently used it as a section heading. All of these manuals did discuss command.

The idea of grouping capabilities into functions used to conduct operations had been around for some time. Both the 1982 and 1986 FM 100-5 included “elements of combat power” (maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership). The 1986 manual also included thirteen “major functional areas.” These functions were formalized in 1987, when the TRADOC commander initiated the “Architecture for the Future Army” (AFA), a “hierarchy of functions that the Army performs on the battlefield at the tactical level of war.” This “functional structure” was called the “Blueprint of the Battlefield.” The “Tactical Blueprint” was organized around Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS).

The original seven BOS were:
- Maneuver.
- Fire Support.
- Air Defense.
- Command and Control.
- Intelligence.
- Mobility and Survivability.
- Combat Service Support.

In the 1993 FM 100-5, the BOS are included, but in a somewhat confused fashion. The heading for the section is “Combat Functions” and the list is the same as the BOS listed above, except instead of “command and control,” the listed function is “battle command.” The paragraph following the enunciation of the combat functions then refers to these functions as “battlefield operating systems (BOS).” There is a glossary entry for “battlefield operating systems,” but none for combat functions. “Command and control” is used only twice in the manual, while “battle command” is used almost 20 times in the same context that “command and control” would normally be used.

The 2001 FM 3-0 used only “battlefield operating systems” (not combat functions). The 2008 FM 3-0 changed “battlefield operating systems” to “warfighting functions” to better align Army and Marine Corps doctrine. Both manuals list “command and control” as one of the functions.

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### Why Mission Command?

- Command and Control (C2) and Battle Command (BC) are inadequate in describing the role of the commander and staff in today’s fight.
- Emphasizes the centrality of the commander.
- Balances the art of command and science of control.
- Reinforces the imperative of trust and collaboration with myriad partners over command and control.
- Enables a leader’s ability to anticipate and effectively manage transitions.
- Creates an environment of disciplined initiative for more decentralized execution.

### Supports our drive to operational adaptability by:

- Requiring a thorough understanding of the operational environment.
- Seeking adaptive teams capable of anticipating and managing transitions.
- Acknowledging that we must share risk across echelons to create opportunities.

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**Figure 1**
In late 2009 the TRADOC commander, General Martin Dempsey, decided that the term “command and control” had become too centered on technology and that we had to get back to a function that acknowledged the centrality of the commander and the essentially human nature of the function. To make this focus clear and unmistakable, he, along with the chief of staff of the Army, General George Casey, decided to change the name of the function from “command and control” to “mission command.” Over the next several months, in conjunction with the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, both the rationale for the change and the structure of the modified warfighting function were formalized. The rationale was summarized as shown in Figure 1. The structure of the warfighting function was laid out as depicted in Figure 2. Of particular note is that the definition of mission command is almost the same as it was in the 2003 FM 6-0, and it has lost none of the essential elements that defined mission command.

Over the past 100+ years, the basic ideas of mission command have evolved continuously, often reflecting combat experience. The fundamental idea, that of issuing orders with desired results and leaving the “how” up to subordinates, has been consistent throughout this evolution. As Army combined arms doctrine has evolved from a single manual (FSR 1905) to a much richer set of doctrine that captures more and more lessons and experiences, so too has the treatment of the elements of mission command in doctrine evolved to capture a more complete set of guidelines and principles. The formal adoption of mission command as a philosophy of command in the early part of this century represented a culmination of this process.

Coming later, but also evolving, was the idea of categorizing the functions used by the Army to conduct operations, originally called battlefield operating systems and later changed to warfighting
functions. These two threads came together in 2010 with the publication of FM 3-0, Change 1, which combined the two threads into a warfighting function labeled “mission command” and based on the philosophy of mission command.

The end result was recognition that warfare itself required an overarching philosophy of command, backed by systems and organizations, that accounts for the uncertain, rapidly changing environment of warfare. This provides the Army with a foundation for education, training, and materiel development that is grounded in a view of warfare that has been proven effective by Western armies over decades, if not centuries, of conflict. **MR**